Crypto policy perspectives.
Underlying the debate on EES are significant issues of conflicting public needs.(1) Every day, millions of people use telephones, fax machines, and computer networks for interactions that used to be the province of written exchanges or face-to-face meetings. Private citizens may want to protect their communications from electronic eavesdroppers. Law enforcement seeks continued access to criminals' communications (under legal authorization). In order to compete in the global marketplace, U.S. manufacturers want to include strong cryptography in their products. Yet national security interests dictate continued access to foreign intelligence. Both the EES and the controversy surrounding it are but the latest and most visible developments of a conflict inherent in the Information Age. Electronic communication is now an unavoidable component of modern life.
Many times a day people transmit sensitive data over insecure channels: reciting credit card numbers over cellular phones (scanners are ubiquitous), having private exchanges over email (Internet systems are frequently penetrated), charging calls from airports and hotel lobbies (our personal identification numbers--PINs--are easily captured). The problem is magnified at the corporate level. For several years in the 1970s, IBM executives conducted thousands of phone conversations about business on the company's private microwave network--and those conversations were systematically eavesdropped on by Soviet intelligence agents.
IBM's situation is not unique. Weak links exist throughout electronic communications, in networks and in distributed computer systems. Often the vulnerability of communications allows system penetration. Computer systems can be a weak link. Deceptive communications can easily undermine users' confidence in a system. For example, a group of students at the University of Wisconsin forged an email letter of resignation from the director of housing to the chancellor of the university. There can be denials of service because of altered or jammed communications; "video pirates" have disrupted satellite television programs a number of times.
Over the past five years thousands of mainframe computers have been replaced by networked distributed computing systems. This process is accelerating, and that change will only increase the importance of secure electronic communications. The National Information Infrastructure (NII)--the information superhighway--will have an even greater effect. Businesses will teleconnect with customers to sell and bill. Manufacturers will electronically query suppliers to check product availability. Insurance companies, doctors and medical centers will carry on electronic exchanges about patient treatment. The emerging technologies of the Information Age are revolutionizing the ways in which people exchange information and transact business. Much of the information being sent on the NII will be sensitive. Protecting confidentiality, authenticity and integrity in the information infrastructure is extremely important to economic stability and national security.
How can communications security be achieved? A very important part of the solution is cryptography. Cryptography was once the domain of generals and small children, but the advent of the Information Age has sharply increased the public's need for it. Cryptography can help prevent penetration from the outside. It can protect the privacy of users of the system so that only authorized participants can comprehend communications. It can ensure integrity of communications. It can increase assurance that received messages are genuine.
Confidentiality, the benefit most often associated with cryptography, is obtained by transforming (encrypting) data so that it is unintelligible by anyone except the intended recipient. Integrity is a security service that permits a user to detect if data has been tampered with during transmission or while in storage. Closely related to integrity is authenticity, which provides a user with a means of verifying the identity of the sender of a message.
Over the last 20 years several strong cryptographic algorithms(2) have emerged, including the Data Encryption Standard (DES), and the public-key algorithms, Diffie-Hellman and RSA. DES is coming to the end of its useful life with its key size and complexity being overtaken by improvements in speed and cost of computers. Because strong cryptography for confidentiality purposes has the potential to interfere with foreign intelligence gathering, the U.S. government generally does not permit the export of strong cryptography for confidentiality purposes. Strong cryptography can also impede electronic surveillance by law enforcement. Yet the U.S. private sector, from bankers to the future users of the NII, needs strong cryptography.
The EES was proposed as a solution to these conflicting problems by making available strong cryptography while providing a mechanism through which law enforcement could access encrypted communications. But EES raises problems of its own:
* many are uncomfortable with a cryptographic scheme in which the private keys of users are available to the U.S. government,
* many distrust a scheme in which an algorithm for public use is classified,
* foreign buyers may be unwilling to purchase products that implement the EES, and
* the algorithm is available only in hardware form, increasing costs and decreasing flexibility.
In 1975 the U.S. proposed DES for the protection of "sensitive but unclassified information" by government agencies. DES was designed by IBM, and adopted as a Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) in 1977 (in the same series that now includes the EES). It is a private or single-key system, and the key used to protect communications between two parties must be known to both parties and kept secret from everyone else.
At the time DES was proposed, it enjoyed a period of controversy in which its keys were characterized as too small and other weaknesses were suspected. Nevertheless, DES has proved remarkably resistant to public attacks.
At about the same time, academic researchers developed a family of cryptographic techniques that became known as public-key or two-key cryptography. One approach, proposed by Ralph Merkle at Berkeley and refined by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman at Stanford allowed two parties to negotiate a common secret piece of information over an insecure channel. Another, proposed by Diffie and Hellman and realized by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman of MIT, made it possible to use a key that was not secret (a public key) to encrypt a message that could only be decrypted by a particular secret key. Conversely, a message transformed by a secret key could be verified as coming from the sender by applying the sender's public key. This second use of public-key technology came to be called a digital signature.
By 1991, the RSA system, which is based on the notion that factoring integers is computationally much more difficult than multiplying them, had become the de facto standard for digital signatures. The list of licensees of RSA digital signature technology(3) read like a computer industry roll call: Apple, AT&T, DEC, IBM, Lotus, Microsoft, Northern Telecom, Novell, Sun, WordPerfect.
RSA and DES provide the U.S. commercial sector with techniques for achieving confidentiality, integrity and authenticity. For example, Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM), an Internet standard for secure email, combines them to achieve security. However, with the exception of exporting DES for use by financial institutions or foreign offices of U.S.-controlled companies, the State Department typically refuses export license for confidentiality systems employing the algorithm. Despite this, DES is believed to be the most widely used cryptosystem in the world, except perhaps scramblers used for pay-television. In the U.S., the American Banking Association recommends DES whenever cryptography is needed to protect financial data. DES is the cryptographic scheme most often used in commercially available secure telephones.
The export system presents a problem for U.S. industry, all the more so since DES is widely available outside the country. A March 1994 study by the Software Publishers Association lists 33 foreign countries with 152 cryptography-based products using DES.
A brief look at communication systems explains the importance of cryptography in achieving security. Telephony is an excellent example. The only way to provide a secure voice path between two telephones at arbitrary locations is to encrypt the words spoken into one and de-crypt them as they come out of the other. Public-key cryptography makes it possible for the two phones to agree on a common key known only to them without the mediation of a trusted third party. The users simply establish the call, push a button, and wait a few seconds for the phones to make the arrangements.
In the simplest systems, the users must rely on voice recognition to assure authenticity, just as with unsecured phone calls. If the system must provide authentication to users who do not know one another, some central administration is required to issue cryptographic credentials by which each phone can recognize the other.
Currently, secure telephones are expensive. In addition to the cryptographic devices, a secure phone must include a voice digitizer to convert speech to a form in which it can be encrypted and a modem to encode the digitized signal for transmission over the phone line. As a result, the least expensive secure phones cost over a thousand dollars apiece.
Securing communications for computers in a distributed system presents different problems. There is no analogue of voice recognition. If authentication is to be available, it must be done by formal cryptographic procedures. This requires the computers to identify people or machines through long-term keys. The relationship between telephones, even secure telephones, is conceptually simple: they set up calls and transmit sound. The relationship between computers in a distributed system is considerably more complex--machines routinely share files and execute programs for each other. These wedded interactions complicate the process of protection and make computer break-ins difficult to prevent.
Systems owners are typically unwilling to make substantial investments in hardware or software for security purposes, although they may be willing to pay some premium for products that contain integrated security features. Many vendors see software as the least expensive means of adding cryptographic security features to their products.
A secure mail system like PEM is the workstation analog of a secure telephone. It encrypts and decrypts mail so the user can correspond privately. Unfortunately, a software implementation of PEM is vulnerable to penetration of the program including the compromise of its long-term keys. One of the ways in which such penetrations occur is through the implanting of modified programs or other data into the user's working environment. Without trustworthiness, cryptography embedded in an application or in the operation system is no panacea.
Technology causes a constant rearrangement in the relationship between the criminal and the law. The advent of telecommunications enabled criminals to execute their plans more covertly. Once law enforcement learned how to listen in, officials could do so without placing themselves in danger. Wiretapping is a tool that diminishes the value of communications to criminals; cryptography potentially counters this.
Current wiretap law dates from the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. Title III of the Act established the basic law governing interceptions in criminal investigations. In 1978 the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act established the national security counterpart to Title III, authorizing electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence.
Title III requires a court order for the installation of a wiretap (as do most FISA intercepts). For Title III orders there must be probable cause to believe that the targeted communications device--whether phone, fax, or computer--is being used to facilitate a crime, which must be one of those enumerated by the law. Thirty-seven states also have statutes authorizing wiretaps. By law, the state requirements must be at least as restrictive as the federal statute.
Since 1968, when Title III was passed, there have been approximately 900 federal and state wiretaps annually. In data released by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, between 1968 and 1992, the average annual number of incriminating conversations intercepted has remained between 200 thousand and 400 thousand. In 1992 the average cost of installing a wiretap and subsequently monitoring it was $46,492.
The law enforcement community views wiretaps as essential. Such surveillance not only provides information not obtainable by other means, it also yields evidence that is considered extremely reliable and probative. According to the FBI, organized crime has had severe setbacks due to the use of wiretap surveillance. The FBI contends the tool is critical for drug cases. Wiretapping is an important investigative technique in cases of governmental corruption and acts of terrorism.
The importance of wiretap surveillance was the reason for the Digital Telephony proposal, which was developed by the FBI and submitted to Congress in 1992. To ensure the government's ability to intercept communications is not curtailed by the introduction of advanced digital switching technology, this proposal requires providers of electronic communication services to design their switches accordingly. Major members of the computer and communications industries, including AT&T, Digital, Lotus, Microsoft and Sun, strongly opposed the proposal, and there were no congressional sponsors. A revised proposal was recently submitted for consideration.
The Digital Telephony proposal concerns access to communications, but law enforcement is also concerned about its ability to understand those communications after interception. Off-the-shelf encryption technology may be an easy way for lawbreakers to foil criminal investigative work. Members of the law enforcement community view EES as a solution that provides the public with strong cryptography while not compromising investigators' ability to comprehend legally intercepted communications.
Foreign access to cryptography of even moderate strength poses a problem for U.S. intelligence. Those who think about vulnerabilities from the viewpoint of security typically regard strong encryption of each message as the only barrier to communications intelligence. However, a message cannot be analyzed until it has been located. Locating the traffic of interest is as important a problem as any. Even encryption that is too weak to resist concerted attack can multiply the cost of targeting traffic several-fold.
The growth of communications intelligence in this century has been accompanied by a similar growth in techniques for protecting communications, particularly cryptography. Nonetheless, the communications intelligence product is now better than ever. In the recent past, there has been migration of communications from more secure media such as wirelines or physical shipment to microwave and satellite channels. This migration has far outstripped the application of any protective measures.
However, while the U.S. may be the greatest beneficiary of communications intelligence in the world today, it is also its greatest potential prey. The protection of American communications against both interception and disruption is vital to the security of the country.
When DES was adopted as a government standard in 1977, cryptographic protection of substantial quality became available in both hardware and software packages. With hindsight, some in the intelligence community might consider the public disclosure of the DES algorithm to have been a serious error. DES-based equipment became available throughout the world, cryptographic principles revealed by studying the algorithm inspired new cryptographic designs, and DES provided a training ground for a generation of public cryptanalysts.
National security experts argue that export control is essential if the U.S. is to protect its communications without affording protection to the rest of the world. Export control policy seeks to limit foreign accessibility to strong cryptography. Internet availability of strong cryptography notwithstanding, many security experts believe the export control policy is working. They argue that foreign organizations that are concerned about protecting their information from sophisticated intercept are not likely to download an encryption program from the Internet. Others disagree, and believe the only real effect of present export control policy is to ship U.S. jobs overseas. Many complain that export control has had a chilling effect on American business by making U.S. products less competitive.
Export control policy on cryptography has complicated development of secure systems. An example is provided by the Digital Equipment's Distributed System Security Architecture (DSSA), which Digital spent many years and many millions of dollars developing. In planning the system, Digital sought to make a product that would pass government export controls for cryptography. In designing DSSA Digital engineers carefully separated authentication from confidentiality. They began building two distinct versions of the product, a domestic one with authentication and confidentiality, and one for export, with authentication only. This additional complexity slowed the work. A Digital senior manager familiar with the program asserted the delays associated with attempts to meet export restrictions were a significant factor in Digital's decision to abandon DSSA.
Cryptography is not the only American product subject to export control. Striking a balance between economic strength (by opening markets for U.S. companies), and protecting national security (by restricting the sale of military technology) requires making complex choices. What differentiates this conflict from, say, the exportability of supercomputers, is that equivalent cryptographic products are available for sale internationally. Opponents of cryptographic export controls argue that U.S. vendors are penalized while cryptographic products proliferate. Proponents of these controls argue the most serious threat to foreign intelligence gathering comes not from standalone products that constitute most of the market, but from well-integrated, user-friendly systems in which cryptography is but one of many features. From this perspective, it is essential to control export of the commodity, desktop hardware and software, with integrated cryptography. The U.S. is the preeminent supplier of such products.
National security experts have argued that removal of U.S. export controls on cryptography would result in the imposition of foreign import controls. They point to France, which does not permit the use of encryption without governmental registration of the algorithm. In recent years, the policy of the U.S. government is to oppose trade restraints, so this contention is something of an about-face. It is speculative. At present, no Western European governments other than France restrain the import of cryptographic products, and only a few Asian governments do so.
The EES may have an indirect impact on the export of computer equipment. Export of key-escrow equipment will be permitted, but both the secrecy of the algorithm and the U.S. government's possession of keys may dampen the enthusiasm of prospective foreign buyers. In order to build products for both the domestic and export markets, computer vendors might need to support two sets of cryptographic algorithms.
The Right to Privacy
If law enforcement and national security interests argue against the availability of strong cryptography without key escrow, other traditions of the U.S. argue strongly in its favor. The right to privacy--the "right to be left alone"--is fundamental to American life. Civil libertarians view the availability of strong cryptography as necessary to the ability to communicate in privacy.
Protecting Americans' privacy rights is a constant struggle. Private industry--including credit bureaus, insurance companies, and direct marketers--collects a vast amount of information about individuals. The proliferation of electronic databases has only exacerbated the problems Congress attempted to ameliorate 24 years ago, when it passed the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Despite abuses by the private sector, civil liberties groups view government abuse of privacy with much greater concern. In its attempt to ensure the safety of its citizens, the government can overstep boundaries of the rights of the individual. One does not have to look far back in the nation's history to find egregious examples of such abuse.
Based on information illegally supplied by the Census Bureau, 112,000 Americans of Japanese ancestry were put in internment camps during World War II. During the 1960s, the FBI regularly taped conversations of many civil rights leaders, including Martin Luther King. The 1974 Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations found numerous examples of the NSA abuse of privacy rights of private individuals. As a direct result of these activities, legislative, executive order, and regulatory provisions were instituted with the intent of eliminating future such occurrences.
Privacy rights are one of the individual's most potent defenses against the state. Privacy rights of the individual are embedded in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis said it eloquently in his dissent on the Olmstead wiretapping case:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and his intellect . . . They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone--the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man . . .(4)
Privacy, however, is not always deemed absolute. Sometimes privacy is traded for convenience. Americans are captured on video recordings as we shop; we leave behind electronic chronicles as we charge phone calls. We pay for milk and bread via an ATM withdrawal at the supermarket, and we leave a record of our actions where five years ago we would have left a five-dollar bill. Sometimes it is traded for safety. Each day hundreds of thousands of Americans pass through metal detectors to get on airplanes. Most people consider those intrusions of privacy well worth the assurance of greater public safety.
Civil liberties groups argue that constitutional protections need to keep pace with new technology. Their concern is that governmental attempts to limit the use of cryptography, whether through force of law, or through more subtle efforts such as market domination, can result in the foreclosing of privacy protection choices.
Concern over control of cryptography first arose when cryptography became an active area of research for academia and business. There were conflicts over which federal agencies would fund nongovernmental cryptography research, and whether such work might be subject to some form of prior restraint on publication.
In response to these difficulties, the American Council on Education convened a study group, which presented a set of voluntary guidelines for prepublication review of research papers in cryptography. The National Security Agency and the National Science Foundation worked out an agreement by which both agencies would fund cryptographic research. Research now flourishes in both domains.
Several years later, President Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive 145 (NSDD-145), establishing as federal policy the safeguarding of sensitive but unclassified information in communications and computer systems. NSDD-145 stipulated a Defense Department management structure to implement the policy: the NSA, the National Security Council and the Department of Defense. There were many objections to this plan, from a variety of constituencies. Congress protested the expansion of presidential authority to policy-making without legislative participation. From the ACLU to Mead Data Central, a broad array of industrial and civil liberties organizations objected to Department of Defense control of unclassified information in the civilian sector.
In 1987 Congress sought to clarify the issue with the Computer Security Act, which assigned to the National Bureau of Standards (now the National Institute of Standards and Technology, or NIST) "responsibility for developing standards and guidelines to assume cost-effective security and privacy of sensitive information in federal computer systems, drawing on the technical advice and assistance (including work products) of the National Security Agency, where appropriate."
Civilian computer security standards were to be set by a civilian agency. But seven years later both civil liberties and industrial groups feel NSA is more involved in civilian standards than the Computer Security Act mandated. They point to the NSA-designed digital signature standard (DSS) and the cryptographic algorithm SKIPJACK that underlies EES. Concerns over national security involvement in civilian matters, as well as concerns over the government plan to escrow keys of private users have led such civil liberties groups as the ACLU and Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility to oppose EES.
EES and Privacy
Advocates of EES claim the availability of strong cryptography will provide Americans with better and more readily available privacy protection than they currently enjoy. They observe that no one will be forced to use it, and that other forms of encryption will be allowed. Opponents believe the potential for abuse by the government makes EES a danger not to be risked, and counter that if a large federal agency like the IRS adopts EES, then electronic fliers who choose to secure their transmissions may have to use EES. This would have the impact of making the voluntary standard the de facto national one.
There is no question the market impact of the federal government can be huge, although recent experience illustrates that the government's ability to influence the computer communication market is not always successful.(5) Adoption of EES, as a standard, voluntary or otherwise, decreases the chance there will be competing systems available. Indeed, the true success of EES, as measured by law enforcement's continued ability to de-crypt intercepted conversations, can only come at the expense of (widespread use of) competing systems for secure telecommunications.
Proponents respond that privacy protection will be better than ever. Should the government illegally tap a communication, the escrowed system will leave an electronic audit trail, and make the illegal interception easier to uncover than it is at present. Reminding us of the abuses of Watergate and the revelations of the Church Committee, civil liberties groups contend that the NSA should not be building government trapdoors into the civilian communications infrastructure.
EES and the Computer Industry
Meanwhile EES presents other problems for the computer industry. The government's attempt to create strong cryptography that would not hinder law enforcement's abilities to comprehend legally intercepted conversations led to a hardware solution. Industry prefers software implementations for a number of reasons. They are cheaper. and they offer a flexibility that hardware does not.
The industry has already made substantial investments in DES and RSA solutions for secure systems. In lots of 10,000, Clipper chips will cost approximately $15. Industry experts contend this translates to a finished product with escrowed encryption capabilities costing about $60 more than one without. From a vendor viewpoint, hardware encryption provides greater security but does so at much greater expense than software. It is not clear that prospective purchasers are willing to pay for this increased security.
The Broader Policy Issues
In the full report, we discuss in detail the various policy and technical concerns surrounding cryptography. The problems of communications security and its cryptographic solutions are technical ones, but the issues are much broader. They deserve careful and thoughtful public debate. We raise questions here and in the full report, Answers will take longer.
It took the Supreme Court nearly 40 years to expound on the privacy of telephone communications. In the Olmstead case in 1928, the Supreme Court held that wiretapping evidence did not need court authorization. Over the next four decades, the Court slowly created a penumbra of privacy for telecommunications. Finally, in 1967, in Katz vs the U.S., the Court held that a phone call in even so public a place as a phone booth was deserving of privacy--it could not be tapped without prior court authorization. Computer communications differ from the telephone, but it is likely that the public's embrace of this medium will be considerably more rapid than the acceptance of the earlier technology. How will law and policy for the protection of electronic communications evolve? Is there an absolute right to communications privacy?
Members of the law enforcement community believe that the widespread use of encrypted telecommunications (especially phone calls) will interfere with their ability to carry out authorized wiretaps. Is this a problem that needs a solution? Should cryptographic solutions for communications security include authorized government access for law enforcement and national security purposes?
What will happen if criminals use cryptography other than EES? The Digital Telephony proposal involves investment in the telephone infrastructure in order to ensure that court-authorized wiretaps can be carried out. These wiretap capabilities will be less useful if communications are encrypted. What is the relationship between Digital Telephony and EES? Will there be any future attempt to outlaw alternative forms of cryptography?
What would the success of escrowed encryption mean? Would it simply mean government use of EES-type products? Or would it mean a much more widespread use of EES products? Would it mean the availability of EES-type products to the exclusion of all else?
We are experiencing fundamental transformations in the way that people and organizations communicate. The very infrastructure of the nation is changing. The question we need to address is: How should we interpret the Fourth Amendment,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, house, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause . . .
for the Information Age?
1 EES is primarily for use with telephones and fax machines, but this report also addresses the expected extension of escrowed encryption to a broader context than the present federal standard.
2 Strong cryptographic algorithms are ones which are exceedingly difficult to break by attacks including exhaustive search over the entire key space.
3 RSA is patented in the U.S.
4 Olmstead vs. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 1928, pg. 752.
5 The failure of the GOSIP initiative, an attempt to mandate procurement of computer communication protocols that conform to the ISO OSI standards, is one such example.
This panel, chaired by Stephen Kent, was convened by the Association for Computing Machinery's U.S. Public Policy Committee (USACM). The panel, which includes members of the U.S. government, attorneys, and members of the computer industry and academia, has not come to conclusions about the direction of cryptography in the public domain or about the appropriateness of the government-preferred escrowed encryption standard. While not always reaching consensus, the panel has attempted to present the issues carefully and correctly, removing rhetoric and replacing it with facts. This summary and the full report represent the work of the panel members as individuals, and do not necessarily represent the opinions of their organizations or of the ACM.
USACM, chaired by Barbara Simons, was created by the ACM to provide a means for presenting and discussing technological issues to and with U.S. policy makers and the general public. Presentation of this information inCludes white papers, news releases, journal articles, and expert testimony for Congressional hearings.
The full report, entitled "Codes, Keys and Conflicts: Issues in U.S. Crypto Policy," may be obtained in printed copy from the ACM Order Department at $10 per copy or in various electronic formats from ACM'S Internet host. To order, please contact ACM Order Dept., P.O. Box 12114, Church Street Station, New York, NY 10257 or call (800) 342-6626 (U.S. and Canada) or (212) 626-0500 (NY metro area and all other locations.) Please use Order #207940.
Internet users may access the report through any of the following URLs: http://info.acm.org/reports/acm_crypto_study.html ftp://info.acm.org/reports/acm_crypto_study/gopher://gopher.acm.org/11 [the_files.reports.acm_crypto_study]
SUSAN LANDAU is research associate professor at the University of Massachusetts. She works in algebraic algorithms.
STEPHEN KENT is chief scientist of security technology for Bolt Beranek and Newman Inc. For over 18 years, he has been an architect of computer network security protocols and technology for use in the government and commercial sectors.
CLINTON C. BROOKS is an assistant to the director of the National Security Agency. He is responsible for orchestrating the agency's technical support for the government's key escrow initiative.
SCOTT CHARNEY is chief of the computer crime unit in the criminal division in the Department of Justice. He supervises five federal prosecutors who are responsible for implementing the Justice Department's Computer Crime Initiative.
DOROTHY E. DENNING is professor and chair of computer science at Georgetown University. She is author of Cryptography and Data Security and one of the outside reviewers of the Clipper system.
WHITFIELD DIFFIE is Distinguished Engineer at Sun Microsystems. He is the coinventor of public-key cryptography, and has worked extensively in cryptography and secure systems.
ANTHONY LAUCK is a corporate consulting engineer at Digital Equipment and its lead network architect since 1978. His contributions span a wide range of networking and distributed processing technologies.
DOUGLAS MILLER is government affairs manager for the Software Publishers Association.
PETER G. NEUMANN has been a computer professional since 1953, and involved in computer communication security since 1965. He chairs the ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy and moderates the RISKS Forum.
DAVID L. SOBEL is legal counsel to the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC). He specializes in civil liberties, information and privacy law and frequently writes about these issues.
Please address all correspondence regarding this report to Susan Landau, Computer Science, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003, USA, landau
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|Title Annotation:||Special Issue: Internet Technology; includes related article|
|Author:||Landau, Susan; Kent, Stephen; Brooks, Clint; Charney, Scott; Denning, Dorothy; Diffie, Whitfield; La|
|Publication:||Communications of the ACM|
|Date:||Aug 1, 1994|
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