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Department of defense energy strategy: teaching an old dog new tricks.

Chapter 4

Energy Strategy for Improved Energy Security

Fans often have the image in their minds of a big hitter coming up with the bases loaded, two outs, and the home team three runs behind. The big hitter wins the game with a home run. We are addicted to home runs, but the outcome of a baseball game is usually determined by a combination of walks, stolen bases, errors, hit batsmen, and, yes, some doubles, triples, and home runs. There's also good pitching and solid fielding, so ball games are won by a wide array of events, each contributing to the result.

--George P. Shultz

Former Secretary of State

In the foreword of Amory Lovins' book, Winning the Oil Endgame, former secretary of state George P. Shultz uses a baseball analogy to describe how the United States needs to rely on a steady, incremental approach to move forward to reduce its addiction to foreign oil and secure the energy future. The solution for the Department of Defense (DOD) is no different.

Energy Strategy

Although many intelligent energy experts reside within the DOD and many outstanding efforts contribute to improve energy security, the DOD does not currently have a permanent organizational focal point or advocate for energy issues or a written, long-term energy strategy. The DOD needs both--an organizational structure to serve as the focal point for energy issues and an energy strategy that improves national security by decreasing US dependence on foreign oil, ensures access to critical energy requirements, maintains or improves combat capability, promotes research for future energy security, provides fiscal responsibility to the American taxpayer, and protects the environment.

Decreasing US dependence on foreign oil significantly can be done only by looking at the many ways the DOD can consume less petroleum-based fuel through greater efficiency, smarter processes, and diversification of fuel sources to include alternatives other than petroleum. Domestically controlled production of alternative fuels also will help to assure access to critical energy requirements. Additionally, the DOD must ensure resiliency of installation electricity supply through increased on-site renewable energy production, reduced dependence on the commercial electric grid, and the capability to operate at full capacity if a commercial grid power failure occurs.

Improved combat capability will result from the efficiency effects and lengthening the tether of fuel. Reduced logistics requirements energy costs will allow assets and funds to be diverted to combat needs and for hard-earned taxpayers' dollars to be spent more responsibly. Reduced consumption, increased alternative fuels, and renewable energy production will help preserve the environment through reduced carbon emissions and more efficient use of natural resources.

Implementing Strategy

A proud tradition in the US government dictates that when issues arise, a bureaucracy is created to deal with it. Larger problems are often treated with larger bureaucracies. Recent examples include the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the director of National Intelligence to respond to the attacks of and intelligence failures associated with 11 September 2001 (9/11). Were there a national security incident involving DOD energy use, for example, a prolonged electrical power failure affecting DOD installations, Congress surely would impose a prescriptive organizational change in the department.

To prevent such an event and to initiate change on its own terms, the DOD must reshuffle its organizational portfolios to create a specific focal point or energy advocate in the OSD to create and implement a department-wide energy strategy. Using Secretary Shultz' baseball analogy, the team currently has no manager. The goal, of course, is not to identify such a vague need as "the DOD needs an energy czar" or create additional bureaucracy in the negative sense with an excessive number of administrators, red tape, and petty energy officials but instead to properly define the requirement and parse authority on energy issues to a specific individual with the authority to allocate resources and establish policy on energy security for the department. Authority is a zero-sum game. A new position with authority over energy issues cannot be established without taking authority from someone else.

United States Code, Title 10, Armed Forces, provides guidance on the structure of the Office of the Secretary of Defense:
TITLE 10--ARMED FORCES
Subtitle A--General Military Law
PART I--ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL MILITARY POWERS
CHAPTER 4--OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Sec. 131. Office of the Secretary of Defense

(a) There is in the Department of Defense an Office of the Secretary
  of Defense. The function of the Office is to assist the Secretary
  of Defense in carrying out his duties and responsibilities and to
  carry out such other duties as may be prescribed by law.
(b) The Office of the Secretary of Defense is composed of the
  following:

  (1) The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
  (2) The Under Secretaries of Defense, as follows:
    (A) The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
      and Logistics.
    (B) The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
    (C) The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).
    (D) The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.
    (E) The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.
  (3) The Director of Defense Research and Engineering.
  (4) The Assistant Secretaries of Defense.
  (5) The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.
  (6) The General Counsel of the Department of Defense.
  (7) The Inspector General of the Department of Defense.
  (8) Such other offices and officials as may be established by law
    or the Secretary of Defense may establish or designate in the
    Office. (1)


A logical level to establish an energy-specific position would be at the assistant secretary of defense (ASD) level. An ASD either could report directly to the secretary of defense, as do the ASDs for Legislative and Public Affairs, or could be made subordinate to an undersecretary of defense (USD) like the ASD for Health Affairs (reports to USD for Personnel and Readiness).

The USD for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics (AT&L) already possesses most of the key organizational structure and expertise needed to create and implement a DOD energy strategy. For example, the deputy undersecretary of defense (DUSD) for Installations and Environment is responsible for energy management at DOD installations, and the director of Research and Engineering is responsible for new technologies that could lead the DOD away from oil dependence. Energy issues cannot be separated from the various research, installations, acquisition, and logistics functional areas under AT&L, but there can be comprehensive energy oversight. Since many of the existing energy fiefdoms reside under DUSDs and agency directors in AT&L, it would make sense to establish an oversight position at the higher level of ASD. Title 10 specifically authorizes the creation of nine ASDs and gives congressionally mandated job descriptions for five of them (Reserve Affairs; Homeland Defense; Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict; Legislative Affairs; and Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Programs). Establishing an ASD for Energy Security beneath the USD (AT&L) would have to be authorized by Title 10. Specific duties, not necessary to be prescribed in Title 10 unless the position is directed by Congress, could follow the author's description as listed below.

1. There is an assistant secretary of defense for Energy Security, appointed from civilian life by the president and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

2. The assistant secretary is the principal adviser to the secretary and the undersecretary of defense for AT&L on Energy Security and energy issues within the DOD and is the principal energy official within the senior management of the DOD.

3. The assistant secretary shall perform such duties relating to Energy Security as the undersecretary of defense for AT&L may assign, including

a. prescribing, by authority of the secretary of defense, policies and programs for the implementation of an energy strategy to enhance Department of Defense Energy Security and combat capability;

b. advising and assisting the secretary of defense, the deputy secretary of defense, and the undersecretary of defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics by providing guidance to and consulting with the secretaries of the military departments, with respect to Energy Security of the DOD; and

c. monitoring and reviewing all energy programs in the DOD.

The ASD for Energy Security must oversee a comprehensive study and direct actions by the services to assure access to critical energy requirements. Vulnerabilities addressed in chapter 3 must be identified and eliminated where possible. This includes petroleum and electricity infrastructure servicing military installations and improving renewable energy production and back-up generator capability in the event of a long-term civilian grid power failure.

Additionally, the DOD should set aside funding to be allocated at the discretion of the ASD for Energy Security for energy-saving programs that do not compete well within the service budget drills. Funding for energy-saving programs exists to some extent for DOD facilities only, but funding must be expanded to include other energy-saving programs. Another funding tool, the Energy Savings Performance Contract (ESPC), allows federal agencies to contract to purchase facility energy-saving measures with an agreement between the contractor and the agency to use the funds saved by those measures to pay for the project. The ASD for Energy Security should aggressively pursue legislation to expand ESPC to other DOD energy programs, such as the aircraft reengining programs discussed elsewhere in this chapter. The Air Force likely would appreciate the chance to execute these programs but not at the expense of other programs such as the F-22. Supplemental funding or ESPCs for energy savings programs could be the catalyst for getting these programs over the budgetary hurdles.

The ASD for Energy Security must leverage existing energy efforts and studies and ensure appropriate actions are taken. A great deal of work already has been accomplished in the previously mentioned studies, and the ASD for Energy Security should monitor this work to ensure that proper actions are taken. Creating the ASD for Energy Security is the baseball equivalent of filling a vacant manager's position.

The National Defense Authorization Act of 2007, Section 360, specifically tasks the secretary of defense to submit to Congress, not later than 16 October 2007, a report to include the following concerns.

1. An assessment of the feasibility of designating a senior DOD official to be responsible for implementing the policy of improving fuel efficiency in weapons platforms;

2. A summary of recommendations from the reports of three recent DOD energy studies: the Energy Security Integrated Product Team (2006); the Defense Science Board Task Force on DOD Energy Strategy (2006); and the Defense Science Board Task Force on Improving Fuel Efficiency of Weapons Platforms (2001);

3. Steps DOD has taken to implement recommendations from the reports;

4. Additional steps planned to implement recommendations from the reports; and

5. Reasons the DOD has not implemented and does not plan to implement certain recommendations from the reports.

Leadership and Culture Change

Air Force colonel James C. Slife believes that "Leadership is about vision, inspiration, values, and culture. Management is about systems, processes, resources, and policies. Organizational structure can, by itself, preclude success, it cannot, by itself, ensure success." (2) True culture change of any large organization must start at the top. Edgar H. Schein is Sloan Fellows Professor of Management Emeritus and a senior lecturer at the Sloan School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In his book, Organizational Culture and Leadership, he tackles the complex question of how an existing culture can be changed--one of the toughest challenges of leadership.

According to Schein, as an organization matures, it develops a positive ideology and a set of myths about how it operates. The organization continues to operate by the shared tacit assumptions that have worked in practice, "and it is not unlikely that the espoused theories, the announced values of the organization come to be, to varying degrees, out of line with the actual assumptions that govern daily practice." (3) In the case of DOD energy use, this assumption would be the assumption that energy is cheap, plentiful, and for someone else to worry about.

Where these differences exist, scandal and myth explosion become relevant as mechanisms of culture change. Left to themselves, change will not occur "until the consequences of the actual operating assumptions create a public and visible scandal that cannot be hidden, avoided, or denied." (4) Recent examples include changes in National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) safety culture following the Challenger and Columbia disasters or the Army's recent health care shakeup following the exposure of substandard administrative handling of wounded soldiers and conditions at certain Walter Reed Army Medical Center facilities. The DOD cannot afford to wait for an energy-related scandal before initiating change.

Schein proposes that leaders systematically can set out to change how a large, mature organization operates. To recognize such change may involve varying degrees of culture change. In short, it involves unlearning old behaviors and relearning new behaviors, and this cannot be done unless some sense of threat, crisis, or dissatisfaction is present to start the process of unlearning and relearning. (5) He adds that "The change goal must be defined concretely in terms of the specific problem you are trying to fix, not as a 'culture change'.... Culture change is always transformative change that requires a period of unlearning that is psychologically painful." (6)

Pres. George W. Bush has addressed dependence on foreign oil as a national security issue in his 2006 and 2007 State of the Union addresses. Unfortunately, every president since Richard Nixon has had some initiative to improve energy security without much success. Any perceived threat either was not threatening enough or not long enough in duration to induce an American culture change with regard to energy.

Perhaps the current threat to energy security is different. The United States is more dependent than ever on foreign oil. Its relations with the Middle East are strained, and China and India are booming economically with a corresponding need for energy.

An excellent way to demonstrate a DOD need for change is for the secretary of defense to deliver a high-profile speech on energy security at a public venue, such as a service academy graduation, to support the president's energy initiatives, highlight the importance of DOD energy security, and announce the goals of a new comprehensive DOD energy strategy and the establishment of the ASD for Energy Security. No one should doubt that the leadership at the highest levels is behind the transformation towards energy security. The secretary should challenge leaders at all levels in the department to create incentives, remove disincentives, and seek out bold and innovative ways to reduce energy consumption, improve processes and efficiencies, and diversify energy sources as a national security issue. The secretary also should make it clear that such showy, automatic solutions as lowering the thermostats in the winter and forcing people to wear jackets in their offices will not be tolerated as acceptable methods of reducing energy use.

There is little current incentive for DOD personnel to reduce energy consumption. In fact, there are disincentives in place. Most military leaders in an organization always looking for places to cut budgets and personnel quickly learn that doing without is a sure way to lose money or personnel. The Air Force Flying Hour Program serves as an example, as is shown later in this section.

A flying squadron commander who is allocated 8,000 flying hours to conduct his or her mission and keep his or her aircrews properly trained in their aircraft but manages on 7,600 hours can expect a 7,600-hour allocation next year. Instead of being rewarded for saving taxpayers' dollars, units perceive such cuts as punishment. The commonly accepted solution is to find a way to fly the hours at the end of the fiscal year vice falling short of the allocation. This is a "use it or lose it" culture.

Saving energy is difficult if you don't know how much you are using. Most military bases today do not measure energy consumption at each building. The Energy Policy Act of 2005, Section 103, directs federal agencies to meter electricity use in all (to the maximum extent practical) federal buildings by 1 October 2012, using advanced meters or metering devices that pro vide data at least daily. The DOD has a plan to meet this requirement, but under the "maximum extent practical" caveat, many older buildings never will be metered. (7) Commanders should monitor energy consumed at their facilities and set goals for energy reduction. Energy savings should be rewarded, and excessive consumption should be investigated and corrected.

The first step towards culture change occurs when top-level officials educate personnel and provide incentives and rewards to commanders who conduct their mission, properly train their personnel, and save flight hours (read energy) or question why the hangar doors are left open in the winter or why the office lights were left on overnight. The DOD will have affected a culture change when commanders instinctively know they are accountable for energy consumption, when they know efficiency is its own "effect" in increasing combat capability, and when they continually strive to improve efficiency because energy is a consideration in all military activities and operations. Only then will energy efficiency become a defining characteristic of DOD operations and facilities.

Innovation and Process Efficiencies

In March 2006, secretary of the Air Force, Hon. Michael W. Wynne, introduced Air Force Smart Operations 21 (AFSO 21), a dedicated effort to maximize value and minimize waste in Air Force operations. AFSO 21 is a leadership program for commanders and supervisors at all levels, looking at each process from beginning to end. It doesn't just look at how the Air Force can do each task better, but asks the tougher and more important questions: Why are things done a certain way? and, Is each of the tasks relevant, productive, and value-added? (8)

The Air Force has assembled an AFSO 21 team to evaluate the core mission area and "conduct air, space, and cyber operations" (CASCO). The CASCO team identified $750 million in potential fuel savings (9) by improving such processes as additional aircraft weight reduction (removal of non-critical equipment), increased use of simulators for flying training and currency, reduced aircraft rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan, closer basing of aircraft to operating areas, more direct aircraft routing through improved diplomatic overflight clearances, greater fuel-efficient ground operations, and an elimination of unnecessary air refueling. (10)

Headquarters Air Mobility Command (AMC), which is responsible for organizing, training, and equipping USAF air mobility platforms (C-5, C-17, etc.), is improving efficiency of flight operations by directing units to stop refueling aircraft without first knowing the required fuel load for the next mission. Air Force flying operations account for 82 percent of its fuel use, with mobility operations consuming the single largest slice (42 percent). Data collected on one C-17 unit conducting stateside operational missions showed aircraft departed with an average of 58,000 pounds more fuel than the mission required due to standard ramp fuel loads. (11) The cost to carry extra weight in aircraft is enormous. The AMC standard cost of 100 pounds of weight across the mobility air forces fleet is $680,000 each year or 1.42 million pounds of fuel. (12)

The ASD for Energy Security should lead a department-wide effort similar to AFSO 21 for fuel savings in other service aviation programs, maritime operations, ground vehicle operations, and facilities energy use. In baseball terms, this is simply playing smarter, like good base running, hitting the cutoff man, and throwing ahead of runners instead of throwing behind them.

Efficiency in Platforms--Aviation

Investing in efficiency is one of the most cost-effective ways to save energy. Recent advances in aviation technology have been significant. Boeing's new 787 Dreamliner represents a 70 percent improvement in fuel efficiency (cost/passenger mile) over their original 707 (KC-135) jet-transport-production aircraft. (13) The DOD should investigate factors that improve efficiency in aircraft and modify those that prove to be life cycle cost effective. In baseball terms, this is like a sacrifice bunt. Sacrifice the batter now (spend money on reengining) to move runners into scoring position (save money on fuel and gain efficiency/combat effectiveness later).

The low-hanging fruit for improving efficiency on older aircraft is reengining or modifying existing engines. This is particularly true for such large non-fighter aircraft as those seen in the commercial aviation market, where fuel costs currently exceed labor costs and have demanded higher efficiency engines in recent decades. Unfortunately, there is no corresponding commercial market for high-performance afterburning engines used on fighter aircraft.

Note, however, that reengining an aircraft is expensive and can affect all major aircraft systems and the training support structure. The cost of implementation may include reanalysis, redesign, or recertification of major aircraft systems to include cockpit controls and instrumentation, bleed air systems, hydraulic systems, electrical systems, aircraft structure, and developing and training new maintenance operations, publishing new technical manuals, training aircrews on new systems, and modifying training courseware and simulators as required. In short, reengining is no simple task.

Through a contract awarded in 1979, the Air Force successfully reengined 410 KC-135A Stratotankers, first delivered in 1957, to the KC-135R configuration. This effort yielded 50 percent more fuel offload capability, 25 percent increase in fuel efficiency, 25 percent decrease in operational cost, and a 96 percent noise reduction. (14) The reengined fleet of KC-135s saves the Air Force from 2.3 to 3.2 million barrels of fuel annually. (15)

In 2006 the Air Force tasked the National Research Council (NRC) to examine and assess options for improving engine efficiency of all large non-fighter aircraft in its fleet. Improved engine efficiency can result in an increase in performance, a decrease in fuel consumption, or both. For the purposes of the NRC report, the primary objective of modifying or reengining aircraft is to reduce fuel consumption. However, the report also highlighted several additional benefits that must be considered, including aircraft performance improvements, reduced maintenance, improved reliability and safety, and reduced environmental impact. Additionally, the report addressed the cost of modifying or reengining aircraft and timing as significant constraints. The report also maintained that "while decisions should be based on economic benefit/cost analysis, they must also consider some of the benefits that cannot be easily monetized, such as performance improvements and national security. It may be the case that a greater good argument prevails, with the decision being made on more than just economic grounds, and that the controlling variable is saving fuel--not at any cost but at a reasonable cost." (16)

Figure 4, taken from the NRC study, depicts selected large non-fighter aircraft potential fuel savings (based on a fuel price of $2.14 per gallon). It also shows the most favorable modification/reengine options in improved efficiency and reduced consumption based on 2005 utilization rates, expected remaining service life, and fleet size (represented by proportional-sized bubble diameter). (17)

[FIGURE 4 OMITTED]

The committee highlighted a number of modification and reengining options that deserve careful consideration and might pay for themselves. Key recommendations are listed below.

* The Air Force should study the potential upgrade of the KC-135R/T fleet with the fuel burn improvement modifications proposed under the Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) for the F108 engine.

* The Air Force should pursue reengining the C-130H on a priority basis, since this aircraft is one of the largest users of fuel in the Air Force inventory. The Air Force should use a competitive bid procurement process to provide the background for a decision on the C-130H models between the AE 2100 and PW150 engine options, either of which would appear to be acceptable on a technical and performance basis, and it should review the economics of engine efficiency upgrades to the older models with a shorter remaining service life.

* In general, where commercial engine/airframe counterparts exist (KC-10/DC-10, etc.), the Air Force engine and weapons system planners, managers, and policy makers should closely monitor the engine's original equipment manufacturers' and commercial operators' activities and actions relative to reengining and engine modification as a measure of the cost/benefit for these activities.

* The Air Force should approach reengining of the aircraft powered by the various models of the TF33 engine on a holistic basis with the goal of removing the engine(s) from the inventory. (18)

The case for replacing the TF33 family of engines is particularly compelling. The Air Force currently has approximately 2,300 TF33 engines of various models that were used mainly on the KC-135E, E-3 AWACS, E-8 JSTARS, and B-52H. The TF33 was designed in the 1950s and is one of the oldest engine families in the Air Force inventory. Since FY03, the TF33 depot overhaul cost has increased by 300 percent to $1.25 million per engine in FY06. The very long, on-wing lives of modern commercial transport engines (potentially 10,000 hours or more on-wing compared to from 1,500 to 2,000 hours for the TF33) would reduce the cost of engine ownership significantly. (19)

With the exception of the B-52H, all of the TF33-powered aircraft are KC-135 variants or derivatives. Given that the majority of the KC-135 fleet has already been reengined in the KC-135R program and the E-8 JSTARS is now in reengining source selection, a portion of the nonrecurring engineering costs may be shared among platforms rather than duplicated. (20) Eliminating TF33 engines from the inventory would dispose $800 mil lion in TF33 inventory and the TF33 support structure of 188 personnel and 82,000 square feet of support real estate to be used for other Air Force needs. (21) The NRC report concluded that "Taken together, these considerations strongly suggest that TF33-powered aircraft should be considered as a group rather than subjected to the traditional approach--i.e., airframe by airframe studies. In this case, the whole savings from reengining all TF33 aircraft may considerably exceed the sum of reengining the individual platform types." (22)

The Defense Science Board, sponsored by USD (AT&L), conducted a study by Gen Michael P. C. Cairns (USAF, retired) in late 2002 and produced an updated version in 2004 on reengining the USAF B-52H fleet. This study was the fourth look at reengining the B-52H fleet since 1996. The first three Air Force studies concluded reengining was not economically justifiable. However, several assumptions drove the decisions, including constant fuel prices, the assumption that engine depot repair costs would remain stable through 2037, the Air Force's judgment that required funding would lose out to higher priorities, and the possibility that premature B-52H retirement and force reductions would be unacceptable program risks. (23) The intent of this paper is not to challenge the USAF decision not to reengine the B-52H fleet but instead to highlight one example of what more efficient engines can provide for energy savings and other operational and environmental gains.

The DSB study concluded that B-52H reengining would reduce overall fuel consumption by about 35 percent and in-flight refueling demand from 50 to 66 percent. The DSB task force scenarios estimated overall savings of nearly $8 billion through 2037 in reduced fuel demand, including reduced demand on existing tanker assets. (24)

A modern turbofan engine on the B-52H also would yield significant aircraft performance and would result in a 46-percent increase in unrefuel range, according to Boeing estimates. For example, a 10,000 mile B-52H mission (United States to Afghanistan and return) would require only one in-flight refueling instead of two and require 158,000 pounds less fuel. On a typical Diego Garcia to Afghanistan mission, a 46 percent range increase would produce the combined benefits of accomplishing the mission with 66 percent reduced tanker demand, plus 4.7 hours of loiter time. Additionally, emissions of carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, and smoke would decrease by 30 percent (oxides of nitrogen would increase by a factor of two), and community noise impacts would be reduced significantly. (25)

The available energy of its fuel limits any propulsion system. One pound of JP-8 jet fuel has enough energy to produce 7.2 horsepower for one hour. Thermal efficiency defines the amount of fuel-available energy that is converted to horsepower for a real engine. Present-day gas turbine engines can convert about 40 percent of the available fuel energy. Overall efficiency of jet propulsion systems defines how much of the fuel-available energy is converted to useful thrust. There are also inherent losses in converting mechanical power to jet thrust. Today's engines are constrained to provide either fuel efficiency or high performance. Modern high-bypass turbine engine transport aircraft are about 30 percent efficient in converting available fuel energy into thrust. Fighters and bombers typically convert from 20 to 25 percent useful thrust. Therefore, plenty of room is available for efficiency improvements in the gas turbine engine. (26)

Promising future engine-efficiency programs are under way in a cooperative government and industry effort. Versatile, affordable, advanced turbine engines (VAATE) is the national turbine-engine technology plan that will provide the future propulsion capability US war fighters need to combat changing threats to security. Comprised of all sectors of the DOD, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the DOE, six major engine companies, and three airframe manufacturers, VAATE is a totally integrated, physics-based, turbine-engine technology program chaired by OSD. The program includes technical activities that will improve turbine-engine capabilities beyond those of a year 2000 baseline engine while reducing all facets of engine cost. VAATE is a three-phase technology program with a defined goal set to produce a 10X improvement in affordable turbine-engine capability by 2017. VAATE engines will reduce engine thrust-specific fuel consumption by as much as 25 percent. (27) VAATE represents the great things a promising young minor league baseball prospect will do.

The NRC is studying several other efficiency approaches to saving fuel by modifying existing aircraft, including aircraft winglets, laminar flow nacelles, optimization of operations, engine build practices, information use, and engine water washes. (28) Aircraft efficiency factors with promising potential for fuel savings on future designs include improved blended wing body designs, reduced weight through use of composite materials and more efficient structural design, and improved aircraft systems (e.g., reduced weights via increased electrical systems versus hydraulic and bleed air systems).

Efficiency in Platforms--Maritime

Like aircraft, maritime platforms have made progress in efficiency over the years. The Navy gained a 15 percent increase in fuel efficiency on selected ships by using stern flaps and bulbous-bow technology on surface ships. The stern flaps create lift to the aft portion of the ship and reduce propeller cavitations. This results in reduced hydrodynamic drag and improved efficiency. The Navy projects a 7.5 percent net annual fuel savings on Arleigh Burke-class guided missile Aegis destroyers of almost $195,000 per year for each ship. Use of the bulbous bow to reduce drag by lowering the wave-making resistance of the ship's hull can save an additional 4 percent in fuel use, with a yearly fuel savings of approximately 100,000 gallons per year for each ship. (29)

The Navy also is studying ways to convert fossil fuel-burning ships to nuclear power. As discussed in reengining aircraft, changing propulsion systems on a ship is no easy task and would include extensive redesign and training. For each class of ship, there is a corresponding price of oil where nuclear-powered propulsion becomes economically feasible.

The civilian shipping industry is also seeing significant efficiency improvements using silicon hull paints, which help to save up to 6 percent of fuel on container ships. (30) This could also have military applications.

Efficiency in Platforms--Ground Tactical Vehicles

Lovins argues in Winning the Oil Endgame that "the nearly 70-ton M1A2 Abrams main battle tank--the outstanding fighting machine of US armored forces--is propelled at up to 42 mph on- or 30 mph off-road by a 1,500-hp gas turbine, and averages around 0.3-0.6 mpg. Its 20-40 ton mpg is surprisingly close to the 42-ton mpg of today's average new light vehicle; the tank simply weighs 34 times as much, half for armor." He cautions, "But there's more to be done than improving its 1968 gas turbine: for 73 percent of its operating hours, Abrams idles that 1,100-kW gas turbine at less than 1 percent efficiency to run a 5kW 'hotel load'--ventilation, lights, cooling, and electronics. This, coupled with its inherent engine inefficiency, cuts Abrams' average fuel efficiency about in half, requiring extra fuel whose stockpiling for the Gulf War delayed the ground forces' readiness to fight by more than a month." (31)

The most important factor in reducing the demand for fuel in vehicles is the weight of the vehicle. Heavier vehicles simply require more energy to move. The DOD recognizes the potential energy-efficiency savings associated with lightweight materials and structures and is investing in materials research to provide high-performance ground vehicles to meet war-fighting needs and save energy.

The Naval Research Advisory Committee's April 2006 report, Future Fuels, recommended hybrid, electric-drive vehicles as the most effective and efficient way to lengthen the tether of fuel. The study found that fuel economy could improve by as much as 20 percent or more, enable highly maneuverable and agile vehicle traction control both on- and off-road, in covert or overt operations, and provide mobile electric power.

The DOD should strive to accelerate ongoing efforts, including using carbon-fiber reinforced composites, expanding the use of titanium (40 percent lighter than steel), rethinking the use of armor to protect the occupants of the vehicle rather than armoring the entire vehicle, and developing a hybrid electric architecture for tactical wheeled vehicles.

The incredibly high utilization rate of tactical wheeled vehicles in OIF and Operation Enduring Freedom is wearing out equipment that will soon need to be replaced. It would be preferable to develop and acquire a fuel-efficient replacement to the high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV or Humvee) now instead of refurbishing or buying new Humvees, which get only 4 miles per gallon in city driving conditions and 8 miles per gallon in highway driving conditions. (32) They are destined to be inefficient for their potential service life of 20 to 30 years.

Increase Supply/Diversify Sources

In coal-rich, oil-poor, pre-World War II Germany, Franz Fisher and Hans Tropsch developed a process to produce liquid hydrocarbon fuel from coal that supplied a substantial portion of Germany's fuel during the war. The Fischer-Tropsch (FT) process is a catalyzed chemical reaction in which syngas--carbon monoxide and hydrogen produced from the partial combustion of coal that has been gasified and combined with molecular oxygen--is converted into liquid hydrocarbons of various forms. Typical catalysts used are based on iron and cobalt. Liquid hydrocarbon fuels produced from coal gasification and the FT process are intrinsically clean, as sulfur and heavy metal contaminants are removed during the gasification process. The principal purpose of the FT process is to produce a synthetic petroleum substitute for use as synthetic lubrication oil or as synthetic fuel. The FT process can be used to produce liquid hydrocarbon fuel from virtually any carbon-containing feedstock, including low-grade tars, biomass, or shale oil; only the preprocessing steps would differ from the gasification process used with coal. (33)

Since the United States has the largest coal reserves in the world, synthetic fuel, or synfuel, made from coal is particularly appealing. Synfuel represents a domestically controlled resource with prices theoretically tied to the coal market instead of the world oil market.

South Africa has been producing synthetic fuel for decades, and many consider it a technology ready for commercialization. Why then, has the synfuel market not boomed and produced billions of gallons of fuel for US energy needs? Until recently, the answer has been financial risk.

Congress approved the Synthetic Liquid Fuels Act on 5 April 1944. The act authorized $30 million for a five-year effort for "the construction and operation of demonstration plants to produce synthetic liquid fuels from coal, oil shales, agricultural and forestry products, and other substances, in order to aid the prosecution of the war, to conserve and increase the oil resources of the Nation, and for other purposes." (34)

In 1948 Congress extended the project to eight years and doubled its funding to $60 million. In the end synthetic fuel from coal could not compete economically with gasoline made from crude oil, especially given the major oil reserve discoveries in the Middle East at the time. In 1953 Congress terminated funding and closed the plants. (35)

At the height of the 1979 oil crisis, when the United States imported approximately 25 percent of its crude oil, Pres. Jimmy Carter proposed an energy security corporation to use $88 billion of windfall profits tax on domestic oil producers to subsidize development of 2.5 million barrels per day of synthetic fuels production. After much debate, Congress passed the Energy Security Act of 1980. The law created a US synthetic fuel corporation with an initial budget of $17 billion. After four years, the corporation would submit a comprehensive strategy for congressional approval, where the balance of $68 billion would be made available. A combination of mismanagement, administrative change from President Carter to Pres. Ronald Reagan, and most significantly, crude oil prices falling from a 1981 peak of $70+ per barrel to $10 in 1986, effectively killed the US Synthetic Fuel Corporation. (36) Of the 67 projects proposed in 1981, only a few carried design efforts to maturity. Bad business risk became the stigma attached to synthetic fuels.

In 2006 the secretary of the Air Force directed a project to procure synthetic jet fuel for ground testing and, if ground tests were successful, flight testing. (37) In September 2006 a B-52 conducted a flight-test mission using a 50/50 blend of manufactured synthetic fuel and petroleum-based JP-8--or synfuel-blend--on two engines. In December 2006 an eight-engine test was successfully conducted. In January 2007, cold-weather testing was performed at Minot AFB, North Dakota. The last step in the testing and certification process was engine teardown and test data analysis. A B-52 certification signing ceremony was held at Edwards AFB, California, on 8 August 2007. The Air Force is committed to completing testing and certification of synfuels for its aircraft by early 2011 and aims to acquire 50 percent of the continental United States fuel from a synfuel-blend produced domestically by 2016. At current consumption rates, this equals to approximately 800 million gallons of synfuel-blend. (38)

The Air Force is standing up a program management office (PMO) to assume responsibility for the remainder of the testing and certification of the fleet. This transition from a research, design, and development program managed by Air Force Research Laboratory to a comprehensive program managed full time by the Aeronautical Systems Center (ASC) is a reflection of the size and complexity of the effort and the importance it has in the Air Force.

The PMO is meeting with all single managers responsible for aircraft engines, airframes, fuel systems, and ground equipment to inform them of the detailed testing and work conducted in the certification of the B-52. These meetings are intended to provide a complete understanding from the macrolevel to the smallest detail affecting operational safety. In addition, the single managers will be asked to provide their assessment of the necessary testing and certification work required to ensure that they are only certifying equipment not covered by the B-52 test and certification program. This process is called gap analysis and is expected to produce a disciplined and efficient certification program.

The Air Force is also collaborating extensively with the Commercial Aviation Alternative Fuels Initiative (CAAFI) that is represented by the Federal Aviation Administration, Air Transport Association, the Airports Council International-North America, and the Aerospace Industries Association. Since a number of aircraft are common to civilians and the military, the high bypass engine test information is being shared to reduce redundancy and facilitate expeditious certification. CAAFI seeks to certify all aircraft for the use of the 50/50 blend of Jet-A and synthetic fuel by 2008 and to certify aircraft for 100 percent synthetic fuel by 2010. (39)

This process certainly will not eliminate US dependence on foreign oil, but it is comparable to a double or triple in the George Shultz baseball analogy cited at the beginning of this chapter. Subsequent actions, such as proving the economic viability of synfuels or improving upon the FT process, could "bring these runners home" and further expand domestically produced energy supplies.

Could the world's single largest energy consumer be the catalyst to successfully launch a new synthetic fuel industry in the United States? Advocates say with government help, FT technology could supply 10 percent of US fuels within 20 years. (40)

A relatively small synthetic fuel plant, processing 17,000 tons of coal per day to produce 28,000 barrels of fuel per day, 750 tons of ammonia per day, and 475MW of net electrical power would cost approximately $3 billion. (41) Ten to 15 such plants could supply all of the DOD's fuel requirements.

Senators Jim Bunning and Barack Obama have introduced legislation to address the need to pull together the investors and the billions of dollars needed to build a synthetic fuel plant by expanding and enhancing the DOE loan guarantee program included in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. They also want to provide a new program of matching loans to address funding shortages for front-end engineering and design (capped at $20 million and a requirement for matching by non-federal money), expand investment tax credit and expensing provisions, and extend the fuel excise tax credit; provide funding for the DOD to purchase, test, and integrate synfuels into the military; authorize a study on synfuel storage in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve; and most importantly, to reduce financial risk associated with starting a US synthetic fuel industry, thus extending existing DOD contracting authority for up to 25 years. (42)

Long-term contracts move much of the financial risk from private investors to the American taxpayers. If there were a long-term decline in the price of oil, the DOD could potentially pay much higher prices for synthetic fuel than they otherwise would pay for petroleum products. In past years the DOD has not received the authority to enter into the 15- or 25-year deals industry wants.

In his keynote address to the March 2007 USAF Energy Forum in Washington, DC, Senator Bunning addressed the issue: "I believe the DOD should be authorized to pay a premium for high-quality, clean, domestic fuel. Long-term contracts will provide price certainty and allow for more consistent budgeting. These contracts will vary above and below market prices as world oil prices change during the life of a 25-year contract. I believe this is healthy and normal for long-term contracts." (43) Secretary Michael W. Wynne also addressed price stability at the Energy Forum: "Last year, the AF spent about $6.6 billion on aviation fuel; 1.6 billion dollars more than budgeted. In 2005, the fuel budget was $1.4 billion more than the previous year. We could have paid a supplier to build a dedicated coal, natural gas, or other derived fuel plant with this $3 billion in unbudgeted expense. Maybe then we could have a predictable cost for fuel." (44)

A coal-based synthetic fuel industry also has significant environmental burdens to overcome. Synfuel plants consume huge quantities of water, both as part of the coal-conversion process and for cooling. A typical plant consumes about 3.5 barrels of water for each barrel of synthetic fuel produced. Water is a potentially limiting factor for building synfuel plants in many coal-rich western states like Wyoming and Montana. (45)

An even bigger environmental issue is the amount of carbon dioxide (C[O.sup.2]) produced by refining coal. This amount can range from 50 to 100 percent higher than the range from refining petroleum. (46) Advocates for synfuel point out the C[O.sup.2] can be captured and used for "enhanced oil recovery" by pumping the captured C[O.sup.2] into oil wells to retrieve otherwise unobtainable oil or oil sequestered in underground saline aquifers or other "storage" locations to prevent addition of C[O.sup.2] from becoming an ever-increasing GHG problem. Skeptics quickly point out that carbon capture and sequestration have never been proven on any large scale, and if such attempts were made, they would surely add to the cost of synfuel production.

Global warming due to GHG emissions has become the political 500-pound gorilla that cannot be ignored. Secretary Wynne acknowledged this in his address to the USAF Energy Forum, saying:
   The big issue is the sequestration of large amounts of carbon
   dioxide before it's released into the atmosphere. The DOE National
   Energy Technology Laboratory and several others are now working on
   the development of carbon capture technology that approaches 90%.

   Our team at Wright-Patterson also is working on a study with DOE to
   find the right mix of biomass and coal to reduce C[O.sup.2] emissions
   starting with the feedstock.

   We aim to be good stewards of the environment and yet push for the
   production and purchase of domestically produced synfuel from
   plants that use coal, natural gas or other derivation that
   incorporate greenhouse gas reduction processes to provide the right
   fuel in the right manner. (47)


The DOD could not only be the catalyst for the synthetic fuel industry in the United States, it could also promote US carbon capture and sequestration on an unprecedented scale. The DOD should not support any synfuel initiatives that do not responsibly handle C[O.sup.2] emissions.

Ethanol is an important alternative to petroleum-based gasoline in the larger national strategy to reduce oil consumption, and the DOD should follow government guidelines in purchasing new non-tactical vehicles capable of operating on ethanol or other alternatives to gasoline. However, gasoline represents 1.1 percent of DOD energy costs, and aggressive pursuit of ethanol for the DOD will not make a significant difference.

DOD Facilities and Renewable/Nuclear Energy Sources

As discussed in chapter 2, the DOD facilities energy management could serve as a model for other federal agencies. The DUSD (I&E) manages an excellent facilities energy program. Facilities are unique in that efficient facilities can reduce energy demand, and renewable energy initiatives on or near DOD installations can also increase supply and diversify sources.

The DOD is one of the major leaders of the federal government in renewable energy, receiving about 9 percent of its electricity from renewable sources in FY 2005 (national average is 6 percent) and has a goal of 25 percent of its electricity from renewable sources by 2025. (48)

Why not a more aggressive goal? The DOD should set a goal of being a net-zero energy consumer at its facilities by 2030. The path to net-zero energy consumption is through expanded production of renewable, and possibly nuclear, energy sources at or near the DOD installations.

Several DOD installations are already exceeding the existing 25 percent renewable goal. Dyess AFB, Texas, is operating 100 percent on renewable energy, with Minot AFB, Montana, and Fairchild AFB, Washington, not far behind with 95.7 percent and 99.6 percent, respectively.

Other energy-saving or renewable energy projects already are established or under way at many DOD installations. At Nellis AFB, Nevada, the Air Force recently awarded a contract to build the largest photovoltaic solar farm in the world that is on track to generate 18MW in late 2008. (49) A 2004 Sandia National Laboratory study concluded that nearly all DOD installations have potential for one or more economically viable solar-energy projects with potential savings of 10 percent in electricity and 14 percent in natural gas. (50)

Geothermal energy has been a success story for the Navy. Geothermal energy is found in underground pockets of steam, hot water, and hot, dry rocks. Steam and hot water can be extracted from underground reservoirs to power steam turbines, which drive generators and produce electricity. Lower intensity geothermal resources are used for such direct-use applications as space heating and by geothermal heat pumps to heat and cool buildings.

The Navy has four privately built, owned, and operated geothermal power plants at Naval Air Warfare Center, China Lake, California, (51) and is building another facility at Naval Air Station, Fallon, Nevada. The private company sells the electricity to a utility company and pays the Navy. The Navy has received an average of $14.7 million annually from 1987 to 2003. The Navy spent about two-thirds of its geothermal revenues on energy-conservation projects, including solar-energy systems. About one-third of the revenues funded the overhead costs of the Navy's Geothermal Program Office. The geothermal plant at China Lake has been producing 345,000 MWh of electricity per year since 1990. (52)

The DOD has identified four additional installations as good candidates for geothermal power generation that might be commercially viable, third-party funded, producers of an average of 40 megawatts (Mwa) of electricity. Six to eight additional installations have hot water potential and will be researched further. (53)

Geothermal heat pumps are similar to ordinary heat pumps but use the ground instead of outside air to provide heating, air-conditioning, and, in most cases, hot water. Because they use the earth's natural heat, they are among the most efficient and comfortable heating and cooling technologies currently available. The services have installed 10,356 geothermal heat pumps among 24 different installations since 1993. (54)

In 2005 Naval Station Guantanamo Bay brought online the world's largest wind farm/diesel hybrid-power system. The plant is rated at 3.8 MW, is improving installation grid reliability, providing 25 percent of the base's power requirements; and saving the Navy $1.2 million annually. (55)

Since 1997 the Air Force has installed five wind-generation facilities, producing 8,400 KW of electricity. The Army has two small wind facilities, generating 335 KW, and the Navy has one wind facility at San Clemente Island, California, rated at 675 KW. (56) The DOD has identified an additional 109 facilities with the potential to produce an additional 70 MWa in wind energy. (57)

Renewable energy production at DOD facilities is growing and must continue to grow to assure access to critical energy requirements. Renewable energy diversifies energy sources and provides cost-effective, environmentally responsible energy to DOD facilities.

Nuclear Power

Another more controversial energy source with great potential to provide assured access to electricity for DOD installations is nuclear power. Secretary of energy, Sam Bodman, announced the Global Nuclear Energy Strategic Partnership (GNEP) in February 2006 as part of President Bush's Advanced Energy Initiative that he highlighted in his 2006 State of the Union address.

GNEP proposes "to work with other nations to develop and deploy advanced nuclear recycling and reactor technologies. This initiative will help to provide reliable, emission-free energy with less of the waste burden of older technologies and without making available separated plutonium that could be used by rogue states or terrorists for nuclear weapons. These new technologies will make possible a dramatic expansion of safe, clean nuclear energy to help meet the growing global energy demand." (58)

In short, GNEP seeks to expand nuclear power capabilities with advanced technologies to effectively and safely recycle spent nuclear fuel without producing separated plutonium. Once the technology is demonstrated, it can be exported to other countries.

If GNEP proceeds as planned, DOE will have to test and validate these new nuclear technologies. Larger DOD installations, especially those with limited renewable energy capabilities, could provide the DOE secure sites to validate the new technologies before sending them overseas. The DOD would gain nuclear-powered installations independent from the vulnerable, fragile commercial electric grid. Additionally, the DOD could provide surplus power to surrounding civilian communities.

The process likely will be a slow one, but the DOD can develop a comprehensive energy strategy and create an organizational structure for implementation. Through culture change, process innovations, efficiencies, and alternative energy sources, the DOD can retool itself with regard to energy.

Notes

(1.) USC, Title 10, Armed Forces, sec. 131.

(2.) Slife, "Officer Professional Development Session on Leadership and Management."

(3.) Schein, Organizational Culture and Leadership, 309.

(4.) Ibid., 310.

(5.) Ibid., 324.

(6.) Ibid., 334-35.

(7.) Brad Hancock, to the author, e-mail, 7 March 2007.

(8.) Wynne, "Letter to Airmen."

(9.) HQ USAF, Air Operations Operational Planning, 16.

(10.) Clary, Air Force Aviations Operations.

(11.) Peterson to AMC OG/CCs, memorandum.

(12.) James, Bullet Background Paper on Hawaii ANG.

(13.) Muellner, USAF Energy Forum.

(14.) KC-135 Fact Sheet, http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet. asp?fsID=110.

(15.) Boeing, KC-135 home page.

(16.) National Research Council, Improving the Efficiency of Engines, 1.

(17.) Ibid., 2.

(18.) Ibid., 1, 3-4.

(19.) Ibid., 42-43.

(20.) Ibid.

(21.) Ibid., 43.

(22.) Ibid.

(23.) Defense Science Board, Defense Science Board Task Force on B-52H, ES-1.

(24.) Ibid., ES-2.

(25.) Ibid., ES-4.

(26.) Stricker, USAF Energy Forum.

(27.) Ibid.

(28.) National Research Council, Improving the Efficiency of Engines, 1.

(29.) House, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, 13.

(30.) http: //www.international-marine.com/news/news_items/New %20Intersleek%20900.pdf.

(31.) Lovins, Winning the Oil Endgame, 86.

(32.) Donnelly, "Military Wants a More Fuel-Efficient HUMVEE," A1.

(33.) Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Future Fuels, 55.

(34.) Department of Energy, Early Days of Coal.

(35.) Ibid.

(36.) Bollinger, to the author, e-mail, 11 September 2007.

(37.) House, Alternative Energy and Energy Efficiency, 3.

(38.) Wynne, USAF Energy Forum.

(39.) Bollinger, to the author.

(40.) Schmidt, "A Reluctant Pentagon Viewed."

(41.) Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Future Fuels, 56.

(42.) Bunning, USAF Energy Forum.

(43.) Ibid.

(44.) Ibid.

(45.) Goodell, Big Coal, 221.

(46.) Ibid.

(47.) Wynne, USAF Energy Forum.

(48.) House, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, 9.

(49.) Wynne, USAF Energy Forum.

(50.) Sandia National Laboratories, DOD Solar Energy Assessment.

(51.) US GAO, Geothermal Energy, i.

(52.) Department of the Navy, FY 2005 Annual Energy Management Report, 6.

(53.) Office of the Secretary of Defense, DOD Renewable Energy Assessment, 3-4.

(54.) Tri-Service Renewable Energy Committee Project Listing, 1-3.

(55.) Department of the Navy, FY 2005 Annual Energy Management Report, 4.

(56.) Tri-Service Renewable Energy Committee Project Listing, 1-3.

(57.) Office of the Secretary of Defense, DOD Renewable Energy Assessment, 3.

(58.) White House, National Security Strategy, 29.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

For more than two decades, federal energy policy has been afflicted by paralysis. Although much energy legislation has been passed into law during this period, America's energy security has grown worse with each passing year. This deteriorating condition has created enormous economic and national security vulnerabilities....

The time for action arrived long ago. We must not waste another moment.

--Energy Security Leadership Council Recommendations to the Nation on Reducing US Oil Dependence

December 2006

This paper has attempted objectively to address the US national security problem of deteriorating energy security from a Department of Defense (DOD) perspective. Energy is the lifeblood of the US economy and the key enabler of US military combat power.

The United States' unique ability to project military power anywhere on the globe requires incredible quantities of liquid hydrocarbon fuel. The primary source of fuel is imported oil from an economically and politically unstable world oil market.

The true cost of fuel is much more than it appears on the purchasing receipt. The DOD's never-ending need for fuel comes with a high price tag that includes not only the bulk purchase price of the fuel itself but also the cost of a fuel logistics system that includes tens of thousands of personnel, storage facilities, tanker trucks, and such major weapons systems as the KC-135, whose primary mission is to deliver fuel. Additionally, fuel has a significant cost in combat capability that is almost impossible to quantify.

Numerous outstanding energy programs abound within the Department of Defense. Rising energy costs have given new emphasis to saving fuel in each of the services, and the DOD facilities energy management program is a model for the federal government. Recent energy studies by military and energy experts provide volumes of recommendations to improve efficiency and save energy. However, there is no existing comprehensive DOD energy strategy, and there is no single energy senior official or energy advocate in the department.

The military's dependence on vast amounts of fuel and electricity creates vulnerabilities. Disruption in the flow of fuel and electricity due to natural disaster, sabotage, or physical attack on the petroleum or electricity infrastructure cannot be dismissed as an unlikely event. Also, that so much of the United States' and other countries' energy needs rely on imported oil creates foreign policy and economic vulnerability.

To improve energy security, the DOD needs a comprehensive energy strategy that improves national security by decreasing US dependence on foreign oil, ensures access to critical energy requirements, maintains or improves combat capability, promotes research for future energy security, is fiscally responsible to the American taxpayer, and protects the environment. Also required is an organizational structure to implement that strategy through the establishment of an ASD for Energy Security with policy and resource authority to serve as the senior official for energy issues in the department. The ASD for Energy Security must implement the department's energy strategy through leadership and culture change to make energy a consideration in all military actions and operations, innovation and process efficiencies, as well as efficiency improvements in platforms and facilities to reduce energy demand, and increased energy supply by way of alternative fuels and renewable energy programs.

The DOD can lead the way in transforming the manner in which the United States consumes and produces energy. In the 1985 movie Back to the Future, scientist Dr. Emmett Brown returns from the year 2015 with a 1980's vintage vehicle modified with a Mr. Fusion device creating huge amounts of energy from organic material found in common household garbage. The year 2015 is only eight years away, and there is no evidence Mr. Fusion or any major scientific breakthrough will make oil obsolete inside the next 30 years. Mr. Fusion represents the fantasy of the game-winning home run. In reality, few home runs exist to reduce the United States' addiction to foreign oil.

Improving energy security must be done through a steady, incremental approach that is not tied to individual personalities, specific military leaders, or partisan political administrations. Securing the energy future of the DOD is a prerequisite to ensuring that the United States remains the world's preeminent global power.

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GREGORY J. LENGYEL

Colonel, USAF

Col Gregory J. Lengyel is the commander, Combined Joint Special Operations Air Component, for United States Central Command. He is currently engaged in combat in Operations Iraqi/Enduring Freedom.

Colonel Lengyel graduated from Texas A&M University in 1985, earning his commission as a distinguished graduate in the Reserve Officer Training Corps. He is a command pilot with more than 3,700 flight hours in the UH-1H, UH-1N, TH-53A, MH-53J, and MH-53M. He is also a graduate of the US Marine Corps Weapons and Tactics Instructor course. Colonel Lengyel has served in several operational flying and staff assignments, including commander of the 21st Special Operations Squadron while flying MH-53M Pave Low IV helicopters in Operation Iraqi Freedom. He was also military assistant to the secretary of defense, Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld, while he was assigned to the Pentagon.

Colonel Lengyel wrote this paper as part of the Air Force Fellows program while assigned as a National Defense Fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, DC. He is married to the love of his life, the former Diane Parman of Omak, Washington. Their pride and joy are children: Daniel, 15, and Matthew, 13. They aslo have a yellow Labrador retriever, named Duke.
Figure 1. Fuel consumption. (Reprinted from Chris DiPetto,
"Energy Efficiency for Tactical Systems" [PowerPoint
presentation to 2006 PEO/SYSCOM Commanders' Conference].)

Understanding the Problem
US Government Fuel Consumption

(Petroleum Based Products)

Air Force       52%
Navy            33%
Army             7%
Other DoD        1%
Government       7%

DOD Uses 93% of all US Government Fuel Consumed

Note: Table made from pie chart.
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Title Annotation:p. 31-69
Author:Lengyel, Gregory J.
Publication:Walker Papers
Article Type:Report
Geographic Code:1USA
Date:Jan 1, 2008
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