Printer Friendly

Cybercrime litigation.

D. What Fact Patterns Are Litigated Under Cybercrime Law?

The longitudinal data are probative of how civil plaintiffs and criminal prosecutors have invoked cybercrime law, but they are certainly not conclusive. In this Section, I turn to a detailed latitudinal analysis, using a new, comprehensive dataset of 2012 federal cybercrime pleadings.

With this novel dataset, it is possible to definitively answer additonal foundational questions about the function of federal cybercrime law: Who invokes CFAA and under what circumstances? The following subsections examine these questions, first for civil litigation, then for criminal prosecutions.

1. Civil Litigation

a. Party Relationships

Civil defendants appear nothing like the outsider rogues that initially captivated Congress and state legislatures, as demonstrated by Table 1.

The overwhelming majority of private cybercrime claims arise in business disputes (238,73%), (108) and of those, most follow from previous employment (168, 52%). (109) Just a small minority of claims (38,12%) are filed against strangers. (110)

An analysis of party relationship coincidence confirms that cybercrime law most often intermediates routine commercial quarrels. There is scant overlap between categories associated with business and those associated with hacker stereotypes; these are not cases in which former employees or competitors have aligned with unrelated, serial computer abusers. Rather, civil CFAA litigation involves one-off commercial disputes that happen to involve information technology.

The data on party relationships, seen in Table 2, reveal a notable trend in litigation: a cybercrime claim against a competitor is often accompanied by a cybercrime claim against a former employee (76, 78%). (111) These cases reflect departed staff who have either established their own firms or joined preexisting competitors. Cybercrime law is merely a novel federal twist in these cases, which have historically been adjudicated under contract, trade secret, or agency law.

b. Underlying Conduct

The overwhelming majority of civil cybercrime claims also look nothing like "hacking," even construed broadly, as shown in Table 3.

Most private claims relate to information misappropriation (170, 52%), (112) or modification or deletion (71, 22%). (113) The categories substantially overlap, and together represent a majority of claims (182, 56%). (114) These findings indicate that civil cybercrime works as a quasi-intellectual property regime, far less concerned with the function and integrity of computer systems than with their information contents.

Only a minority of claims could be reasonably characterized as involving the circumvention of a technical protection measure (99,30%). (115) Furthermore, even within these cases that involve technical circumvention, the most common avenues for unauthorized access are password theft (53, 54%), ns mobile phone unlocking (16, 16%), (117) and password sharing (n, n%). (118) Civil cybercrime cases, in short, do not arise from technically sophisticated "breaking and entering." (119)

There is remarkably little commonality in the long tail of fact patterns. Claims present a hodgepodge of theories favoring liability, ranging from online harassment (11, 3%) (120) to hosting an unrelated website (9, 3%) (121) to scraping online material (5, 2%). (122) Cybercrime use in copyright trolling (8, 2%) (123) and bulk mobile phone unlocking cases (16, 5%) (124) suggests the law has been opportunistically seized upon for non-adversarial litigation. (125)

2. Criminal Litigation

a. Victim-Defendant Relationships

Most criminal charges, like most civil claims, arise from a preexisting relationship, as shown in Table 4.

And, like with civil claims, the majority of criminal charges relate to an employment or commercial dispute (76, 57%). (127)

These findings squarely deflate the myth that most cybercrime defendants align with hacker archetypes (i.e., repeat offenders motivated by sport, profit, or national pride). Instead, most criminal cases arise from one-time misconduct, in which an underlying dispute migrates from the real world to the Internet.

The criminal prosecution data reveal, however, one notable departure from civil practice: although still a minority, cases in which there is no relationship between the defendant and victim, or where the defendant is unidentified, occur about three times as often in criminal prosecutions as in civil suits (44, 33%). (128)

b. Underlying Conduct

Criminal cases, much like civil cases, tend not to arise from sophisticated hacking, as seen in Table 5.

About half of prosecutions do not involve technical circumvention of an access control (65, 49%).wo And, among those cases that do involve a circumvention of a technological protection, many of the fact patterns do not reflect technical sophistication but rather password theft (32, 47%). (131)

These results belie the narrative that federal prosecutors generally reserve cybercrime charges for the worst offenders, namely serial and sophisticated computer hackers. (132) In fact, prosecutors routinely file cybercrime charges for minor misconduct, especially when a current or former employee misappropriates information (51,39%). (133)

One substantial point of divergence between civil and criminal litigation is the extent to which government computer systems are involved. Nearly all the civil cases in the dataset related to computer systems owned by private individuals or businesses. (134) In the criminal cases, by contrast, roughly a quarter of charges related to a government computer system (38, 29%). (135) Most of the defendants in these cases were current or former government employees who had technically valid credentials for a system, but misused the system (21, 55%). (136) Remarkably, among those cases where a government employee repurposed their access to a workplace computer system, the most common class of defendant consisted of law enforcement personnel (12, 57%). (137)

E. Is Cybercrime Law Redundant?

Cybercrime law is not monolithic. Federal and state legislatures have enacted a diverse array of offenses and have drafted those offenses with a wide range of textual variations. (138) The current CFAA, for instance, contains (depending on how one counts) up to fourteen different statutory offenses. (139)

The structure of cybercrime law generates the potential for two different types of redundancy. First, a cybercrime offense might be internally redundant, overlapping with other cybercrime offenses within the same statutory scheme. Second, a cybercrime offense might be externally redundant, overlapping with noncybercrime civil claims or criminal charges.

This Section examines the extent to which cybercrime is both internally and externally redundant. It begins with civil claims before turning to criminal charges.

1. Civil Litigation

a. Internal Redundancy

Many pleadings invoke cybercrime law only generally and fail to identify particular statutory claims (123, 38%). (140) These plaintiffs treat CFAA as a single type of liability, blurring the various offenses. One plausible interpretation is that attorneys simply fail to understand the federal statute's structure. Alternatively, practitioners may view cybercrime law as so internally duplicative that particularized claiming is unnecessary. A more cynical view is that many courts tolerate this vague pleading practice, thus providing little incentive for plaintiffs to furnish detail.

CFAA's structure provides a limited natural experiment for evaluating whether attorneys are confused by the statutory scheme or are pleading strategically. In civil practice, statutory claims for unintentional damage to a computer are markedly easier to prove than claims for reckless damage to a computer, and both claims provide identical remedies. (141) Nevertheless, a nontrivial share of filings (55, 27%) include a reckless damage claim. (142) Most of these pleadings also include an unintentional damage claim (42, 76%), such that the reckless damage claim is merely duplicative. (143) But a meaningful share of reckless damage pleadings do not include an unintentional damage claim (13, 24%), (144) a result that can only be explained by attorney confusion. So, this much is certain: a fair number of practitioners are befuddled by cybercrime law.

Within the subset of filings that are more precise about statutory claims (202, 62%), (145) a substantial majority reference multiple provisions (142, 70%), as shown in Figure 10.

These findings strongly suggest that CFAA's various provisions greatly overlap. Most plaintiffs who plead with specificity believe their fact pattern could be styled as a violation of more than one statutory offense.

Pleadings most commonly cite CFAA's taking information and fraud offenses, as would be expected given their broad judicial constructions. (146) The unintentional damage and loss provision is also widely invoked, suggesting plaintiffs recognize the broad and overlapping interpretations of "damage" and "loss" that some courts have adopted.

Claiming coincidence under CFAA lends further credence to the view that the statute is internally redundant, as seen in Table 7. There are extraordinarily high rates of coclaiming across CFAA's broadest provisions.

Several areas of claiming coincidence warrant note. First, the taking information and fraud offenses frequently coincide, (147) likely because courts have watered down key elements of CFAA's fraud offense.

Second, the various "damage" claims commonly are coupled with a taking information or a fraud claim. (148) These filings reflect jurisprudence that broadly interprets "damage" to encompass mundane copying or modifying data. (149)

Third, the overwhelming majority of password trafficking claims are paired with fraud claims (20, 87%). (150) Much, but not all, of the overlap arises from copy-and-paste complaints in mobile phone unlocking disputes (13, 65%). (131) The theory of these cases seems to be, in part, that use of another person's password is inherently fraudulent. If viable, this theory renders the password trafficking offense largely redundant as against the fraud offense.

b. External Redundancy

Private cybercrime claims are usually bundled with a passel of other causes of action, as shown in Figure 11.

This high rate of coclaiming buttresses the theory that, in civil litigation, CFAA and conventional bases of liability are usually redundant. Plaintiffs evidently believe they have a broad range of colorable theories for recovery.

As demonstrated in Table 8, the most frequent cybercrime coclaims are broad, state common law causes of action.

This result is consistent with the theory that courts have adapted conventional tort and property claims to technology, making dedicated, computer-specific causes of action less necessary.

The leading civil coclaims also reinforce the conclusion that civil cybercrime mediates commercial grievances, not sophisticated computer intrusions. Claims grounded in contract, unfair business practices, and fiduciary duty appear in the overwhelming majority of civil cybercrime cases (152)--and necessarily arise from business and employment relationships. (153)

Comparing claiming coincidence across CFAA and non-CFAA causes of action reveals that this external redundancy is not unique to specific cybercrime offenses, as demonstrated by Table 9.

Litigants invoke the same state common law causes of action, regardless of whether their cybercrime claim arises from a taking information, fraud, or damage theory. (154)

A final observation is how many cases are in federal court solely based on a CFAA claim. A slight majority of filings do not include any federal claim other than CFAA (166, 51%). (155) While plaintiffs in some of these cases could assuredly invoke diversity jurisdiction, the high proportion strongly implies that many CFAA plaintiffs rely upon the statute as a hook for federal subject matter jurisdiction, and many of these disputes would end up in state court but for CFAA. (156)

2. Criminal Prosecutions

a. Internal Redundancy

At first glance, CFAA's internal redundancy appears significantly less pronounced in criminal prosecutions than in civil cases. (157) Prosecutors uniformly reference specific provisions of CFAA, and the overwhelming majority of defendants are accused of violating just one of CFAA's statutory offenses (too, 75%), as illustrated by Figure 12.

Prosecutors thus appear to be exercising restraint in cybercrime cases. Even in fact patterns where judicial constructions of CFAA would allow for charging under multiple statutory provisions, prosecutors rarely invoke more than one type of offense. The result also suggests that prosecutors make a meaningful effort to distinguish between various cybercrime offenses.

There is, though, a cynical alternative reading of this result. Prosecutors can already easily obtain a maximum five-year sentence under CFAA's broad taking-information provision. (158) An additional conviction for fraud or damage would likely carry the same maximum sentence and would be subject to the same sentencing guidelines. And, since the charges arise from the same conduct, sentences would likely run concurrently. (159) Additionally, if the underlying theories for various offenses overlap too extensively, courts might invalidate the charges on Double Jeopardy Clause grounds. (160) Accordingly, if prosecutors make charging determinations to obtain the greatest possible punishment, they would have little incentive to charge under multiple CFAA provisions. Prosecutors would instead charge under just the offense that is both the easiest to prove and most punitive. (161)

Results on charging coincidence (Table to) do not, unfortunately, aid in selecting between these competing hypotheses of prosecutorial behavior.

As seen in Table 10, there are generally low levels of charging coincidence across the statutory provisions. That could be because of prosecutorial restraint and careful statutory interpretation, or it could be due to crass calculations about sentencing.

Examining the frequency of specific CFAA offenses, in Table n, sheds more light on prosecutorial strategy. (162) The most common CFAA criminal charge parallels the most common civil claim: taking information.isi That result comes as little surprise, since the taking information offense is the broadest in the statute.

In a departure from the practices of private plaintiffs, however, prosecutors less frequently allege CFAA's broad fraud offense. (164) Criminal defendants face a fraud charge at roughly a third the frequency that plaintiffs include a fraud claim. (165)

This result suggests that prosecutors are making a greater effort than private litigants to distinguish among fraud theories of cybercrime liability. Prosecutors appear to generally treat CFAA fraud as a species of financial fraud--most cases directly involve either financial misconduct (11,46%) (166) 0r a financial institution or agency (12,50%). (167)

Another departure from civil practice is how prosecutors have invoked CFAA's intentional damage offense. Criminal defendants face a charge under that provision roughly half more often than civil cases invoke it. What's more, most of the cases under that provision involve either a circumvention of a technical protection (35, 71%) (168) or a software disruption (11, 22%). (169)

At a high level, this result indicates that part of CFAA is functioning as intended. Cases under CFAA's intentional damage provision map closely onto archetypal computer abuse of the sort that Congress and state legislatures emphasized when they enacted cybercrime statutes.

Looking more closely at fact patterns, though, prosecutors are not treating the intentional damage offense as a distinct theory of cybercrime liability. Most criminal cases involving CFAA's intentional damage offense appear much better characterized by the statute's taking information offense. While prosecutors have made a meaningful effort at distinguishing CFAA's fraud offense, they have treated the intentional damage offense as a catchall.

A likely explanation for why prosecutors are lumping fact patterns into the intentional damage offense is that it has uniquely enhanced sentencing consequences. As a statutory matter, the intentional damage offense is automatically associated with a maximum sentence of ten years. (170) And, under the federal sentencing guidelines, intentional damage automatically increases a defendant's recommended period of incarceration. (171)

In sum, prosecutors appear to exhibit complex strategic behavior in distinguishing cybercrime offenses. Where there is little or no sentencing difference, prosecutors are exercising much greater restraint than civil plaintiffs. They usually charge just one type of violation, and they usually select an appropriate theory.

Where there is a sentencing difference, though, prosecutors are blurring the distinctions between cybercrime offenses. They tend to charge just one type of violation--but they often charge the violation associated with substantially enhanced punishment, not the violation that best fits the defendant's conduct.

b. External Redundancy

Only a slight majority of CFAA prosecutions involve at least one non-CFAA charge (69, 52%). (172)

What's more, among prosecutions that involve archetypal computer abuse--circumvention of a technical protection or disabling a computer system--most defendants face only CFAA charges (45, 58%). (173) This result stands in stark contrast to civil litigation practice. In criminal law, cybercrime offenses are fairly unique. (174) Examining the frequency of specific criminal charges, seen in Table 12, sheds more light on prosecutorial strategy.

The commonality between these cocharged offenses is that they are all (but one) accompanied by higher maximum or recommended sentences than the most frequent cybercrime offenses. (175) Where prosecutors do file a noncybercrime charge, then, they appear motivated by sentencing considerations.

The most common cocharge, identity theft, would seem to be an odd pairing for cybercrime offenses. The text of the statutory scheme primarily contemplates conventional identity theft involving forged documents. (176) But about half of cybercrime cases involving an identity theft charge arise from accessing another person's account on an online service (15, 50%). (177) The underlying statutory interpretation appears to be that entering another user's login and password constitutes an actionable form of identity theft.

This result bolsters the theory raised earlier that prosecutors strategically blur statutory offenses where enhanced sentences are available. In a plain reading of text and legislative history, the federal identity theft statute was intended to cover a distinct set of fact patterns from its neighboring computer abuse statute. (178) But identity theft offenses are accompanied by substantial and automatic sentence enhancements, so prosecutors have also styled computer abuse to fit within these identity theft offenses. (179)

A notable omission from the top cybercrime cocharges is the federal trade secret statute, part of the Economic Espionage Act (EEA). (180) Given that so many criminal prosecutions involve employees absconding with business information (51,38%), (181) one would expect many cases to include trade secret counts. But there was only one CFAA case in 2012 that included an EEA count (1, 1%). (182)

A partial explanation is that nearly half of these employee prosecutions arise from government employment (23, 45%), (183) where trade secret protection is not available. As for the remainder, it is possible that prosecutors view the (slight) sentencing increases associated with a trade secret charge as offset by the (significant) additional offense elements. (184)

An examination of specific charge coincidence, as demonstrated by Table 13, lends further support to the earlier observations about cybercrime's uniqueness, as well as how prosecutors are charging identity theft and fraud offenses.

The cybercrime offenses that relate to taking information from a federal government computer, and recklessly damaging a computer, have near-zero charge coincidence. In these areas of misconduct, CFAA provides especially unique criminal law coverage.

The high coincidence between information misappropriation charges and identity theft charges reaffirms that prosecutors are strategically invoking identity theft offenses to secure sentencing enhancements. These are fundamentally computer abuse cases, involving account break-ins.

Finally, CFAA fraud charges are frequently paired with wire fraud or bank fraud charges (12, 50%). (185) This result further confirms that, in prosecutorial practice, cybercrime fraud is largely a species of conventional financial fraud.

F. Does Cybercrime Law Deter Computer Abuse?

In a conventional quantitative evaluation of deterrence, a cybercrime offender is motivated by the potential gain associated with misconduct, less the sentence imposed by criminal law, discounted by the probability of successful prosecution. (186)

Available datasets on cybercrime are not sufficiently comprehensive or detailed to credibly estimate these values for individual offenders. It is possible, though, to compute aggregate metrics of how cybercrime law deters cybercrime offenses.

One simple measurement is a comparison of total cybercrime gains to total cybercrime sentences in a given year. The result is a very rough approximation of expected punishment relative to the incentive to commit cybercrime.

[Expected Punishment.sub.year] = [Total Punishment.sub.year]/[Total Gains.sub.year]

A slightly more sophisticated measurement takes advantage of cybercrime time series data by treating year-to-year changes as natural experiments. By comparing the volume of punishment in sequential years, it is possible to--again, very roughly--estimate the marginal punishment imposed by cybercrime law relative to the incentives for cybercrime. In intuitive terms, this measure reflects how responsive the criminal justice system is to changes in cybercrime volume.

[Marginal Punishment.sub.year] = [Total Punishment.sub.year] - [Total Punishment.sub.year-1]/ [Total Gains.sub.year] - [Total Gains.sub.year-1]

Prosecution data from the Department of Justice are reasonably accurate and are sufficient to calculate the numerators in these equations. The denominators, by contrast, are much more difficult to obtain. Data sources on gains and losses associated with cybercrime are notoriously unreliable, (187) and many high-profile breaches are associated with nonmonetary motives.

In the interest of generating highly defensible figures, I conservatively estimate the gains from cybercrime as those solely due to domestic credit card fraud. (188) I also liberally estimate the punishment associated with cybercrime by including not just CFAA offenses, but also federal identity theft and access device offenses.

Even with these exceedingly generous assumptions--likely underestimating incentives and overestimating punishments by orders of magnitude--the results are unequivocal. If a would-be offender can expect to earn (very roughly and conservatively) $100,000 and serve just one month in prison, and if punishment levels are far outpaced by incentive growth, then cybercrime law cannot meaningfully deter cybercrime.

G. Assessing the Two Perspectives on Cybercrime Law

In civil cybercrime litigation, the critical perspective has strong empirical support. The volume of litigation has radically increased, and the overwhelming majority of claims do not arise from sophisticated hacking. Rather, cases relate to mundane commercial disputes that happen to involve computers. Considerable evidence indicates that civil cybercrime liability is duplicative of conventional private causes of action, and that private plaintiffs greatly blur theories of cybercrime liability.

The data on criminal litigation are much more mixed. Cybercrime charges increased from the 1990s to the 2000s, but then leveled off. Prison sentences have shot up, but prosecutors continue to exercise substantial discretion over whether to impose any incarceration. Prosecutors generally only charge under one theory of cybercrime liability, but this is likely due to strategic sentencing calculations. A little over half of criminal charges arise from archetypal hacking activities, and prosecutors do succeed in occasionally prosecuting serious offenders. But most defendants engage in unsophisticated and minor misconduct, arising from an existing commercial, employment, or personal relationship. In sum, the state of cybercrime prosecutorial practice is highly nuanced, and neither perspective is descriptively accurate.

III. Recommendations

Several prescriptions follow naturally from this comprehensive empirical portrait of cybercrime litigation. The data provide support for three readily implementable proposals: congressional elimination of civil CFAA liability, the establishment of clear Department of Justice enforcement priorities, and a narrow interpretation of cybercrime statutes. (189)

A. Civil Liability

Providing private causes of action for cybercrime has proved to be a failed experiment, spurring an explosion of highly redundant litigation.

The underlying cause of this phenomenon appears to be readily discernable: Conventional employment and commercial disputes increasingly involve information technology, are relatively straightforward to investigate, and can generally be addressed through conventional legal processes. Sophisticated hacks, by contrast, can be difficult to uncover and attribute, and perpetrators will often be either outside the reach of United States courts or judgment proof. (190) In more precise policy terminology, private cybercrime liability poses a fundamental target inefficiency. (191) If cybercrime law even cracks the door to mundane private controversies, they will naturally swamp serious computer abuse cases.

The easy statutory fix is to eliminate private cybercrime causes of action. (192) Textual revisions are trivial to make, since cybercrime statutes were drafted primarily as a set of criminal offenses. (193) Private causes of action generally consist of secondary add-on provisions, which Congress and state legislatures could simply repeal. (194)

B. Enforcement Priorities

Most federal cybercrime prosecutions arise from minor and technically unsophisticated misconduct, especially employees misappropriating information. There is, though, a meaningful subset of prosecutions that involves serious computer abuse.

The Department of Justice should establish a clear cybercrime enforcement policy to shift this balance, ws Where a fact pattern involves special factors--for instance, technical sophistication, significant monetary loss, or a federal computer system--federal prosecutors should consider filing cybercrime charges. But where the circumstances are more mundane, such as a commercial or employment dispute that happens to involve information technology, the local United States Attorney's Office should (at most) refer the matter to state and municipal law enforcement agencies. (196)

An enforcement policy could also address concerns about cybercrime overbreadth. Prosecutors rarely charge ordinary consumers, journalists, or security researchers under cybercrime law--yet there is a widely perceived legal risk for those communities. (197) Department of Justice officials already assert a lack of prosecutorial interest in those fact patterns; formalizing a declination policy would go a long way toward allaying concerns. (198)

Finally, an enforcement policy could facilitate doctrinal clarity for cybercrime law, enhancing conformity with the statutory scheme and promoting predictability in criminal justice outcomes. Federal prosecutors do currently appear to be making good-faith attempts at distinguishing individual cybercrime offenses--but only where there is no sentencing advantage. The Department of Justice could easily provide guidance on which statutory offenses are most appropriate for recurring fact patterns. (199)

C. Narrow Construction of CFAA

The courts are presently engaged in a debate about the appropriate scope of federal cybercrime law. Since CFAA's scoping provisions are so ambiguous, courts have resorted to reading proverbial legislative history tea leaves. Some conclude that Congress did not intend for CFAA to have broad reach, going far beyond archetypal hacking; (200) others conclude that Congress did contemplate liability for mundane computer misuse, especially by employees. (201)

The empirical data on federal cybercrime litigation enable a powerful new argument to be made from CFAA's legislative history. Congress may have intended to open the federal courthouse door--just a crack--to claims involving routine and unsophisticated computer misconduct. (202) But Congress did not intend to fling the door wide open, for so much run-of-the-mill commercial litigation. (203)

Setting aside the merits of any individual case, the aggregate civil and criminal caseloads under CFAA simply cannot be reconciled with a fair reading of the legislative record. (204) Nearly every cybercrime anecdote that Congress considered, and nearly every statement in the record, presumed legislation would reach archetypal hacking. (205) There was almost no opposition to CFAA expansion based on potential liability for employees, competitors, or consumers. (206) If the statute were intended to sweep as broadly as it does in its most common uses today--with significant implications for individual liability and the scope of federal jurisdiction--surely Congress would have spoken more plainly, and would have deliberated the consequences. (207)


Cybercrime is a serious and growing problem, resulting in (by some estimates) over $100 billion in losses per year. (208) The primary response by federal and state legislatures, so far, has been to impose and expand cybercrime liability. (209)

That approach is no longer tenable. The drawbacks of excessive scope are real--constituting a majority of civil cases and about half of criminal cases. Those drawbacks are inherent in the very concept of computer abuse liability.

Constructing digital analogies to physical trespass and property damage had an understandable logic in the 1970s and 1980s; computer systems were relatively rare, single-purpose, limited to particular users,

dedicated to sensitive applications, and had scarce resources. (210) Legislators and courts could afford to play somewhat fast and loose with "authorization," "damage," and other key scoping provisions, since egregious misconduct was more readily ascertainable: breaking into the nuclear weapons laboratory at Los Alamos, for example, or tampering with medical records at the Sloan Kettering Cancer Center. Both of these examples are drawn directly from early hearings on federal cybercrime law. (211)

Today, of course, computer systems are pervasive, have myriad functions, can be shared by millions of users, and are used for everyday activities. Assessing the scope of authorization and calibrating compensable harm are radically different and far more challenging tasks; defendants tend to have some permission with respect to a computer system, and conduct at issue tends to be less patently wrongful. Plaintiffs and prosecutors can craft a colorable cybercrime claim from myriad modern fact patterns, dragging the courts into doctrinal quagmires and chilling socially beneficial activities.

As against this downside, there is not much upside. The plausible deterrence benefits of cybercrime law are, empirically, negligible.

Cybercrime law does have value, to be sure. Prosecutors are able to charge serious offenders on occasion, and meaningful criminal sanctions should be available. But, on the whole, cybercrime law is an exceedingly limited mechanism for addressing online misconduct.

The federal and state governments have a number of other viable responses to cybercrime. They could mitigate the harms associated with security breaches, by enacting notification and credit monitoring mandates. (212) They could improve defenses, by leveraging acquisitions, promoting best practices, and facilitating information sharing. (213) In areas of critical infrastructure, or where sensitive data are involved, they could impose ex ante security standards and ex post regulatory liability. (214)

For too long, federal and state policies have overemphasized malicious computer abusers as the exclusive cause of serious cybersecurity incidents. The temptation is understandable--as Ronald Coase famously observed, law conventionally allocates responsibility to actions that give rise to social costs, rather than inaction that magnifies those costs. (215) But technology owners and operators are often in the best position to repel and remediate online misconduct. They just lack sufficient incentives to do so in the status quoincentives that cybercrime litigation will never provide.


([dagger]) Cybersecurity Fellow, Stanford University; J.D., 2013, Stanford Law School; Ph.D. candidate, 2016, Stanford University Department of Computer Science. The author is currently serving as Chief Technologist of the Federal Communications Commission Enforcement Bureau. All views are solely the author's own and do not reflect the position of the United States Government or the Federal Communications Commission. The author is grateful to Andrew Schlossberg, Markus Brazill, and the editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, who provided thoughtful recommendations (and endless patience) throughout the revision process. Participants at the Privacy Law Scholars Conference, and especially session chair Professor David Thaw, provided invaluable feedback on this project. The author also wishes to express gratitude to the many colleagues who contributed insights to this work, including Dan Boneh, Ryan Calo, Cindy Cohn, Hanni Fakhoury, Laura Fong, Jennifer Granick, James Grimmelmann, Anne Hilby, Marcia Hofmann, Orin Kerr, Mark Lemley, Whitney Merrill, John Mitchell, Paul Ohm, Kurt Opsahl, Chris Riley, Barbara van Schewick, Peter Swire, Lee Tien, and George Triantis. The author participated in both the United States v. Auernheimer and United States v. Swartz litigation.

(1) 295 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1196 (E.D. Wash. 2003); see also P.C. Yonkers, Inc. v. Celebrations the Party and Seasonal Superstore, LLC, 428 F.3d 504, 510 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Pacific Aerospace for the proposition that most CFAA cases are about "classic" hacking); Dresser-Rand Co. v. Jones, 957 F. Supp. 2d 610, 616 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 2013) (citingRC. Yonkers for the same underlying claim); 1st Rate Mortg. Corp. v. Vision Mortgage Servs. Corp., No. 09-C-471, 2011 WL 666088, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 15, 2011) (same); Guest-Tek Interactive Entm't, Inc. v. Pullen, 663 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (D. Mass. 2009) (same); Dudick ex rel. Susquehanna Precision, Inc. v. Vaccarro, No. 3:06-CV-2175, 2007 WL 1847435, at *5 (M.D. Pa. June 25, 2007) (same).

(2) See Joseph B. Tompkins, Jr. & Frederick S. Ansell, Computer Crime: Keeping Up with High Tech Criminals, CRIM. JUST., Winter 1987, at 31, 32 (noting that Fadriquela was the only person who had ever been indicted under the 1984 law that CFAA then amended in 1986); Glenn D. Baker, Note, Trespassers Will Be Prosecuted: Computer Crime in the 1990s, 12 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 61, 65-66 (1993) (describing Fadriquela as "a Los Angeles computer hacker"); Mitch Betts, DP Worker Charged with Hacking, COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 11, 1985, at 2 (highlighting the indictment); Paul Korzeniowski, Agencies' Hacker Troubles Blamed on Bulletin Board, COMPUTERWORLD, July 8, 1985, at 15 (outlining Fadriquela's actions in further detail).

(3) The Region: Gang Members Aid Landmark Cleanup, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1985, at OC2.

(4) Tompkins & Ansell, supra note 2, at 31-32. Although at the time of Fadriquela's indictment the statute was called "The Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act," his conviction is properly understood as the first CFAA conviction because Congress renamed the statute "The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act" as part of the 1986 Amendments. See generally Pub. L. No. 99-474, too Stat. 1213 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. [section] 1030 (2012)).

(5) Complaint at 3, Deuel v. 1800 GETTHIN, LLC, No. BC477064 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 17, 2012).

(6) See Stuart Pfeifer, Another Patient Dies After Lap-Band Surgery, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2011), [] ("[P]atients' deaths and injuries have led to a series of wrongful-death and personal injury lawsuits against 1-800-GET-THIN, its affiliated surgery centers and doctors who performed the procedures."); Press Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA Issues Warning Letters for Misleading Advertising of Lap-Band (Dec. 13, 2011), 3455-htm [] (warning consumers that advertisements for 1-800-GET-THIN "fail to provide required risk information, including warnings, precautions, possible side effects and contraindications").

(7) Complaint at 14-16, Deuel, No. BC477064 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 17, 2012); Stuart Pfeifer, Patients Allege Gruesome Conditions at Lap-Band Clinics, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2012), 2012/jan/17/business/la-fi-get-thin-whistleblower-20120118 []. The local coroner's expert subsequently described the medical practice as "gross negligence with incompetence." Stuart Pfeifer, Errors Cited in Lap-Band Operation, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 19, 2013), [ B3DV-BTM7].

(8) Complaint at 8-11, Beverly Hills Surgery Ctr., LLC v. Deuel, No. 12-CV-1789 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2,2012).

(9) Id. at 8.

(10) See Kyle W. Brenton, Trade Secret Law and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Two Problems and Two Solutions, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 429, 441-51 (explaining how a CFAA claim is both easier to prove than a trade secret claim and less limited by concessions to employee mobility and morality); Christine D. Galbraith, Access Denied: Improper Use of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to Control Information on Publicly Accessible Internet Websites, 63 MD. L. REV. 320, 340-41 (2004) (noting how CFAA can protect uncopyrightable information without the limitations of contract law); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Common Law and Statutory Restrictions on Access: Contract, Trespass, and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 295, 297-310 (comparing contract, copyright, and trespass to chattels protections against CFAA); Thomas E. Booms, Note, Hacking into Federal Court: Employee Authorization" Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 543, 550-51 (2011) (noting that a CFAA claim is easier to prove than a trade secret claim); Katherine Mesenbring Field, Note, Agency, Code, or Contract: Determining Employees' Authorization Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 107MICH. L. REV. 819, 845-46 (2009) (same); Garrett D. Urban, Note, Causing Damage Without Authorization: The Limitations of Current Judicial Interpretations of Employee Authorization Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1369,1390-91 (2011) (arguing that CFAA threatens to displace state contract and trade secret law).

(11) See infra Section I.A.

(12) See infra Section I.B.

(13) See Richard C. Hollinger & Lonn Lanza-Kaduce, The Process of Criminalization: The Case of Computer Crime Laws, 26 CRIMINOLOGY 101,106-07 (1988) (recounting that media attention in the early 1980s "ensured that both the public and its elected representatives 'knew' that computer crime was a major problem and that something had to be done quickly").

(14) See id. (describing media fixation on "juvenile hackers and the perceived threat of computer crime" in the early 1980s); Reid Skibell, Cybercrimes 6? Misdemeanors: A Reevaluation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 BERKELEYTECH. L.J. 909, 910, 917-18 (2003) (noting that CFAA was passed in part due to the movie WarGames, which reinforced a public fear of computer crime); Mary M. Calkins, Note, They Shoot Trojan Horses, Don't They? An Economic Analysis of Anti-Hacking Regulatory Models, 89 GEO. L.J. 171,175-77 (2000) (emphasizing that WarGames strongly influenced the public's stereotype of what a hacker looks like); Declan McCullagh, From 'WarGames' to Aaron Swartz: How U.S. Anti-Hacking Law Went Astray, CNET (Mar. 13, 2013, 4:00 AM), fi'om-wargames-to-aaron-swartz-how-u.s-anti-hacking-law-went-astray/ [ C55-DL2L] (describing political and media focus on The 414s, a group of young hackers that accessed sensitive government and private computer systems around the time that WarGames was released); see also Greg Pollaro, Note, Disloyal Computer Use and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Narrowing the Scope, 2010 Duke L. & Tech. Rev. 12, K 4 ("War Games introduced much of the country to the 'hacker,' and its influence was not lost on members of Congress, who already were trying to decide what to do about ... network trespassers...."); Tompkins & Ansell, supra note 2, at 31 ("[Mjany [legal] practitioners probably consider computer crime to be the light-hearted, glamorous avocation of whiz kids.").

(15) See Office of Tech. Assessment, OTA-CIT-297, Federal Government Information Technology: Management, Security, and Congressional Oversight 89-91 (Feb. 1986) (providing an overview of computer crime legislative proposals in the 98th and 99th Congresses); Robin K. Kutz, Note, Computer Crime in Virginia: A Critical Examination of the Criminal Offenses in the Virginia Computer Crimes Act, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 783,785-88 (1986) (observing that law enforcement in the 1970s realized that federal criminal law did not easily cover computer crime, so Congress intervened to pass new legislation).

(16) See Computer Crime Statutes, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 12, 2015), http:// [] (collecting state computer abuse statutes); see also Hollinger & Lanza-Kaduce, supra note 13, at 101-04 (reviewing how state law evolved to address computer crime); Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003,1017 (2001) ("[W]hen Vermont enacted a statute proscribing computer crime in 1999, it became the fiftieth state to devote specific legislation to computer crimes."); John Montgomery, Computer Crime, 24 Am. CRIM. L. REV. 429, 430 (1987) (noting the proliferation of state computer crime statutes by 1987); Douglas M. Reimer, Judicial and Legislative Responses to Computer Crimes, 53 INS. COUNS. J. 406, 419-30 (1986) (surveying computer crime statutes in twenty-three states); Michael P. Dierks, Note, Computer Network Abuse, 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307, 322-25 (1993) (reviewing the evolution of state computer crime law); Kutz, supra note 15, at 789-90 (describing the varying computer crime statutes in fourty-five states by 1986).

(17) Eric A. Fischer, Cong. Research Serv., R42114, Federal Laws Relating to CYBERSECURITY: OVERVIEW AND DISCUSSION OF PROPOSED REVISIONS 1 (2013).

(18) See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.

(19) See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.

(20) The perspective in this Section is, necessarily, a synthesis of myriad viewpoints. For detailed arguments in favor of expanding cybercrime law, see generally Frank P. Andreano, The Evolution of Federal Computer Crime Policy: The Ad Hoc Approach to an Ever-Changing Problem, 27 Am. J. CRIM. L. 81 (1999); Richard Warner, The Employer's New Weapon: Employee Liability Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 12 EMP. RTS. &EMP. POL'Yj. 11 (2008); Peter A. Winn, The Guilty Eye: Unauthorized Access, Trespass and Privacy, 62 BUS. LAW. 1395 (2007); Sarah Castle, Note, Cyberbullying on Trial: The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and United States v. Drew, 17 J.L. & POL'Y 579 (2009); Joseph P. Daly, Note, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act--A New Perspective: Let the Punishment Fit the Damage, 12 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & Info. L. 44J (1993); Graham M. Liccardi, Note, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: A Vehicle for Litigating Trade Secrets in Federal Court, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 155 (2008); Matthew Aaron Viana, Note, Aaron's Law: Reactionary Legislation in the Guise of Justice, 10 U. MASS. L. REV. 214 (2015); Scott Zambo, Note, Digital La Cosa Nostra: The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act's Failure to Punish and Deter Organized Crime, 33 NEW ENG. J. ON Crim. & Civ. Confinement 551 (2007).

(21) See O'Rourke, supra note 10, at 308 ("The CFAA essentially fonctions like a federal claim for trespass."); Winn, supra note 20, at 1397-1403 (viewing CFAA as a property right in information technology).

(22) Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, S. Dist. of N.Y., Leading Member of the International Cybercriminal Group "Lulzsec" Sentenced in Manhattan Federal Court (May 27, 2014), []; Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, Cent. Dist. of Cal., Second Member of Hacking Group Sentenced to Over Year in Prison for Stealing Customer Information from Sony Pictures Computers (Aug. 8, 2013), second-member-hacking-group-sentenced-over-year-prison-stealing-customer-information [https://]; Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, S. Dist. of N.Y., Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announces Guilty Plea of Jeremy Hammond for Hacking into the Stratfor Website (May 28, 2013), []]; Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, Cent. Dist. of Cal., Member of LulzSec Hacking Group Sentenced to Over Year in Federal Prison for 2011 Intrusion into Sony Pictures Computer Systems (Apr. 18, 2013), member-lulzsechacking-group-sentenced-over-year-federal-prison-2ou-intrusion-sony []; see also GABRIELLA COLEMAN, HACKER, HOAXER, WHISTLEBLOWER, SPY: THE MANY FACES OF ANONYMOUS 237-75 (2014) (describing the LulzSec group).

(23) Eg., David B. Fein, Major Achievements in the Courtroom: Coreflood Botnet Takedown 6? Civil Action, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (July 9, 2015), majorachievements-courtroom-coreflood-botnet-takedown-civil-action []; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Major Computer Hacking Forum Dismantled (July 15, 2015),[]; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Pakistani Man Indicted for Selling 'StealthGenie' Spyware App (Sept. 29, 2014), []; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Leads Multi-National Action Against "Gameover Zeus" Botnet and "Cryptolocker" Ransomware, Charges Botnet Administrator (June 2, 2014), us-leads-multi-national-action-againstgameover-zeus-botnet-and-cryptolocker-ransomware []; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Cyber Criminal Pleads Guilty to Developing and Distributing Notorious SpyEye Malware (Jan. 28, 2014), cyber-criminal-pleads-guiltydeveloping-and-distributing-notorious-spyeye-malware [].

(24) See, e.g., Cyber Crime: Modernizing Our Legal Framework for the Information Age: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime & Terrorism of the S. Comm, on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 5 (2015) (statement of David M. Bitkower, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Department of Justice) (describing court decisions that narrowly construe CFAA as "unfortunate") [hereinafter Bitkower statement]; Taking Down Botnets: Public and Private Efforts to Disrupt and Dismantle Cybercriminal Networks: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime & Terrorism of the S. Comm, on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 9 (2014) (statement of Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Department of Justice) (arguing that CFAA is not "up to date" and must "keep up with rapidly evolving technologies and uses"); Cybercrime: Updating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to Protect Cyberspace and Combat Emerging Threats: Testimony Before the S. Comm, on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 3-4 (2011) (statement of James A. Baker, Associate Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Department of Justice) (arguing that federal law must "more effectively deter" computer crime and setting forth a proposal to amend the law to "increase the maximum penalties").

(25) See GINA STEVENS & JONATHAN MILLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41941, THE Obama Administration's Cybersecurity Proposal: Criminal Provisions 3-6 (2011) (describing the provisions of the reform package).

(26) See Mike Masnick, Rather Than Fix the CFAA, House Judiciary Planning to Make It Worse ... Way Worse, TECHDIRT (Mar. 25, 2013,5:43 AM), rather-than-fix-cfaa-house-judiciary-committee-planning-to-make-it-worse-way-worse.shtml [https://] (describing the unattributed discussion draft and providing a copy).

(27) The White House, Updated Administration Proposal: Law Enforcement PROVISIONS (2015), updatedlaw-enforcement-tools.pdf []; see also Letter from Shaun Donovan, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to John A. Boehner, Speaker of the House of Representatives (Jan. 13, 2015), cybersecurity-letters-tocongress-house-signed.pdf [] (presenting and summarizing the Obama Administration's proposed substantive changes to the existing statutory regime); Barack H. Obama, 2015 State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2015), remarks-president-state-union-address-january-20-2015 [] ("I [President Obama] urge this Congress to finally pass the legislation we need to better meet the evolving threat of cyberattacks....").

(28) See Harley Geiger, Graham/Whitehouse Draft Bill Would Make CFAA Worse, CDT BLOG (July 17, 2015), [https://perma. CC/F5ND-68JC] (explaining the proposed legislation and providing a copy).

(29) See Bitkower statement, supra note 24, at 6 ("These [limiting] judicial decisions stemmed from the concern that the relevant provision of the CFAA could potentially make relatively trivial conduct a federal crime--such as checking the baseball scores ... in violation of an employer's strict Internet use policy. The department has no interest in prosecuting such harmless acts."); Leslie R. Caldwell, Prosecuting Privacy Abuses by Corporate and Government Insiders, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST.: JUST. Blogs (Mar. 16, 2015), insiders [] ("We understand these [overbreadth] concerns. The Department of Justice has no interest in prosecuting harmless violations of use restrictions like these.").

(30) The 2015 Obama administration proposal would introduce a new monetary threshold for CFAA liability. See THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 27 (triggering liability under CFAA only if the value of the illegally-acquired information exceeds $5000). Given how easily litigants have pled around CFAA's existing monetary threshold, it is not apparent that this provision would meaningfully constrain liability.

(31) While this Article endeavors to objectively assess cybercrime litigation in the federal courts, in the interest of complete transparency, I fall firmly within the school of thought that criticizes cybercrime law. That view is informed as much by policy and legal considerations as it is by the empirical assessment presented here.

(32) A voluminous academic literature has criticized cybercrime law, and especially CFAA, as overbroad or overly punitive. See, e.g., Brenton, supra note 10, at 440-56 (explaining that CFAA presents inconsistencies with trade secret law); Galbraith, supra note 10, at 361-66 (arguing that courts have improperly construed CFAA to permit website owners to enforce restrictions on access to and use of copyrightable information); Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope: Interpreting 'Access" and Authorization" in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1617-32 (2003) (explaining how courts have expansively interpreted the concepts of "access" and "authorization" under CFAA to capture undesirable behavior, and arguing that such a broad sweep is normatively undesirable); Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1575-78 (2010) (arguing that a broad construction of "authorization" under CFAA may amount to unconstitutional vagueness); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, The Law of the Zebra, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 155, 182-208 (2013) (criticizing CFAA for permitting both criminal and civil liability for contractual breaches); O'Rourke, supra note 10, at 308 ("Congress likely did not intend the [CFAA] statute to become the potent weapon that it now is 'against employees, former employees, competitors and others.' Unanticipated uses of the Act have arisen because its language is not limited to cases of hacking but instead is broad enough to encompass a wide range of conduct." (footnote omitted)); Skibell, supra note 14, at 922-43 (arguing that CFAA mistakenly treats the crime of trespass and the crime of fraud or theft identically, imposes unfair punishments on some individuals, has done little to slow the growth of computer crime, and imposes unnecessarily high penalties that do not serve proper deterrent or retribution purposes). See generally Booms, supra note 10; Sarah Boyer, Note, Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Abusing Federal Jurisdiction?, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 661 (2009); Cyrus Y. Chung, Note, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: How Computer Science Can Help with the Problem of Overbreadth, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 233 (2010); Dierks, supra note 16; Katherine Mesenbring Field, Note, Agency, Code, or Contract: Determining Employees' Authorization Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 107 MICH. L. REV. 819 (2009); Andrew T. Hernacki, Note, A Vague Law in a Smartphone World: Limiting the Scope of Unauthorized Access Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1543 (2012); Haeji Hong, Note, Hacking Through the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283 (1997); Nicholas R. Johnson, Recent Developments, "I Agree" to Criminal Liability: Lori Drew's Prosecution Under [section] 1020(a)(2)(C) of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and Why Every Internet User Should Care, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 561; Caroline G. Jones, Note, Computer Hackers on the Cul-de-Sac: MySpace Suicide Indictment Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Sets Dangerous Precedent, 17 WIDENERL. REV. 261 (2011); Ryan Patrick Murray, Note, MySpace-ing Is Not a Crime: Why Breaching Terms of Service Agreements Should Not Implicate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 29 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 475 (2009); Warren Thomas, Note, Lenity on Me: LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka Points the Way Toward Defining Authorization and Solving the Split over the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 379 (2011); Garrett D. Urban, Note, Causing Damage Without Authorization: The Limitations of Current Judicial Interpretations of Employee Authorization Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1369 (2011) ; Note, The Vagaries of Vagueness: Rethinking the CFAA as a Problem of Private Nondelegation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 751 (2013).

(33) See, e.g., Letter from Internet Infrastructure Coalition (12Coalition) et al., to Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner et al. (Mar. 12, 2013), [] (urging Congress to reform CFAA due to its chilling effects on innovation and economic growth in the technology field).

(34) For a particularly sharp critique offered by then-Chief Judge Alex Kozinski, see United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 862-63 (9th Cir. 2012) (rejecting an expansive interpretation of CFAA on statutory, constitutional, and policy grounds). See also United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 523-28 (2d Cir. 2015) (following Nosal)-, WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 203-07 (4th Cir. 2012) (same).

(35) In the interest of brevity, this Article focuses on policy perspectives and empirical analysis rather than legal synthesis. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that nearly all online conduct that is conceivably objectionable could plausibly fall within the scope of civil and criminal sanctions. See supra note 32.

(36) Nosal, 676 F.3d at 862.

(37) Id.

(38) United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 452 (C.D. Cal. 2009); see also Nosal, 676 F.3d at 862 (discussing Drew as a poor exercise of prosecutorial discretion).

(39) Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 464.

(40) Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge at 1-2, United States v. Kane, No. 2:u-cr-ooo22 (D. Nev. Oct. 15, 2012), ECF No. 86.

(41) Id. at 9.

(42) See, e.g., CISCO SYS. INC., DATA LEAKAGE WORLDWIDE: COMMON RISKS AND MISTAKES EMPLOYEES Make 1-7 (2008), data-loss-prevention/white_paper_cu-499060.pdf [] (giving numerous examples of employee misuse of information technology); PONEMON INST., DATA LOSS RISKS During Downsizing: As Employees Exit, So Does Corporate Data 3-24 (2009), http:// WP.en-us.pdf [] (providing in-depth data on misuse of confidential information); SYMANTEC CORP., WHAT'S YOURS IS MINE: HOW EMPLOYEES ARE PUTTING Your Intellectual Property at Risk 2 (2013) paper/WP_WhatsYoursIsMine-HowEmployeesarePuttingYourIntellectualPropertyatRisk_da1211501_ cta69167.pdf [] (showing the "top reasons" why employees take corporate data).

(43) United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258,1263 (nth Cir. 2010).

(44) Int'l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420-21 (7th Cir. 2006).

(45) See, e.g., Lee v. PMSI, Inc., No. 8:10-cv-2904, 2011WL1742028, at *2-3 (M.D. Fla. May 6, 2011) (dismissing a cybercrime counterclaim by a former employer in a wrongful termination suit, which alleged that the former employee was liable for merely checking personal email and social network accounts); see also United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 860 n.6 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Lee as an example of cybercrime overbreadth risks).

(46) The in-vogue term for this phenomenon is "platform." See Benjamin Edelman, How to Launch Your Digital Platform, HARV. BUS. REV., Apr. 2015, at 92 (using the term "platform" to refer to shared technology foundations for new small businesses).

(47) See Alexis Ohanian, Without Their Permission 199-231 (2013) (arguing that information technology innovation occurs without seeking permission in advance, and laws that require permission necessarily impede innovation).

(48) See, e.g., Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 964 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1180 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (using CFAA against a business that republished classified advertisements); Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962, 969 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (same); Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1039,1049 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (using CFAA against a business that enabled automatic posting of classified advertisements).

(49) See, e.g., Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1027-28 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (using CFAA against a website that aggregated information from multiple social network feeds); Facebook, Inc. v. MaxBounty, Inc., 274 F.R.D. 279, 281 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (using CFAA against a marketing company that created misleading social network pages).

(50) See, e.g, Oracle Am., Inc. v. TERiX Comput. Co., No. 13-CV-03385, 2014 WL 31344, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2014) (using CFAA against an aftermarket service provider for database software); Oracle Am., Inc. v. Serv. Key, LLC, No. 12-CV-00790, 2012 WL 6019580, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2012) (same).

(51) See Healthcare Advocates v. Harding, Earley, Follmer & Frailey, 497 F. Supp. 2d 627, 630-33 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (describing the Internet Archive's Wayback Machine crawler and its alleged cybercrime infraction).

(52) Sarah Laskow, Reporting, or Illegal Hacking: Scripps Reporters Are Accused of Violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (June 13, 20x3), [].

(53) Id.

(54) Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, TerraCom, Inc. and YourTel America, Inc., No. EB-TCD-13-00009175, at 1 (FCC Oct. 24, 2014), FCC-14-173A1.pdf [].

(55) See William D. Cohan, How a Strange, Secretive, Cult-Like Company Is Waging Legal War Against Journalists, NATION (Nov. 18, 2014), how-strange-secretive-cultcompany-waging-legal-war-against-joumalists/ [].

(56) Id.

(57) NXIVM Corp. v. Foley, No. 14-CV-01375, slip op. at 13 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2015)

(58) See, e.g., Letter from Alex Stamos et al. to the House and Senate Judiciary Comms. (Aug. 1,2013), [] ("[P]aradoxically, the CFAA currently threatens and chills valuable research in the field by reaching mere violations of terms of use and other acts, such as security research, which cause no real harm and indeed make the public safer.").

(59) Sony Comput. Entm't Am. LLC v. Hotz, No. n-cv-0167, 2011WL 347137, at * 1-2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2011).

(60) Temporary Restraining Order at 1-2, Mass. Bay Transp. Auth. v. Anderson, No. 08-CV-11364 (D. Mass. Aug. 9, 2008).

(61) United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525, 529-30, 532 (3d Cir. 2014). The Third Circuit subsequently vacated the conviction on venue grounds. Id. at 329.

(62) See supra note 58 and accompanying text.

(63) See supra note 10 and accompanying text.

(64) See Dierks, supra note 16, at 332-36 (arguing that deterrence has failed in computer crime law owing to difficulty in detecting breaches, identifying perpetrators, building a case, and encouraging reporting by victims); Skibell, supra note 14, at 935-37 ("Deterrence theory needs to account for the empirical evidence that nineteen years under the CFAA has done little to slow the growth of computer crime."); Calkins, supra note 14, at 183-84 (noting practical difficulties in enforcing computer crime law).

(65) Indictment, United States v. Dong, Crim. No. 14-118 (W.D. Pa. May 12, 2014); see also Jonathan Mayer, Charges Against Chinese, and U.S. Policy on Hacking, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2014), [].

(66) Michael S. Schmidt 8t David E. Sanger, 5 in China Army Face U.S. Charges of Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2014), [].

(67) Indictment, United States v. Fathi, No. 16 Crim. 48 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2016).

(68) David E. Sanger, U.S. Indicts 7 Iranians in Cyberattacks on Banks and a Dam, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2016), attacks-on-banks-and-a-dam.html [].

(69) See, eg, Mark Jaycox, Why the CFAA's Excessive Criminalization Needs Reform, ELECTRONIC Frontier Found. (Apr. 2, 2013), [] (identifying numerous overlaps between CFAA and other theories of criminal and civil liability).

(70) See Orin Kerr, A Question for Supporters of Increasing Maximum Sentences Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 28, 2013,1:59 PM), aquestion-for-supporters-of-increasing-maximum-sentences-under-the-computer-fraud-and-abuse-act/ [] ("Congress is considering legislation to increase maximum punishments under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.... [H]ave there been any cases in which judges maxed out the current sentences ...?").

(71) John Schwartz, Internet Activist, a Creator of RSS, Is Dead at 26, Apparently a Suicide, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2013), [https://perma/cc/gBBY-77VM].

(72) Id.

(73) Josh Solomon, Middle School Student Charged with Cybercrime in Holiday, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Apr. 9, 2015,1:05 PM), middle-school-studentcharged-with-cyber-crime-in-holiday/2224827 [https://perma/cc/F8CD-PD8Z].

(74) Id.

(75) Aaron's Law Act of 2015, H.R. 1918, 114th Cong. (2015); Aaron's Law Act of 2015, S. 1030, 114th Cong. (2015).

(76) Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2014, S. 1897,113th Cong. [section][section] 107,110 (2014). This effort draws on an earlier reform amendment sponsored by Senators Grassley, Franken, and Lee. See Jake Laperruque & Greg Nojeim, Why Fibbing About Your Age Is Relevant to the Cybersecurity Bill, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY &TF.CH. (July 30, 2012), about your-age is-relevant-to-the-cybersecurity-bill/ []. A prior version of Senator Leahy's proposal included a more questionable attempt to narrow CFAA. See Orin Kerr, My Assessment of Senator Leahy's Proposed Amendment to the CFAA, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 22, 2011, 5:53 PM), [https://] (explaining the prior Leahy proposal and noting that it may be ineffective).

(77) But see Eric Goldman, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Is a Failed Experiment, FORBES (Mar. 28, 2013, 4:21 PM), the-computerfraud-and-abuse-act-is-a-failed-experiment/ [https://perma/cc/Z8XU-E526] (arguing in favor of substantial repeal); Robert Graham, Aaron's Law: Repeal CFAA Rather Than Amend It, ERRATA Security (Jan. 17, 2013), VtYtC50zLxM [] (suggesting that total repeal would not create additional vulnerabilities or remove penalties for other cybercrimes).

(78) Pacific Aerospace & Elecs., Inc. v. Taylor, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1188,1196 (E.D. Wash. 2003); see also supra note 1.

(79) See supra Section I.B.

(80) There has been remarkably little quantitative research on cybercrime law. But see Anele Nwokoma, Process Evaluation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, 17 PROC. INFO. SYS. EDUC. CONF. [section] 128 (2000) (reporting Department of Justice statistics on CFAA usage); George Roach & William J. Michiels, Damages Is the Gatekeeper Issue for Federal Computer Fraud, 8 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. Prop. 61, 62 (2006) (finding that many courts reject civil CFAA claims for insufficient "loss" or "damage"); McCullagh, supra note 14 (plotting longitudinal invocation of CFAA in federal opinions).

(81) This project began in mid-2013.1 selected 2012 as the last complete calendar year of court filings.

(82) Specifically, I used the query: ("computer fraud") OR ("18 U.S.C. 1030") OR ("18 USC 1030") OR ("18 U.S.C. [section] 1030") OR ("18 USC [section] 1030") OR ("18:1030") OR ("fraud activity connected with computers") OR ("unauthorized access to a computer"). The latter two phrases are commonly used on criminal dockets involving a CFAA charge.

(83) Many filings are imprecise about the specific CFAA cause of action. Where a filing was not explicit, I attempted to infer the relevant subsections by comparing the text of the filing to the text of the statute.

(84) There is, to be sure, no neat taxonomy of party relationships and underlying conduct. I made an initial review of the documents to discern the most common fact patterns, then applied those categories in a second review.

(85) Given the volume of civil pleadings, I did not filter out multiple filings from the same proceeding. For criminal charging documents, by contrast, I located the latest document for each proceeding.

(86) The civil dataset is available at [hereinafter Civil Dataset]. The criminal dataset is available at [hereinafter Criminal Dataset].

(87) Since I did not manually confirm that each opinion concerned a CFAA theory, I used a narrower search query than for pleadings: "computer fraud and abuse." The results under this methodology, to be sure, include false positives and negatives. Aggregate figures on judicial opinions should be considered as estimates, reflective of trends in federal litigation.

(88) Criminal Enforcement, TRACFED, [] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016); Federal Criminal Case Processing Statistics, BUREAU JUST. STAT., [] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016). The two datasets use slightly different means of classifying prosecutions: the DOJ Bureau of Justice Statistics dataset reports all defendants with a CFAA charge, while the TRACFed dataset reports only defendants where prosecutors noted a "lead" CFAA charge. Also, the DOJ BJS dataset only offers annual summary statistics, rather than individual case tracking. In order to associate prosecutions, convictions, and sentences in both datasets, I make the simplifying assumption that all three stages of litigation are contemporaneous.

(89) See infra Figure 1.

(90) See infra Figure 1.

(91) See infra Figure 2.

(92) The growth in CFAA litigation is difficult to attribute to expanded statutory scope. Congress substantially expanded CFAA liability in 1996, nearly a decade before the litigation boom.

(93) See Michael Goldsmith & Penrod W. Keith, Civil RICO Abuse: The Allegations in Context, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 55, 62-66 (describing the rise in civil RICO litigation and providing data); see also Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1,19-23 (2002) (providing more recent data on civil RICO litigation).

(94) Goldsmith & Keith, supra note 93, at 63, 64 n.38.

(95) Id. at 64 n.38.

(96) Cf. Nick Akerman, CFAA Resembles RICO, NAT'L L.J. (Aug. 29, 2005), http://www. [] ("As with civil RICO, litigators can no longer overlook the CFAA. Whenever the evidence reflects that computers are involved in the perpetrating of a wrong, the CFAA should be reviewed for potential claims. The advantages are obvious. Like RICO, the CFAA is a federal statute and thus provides automatic federal jurisdiction, when the only available claims might be based on state law with no diversity jurisdiction. The CFAA also has certain advantages over using RICO (albeit without the treble damages and attorney fees mandated by RICO).").

(97) See infra Figure 4.

(98) See infra Figure 5.

(99) Cf. Goldsmith & Keith, supra note 93, at 62-64 (suggesting that criminal prosecutors took advantage of RICO's broad provisions slightly before civil plaintiffs).

(100) See infra Figure 7 and accompanying text.

(101) See infra Figure 8.

(102) See infra Figure 7.

(103) See supra Figure 8.

(104) See supra Figure 8.

(105) See supra Figure 9.

(106) See supra Figure 9.

(107) One manner in which a minor CFAA offense can be converted into a felony is by incorporating a violation of state cybercrime law. 18 U.S.C. [section] 1030(c)(2)(B)(ii) (2012); see Orin Kerr, Obama's Proposed Changes to the Computer Hacking Statute, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 14, 2015), obamas-proposed-changesto-the-computer-hacking-statute-a-deep-dive/ [] (explaining how state cybercrime statutes often overlap with CFAA); Zoe Lofgren & Ron Wyden, Introducing Aaron's Law, A Desperately Needed Reform of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, WIRED (June 20, 2013), [ /C8AL-UC26] (noting that "a prosecutor can seek to inflate potential sentences by stacking new charges atop violations of state laws"). Another avenue for converting a minor CFAA offense into a felony is to charge the expansive fraud provision, 18 U.S.C. [section] 1030(a)(4), or one of the damage provisions, 18 U.S.C. [section] 1030(a)(5)(A)-(C). For an explanation about how sentencing enhancement factors can easily apply in cybercrime cases, see Hanni Fakhoury, How the Sentencing Guidelines Work Against Defendants in CFAA Cases, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.: DEEPLINKS BLOG (Apr. 9, 2013), https:// [] (critiquing the use of an enhancement factor targeted specifically at CFAA crimes).

(108) Civil Dataset, supra note 86 ((Business Dispute) / (All Civil Filings)). In describing the latitudinal data throughout this Article, I use the following logic notation to reflect operations on the civil and criminal datasets: (1) "[conjunction]" for "and," (2) "[disjunction]" for "or," and (3) "[logical not] for not." The symbol "/" represents division of the sum of records matching the numerator by the sum of records matching the denominator. The symbol represents the difference between the sum of records matching the minuend and the sum of records matching the subtrahend.

(109) See id. ((Business Dispute A Employee, Consultant, Contractor, or Distributor) / (Business Dispute)).

(110) See id. ((Unrelated Parties) / (All Civil Filings)).

(111) See id. ((Competitor A Employee, Consultant, Contractor, or Distributor) / (Competitor)).

(112) See id. ((Misappropriating Information) / (All Civil Filings)).

(113) See id. ((Editing or Deleting Information) / (All Civil Filings)).

(114) See id. ((Misappropriating Information V Editing or Deleting Information) / (All Civil Filings).

(115) See id. ((Circumvention of a Technical Protection) / (All Civil Filings)).

(116) See id. ((Circumvention of a Technical Protection A Accessing or Hijacking Another Person's Account--Circumvention of a Technical Protection A Accessing or Hijacking Another Person's Account with aTechnical Circumvention Except Credentials) / (Circumvention of a Technical Protection)).

(117) See id. ((Circumvention of a Technical Protection A Mobile Phone Unlocking) / (Circumvention of a Technical Protection)).

(118) See id. ((Circumvention of a Technical Protection A Credential Sharing) / (Circumvention of a Technical Protection)).

(119) Contra H.R. REP. No. 98-894, at 20 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3689, 3706 ("The conduct prohibited [in CFAA] is analogous to that of 'breaking and entering' rather than using a computer (similar to the use of a gun) in committing the offense.").

(120) See Civil Dataset, supra note 86 ((Harassment) / (All Civil Filings)).

(121) See id. ((Unrelated Website) / (All Civil Filings)).

(122) See id. ((Automated Website Interaction) / (All Civil Filings)).

(123) See id. ((Copyright Trolling) / (All Civil Filings)).

(124) See id. ((Mobile Phone Unlocking) / (All Civil Filings)).

(125) See generally Civil Dataset, supra note 86.

(126) Criminal Dataset, supra note 86.

(127) See id. ((Employee, Consultant, Contractor, or Distributor V Business Partner V Colleague V Customer or User V Competitor) / (All Criminal Defendants)).

(128) See id. ((Doe(s) V No Substantial Relationship) / (All Criminal Defendants)).

(129) Criminal Dataset, supra note 86.

(130) See id. ((All Criminal Defendants--Circumvention of a Technical Protection) / (All Criminal Defendants)).

(131) See id. ((Circumvention of a Technical Protection--Circumvention of a Technical Protection Except Credentials) / (Circumvention of a Technical Protection)).

(132) But cf U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Washington fenny A. Durkin Testifies Before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism, JUST. NEWS (May 8, 2013), http:// [] (highlighting federal prosecutorial successes in cybercrime cases despite the "increases in the skills of threat actors and the complexity of their organizations").

(133) See Criminal Dataset, supra note 86 ((Employee, Consultant, Contractor, or Distributor A Misappropriating Information) / (All Criminal Defendants)).

(134) Civil Dataset, supra note 86.

(135) See Criminal Dataset, supra note 86 ((Government Computer System) / (All Criminal Defendants)).

(136) See id. ((Government Computer System A Misappropriating Information [disjunction] [logical not] (Circumvention of a Technical Protection)) / (Government Computer System)).

(137) See id. ((Government Computer System A Misappropriating Information A--(Circumvention of a Technical Protection) A Law Enforcement Personnel) / (Government Computer System A Misappropriating Information [disjunction] [logical not] (Circumvention of a Technical Protection)).

(138) See, e.g., Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., No. C 08-05780, 2010 WL 3291750, at *912 (N.D. Cal. July 20, 2010) (holding that "permission" under the California cybercrime statute has a different meaning than "authorization" under the federal statute); see also United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525, 534 n.5 (3d Cir. 2014) (suggesting that "without authorization, or in excess of authorization" under the New Jersey statute has a different meaning than "without authorization or exceeds authorized access" under the federal statute).

(139) 18 U.S.C. [section] 1030 (2012).

(140) See Criminal Dataset, supra note 86 ((Unspecified Claims / All Civil Claims)).

(141) CFAA plaintiffs usually must show $5000 in "loss" under 18 U.S.C. [section] 1030 (g) and (c)(4)(A)(i)(I). As a result, in civil cases, the reckless "damage" offense in (a)(5)(B) is ordinarily strictly harder to prove than the "damage and loss" offense in (a)(5)(C).

(142) See infra Table 6 ((1030(a)(5)(B) / (All Civil Claims)).

(143) See infra Table 7 ((1030(a)(5)(B) [conjunction] 1030(a)(5)(C) / (1030(a)(5)(B)).

(144) See id. ((1030(a)(5)(B) [conjunction] [logical not] 1030(a)(5)(C)) / (1030(a)(5)(B).

(145) See Civil Dataset, supra note 86 (([logical not] Unspecified CFAA Claims) / (All Civil Claims)).

(146) As an aside, CFAA incorporates an unusual cause of action for password trafficking, and plaintiffs have found a way to put even this to use. Most of these cases arise from mobile phone unlocking (13, 57%) or voluntary password sharing (6, 26%). Id. ((1030(a)(6)(A) [conjunction] Mobile Phone Unlocking) / (1030(a)(6)(A))); id. ((1030(a)(6)(A) [conjunction] Credential Sharing) / (1030(a)(6)(A))).

(147) See supra Table 7.

(148) See supra Table 7.

(149) Civil Dataset, supra note 86. Measured slightly differently, within the subset of filings that included any (a)(5) claim (137, 68%), a slight majority involved information misappropriation, modification, or deletion (69, 50%).

(150) See id. ((1030(a)(6)(A) [conjunction] 1030(a)(4)) / (1030(a)(6)(A))).

(151) See id. ((1030(a)(6)(A) [conjunction] 1030(a)(4) [conjunction] Mobile Phone Unlocking) / (1030(a)(6)(A) A 1030(a)(4))).

(152) See infra Table 9.

(153) Claims for trade secret theft, conversion, and tortious interference suggest an underlying commercial dispute, but are not so conclusive. A hacker breaching a system and obtaining information could be liable under trade secret or conversion theories for misappropriating confidential business information. An intentional disruption of a commercial computer system could be actionable as tortious interference since the aim is interfering with ongoing and prospective business operations.

(154) Civil Dataset, supra note 86.

(155) Id. ((-Other Federal Claims) / (All Civil Claims)).

(156) Some courts have recognized CFAA usage as a strategic mechanism for federal subject matter jurisdiction and have declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over associated state law claims. See, e.g., Landmark Credit Union v. Doberstein, 746 F. Supp. 2d 990, 993-94 (E.D. Wis. 2010) (stating that plaintiff's claim "borders on the frivolous" and is "an attempt to artificially create federal jurisdiction"); Contemporary Serv. Corp. v. Hartman, No. 08-02967, 2008 WL 3049891, at * 3-4 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2008) (discussing the differences in what plaintiffs must prove for CFAA claims in comparison to state law claims).

(157) This criminal charging analysis provides equivalent treatment to principal, attempt, accomplice, and conspiracy charges under each CFAA provision, since the purpose of the analysis is to compare the scope and invocation of CFAA's various provisions.

(158) See 18 U.S.C. [section] 1030(c)(2)(B) (2012) (setting a five-year maximum sentence for CFAA's taking information offenses, so long as prosecutors can establish any of several straightforward enhancements).

(159) See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL [section] 5G1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N 2015) (recommending concurrent sentencing).

(160) Cf. United States v. Cioni, 649 F.3d 276, 281-83 (4th Cir. 2011) (invalidating a CFAA felony enhancement for a Stored Communications Act violation, pursuant to the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment).

(161) There are substantial policy consequences if this alternative theory is accurate. If Congress or the courts narrowed the taking information offense, prosecutors could respond by charging the fraud and intentional damage offenses with greater frequency.

(162) Two absences from criminal charging practice warrant brief mention. First, prosecutors made almost no use of CFAA's password trafficking provision. See infra Table 11. Since a substantial proportion of the Internet's underground economy involves stolen login credentials, the omission reaffirms that law enforcement has had difficulty reaching sophisticated offenders. CFAA's unintentional damage and loss offense is also missing from criminal practice. See infra Table 11. Apparently, the Department of Justice did not file a single charge under that provision in 2012. See infra Table 11. A likely explanation is that the statutory elements include intentional unauthorized access. If prosecutors can already clear that mental state hurdle, they can likely demonstrate that the subsequent damage or loss was reckless or intentional.

(163) See infra Table 11.

(164) See supra Table 11.

(165) Compare supra Table 11, with supra Table 6.

(166) See Criminal Dataset, supra note 86 (((1030(a)(4) V 1030(a)(4) Conspiracy) [conjunction] Financial Misfeasance) / (1030(a)(4) [disjunction] 1030(a)(4) Conspiracy)).

(167) See id. ((Financial Institution Computer System) / (1030(a)(4) [disjunction] 1030(a)(4) Conspiracy)).

(168) See id. (((1030(a)(5)(A) [disjunction] 1030(A)(5)(A) Conspiracy) [conjunction] Circumvention of a Technical Protection) / (1030(a)(5) [disjunction] 1030(A)(5)(A) Conspiracy)).

(169) See id. (((1030(a)(5)(A) [disjunction] 1030(A)(5)(A) Conspiracy) [conjunction] Software Disruption of a Computer System) / (1030(a)(5)(A) [disjunction] 1030(A)(5)(A) Conspiracy)).

(170) 18 U.S.C. [section] 1030(c)(4)(B)(i).

(171) See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual [section] 2B1.1(b)(18)(A)(ii) (U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 2015) (directing an offense enhancement of four levels where the charge is intentional damage).

(172) See infra Figure 13 ((Count of defendants with > 1 non-CFAA charge) / (All Criminal Defendants).

(173) See Criminal Dataset, supra note 86 (((Circumvention of a Technical Protection V Software Disruption of a Computer System) A Only CFAA Charges) / (Circumvention of a Technical Protection V Software Disruption of a Computer System)).

(174) An alternative interpretation, that prosecutors are strategically charging solely cybercrime offenses because they are the most punitive and easiest to prove, would also be consistent with this data. But examining the federal criminal statutes controverts that hypothesis--there are not lesser federal offenses that would generally reach archetypal computer abuse.

(175) The offense for false statements to a federal official, 18 U.S.C. [section] 1001, carries the same maximum and recommended sentences as the most common cybercrime offenses. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual [section] 2B1.1(h)(n) (U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 2015). Compare 18 U.S.C. [section] 1028(b)(2), with 18 U.S.C. [section] 1030(c)(2)(B).

(176) See generally 18 U.S.C. [section][section] 1028(a), 1028A(a), (c).

(177) See Criminal Dataset, supra note 86 (((Identity Theft [disjunction] Identity Theft Conspiracy) [conjunction] Accessing Another Person's Account Without Permission) / (Identity Theft [disjunction] Identity Theft Conspiracy)).

(178) See 18 U.S.C. [section] 1028 (framing most offenses in terms of "identification documents" and "authentication features"); id. [section] 1028A (explicitly omitting CFAA as an overlapping offense for purposes of aggravated identity theft). The early legislative history of section 1028 centered on forged identification paperwork. See False Identification: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm, on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 19 (1982) (statement of Rep. William J. Hughes, Chairman, Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm, on the Judiciary) (highlighting fraudulent identification in association with check forgery, travel, and firearm purchasing). Later expansion of the statute, including the provisions that (arguably) reach computer credentials, focused on identity theft and associated financial fraud. See S. REP. NO. 105-274, at 4-9 (1998); Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act: Hearing on S.J. Res. 512 Before the Subcomm. on Tech., Terrorism, and Gov't Info, of the S. Comm, on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 1, 2 (1998) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyi, Chairman, Subcomm. on Tech., Terrorism, and Gov't Info, of the S. Comm, on the Judiciary) (emphasizing identity theft arrests and financial losses).

(179) See 18 U.S.C. [section] 1028(b)(1)(D) (imposing maximum sentence of fifteen years for identity theft if a defendant obtains $1,000 in value within one year); id. [section] 1028A(b)(2) (imposing mandatory two-year, non-concurrent sentence enhancement for aggravated identity theft); U.S. SENTENCING Guidelines Manual [section] 2B1.1(b)(u) (U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 2015) (suggesting automatic enhancement to recommended sentence for identity theft offenses).

(180) 18 U.S.C. [section] 1832.

(181) See Criminal Dataset, supra note 86 ((Employee, Consultant, Contractor, or Distributor A Misappropriating Information) / (All Criminal Defendants)).

(182) See id. ((Trade Secret Theft) / (All Criminal Defendants)).

(183) See id. ((Employee, Consultant, Contractor, or Distributor [disjunction] Misappropriating Information [disjunction] Government Computer System) / (Employee, Consultant, Contractor, or Distributor [disjunction] Misappropriating Information)).

(184) The trade secret provisions of the EEA include a ten-year maximum sentence, 18 U.S.C. [section] 1832(a), but are subject to the same sentencing guidelines as common CFAA offenses, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual [section] 2Bi.i(b)(n) (U.S. Sentencing Comm'n 2015). Moreover, the EEA trade secret offense incorporates a number of additional elements, including reasonable measures to maintain secrecy and independent economic value on account of secrecy. See 18 U.S.C. [section][section] 1832,1839; Cyber Security: Protecting Americas New Frontier: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm, on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 49 (2011) (statement of Professor Orin S. Kerr) ("Establishing a theft of trade secrets requires proving all the elements of the crime, and that can be a difficult task. In contrast, proving [under CFAA] that an employee did something for reasons other than official company business is vastly easier.").

(185) See Criminal Dataset, supra note 86 (((1030(a)(4) [disjunction] 1030(a)(4) Conspiracy) [conjunction] (Wire Fraud [disjunction] Wire Fraud Conspiracy [disjunction] Bank Fraud)) / (1030(a)(4) [disjunction] 1030(a)(4) Conspiracy)) .

186 See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169,176-79 (1968) (offering a theoretical approach to measuring deterrence based on the number of offenses a criminal would commit, the probability of conviction per offense, and "a portmanteau variable representing all ... other influences"); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193,1201-03 (1985) (justifying criminal sanctions based on the need to impose optimal deterrence for such offenses, which pecuniary penalties alone cannot achieve).

(187) See Ross Anderson et al., Measuring the Cost of Cybercrime (critiquing prior attempts at quantifying cybercrime as inconsistent and inaccurate), in THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION SECURITY AND Privacy 265, 267 (Rainer Bohme ed., 2013); Dinei Florencio & Cormac Herley, Sex, Lies and Cyber-Crime Surveys (noting survey errors in attempts to quantify cybercrime), in Economics of Information and Security and Privacy III 35,37 (Bruce Schneier ed., 2013).

(188) The underlying data on credit card fraud are sourced from a regular financial newsletter that maintains a longitudinal fraud dataset. See Card Fraud Losses Reach $16.31 Billion, NlLSON Rep. (HSN Consultants, Inc., Carpinteria, CA), July 2015, at 5,10 (reporting trends in credit card fraud from the 1990s onwards). For purposes of the marginal punishment metric, movement in credit card fraud functions as a rough proxy for movement in the overall level of cybercrime.

(189) This part focuses primarily on federal reforms in the interest of brevity and because the data examined in this Article were exclusively federal. Nevertheless, these same recommendations extend to state legislatures, prosecutors, and courts.

(190) Notably, in a review of recent high-profile data breaches, almost none resulted in civil litigation or criminal charges. See Chronology of Data Breaches, PRIVACY RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE (Apr. 20, 2005), [] (providing a dataset of data breach incidents).

(191) See Robert S. Goldfarb, Compensating Victims of Policy Change, REG., Sept.-Oct. 1980, at 22, 24 (explaining the theory of target inefficiency).

(192) Cf. Brenton, supra note 10, at 457-59 (recommending the partial repeal of CFAA's private cause of action); Cindy Cohn & Marcia Hofmann, Part 2: EFF's Additional Improvements to Aarons Law, Electronic Frontier Found. (Jan. 23, 2013), part-2-effsadditional-improvements-aarons-law [] (recommending the total repeal of CFAA's private cause of action, among other revisions); Eric Goldman, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act is a Failed Experiment, FORBES (Mar. 28, 2013), [] (same); Orin Kerr, Proposed Amendments to 18 U.S.C. 1030, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 20, 2013), [] (same).

(193) See Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962, 965-66 (D. Ariz. 2008) ("Simply stated, the CFAA is a criminal statute focused on criminal conduct. The civil component is an afterthought.").

(194) At the federal level, for instance, eliminating civil liability would simply require repealing 18 U.S.C. [section] 1030(g) (2012).

(195) Cf. Tim Wu, Fixing the Worst Law in Technology, NEW YORKER NEWS DESK (Mar. 18, 2013), [] (recommending that the Department of Justice adopt a narrow CFAA enforcement policy).

(196) Cf. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att'y Gen., Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement 3-4 (Aug. 29, 2013), 1327 56857467.pdf [] (establishing Department of Justice enforcement policy for marijuana offenses, such that state and local law enforcement have primary responsibility).

(197) See supra Section I.B.

(198) See, e.g., David Bitkower, Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime and Terrorism, JUST. News (July 8, 2015), testimony-senate-judiciary [] ("The department has no interest in prosecuting such harmless acts."); Leslie R Caldwell, Prosecuting Privacy Abuses by Corporate and Government Insiders, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. (Mar. 16, 2015), [] ("The Department of Justice has no interest in prosecuting harmless violations of use restrictions like these.").

(199) Cf. U.S. Dep't Justice, Prosecuting Computer Crimes 1-58 (2010) (reviewing components of CFAA for United States Attorneys).

(200) See, e.g., United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 2012) (concluding that a narrower interpretation of CFAA "maintains the CFAA's focus on hacking rather than turning it into a sweeping Internet-policing mandate"); Black & Decker (US), Inc. v. Smith, 568 F. Supp. 2d 929, 935-38 (W.D. Tenn. 2008) (discussing the legislative history of CFAA at length to bolster its conclusion that CFAA should not be read broadly); Shamrock Foods Co. v. Gast, 535 F. Supp. 2d 962, 963-67 (D. Ariz. 2008) ("[T]he legislative history supports a narrow view of the CFAA."); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Werner-Masuda, 390 F. Supp. 2d 479, 495-99 (D. Md. 2005) (relying on the legislative history of CFAA to interpret the statute).

(201) See, e.g., NCMIC Fin. Corp. v. Artino, 638 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1058 (S.D. Iowa 2009) (reviewing aspects of CFAA's legislative history before adopting a broad view of the statute); Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1127-29 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (relying on Senate Reports to construe CFAA broadly).

(202) In my own reading of the legislative history, Congress did--ever so slightly--consider the issue of unsophisticated employee liability. See S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 7-8 (1996) (establishing liability for "individuals who intentionally ... abuse their authority to use ... a computer and thereby obtain information of minimal value"); Security in Cyberspace: Hearings Before the S. Subcomm. On Investigations of the S. Comm, on Gov't Affairs, 104th Cong. 6 (1996) (statement of Sen. John Glenn) ("Over the years, this Committee has examined threats to security and privacy as diverse as ... IRS employees browsing through taxpayer records...."); id. at 326 (statement of Richard G. Power, Editor, Computer Security Institute) ("Also, in recent weeks, it was revealed that several employees of the Social Security Administration allegedly passed information on 11,000 people ... to a credit card fraud ring."); Computer Fraud Legislation: Hearing on S.440 and S. 1678 Before the S. Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the S. Comm, on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 35 (1985) (statement of Victoria Toensing, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.) (noting an incident where a former employee of the Federal Reserve illicitly accessed money supply information on a computer system); Computer Crime and Computer Security: Hearing on H.R. loot and H.R. 930 Before the H. Subcomm. on Crime of the the H. Comm, on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 30 (1985) (statement of John C. Keeney, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen.) (discussing the potential for computer-based financial fraud by bank employees); id. at 149-150 (statement of Allan Robert Adler, Legislative Counsel, ACLU) (noting possible CFAA application to government employees who use data for whistleblowing); id. at 213-14 (debating propriety of employee liability for mishandling information); 98 CONG. REC. 31,992-93 (1984) (statement of

(203) Cf. Shamrock Foods, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 967 ("The Court declines the invitation to open the doorway to federal court so expansively when this reach is not apparent from the plain language of the CFAA."). Sen. Patrick Leahy) (criticizing CFAA for putting government employees at risk when whistleblowing); id. at 32,083-84 (statement of Sen. Charles Mathias) (proposing amendment to CFAA that would restrict applicability to government employees).

(204) In addition to this aggregate legislative history argument, and a more conventional legislative history argument, there are other reasons to narrowly construe CFAA. A broad interpretation raises myriad issues, including the rule of lenity, due process void-for-vagueness protections, nondelegation considerations, the expectation that Congress should speak clearly when determining significant policy, federalism, and judicial economy. See United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 523-28 (2d Cir. 2015) (following Nosal in applying the rule of lenity); WEC Carolina Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 203-07 (4th Cir. 2012) (same); Nosal, 676 F.3d at 863 (invoking the rule of lenity in declining to extend CFAA to violations of a website's terms of use); United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 462-67 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (holding that an interpretation of CFAA that reaches conscious violations of a website's terms of use is constitutionally void for vagueness); Shamrock Foods, 535 F. Supp. 2d at 967 (D. Ariz. 2008) ("The Court declines the invitation to open the doorway to federal court so expansively when this reach is not apparent from the plain language of the CFAA."); Samantha Jensen, Abusing the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Why Broad Interpretations of the CFAA Fail, 36 HAMLINE L. REV. 81,137 (2014) ("A narrow interpretation of the CFAA is the only way to ensure that the statute does not eclipse large portions of state law."); Alden Anderson, Comment, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Hacking into the Authorization Debate, 53 JURIMETRICS 447, 457-59 (2013) (contending that a broad interpretation of CFAA is inconsistent with the historical division of cases between state and federal courts); Note, The Vagaries of Vagueness: Rethinking the CFAA as a Problem of Private Nondelegation, 127 HARV. L. Rev. 751, 768-71 (2013) (arguing CFAA violates nondelegation doctrine).

(205) After an exhaustive review of committee hearings and reports on CFAA, I located only a handful of anecdotal references to employees misappropriating information. See supra note 206. Discussion of hacking, by contrast, pervades the legislative history.

(206) From a review of the legislative history, it appears that vocal opposition to CFAA is a recent phenomenon. Congressional hearings did not involve witnesses critical of CFAA's scope until 2011, and those witnesses were only invited after public interest advocacy. See Cyber Crime: Updating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to Protect Cyber Space and Combat Emerging Threats: Hearing Before the S. Comm, on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 27 (2011) (joint letter for the record from public interest organizations); id. at 48 (letter for the record from Gregory T. Nojeim) (advocating that the committee "address longstanding concerns with the ambiguity and breadth of the CFAA"); Cyber Security: Protecting America's New Frontier: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. On Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security of the H. Comm, on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 39 (2011) (statement of Orin S. Kerr, Professor of Law, George Washington University) ("I think the answer is to narrow the scope of [CFAA]...."). The sole exception to this was some initial concern in the 1980s about enforcement against whistleblowers.

(207) See Nosal, 676 F.3d at 857 ("If Congress meant to expand the scope of criminal liability to everyone who uses a computer in violation of computer use restrictions--which may well include everyone who uses a computer--we would expect it to use language better suited to that purpose.").

(208) See, e.g., CTR. FOR STRATEGIC AND INTL STUDIES, NET LOSSES: ESTIMATING THE GLOBAL Cost OF CYBERCRIME (2014), [] (extrapolating from global data on the cost of cybercrime to produce admittedly rough estimates of losses totaling between $375 and $575 billion).

(209) See Stewart Baker, Poisoning the Hamburger Helper, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 11, 20x1), [] ("Every time Congress gets exercised about cybersecurity, the Justice Department claims that the CFAA needs to be updated."); Orin S. Kerr, Powerpoint: Domestic Cybersecurity Law (or at Least Parts of It) (2014),] ("Expanding CFAA becomes Congress's favorite way to 'do something' about cybersecurity.").

(210) Cf. Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope: Interpreting 'Access" and Authorization" in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596, 1601 (2003) ("Unauthorized access statutes are creatures of the 1970s, when the Internet remained the domain of a few scientists and engineers .... While technology has advanced considerably in the last three decades, the law has not; the same one-size-fits-all prohibitions on unauthorized access still govern."); Greg Pollaro, Disloyal Computer Use and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Narrowing the Scope, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. [parallel][parallel] 1,10 (using one computer crime statute for myriad activities "has inevitably forced square pegs into round holes").

(211) See Computer Viruses: Hearing on the Impact of Computer Viruses and Other Forms of Computer Sabotage or Exploitation on Computer Information Systems and Networks Before the S. Subcomm. On Tech, and the Law, S. Comm, on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 6 (1989) (statement of Sen. Gordon J. Humphrey) (discussing a hack into the computers at Los Alamos); The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986: Hearing on S. 2281 Before the S. Comm, on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 39 (1986) (statement of Joseph Tomkins, Chairman, American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section Task Force on Computer Crime) (describing the "infiltration of hospital records" at the Sloan Kettering Cancer Institute).

(212) At the time of writing, forty-seven states have enacted data breach notification laws. See Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT'L CONF. St. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 4, 2015), telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breach-notification-laws.aspx [ VAZ-RDQU] (collecting state data breach notification statutes). The Obama Administration has also twice proposed a federal data breach notification requirement. THE WHITE HOUSE, ADMINISTRATION Discussion Draft: Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act (Feb. 27, 2015), https:// [https://]; The White House, Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World (2012), []. At the federal level, there are also sector-specific data breach notification rules. See GINA STEVENS, CONG. Research Serv., RL34120, Federal Information Security and Data Breach notification Laws (2010).

(213) See generally Jonathan Mayer & Edward W. Felten, California Must Lead on Cybersecurity, Sacramento Bee (Jan. 24, 2015), [] (suggesting state-level policies that would promote cybersecurity).

(214) See, e.g., FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 243-59 (3d Cir. 2015) (sustaining FTC Act liability for a breached business); COPPA Rule, 16 C.F.R [section] 312.8 (2015) (security requirements for certain children's information); GLBA Safeguards Rule, 16 C.F.R. [section][section] 314.1-5 (2015) (security requirements for certain financial information); HIPAA Security Rule, 45 C.F.R [section][section] 164.302-.318 (2015) (security requirements for certain medical information); FED. COMMC'N COMMEf, CHAIRMAN WHEELER'S PROPOSAL TO GIVE Broadband Consumers Increased Choice, Transparency, and Security with Respect to Their Data (2016), pdf [] (proposed security requirements for broadband Internet service providers).

(215) R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1,13-15 (1960).

Caption: Figure 1: Federal Court Opinions-Civil

Caption: Figure 2: Federal District Court Opinions-Civil, by Circuit

Caption: Figure 3: Federal Court Opinions-Criminal

Caption: Figure 4: Federal Criminal Prosecutions Caption: Figure 5: Federal Criminal Convictions

Caption: Figure 6: Mean Prison Sentence in Closed Prosecutions (Months)

Caption: Figure 7: Sentencing for Convicted Defendants (DOJ BJS)

Caption: Figure 8: Outcomes in Closed Prosecutions (DOJ BJS)

Caption: Figure 9: Prison Sentence, If Any (TRACFED, Months)

Caption: Figure 10: Number of Specific CFAA Provisions in Civil Filings

Caption: Figure 11: Number of Non-CFAA Claims in Civil Filings

Caption: Figure 12: Number of Specific CFAA Provisions in Criminal Prosecutions

Caption: Figure 13: Number of Non-CFAA Charges in Criminal Prosecutions

Caption: Figure 14: Deterrence Effects of Federal Cybercrime Law (Months Incarcerated Per $100,000)

Table 1: Party Relationships in Civil CFAA Filings

Relationship Between Plaintiff(s)     Number of
and Defendant(s)                      Filings

Employee, Consultant, or Contractor   162 (50%)
Competitor                            97 (30%)
Technology Service Provider           42 (13%)
Derivative Business                   29 (9%)
Business Partner                      24 (7%)
Doe(s)                                22 (7%)
No Substantial Relationship           16 (5%)
Customer or User                      8 (2%)
Employer                              6 (2%)

Table 2: Party Relationship Coincidence in Civil CFAA Filings

               Employee   Competitor   Technology   Derivative
                                       Service      Business

Employee                  76 (47%)     0 (0%)       0 (0%)
Competitor     76 (78%)                0 (0%)       6 (6%)
Service        0 (0%)     0 (0%)                    0 (0%)
Business       0 (0%)     6 (21%)      0 (0%)
Partner        9 (38%)    4 (17%)      0 (0%)       0 (0%)
Doe(s)         0 (0%)     0 (0%)       0 (0%)       0 (0%)
Relationship   0 (0%)     0 (0%)       0 (0%)       0 (0%)
Customer       0 (0%)     1 (12%)      0 (0%)       0 (0%)
Employer       0 (0%)     1 (17%)      0 (0%)       0 (0%)

               Business   Doe(s)   No             Customer   Employer
               Partner             Relationship

Employee       9 (6%)     0 (0%)   0 (0%)         0 (0%)     0 (0%)
Competitor     4 (4%)     0 (0%)   0 (0%)         1 (1%)     1 (1%)
Service        0 (0%)     0 (0%)   0 (0%)         0 (0%)     0 (0%)
Business       0 (0%)     0 (0%)   0 (0%)         0 (0%)     0 (0%)
Partner                   0 (0%)   0 (0%)         0 (0%)     0 (0%)
Doe(s)         0 (0%)              0 (0%)         0 (0%)     0 (0%)
Relationship   0 (0%)     0 (0%)                  0 (0%)     0 (0%)
Customer       0 (0%)     0 (0%)   0 (0%)                    0 (0%)
Employer       0 (0%)     0 (0%)   0 (0%)         0 (0%)

Table 3: Conduct Alleged in Civil CFAA Filings

Conduct                                    Number of Filings

Misappropriating Information               170 (52%)
Editing or Deleting Information            71 (22%)
Invasion of Privacy                        41 (13%)
Accessing Another Person's Account         40 (12%)
Financial Misfeasance                      26 (8%)
Hijacking Another Person's Account         26 (8%)
Impersonation                              20 (6%)
Misappropriating a Computer System         18 (6%)
Mobile Phone Unlocking                     16 (5%)
Software Disruption of a Computer System   14 (4%)
Credential Sharing                         11 (3%)
Harassment                                 11 (3%)
Unrelated Website                          9 (3%)
Copyright Trolling                         8 (2%)
Spam Calls or Email                        7 (2%)
Malware                                    6 (2%)
Reverse Engineering                        6 (2%)
Physical Disruption of a Computer System   5 (2%)
Automated Website Interaction              5 (2%)
Modifications to Enterprise Software       5 (2%)

Table 4: Victim-Defendant Relationships in CFAA Prosecutions (126)

Relationship Between Defendant and Victim   Number of Defendants

Employee, Consultant, or Contractor         64 (48%)
No Substantial Relationship                 41 (30%)
Colleague                                   9 (7%)
Social or Familial Relation                 5 (4%)
Technology Service                          5 (4%)
Business Partner                            4 (3%)
Customer or User                            3 (2%)
Doe(s)                                      3 (2%)

Table 5: Conduct Alleged in Criminal CFAA Filings (129)

Conduct                                    Number of

Misappropriating Information               82 (62%)
Accessing Another Person's Account         47 (35%)
Financial Misfeasance                      32 (24%)
Editing or Deleting Information            18 (14%)
Malware                                    17 (13%)
Software Disruption of a Computer System   14 (11%)
Unspecified Breaking In                    13 (10%)
Hijacking Another Person's Account         11 (8%)

Table 6: Frequency of Specific CFAA Provisions in Civil Filings

Civil Claim                    Statutory   Filings with
                               Provision   a Claim

Taking Information             (a)(2)(C)   136 (67%)
Fraud                          (a)(4)      111 (55%)
Damage and Loss                (a)(5)(C)   96 (48%)
Reckless Damage                (a)(5)(B)   55 (27%)
Intentional Damage             (a)(5)(A)   48 (24%)
Trafficking in Passwords       (a)(6)(A)   23 (n%)
Unspecified Damage             (a)(5)      18 (9%)
Taking Financial Information   (a)(2)(A)   4 (2%)
Extortion                      (a)(7)      2 (1%)

Table 7: Coincidence of Specific CFAA Provisions in Civil Filings
(18 U.S.C. [section] 1030(a) (2012))

         (2)(C)     (4)        (5)(C)     (5)(B)     (5)(A)

(2)(C)              72 (53%)   59 (43%)   39 (29%)   26 (19%)
(4)      72 (65%)              51 (46%)   26 (23%)   22 (20%)
(5)(C)   59 (61%)   51 (53%)              42 (44%)   32 (33%)
(5)(B)   39 (71%)   26 (47%)   42 (76%)              31 (56%)
(5)(A)   26 (54%)   22 (46%)   32 (67%)   31 (65%)
(6)(A)   7 (30%)    20 (87%)   15 (65%)   2 (9%)     2 (9%)
(5)      16 (89%)   13 (72%)
(2)(A)   3 (75%)    3 (75%)    1 (25%)    1 (25%)    1 (25%)
(7)      1 (50%)    1 (50%)    2 (100%)   1 (50%)    1 (50%)

         (6)(A)     (5)        (2)(A)   (7)

(2)(C)   7 (5%)     16 (12%)   3 (2%)   1 (1%)
(4)      20 (18%)   13 (12%)   3 (3%)   1 (1%)
(5)(C)   15 (16%)              1 (1%)   2 (2%)
(5)(B)   2 (4%)                1 (2%)   1 (2%)
(5)(A)   2 (4%)                1 (2%)   1 (2%)
(6)(A)              1 (4%)     1 (4%)   0 (0%)
(5)      1 (6%)                0 (0%)   0 (0%)
(2)(A)   1 (25%)    0 (0%)              0 (0%)
(7)      0 (0%)     0 (0%)     0 (0%)

Table 8: Frequency of Non-CFAA Claims in Civil Filings

                            Source    Filings with
Non-CFAA Claim              of Law    a Claim

Contract                    State     161 (50%)
Unfair Business Practices   State     138 (42%)
Trade Secret                State     131 (40%)
Conversion                  State     126 (39%)
Tortious Interference       State     125 (38%)
Fiduciary Duty              State     115 (35%)
Unjust Enrichment           State     89 (27%)
Civil Conspiracy            State     86 (26%)
Stored Communications Act   Federal   67 (21%)
Computer Trespass           State     63 (19%)
Fraud                       State     62 (19%)
Trademark                   Federal   56 (17%)
Wiretap Act                 Federal   54 (16%)
Trespass to Chattels        State     44 (14%)
Copyright                   Federal   36 (11%)
Privacy Tort                State     27 (8%)
Defamation                  State     21 (6%)
Negligence                  State     17 (5%)
Wiretap Statute             State     14 (4%)

Table 9: Coincidence Between the Most Common
CFAA and Non-CFAA Claims in Civil Filings

                       Contract   Unfair Business   Trade
                                  Practices         Secret

Taking Information     62 (46%)   58 (43%)          69 (51%)
Fraud                  61 (55%)   58 (52%)          52 (47%)
Unintentional Damage   45 (47%)   50 (52%)          33 (34%)
and Loss
Reckless Damage        25 (45%)   24 (44%)          23 (42%)
Intentional Damage     24 (50%)   20 (42%)          15 (31%)

                       Conversion   Tortious

Taking Information     42 (31%)     46 (34%)
Fraud                  43 (39%)     54 (49%)
Unintentional Damage   36 (38%)     42 (44%)
and Loss
Reckless Damage        17 (31%)     22 (40%)
Intentional Damage     16 (33%)     22 (46%)

Table 10: Coincidence of Specific CFAA Provisions in
Criminal Prosecutions (18 U.S.C. [section] 1030(a) (2012))

         (2)(C)     (5)(A)     (4)       (2)(B)   (5)(B)

(2)(C)              15 (24%)   5 (8%)    3 (5%)   5 (8%)
(5)(A)   15 (31%)              7 (14%)   0 (0%)   4 (8%)
(4)      5 (21%)    7 (29%)              0 (0%)   0 (0%)
(2)(B)   3 (20%)    0 (0%)     0 (0%)             0 (0%)
(5)(B)   5 (56%)    4 (44%)    0 (0%)    0 (0%)
(7)      4 (57%)    2 (29%)    1 (14%)   0 (0%)   0 (0%)
(6)(A)   4 (80%)    4 (80%)    1 (20%)   0 (0%)   3 (60%)
(2)(A)   0 (0%)     0 (0%)     0 (0%)    0 (0%)   0 (0%)
(3)      0 (0%)     0 (0%)     0 (0%)    0 (0%)   0 (0%)

         (7)      (6)(A)    (2)(A)   (3)

(2)(C)   4 (6%)   4 (6%)    0 (0%)   0 (0%)
(5)(A)   2 (4%)   4 (8%)    0 (0%)   0 (0%)
(4)      1 (4%)   1 (4%)    0 (0%)   0 (0%)
(2)(B)   0 (0%)   0 (0%)    0 (0%)   0 (0%)
(5)(B)   0 (0%)   3 (33%)   0 (0%)   0 (0%)
(7)               0 (0%)    0 (0%)   0 (0%)
(6)(A)   0 (0%)             0 (0%)   0 (0%)
(2)(A)   0 (0%)   0 (0%)             0 (0%)
(3)      0 (0%)   0 (0%)    0 (0%)

Table 11: Frequency of Specific CFAA
Provisions in Criminal Prosecutions

Charge                          Statutory       Defendants
(Principal, Attempt,            Provision
Accomplice, or
Conspiracy Liability)

Taking Information              1030(a)(2)(C)   63 (47%)
Intentional Damage              1030(a)(5)(A)   49 (37%)
Fraud                           1030(a)(4)      24 (18%)
Taking Federal Information      1030(a)(2)(B)   15 (11%)
Reckless Damage                 1030(a)(5)(B)   9 (7%)
Extortion                       1030(a)(7)      7 (5%)
Trafficking in Passwords        1030(a)(6)(A)   5 (4%)
Taking Financial Information    1030(a)(2)(A)   3 (2%)
Accessing a Federal System      1030(a)(3)      1 (1%)
Unintentional Damage and Loss   1030(a)(5)(C)   0 (0%)

Table 12: Frequency of Non-CFAA Charges in Criminal Prosecutions

Non-CFAA Charge                 Statutory                  Defendants
(Principal, Attempt,            Provision
Accomplice, or
Conspiracy Liability)

Identity Theft                  18 U.S.C.                  30 (23%)
                                1028,1028A (2012)

Wire Fraud                      18 U.S.C. [section] 1343   23 (17%)

Bank Fraud                      18 U.S.C. [section] 1344   22 (17%)

Access Device (Production,      18 U.S.C. [section] 1029   16 (12%)
Trafficking, Possession,
or Use)

Racketeer Influenced and        18 U.S.C. [section] 1962   9 (7%)
Corrupt Organizations
 Act (RICO) Conspiracy

False Statements to a Federal   18 U.S.C. [section] 1001   7 (5%)

Health Insurance Portability    42 U.S.C.                  4 (3%)
and Accountability Act          [section] 1320d-6
(HIPAA) Disclosure

Table 13: Coincidence Between the Most Common CFAA
and Non-CFAA Charges in Criminal Prosecutions

                 Identity     Wire       Bank      Access
                   Theft      Fraud      Fraud     Device      RICO

Taking           19 (30%)   13 (21%)   11 (17%)   11 (17%)   9 (14%)
Intentional      11 (22%)   16 (33%)   16 (33%)   12 (24%)   9 (18%)
Fraud             4 (17%)   10 (42%)    8 (33%)     1 (4%)    0 (0%)
Taking Federal     1 (7%)     0 (0%)     0 (0%)     1 (7%)    0 (0%)
Reckless Damage    1 (n%)     0 (0%)     0 (0%)     0 (0%)    0 (0%)


Please note: Illustration(s) are not available due to copyright restrictions.
COPYRIGHT 2016 University of Pennsylvania, Law School
No portion of this article can be reproduced without the express written permission from the copyright holder.
Copyright 2016 Gale, Cengage Learning. All rights reserved.

Article Details
Printer friendly Cite/link Email Feedback
Title Annotation:II. An Empirical Evaluation of Cybercrime Litigation D. What Fact Patterns Are Litigated Under Cybercrime Law? through Conclusion: A Limited Role for Cybercrime Liability, with footnotes, p. 1480-1507
Author:Mayer, Jonathan
Publication:University of Pennsylvania Law Review
Date:May 1, 2016
Previous Article:Cybercrime litigation.
Next Article:How to avoid the standing problem in Floyd: a relaxed approach to standing in class actions.

Terms of use | Privacy policy | Copyright © 2021 Farlex, Inc. | Feedback | For webmasters |