Defining information operations forces: What do we need?
In 2001 the Quadrennial Defense Review Report mandated that the military treat information operations (IO) not merely as an enabling function but as a "core capabilit[y] of future forces." (1) In 2002 the Defense Planning Guidance, 2004-2009 directed the development of an "IO Roadmap" that would "address the full scope of IO," including a "career force." (2) The following year, that road map recommended "establish[ing] an IO career force" and "develop[ing] IO planners." (3) Most recently, the Quadrennial Defense Review Report of 2006 again highlighted the need for IO forces. (4) Although the military services have made some progress toward carrying out these directives, they have not yet come close to fulfilling their intent.
Our struggles come as no surprise. They are due in no small part to our inability to answer the question, what exactly constitutes an "IO force"? Given the broad definition of IO, it has proven difficult to create a professional whose training and education encompass the broad set of skills required to operate across the full spectrum of IO. Having to contend with so many disparate parts, how can we define--much less build--such a force? In fact, we cannot. No single "career force" can cover all of IO.
Realizing this fact, each military branch has approached the problem piecemeal, attacking those elements of IO most supportive of its own objectives, missions, and competencies. the Army has defined an IO functional area and has matured portions of the psychological operations (PSYOP) mission. The navy has focused mainly on electronic warfare (EW) and network warfare (NW), as has the Air Force. the Air Force recently began to address the idea of an NW force but has yet to define an Air Force specialty (AFS) or organize most effectively for use by combatant commands. (5) Throughout these efforts, no branch has provided a clear vision for where we want to go or a corporate strategy for how to proceed.
This article attempts to answer the question, what is an IO force? and determine those elements necessary to fulfill the directives of the past six years. In this regard, it analyzes the doctrinal definition of IO (and its mission areas), examines capabilities that currently conduct operations for these mission areas, and presents a gap analysis for existing shortfalls. It concludes with four recommendations that could help fulfill these directives. Although the focus of this article remains on the Air Force (largely by design), its theory, ideas, and recommendations may prove useful to the other services.
Words Are Important
In defining operational forces for IO, one finds it useful to describe IO in operational terms. As planners and operators, we characterize operations using words such as domains, effects, targets, and capabilities. Unfortunately, we find variations in the meanings of these common terms throughout the Department of Defense (DOD) (if they are defined at all). For our purposes, this article uses a combination of definitions adopted by joint doctrine and the Battlespace 21st Century (B21) model. (6)
Our universe consists of three primary domains: physical (including the terrestrial, atmospheric, marine, space, and electromagnetic [EM] environments as well as the tangible components contained within them), cognitive (the single and collective consciousness that exists in the minds of individuals), (7) and information (existing within both the physical and cognitive domains and hosting the creation, manipulation, storage, and sharing of data and information). (8)
An operational domain represents a portion of one or more primary domains chosen for a specific national or military operation. (9) Essentially, it is an artificially defined (in that it is defined by humans), bounded area of the universe. For example, the operational domain within which the Air Force traditionally operates is made up of parts of the physical (atmospheric, space, terrestrial, and the eM environments), cognitive (the minds of the participants), and information domains (the data and information associated with the operations at hand). Another example, pertinent to the discussion that follows, is cyberspace. The cyberspace operational domain is "characterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic environment to store, modify, and exchange data and information via networked systems and associated physical infrastructure." (10) From this definition, we can see that cyberspace consists of elements of the physical (the physical electronic components as well as the eM environment), cognitive (the "mind" of any automated decision maker), and information domains (the data and information confined within its physical architecture).
Within any operational domain, capabilities achieve effects against specific targets. Leveraging joint doctrine, we define a target as "an area, complex, installation, force, equipment, capability, function, or behavior identified for possible action to support the commander's objectives, guidance, and intent." (11) Using the same reference, we define an effect as "a change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom" to one or more targets. (12) Finally, we draw upon the B21 model to define capabilities as "the combination of military equipment (weapons systems, tools, software, etc.), personnel, logistics support, training, and resources that provide the ability to achieve effects against targets in one or more domains." (13)
Having defined some operational terms, we turn to the current doctrinal meaning of IO, defined by Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, as "the integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own." (14) DOD- and service-level doctrines adhere to this definition and further define the "core capabilities" identified therein. (15) Unfortunately, the terms and definitions for these capabilities vary somewhat. Further, DOD-, joint-, and service-level doctrines present a number of additional terms intended to help further characterize IO. The table on the next page identifies those that make up a good portion of the entire scope of IO. The sheer number of disparate terms, however, tends to muddy the waters rather than bring clarity to an already murky subject.
For simplicity's sake, we confine our analysis to the following terms: EW, CNA/NetA, CND/NetD, PSYOP, MILDEC, and OPSEC (see table). In doing so, we consider all definitions of these terms as presented in national-level directives and in joint, Army, navy, and Air Force doctrine. However, we refrain from referring to these terms as capabilities (as does most doctrine), contending that they represent a combination of capabilities, domains, and effects (as we have defined these terms earlier). Consequently, they are referred to hereafter simply as mission areas.
A Review of the Information Operations Mission Areas: Characteristics, Capabilities, and Career Paths
The following discussion reviews each mission area of IO, translates its definitions into operational terms, and performs a gap analysis of current capabilities and career forces responsible for that mission area. It introduces each mission area by identifying the common characteristics found within DOD-, joint-, and service-level doctrinal definitions and then using these characteristics to restate the mission area in operational terms. Viewed in this operational context, each analysis concludes by identifying those capabilities and effects required to conduct operations effectively for the mission area and by evaluating these requirements against existing capabilities. For organizational purposes, and in conformance with AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, we combine the analysis of CNA/NetA and CND/ NetD under the heading of NW and the analysis of PSYOP and MILDEC under the heading of influence operations. However, due to its unique nature, OPSEC, normally associated with influence operations, is examined separately.
An analysis of current doctrine shows that EW involves the use of EM or directed energy and includes offensive or defensive operations affecting the eM spectrum. (16) Translating these characteristics into operational terms, we see that the EW mission area consists of capabilities which use EM energy or directed energy to achieve their effects and that those effects occur within the EM environment (physical domain).
A review of current Air Force capabilities shows that many of today's weapons systems use EM energy to achieve their effects. Most of these come in the form of airborne jamming and collection assets. However, we have made progress in the area of space control, which also produces effects in the EM environment. (17) In addition to achieving offensive effects, all of these capabilities use measures within the eM environment to deconflict their profiles or protect themselves from enemy attacks.
Career fields and training strategies for the EW mission area are relatively mature. Airborne EW systems are typically integrated within each platform, and the flying community has a recognized career path and qualification program for personnel assigned to use these systems. Typically these individuals are identified under the navigator (12XXX) AFS, associated with a particular platform, and designated with an AFS prefix, which highlights their specialty as an EW airborne operator. Space-control capabilities that use eW assets are primarily manned by personnel from the space and missile operations AFS (13SXX) and follow the career path specified under that career field.
Although this represents only a cursory analysis, we see that the Air Force maintains capabilities that fulfill the immediate needs of the EW mission area. Its systems can achieve a number of effects within the EM environment, and the associated forces have well-established career paths and appropriate training. Therefore, the Air Force does not require additional capabilities or career forces for the EW mission area of IO. (18)
NetD and NetA involve the use of hardware, software, and network-based capabilities to conduct defensive and offensive operations, respectively. (19) NetD operations protect and defend friendly information systems, computer networks, and information transiting within them. In addition, they protect against the NetA capabilities of others. NetA operations traverse through computers or computer networks to offensively affect them or the information resident therein. (20) Translating these characteristics into operational terms, we see that the NW mission area consists of both NetD and NetA capabilities, the former using computer networks (network-based) to produce defensive effects that protect our friendly spaces of the cyberspace operational domain, and the latter using computer hardware or software to traverse the cyberspace operational domain and achieve offensive effects within it.
The Air Force has made significant progress in the area of NetD capabilities but still finds itself primarily confined to software-patch updates, virus protection, and network-perimeter defense. While the commercial world continues to make advancements in areas such as spyware and rootkit detection, the corporate Air Force has implemented few of these tools or techniques. The DOD limits detailed discussion of NetA capabilities to classified forums, so further discussion here is not possible. Suffice it to say that the service still needs a well-structured, efficient capability-development strategy to keep up with current advances in technology.
Neither dedicated forces nor a mature training strategy exists for the NW mission area. Individuals from a mix of different specialties fill NetA positions at all levels of operation. NetD positions at the tactical level are more standardized in that they primarily include communications personnel (33XXX/3C0XX). However, at the operational and strategic levels, NetD personnel are just as varied as their NetA brethren. Most individuals assigned to NW positions are considered on "career broadening" tours and are expected to return to their designated career-field path upon completion of the NW assignment.
Lack of dedicated forces affects the potency and maturity of these forces. NW units require unique training and experience to perform the technical aspects of their mission. Unfortunately, these units must rely significantly on the prior experience and formal education of new arrivals. Some of these individuals may have previous training in basic computer and networking concepts, but many possess little technical expertise. We can conduct training at the gaining unit (what occurs today), but such instruction takes time and money, shortens the operational "shelf life" of the individual, and detracts from mission accomplishment. Lastly, the fact that we "borrow" all personnel from other career fields affects continuity and typically results in the loss of such expertise at the conclusion of the tour. Some may argue that such disbursement strengthens the Air Force as a whole, but it provides little in the way of providing a mature, experienced NW war-fighting force.
AFDD 2-5 describes influence operations as those "affecting the perceptions and behaviors of leaders, groups, or entire populations," including PSYOP and MILDEC within its definition. (21) PSYOP involves conveying selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, attitudes, objective reasoning, and behavior. MILDEC operations (whether offensively or defensively focused) mislead adversary decision makers in order to cause them to take actions (or not act) in accordance with friendly objectives. (22) Viewed in operational terms, the influence-operations mission area consists of capabilities that produce effects within the cognitive domain.
Any weapons system and/or platform within the Air Force can achieve effects within the cognitive domain (albeit not directly). For example, an F-15 may destroy a supply truck, which, in turn, disrupts an adversary's fuel supply, which then denies the adversary use of his aircraft. The inability to field aircraft may then influence the adversary to capitulate. Consider also the positioning of the 5th Marine expeditionary Brigade off the coast of Kuwait during Operation Desert Storm, an action that helped deceive Iraq as to the direction of the allied advance and influenced Saddam Hussein to reposition his defenses. Admittedly, we will need many capabilities not yet in existence to achieve certain cognitive effects. however, such capabilities will always depend upon a commander's established mission objectives. Without a thorough analysis of current and future combatant-commander requirements, we cannot identify all needed capabilities here. Such analysis lies beyond the scope of this article. We move forward with the assumption that current kinetic and nonkinetic weapons systems and military assets can fulfill immediate requirements to conduct influence operations and have the potential to achieve necessary effects within the cognitive domain.
Although career paths and trained personnel already exist for most Air Force weapons systems and platforms, training in the art of influence operations remains limited. School-house and weapons-school focus does not extend far beyond the tactical-level effects of deny, disrupt, degrade, and destroy. This is not to say that psychological effects or MILDEC does not exist or that we do not conduct them, but most operators receive little formal training in these areas. The concepts taught--if at all--are system specific and constrained to the tactical level. Few personnel receive formal training in planning and executing influence operations at the operational and strategic levels through the application of our full range of national capabilities. Some career forces that specialize in affecting the cognitive domain do exist, however. The Army has a handful of specialists trained in some aspects of influence operations. (23) The Air Force has public-affairs forces, but necessarily restrictive rules of engagement limit their capabilities. Cultural attaches or foreign area officers also receive training in related skill sets, but even these have limited scope. In essence, the Air Force lacks a cadre of individuals with the training and experience necessary to produce mature, sophisticated effects within the cognitive domain (i.e., those that leverage arts and sciences such as marketing, psychology, and sociology). The state of operations in Iraq offers a perfect example of why we need such training now and in the future. Our inability to cultivate personnel trained in these skills may have led to our failure as a department to affect the cognitive domain and quickly establish conditions conducive to long-term stability and democracy. (24)
Doctrinally, the definition of OPSEC is standardized throughout the DOD. (25) In operational terms, the OPSEC mission area consists of capabilities that achieve the effects of identifying critical information about friendly forces, analyzing friendly actions, and determining indicators that hostile intelligence systems-might obtain which could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries. In addition OPSEC includes capabilities, which conduct defensive effects that eliminate or reduce vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. the effects produced can take place anywhere within the associated operational domain and can involve the use of many different capabilities (whether kinetic or nonkinetic, a national or military asset, or at the strategic, operational, or tactical levels).
Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 10-11, Operations Security, directs "commanders at every level [to] establish a program that ensures OPSEC is fully integrated into their mission responsibilities." (26) Local OPSEC managers rely on Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-701, Operations Security (OPSEC), to develop and execute their local programs. (27) The program is well documented and appears well structured on paper. Unfortunately, most OPSEC managers take on these responsibilities as an additional duty instead of as a full-time job, and many find themselves ill equipped to perform the type of vulnerability assessments necessary to meet the requirements identified in these regulations. Thus, more often than not, they implement only the minimum requirements (e.g., unit training and development of a critical-information list)--enough to pass an inspection but not enough to defend effectively against enemy observations. The most effective capabilities we have today come in the form of multidisciplinary vulnerability assessments (MDVA). Unfortunately, few units in the Air Force conduct these at this time.
Not part of a focused career field, OPSEC managers are appointed locally from available personnel at each level of command. They receive standardized training--mostly consisting of a threat overview and brief summary of the five-step OPSEC process--but very little instruction in OPSEC tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). Any continuity relies strictly on the ambition of their predecessors. Typically, long-term, experienced OPSEC managers do not exist. Their appointments are considered a secondary duty, and they tend to be junior personnel.
The preceding section characterized, in operational terms, the different mission areas of IO. It identified each area's capabilities and effects and defined the domains within which each one operates. In addition, an analysis of current capabilities and career forces highlighted shortfalls that contribute to our inability to execute certain mission areas effectively. We now address these gaps with four recommendations intended to help fill them. Specifically, these include the establishment of both an NW-operations career force and an influence-operations-planner career force, OPSEC Red teams at the base and major command (MAJCOM) levels as well as full-time OPSEC managers, and a more effective integration of IO theory within the corporate Air Force.
Network-Warfare-Operations Career Force
NW forces should have both technical training in the use of computer hardware and/or software and the ability to use such equipment to produce offensive and/or defensive effects within the cyberspace operational domain. Junior officers are experts in one or more "classes" of networks (e.g., Internet protocol-based networks, process-control networks, telephony, etc.) (28) with experience in both offensive and defensive operations at the tactical level. Senior officers have the background necessary to leverage a variety of NW capabilities in order to plan and execute integrated operations at the operational and strategic levels.
NW forces have their own AFS and career-force managers. Their dedicated development team (DT) at the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) works to ensure that each individual obtains tactical-level expertise and experience in a variety of NW capabilities and skill sets during his or her junior years. This ensures that NW operators acquire the foundation necessary to serve MAJCOM and combatant commands as skilled planners and staff personnel during their midgrade years. Senior personnel lead NW units and organizations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.
These forces have their own education and training path similar to those that currently exist for other operations career fields (e.g., pilots and space operators). Air education and training Command handles the formal undergraduate and graduate training of new accessions who pass stringent aptitude tests. Undergraduate training covers core fundamentals such as operating systems, architecture, and networking as well as basic force application, including attack, evasion, and exploitation techniques. Graduate training improves upon these skills but focuses on a specific network class. (29) Following graduation from these two programs, qualified operators move on to their gaining operations unit, where they receive training in local policy and procedures. A numbered air force or MAJCOM-level cyber command oversees recurring training and standardization/evaluation while an expansion of the USAF Weapons School implements advanced tactics.
Influence-Operations-Planner Career Force
These forces would be practiced in arts and sciences such as psychology, sociology, and marketing with an understanding of how to integrate national and military assets to conduct sophisticated effects within the cognitive domain. Junior officers are experts in the creation of tactical-level effects using one or more different capabilities (e.g., those of the land, sea, air, and cyberspace). Midgrade officers can integrate a variety of capabilities to create operational-level effects (e.g., joint operations and military campaigns), whereas senior-level officers have the experience necessary to plan and execute more strategic-level effects (e.g., foreign-policy development and long-term planning).
Like NW forces, influence-operations planners have their own AFS, career-force-managers, and Dt at the AFPC. They spend their junior years embedded within a variety of tactical units (e.g., armor battalions, air squadrons, and surface fleets), where these planners hone their craft and apply techniques during exercise and real-world situations. They spend their midgrade years at the MAJCOMs and/or combatant commands leveraging the expertise gained during earlier years but now applying it at the operational and strategic levels. Planners could also serve a tour in a joint strategic-communications organization before taking on more senior roles that affect national policy and strategy. (30)
Influence-operations planners receive formal undergraduate training in skills such as applied psychology, sociology, and marketing. Much of their early development results from experiences within a variety of tactical-level capabilities and scenarios. Additional professional military education (PME) coursework includes topics such as military operations, command-and-control authorities, and law. Midgrade assignments also include cultural immersion in one or two particular theaters and possibly a media posting aimed at honing public-communication skills. (31) Continuous course-work in such subjects as organizational behavior, foreign policy, world religions, cultural studies, and strategic communications becomes required as planners move into their mid and senior years.
OPSEC Red Teams and Full-Time OPSEC Managers
OPSEC managers would still provide the lead for command-directed requirements. However, their full-time status now gives them the time to implement effective OPSEC programs. Red teams provide vigilant support to the unit OPSEC managers by regularly conducting MDVAs for their base or MAJCOM. MAJCOM Red teams conduct assessments from a more regional perspective. Red teams and unit OPSEC managers are closely connected with the counterintelligence community, thus ensuring that OPSEC tactics and effects mirror--but are not limited to--expected adversary methods. Together, these individuals work to continuously mitigate OPSEC vulnerabilities and counter adversary threats.
No specific career field or path is envisioned for either OPSEC managers or Red Team personnel. (32) Positions are filled by individuals from a variety of backgrounds, and OPSEC assignments are treated as career-broadening opportunities. However, OPSEC planners at the operational and strategic levels should have previous experience as an OPSEC manager or Red Team member. All OPSEC personnel receive initial qualification training at the local unit in areas such as social engineering, physical security, and collection of open-source intelligence; they acquire more advanced skill sets through on-the-job training. Well-documented TTP manuals maintain continuity and advances in this art, which are passed on during initial and recurring training of new personnel. As with all IO mission areas, "best practices" are maintained in the appropriate Air Force TTP series volume for use by all OPSEC personnel.
More Effective Integration of Information Operations Theory within the Corporate Air Force
In addition to heeding the mission-area-focused recommendations mentioned above, we must more effectively integrate the doctrinal concepts of IO into the corporate Air Force. After all, just as all Airmen must understand air and space theory, we must also understand IO theory if it is to truly become a "core capabilit[y] of future forces." (33) This integration must occur in two ways: (1) through improved education within PME curricula, and (2) (and more fundamentally) as an underlying cultural change in how we approach all operations (whether kinetic or nonkinetic).
PME exposes every member of the Air Force, regardless of specialty, to air and space power doctrine during different stages of his or her career. Although this coursework includes IO to some extent, such lessons remain largely theoretical, provide little or no instruction on how to apply its concepts to existing operations, and do little more than provide interesting points to ponder. In short, IO lessons at present have little or no substantial operational value to their recipients--a situation that one can attribute to the nascency of Air Force IO itself. In some aspects, we are just learning how to effectively "do" the mission areas of IO, and in many respects, we lack in-depth, mature operational experience--the lessons learned from which we distill our doctrine. However, as we continue to expand our operational knowledge and abilities in this area, the Air Force must expose all personnel to its evolving doctrinal concepts. In addition, we must strive to better integrate our developing IO-power doctrine seamlessly with that of air and space power and, as it matures, demonstrate its utility to real-world operations.
The second approach to corporate integration requires a shift in culture. For years, leadership has realized the importance of integrating IO within all other operations, yet we have not completely succeeded--due in large part to the fact that we have defined IO too broadly, as mentioned earlier. However, in our effort to move forward, we have effectively sidestepped integration and instead simply developed IO as a separate entity. In doing so, we have created everything from IO doctrine to IO organizations to IO training blocks of PME, all independent of air and space operations. Unfortunately, "add-on" IO can work for only some of its mission areas. For example, we can (and should) develop and organize NW capabilities separately, at least until they attain a certain level of maturity and prove fit enough to integrate with other air and space power capabilities for combined operations. (34) However, portions of IO--specifically, those within the influence-operations mission area--will never be effective if developed or employed independently. Influence operations (or the effects achieved within the cognitive domain) represent the impetus for all operations and thus must become an integral part of every capability (whether kinetic or nonkinetic) and the basis for how all operators approach mission planning and execution. Every effect of every objective of every strategy supports an end state that aims at affecting the cognitive domain. As Lt Gen Robert Elder recently stated, "Operations ultimately seek to influence behaviors so we can achieve our objectives at the operational and strategic (and even the tactical) levels." (35) While this article advocates separate planners who specialize in these arts, it does so in part because this principle has not yet become an accepted and integral part of our culture. If we are to truly be successful in this mission area, it must become the bedrock of every step in force development, from institutional dogma to operational training--something we cannot achieve simply by adding another block of instruction to standing curricula. however, embracing such a philosophy requires a complete change in culture and a transformation of our foundational beliefs.
Information Warfare has become central to the way nations fight wars, and will be critical to Air Force operations in the 21st century.... We must invest in our people, planning, equipment, and research so our ambitions can become reality. --Cornerstones of Information Warfare, 1997
Experts agree that the future of warfare is changing and that our ability to execute IO effectively remains critical to our success on the battlefields of the twenty-first century. Over the past several years, leadership has called for development of a career force that will lead us into this arena. Unfortunately, we have struggled even to define IO, much less determine what forces we need to answer this call. Seen in an operational light, our analysis has identified several gaps in both capability and career field that we must address. These gaps not only hinder our ability to advance IO and its mission areas but also, if the epigraph above is to be believed, threaten the very security of our nation. The recommendations provided here represent one solution. Do they give us the entire answer? No, but they offer a starting point for discussion and a vision to strive for.
Editorial Abstract: For years national leadership has called for an information operations (IO) career force, but the broad range of skills required has prevented implementation. This article analyzes current doctrinal definitions to determine the need for such a force and outlines recommendations for network-warfare and influence-operations-planner career forces as well as operational-security Red Teams. It also advocates better integration of IO theory into the Air Force.
(1.) Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 30 September 2001), 38, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf.
(2.) Defense Planning Guidance, 2004-2009 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 2002), 36. Secret/NOFORN. Information extracted is unclassified.
(3.) Information Operations Roadmap (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 30 October 2003), 33, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB177/ info_ops_roadmap.pdf. NOFORN.
(4.) Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 6 February 2006), passim, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf.
(5.) the Air Force is attempting to better organize its cyber forces. In late 2006, the chief of staff of the Air Force designated the commander of eighth Air Force as the commander of the new Air Force Cyber Command, directing him to lead such forces and provide "combat ready forces trained and equipped to conduct sustained offensive and defensive [cyber] operations." AF/CC to 8AF/CC, memorandum, 1 november 2006.
(6.) For information on the B21 model, see Maj timothy P. Franz, "IO Foundations to Cyberspace Operations: Analysis, Implementation Concept, and Way-Ahead for Network Warfare Forces" (master's thesis, Air Force Institute of technology, March 2007), 7-29.
(7.) It is important to note that the terms individual and mind used here represent any decision maker, whether human or automated.
(8.) The three-domain concept is based on the original work of David S. Alberts et al., Understanding Information Warfare (Washington, DC: CCRP [Command and Control Research Program] Publication Series, 2001). This article uses a modification of the definitions in this work, as presented in Franz, "IO Foundations to Cyberspace Operations," 9-14.
(9.) For the definition of the term operational domain, see Franz, "IO Foundations to Cyberspace Operations," 14-17.
(10.) This definition is a modification of the one found in the "national Military Strategy for Cyber Operations," draft (Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, november 2006), vii. Secret. Information extracted is unclassified. For the background of and justification for the modification, see Franz, "IO Foundations to Cyberspace Operations," 15-16.
(11.) Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 (as amended through 5 January 2007), 529, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.
(12.) Ibid., 174.
(13.) Franz, "IO Foundations to Cyberspace Operations," 18.
(14.) JP 3-13, Information Operations, 13 February 2006, GL-9, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_13.pdf.
(15.) As defined in Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3600.1, Information Operations (IO), 14 August 2006, 1; JP 3-13, Information Operations, GL-9 and II-1 through II-9; AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, 11 January 2005, 1--25; Field Manual (FM) 3-13, Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 28 november 2003, 1-13, 1-14, 2-7, 2-8; and navy Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-13, Navy Information Operations, 2003, 13, 14, and 2-6.
(16.) As defined in DODD 3600.1, Information Operations (IO), 1-1; JP 3-13, Information Operations, GL-7 through GL-8; AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, 50; FM 3-13, Information Operations, 2-7; and NWP 3-13, Navy Information Operations, 13.
(17.) TSgt Austin Carter, "New Squadron Trains for Space-Based Aggression," 25 October 2000, http://www.spacedaily.com/news/milspace-00q.html.
(18.) Two items to note: (1) Classification restrictions prevent a more in-depth discussion of eW capabilities. however, understanding that organized, trained, and equipped eW capabilities do exist is sufficient to proceed for the purpose of this article. A detailed analysis that determines whether existing eW capabilities fulfill all of a combatant commander's needs is beyond the scope of this work. (2) The authors recognize that an overlap exists between the eW and NW mission areas since some NW capabilities may use eM energy to achieve their effects within the eM environment of cyberspace. Such capabilities are addressed under the NW section later in this article.
(19.) We use the terms NetD and NetA to be more in step with Air Force terminology. However, we do not restrict our analysis of these terms to Air Force doctrine but include the equivalent terms CNA and CND, found in DOD-, joint-, and other service-level doctrine.
(20.) As defined in DODD 3600.1, Information Operations (IO), 1-1; JP 3-13, Information Operations, GL-5 through GL-6; AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, 53; and FM 3-13, Information Operations, 2-9 through 2-20. The US navy uses the joint definition.
(21.) AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, 3. As mentioned earlier, we evaluate OPSEC separately although, doctrinally, it is still considered part of influence operations.
(22.) As defined in DODD 3600.1, Information Operations (IO), I-2; JP 3-13, Information Operations, GL-10 through GL-11; AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, 52-54; FM 3-13, Information Operations, 2-3 and 2-6; and NWP 3-13, Navy Information Operations, 2003, 15.
(23.) Examples include the IO specialist (FA30) and the PSYOP specialist (FA39).
(24.) Maj tadd Sholtis, "Public Affairs and Information Operations: A Strategy for Success," Air and Space Power Journal 19, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 97--106, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/ apj/apj05/fal05/fall05.pdf.
(25.) As defined in DODD 3600.1, Information Operations (IO), 1-2; JP 3-13, Information Operations, GL-11; AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, 53--54; FM 3-13, Information Operations, 2-2; and NWP 3-13, Navy Information Operations, 15.
(26.) Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 10-11, Operations Security, 31 May 2001, 1, http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/10/afpd10-11/afpd10-11.pdf.
(27.) Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-701, Operations Security (OPSEC), 30 September 2005, http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/pubfiles/af/10/afi10-701/afi10-701.pdf.
(28.) The concept of of a "network class" is introduced in Franz, "IO Foundations to Cyberspace Operations," 67--69. Networks are organized under "classes" according to similar underlying technologies (e.g., hardware, common services, architectures, protocols, etc.).
(30.) Sholtis, "Public Affairs and Information Operations," 105.
(32.) Despite the fact that some experience will be beneficial at the higher levels, we do not believe that our analysis of the OPSEC mission area indicates the need for a dedicated career force at this time. In contrast, due to the mostly nontechnical nature of the mission area, we believe that it is more beneficial to cycle through personnel with different backgrounds and mission areas. Such diversity provides two benefits: (1) different backgrounds bring different ways of thinking, which is advantageous when it comes to this mission area, and (2) the more individuals exposed to OPSEC positions and then recast into their assigned career field, the more "OPSEC aware" the corporate Air Force becomes. For the technical aspects of MDVAs (e.g., network-penetration testing), it is recommended that each Red team be supported by one or more NetA aggressor units. It is envisioned that such aggressor units, which do require a dedicated career force due to their technical nature, would be part of the NW forces discussed earlier.
(33.) Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001), 38.
(34.) One finds a precedent in the development of early airpower. Air capabilities required time for independent growth and development before becoming mature enough to integrate with established land and sea capabilities.
(35.) Lt Gen Robert J. elder Jr., "effects-Based Operations: A Command Philosophy," Air and Space Power Journal 21, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 17, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/ apj07/spr07/spr07.pdf.
MAJ TIMOTHY P. FRANZ, USAF MAJ MATTHEW F. DURKIN, USAF MAJ PAUL D. WILLIAMS, PHD, USAF MAJ RICHARD A. RAINES, PHD, USAF, RETIRED LT COL ROBERT F. MILLS, PHD, USAF, RETIRED
Table. Common Information Operations Terms Term Joint Doctrine Air Force Doctrine Identification Identification EW / EW Core Capability Capability Operations (EWO) (USAF-only term) Electronic Action of EW Military Attack Capability of EWO Electronic Action of EW Military Protect Capability of EWO EW Support Action of EW Military Capability of EWO Computer Network Core Capability Operations (CNO) Capability / Network Warfare Ops (NW Ops) (USAF-only term) Computer Network Action of Operational Attack (CNA) / CNO Activity of NW Ops Network Attack (NetA) (USAF-only term) Computer Network Action of Operational Defense (CND) / CNO Activity of NW Ops Network Defense (NetD) (USAF- only term) Computer Network Related Operational Exploitation / Enabling Activity of NW Ops Network Operation Support of CNO (USAF-only term) Information Supporting Integrated Control Assurance Capability Enabler (part of Net Ops) Influence N/A Capability Operations PSYOP Core Military Capability Capability of Influence Operations Military Core Military Deception Capability Capability of (MILDEC) Influence Operations Operations Core Military Security Capability Capability of (OPSEC) Influence Operations Physical Supporting Supporting Attack / Capability Capability Physical of Influence Destruction Operations Counter Supporting Military intelligence Capability of Capability Public Affairs Related Military Capability Capability of Influence Operations Counter Action Military propaganda taken by Capability Public of Influence Affairs Operations Counterdeception N/A N/A Term Army Doctrine Navy Doctrine Identification Identification EW / EW Core Capability Core Capability Operations (EWO) (USAF-only term) Electronic Component of EW Subdivision of EW Attack Electronic Component of EW Subdivision of EW Protect EW Support Component of EW Subdivision of EW Computer Network Core Capability N/A Operations (CNO) / Network Warfare Ops (NW Ops) (USAF-only term) Computer Network Core Capability Core Capability Attack (CNA) / Network Attack (NetA) (USAF-only term) Computer Network Core Capability Core Capability Defense (CND) / Network Defense (NetD) (USAF- only term) Computer Network Core Capability N/A Exploitation / Network Support (USAF-only term) Information Supporting Supporting Assurance Capability Capability Influence N/A N/A Operations PSYOP Core Capability Core Capability Military Core Capability Core Capability Deception (MILDEC) Operations Core Capability Core Capability Security (OPSEC) Physical Supporting Core Capability Attack / Capability Physical Destruction Counter Supporting N/A intelligence Capability Public Affairs Related Activity Supporting Capability Counter Supporting N/A propaganda Capability Counterdeception Supporting N/A Capability * N/A = term not referred to in core doctrine document Sources: Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, 13 February 2006, II-1 through II-9; Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-5, Information Operations, 11 January 2005, 5-25; Field Manual 3-13, Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 28 November 2003, 1-14, 2-7, 2-8; and Navy Warfare Publication 3-13, Navy Information Operations, 2003, 13 and 2-6.
|Printer friendly Cite/link Email Feedback|
|Author:||Franz, Timothy P.; Durkin, Matthew F.; Williams, Paul D.; Raines, Richard A.; Mills, Robert F.|
|Publication:||Air & Space Power Journal|
|Date:||Jun 22, 2007|
|Previous Article:||Inventory management of officers with advanced academic degrees: the case for a new approach.|
|Next Article:||Preferential treatment for military members based on personality type.|