Printer Friendly

Destabilizing the Middle East: U.S. policy toward Palestine, 1943-1949.

Abundant literature on U.S. policy toward Palestine acknowledges the overriding influence of domestic support for a Jewish state. President Harry S. Truman's electoral concerns as well as outrage over the Holocaust naturally affected his decisions, and well-funded Zionist organizations were positioned to shape public opinion in the United States and finance the struggle of immigrants to transform the Holy Land into their biblical homeland. Historians agree on these generalities, although their interpretations span a continuum from praise to outrage, many expressing resignation to these events as the by-product of America's system of democratic governance.(1)

William R. Polk presents the Arab-Israeli War of 1948 as far more disruptive than suggested by its: small scale relative to European conflicts, considering the large number of Arab refugees whose plight remains unresolved to this day.(2) L. Carl Brown credibly portrays the displaced Palestinians as victims and suggests some parallel between their plight and the Holocaust.(3) Relativism notwithstanding, the White House's pivotal support for the creation of Israel thwarted the Department of State's objective to preserve regional stability.(4) America's commitment to a Jewish homeland held great significance for Truman, and the government's consistent support for it ever since the 1917 Balfour Declaration became a touchstone for public opinion.(5) It was unsurprising, as Thomas G. Patterson writes, that the president largely ignored advice from the Department of State,(6) instead adopting an approach that Dan Tschirgi dismisses as quixotic.(7)

Truman related to the Zionist refugees for a variety of reasons, many of which incorporated elements of Judeo-Christian mysticism. The Congress, like the diverse populace it represented, envisioned the Jewish state as serving as a periscope for U.S. interests in a hostile part of the world. This viewpoint grew out of somewhat questionable religious and cultural assumptions. Though obviously more Western than the Arabs, the earliest Israelis came disproportionately from Eastern Europe, and indeed courted Soviet sponsorship for their armed struggle. While the Cold War had not yet gained full momentum by this period, the Department of State appreciated that Middle Easterners viewed Zionism and communism with equal, not always distinguishable dread.

Blurring the nature of Jewishness itself was that a majority of Jewish Palestinians did not practice their religion. Whether or not Muslims were more devout, a significant minority of Arabs did practice Christianity. The United States abandoned its ideal of separating church and state for a secular state whose existence would provoke fundamentalist extremism, itself based on politics rather than religion. Melvyn Leffler sympathetically portrays the president and his advisers as facing tremendously complex decisions in Palestine, conscious that any might fail.(8) Undermining his otherwise superb treatment of the Cold War is that, although Truman did alter his stance on Palestine at some junctures, he did so without prescience. His stance varied only in its degree of pro-Zionism. At no point did it promote alternatives that the Middle East considered satisfactory.

U.S. policy toward Palestine during and after the Second World War became a de facto policy toward Israel long before its declaration of statehood. Truman's decisions, regardless of their popularity, alienated the Arab world as was foreseeable and foreseen by personnel within his administration. Gabriel Kolko notes the tendency of historians to portray U.S. foreign relations as more coherent than policymakers actually approached them at the time.(9) The case of Palestine marks a departure from this insofar as it has led to portrayals of Truman as unduly aware of the strategic consequences of his policy or, as Michael J. Cohen insists, resistant to Zionist demands when he believed they contradicted America's objective national interest.(10)

This article presents an overview based, for the most part, on readily available sources. It borrows from archival sources to augment policymaking details of the general drama that journalists recounted both thoroughly and insightfully, and it abides a chronological approach for the sake of clarity. However much methodological innovation can revitalize history, this article chooses to present a geopolitical perspective of events, as appreciated at the time and as can be documented as an evolving tapestry. The more emotional--though not illogical--perspective that held greater importance for President Truman and Americans at large receives some elaboration thereafter. In short, the strategic viewpoint derived from the Arab world's vehement rejection of the United States's empathy toward Jewish refugees, as well as its willingness to suspend the concept of justice and self-determination since the Holocaust, had violated the same concepts on an unfathomably greater scale.

In July 1943, American Zionists strenuously protested a scheduled White House press release, leaked to them from official sources, that the United States would consult Arabs as well as Jews in its decision regarding Palestine. The secretaries of state and war decided to cancel the statement for fear that it would undermine Jewish support for the Allied cause in the Second World War. Within a year this trend accelerated with a White House-al)proved press release that the government supported unrestricted Jewish immigration to Palestine.(11) President Franklin D. Roosevelt elaborated that this did not represent an official position on Palestine; it simply was necessary to save Jews from Hitler's persecution.(12)

The Department of State's specialists in the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (ONEAA) believed that Zionist activists were being allowed to alter the impartiality of U.S. foreign policy that was believed necessary to preserve harmonious relations with the Middle East.(13) They believed that Arab Palestinians deserved self-rule in the regions where they still formed the majority, and granting this was the best means by which to prevent a recurrence of the violent uprising against Jewish immigration that had erupted in 1936-39.(14)

The King of Saudi Arabia warned President Roosevelt that America's support for "unreasonable" Jewish immigration would lead to great bloodshed and disorder throughout the Middle East.(15) Weeks later in February 1945, Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon forged a common diplomatic front known as the Pan-Arab League. Having dispelled Zionist hopes that conflicts between their leaders would prevent them from uniting,(16) they joined the Allied war effort in a gesture that reflected their desire for greater cooperation with and respect from the Western powers.(17) Furthering this effort, the Arab League announced its willingness to discuss the immigration of up to three hundred thousand Jews into the lands of Arab Palestinians whose territory the league considered an independent state even though it had won no such recognition.(18)

American Zionists, dissatisfied with this compromise, sought and won bipartisan support from the U.S. Congress for unlimited Jewish immigration.(19) At the Department of State's recommendation, President Truman repeated his predecessor s pledge of neutrality to King Saud, but, to avoid domestic criticism, he did not publicize it.(20) Moreover, his neutrality was as suspect as Roosevelt's since he was pressuring the British to liberalize Jewish immigration beyond the quota of fifteen hundred per month set by its White Paper. London believed that it was preferable to take the issue before the United Nations, lest the Allies face a major conflict in the Holy Land that could disrupt the flow of their supplies to the Pacific theater.(21) The Arab majority in Palestine had fallen from 93 to 67 percent over the last six years, with the Jewish population now at six hundred thousand.(22)

Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Grew attempted to explain these practical considerations to the Jewish Agency--the Zionist organization to which Britain had delegated authority over Palestinian immigration. Chaim Weizmann, the future president of Israel, responded that Jews would employ any degree of force necessary to increase immigration and establish a national homeland.(23) This bellicosity, however, had no effect on the U.S. Army's decision, made in coordination with the United Nations, to grant preferential treatment for Jewish refugees and transport small groups of them directly to Palestine.(24)

President Truman in August 1945 declared his support for increasing Jewish immigration to the limit of Palestine's absorptive capacity, and he expressed hope that maintaining peace thereafter would not require a half million U.S. soldiers.(25) Britain adamantly rejected his position, and the State Department concurred with its logic that the military responsibilities would be too great in light of the Arab world's increasing hostility.(26) The Joint Chiefs of Staff objected to any policy that might entail consequences beyond Britain s unilateral control. U.S. intervention, it speculated, would plunge the whole region into anarchy that could become a pretext for global conflict.(27)

While such concern did not temper the enthusiasm of American journalists for so-called "refugee Zionism," the British public was prepared for more sober analysis. The Economist censured Truman's position for being based upon unwillingness more than inability to appreciate the difficulties confronting British troops in their attempt to maintain order.(28) Highly publicized charges of the U.S. military mistreating Jewish refugees gave new impetus for increased immigration.(29) The investigation called for by Truman alleged that, although the army did not mistreat Jews by any conventional standard, it failed to do enough for them out of an unwillingness to inconvenience the defeated Germans. The final report called for the immediate immigration of one hundred thousand Jews to Palestine.(30)

British Prime Minister Clement Attlee implored Truman not to release the report. The ONEAA pointed out that the president's approach to Palestine was threatening to imperil Anglo-American relations, aside from inciting the Middle East.(31) Regardless, Truman released the report and specifically endorsed its immigration target.(32) This unfortunate development, in Attlee's perspective, only encouraged Jews to circumvent the White Paper whose quota they were leaving unfilled in protest of British policy.(33) The prime minister reminded his U.S. counterpart that failing to consult the Arabs, in accord with the White House's earlier pledge, risked igniting the entire region in violence.(34) Sharing this perspective, the Department of State cautioned that U.S. credibility was waning and that it eventually might be negated altogether at the expense of the country's vital security interests.(35)

In October 1945, General Dwight D. Eisenhower assured the White House that conditions for Jews had improved significantly,(36) and he echoed British concerns that the report had conspicuously ignored logistical considerations.(37) These had grown acute not only in Europe but also in the Holy Land where formations of well-armed, illegal Jewish immigrants increased in number and willingness to engage British forces.(38) Palestine turned into such a guerrilla battlefield that the U.S. Army ordered it off limits to non-essential personnel and evacuated the remainder.(39) The political adviser to the Supreme Allied Command in the Mediterranean Theater asserted that it was inconsequential that the Jewish Agency did not endorse terrorism officially, since its encouragement of illegal immigration had the same effect.(40)

Secretary of State James F. Byrnes later in the month restated that the United States would adhere to its pledge to consult with both Jews and Arabs in making further decisions on immigration to Palestine.(41) The New York Times reproduced the correspondence between King Saud and Roosevelt that had initially declared this intention.(42) Truman displayed no embarrassment, much less contrition, about having held a press conference to deny that the pledge had ever been made. On the contrary, he increased pressure on the British to increase their quota of monthly Jewish immigration to Palestine from 1,500 to 1,800.(43) Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria presented Byrnes with a declaration that they would go to war if the immigration that the president supported were to lead to the establishment of a Jewish state, as seemed likely.(44)

Jewish activism toward this end provoked riots throughout the Middie East,(45) reinforcing London's opposition to mass immigration. Truman, now recognizing the need for greater cooperation with the British, agreed to the formation of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry (AAC).(46) In December 1945, he withdrew his support of a congressional proposal in favor of unlimited immigration and the establishment of a Jewish state. Although still committed to immediately opening Palestine to one hundred thousand Jews, he claimed to oppose the creation of any state based on race or religion, and instead called for genuine democracy.(47)

Given that half of the dozen members of the AAC were British, Arabs hoped that the committee would be able to analyze the effects of Jewish immigration on Palestine, its primary objective, without being unfairly biased.(48) One encouraging step was that it followed through on Roosevelt's pledge to consult with both sides. Arab delegates to the hearings in Cairo explained their insistence on the immigration quotas set by the White Paper in terms of the political, military, and economic threats posed by Zionism.(49) Fearful that their position was not duly appreciated, the Middle Eastern states commenced an economic boycott against Jewish Palestinians in an unsuccessful attempt to render further immigration infeasible.(50)

When hearings finished in Jerusalem, some British members supported Arab calls to divest the Jewish Agency of control over immigration since its leaders refused to cooperate with Britain's anti-terrorist efforts.(51) The U.S. representatives responded with threats to resign if London continued to oppose mass immigration for any reason,(52) and they sought to expand the Jewish Agency's authority.(53) Amid rumors that U.S. loans were at stake, the British representatives altered their stance in April 1946, voting in favor of the immigration of one hundred thousand Jews as quickly as possible.(54) Distraught by Washington's unwillingness to intervene against weapons transfers to Zionist guerrillas,(55) London refused to implement the committee's recommendation.(56)

The AAC ironically proceeded there to continue detailing a plan for the mass immigration opposed by the host government. One alternative was to divide Palestine into three zones--15 percent Jewish, 45 percent British, and 40 percent Arab--with the British retaining overall authority but delegating powers in accord with a federal constitution.(57) While President Truman withheld opinion, the Arab League denounced the plan for allowing Jews to control the immigration in their sector and thereby encouraging their much greater territorial ambitions.(58) The Jewish Agency, on the other hand, accepted the principle of apartition,(59) and it chose this moment to remind President Truman that retreating in any way from his pro-Zionist position would incur the wrath of Jewish opinion in the United States and around the world.(60)

Truman withdrew American representatives from ongoing negotiations when the AAC began to consider a bi-national state as an alternative to a partition.(61) Secretary Byrnes, cognizant of Britain's inability to finance any plan for Palestine without U.S. support, concurred with this decision.(62) Some diplomatic personnel encouraged the president to issue a statement endorsing a partition in the hope that doing so would put the Jewish Agency in a position to achieve immediate mass immigration. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the contrary, presented this tact as highly injurious to long-term U.S. interests in the Middle East.(63) Saudi Arabia informed Washington of the Muslim world's growing embitterment, and it refused to deny rumors that it planned to deprive America of oil concessions unless the country's policy changed drastically.(64) The Syrian government had already refused to discuss oil or transportation agreements with the United States.(65)

The president announced opposition to the AAC's majority decision in favor of a bi-national plan based on the current population ratio, rather than the partition plan that called for a million new Jewish immigrants.(66) King Saud rebuked him for attempting to "perpetrate a monstrous injustice" against the will of Arabs who, he claimed, had not been consulted sufficiently.(67) Truman promptly denied the applicability of Roosevelt's pledge, arguing that a Jewish state was not by definition inimical to Arab interests.(68) This position he rationalized with the assertion that Arabs harbored an unfair anti-Jewish bias.(69) King Saud, the Arab world's unofficial spokesman, unsurprisingly dissented; he held Washington responsible for betraying both Arabs and the British to Jewish immigrants who held distinct advantages in military training and supplies.(70)

The Jewish Agency did not deny these advantages. Rather, it appeared to use them as leverage by reiterating its refusal to intervene against terrorism unless the British consented to mass immigration.(71) The Arab Higher Committee (AHC), the major political organization representing Palestinians, recoiled at America's self-appointed right to intervene in its affairs.(72) Haj Amin al-Husseini (the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and a highly influential Palestinian leader) formed an underground movement to prepare anti-terrorist strikes. Although its size, an estimated twenty thousand,(73) was small relative to the total of various Jewish militias, Secretary of State Byrnes deemed it adverse to the conciliatory efforts necessary for charting Palestine's future. He blamed King Saud's harsh rhetoric for encouraging violence although he refrained from charging the Jewish Agency likewise.(74)

The British delegates succumbed to pressure for a partition in January 1946 as AAC negotiations proceeded. Their government, however, still refused to enforce it against the unanimous will of Arab Palestinians.(75) Violence in the Holy Land escalated to such a degree the following month that Britain evacuated all women, children, and non-essential military personnel, as the U.S. Army already had.(76) Lest the situation grow even more dangerous, Loy W. Henderson, director of the ONEAA, recommended that the United States express no opinion on the partition plan.(77) Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson agreed. He recognized that U.S. support for the partition would be domestically popular but that its explosive consequences abroad negated any such justification.(78)

On 24 February 1947, Britain turned Palestine over to the United Nations, asserting that a partition would be impossible to enforce aside from going beyond the terms of the Mandate.(79) Secretary Bevin announced exasperation that U.S. domestic politics appeared to exert a stronger influence over Truman than a desire to accommodate the British or Arabs in any way.(80) Palestine had become a low-intensity battleground on which clashes reached new peaks with each wave of illegal Jewish immigration.(81)

The General Assembly attempted to prevent the trend toward full-scale warfare by appointing a Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) to report on all related issues by the end of its regular session in September.(82) The Arab Higher Committee and Jewish Agency were allowed to send liaisons but not formal representatives in an attempt to avoid bias.(83) The committee's eleven members were chosen from smaller powers that held fewer direct interests and rivalries than the Big Five.(84) The Jewish Agency objected that smaller powers were less likely to take the bold initiatives that the situation required.(85)

If the Zionist cause faced a possible setback, it regained momentum during the special session of the General Assembly held in April 1946.(86) There, in New York, America's predominately Zionist press took a more active role than in the past. Instead of merely advocating policy, Freda Kirchway, one of The Nation's editors, circulated to all fifty-one UN delegations photographs of Arab leaders posing with National Socialist leaders including the Fuhrer. The Arab Higher Committee made no attempt to deny its association with leaders, such as the Grand Mufti, who had sided with the Axis powers, insisting that Palestinians had a right to choose their own leaders rather than have them imposed by Washington. The term collaborator, the AHC contended, was inappropriate since Palestine had not been at war with Germany.(87)

The special session ended the following month with a resolution that all parties should refrain from violence, at least until UNSCOP completed its report.(88) It was not promising that Jewish guerrillas responded to this by taking British officers hostage in retaliation for death sentences issued to their militant colleagues.(89) Hagana, the Jewish Agency's militia, bombed civilian Arab positions as further retaliation,(90) and the AHC withdrew from UNSCOP, which it believed to be legitimizing Zionist ends and means alike.(91) Within a hundred yards of a later committee meeting in Jerusalem, Jewish paramilitary forces brazenly attempted to kidnap a British policeman. The U.S. consul general indicated that events seemed to confirm Arab charges of bias since UNSCOP maintained its plea to stay the executions of convicted Jewish terrorists and refused to censure Hagana's excesses.(92)

Loy W. Henderson called for the United States to renounce the partition plan because it legitimated the goals of an armed minority, violated Arab self-determination, and increased Zionist demands.(93) As the Holy Land descended into chaos, financed largely with American dollars, according to Bevin,(94) illegal Jewish immigration rose steadily. The Jewish Agency repeated its five-year-old demand to transform all of Palestine into a Jewish state although it did not renounce the partition plan per se.(95) U.S. legislators in a complementary fashion renewed pressure for an unlimited number of Jewish immigrants, as Truman had supported originally.(96)

Hope of any concessions to British security imperatives disappeared when soldiers violently intercepted Exodus 1947 on its voyage delivering over forty-five hundred illegal Jewish immigrants to Palestine.(97) The Jewish Agency portrayed the mandatory power's willingness to repel victims of Nazism as a form of Nazism itself.(98) One of the interned refugee leaders defiantly announced that Jewish refugees were confident that they would be able to secure their objectives in Palestine through violence.(99)

In August 1946, UNSCOP presented the General Assembly with its majority plan to partition Palestine, stretch the immigration of 150,000 Jews over a two-year transitional period, and grant independence to Jewish and Arab states thereafter.(100) Even threatened with a full economic and cultural break with the Middle East,(101) and appreciating that American troops might be required,(102) the U.S. mission at the United Nations on 10 October 1947 announced support for the partition based on Truman's claim that it would not jeopardize Arab rights.(103) The Arab League solemnly predicted that this development made war inevitable, and the AHC declared that it would "fight to the last man."(104)

When U.S. delegates commenced a campaign to win support for the partition plan, charges emerged of America's domestic considerations being used as leverage against other states whose votes were needed.(105) Herschel Johnson, the U.S. representative to the United Nations, denied any inappropriate official coercion but recognized that well-financed and highly organized American chapters of the Jewish Agency exerted formidable pressure throughout Latin America and elsewhere.(106) When Britain, unswayed by Zionist lobbies, refused to allow its troops to be put under UN command during the transitional period,(107) the United States indicated that it considered independence viable directly after the Mandate's termination.(108) The following month UNSCOP voted in favor of the majority plan over the argument of those who supported a unitary state and charged that a partition made a mockery of Palestine's self-determination.(109)

Truman bore indirect responsibility for episodes of "political blackmail," according to the ONEAA, since he had ordered the American delegation to bring other countries into line. Both official and unofficial coercion had to be avoided, it reasoned, since the United Nations could not legitimately enforce a policy opposed by the majority of Palestinians.(110) These concerns were disregarded by senators who threatened to suspend economic assistance to countries that voted against the plan.(111)

The General Assembly on 29 November 1947 voted in favor of the final partition plan that ceded two-thirds of Palestine to the Jewish immigrants who constituted but one-third of its population.(112) Riots broke out in Cairo with twenty thousand protesters chanting for retaliation against the United States.(113) Acting Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett attempted to counteract this hostility by instructing the U.S. Embassy in Egypt to inform King Farouk that public opinion had forced the government to support the partition.(114) The department's Policy Planning Staff concurred with regret that most Americans supported Jewish statehood, regardless of how war in the region might lead to an Arab oil embargo and thus jeopardize the European recovery program.(115)

This issue did motivate the United States to retreat to the idea of a temporary international trusteeship.(116) Truman presented it not as a substitute for partition but as a stopgap measure to preserve stability.(117) Jewish Agency personnel condemned the proposal as treasonous but undamaging since a de facto Jewish state already existed and would be formally declared after the British Mandate expired.(118) For this reason, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the trusteeship plan was little better than a partition. It is now estimated that upholding a trusteeship would require one hundred thousand troops, the majority American, and that this number, though less than previously estimated, was too great in the wake of demobilization.(119)

Conflict in Palestine was claiming dozens of lives on a daily basis, the cumulative death toll having doubled over the last four months to 2,018 Arabs; 1,850 Jews; and 309 British.(120) Negotiations between the Jewish Agency, Arab Higher Committee, and British failed to produce an enforceable truce.(121) The U.S. consul in Jerusalem reported that Jewish forces had no incentive to cooperate since ample munitions stoked their fanaticism.(122) To compromise with the poorly organized Arabs or the already retreating British would have constituted an unnecessary abandonment of their plans to establish a government.(123) American journalists applauded that Zionists wielded enough power to overtake areas that the partition plan assigned to Arabs.(124)

Representatives from the U.S. armed forces converged in an emergency meeting of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to discuss the partition plan. Its presiding officer set the tone by dividing the consequences into only two categories, the damage already done and the damage likely to follow. His pessimism corresponded to doubt that American Jews could be prevented from assisting their brethren overseas since President Truman and prominent UN personnel openly participated in their fundraisers.(125) Fearful of the Mandate's expiration, Middle Eastern states offered to accept the unfavorable terms of the partition plan.(126) The impetus for a Jewish state had grown exponentially such that it could not be reversed at this late moment.

Israel declared statehood on 15 May 1948. Ignoring the advice of Secretary of State George C. Marshall to respond only after consulting with other UN members,(127) President Truman granted de facto recognition to its provisional government within twenty-one minutes.(128) He called for the UN's truce to be upheld in an effort to protect the fledgling state from the thirty thousand troops that the Arab League dispatched to Palestine after declaring war.(129) American diplomats in Saudi Arabia reported that the "profoundly shocked" royal family was considering breaking relations with the United States. King Saud, who considered Israel a threat to the independence of all Arabs, announced his willingness to lose fighting rather than to surrender.(130)

Israeli statehood trivialized disputes between the radical Irgun and Stem Gangs that had joined the national struggle led by the Hagana. Their combined forces exceeded those of the Arab League in both number and resources due to support primarily from American Jewish groups.(131) Superb organization complemented their nearly inexhaustible supplies while the Arab League's members suffered from conflicts of interest that befuddled their multi-national coordination,(132)

In Britain's perspective, the Middle East had no choice but to intervene.(133) The Arab League unsuccessfully appealed to the UN Charter's provision for regional organizations to defend against aggression.(134) As the amazingly efficient Israeli government moved into buildings vacated by the Mandate authorities, Arab troops were forced to abandon over two hundred Palestinian villages.(135) The Department of State accurately predicted that, regardless of ongoing UN attempts to impose a truce,(136) the uninterrupted flow of illegal arms to Zionists guaranteed them an uncompromised victory.(137)

The Democratic Party platform called for exempting Israel from the regional arms embargo that the United States upheld, at least nominally.(138) Truman resisted pressure to alter his policy since the British might respond by exempting the Arabs, who would consider the U.S. move a virtual declaration of war.(139) If, as it appeared, there were limits to his domestic political motivations, Arab leaders could afford fewer. American diplomatic personnel recognized that any Middle Eastern government which abandoned the anti-Zionist struggle in Palestine would be overthrown, possibly leading to a withdrawal of all Arab states from the United Nations by heightening public outrage that the organization served Israeli interests.(140) The sorest point of contention was that the Jewish immigration that served as the catalyst for Israeli statehood had forced a half million Arabs to flee to neighboring states which could hardly provide sustenance to their own populations.(141)

The refugee issue, obviously incompatible with the Israeli government's stated desire for peaceful coexistence, embarrassed the U.S. delegation to the United Nations,(142) but insufficiently for it to criticize Israel's territorial aggrandizement. Truman ignored the almost unanimous consensus among his diplomatic personnel that Israel had to be considered the war's aggressor. He attributed his unswerving support for the new state to the historical persecution of Jews.(143)

The United Nations responded slowly and modestly to the Arab refugee crisis, and, by granting membership to Israel in May 1949, ensured that its relief program would never be sufficient.(144) The final armistice agreement signed thereafter legitimated Jewish authority over 40 percent more territory than called for by the partition plan. Israel's militarily unchallenged position allowed it to refuse any responsibility for displaced Arabs, such as compensation or repatriation, and to expropriate their property to accommodate a monthly influx of over twenty-five thousand immigrants.(145) The Arab League's worst fears had been realized, based not upon paranoia, as Truman had suggested, but upon a proper assessment of an enemy that had stated its intentions repeatedly and bluntly.

Michael Palumbo devotes a superb monograph to the moral contradictions between creating a Jewish state and expelling the resident Arabs.(146) The humanitarian issues that he raises are compelling, but not necessarily more so than those raised by Zionists. Arab Palestinians' affiliation with those who had perpetrated the Holocaust detracted from the credibility of their pleas for justice, although the pleas themselves held validity. More importantly, even with the Arab League's assistance, Arab Palestinians lacked resources in any way comparable to those raised in the United States for Jewish immigrants.

Ralph Bunche--the U.S. mediator for Palestine who unsuccessfully attempted to enforce the cease-fire agreements brokered by the United Nations--believed that the Jews won their most important victory politically, hemorrhaging foreign support, mostly from the United States, to transform their state into an undeniable reality prior to the Mandate's termination. Furthermore, he acknowledged that the Arab states had repeatedly announced that they would intervene if, as they witnessed, Israel was allowed to establish itself step by step.(147)

For many, the ancient promise for a Jewish homeland implied the modern concept of nation-statehood, and it remained inseparable from the religious dogma that those who sought it were God's chosen people. The United States shared this rarely admitted conviction since it was more steeped in biblical traditions than its citizens cared to acknowledge. Like non-practicing Jews, a significant number of non-practicing Christians took it for granted that Jews belonged in the Holy Land, regardless of the opinions held by other residents there. Many of those who upheld formal Judeo-Christian traditions held the same perceptions, but it is revealing that the Catholic Church became one of the few non-government organizations to aid the Palestinian refugees. Its clergy lamented that the U.S. press paid scant attention to those 750,000 Arabs who had been left homeless, starving, and freezing to death in the desert.(148) The church's pleas on their behalf also received scant attention since many Jews regarded it as having consented silently to the Holocaust.

American journalists avidly supported the Jewish cause, it is true, but their incessant reports acknowledged the Arab perspective as well. Rather than their propaganda itself, Zionists' effectiveness on the battlefield made refugees of the Arab Palestinians.(149) Ralph Bunche learned of this semantical distinction when in 1949 he was assassinated by Jewish paramilitary troops. Americans had sufficient information at their disposal to appreciate the simple conflict of interest in Palestine, but their perspective transcended factual analysis since their heritage was fully' suffused' with the concept of Zionism, a fact upon which its American exponents hoped to and did capitalize.(150)

Jewish leaders deserved no blame for fully utilizing their opportunities to influence U.S. policy, and it must be acknowledged that this influence would have come to nothing but for their unflinching willingness to confront Arab Palestinians face-to-face. The fundamental issue, not overlooked by all journalists at the time, was that American decisions rashly coincided with the Zionists' influence.(151) From the Central Intelligence Agency to the National Security Council to the Department of State, personnel agreed that President Truman was jeopardizing long-term U.S. interests by giving Israel's neighbors reason to consider it the bulwark of Western colonialism.(152)

Throughout the 1940s, Rabbi Judah Leon Magnes, the American-born president of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, voiced opposition to a Jewish state in religious as well as political terms. He reasoned that animosity toward Israel would carry over, by default, to the Jewish faith. The Christian Century indelicately captured his sentiments by referring to Israel as one of the "darkest tragedies in the record of Judaism."(153) Magnes, unquestionably a man who appreciated the nuanced aspects of his religion, feared that Jews everywhere would be perceived as guilty by association with "their" state's amoral nascence, aside from being faced with questions of national allegiance.

The same periodical aptly hailed him as one of the noblest figures in the modern world," noting his courage to advocate a bi-national state before the United Nations.(154) The role that he played was not merely thankless; it incurred the wrath of all parties. Arabs ventured that he secretly supported the Zionist cause and only cloaked his statements in moderation.(155) This cynicism was understandable but unjustified since he impressed the overwhelming majority of American Jews as an apostate, in the political terms that had come to redefine Judaism. The Arabs actually had no better ally than Magnes, for he was in a position to condemn the violence of "new-fashioned Hebrews" without being charged with anti-Semitism.(156) It reflected tragically upon his era rather than upon him that he died in virtual exile.(157)

The regional destabilization foreseen by Truman's frustrated advisers and Rabbi Magnes has reached fruition over a half century of repeated Arab-Israeli wars, an Arab oil embargo, and perpetual failure to resolve the Palestinian refugee crisis. Now, given its own military presence in the region and unwavering commitment to Israel's defense, the United States faces bleak prospects in convincing the Arab world that its ongoing involvement is neutral. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1947 accurately predicted that, by sponsoring Jewish statehood, it inextricably linked its influence in the region to the threat or use of force.(158) Since Arab leaders during this period had been afflicted by their own rivalries, the Middle East might never have achieved stability, but Israel introduced a more perpetual source of destabilization than otherwise imaginable--and one from which the United States would never be able to distance itself.

(1.) See, for example, the contributions of Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Hooshang Amirahmadi, Ilan Pappe, J. C. Hurewitz, Martin Gilbert, Nadav Safran, David Sehoenbaum, Evan M. Wilson, and Bernard Reich.

(2.) William R. Polk, David M. Stammler, and Edmund Asfour, Backdrop to Tragedy (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1957), 291-92. Also see the contributions of W. F. Abboushi, Ibrahim Abu-Lubhod, John W. Amos, M. F. Anabtawi, Naseer Aruri, John S. Badeau, Aouney W. Dejany, Wilbur Crane Eveland, Fred J. Khouri, and Andrew C. Kimmens.

(3.) L. Carl Brown, International Politics and the Middle East (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 135-38.

(4.) See David E. Long, The United States and Saudi Arabia (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), 2-7; Peter L. Hahn, The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 1, 92.

(5.) See Zionist Organization of America, The American War Congress and Zionism (New York, 1919); American Zionist Emergency Council, After the Victory (New York: American Zionist Emergency Council, 1943); Jewish Agency for Palestine, Documents Relating to the Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate (London: Jewish Agency for Palestine, 1939); Reuben Fink, ed., America and Palestine (New York: American Zionist Emergency Council, 1944).

(6.) Thomas G. Paterson, Meeting the Communist Threat (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 86.

(7.) Dan Tschirgi, The Politics of Indecision (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983), 31-33, 143-45, 255-56. Also see the contributions of Kenneth Ray Bain, George W. Ball, Douglas B. Ball, Abraham Ben-Zvi, Bruce J. Evensen, and Edward Tivnan.

(8.) Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power (Stanford, Conn.: Stanford University Press, 1992), 122, 239-46.

(9.) Gabriel Kolko, Confronting the Third World (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), 3.

(10.) Michael J. Cohen, Truman and Israel (Berkley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1990), 275-81.

(11.) Memorandum by Director, ONEAA (Murray) to Acting Secretary of State, 20 March 1945, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, hereafter FRUS, 1945, vol. 3, The Near East and Africa (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), 694-95.

(12.) Memorandum by Executive Director, War Relief Board (Pehle) to Under Secretary of State (Stettinius), 10 March 1944, FRUS 1944, vol. 1, General (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 1006-07.

(13.) Memorandum by Director, ONEAA (Murray) to Acting Secretary of State, 20 March 1945, FRUS 1945, 3: 694-95.

(14.) Four Memoranda Prepared by Department of State, 30 January 1945, FRUS 1945, 3: 684-87.

(15.) Minister in Saudi Arabia (Eddy) to Secretary of State, 22 February 1945, FRUS 1945, 3: 690.

(16.) "Pan-Arab Conference Opens in Cairo," Christian Century 62 (28 February 1945): 260.

(17.) Sidney B. Fay, "The New Arab Federation," Current History 8 (May 1945): 398-402.

(18.) Hal Lehrman, "Pan-Arabia Deserta," The Nation 160 (14 April 1945): 413-14; Sidney B. Fay, "The New Arab Federation," Current History 8 (May 1945): 398-402.

(19.) Julian Louis Meltzer, "Arab Compromise on Jews Reported," The New York Times, hereafter NYT, 11 March 1945.

(20.) Memorandum for President by Acting Secretary of State (Grew), 1 May 1945, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Liberty, Missouri, B File: Recognition of Israel.

(21.) Briefing Book Paper, 22 June 1945, FRUS 1945 The Conference of Berlin (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1960), 971-73.

(22.) "Wagner Appeals for a Free World," NYT, 25 February 1945.

(23.) Memorandum by Director, ONEAA (Henderson), 28 June 1945, FRUS 1945 Potsdam, 978-79.

(24.) "Jewish Refugees Aided by UNRRA," UNRRA Monthly Review 12 (August 1945): 19.

(25.) Secretary of State (Byrnes) to Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton), 18 August 1945, FRUS 1945, 3: 722.

(26.) ONEAA (Hendeson) to Secretary of State, 10 October 1945, National Archives, College Park, Maryland, Record Group 59, herafter RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Office of Near East Affairs, Subject File.

(27.) Joint Chiefs of Staff, Memorandum for the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, 21 June 1946, National Archives, RG 59, Office of Near East Affairs, Subject File.

(28.) "Policy for Palestine," The Economist 149 (29 September 1945): 450-51.

(29.) U.S. Forces, European Theater (Eisenhower) to President Truman, 14 September 1945, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abeline, Kansas, Pre-Presidential File.

(30.) Summary of President Truman to General Eisenhower, 31 August 1945, Truman Library, Official File 127; Report of Earl G. Harrison to President Truman, Eisenhower Library, Pre-Presidential File: Truman.

(31.) Memorandum by Chief, Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Merriam) to Director, ONEAA (Henderson), 26 September 1945, FRUS 1945, 3: 745-48.

(32.) Henry Morganthau, Jr., to President Truman, 30 September 1945, Truman Library, Official File 127; Statement by President, 13 November 1945, Truman Library, Nash Papers.

(33.) British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman, 5 October 1946, National Archives, RG 59, Office of Near East Affairs, Subject File.

(34.) British Prime Minister (Attlee) to President Truman, 16 September 1945, FRUS 1945, 3: 740-41.

(35.) Memorandum from Acting Secretary of State (Acheson) to President (Truman), 2 October 1945, National Archives, RG 59, Office of Near Eastern Affairs, Subject File.

(36.) Commanding General, U.S. Forces, European Theater (Eisenhower) to President Truman, 8 October 1945, Truman Library, Official File 127.

(37.) General Eisenhower to President Truman, 8 October 1945, Truman Library, Official File 408; "General Eisenhower Commends UNRRA Efficiency in DP Operations," UNRRA Monthly Review 15 (November 1945): 8.

(38.) British Embassy to Department of State, 19 October 1945, FRUS 1945, 3: 775.

(39.) A.C. Sedgwick, "U.S. Sends Stores from Palestine," NYT, 13 October 1945.

(40.) Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser to SACMED, to Secretary of State, 2 November 1945, FRUS 1945, 3: 806.

(41.) "US Bars Decision on Palestine Without Consulting Jews, Arabs," NYT, 19 October 1945.

(42.) "Texts of Letters Exchanged by Ibn Saud and Roosevelt," NYT, 19 October 1945.

(43.) "Battle of Jericho," Time 46 (29 October 1945): 32.

(44.) King Abdullah to President Truman, 29 September 1945; ONEAA (Henderson) to Undersecretary of State, 1 October 1945; ONEAA (Henderson) to Secretary of State, 9 October 1945, National Archives, RG 59, Office of Near East Affairs, Subject File.

(45.) "The Near East: Eruption," Time 46 (12 November 1945): 40.

(46.) Secretary of State to Ambassador in UK (Winant), 13 November 1945, FRUS 1945, 3: 819-20.

(47.) "President Truman's Position on Palestine Defined," Christian Century 62 (19 December 1945): 1405.

(48.) Executive Order, 19 January 1946, Truman Library, Nash Papers; Summary of Secretary of State to President, 2 January [1946], Truman Library, Pre-Presidential Papers, Personal File.

(49.) Acting Secretary of State to Certain American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 17 January 1946, FRUS 1946, 7: 576-80.

(50.) "The Arab Boycott," The Economist 150 (19 January 1946): 86.

(51.) "Palestine: No Compromise," Newsweek 27 (18 March 1946): 53.

(52.) Representative Emanuel Celler to President Truman, 20 March 1946, Truman Library, B File: Recognition of Israel.

(53.) Sydney Gruson, "Wide Inquiry Split on Palestine Seen," NYT, 6 April 1946.

(54.) Sydney Gruson, "Palestine Visas for 100,000 Urged by Anglo-US Board," NYT, 23 April 1946.

(55.) Acting Secretary of State to Certain American Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 25 April 1946, FBUS 1946, 7: 585-88.

(56.) Memorandum by Director, ONEAA (Henderson) to Undersecretary of State (Acheson), 7 June 1946, FBUS 1946, 7: 619.

(57.) "Palestine: Rubble," Time 48 (5 August 1946): 33.

(58.) Charge in Egypt (Lyon) to Secretary of State, 2 August 1946, FRUS 1946, 7: 676.

(59.) President Truman to British Prime Minister (Attlee), 12 August 1946, FRUS 1946, 7: 682.

(60.) Ambassador in UK (Harriman) to Secretary of State, 25 July 1946, FRUS 1946, 7: 667-(68.)

(61.) Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 5 September 1946, FRUS 1946, 7: 691.

(62.) "Comment on Admission of Displaced Jews to Palestine," Department of State Bulletin 15 (25 August 1945): 380.

(63.) Memorandum by Acting Secretary of State to President Truman, 12 September 1946, FRUS 1946, 7: 693-98.

(64.) Clifton Daniel, "US Urged to Shift Middle East Aims," NYT, 6 September 1946.

(65.) Clifton Daniel, "Syria Bars U.S. Oil and Air Talks Because of U.S. Zionist Sympathy Here," NYT, 4 September 1946.

(66.) "President Truman on Palestine," Current History 11 (December 1946): 517-19.

(67.) King of Saudi Arabia (Saud) to President Truman, 15 October 1946, FRUS 1946, 7: 708-09.

(68.) Statement by the President, 4 October 1946, Truman Library, Nash Papers, Press Releases; "United States-Arabian View on Palestine Problem," Department of State Bulletin 15 (10 November 1946): 848-51.

(69.) Memorandum by Acting Secretary of State, 13 December 1946, FRUS 1946, 7: 730.

(70.) President Truman to King Saud, 28 October 1946, Truman Library, Nash Papers.

(71.) Charge in UK (Gallman) to Secretary of State, 5 October 1946, FRUS 1946, 7: 705.

(72.) "Arab Kidnapped by Zionist Gang," NYT, 12 December 1946.

(73.) "Arab Army Told to Prepare Itself to Strike at Jews on Mufti's Signal," NYT, 23 December 1946.

(74.) Memorandum of Conversation, by Director, ONEAA (Henderson), 17 January 1947, FRUS 1947, vol. 5, The Near East and Africa (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), 1007-08.

(75.) Charge in UK (Gallman) to Secretary of State, 30 January 1947, FRUS 1947, 5: 1019.

(76.) Consul General at Jerusalem (Pinkerton) to Secretary of State, 31 January 1947, FRUS 1947, 5: 1023-24.

(77.) Memorandum by Director, ONEAA (Henderson) to Undersecretary of State (Acheson), 10 February 1947, FRUS 1947, 5: 1038-39.

(78.) Undersecretary of State (Acheson) to Director, ONEAA (Henderson), 15 February 1947, FRUS 1947, 5: 1048-51.

(79.) "Palestine: In UN's Lap," Newsweek 29 (24 February 1947): 45-46; "Palestine Goes to the United Nations," The Economist 152 (22 February 1947): 306.

(80.) "Bevin Charges Truman Was Irresponsible," The Christian Century 64 (12 March 1947): 323.

(81.) "Palestine: Nationalism's Battleground," Newsweek 29 (5 May 1947): 36.

(82.) "Membership of Special Committee Determined," UN Weekly Bulletin 2 (20 May 1947): 537-40.

(83.) "Palestine Committee Prepares for Hearings," UN Weekly Bulletin 2 (10 June 1947): 618-19.

(84.) Thomas J. Hamilton, "11-Nation Inquiry on Palestine Set," NYT, 14 May 1947.

(85.) Memorandum of Conversation, by Acting Secretary of State, 23 April 1947, FRUS 1947, 5: 1073-77.

(86.) Memorandum by Secretary of State to President Truman, 28 April 1947, FRUS 1947, 5: 1080-81.

(87.) J. Alvarez del Vayo, "Arabian Nights in Flushing," The Nation 164 (10 May 1947): 534- 36.

(88.) Statement by the President, 5 June 1947, Truman Library, Acheson Papers.

(89.) Clifton Daniel, "Terrorists Free 2 Palestine Police," NYT, 11 June 1947.

(90.) "Palestine: Joint Life, Mutual Death," Newsweek 29 (2 June 1947): 36.

(91.) "Special Committee Tours Palestine: Petition to Death Sentences," UN Weekly Bulletin 3 (1 July 1947): 3-5.

(92.) Consul General at Jerusalem (Macatee) to Secretary of State, 23 June 1947, FRUS 1947, 5: 1107-12.

(93.) Memorandum by Director, ONEAA (Henderson) to Secretary of State, 7 July 1947, FRUS 1947, 5: 1120-23.

(94.) British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin) to Secretary of State, 27 June 1947, FRUS 1947, 5: 1112-13.

(95.) "Bargaining by the Jews," The Economist 152 (28 June 1947): 1020.

(96.) "Zionists to Open Convention Today," NYT, 3 July 1947.

(97.) Gene Currivan, "3 Slain on Zionist Vessel As Refugees Fight British," NYT, 19 July 1947.

(98.) "UN Gets Protest of Jewish Agency," NYT, 26 July 1947.

(99.) "Jew from Exodus Warns of Retort," NYT, 12 September 1947.

(100.) "Summary of Recommendation and Conclusions," UN Weekly Bulletin 3 (9 September 1947): 327-33.

(101.) "Arabs Plan Break with West if UN Partitions Palestine," NYT, 23 September 1947.

(102.) Excerpts from Minutes of Sixth Meeting of U.S. Delegation to Second Session of the General Assembly, 15 September 1947, FRUS 1947, 5: 1147-51.

(103.) U.S. Mission to the United Nations, Press Release No. 260, 10 October 1947, Truman Library, Papers of Dean Acheson, State Department-Palestine 1947-1948.

(104.) The Arab Higher Committee, The Palestine Arab Case (Cairo: Costa Tsoumas & Co, 1947); "Five Countries in Opening of Palestine Debate," UN Weekly Bulletin 3 (14 October 1947): 479-81.

(105.) Charge in Iraq (Dorsz) to Secretary of State, 5 November 1947, FRUS 1947, 5: 1240.

(106.) Secretary of State to Legation in Syria, 10 November 1947, FRUS 1947, 5: 1248-49.

(107.) Secretary of State to U.S. Representative to United Nations (Austin), 14 November 1947, FRUS 1947, 5: 1260.

(108.) "Accord on Implementing Palestine Partition," UN Weekly Bulletin 3 (18 November 1947): 655-57.

(109.) "Committee Recommends Partition of Palestine," UN Weekly Bulletin 3 (2 December 1947): 741-46.

(110.) Director, Division of Near Easter Affairs (Merriam) to ONEAA (Henderson), 11 December 1947, National Archives, RG 59, Office of Near East Affairs, Subject File.

(111.) Thomas J. Hamilton, "UN Decides Today Palestine's Future," NYT, 28 November 1947.

(112.) "Assembly Adopts Plan for Palestine," UN Weekly Bulletin 3 (9 December 1947): 773-76.

(113.) "44 Arabs, Jews Die in Clash at Aden," NYT, 6 December 1947.

(114.) Memorandum by Samuel K. C. Kopper (ONEAA), 27 January 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. 5, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976): 563-66.

(115.) Memorandum by Director, PPS (Kennan) to Under Secretary of State (Lovett), 29 January 1948, FRUS 1948, 5/2: 573; Draft Position of the U.S. with Respect to Palestine, 17 February 1948, Truman Library, Records of the National Security Council, Reports to President.

(116.) "Realities in Palestine," The Economist 154 (27 March 1948): 489-90.

(117.) Memorandum by Divison of UN Affairs (Rusk) to Secretary of State, 22 March 1948, FRUS 1948, 5/2: 750-51.

(118.) Dana Adams Schmidt, "'De Facto' Regime Exists, Jewish Agency Contends," NYT, 22 March 1948.

(119.) Memorandum of JCS to President, 4 April 1948, FRUS 1948, 5/2: 798-800.

(120.) "Palestine Commission Stresses Urgent Problems," UN Bulletin 4 (1 May 1948): 380- 81.

(121.) "Security Council Acts to End Palestine Fighting," UN Bulletin 4 (15 May 1948): 412- 14.

(122.) Consul at Jerusalem (Wasson) to Secretary of State, 10 May 1948, FRUS 1948, 5/2: 956-57.

(123.) Consul at Jerusalem (Wasson) to Secretary of State, 11 May 1948, FRUS 1948, 5/2: 972.

(124.) "Palestine. The Eleventh Hour Strikes," Newsweek 31 (10 May 1948): 28, 30-32.

(125.) Meeting of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, 10 December 1947, National Archives, Record Group 218, hereafter RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Leahy File.

(126.) "Palestine at Lausanne," The Economist 156 (4 June 1949): 1032.

(127.) Memorandum by Secretary of State to Under Secretary of State (Lovett), 24 May 1948, FRUS 1948, 5/2: 1037.

(128.) "Israel Proclaimed as an Independent Republic," Department of State Bulletin 18 (23 May 1948): 673.

(129.) Statement by U.S. Representative to the United Nations (Austin) to Security Council, 17 May 1948, FRUS 1948, 5/2: 1008-10.

(130.) American Legation at Jidda (Childs) to Secretary of State, No. 281, National Archives, RG 218, Leahy File.

(131.) Director, Central Intelligence Agency (Hillenkoetter), Memorandum for President, 8 July 1948, Natinal Archives, RG 218, Leahy File.

(132.) U.S. Representative to the United Nations (Austin) to Secretary of State, 19 May 1948, FRUS 1948, 5/2: 1013-15.

(133.) British Embassy to Department of State, 24 May 1948, FRUS 1948, 5/2: 1035.

(134.) "Further Discussion in the Security Council of the Palestine Situation," Department of State Bulletin 18 (30 May 1948): 695-98.

(135.) Director, Central Intelligence Agency (Hillenkoetter), Memorandum for President, 8 July 1948, National Archives, RG 218, Leahy File.

(136.) "Acceptance of Four-Week Truce Resolution by Jewish and Arab Leaders," Department of State Bulletin 18 (13 June 1948): 763-64.

(137.) Memorandum of Conversation, by Director, ONEAA (Henderson), 6 June 1.948, FRUS 1948, 5/2:1099-1101

(138.) Secretary of State to Embassy in Egypt, 3 July 1948, FRUS 1948, 5/2: 1187-88.

(139.) Representative Sol Bloom to President Truman, 3 August 1948, Truman Library, B File: Recognition of Israel.

(140.) Charge in Egypt (Patterson) to Secretary of State, 17 July 1948, FRUS 1948, 5/2: 1229.

(141.) "Half-a-Million Arab Refugees," The Economist 155 (7 August 1948): 221.

(142.) U.S. Representative to the United Nations (Jessup) to Secretary of State, 27 July 1948, FRUS 1948, 5/2: 1248.

(143.) Secretary of State, Memorandum for President, 16 August 1948, National Archives, RG 218, Leahy File.

(144.) Acting Secretary of State to Embassy in UK, 18 June 1949, FRUS 1949, vol. 6, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977): 1156.

(145.) Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to Secretary of State, 12 May 1949, FRUS 1949, 6: 999-1000.

(146.) Michael Palumbo, The Palestinian Catastrophe (Boston, Mass.: Faber and Faber, 1987).

(147.) "Discussion of the Palestine Situation in Committee I," Department of State Bulletin 19 (24 October 1948): 517-20.

(148.) O.M. Marashian, "DPs from the Holy Land," The Catholic World 169 (May 1949): 109-14.

(149.) See Benny Morris, 1948 and After (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1990), 169, 174-75; Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 286.

(150.) American Zionist Emergency Council, After the Victory (New York: American Zionist Emergency Council, circa 1943), 15.

(151.) "`Jewish Vote' Closing Campaign Issue," Christian Century 65 (3 November 1948): 1165-66.

(152.) Secretary of Defense (Johnson) to Secretary of State, 14 June 1949, FRUS 1949, 6: 1134-35.

(153.) "Israel and Judaism," The Christian Century 66 (16 March 1949): 327-29.

(154.) "UN Commission Ends Palestine Hearings," Christian Century 64 (30 July 1947): 917. Eugene V. Rostow, a law professor at Yale University, previously with the Department of State, referred to Magnes as "the best balanced and most penetrating Jewish spokesman in Palestine." Eugene V. Rostow, "Palestine and American Immigration," The American Scholar 16 (Summer 1947): 291-301.

(155.) The Arab Office (London), The Future of Palestine (Geneva: Imprimerie Centrale, August 1947), 67-68.

(156.) "Sobering Words from Chancellor Magnes," Christian Century 64 (12 November 1948): 1355-56.

(157.) "Judah Magnes, a Son of the Prophets," Christian Century 65 (10 November 1948): 1196.]

(158.) JCS, Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, November 1947, National Archives, RG 218, Leahy File.

JASON KENDALL MOORE (B.A., M.A., Southern Illinois University at Carbondale) is a researcher affiliated with the Antarctic Institute (INACH) of the Chilean Foreign Affairs Ministry. His articles on the history of international relations have appeared in U.S and British journals while others are scheduled for publication in South America. Currently the author is investigating the influence of culture and journalism on the Department of State's policymaking decisions.
COPYRIGHT 2001 Oxford University Press
No portion of this article can be reproduced without the express written permission from the copyright holder.
Copyright 2001 Gale, Cengage Learning. All rights reserved.

Article Details
Printer friendly Cite/link Email Feedback
Author:Moore, Jason Kendall
Publication:Journal of Church and State
Geographic Code:7PALE
Date:Jan 1, 2001
Previous Article:Interpretations of Jewish tradition on democracy, land, and peace.
Next Article:Augustine Through the Ages: An Encyclopedia.

Terms of use | Privacy policy | Copyright © 2022 Farlex, Inc. | Feedback | For webmasters |