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Dhvani and dissociation of sensibility.

Dhvani system of Indian poetics deals with the constitution of internal and external creative environments primarily with emphasis on increasing universality on both the levels or stages. This position remains central to the idea of Dhvani and it is remarkable on the part of Anandavardhana (6th Cent A.) to have developed such a thesis that takes into consideration the appropriate transformation, proportional signification, simultaneous cognition, modelised applicability and finally positional changes of each of the categories, constructs, and primary as well as secondary models of an artistic situation. We will quote just an observation to show how Anandavardhana deals with the formal integration procedures in the creativity:
 Rasa, Bhava, the semblance of Rasa and mood and their (rise and)
 cessation etc. are all of undiscerned sequentiality. It is decided
 that when we have prominent presence of this variety, we have the
 very soul of suggestion. (1)

It is obvious to include the form of creative method on the one hand and constructive apparatuses, mediums, models and finally the categories on the other and what Anandavardhana is trying to show is that the mechanism of finer integrational genre evolves through an equivalence, enrichment and concreteness developed in each of the mentioned units and parts. It is, therefore, not out of place to remark that in Anandavardhana's understanding formal integration is never unitary, taking into account some models and some categories rather it is always inclusive and significant for the sake of primary as well as secondary mediums.


T. S. Eliot's idea of Unification of Sensibility is concerned with categorical synthesis in which constructive apparatuses are informal in the primary as well as secondary mediums because of the fact that refined feeling should be formally integrated with refined language. What he says is just that these two categories must equal one another in an ideal creative environment. Equal or equivalence are homogeneising modes and in that way formal integration is rarely or hardly arrived at. We will consider one of the earliest observations on dissociation theme:
 The poets of the seventeenth century, the successors of the
 dramatists of the sixteenth century, possessed the mechanism of
 sensibility which could devour any kind of experience. They are
 simple, artificial, difficult or fantastic, as their predecessors
 were; no less nor more than Dante, Guido Cavalcanti, Guinizelli or
 Cino. In the seventeenth century a dissociation of sensibility set
 in, from which we have never recovered; and this dissociation as
 is natural was aggravated by the influence of the two most powerful
 poets of the century, Milton and Dryden ... The language went
 on and in some respects improved ... but while the language became
 more refined, the feeling became more crude. (2)

And immediately after this we come to another significant remark:
 When we come to Gray and Collins, this sophistication remains only
 in language and has disappeared from the feeling. Gray and Collins
 were masters, but they had lost that hold on human values and that
 firm grasp of human experience, which is a formidable achievement
 of the Elizabethan and Jacobian poets. (3)

At least some conclusions could be immediately drawn. In the first place, Eliot anticipates an ideal poetic tendency or habit which could equalize the various phases of various categories. The phases, as Eliot understands the term are restricted and conspicuously limited in attaining the uniformity in primary medium and homogeneity in the secondary medium. If it is like that, than, empirical positivisatione46 either by transformation or even by other necessary modes shall always be lacking. This becomes one of the central problems in Eliot's critical theories. It is not that a construct is well open in constructive facilities in relation to the attendant categories rather it is a point to point equalizing the enriched contents of feeling with the enriched contents of language. While we don't deny to the theory, the essential fact of transformation, but it is always intended in the background of equalizing the contents. We will consider few more observations:
 Tennyson and Browning are poets, and they think; but they do not
 feel their thought as immediately as the odour of rose. Thought to
 Donne was an experience; it modified his sensibility, when a poet's
 mind is perfectly equipped for its work, it is constantly
 amalgamating disparate experience ... In the mind of the poet these
 experiences are always forming new wholes. (4)

And also this:
 We say, in a vague way that Shakespeare or Dante, Lucretius, is a
 poet who thinks ... the poet who thinks is nearly the poet who can
 express the emotional equivalent of thought. (5)

It becomes easier for ourselves to understand how the creation of newer order or level or creative facts has been deliberately presented in the form of immediacy, modification and amalgamation and finally formation of a new whole. If we could concentrate on the different degrees of evolution of enrichment and concretisation (immediacy, modification and the like) we would find that these are nothing but the evolution and development of equivalence immediately e.g. in a proper way and with suitable equivalents. Modification, in the next place, is nothing but the newness that has developed with the help of suitable equivalent, while amalgamation is content specific coalescement only with a view to equal the contents. And finally formation of new whole only indicates the final proportion of certain poetic contents in relation to certain other creative contents. The questions that we have in our mind are the questions that arise when one is confused with, "equaling" the contents and "modifying the contents for the sake of a finer transformative genre". Eliot's position is undoubtedly the former one. Even in the observation that we have quoted in the second place, Eliot denies the meaning oriented perspective to the categories of emotion and thinking. The term equivalence or finding an emotional equivalent is merely locating the denotational perspective of an emotion and equalizing these perspectives with the suggestive facts of an emotion. In that way, once again, we come back to same basic question: Is equivalence or equalizing sufficient or enough to bring about genuine or qua creation? Eliot does not seem to have any answer for this but Anandavardhana has certainly a well constructed argument:
 Only those contexts were Rasa, and the like are made known by the
 descriptions of the situational stimuli, responses, and the passing
 moods which are themselves expressed by many words will stand as
 proper instances of this suggestion. (6)

Anandavardhana makes a difference between what is ordinary and what is significant in creation and what he says settles the question once for all. It is, of necessity, in good creation that the two stages must have preceded the final creative phase. In the first place, there must be a proportional correlation of each of the primary models with each of the primary categories and secondly the proportional signification of those categories which have been correlated, and, in that way, correlation is followed by signification of each of the participating and available models and the categories. This is a basic difference between Anandavardhana and Eliot, while Eliot rarely understands anything beyond enriching the contents, and having done so, equalizing and also finding equivalents but it hardly stands to the test of practical notions. Difference is not just that of less profoundity and immature understanding, but, if we have understood Eliot's critical theories well, we will say that Eliot has always denied a genuine perspective to the creative principles. In Indian poetics, especially in Anandavardhana's Dhvani theory, each of the positions and statuses of poetic creation has a fact of structural synthesis and that is more important and more authentic. We may also take into consideration how different conceptual tools have been dealt with by critics belonging to two different traditions. In one of his essays, Eliot observes:
 These lines of tourneur and of middleton exhibit that perpetual
 slight alteration of language, words perpetually juxtaposed in
 new and sudden combinations, meanings perpetually engeschachtelt
 into meanings, which evidences a very high development of the
 senses. And indeed, with the end of Chapman ... Donne we end a
 period when the intellect was immediately at the tips of the
 senses. Sensation became word and word was sensation ... but every
 vital development in language is a development of feeling as
 well. (7)

Eliot, in this particular context, has expanded the scope of the idea of dissociation of sensibility and the modes of unification have been clearly outlined--sense and feeling, the two important suggestive categories and the language as one of the important denotative categories are now the foci of attention. Sense and feeling, as Eliot understands, are two important positivized mediums and it is only the positivisation of sense and feeling that could create an equivalent suggestive sense and suggestive feeling. While Eliot is proceeding from methods of unification to the modes of unification, nevertheless, he is reducing the expansion of theoretical framework because of the fact that what used to be equalizing measure, now becomes a synthetical equality of attending and participating models and categories. Mowbray Allen has made an examination of Eliot's attempt to develop such a thesis:
 The perfect critic, suggests a method of thanking i.e. a mean
 between or a synthesis of, or the undissociated form of two
 heretical ways of thinking: the abstract--thought operating in
 relative independence of organizing thought. (8)

It provides a good reason for believing that methodical perspective and mode-specific perspective in relation to unified sensibility are, infact, bottom and upper of scale of concretisation. When we have method, we are more impersonal and when we have modes, we become less impersonal and more universal. In that way sensation and word, on the one hand, and language and feeling, on the other, become newer and new variations, in the order established for integrated sensibility. When Eliot says, "Sensation became word and word was sensation", he does not mean to establish a case for transmutation, rather, he identifies two appropriate levels of equivalences to which both of the categories must be taken to. Sensation is the concentration of mind in relation to thought while word is a model which is a developed denotation of an raised construction. The basic point that we have in our mind, is to show how Eliot always reaches a fallacy in his arguments about what he understands by his own critical ideas. We will take a few questions that have arisen in our minds, for example, if sensation is a concentrated fact of the mind in relation to the thought, then how is it possible to equal sensation with the word? And why modes of unification are inoperative for other methods of enrichment of the categories? Eliot's observations do not quite give an answer to either of these questions. What he seems to be most interested in is that a scale is always indicated while creative categories go into the making of a good artistic work. In his essay on Dante he speaks of, "width of emotional range", we can see for ourselves how the sole emphasis is laid upon a presupposition of a calibrated scale. It could hardly be a justification for the valid procedures for integration or transformation or even transmutation. It now seems that unification of sensibility is not conceptually well founded as it is only a summing up of the same fallatic conception. This scale is calibrated upon the structures which get dislocated at the beginning and remain so till the completion of the whole artistic process:
 Feeling therefore, is an aspect and an inconsistent aspect; it is
 not a separate and insolable phase. On the one hand feeling is an
 abstraction from anything actual, ... they fuse into each other and
 stand out upon a background, which is merely felt and from which
 they are continually requiring supplementation. (9)

These arguments have factual inconsistency and for that matter they always argue for completion of creative process in different stages. It is commonplace in Eliot's ideas that structural synthesis (equalizing) always begins with ordinary perspective (background) and terminated at the secondary level with the completion of significant perspective. Since synthesis or equalizing comes up at this stage, tertiary level is rarely reached at. It is because of this, that Eliot's insistence on, "Fusing", "Recreating", "Amalgamating", "Transmuting", become secondary level structural function obviously because they hardly synthesize the appropriate category, at most they turn the function of synthesis towards a measurement of equality on a particular scale. It is a question of an excessive presence of "scale oriented", "Structure specific" orders that constitute, as Fej-Pei Lu has noted, "Correspondence, coherence and comprehensiveness." (10) What seems to be wanting or lacking in Eliot's understanding of scale and structure is the proposed methods of "reduction" and "expansion". "Reduction" according to Eliot is an exercise that sums up for an organized perspective all the positive categories and that is why he makes mention of the following:
 The seventeenth century sometimes seems far more than a moment to
 gather up and to digest into its arts, all the experience of human
 mind, which (from the same point of view) the later centuries seems
 to have been partly engaged in repudiating. But Donne would have
 been an individual at any time and place. Marvell's best verse is a
 product of European, that is to say, Latin, culture. (11)

We understand from this that the reductionist perspective is operative as developing stages of enrichment, e.g., "Gathering" and "Digesting" and also "Art", are increased positional variations while each of the variations reduces the forthcoming positive event. Unified sensibility, for that matter is obviously a reduction of positive phases of concrete structural order and, that is why, Eliot locates the very problem of dissociation in the increased inequivalence of negativised categorial unities. We do not quite understand how, "refined language" (increased positivisation of denotation), and refined feeling (increased positivisation of suggestion) create a scale or structure which in turn is creative of equivalence or equality or homogeneity with reference to artistic facts. Eliot never appears to have examined the cause of such a factual error in his estimation of unification of sensibility. Mowbray Allen has noted that, "the unified sensibility is an ideal limit rather than an actuality". It is a point of acute observation that Eliot's ideas rarely go beyond methodical perspectives. What is learnt through the whole corpus of observations is that the poet must, in the first place, identify the categories and having done so, locate them as specific instances of identification in a scale which has to be developed for such a purpose. Rest of the stages advised by Eliot become only a development and expansion of such a cause. It is then, and truly a case of measurement of the amount of enrichment. We will quote yet another observation to prove our position:
 If the artistic emotion presented by any episode of the Comedy is
 dependent upon the whole, we may proceed to inquire what the whole
 scheme is ... as the centre of gravity of emotion is more remote
 from a single human action or a system of purely human actions
 ... The emotional structure within this scaffold is what must be
 understood. The structure made possible by the scaffold. This
 structure is an ordered scale of human emotions. (12)

When we further work out the causes of dissociation of sensibility and methods of unification of sensibility, we find that Eliot always tries to indicate a preference for the original emotion and the further developments in the transformation of the same emotion have been made an accessibility to rich and proven artistic categories. Substantial alterations are rarely advocated by Eliot rather it is always selected constituents of a particular category which are needed to be enriched. In that way two broad directions of this theory emerge. In the first place, it is a methodical measurement of the participating categories like emotion, feeling, language and the like. Identificational adoptability to the artistic situation becomes yet another feature of this theory and finally selective alterations and limited accessibility become the last directions in which the theory appears to have gone. The structures included in the theories could be significantly completed through the relevance each finds in the following users:


Dhvani is a conceptualization of the methods appropriate for universal and ideal artistic situation and it is because of that Anandavardhana has laid the foundations of the system on four principal conceptualisational modes: Propositional and proportional correlation, appropriate transformation, simultaneous cognition, positional change and applicablitiy of models. Eliot's framework for unified sensibility is more a limitation than an expansion or development in the direction of artistic freedom. It reduces the different categories to a point at which only numerical measurement becomes recognizable and art is virtually non-existent. Anandavardhana, with the help of above cited conceptual modes turns the whole artistry into universal applicability of artistic processes and procedures. It is also one of the points that we must remember and also quite remarkable that artistic event and creative models become interdependent and simultaneous for the sake of an absolute model. This is an obvious result or the distinction that Dhvani theorists have made in regarding that methods and models have the beginning for the sake of a prospective simultaneity for a homogeneous effect. Anandavardhana observes quite convincingly:
 Suggestiveness alone is the criterion in question. There is no
 contradiction in one's regarding the individual words also as
 suggestors of beauty which is really occasioned by the combination
 of different words ... (13)

The approach of Dhvani theorist is well comprehended. The first notational development consists of the enrichment of the primary models and in that the model acquires basic artistic orientation and creative figuration. This is a stage of earliest transformation that begins immediately after the recognition of this event. The next important thing that we like to mention at this stage is that the transformative properties, indicated by a particular primary model. (word, for example), also constitutes a similar increased positivisation in the further phases. Abhinavagupta agrees with Anandavardhana in that the Rasa is suggested by Dhvani but suggestion, of necessity, involves experiencing or idealizing towards an experience. While we have made the indication of transformative property, a beginning of artistic homogeneity, the question of the earlier separation of primary models and the methods still remains. It is quite likely that the primary models develop a recreative tendency, when suitable condition is there. Kuntaka also suggests that the primary model in the form of word also creates an equivalence as a measure of transformation in the literary competence and when the situation is actually competent, Rasa becomes comprehensible. We can understand from these opinions that the procedure and method adopted by Dhvani theroists include the earliest status of the model in the form of creative enrichment, and the later in the shape of transformation and it is because of that it never becomes a case of balancing or equaling. It is always development of simultaneous process in which suggestive indications occur or take place almost in each. On the other hand, Anandavardhana's position with regard to the idea of Dhvani is a fine development of logical aesthetics. If the beginning is made with the word as model, the secondary situation that are going to emerge would be relatively more inter-significant. The second important thing that comes to us, and that which is almost entirely lacking in the Western critical tradition is that the notational sufficiency becomes an aspect of proportional and positional correlation with the available as well as the existing artistic constructs. In that way two broad tendencies could very well be understood Transformation, as one of the earliest notational development and correlation (Proportional and correlative) as one of the later expansions. This is the point that western literary theorists have never understood. Anandavardhana reconsiders such a necessity and observes:
 Moreover, even supposing that Rasa and the like can be suggested
 only by specific senses a classified treatment of suggestive
 elements give above, would still be useful since specific senses
 are inseparably connected with suggestive words. (14)

It is exactly what Anandavardhana has been maintaining and also what Eliot never succeeds in estimating. It is immediately recognized that the enrichment of a category and concretization of another category is equally simultaneous in effect in as much as its distribution is equal throughout the creative contents. (15) The aspect of equal distribution is absolute for above mentioned purposes. The difference that we find in Eliot and Anandavardhana, is the difference of kind as well as of degrees. Eliot ignores the associative aspects and its equal distribution in the background of emerging states of correlation. In Eliot's understanding an artistic event is an event of an evolution upto second phase of enrichment only and in that way it becomes an exercise of filling up the artistry with high creative contents with no or almost negligible emphasis on transformation as an aspect of correlation in the first place and of the distribution in the second place. It is quite likely then, that, in Eliot's ideas the transformation is a restricted feature of mutual adaptability, when artistic phase is well open. Anandavardhana never tries to ensure creative phases as forms of transitory accentuation or even correlation. It becomes necessary, then, to formulate certain logical grounds at this stage through which we could recognize inherent fallacies in Eliot's critical ideas and remarkable genius of Dhvani theorists. As we have seen Dhvani deals with the development of creative models on the basis of logical correlation in each of the different stages. The logical correlation is always proportionate and balanced and it is because of that there are various sets and various pairs which combine through combinations which is once again intertransformation. This is the stage of concrete applicability. Another expansion on the other side of creative models produces a meaning specific, sense specific, language specific, and finally imagination specific functional models that internalize the enrichment and the correlation. This creates a new perspective in the understanding of the artistic problems. Rajasekhara points out a method through which ability in creating a good framework for creative contents become evident:
 Genuine poets have an extraordinary artistic insight ... it is only
 they who discover newness in the context. (16)

It is quite in the direction of Dhvani theory and the role that Rajasekhara assigns to the poet is certainly the role that brings excellence into the artistry. At the beginning the positional variations amongst the primary models and the secondary models is more for the sake of organization and less for status, hence the element of newness that Rajaskhara likes a poet to discover is, infact, harmonizing the contents that are there in the positions of different models and richness that must come when variation comes into effect. Mammata, however denies newness as a point of fact yet accepts the signification of suggesters and in that way one of the questions appears to have been answered by this great critic:
 That (Suggestion) which is based upon the force of meaning occurs
 in context also. (16)

Mammata's answer to our question obviously lies in the fact that the suggestive contents, when phase of variation is progressing well, are equally optimum in the context. The question that we had infact, originated from the same explanation. It is now an easier task to understand why Dhvani system is more responsive to the artistic problems. We can cite at least some reasons for that. In the first place, in Dhvani, a beginning is made by the opening of transformative feature in the form of correlation, or another words, we can say that the primary models, categories and constructs correlate themselves with the secondary models and simultaneously the event of enrichment goes on. So transformation and correlation are indicated at the very beginning. Another point that we like to make mention of is that every smaller unit and every bigger unit concretize one another by inter-signification. The way in which the theory deals with the inclusion of developing specific instances of the categories is well argued and well constructed by Anandavardhana. In the native artistic notions like Rasa, the artistic tools like figures of speech, and emerging states of meaningfullness acquire concurrence of suggested property. It is interesting to note that Anandavardhana never argues for level balancing of each of these. What infact, we understand is that the harmony comes at once and immediately between the participating constructs. Anandavardhana has further noted that "the scope of suggestiveness is three fold, viz. 1) Rasa and the like 2) The specific figures of speech and suggested ideas".

This is the distinction between effective enrichment of the artistic construct, artistic environment and the creative medium that has been so finely set forth by Dhvanikara, What begins the process is larger and certainly an ideal state of universal artistic situation and when we speak of the "distinction" then, by that we mean natural role orientation for an encoding in an equally naturalized perspectives. The naturalization of perspective for the sake of an ideal artistic situation is distinguishable from elementary enrichment and the elementary idealization and in Dhvani every phase of creation dislocates a new meaning for itself. K. Krishanmoorthy observes of Dhvani that:
 Dhvani proceeds with three fundamental postulates. In the first
 place, it assumes that Dhvani exists apart from primary sense,
 secondly it presupposes that Dhvani is most intrinsic to poetry.
 And thirdly, it believes that Dhvani can not be explained in terms
 of either denotation and indication and hence a new function of
 words e.g. suggestions should be admitted. (17)

This is the relationship that is there between the artistic environment and the exclusive medium created by the primary and secondary models. We can not say that Dhvani develops an artistic homogeneity and creative appropriateness by the way of completing primary, secondary and even tertiary level of correlations and transformations. It is just like a fitness when appropriateness is most genuinely demanded or required and we will say that Dhvani has appropriateness for all the participating models categories and constructs in each of the stages and in each of the situations. Masson and Patwardhan have noted that the "Underlying assumptions in the Dhvanyaloka is the autonomy of literary experience."


Eliot's idea of unification of sensibility has certain pre-suppositions which need to be understood and we will try to do so in the next part of this discussion. But we will say that the theory is a synthesis constituted out of various calculations and measurements which as a rule must have existed in the artistic evolution of a particular category or particular construct or a particular model. What is ignored is harmonious correlation at the very beginning, proportional correlation in the middle, and prepositional signification at the end of an artistic event. It is generally noted in Eliot's contemporaneity that poetic process is at most a process of arithmetical conceptualization which begins in a denied artistry and therefore critical tools will have to be equally synthetical Ezra Pound has noted that
 the art of poetry consists in combining these 'essential to
 thought', these dynamic particles ... this radium, with that
 melody of words which shall most draw the emotion of the hearer
 toward accord with their import and with that 'form' which shall
 most delight the intellect. (18)

What infact we are trying to show is that the general direction of criticism of poetry in Eliot's contemporary circle was towards a numeral oriented and scale specific artistry. It is never a largeness of creativity that begins, as it happens in Dhvani, mutual adaptability or the concrete transformative states Eliot undoubtedly relies upon certain philosophical thinkers like F. H. Bradley to prove the point that emergence of language and emotion within a complete and total artistic phase is also the ideal point of any creation. For example, emerging feeling of necessity stands in opposition to the emerging language and what Eliot wants is that contents of feeling should oppose contents of language in such a way that it excludes those contents of language which are non-significant and includes those which are significant and in that way a case is established for effectiveness in an artistic process. This is quite an unacceptable position, while on the other hand the whole writings of Eliot put an emphasis on such an aspect:
 Feeling itself is properly speaking neither subjective nor
 objective but its development into an articulate whole of terms
 and relations seems to affect the conscious subject, but not the
 object of which, the subject is conscious ... the only reality
 which feelings can have ... is in a consciousness ... experience
 is certainly more real than anything else, but any experience
 demands reference to something which lies outside of the
 experience ... in feeling the subject and object are one. (19)

Eliot does understand the logical role that feeling and experience play, but the hardly estimates the feeling that derives from the continuous coalescement of the actual concrete order and its suggestive states. What infact culminates into the suggestive phase of feeling is the acquired consistency and homogeneity which have been there in the earlier phases of transformation. It is because of that Eliot's understanding only equates the primary notational disturbance with the primary notional appropriateness and, in consequence, we get, what we like to call the derivation of synthesis and indeterminate incoherence. This could be seen as one of the earliest dissociative phases in which the positivisation is only a reduced creative apparatus. The only point that Eliot seems to be making is that the role oriented feeling has larger and bigger significational statuses than one which is less concrete for such a purpose. It is also indicated that models themselves are less important than the quantitative wholeness. That is presupposed at the end of specified artistic event. DES Maxwell has very well taken up the point in his observations on dissociation phenomenon, and, probably, he disregards the fact that unification is actual correlation of transforming categories:
 it is in imagery that the unification of sensibility finds
 expression. Imagery transcribes one experience in terms of another,
 it reveals, for instance, the similarity between two visual, or
 between two aural experience ... (20)

The fact is always missed that how, even when an artist has to make the categories qualitatively whole, should progress in the differential creative phases. It is not that there is no awareness of the fact in Eliot's critical observations but it is the preference of role orientated or specific artistry over ideal or genuine artistry which substantiates Eliot's position.

Dhvani includes as we have stated earlier, systematization of determinate artistic and creative variations. Determinacy in the artistic systematization is reached through constituted propositions primarily through emotive and linguistic models. Mahimabhatta does not accept the aspect of exceptional linguistic emotive and verbal fineness, still he subscribes to the view that empirical meaningfulness is also a way to higher artistic order:
 Art has to have Rasa in order to become distinctive This is hardly
 a point of consideration. Constructs, infact, are forms of ViBhavas
 themselves while they are objects of Rasa's expression. Uniqueness
 inherent upon suggesters does hardly indicate a point of uniqueness
 in the suggested. Even if we accept otherwise, presence of
 uniqueness in either is sufficient to set a pattern for
 Dhvani. (21)

Mahimabhatta's explanation does prove the point that union of differential categories is trans-modificative and inter-significative. It is because of that homogeneous pattern in one participating model is sufficient to develop modality of enrichment is others and that is how Kuntaka, of necessity includes Sabda (word) and Artha (meaning) as measures of content specific and intent oriented newness in each of these, in the first place, and both of these in the second place. It now appears that Dhvani system adopts all the necessary procedures in intentional internalization of participating categories and content wise externalization of exclusive contextual mediums. It is appropriate at this stage to remark that Dhvani systematizes the whole artistic medium through correlations or correlatives understood as implicational orientation of early and later phases of categorical synthesis.

While it is the conceptual consideration of certain categories like emotion, feelings, thought and language that comes to occupy foremost position in our consideration of dissociation of sensibility, the extent of the conceptual construct participating in the medium must be understood well. In dissociation of sensibility emotion, feeling and language operate towards discursive systematization of the whole creative process and also set a limit for extent of such a discursion in relation to objective equivalence. Emotion, feeling and language change the medium of the context of any equivalent category in proportion to equivalence that comes to be reciprocated in another medium. In that way these categories, as Eliot says, are the positions exclusive for the objects themselves. It is also important to recognize that each of these categories opts for differential proportion of equivalence that comes to be there because of differences in constitution of the categories. Emotion, for example, is neither an image nor sensation rather it is a correlative for those specific contents of image which are appropriately contextualized and, once again, emotion, is, nor an object of sensation but it is a restoration of those equivalent position in sensation which become instances of enrichment which exactly works towards synthesis in the correlative status obtained as a point of determinacy in the creative phases. If that is a basis for Eliot's observations, emotion turns out to be a mode of correlative appropriated in sensation and image. Allen, Pei Lu, Sean Lucy, Maxwell, Ellamann and Menand, have recorded the existence of such a feature in Eliot's work. Ellmann more particularly observes:
 In Eliot's essays ... feeling presupposes of feeler ... He
 reinstates the feeling subject at the center of the process of
 creation. At the same time that he attempts to circumscribe
 his will. (21)

As we have seen emotion acquires a status corresponding to the correlation adopted as a mode of enrichment in sensation and image. Feeling on the other hand, is the completion of the process of enrichment that emotion sets into sensation and image. Ideally enriched sensation, according to Eliot, is also an appropriate feeling, but the difference still exists and that lies in the fact that feeling is sensation when underlying experience is concrete. Such a proposition clearly states the fact that the feeling is less nearer to the concreteness of experience than emotion while the object of experience is either sensation or image. Looking at these considerations, unification of sensibility appears to be a case stated for reallocation of points of equilibrium in sensation, image, emotion, feeling and language, in relation to the contents entering into the accessible context, medium and the object. The case of reallocation, and replacement of the point of equilibrium is quite remarkable in so far as each reallocation obtains a mode of transformation naturally. Eliot also provides on explanation for the event:
 The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding
 an 'objective correlative', in other words, a set of objects, a
 situation, a chain of events, which shall be the formulae of that
 particular emotion, such that, when external facts, which must
 terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is
 immediately evoked. (22)

This is a justified position for an intensive equilibrium opted in the external and internal artistic environment with total adequacy and what is reallocated and replaced is, once again, an equilibrium. The reallocation of an equilibrium is a reinforcement of sensibility with contextualised and enriched emotions and it is only that which brings object, medium and environment into a one finer organization. The fact that comes to our notice is that the encoded emotion is optionally a variable defined precisely through the richness of contents, that it brings to all the three phases of artistry.

The fact that we want to highlight is the aspect of interacted arrangement of reallocated contents that sets to introduce a pattern for adequacy. This adequacy evidently concretizes significant artistic habits and brings forth rational circumstances of poetic creation.


Theorists in Dhvani have given an attention to the facts of Bhava, Rasa, language and Pratibha and now we will state a common theoretical position in each of these. Anandavardhana states at the very beginning of his work:
 Rasa, Bhava and the semblance of Rasa and Mood and their rise and
 cessation are all of 'undiscerned sequentiality'. It is decided
 that when we have the prominent presence of this variety, we have
 the very soul of suggestion. (23)

It is undoubtedly a proof of the fact that Bhava is conceptual basis of the artistry which comes to occupy such an important place in Indian poetics. Emotion is an encoded internal object of enrichment and because of that it is also the expanded internal medium. Development of Dhvani theory has obviously given a new interpretation to the Bhava and its artistic contents. At the very beginning two important facts come to be recognized. In the first place emotion and Bhava are distinguishable quite sufficiently and therefore emotion is always a minor term while Bhava is a major aesthetic correlation. Mammata recognizes the evidence of such a position and says:
 Love towards God or such other beings as also a variant, when
 suggested as a primary factor is described as Bhava or
 emotion. (24)

This is hardly an explanation of the point that emerged during earlier discussions but we have quoted the passage because we will really upon at least one important mention and that is "variant when suggested is described as Bhava or emotion". What we understand from this is that the emotion is logically a constitutive phase of concrete artistic tendencies. It is located as a determinant of all those creative signifiers which close the artistic options in the external creative environment. It is exactly the position that we are willing advance. Mahimabhatta seems to have precisely maintained that, "Bhavas are trans-experiential, trans-existential and inter locative idealization of the point of object in the art", it could also be estimated that the Bhava and the emotion dislocate one another in an artistic environment determined by exact enriched constructs, and if dislocated enrichment is the earliest necessity for an artistic construction. That is to create segmented structures appropriately and evenly. Vishwanath has favoured such a position by end or the fact that Vibhava, Anubhava and Sanchari Bhava and Sthayi Bhava, are, in fact the points of correlation in any significant artistic situation. The precision of Bhava includes variation in the internal phase and also the external one. The point of discussion lies almost entirely in the fact that the variation is more creative and less constructive apparatus that is there in Bhava. These interpretations do not exactly realize that the Bhava is nominal dislocation of external signification and internal representation of conclusive temperaments. And in that way Bhava becomes required dislocation of the suggestive phase of presupposition that works into the nominal restoration of differential meanings while emotion is exclusively dislocated enrichment of suggestive categories. It is neither as has been understood by different commentators, a merely correlative feature, second to Bhava only, nor does it integrate the conceptualization of secondary feelings and sentiments. It is, in fact, methodical structure of injunction in the categories and awareness of the object of emotion as a tool in the artistry, has brought remarkable changes in the understanding of creative principle. Abhinavagupta indicates an accessibility to the phased orientation of Bhava as suggested by Bharata, but also assumes that inter-signification must remain a basis in the developed artistic concentration. It is, precisely an inverted restriction to the discursion that is very much in effect in identifying locative features and its internalization in the artist and the art. It goes once again to the genius of Abhinavagupta to have stated that; different modes of acting when internalized create distinction of actualization, actual is Bhava. It could be understood from the fact of observation that the acting operates as an empirical notation by the way of distinctive actualization and each of such becomes Bhava. What could be said of non-empirical notation which equally participate in standardized categorical synthesis? That is the question that calls for an understanding and looking at the general line of arguments presented by the critics and commentators. We can say that non-empirical notations become the factors of emotion. Viswanath reduces the acceptability of an ideal suggestive level in which location of a construct is also a point of reversibility. It is because of the fact that Bhava is always a reduced categorical content in which reversibility and inter-transformation are more nearly stabilized and assorted. The difference that we find in located notation of contents and non-empirical and non-located notation of the contents in relation to Bhava and Emotion respectively suggests an ideal perspective in which creative principles are suitably affirmed and an approach to the artistry is expounded. In creativity it becomes a standard of positional construction by the way of dislocation of primary suggestive models and primary denotative models and quite obviously an exclusion is made of the subordinately suggested categories. It is in that way locus of suggestive appropriateness becomes one of the principles of creativity explained in terms of Bhava and Emotion. What emerges from an outline presented above is that Bhava is a re-assessment of the contents of an inter-locative category and emotions is the reduction of the same contents of interlocative category. It is not only the objects organized for such a purpose which indicate the optimum value obtained through a retentive figuration but the scale that evolves works out the properties of synthesis. Anandavardhana affirms such a position and states:
 Only that is admitted as a figure of suggestive poetry whose
 employment is rendered possible just by the emotional suffusion
 of the poet and which does not require any other extra effort
 on his part. (25)

It is immediately understood that contents specific to the organized levels of categories approach the condition of coalescent when the object of coalesment has been completed. In that way Bhava becomes contentive naturalization. The extent of naturalization does not always include or exclude the local contents is the form of Sthayi Bhava and external contents in the form of Anubhava, Vibhava and Sancari Bhava. What appears to be evident is that the external phases of Bhava are constitutively and contentively more enriched that what they are in the internal level. Reason is precisely than the external phase is also a combining phase which treatments Anubhava, Vibhava and Sthayi Bhava as well. We do not want to say that such a situation creates a state of disjunction rather it is a state of selection of right contents and constructs in Vibhava and Anubhava and in that way what looks like disjunction is in fact a newer creative phase. Abhinavagupta, while explaining the inter relationship of Bhava and Rasa makes an observation which nearly answers all the questions which have been raised time and again regarding the constitutive status of Bhava:
 Reciprocity must remain an object of concern but it has its
 qualifications. If actions which produce or create two different
 objects are the same, reciprocity does not stand to defect ... the
 Bhavas make Rasa comprehensible and Rasas objectify the situations
 inherent upon the Bhavas. Difference in action does hardly prove
 to be an obstacle in reciprocity. (26)

It stands out clear from the observation that Bhavas are not only locative in nature, but they have internal contentive state as well. So it is always the sequential position that comes to the foremost application in the explanation. Anandavardhana, Mammata, and Kuntaka have endorsed such a position. On the other hand emotion does not engage the attention of Dhvani theorists because a larger concrete entity is already in existence to answer the questions pertaining to artistry and creativity. Still emotion does mean the transfer of locative contents in the immediacy of an equally immediate context provided by Vibhava, Anubhava and Sancari Bhava. In one of the observations at least, Vishwanath has maintained that while Vibhava is being comprehended the distinctions relating to possessions like; this is mine and that is thou art's, are always obliterated. It is quite likely then, that the emotion exists but only in form of an ordinary perception, which does not actualizes either Vibhava or even Anubhava. It is only a continuous reduction for each of the normative procedures like Sthayi Bhava, Vibhava, Anubhava and Sancari Bhava. Another obvious mode of suggesting an existence of Bhava is by considering indeterminate formalization that comes into as effect in normative prepositional features. One of the effects that is evident and noticed is the presence of affinity in the subject and because of that Bhava becomes primary in estimation. While this effect, as has been noted by Vishwanath, is Bhava, another cumulative aspect quite operative is lack of ViBhava specific objects in the event. It could also be mentioned that organization of these effects constitutes conceptual standards effective in Rasa. Such, a consideration could also suggest the acquisition of permanence as a mode of appropriation in the native state and suggestion in the form of gesture in the transformed state and because of that Bhava becomes suggested content retaining permanence as a native order. Mahimabhatta explains the fact not merely as an internalized option presented by the medium to the actor rather as a creative constitution employing meaning in the standards of modelised proposition. What we like to say is that the Bhava is retention of an order in the acting that is also a fact of transformative content in relation to Rasa and locative content in relation to other participating models. We can extend the terms closely through are liability observed in:


Acceptance of Bhava as a locative as well as transformative content in relation to the comprehension of immediate artistic object makes the normativisation of inter-substitutional orders possible. And it is because of that points of artistic location cumulatively create internalized significational units in the form of Sthayi Bhava, ViBhava, AnuBhava and Vyabhichari Bhava. Sthayi Bhava is propositionally internal to the phases of art and normatively structured as synthesized medium. The way in which orientation for internal phases is reached is quite remarkable and for that matter Sthayi Bhava appropriate the composite context by giving unity relative to artistic adequacy. In them, therefore, two aspects are well worth noticing. Location of emotive contents is positionally enriched and comprehended to create uniform artistic configuration. Secondly, the structure of appropriation combines differential attributes of artistry in the direction of internalization only. Now we will have to say that Sthayi Bhavas indicate the points of poise between appropriation and location of contents. Vishwanath exactly points out the existence of such an understanding while he makes Sthayi Bhavas finely balanced as a mode of retention. It must also be accepted that what is permanent or Sthayi, is, in fact, an indication of systematization of contents and notation of constructs in all the possible artistic variations. It, does, however, universalize the context of a particular artistic constructs of the categories. We will now state a broader framework in which we could sufficiently examine the basis of our theoretical position. Bharata makes mention of Rati, Hasa, Soka, Krodh, Utsaha, Bhaya, Jugupsa and Vismay to be as the Sthayi Bhavas. What is important is the structure, the constitution, and, on the whole normativisation of these Sthayi Bhavas. (27) Before we proceed to state our position, we will say that each of the structures, each of the constituting elements and each of the normative standards that go into the making of Sthayi Bhavas are, in fact, definite for all the possible variations in the artistry. In that way, a conclusion is reached that a particular category might have given rise to it makes Sthayi Bhavas a concluded restoration of necessitated and created categorical variation. Rati or love, for instance has favourable season, garlands, ornaments, people near and dear and the like as Vibhavas. On the other hand, Anubhavas that we have in this, are, face beaming with smile, words of sweetness, knitting of the eyebrows, glances and the like. In the next place, it has to be represented on the stage through sweetness of word and suitable movement of the limbs. It could be seen that Rati (love) is constitutively, structurally and normatively poised and definitely organized. What we like to say is not that one of the important Sthayi Bhavas is an universal application of modelised structures, of, appropriation and signification, we just like to prove the point that contentive positivisation is more nearly a principle of artistry in Dhvani system of Indian poetics. What holds the ground is the fact that effect that has been created by such a remarkable phenomenon and it is quite the outcome of effect that the contents, constructs, and categories on the whole merge into transforming event in the nearness of creative phase. The aspects that are well worth noticing are the constitution of Sthayi Bhava as methodical perspective for correlative transformation and formalization of structure of sensibility.

The facts that we have cited are important for an understanding of Sthayi Bhavas in relation to Dhvani system and it remains one of the conclusions that before being transformed into a genre specific to a location at a point, each of the Bhavas becomes normatively, structurally and constitutively definite.

Anandavardhana and his commentator Abhinavagupta have examined the possibility that Sthayi Bhava could create substantial notation when creativity is minimum and inter-textualise primary and secondary artistic models when creativity is optimum. Mammata and Vishwanath have taken a strong exception to the existence of such a possibility while establishing the fact that cognitive standardization is the most suitable response that emerges when creative value is optimum. The point of observation now shifts to earlier preliminary inquiries in which we insisted upon division of Sthayi Bhavas into external locative content and internal transformative order.

What is obviously approached in Dhvani system in relation to Bhavas is the creation of required necessity of presentation in contextual as well as inter-contextual modes. It is also remarkably assured that Bhavas should constitute a combination determined by a status specific to such a purpose. When combination is relative to the status it gives rise to a model of transformation. Mammata has recorded the existence of such a fact:
 Of Bhava, there are (a) Allayment (b) Manifestation (c)
 Conjuncture and (d) Admixture. (28)

It must be understood that Bhava develops both in terms of contents, constructions and positions and quite naturally expansion in each produces the status for a definite organizational position. It is because of that Bhava is determiner of equal notation. The basis of such an argument appears to have been founded upon the fact that the Bhava is more constructive and less constitutive while the proportions of categories and constructs are equal in the direction of artistic environment and unequal in earlier creative phases. In Dhvani, Bhava becomes an expansion, development and standardization relatively in proportion to an entry made into the contents of combination in the first place and constructs of transformation in the second place Anandavardhana also approves of the same possibility:
 Moreover even supposing that Bhava and the like can be suggested by
 specific senses, a classified treatment of suggestive elements
 would still be useful since specific senses are inseparably
 connected with suggestive words. (29)

What emerges from this is the appropriate condition that Anandavardhana sets for the nearness in the concrete dimensions of organization of the contents. Primarily the status of Bhava in the context of Dhvani is determined by the facility provided in each of the normative orders. It begins, for example, with Sthayi Bhava and gets completed in Sancari Bhava. Abhinavagupta in his Locana has made it explicit that contents of Rasa are suitably modified or suggested to create a condition suitable for Dhvani being made evident:
 The only logical mode to experience a work of art is to indicate
 the existence of Rasa, Dhvani, and the same, Dhvani, remains the
 soul of work of art. (30)

While it must be a point of validity in the estimation of effects of Dhvani, important thing that Abhinavagupta brings to notice is the order and the outcome attached to the acceptable standardization and the issue with which we are dealing becomes at once concretized. The Bhava is organizationally and artistically confirmed in the events of experiential notations and significations which pass into creativity as the final modes of expression. It now seems worth our while to durlip application relevance for the above:


The explanations that we have provided and considerations which we have made for Bhava are quite appropriate for any ideal artistic environment and now, when we come to T.S. Eliot's understanding of Emotion, we will realize the potential deficiency with which any Western poet-critic, for that matter, suffers, T. S. Eliot has made emotion, an artistic and conceptual structure of any genuine art. He has so often stated the concept of emotion that it becomes practically an inclusive category that determines the conditions for the creation of an image and sensation at large. In that way emotion becomes an adaptation in the medium exclusive for images and the sensation while this is one of the facts that one gets while pursuing Eliot's observations. But another point of view also appears to be equally appropriate and that is quite obviously description of emotion as constitutive localization when immediacy in artistic models like image and symbol is rendered insignificant. In that way emotion becomes a sensation of local categorical contents and also an image in the form of reduced immediacy while these theoretical positions could very well be brought into examination, the whole structure of emotion is a point to be understood. We will consider some of the observations on emotion and develop our theoretical framework. In "Tradition and the Individual Talent," Eliot states:
 The experience ... are ... of two kinds emotions and feelings. The
 effect of a work of art upon the person who enjoys it is an
 experience different in kind from any experience not of art. (31)

 The episode of Paolo and Francesca employs definite emotions..
 Great variety is possible in the process of transmutation of
 emotion ... in the Agamemnon, the artistic emotion approximates
 to the emotion of an actual spectator, in Othello to the emotion
 of Protagonist himself. (32)

And also
 But the effect ... is due to the fact that a number of floating
 feelings, having an affinity to this emotion becomes superficially
 evident, have combined with it to give us a new art emotion. (33)

And still further
 The business of the poet is not to find new emotions, but to use
 ordinary ones and in working them up into poetry, to express
 feelings which are not in actual emotions at all. (34)

And finally

The emotion of art is impersonal. (35)

The arguments that Eliot presents are inclined to constitute a structural framework in which experience, emotion and feeling are hierarchised into an evolutionary scale. As it is commonplace in Eliot's critical ideas "Scale", always exists for the summation of artistic contents and creative facts. This perspective must suggest that the emotion is figuratively an image and artistically a sensation and combination of fact of art and fact of figure does indeed produce what Eliot likes to call "artistic emotion". But the fact still remains as to what structurally determines the points of consideration in emotion itself. Eliot's understanding of the term presents the situation as a case of an effective point of balance between ordinary and significant concretization or even the point of intersection between the lower crudeness and higher enrichment with fact of art. Now it appears as if the emotion is presentative beginning of an image while reducing the actual contents to the minimum of ordinariness and increasing maximum of artistic facility and it is because of that emotion is open to reversion if the direction of reduction does not include, in equal measure, the reduction of non-artistic facts. This slightly confuses the whole issue because reduction does not, of necessity, produce, variations in equivalent positive standards. One of the earliest observations, as we have stated, suggests structural evolution of emotion and accordingly the feeling must evolve into emotion, and emotion, in the second place, must create experience. Equivalent standards in logic prove the point that emotion in the form of image is nearest to the faculty of sensation when scale of artistry is developing image and what comes out of that is the organization of sensation as a medium of restoring located contents in images. In that way, it is not out of place to say that emotion is neither an image nor a sensation but a definite location of artistic contents in image and retention of the same contents in equivalent sensation. The objects of arguments precisely lie in the capacity of an image to recreate receptive modifications in the earliest contents of sensation. Eliot also considers possible limits of location of sensation when the contents are operative in the positivisation of the medium and calls it a definite emotion. And when location of content is modified in each of the instances of artistry, the emotion becomes "artistic emotion".

It could also be proved that the emotion is an exclusive inherence of a property of sensation upon image and in that way emotion is an equivalent standard of combination between sensation and image and we will also say that Eliot primarily emphasizes the point of intersection between sensation and image as he generally does in his critical estimations. While this remains quite an understandable approach defining the perspective of emotion, it should also be evident that this is not the real substance. In "Knowledge and Experience", the direction of argument changes:
 Feeling therefore is an aspect and an inconsistent aspect in
 knowing it is not a separate and isolable phase. On the one
 hand feeling is an abstraction from anything actual ... it is an
 experienced nonrelational unity of many in one. (36)

It quite clearly speaks of the integration of the contents that feeling brings into and obviously the differentiation precedes the same combination and indivisibility and it is because of that feeling is modificational organization of contentive enrichment and if feeling is like that emotion must be nearest to the same applicability. This is one of the ways in which we distinguish between organization of contents and reduction of the same organization. General applicability of such an argument is broadly the requirements of the applicatory features of sensation and image. Eliot says that "feeling is not isolable" then, by that he means a concreteness towards artistic completeness or completeness by the standards of proportional sensory equivalents in another medium. It must however, be accepted that emotion is a newer conductive construct operative in the immediacy of sensation and externalized in the immediacy of image. If that is the situation, the emotion becomes a case of reversibility in sensation. This argument does not indeed prove the fact that emotion conveys a wider perspective still the observations hold ground. What is important to know is that richness of contents within a category becomes a cited case of artistic emotion if responding category is either experience or feeling. Mowbray Allen has also suggested that the same situation comes into being because "Eliot recognizes two main categories of thought; logic and association". (37)

These arguments hold a valid basis for an understanding that the emotion is always a midway between sensation and image and perhaps, because of that it organizes both thinking and feeling.


The fundamental question that has been underlying our discussion is the nature of wholeness of the artistic contents transforming the artistic categories primarily to modify the object of sensibility. In Dhvani system, effect of Pratibha ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) creates an effective discourse between creative environment and creative fact in discursive reference and an appropriate suggestion of significant unit in normative reference. Anandavardhana introduces the aspect of newness of [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] (Pratibhaguna) and it is also an important aspect of Dhvani system. Anandavardhana develops the idea by introducing at least, three broad categories of applicability. In the first place, aspect of newness of the theme and in that newness of [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] becomes precision acquired when linguistic suggestors like letters, words and sentences create positions of selective references. This is achieved through specified orientation of suggestors and suggested towards equal wholeness. [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] (Pratibha Guna) in that way, in Anandavardhana's understanding is suggestive ability working through positional references and denotative systematization Positional references develop out of suggestors creating a broad pattern of correlation and organization of positional references helps in suggesting a Rasa which in due course of time, becomes not only "single" but predominant as well. On the other hand, positional references are suggestive in nature because there is an appropriate cognition of each of the referents. The creation of wholeness of the contents could be seen to be taking place, in two different ways, in the first place, Pratibhaguna is presentative model of applicability distinguished in terms of denotation and suggestion. This could be justified in so far as denotation of the categories is internalized in that primary models are developed, extended and terminated at the beginning of artistry while suggestion includes externalized as well as internalized primary models. Anandavardhana observes of the phenomenon:
 So long as the poet excercises undeflected concentration regarding
 the suggested contents viz. Rasa, Bhava, its semblance and the
 suggesters previously involved viz. letter, word, sentence and
 texture and the work as a whole, the poet's entire work will
 become strikingly novel. (38)

And also
 By the ways of principal suggestion as also subordinated suggestion
 shown thus far, the quality of creative imagination in poets will
 assume endlessness. (39)

It is appropriately stated that definiteness occasioned into synthesized primary models creates coherence in the effect that comes to be actualized in the emotive categories and in that way the object of proposition is formatively [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] (Pratibha) while Anandavardhana makes sensibility a major effect created by Pratibha. Bharata Abhinavagupta, Mammata, Vishwanath and Rajasekhara and Jagannatha have quite harmoniously examined the effect of Pratibha ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]). In Bharata's understanding concretized external and internal locations in differential normative orders of Rasa and Bhava specifically Sthayi Bhava, Vibhava, Anubhava and Sancari Bhava become points and objects of Pratibha. Abhinavagupta does certainly extend the concept of Pratibhaguna ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) expounded by Anandavardhana, in Locana as well as in Abhinavabharati, and he makes it a potential inhering upon in an object of description as one equivalent for Pratibha. This appears to be a description quite in line with the existing interpretations in which effect of Pratibha is exclusive for the contents of categories and inclusive for the external orientations. Rajasekhara, however, gives a new interpretation for the effects that Pratibha creates and adequacy of the observation is pertinent:
 Pratibha internalizes and incorporates, each and everything in
 words, sentences, meaning, into the wholeness of meaningful
 expression while rendering the poetic material into new
 fineness. (40)

It follows from this that the effect that Pratibha is the universalization of poetic contents as well as poetic personality. The way in which it takes place substantially restores a provision for presentative applicability of contents.

Anandavardhana's position with regard to Pratibhaguna and its applicatory necessity in the transformation of poetic contents and poetic personality has been substantiated by the views stated in the foregoing. The question that we asked at the beginning as how the wholeness of artistic categories and artistic contents entering into the poetic process comes into, could very well be answered at this stage. In Dhvani system reliance has been laid upon the fact that Rasa, which also represents the wholeness of poetic contents and poetic personality, is transformed in the direction of appropriateness and in that way contentive enrichment is brought about by the cognition, positional changes, correlatives and applicability of presentation. Eliot's views on Sensibility are ineffectively pursued as a mode of disintegrated abstraction and dislocated thought creative of asymmetrical categories. Eliot does not say that the medium of occurrence is a necessity in establishing appropriateness for emotion, feeling and the thought. In that way sensibility becomes the highest stage in the reduction of abstracted points in the emotion, feeling, imagination, thought and language. The point of observation of Eliot is exactly located in the formation of an appropriate level in which reduction of the categories and abstraction of the categories become quite similar and equivalents for one another. Looking at the perspective, we can say that any variation in the abstracted thought and for that matter, emotion, language and feeling, is also a point of immediate dislocation in such categories, then sensibility comes to be created. Another theoretical position that is quite obviously emerging in our discussion of Eliot's ideas is that the sensibility is a mode of termination of non-contextual, non-medium specific, and trans-objective positions. What is intended is that positivisation appropriates an equivalence for artistic contents for the sake of newness or novelty. Eliot's actual observations on the theme of sensibility state the fact arrangement of feeling, emotion, thought or experience with an appropriate mode creates sensibility. Eliot observes:
 Even ... their sensibility, their mode of feeling was directly and
 freshly altered by their reading and thought. (41)


A thought to Donne was an experience it modified his sensibility. (42)

 The poets of the seventeenth century ... possessed a mechanism of
 sensibility which could devour any kind of experience. (43)

 Our civilization comprehends great variety and complexity and this
 variety and complexity playing upon refined sensibility, must
 produce various and complex results. (44)

The ways in which Eliot understands the term is quite interesting and in each sensibility acquires a new meaning. In the very first observation sensibility is common with "mode of feeling" and has the suggestion of definiteness when the direction of medium and context is genuine. In the next observation, emphasis shifts to immediacy that equals the contents and the sensibility becomes an effect of immediacy that equals the content of categories. Still further, sensibility has been made a method, device or procedure to create the states of meaningfulness and finally Eliot makes sensibility an evolved species of adequacy of the artistic contents. The question that we have in our mind is that the context specific nature of sensibility hardly suggests wholeness of the contents. The real problem seems to be lying in the facility that artistic contents create when they enter into a combination for the sake of newness that constitutes the basis of wholeness. If such is the situation, then sensibility becomes an effective mode to open up the points of nearness in the immediate artistic environment. What exactly Eliot appears to be suggesting is localization that excludes vagueness in conceptual constructs, Eliot observes:
 Sensibility is not merely an increase of understanding, leaving,
 the original acute impressions changed. The new impressions
 modify the impressions received from objects already known.
 An impression needs to be constantly refreshed by new impressions
 in order that it may persist at all it needs to take place in a
 system of impressions. (45)

It now appears as if the term, sensibility connects an evolution of earliest categorical content in form of impression to a later constructive content in the form of increased impressions and at that, it is the evolution of content of thought into contents of intellect while including select points of reference in thought and intellect only. Eliot justifies that in "Knowledge and Experience":
 However I express myself, I mean only that the sensation is there
 is a relation between myself and the object arclation which is
 internal and goes to make up both self and object. (46)

This explains quite a useful habit that Eliot's ideas have acquired and it must be stated that Eliot tries to locate effectiveness of contents in the specific points in that particular category and for that matter sensibility also becomes derived from artistically adequate locations in thought and intellect. Looking at earlier observations we will now say that wholeness of the artistic categories and contents is a phenomenon of location of ideal points of adequacy of enrichment, concretization and meaningfulness Eliot's ideas do not bring about exact nature of poetic transformation, tendency of participating categories and nature of contents that externalize the internal creative environment. It happens because terminal variation in emotion, feeling and language does not exactly create equivalent correlated constructs and what is denied, because of that, is different levels of poetic transformation. This fact is substantiated by yet another fact that the state of newness is neither open or accessible to the ordinary contents which also make artistic environment genuine. It turns out to be a conclusion stated in the effectiveness of the objectivity of emotion and status that it creates in the immediacy of objectivity are what we stated as "conclusion" of artistic environment. There are certain other questions which keep arising in our estimation. The methods and procedure adopted for wholeness of contents, quite inconclusively affect the appropriation of emotion, feeling, thought, and language. In this early essays, "Amalgamation", "Devouring", "Recreating", "Modifying", "Transmuting", "Transforming", and "Transmogrifying", become the stages in different processes that create wholeness of the contents and it is also interesting to note that these methods and procedures presuppose homogeneity and numerical equality in the construction of wholeness in emotion, thought, language and they only create the scope of homogeneity and equality sometimes with the effect of sensibility and sometimes with the effect of language when sensibility is an instrument of wholeness of the contents, it divides the categories into the points of increased wholeness. In Andrew Marvell, Eliot observes:
 Out of that high style developed from Marlowe through Johnson, the
 seventeenth century separated two qualities : Wit and
 Magniloquence ... The wit ... a tough reasonableness beneath slight
 lyric grace ... And of Magniloquence, the deliberate exploitation
 of the possibilities of magnificence in language. (47)

 With our eyes still on Marvell we can say that wit is not
 erudition ... it involves probably a recognition implicit in the
 expression of every experience, of other kinds of experience
 which are possible. (48)

The nature of wholeness could very well be understood and it is precisely the function of sensibility to divide and break experience into ideal and exact locations in the hardness and purity of enrichment in emotion, feeling, language and thought but question still remains as what constitutes coherence and organization in applicatory and applied medium of artistry. The effect of sensibility does indeed establish the fact that the contents are modified in relation to the existing intensity of the process and the object of modification is always larger than the contents of modification and in that way applied medium and applicatory medium become substantially denied in as much as each of these gets reduced appreciably.

It is conclusively established in the earlier discussions that the wholeness of the contents of the creative categories like emotion, feeling, thought, language and imagination, and the like remain basic concerns of T.S. Eliot's idea of unification of sensibility. In Dhvani system, it is primarily Bhava, Pratibhaguna, Rasa and the language which primarily make poetic contents a whole or for that matter meaningful, enriched and concrete by the way of Proportional correlation, Simultaneous cognition, Positional changes and Modelised applicability. It is also important to note that Dhvani system presents universalization of poetic contents on the internal creative and external artistic levels. Hence the creative categories function in harmony with one another. Rasa, for example is an appropriate phase of artistic completeness but in Dhvani meaning for Rasa is created or Rasa creates meaning as a point of notation in the internal creative phase and as a point of suggestion in the external artistic orientation what we want to say is that the artistic environment is exclusively enriched and concretized externally as well as internally. The nature of poetic categories is also well in line with the idea of conceptual applications created by Dhvani system. Rasa and Bhava for example, represent higher stages in notional appropriation and normativisation of the categorical order and because of that, Rasa becomes a constructive apparatus in specifically located as well as reallocated variations in the artistic status of any creative event.


(1.) Anandavardhana, Dhvanyaloka, translation by K. Krishnamurthy, Motilal Banarasidas, New Delhi, 1985, 41

(2.) T.S. Eliot, Selected Essays, Faber & Faber, London, 1951, p. 247

(3.) Ibid, p. 256

(4.) Ibid, p. 247

(5.) Ibid, p. 115

(6.) Acceptability of transformation in order to harmonize the creative contents remains wanting in the theoretical framework of unification of sensibility. Transformation is the internal harmony of creative contents that is externally sustained. Bush (1997:191), Ward (1973:1) Ellamann (1987:23), Manand (1988:133) have advanced ideas exactly to the same effect.

(7.) Anandavardhana, op. cit., p. 21-23

(8.) T.S. Eliot. op. cit., p.185

(9.) Mowbrey Allen, T.S Eliot's Impersonal Theory of Poetry, Bucknill University Press, New Haven

(10.) T.S. Eliot. The Perfect Critic, Faber& Faber, London , 1978, p. 134

(11.) T.S. Eliot. Knowledge and Experience in the Philosophy of F.H. Bradley, Faber & Faber, London, 1964, p. 134

(12.) Fei-Pei Lu. Dialectical Structure of T.S. Eliot's Critical Theory, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1968

(13.) T.S. Eliot, Selected Essays, op. cit., p. 252

(14.) Mowbrey Allen, op. cit., p. 82.

(15.) T. S. Eliot, The Perfect Critic, op. cit., p. 167-168

(16.) Anandavardhana, Dhvanyaloka, 112 [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]

(17.) Anandavardhana, op. cit., p. 112

(18.) Abhinavagupta, Locan, Chowkhanbha Aanskrit Sansthan, Varanasi, p. 200

(19.) Anandavardhana, Dhvanyaloka, op. cit., p. 156

(20.) Ibid

(21.) Rajasekhara, Kavya Mimamasa, Bihar Rashtrabhasa Parishad, Patna, p. 155.

(22.) Mammata, Kavya Prakasha, Bhartiya Vidya Bhawan, New Delhi, p. 100

(23.) Anandavardhana, op cit.

(24.) K. Krishnamoorthy, Dhvani and its Critics, Motilal Banarasidas, New Delhi , 1968, p. 100

(25.) J. L. Masson and M. V. Patwardhan. Abhinavagupta's Theory of Aesthetics

(26.) William Cokson Ed., Selected Writings of Ezra Pound, Faber & Faber, London, 1978, p. 330

(27.) T. S. Eliot, Knowledge and Experience in the Philosophy of F. H. Bradley op. cit., p. 81

(28.) D. E. S. Maxwell, Poetry of T. S. Eliot, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1961, p. 69

(29.) Mahimabhatta, Vyakti-Viveka, Chowkhambha, Benares, p. 104

(30.) Kuntaka. Vakroktijivitam, Chowkhambha Sanskrit Sansthan, Benares

(31.) Maud. Ellmann. T. S. Eliot and Impersonal Theory of Poetry, New Harvester Press, London, 1987, p. 124-135

(32.) T. S. Eliot. Selected Essays, op. cit., p. 124-135

(33.) Anandavardhana, Dhvanyaloka, op. cit., p. 41

(34.) Mammata, Kavya.Prakash, op. cit., p. 70

(35.) Mahimabhatta, Vyaktiviveka, op. cit., p. 71

(36.) Abhinavagupta, Abhinavabharati, University of Delhi Press, Delhi, 1985, p. 512.

(37.) Anandavardhana, Dhvanyaloka, op. cit., p. 15-16.

(38.) Abhinavagupta, Abhinavabharati, op. cit., p. 514.

(39.) Significant or appropriate sequence is a characteristic of Bhava. Acquisition of such a remarkable tendency suggests a new feature in the development of the concept of Bhava. Anandavardhana and Mammata have made it a contextualised mode while Kuntaka takes it to be the universal order.

(40.) Mammata, Kavyaprakash, p. 26-51 [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], Kavyaprakash, p. 26-51)

(41.) Kuntaka, Vakroti-Jivitam, p. 3-10 [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]

(42.) Viswanatha, Sahiptyadarpanam

(43.) Ibid

(44.) Mammata, Kavyaprakash, op. cit., p. 73

(45.) Anandavardhana, Dhvanyaloka, op. cit., p. 157

(46.) Abhinavagupta, Abhinavabharti

(47.) T. S. Eliot, Selected Essays, op. cit., p. 4

(48.) Ibid, p. 8.






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Author:Indraguru, Bhavatosh
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Date:Jan 1, 2007
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