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Corporate governance and financial performance of BSE listed firms: evidence from Indian pharmaceutical sector.



If the most successful companies across the world are looked upon, there has been one common factor that has been behind their story of success and growth is their adaptability to change. No doubt, change has never been easy for them, but it was also a necessary for their growth. The most important and revolutionary change in corporate sector in India was the transformation of India's corporate governance framework. For instance, the introduction of Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement of Stock Exchanges brought about a transformation for Indian businesses. It focussed on the role and structure of corporate boards, board committees, internal controls and extent of disclosure to shareholders. It brought in a number of mandatory and recommendatory requirements for the corporate sector. Ever since, the success of any organisation depends upon the role of corporate governance. The need for compliance to the corporate governance laws are more compelling for the corporate now than ever.

The main objective of the study is to analyse the effect of ownership pattern, board size, board independence and remuneration of executive directors on financial performance of the pharmaceutical companies in India listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE).

Theoretical Background

Although there is an abundance of research which aims to explain the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance, empirical evidence yields contradictory and inconsistent results. Arguments and empirical findings have gone both ways. Some researchers argue that internal governance mechanisms such as board size, independent directors, ownership concentration and remuneration of executive directors have a positive effect on firm performance, whereas other researchers oppose such claims by arguing that these mechanisms have a negative effect on firm performance.

Board Independence. In general, the value of independent directors is related to their ability to take the decisions independently. Executive directors have valuable knowledge about a firm's activities, while independent directors may contribute both expertise and objectivity in evaluating managers' decisions. Thus, a high degree of board independence facilitates close monitoring of a firm and appropriate governance actions are taken up in the firm. Several empirical studies have substantiated the monitoring role played by independent directors. For instance, Sheikh N. H. et al (2013) used Panel econometric technique namely pooled ordinary least squares to estimate the relationship between internal governance mechanisms and performance measures (i.e., Return on Assets, Return on Equity, Earnings per Share, and Market-to-Book ratio) using the data of non-financial firms listed on the Karachi stock exchange Pakistan during 2004-2008. The empirical results indicated that board independence is negatively related to the return on assets, earnings per share, and market-to-book ratio. The results are in consistent with the Berthelot, S., (2012) who conducted a study on a sample of 355 observations from 199 Canadian listed companies. Partial least square analyses were performed in the study. The results from the study suggested that the percentage of independent directors on the board is significantly and negatively related to the firm's net book value or income. The results were also supported by Al-Saidi M; Al-Shammari B. (2013); Guo Z. and Kumara U. (2012).

Nyamongo, E. M.; Temesgen K. (2013) and Stefdnescu C. A. (2011) analyzed that board independence proved to have the strongest influence over the strategies. Pombo, C. and Gutierrez L. H. (2011) found a positive relationship between both the ratio of outside directors and firms return on assets. The results also showed that the outside busy directors turned out to be key drivers of improved firm's performance. Wang, W. K. et al (2012) has investigated that a high proportion of independent directors lowered the performance and these results are inconsistent with the Chaugh L.C. et al (2011) who also demonstrated that presence of independent directors lowers profitability.

Board Size: There has also been mixed response regarding linkage between board size and corporate performance. The degree of positive linkage depends on the extent to which board is able to reach consensus, and gain advantage of the knowledge and expertise of the board members. From the extant literature, two divergent views emerged on the linkage between board size and firm value. One the one hand it is argued that larger boards helps in improving the performance of company. Empirical results of Sheikh N. H., Wang Z. and Khan S. (2013) indicated that board size is positively related to the firm performance. This finding is congruent with the predictions of resource dependence theory suggesting that a board with high levels of links to the external environment can improve a firm's access to various resources, hence positively affecting firm performance. These results are inconsistent with Wang, W. K. et al (2011), Dalton et al., (1999); Pearce and Zahra, (1992), Chaugh L.C. et al (2011) and Lu, W. et al (2012). But on the other side results of Kumar N. and Singh J. P. (2013) indicated negative firm value for larger board. But here the relationship between board size and firm value is less negative for large companies than smaller ones. The same negative association between the Board size and firm performance was exhibited by O'Connell, V and Cramer, N. (2010), Al-Saidi M.; Al-Shammari B. (2013); Nyamongo, E. M. and Temesgen K. (2013). Arouri H. et al (2014) analyzed that governance variables such as Board size appear to have an insignificant impact on performance. These results by Ujunwa A. (2012) indicated that Board size was negatively linked with firm performance. Guo Z. and Kumara U. (2012) also found the Board size showed a marginal negative relationship with firm value. Stefdnescu C. A. (2011) and Reddy K. et al (2010) analyzed that the board size had not have a significance influence over bank performance and strategy.

Directors Remuneration: Shiah-Hou S. R. and Cheng C. W. (2012) analyzed that outside director compensation have an economically positive impact on a firm's accounting and market performance and results are in consistent with Kato, T. and Kubo, K. (2006) who found a positive and significant link of CEO compensation to Return on Assets (ROA) consistently. Compensation-performance link was also supported by Kato T. et al (2007), Kato and Long (2006) and Firth et al. (2007). Furthermore, Nulla, Mohammed Y (2013) investigated the effect of CEO age on CEO compensation using accounting performance as an independent variable from 2005 to 2010. They observed that there was a relationship between CEO salary, CEO bonus, CEO total compensation, CEO age, and accounting performance among all CEO age groups. The quantitative research and stratified sample methods were used for the study. In the earlier related research, Firth et al. (1999) examined cash compensation in Hong Kong and found that there is a little statistical correlation between pay and firm's stock market performance. On the contrary, Abdullah, S. N. (2006) analyzed that directors' remuneration is not associated with firm's profitability, as measured by ROA. A negative and significant association is observed between directors' remuneration and lagged ROA. In addition, findings also revealed that directors' remuneration is positively associated with firm's growth and size. Sun G. Et al (2013) examined the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) compensation and firm performance proxied by efficiency estimated from data envelopment analysis (DEA) of the US property-liability (P&L) insurance industry. The results indicated that Firm efficiency is positively and significantly associated with total CEO compensation. While revenue efficiency is associated with CEO cash compensation, cost efficiency is associated with incentive compensation.

Ownership Pattern and Performance: Corporate governance is usually seen as a set of regulations, processes and customs affecting the way a company is administered. However, Good governance revolves around the tenets of trust and transparency, ethical business conduct and a deeper commitment to all stakeholders. Necessities such as consistency and transparency in disclosures and in all business transactions can help promote stakeholder confidence to a great extent. The Board of Directors (agents) have the responsibility of advising and monitoring management and have the powers to hire, fire, and compensate the senior management team (Jensen, 1993). Monitoring of these agents is also governed by how investors are organised. Whether there is existence of a large number of small investors or a few large players. Regarding the ownership pattern, there is mixed evidence in the empirical literature linking ownership pattern to corporate performance. Some researchers predicted the positive link between ownership pattern and firms performance while some analysed a negative association between these two. Arouri H. Et al (2014) used a dataset of 58-listed banks of Gulf Co-Operation Council (GCC) countries and examined the effect of ownership structure and board composition on bank performance as measured by Tobin's Q and market to book value by using multivariate regression analysis. The result showed that the extent of family ownership, foreign ownership and institutional ownership has a significant positive association with bank performance. However, government ownership does not have a significant impact on performance. The results are inconsistent with the findings of Kumar N. and Singh J. P (2013) who analysed a significant positive association of promoter ownership with firm performance. The regression results suggest that firms with high ownership concentration of promoters have high market valuations (Tobin's Q). On the contrary, Mollah S. Et al (2012) found that it is dispersed ownership that improves firm performance and mitigate agency conflicts in the corporate sector of Botswana stock market. The researcher has taken the market-based performance measures as dependent variable (i.e. LnMktCap) and the results of their study suggested that all major ownership concentration groups (e.g. Sponsor, Instin, Govt and Foreign) are destructive to firms' financial performance and value except minority shareholdings (e.g. public), which is consistent to the tenets of agency theory (i.e. conflict between majority and minority owners). Hiraki T. et al (2003) examined how alternative corporate governance mechanisms work in Japan using Panel data on the Equity ownership and bank loans of manufacturing companies and found that managerial ownership is monotonically and positively related to firm value.

Filatotchev, I. Et al (2005) who analysed the effect of ownership structure and board characteristics on performance in large, publicly traded firms. It was found that share ownership by institutional investors and foreign financial institutions in particular, is associated with the better performance. Patibandla M. (2005) empirically showed that increasing presence of foreign institutional investors has a positive effect on corporate performance in terms of profitability and the firms that depend on government finance institutions for external finance showed decline in performance. The same results were also supported by Omran M.(2009) where ownership concentration and ownership identity, in particular foreign investors proved to have a positive impact on firm performance, while employee ownership concentration has a negative impact on firm performance. On the other hand there are researchers who found the negative association between the ownership pattern and financial performance of the firms. Sheikh N. H., Wang Z. and Khan S. (2013) found the negative relationship between managerial ownership (Ratio of shares owned by the CEOs, directors and their immediate family members to total outstanding common shares) and performance is incongruent with the proposition made by Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggesting that increases in fraction of equity owned by managers might mitigate loss by aligning the interests of managers with shareholders. Stefdnescu C. A. (2011) also found negative correlation between the shareholders structures (presence of individual ownership) and bank value. It was revealed from the study that those banks that still have individuals within its ownership instead of institutions performed lower. But in this study shareholding provenience (presence of foreign investors) significantly influenced the bank performance.

Choi H. M. et al (2012) found that foreign block ownership contributes to enhancing firm value through independent monitoring and expertise only when foreign investors are indented to do so. Foreign ownership impairs firm value when it rises to a level of concentrated ownership, with its attendant control of board members as representatives of the foreign investors. One of the researchers found that link between ownership pattern and performance changes when different measures of performances are used. Alipour, M. (2013) applied panel data regression (Two-stage least-squares) analysis to a sample of companies listed in TSE during the period 2005-2009 and analysed that ownership concentration is positively related to ROE, and that ownership concentration is negatively related to ROA. Moreover, state, family, and individual ownership are negatively related to performance, and firm (legal person) and institutional ownership are positively related to performance.

Data and Methodology


This paper attempts to examine the effect of governance variables on firm financial performance. The financial performance data has been collected using PROWESS Database and governance data has been collected from the annual reports of the sample companies listed in Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). The final sample set, after deleting firms with incomplete data, consists of 117 observations for 13 Indian pharmaceutical firms having market capitalisation above 1000 crore have been studied over the period of 2005-2013.


On the basis of research objectives, variables (dependent and independent) used in this study and their definitions are largely adopted from existing literature. Notably, Firm performance is measured using two accounting-based measures ROA (Return on Assets- Log of Ratio of profit before taxes to total assets) and RONW (Return on Net Worth- Log of Ratio of profit before taxes to Net Worth). These are used as dependent variables. Key explanatory variables include Ownership pattern (Promoters' shareholding (LPSH), Indian Financial Institutions' Shareholding (LISH) and Foreign Institutional investors' shareholding (LFII), Board Size (LBS-Log of total number of directors in a firm's board), Independent Directors (LIND- Log of percentage of Independent directors to total directors in a firm's board ownership) and Remuneration of executive directors (LATR- Log of average of total remuneration of executive directors in a firm).


Panel data methodology is used to draw the results because the sample contained cross-sectional data and time series data. Moreover, panel data sets are better able to identify and estimate effects that simply are not detectable in pure cross-sectional or pure time-series data.

After having discussion on the extant literature, the following null hypotheses are to be tested:

[H.sub.0]1--Ownership Pattern has no influence on firm's financial performance.

[H.sub.0]2--Board Characteristics have no influence on firm's financial performance.

[H.sub.0]3--Remuneration of executive directors has no influence on firm's financial performance.

And alternative hypotheses are as follows:

[H.sub.a]1--Ownership Pattern has significant influence on firm's financial performance.

[H.sub.a]2--Board Characteristics have significant influence on firm's financial performance.

[H.sub.a]3--Remuneration of executive directors has significant influence on firm's financial performance.

Multiple regression models are used to determine the relationship between Board characteristics, Ownership Pattern, Remuneration and Financial Performance. The basic model of the study is as follows:

[] = [alpha] + [beta] (Ownership Pattern) + [gamma] (Board Characteristics) + [lambda] (Remuneration) + [[epsilon]]


[] = Financial performance of ith firm at time period "t"

Ownership Pattern = Ownership pattern of the ith firm

Board characteristics = Board characteristics of the ith firm

Remuneration = remuneration of the executive directors of ith firm.

[[epsilon]] = error term

For ownership pattern three variables are included i.e. promoter shareholding (PSH), Indian institutions shareholding (ISH) and foreign institutional shareholdings (FII). Similarly, for Board Characteristics two variables are included i.e. Board Size (BS) and Board Independence (IND). For remuneration one variable is included i.e. Remuneration of executive directors. So, following two models are used in the study to draw conclusions:

Model 1: ROA = [alpha] + [[beta].sub.1] (PSH) + [[beta].sub.2] (ISH) + [[beta].sub.3] (FII) + [[gamma].sub.1] (BS) + [[gamma].sub.2] (BS) + [[lambda].sub.1] (ATR) + [[epsilon]]

Model 2: RONW = [alpha] + [[beta].sub.1] (PSH) + [[beta].sub.2] (ISH) + [[beta].sub.3] (FII) + [[gamma].sub.1] (BS) + [[gamma].sub.2] (BS) + [[lambda].sub.1] (ATR) + [[epsilon]]

It is noted that both Cross Section fixed effects and period fixed effects are also tested in order to control the influence of firm heterogeneity and the influence of particular year of the data set.

Empirical Results

Descriptive Statistics

All the Data analysis has been done using the E-views software. Descriptive statistics of dependent and explanatory variables used in this study are presented in Table I which indicates that average Return on Assets and Return on Net Worth is 13.78 and 23.62 percent, respectively. The mean of board size is 8.48, whereas the average representation of independent directors on firms' boards is 59.59 percent. On average 53.86 percent of total outstanding shares are owned by the promoters which shows that they hold a significant proportion of ownership pattern where as on average 11.29 and 11.64 percent of shares are owned by the Indian institutions and foreign financial investors. The average remuneration of the executive director is Rs. 3,43,03,902.

In addition, results of correlation matrix are presented in Table II indicate that most of the correlations for explanatory variables are small and some of them are insignificantly large. So there is no cause for concern about problem of multicollinearity among the explanatory variables.

Assumption of Hetroscedasticity and normality of residuals is also checked on the residuals of both the Models. Under the null hypothesis of a normal distribution, the Jarque-Bera statistic is distributed as with 2 degrees of freedom. The reported Probability is the probability that a Jarque-Bera statistic exceeds (in absolute value) the observed value under the null hypothesis--a small probability value leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis of a normal distribution (Jarque and Bera, 1980). The value of Jarque-Bera is 1.052984 (p=0.590673) for Model 1 and 8.348115 (p= 0.015390) for Model 2. For the residual series, the hypothesis of normal distribution is accepted at the 5 percent level in Model 1 and the same is accepted at 1 percent level in Model 2. In order to check the assumption of Heteroscedasticity, residual series are made and test of Heteroskedasticity called White test was conducted to check the null hypothesis that error variances are Homoskedastic in nature. The white test results for Model I and Model II depicted (probability value> Chi2) 0.2518 and 0.5118 respectively which indicated the acceptance of null hypothesis at 5 percent level of significance and favoured Homoskedasticity.

Regression results

During the data analysis process, two regression equations were estimated in order to draw out the significant links between the corporate governance variables and performance measures. Empirical results presented in Model 1 indicate that Indian Institutional Shareholding is statistically significant and negatively related to the Return on Assets. On the other hand, Board size and Average remuneration are statistically significant and positively related to the Return on Assets. Promoters' shareholding is positively related with ROA but relationship is insignificant. Foreign Institutional investors' shareholding and percentage of independent directors are negatively related with ROA but this relationship is also insignificant at 5 percent level of significance. There is no autocorrelation between the error terms as Durbin -Watson is near to 2 (Andy Field, 2005). Here R-square is .53 means approximately 53 percent of variation in the ROA is explained by the independent variables. The most important part of the table is F-ratio and associated significance value of that F-ratio. For this data f-statistic is 3.92 which is significant at p<0.01. Therefore it can be concluded that regression results are insignificantly better prediction of ROA than if the mean value of ROA was used. In short, regression model overall predicts ROA significantly well.

Results shown in Model 2 indicate that that Indian Institutional Shareholding is statistically significant and negatively related to the Return on Net Worth. On the other hand, Board size, Promoter shareholding and Average remuneration are statistically significant and positively related to the Return on Net Worth. Foreign Institutional investors' shareholding and percentage of independent directors are negatively related with RONW but this relationship is insignificant at 5 percent level of significance though FII is significant at 10 percent level of significance.

So, the null hypotheses H01, H02 and H03 are rejected for ownership pattern of Indian Institutional Shareholding, Board Size and Average remuneration of executive directors at 5 percent level of significance. There is no autocorrelation between the error terms as Durbin -Watson is near to 2(Andy Field, 2005). Here R-square is .601270 means approximately 60 percent of variations in the RONW are explained by the independent variables. For this data F-statistic is 5.219873 which is highly significant at p<0.001. Therefore, it can be concluded that regression results are insignificantly better prediction of RONW than if the mean value of RONW was used. In short, regression model overall predicts RONW significantly well.

In summary that Indian Institutional Shareholding is statistically significant and negatively related to both ROA and RONW. Whereas Board size and Average remuneration are statistically significant and positively related to the ROA and RONW. Promoters' shareholding is positively related with both financial measure but relationship is significant only to RONW. So, the null hypotheses H01, H02 and H03 are rejected for ownership pattern (Promoters' shareholding and Indian Institutional Shareholding), Board Size and Average remuneration of executive directors at 5 percent level of significance. There is insignificant negative relationship between foreign institutional shareholding and financial performance measures and same insignificant negative relationship was found between board independence and financial performance.

Discussion on Empirical Results

Development of Corporate Governance in India

After Liberalisation, the establishment of Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) in 1992 was the most significant event in the growth of corporate governance in India. In the late 2009, Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) has released a set of voluntary guidelines for corporate governance which address myriad corporate governance matters including the board independence, the responsibilities of the board, the audit committee, auditors and mechanisms to encourage and protect whistle blowing. Since its establishment, the SEBI has initiated a number of reforms with the aim to develop a fair, efficient and transparent regulatory framework to protect the interest of all shareholders, especially those of minority shareholders. Like in Jan, 2013 this Capital Market Regulator has proposed measures to strengthen corporate governance at Indian companies in a move to match best global practice and win investor's confidence. These measures include separating the role of chairman and chief-executive to promote the balance of power. Along with this, SEBI also proposed that independent directors at listed companies must be elected by minority shareholders, ending their appointment and removal by majority shareholders this will lead to solve the principal-principal agency problem.

While there are many companies in India who have prepared their basic governance structures such as adequate board size, some--independent directors and independent auditors, but the whole range of governance mechanisms is being followed by only few of them. Foremost in this regard Infosys Technologies, the Indian software leading company is the one which discloses the extent of its compliance with ten OECD (Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development) corporate governance codes (Barton et al., 2004). This could be the reason that Infosys Technologies has been given 1st corporate governance ranking (CGR) by ICRA in 2012. The emphasis of ICRA's CGR is on a corporate business practices and quality of disclosure standards that address the requirements of the regulators and are fair and transparent for its financial stakeholders and this would in turn may help the Rated companies in raising funds; listing on the stock exchange; dealing with third parties like creditors; providing comfort to regulators; improving credibility; improving valuation; and bettering corporate governance practices through benchmarking.


The study investigates whether corporate governance variables, such as ownership pattern, board attributes and remuneration of executive directors affected the financial performance of Indian pharmaceutical firms listed on BSE during 2005-2013. Empirical results indicate that Indian institutional shareholding is statistically significant and negatively related to both ROA and RONW. Board size is statistically significant and positively related to the ROA and RONW which is consistent with the predictions of resource dependence theory suggesting that large boards have high levels of links with the external environment and can improve a form's access to various resources, hence positively affecting firm performance. The remuneration of executive directors is also statistically significant and positively related to the ROA and RONW. Promoters' shareholding is positively related with both financial measure but relationship is significant only to RONW. There is insignificant negative relationship between foreign institutional shareholding and financial performance measures and same insignificant negative relationship was found between board independence and financial performance.

In summary, empirical results indicate that governance variables have material effect on the firm financial performance. From the existing review of literature on link between governance and performance a variable called Board Provenience (% of Foreign Directors) is least studied. The researcher wanted to study the effect of this variable on the financial performance but no information regarding foreign directors was given in the annual reports of the companies under study. So it is proposed that proportion of Indian and foreign directors should be clearly indicted by the Indian companies in their annual reports. So far as shareholding pattern is concerned there should be a mandatory uniform categorical Performa of shareholding pattern for all the companies. Because of lack of this some of the companies were dropped out from the study. Notably this study has explained only the uni-directional relationship i.e. the relationship between governance variables and firm financial performance by taking governance variables as independent variables and financial performance as dependent variable. Finally this study proposed to explore other direction of relationship i.e. the impact of performance measures on the ownership pattern and the remuneration of both executive and independent directors.


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Seema Malik

Assistant Professor, Department of Commerce, Bhagat Phool Singh Mahila Vishwa Vidyalaya, Haryana.
Table I

Descriptive Statistics

              ROA        RONW       PSH        ISH        FII

Mean        13.78154   23.62983   53.86598   11.29306   11.64028
Median      12.72000   23.73000   52.15000   11.05000   9.610000
Maximum     32.78000   47.98000   76.42000   35.42000   34.92000
Minimum     2.060000   2.860000   25.14000   0.790000   0.000000
Std. Dev.   5.272557   8.193984   13.81585   6.068470   9.082366
Obs.          117        117        117        117        117

               BS        IND         ATR

Mean        8.487179   59.59588    34303902
Median      9.000000   58.33333    16190436
Maximum     12.00000   100.0000   1.75E + 08
Minimum     4.000000   28.57143    3920800.
Std. Dev.   1.817612   11.66339    35630849
Obs.          117        117         117

Table II

Correlation Matrix

                        Sample: 2005-2013

Variables        ROA        RONW        PSH

ROA            1.0000
Probability      --
RONW           0.7710      1.0000
Probability   0.0000 **      --
PSH            0.1273      0.2783     1.0000
Probability    0.1712     0.0024 *      --
ISH            0.0168     -0.0605     -0.4245
Probability    0.8568      0.5168    0.0000 **
FII            -0.2103    -0.1314     -0.5960
Probability   0.0228 *     0.1579    0.0000 **
BS             -0.0118     0.1528     -0.3387
Probability    0.8992      0.1000    0.0002 **
IND            -0.1939    -0.2265     -0.2203
Probability   0.0362 *    0.0141 *    0.0170*
ATR            0.1317      0.0533     -0.2757
Probability    0.1569      0.5677    0.0026 *

                             Included observations: 117

Variables        ISH         FII        BS         IND       ATR

ISH            1.0000
Probability      --
FII            -0.0797     1.0000
Probability    0.3926        --
BS             -0.0109     0.6752     1.0000
Probability    0.9063     0.0000 **     --
IND            0.0773      0.0758     -0.1527    1.0000
Probability    0.4073      0.4164     0.1001       --
ATR            0.2792      0.3051     0.0527     0.4074     1.0000
Probability   0.0023 **   0.0008 **   0.5722    0.0000 **     --

Note: Significant at: * 5 and ** 1 percent levels.

Model 1

Dependent Variable-LROA

Variable             Coefficient   Std. Error   t-Statistic   Prob.

C                    -1.936103     0.875319     -2.211883     0.0295
LPSH                 0.260611      0.274131     0.950682      0.3443
LISH                 -0.120663     0.059204     -2.038076     0.0445
LFII                 -0.067017     0.041310     -1.622309     0.1082
LBS                  0.986313      0.281733     3.500879      0.0007
LIND                 -0.310896     0.223470     -1.391217     0.1676
LATR                 0.329880      0.063422     5.201338      0.0000
R-squared            0.531057            F-statistic          3.920044
Adjusted R-squared   0.395585         Prob (F-statistic)      0.000001
S.E. of regression   0.138531         Durbin-Watson stat     1 .861337

Model 2

Dependent Variable-LRONW

Variable             Coefficient   Std. Error   t-Statistic   Prob.

C                     -2.027223     0.799586     -2.535341     0.0130
LPSH                  0.635583      0.250413     2.538138      0.0129
LISH                  -0.115119     0.054082     -2.128607     0.0360
LFII                  -0.063993     0.037736     -1.695820     0.0934
LBS                   1.216258      0.257357     4.725950      0.0000
LIND                  -0.297260     0.204136     -1.456191     0.1488
LATR                  0.253577      0.057935     4.376940      0.0000
R-squared             0.601270           F-statistic          5.219873
Adjusted R-squared    0.486081        Prob(F-statistic)       0.000000
S.E. of regression    0.126545        Durbin-Watson stat      2.126158
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Title Annotation:Bombay Stock Exchange
Author:Malik, Seema
Article Type:Report
Geographic Code:9INDI
Date:Jul 1, 2016
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