Corporate social responsibility and corporate governance: Japanese firms and selective adaptation.
If CSR is at the heart of a corporation's comprehensive activities aimed at maintaining harmony between the corporation, society, and the environment, all the while sustaining development, Japanese companies are certainly at least on par with the West. Moreover, by turning its resource-poor handicap to its advantage, Japan has targeted cutting-edge technology and knowhow toward energy conservation, resource conservation, and environmental protection--to the good of the rest of the world. (2)
Differences in business practices in corporate governance (CG) and organizational behaviour between Japanese and U.S. firms have been widely debated. In most analyses, U.S. firms are considered to be driven primarily by shareholder-value-maximization objectives, whereas Japanese firms are driven by stakeholder-welfare considerations. (3) However, recent CG reforms in Japan have incorporated various aspects of U.S., and more broadly AngloAmerican, CG practices, including the adaptation of the SarbanesOxley Act (SOX) (4) SOX and the Japanese equivalent, J-SOX (the section on internal control in Japan's revised Financial Instruments and Exchange Act), (5) show what law and society expect from corporations in their financial transactions and related behaviour. (6) In Japan, where stakeholder welfare is regarded as the primary objective of corporate function, the role of J-SOX and how it actually functions is relevant in both CG and corporate social responsibility (CSR) contexts. Given these recent trends in CG- and CSR-related laws and institutions in Japan, establishing clear-cut typologies between Anglo-American and Japanese practices in these areas has become increasingly difficult. This observation resembles the insights gained from the convergence-divergence debate of the 1990s and early 2000s that revealed that formal changes in organizational and institutional structures of political-economic models may be paralleled, followed, or undermined by a functional alteration of organizational and institutional practices. (7) Successive Japanese governments and large numbers of Japanese corporations have been implementing U.S.-style CG practices in a selective manner in their ongoing CG reforms since the mid-1990s. As we have shown elsewhere, (8) selective adaptation drives the dynamic process of transplantation of U.S.-style CG mechanisms based on Anglo-American liberal norms to Japan. Japan's CG reform aim has been to enhance Japanese firms' global competitiveness by introducing a U.S.-style (or more broadly Anglo-American style) CG system. The implementation and integration through "selective adaptation" (9) depends on a range of conditional factors, including relevant institutions and established business practices in Japan and the respective "shared understandings" (10) through which such novelties are assessed and evaluated by corporate actors and stakeholders.
While CG practices and associated organizational forms have been discussed prominently in the context of divergence--convergence debates, recent and significant changes in another area of corporate behaviour, CSR, have received relatively scant attention in this context. CG and CSR are inherently related, yet their interactions are not clearly defined in practice. Defining and analyzing their intersection depends on, inter alia, what the perceived purposes of corporations, in the form of legal requirements as well as prevailing best-business-practice expectations, are. Even broadly conceived, these conditions vary greatly between firms operating in the Japanese and American business environments due to differences in localized social understanding of corporate philanthropy and responsibility.
Building on findings from previous research on the dynamic process of transfer and integration of U.S.--style corporate governance practices into the Japanese system, in this article we examine the interactions of CG and CSR by comparing CSR practices of U.S. and Japanese firms operating and competing in the global markets. (11) Similar to the findings for CG practices, we contend that the shareholder-value-maximization principle, one of the key notions in U.S. firms' CG and CSR practices, will continue to be challenged by Japan's more traditional stakeholder-welfare-maximization principle. (12) Speaking to the gap in the literature on CSR, we show that Anglo-American-style CSR practices are selectively adapted into Japanese firms' CSR practices and that the long-standing Japanese business tradition of close intertwining between corporation and stakeholder provides Japanese firms with a degree of advantage over their American counterparts in terms of reputation benefits and credibility.
In the next section (Section II), we briefly review the literature on CSR and CG practices and outline the theoretical framework underlying our discussion. In Section III, we discuss how selective adaptation in CSR is proceeding in Japan as Anglo-American-style CSR practices are being introduced. We present some examples of corporate practices that illustrate this point.
Presenting some limited statistical evidence in Section IV that connects Japanese firms' CSR performance to CG performance, we show that although the connection is not clear-cut, a positive relationship is broadly discernible, which confirms that Japanese firms' CSR approaches are statistically positively correlated with profit considerations. These findings are qualified insofar as it is not possible to ascertain the direction of the causality of this relationship. In Section V, we present a comparative analysis of some U.S. and Japanese high-tech firms' CSR structures, guiding principles, and explicit policies, which will serve to substantiate our theoretical framing with empirical evidence. In Section VI, we conclude by discussing the implications of our findings.
II. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
Although its formal conceptualization and national as well as international standardization are more recent phenomena, CSR itself is not. For example, many large enterprises owned by successful Japanese merchants in the 1500s and 1600s emphasized the importance of modesty in profit making and contributing to various aspects of society for their sustainable existence. This is thought to be due to the traditional emphasis in Japan on maintaining social harmony; the merchants learned this skill historically by experience and kept it within their family business enterprises. (13) For example, the Mitsui family enterprise, noted as one of the great merchants in the Edo era, kept as one of its house rules: "greed causes a feud"; (14) the Sumitomo family, another long-standing business enterprise, kept house rules such as "do not profit yourself in your task", "do not behave in such a way to shame our fame and trust", and "maintain your sense of honor and avoid greed and corruption"; (15) and the Ohmi Shonin (the collective of merchants from the Ohmi, now the Shiga Prefecture area) has had a long-standing motto of its business: sampoyoshi (good for three sides), (16) meaning its business must be good for (1) the company, (2) the customer, and (3) society--this is what Hama coined the "trinity of bliss". (17) These businesses implemented their social contributions and public goods in various ways, as documented historically. (18)
In many ways, contemporary Japanese firms continue to share some of these traditional attitudes in order to maintain some form of social harmony and emphasize their ability to survive as a going concern in the long run, often expressed by the importance of the corporation's relationship with, and responsibility for, its related stakeholders. This notion of harmony has some things in common with more activist approaches introduced recently in Japan by the modern Anglo-American notion of CSR, but as we show below, Japanese firms' implementation of modern CSR practices seems systematically different than that of their Western counterparts.
As early as the 1800s, firms in the U.S. actively practised community engagement and involvement on a philanthropic basis. Such involvement, however, was conditional on the premise that it would positively affect shareholder value. (19) This line of thought has survived, and its focus has been sharpened, as is best evidenced by debates on this subject found in management literature from the past three to four decades. Substantial demarcation evolved around the question of what the central purpose of a corporation ought to be. For scholars such as Milton Friedman, wealth generation is the primary objective of a corporation, (20) whereas others such as Edward Freeman contended that corporations should have a more socially balanced purpose (i.e., a stakeholder approach). (21) Subsequent debates have allowed for more nuanced distinctions. It is in this context that the CG-CSR nexus can be clarified further along four categories/dimensions as outlined by Garriga and Mele: instrumental, political, integrative, and ethical. (22)
For comparative purposes, in this article, we are primarily concerned with instrumental approaches, best represented by Friedman:
[T]here is one and only one social responsibility of business--to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition, without deception or fraud. (23)
In essence, this is to say that socially responsible activities of firms are acceptable only if they contribute toward firms' wealth-generating function. We contrast this position with the perspectives that follow a mere "enlightened value-maximization" principle. (24) Duane Windsor argues that wealth generation is an overarching managerial leitmotif, (25) and thus, an adequate level (26) of philanthropic corporate activity may resonate well with such a premise. Especially in the context of fierce competition among firms with prima facie similar competitive edges, CSR can become a tool or means to attain a competitive advantage; for example, through positive reputation effects. (27) Challenging the rigid value-maximization principle, enlightened value maximization conforms to "much of the structure of stakeholder theory but accepts maximization of the long-run value of the firm as the criterion for making the requisite tradeoffs among its stakeholders". (28) It is from here that the contention can be made that companies with close stakeholder relations and long-standing experience in stakeholder-welfare management may have a distinct advantage over firms whose preponderant leitmotif has been shareholder value.
Following Marcel van Marrewijk's line of reasoning that if definitions of CSR are not concise enough, they will be "too vague to be useful in academic debate or in corporate implementation", (29) we introduce our working definition of CSR as follows: A corporate strategy that firms adopt to integrate social and environmental concerns into their business operations and into their interaction with their shareholders and/or stakeholders on a profit-generating basis. (30)
Given the breadth of competing views about the objective of CSR, we derive our theoretical framework on the premise that, in accordance with general CG practices in Japan and the U.S., we expect U.S. companies' CSR approaches to be innately short-term and shareholder-value oriented and their Japanese counterparts to follow comparably long-term stakeholder perspectives. That is, CSR is a means for wealth creation in the form of shareholder value for U.S. firms, whereas CSR for Japanese firms is a means to sharpen long-term competitive advantage and survivability over other firms. However, in both countries, investments in firms' CSR activities and engagements are assumed to be pursued predominantly out of for profit reasoning and not altruistic or purely ethical reasoning. (31)
If the wealth-creating potential of CSR is emphasized or made explicit in firms' CG policies and codes of conduct and/or vis-a-vis shareholders, then we conceive of CSR as following short-term, profit-making rationales (i.e., the U.S. model). If the predominant emphasis is laid upon the long-term stakeholder-welfare maximization--survivability and corporate development in terms of reputation and competitiveness--then this will be considered the enlightened value-maximization principle framed within the stakeholder-oriented view (i.e., the Japanese model). Ambiguous strategies (i.e., "hybrid" approaches) will fall under "selective adaptation" in reference to the frameworks explicating Japan's CG reforms, during which American business liberalism was merged with the Japanese corporate emphasis on stakeholder relations and socio-economic responsibility.
We present below some limited empirical evidence based on statistical analysis and case studies of firms that suggest that the types of differences in CSR behaviour alluded to above are empirically discernible among Japanese and U.S. firms. U.S. firms tend to focus more explicitly on profit making as they pursue investment in CSR activities, while Japanese firms often state their seriousness in responding to social needs, despite the potentially adverse profit implications of certain CSR activities. This seems to be consistent with our selective-adaptation (hybrid) hypothesis.
III. ANGLO-AMERICAN CSR PRACTICES AND JAPAN'S SELECTIVE ADAPTATION: SOME EXAMPLES OF JAPANESE FIRMS' CSR PRACTICES
Although profit making has always been an essential ingredient of Japanese firms' operating principles, many Japanese managers and workers alike consider their firms as serving not just their shareholders, but also more broadly their stakeholders, including workers, suppliers, customers, creditors, and the community. (32) Such notions of firms tend to open more possibilities for government interventions in firm decisions in various ways (e.g., regulations or influence on firms' investment decisions).
Contemporary CSR activities in the Western economies are founded not just on philanthropy, but also on firms' interest in contributing actively to the communities they serve in a broad sense. Japanese firms generally accept these principles of CSR as Western firms do. Yet, in part because of different perceptions, institutions, and business norms, the framework in which Japanese firms engage in CSR decisions is systemically different, for example, from their U.S. counterparts. This is expected, given that the Japanese CG system, after the last two decades of Japan's reform efforts to achieve a more U.S.--style system, has now adopted many U.S. CG practices, but in a rather selective way. (33) CSR activities are inevitably closely tied to firms' CG principles, and we expect Japanese firms' CSR activities to reflect such differences in CG practices as exist between Japan and the U.S.
In the Appendix we show the types of criteria included in annual surveys on Japanese firms' CSR activities conducted by Toyo Keizai, a leading business-intelligence firm in Japan. The criteria included in their questionnaires are generally reflective of Japanese firms' CSR activities. We see that, in addition to standard items included in Western firms' lists of CSR activities (e.g., firms' contributions to the environment and communities), firms' contributions to employment are given heavy weight in these surveys. Questions about female employment and employment stability at firms, for example, are given special attention in the Toyo Keizai list of CSR activities. (34) This is consistent with our discussion above asserting that Western CSR activities have gone through some type of selective adaptation in Japan.
As noted previously, despite historically strong ties between Japanese firms and the communities in which they operate, the Western (both Anglo-American and European) concept of contemporary CSR practices has motivated many Japanese corporations to rethink their contributions to society as related to company profit, and more broadly, the notion about what corporations' objectives should be. Clearly, such rethinking is important and often essential if they want to continue operating in global markets. However, this rethinking takes place within the explicit stakeholder context that Japanese firms are nested in, and not outside of it. This is the dimension along which selective adaptation and credibility advantages, as mentioned previously, intersect.
In August 2011, the Nikkei newspaper reported on the recent global strengthening of CSR practices by large Japanese firms in 2011. (35) Some of the reported, notable developments are as follows:
1. As more countries adopt ISO 2600036 (the ISO international standard on social responsibility), Japanese firms, in order to achieve their global expansions, recognize the need to make their management practices compatible with the ISO 26000 standard in the areas of human rights, labour management, and other company management areas. NEC and Shiseido began identifying potential problems with their company practices in human rights and labour management, while Ricoh has begun quantifying its progress in these areas of CSR so that it can visualize the progress the company makes annually.
2. To avoid potential problems arising from using suppliers who do not satisfy the ISO 26000 standard in countries where ISO 26000 has been adopted, NEC has decided to implement its policies such as enforcing human rights and avoiding child labour practices at its 200 subsidiaries as well as its local suppliers by the end of March 2012. The company has prepared learning materials about human rights to be accessed on the internet in order to generate worker interest in this area of management. NEC regards this as an important point in its risk-management system since the importance of adhering to human rights is becoming recognized as essential in some of the developing countries where NEC plans to expand its business.
3. Shiseido has begun investigating 32 items regarding its (approximately 50) suppliers' CSR practices, including the question about whether their employeeshave good work-life balance. Shiseido has used more than 20 different manuals for CSR behaviour in different countries, but it is working on creating a single manual for CSR practices based on ISO 26000 for all countries.
4. Ricoh introduced numerical goals for 30 of its CSR practices, starting in fiscal 2011 (ending in March 2012). This will supplement existing numerical goals for its practices regarding greenhouse emissions and other environment-related activities. By comparing these goals with where the practices currently are, it hopes to show its CSR approaches to the global marketplace. Similar numerical goals for CSR practices were also adopted by Toshiba and have been operational since the 2009 fiscal year (adoption of key performance indicators from 2009 through until the fiscal 2012 year-end). (37)
5. Finally, these companies' approaches to CSR have been generally framed as a part of their corporate risk-management systems, and in response to this, NKSJ Risk Management began providing consulting services on how firms should approach ISO 26000. (38) Its first seminar for Japanese firms' CSR personnel was given in July 2011. (39)
We have shown above some of Japan's representative corporations paying attention to CSR from their global perspectives. We now list a number
of areas where Japanese firms' CSR behaviour differs from that of their U.S. counterparts.
A. TRANSPARENCY (TO IMPROVE DISCLOSURE IN THE CAPITAL MARKETS)
The Japanese government introduced its own version of SOX, J-SOX, to protect shareholders. The introduction of J-SOX is an important part of Japan's ongoing CG reforms. (40) Disclosure and transparency are clearly essential not only for shareholders, but also for the Japanese economy, which requires efficiently functioning capital markets. In this sense, J-SOX provides an institutional setting for CSR behaviour in financial transactions. Yet, as implemented, J-SOX seems considerably diluted in its enforcement power/effectiveness compared to its U.S. counterpart, as is shown below.
1. SOX COVERAGE
Initially SOX applied to all publicly traded firms in the U.S. with a market value of $75 million or greater (41) (about half of all listed firms in the U.S.). After several extensions to include smaller firms over the years, SOX is now applicable to all publicly traded firms. (42)
2. SOX INFRASTRUCTURE
There are over 300,000 Certified Public Accountants (CPAs). (43) SOX requires both internal reporting by the management and direct reporting in which external auditors report the results of their internal-control audits independent from the management's assessment. (44)
3. J-SOX COVERAGE
J-SOX applies to all listed firms (about 4000 firms), as well as their related (consolidated) firms (over 50,000 firms), (45) which makes the required auditing task potentially very large compared to U.S. circumstances.
4. J-SOX INFRASTRUCTURE
There are about 20,000 CPAs in Japan. (46) Parent firms' internal controls requires standardization of work processes at both parent and subsidiary firms. From 1 April 2008, internal controls and auditing reports must be prepared. (47) Under Japan's Standards of Internal Control Audit, (48) the same auditor performs the internal-control audit and financial-statement audit. (49) Audit evidence obtained through each audit can be effectively used in both fields, and improvements can be expected in the efficiency and effectiveness of the audit. Furthermore, unlike in the U.S., direct reporting, in which external auditors report the results of their internal-control audits independent from the management's assessment, is not required. (50) Auditors in Japan eventually will prepare one single audit report containing the results of both financial-statement audits and internal-control audits because the same auditor conducts both audits in a similar framework. (51)
The large domain of coverage and the relatively small number of CPAs in Japan may imply that the implementation of J-SOX will be limited to very large firms, and the enforcement in general will be weak at best. (52)
1. SOX Penalty
Up to 20 years in prison; up to $5 million fine. Corporate directors, executives, and CPAs will be liable.
2. J-SOX Penalty
If false reporting or no submission of reports occurs, possible penalty will be up to five years in prison, or up to [yen] 5 million (about $63,000) fine.
We expect that Japan's rather weak implementation of J-SOX embodies selective adaptation, as has been the case in other instances of Japan's efforts to adopt Western laws (e.g., antitrust laws). (53)
D. STAKEHOLDER INTERESTS/HUMAN RIGHTS
Selective adaptation has had a significant impact on Japan's ongoing CG reforms, where the aim has been to introduce more U.S.--style CG practices into Japan. Even though the Japanese government has essentially created an institutional and legal framework in which Japanese firms can operate like U.S. corporations as far as CG practices are concerned, many Japanese firms have chosen not to adopt U.S. CG practices in their original forms, or not to adopt them at all in the case of certain practices. The U.S. practices adopted were selectively chosen and modified. Concerns have been raised that adopting U.S. CG practices by selective adaptation might result in inconsistencies and dysfunctional applications of some important CG principles, leading to serious economic inefficiencies. (54)
In this process of selective adaptation in Japan, the shareholder-value-maximization principle, one of the key notions in the U.S. CG system, has been challenged by Japan's more traditional stakeholder-welfare-maximization principle. Since CSR generally addresses firms' stakeholders, including shareholders, workers, suppliers, customers, and the localities where firms operate, it may mean that CSR activities might find a better fit in Japan than U.S. firms in the area of stakeholder relations. (55) We will explore this notion further in our case studies in Section V.
Finally, the following two related examples illustrate the intertwining relationship between CSR and CG (or, more generally, management) practices in Japan.
E. Female workers in Japan
Japanese labour-management practices include several practices that are not common in the U.S. For example, because of female workers' relatively short tenure, many Japanese firms do not think promoting them is consistent with firm-profit maximization. This is because these firms invest heavily only in the human capital of long-term workers, and they expect to receive the returns of their investment in workers' human capital over a long period of time.
Female workers' short tenure is thought to arise from the termination of their employment if they get married, quit, and/or decide to spend their time on child rearing after they give birth to a child. (56) Also, many Japanese firms' policies of not giving the same types of employment and promotion opportunities to both men and women is clearly a statistical discrimination for the women who do not follow this perceived pattern of employment over time. (57) Such a practice has not caused any problem in CG contexts at many Japanese firms, despite Japan's Equal Employment Opportunity Law, which has gone through several revisions since the 1980s. (58) (The primary reason for this disobedience of the law by firms seems to be that the law lacks serious enforcement or penalty clauses, unlike its U.S. counterparts.) (59) Strong U.S. government regulations have discouraged this type of discrimination. For example, even though some small improvement was made in Japan's gender wage gap between 1999 and 2009, Japan remained next to last in the level of gender wage gap among OECD countries in both 1999 and 2009. (60)
Even though it is not necessarily profitable to do so (hence it would not be good management/CG practice), Japanese firms with good standings in CSR areas may choose to promote female workers in their workplaces. For example, Toshiba, regarded as having one of the highest CSR ratings in Japan, has the following reported example:
It is the Achilles' heel of 3-D television: the clunky glasses that viewers must wear to see images pop out in 3-D. But Rieko Fukushima, a researcher at Toshiba, developed a way to do away with the glasses--and at the same time is helping to crack Japan's glass ceiling for women. 'I'd be lying if I said it wasn't tough as a woman,' said Mrs. Fukushima, 39, who led Toshiba's effort to develop the world's first 'naked eye' 3-D TV. The project began nine years ago, when she had just returned from maternity leave. 'Sometimes, I'd see it in my colleagues' expressions,' she said. 'What? A woman? This age? In charge?' (61)
But Mrs. Fukushima's breakthrough is a rare example of a company that has successfully tapped into what some economists call Japan's most underused resource: women. (62) According to a 2009 government survey, women made up 10% of managerial jobs in Japan; (6) 3 in the United States, women hold 51% of supervisory positions, according to Catalyst, a non-profit in New York. (64) Only 65% of college-educated Japanese women are employed, many of them in low-paid temp jobs, compared with about 80% in the United States--"a significant lost economic opportunity for the nation", Goldman Sachs said in a report in October 2010. (65) Over two-thirds of Japanese women leave the workforce after their first child compared with just one-third of American women, the report said, often because of corporate and societal norms, as well as insufficient child care. (66) If Japan's 60% female-employment rate in 2009 could match the 80% rate among men, the country would have 8.2 million more workers to replenish its rapidly aging population and raise its gross domestic product by as much as 15%, according to the report. (67)
Mrs. Fukushima credits Toshiba with creating a hospitable environment for women. When she was on maternity leave, her supervisor e-mailed her with updates on the latest research and to assure her she "had a place to come back to," she said. (68) Toshiba introduced measures in 2004 to help women balance work responsibilities with those at home, including more flexible working hours and a career track with a reduced workload. (69) Now, the majority of women who take maternity leave return to their jobs, officials say. (70)
The type of work environment that promotes female workers is still uncommon in Japan. Even though doing so is socially beneficial, many firms in Japan are still reluctant to follow Toshiba's example, primarily because they do not see good prospects in recovering their cost of investment in such projects. (71) Another reason may be that they do not know how to proceed with such a new employment policy in their management structures.
Is this a profitable thing to do? Most firms consider it potentially profitable in the long run, yet not in the short run. Since this is something that goes beyond what CG usually covers, we might say this behaviour by Toshiba belongs to CSR and outside CG.
F. PROMOTION OF EMPLOYMENT BEYOND PROFIT
We might generalize the above case of female workers and consider some Japanese firms' desperate efforts to retain their employment in Japan as an activity almost belonging to CSR. To the extent that workers form an integral part of Japanese firms' stakeholders (despite the above example of female workers), we expect Japanese firms to pay special attention to workers' employment problems.
For example, Akio Toyoda, CEO of Toyota Motor Corporation, asserted again (72) while commenting on Toyota's effort to maintain domestic production of three million cars, that
[production in Japan in the adverse environment with the highly appreciated Japanese currency, the earthquake/tsunami disaster, etc.] is beyond any [economic] reasoning, but Toyota will do everything to adhere to the domestic production.... Toyota, a global enterprise, was born and brought up in Japan, and we cannot abandon domestic production just because of adverse business environments. (73)
It remains to be seen how Toyota's policies on domestic production and employment change over time. Moving production facilities out of the domestic home market to low-wage countries has been observed in all developed economies. This is what one would expect under standard CG practices. Then can we say that Japanese firms like Toyota, behaving in the manner discussed above, are following their domestic-production policy, at least in part, as a CSR activity?
G. RELATIONSHIP TO GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS
As discussed above, Japan has its own version of the equal-employment-opportunity law, which was introduced in the late 1980s and has been revised several times since then. Its primary aim is to promote female employment opportunities and, for the most part, it is very similar to the U.S. equal-employment law. (74) But one main difference between this law and its U.S. counterpart is that the Japanese law has no real enforcement clause yet. (75) In this context, firms that provide more than the average treatment to their female workers might be making some CSR contributions beyond CG, as we discussed above. (76)
We note also that Japanese firms' subsidiaries in the U.S. promote female employment and equal employment opportunities just like many U.S. firms, and they are in fact largely profitable. (77) At many such U.S.--subsidiary firms, this type of human-resource-management (HRM) practice is well established, providing added productivity and good public image.
Although all Japanese firms' subsidiaries in the U.S. conform to the U.S. equal-employment laws, few have introduced the practice of equal employment back in Japan. The generally light penalty in Japan for corporate violators of the laws originally imported from the West, such as the equal-employment law and the antimonopoly law, reflects closer relationships between Japanese corporations and government and is consistent with Japan's selective-adaptation behaviour. (78)
|Printer friendly Cite/link Email Feedback|
|Title Annotation:||I. Introduction through III. Anglo-American CSR Practices and Japan's Selective Adaptation: Some Examples of Japanese Firms' CSR, p. 723-747; Corporate Social Responsibility in the Pacific Rim|
|Author:||Nakamura, Masao; Rebien, Sven Tommi|
|Publication:||University of British Columbia Law Review|
|Date:||Oct 1, 2012|
|Previous Article:||Transnational business, CSR, and governance in China.|
|Next Article:||Corporate social responsibility and corporate governance: Japanese firms and selective adaptation.|