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Controlling land borders: a comparison of the United States of America, Germany and South Africa.

ABSTRACT

When considering border control it is necessary to define political and cultural boundaries. International political land borders are lines drawn on maps, and normally physically on the ground, to specify the limits of a state's territory and autonomy. These borders must be internationally accepted as the land borders of the sovereign state involved. Cultural boundaries, defined as the geographical area where ethnic groups meet and interact, are common in Africa where tribal peoples live on either side of a legally recognised interstate border. Although cultural boundaries result in limits to the real control which states, particularly in Africa, can exercise over their borders, it is accepted practise to use the political borders as the line which controls what a state desires to keep in, and who and what it desires to keep out.

1. INTRODUCTION

Border control, and specifically entrance control, of people and goods on the South African land borders has never been effective. The length of the borders and the extent of undeveloped, remote and inaccessible terrain are major factors. Poor control is, however, a drain on the South African economy. A threat which has become prominent and very visible is that of international terrorist organisations, whose members enter countries to either use them to develop base facilities, to recruit members, or to attack the host countries themselves.

On the other hand, there is a need for open borders allowing easy movement of people and goods to stimulate the African economy. The newly established African Union (AU) and the South African government as one of its chief proponents, propagates the 21st century as the African century. The AU is to be the means for implementing the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) to bring about accelerated economic development and prosperity.

No matter what the circumstances are, in the post-Cold War era it is not possible to moralise a harsh stance towards border control. Consequently South Africa has to meet the needs of the free movement of goods and people to foster economic development, good border control, and humane standards all at once.

The United States of America (US) and the European Union (EU), particularly Germany on its eastern border with Poland, have grappled with the same control versus open border contradiction. This article will describe briefly how the US, Germany and the Republic of South Africa (RSA) have approached the problem, and an attempt will be made to draw conclusions as to how South Africa should continue to attempt to seek solutions to the issue of border control.

2. THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN CLOSED AND OPEN BORDERS

In the post-Cold War era with the tremendous development in computerisation and communication information technology, advances have made it almost impossible to control the cross-border movement of capital. This in turn has accelerated globalisation, the results of which humankind still has to comprehend.

It is already accepted that open markets and the internationalisation of the world economy is leading to new ways of managing boundaries. Land and sea borders must allow free movement of people, goods and capital if countries are to prosper in the modern world. (1) It is clear that border control must not prevent the movement of people but it is still necessary to regulate their movement so that temporary or permanent migration takes place in an orderly manner. It is stated that the emphasis has shifted from controlling borders to detect and repel foreign armies, to ensuring that foreigners and goods do not enter a country in violation of its laws without there being a record of that movement. This being the requirement, new types of equipment and trained personnel to carry out these controls will be needed. (2)

Control over, and records of movement of people and goods, are of particular importance where developed and less-developed countries share a common boundary. Cross-border economic activity can lead to an increase in political tension caused by illegal cross-border movement and a need for better policing. This can be seen on the US-Mexico border and on the external borders of the EU. These borders are controlled to halt "perceived invasion of undesirables", mainly illegal immigrants, and drug traffickers. (3) In the case of the US and Mexico, this has become such a political issue that a large part of the media conference held by the presidents of the two states in Mexico in 2001, was spent on the topics of illegal immigration of Mexicans into the US and drug imports to the US from Mexico.

South Africa has the same problems as the US and EU in that the states to the north of it namely Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Mozambique, are developing countries in the early stages of development with very small economies. South Africa itself is a developing country with a relatively well-developed economy and a strong First World element, not comparable to any state in sub-Saharan Africa. However, unlike the US and the EU, it has a huge unemployment, poverty and crime problem. South Africa cannot afford to ignore border control and in so doing aggravate its own unemployment, crime and other social problems. Without proper border control, the illegal movement of goods, contraband and people will cause crime to continue increasing in the country. (4)

However, there is a contradiction in the South African condition, which must be solved, namely that it is an African country, which will prosper if Africa can begin to develop economically.

3. US BORDER AND ENTRANCE CONTROL

3.1 The aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks

The importance of international trade to the US economy has increased tremendously. Its volume is said to have doubled from 1990 to 2000 and will double again between 2001 and 2005, both in terms of value and volume. (5) After the 11 September 2001 attacks the problem for the Administration was whether the freedom of movement of goods and people on which the economy relied should be maintained, or whether steps should be taken to limit that freedom, thereby ensuring greater physical security of people and property. The Bush administration adopted the first option. At the same time US$38 billion was allocated to a "homeland security plan designed to secure rather than close the US borders". (6)

Statistics show that 127 million cars and 11,5 million trucks passed through US borders in 2000. More than US$8,8 billion worth of goods went through which equals a container every 20 seconds at major ports of entry "It takes five inspectors three hours to conduct a thorough examination of a 12 metre container or an 18-wheel truck". Evidently this means that only two per cent of the cargo which enters the US is inspected. (7)

In the financial year 2000, US immigration courts processed 215 894 undocumented aliens. This figure included 144 000 people who had been released on bail pending their hearings. About 31 per cent of those released on bail failed to attend the hearings and were ordered deported in their absence. The US Immigration and Nationalization Services (INS) estimated that 314 000 foreigners who have been ordered deported are still in the US. (8)

Forty to 50 per cent of the illegal immigrants enter the country legally and then overstay their visas. Roughly 150 000 people settle illegally after entering legally each year. These overstayes are unlikely to be tracked down since the tracing ability of the INS has not been increased sufficiently to manage the problem. False documents are increasingly used to enter the US and the border control posts do not have the time to peruse documents properly, because they do not want to delay the legitimate border crossers. (9)

It is recorded that the US issued 67 742 visas to persons visiting the country from Saudi Arabia alone. More than 50 per cent overstayed their visas, of which only five were deported. The fact that the INS has only 2 000 agents available for interior border and immigration enforcement, confirms that the means to curb this problem is simply not allocated to it. (10)

The most recent estimates of illegal immigrants in the US are as high as 6-11 million. To confront this problem the INS employs 35 000 people and has a US$5,6 billion budget for 2002. (11) Subsequently, the Bush Administration has proposed a US$6,3 billion budget for the INS for the 2003 financial year which will enable it to employ 37 000 people. (12)

3.2 Measures employed to secure the US-Mexican border

As early as 1989 the US Congress passed an anti-drug law to combat drug trafficking and associated crimes such as money laundering. On 2 May 1996, the US Senate passed the Immigration and Nationality Act, 1996 to crack down on illegal aliens. (13) The Act was signed by the president as the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act, 1996 in September 1996. It authorised a large increase in the strength of the Border Patrol by 2001. It also allowed for additional measures to secure the US-Mexican border such as heavier penalties against alien smugglers and the erection of a triple layered fence along 14 miles of border south of San Diego. A study done by a national weapons laboratory for the INS recommended that "a three-fence barrier system with vehicle patrol roads between the fences and lights" would provide the required deterrent to aliens "who will destroy or bypass any single measure placed in their path". (14)

These laws indicate the high priority given to combating drug trafficking and illegal immigration. The INS already estimated in 1997 that there were about five million illegal immigrants living permanently in the US and that numbers grew by 275 000 per year. California which shares a border with Mexico, was the favoured area of entry and had about 40 per cent of this total, of which it was estimated that 54 per cent were from Mexico. (15)

The US border control campaign has been driven by politicians representing San Diego County and the states most effected by illegal immigration, namely California, Texas and Florida. It is stated that San Diego County had to spend US$64,5 million for services for illegal aliens in 1992-1993. California spent US$173,6 million. A 1995 proposed strategy to solve the problem was to increase the number of Border Patrol agents to 10 000 on the San Diego border alone. (16) In fact, on the southwest border the Border Patrol grew from 3 389 agents to 6 213 agents between 1993 and 1997 and this was supported by adding new equipment which included infrared night-vision scopes, low light television cameras, ground sensors, helicopters and vehicles capable of moving on rugged terrain. (17)

The INS, which is the parent agency for the Border Patrol, had an increase in its control post inspectors from 1 117 to 1 865 between 1994 and 1997. The increase in inspectors was supported by an increase in penalties where entry with false documents would actually be prosecuted and vehicles could also be confiscated. (18) The legislation passed in 1995 required that the INS had to take criminal aliens into custody and that they were to be deported within 30 days. (19)

The military, which is prohibited from making arrests and whose internal role in the US is well circumscribed, has begun to play an important role in the border control campaign. They operate night scopes, motion sensors and communication equipment and build fences and roads, which they maintain as well. On the San Diego border a ten-foot high steel wall of metal sheets using 180 000 sheets, normally used for surfacing temporary airfields, has been built by the military. In 1995 a Border Research and Technology Centre was opened in San Diego to study how military technology could be adapted to border control requirements. In 1997 the US government approved the deployment of 10 000 soldiers to assist on the borders to combat drug trafficking and illegal immigration. (20)

The concept of increasing the law enforcement resources drastically at the most popular entry-points was to force the human traffic to the border posts, or failing that, to remote areas which were considered to be easier to regulate. The immediate result was that more smugglers were hired to help people cross. The counter to that is that when caught the smugglers are jailed. The risks are high and consequently smugglers can charge up to US$500 for their services. (21)

The politicians have supported better border control. The measures taken, of which only a few have been described above, have led to far better control at major urban crossing points. However, crossings now take place at points which are better hidden and dispersed. It would seem that the border is better controlled but in fact people cross elsewhere. The president of the National Border Patrol Council stated that "the game is to try to focus as much attention as possible on a small piece of real estate. You then hope everyone ignores the fact that you are being overrun in the rest of the sector". (22) Even if there is some scepticism in that statement, it would seem that there is some truth in the fact that border policing has been seen as a project in image management. The media, the public and importantly the residents near the borders must have the perception that illegal border crossings are deterred. (23) A researcher at the University of Texas at El Paso wrote that "sealing the border was an impossible mission" but that "Chief Reyes (the El Paso sector Border Patrol Chief) has compromised by making the border invisible. In that sense he has been successful". (24)

The problem of control to stop drug trafficking and to enforce immigration laws and at the same time facilitate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a direct contradiction. The economies of the US and Mexico are so integrated that about 230 million people and 82 million vehicles enter the US from Mexico every year. (25) It was believed that the Free Trade Agreement might stimulate the Mexican economy in such a way that Mexicans would tend to stay in their own country. However, Mexico is a developing country and it can be expected that movement from rural to urban employment will increase rapidly. This will surely lead to an even greater tendency to have former peasant farmers move to the US. The US does depend on cheap labour provided by Mexican workers and at the same time Mexico needs to export its unemployment problem. However, the 2001 US-Mexico Partnership for Progress signed by the US and Mexican presidents allocated a US$30 million input into the Mexican country districts to discourage il legal migration. (26) Mexican farm workers have dominated the agricultural labour force in California for years and as early as 1996 were already working in Oregon, Iowa, Virginia and New Jersey, many of them illegal immigrants. (27)

The above summary of the human effort as well as the financial and logistic resources which the US is using on its border with Mexico, represents but a small part of the whole. The US administration including the president himself, is very involved in the control of illegal immigration and drug trafficking. In early 2001, as stated, the presidents of the US and Mexico held in-depth discussions about how the two countries were to maintain control and at the same time support economic development on both sides of the border. Mexico thus attempts to co-operate as best as it can. In spite of this, the need to let the free market economy prosper, clearly makes absolute control of people and goods impossible.

3.3 Deductions from the US experience

The conclusion that can be drawn from the US experience is that control of the movement of people and goods on international borders between countries on different levels of economic development is very difficult. At the same time, if no effort is made, it will lead to chaos and degradation on both sides of the border. Lastly, control cannot only be achieved by border policing. Tracing illegal immigrants and alien criminals needs to be done in the country itself if control is to be successful at all.

4. EU BORDER AND ENTRANCE CONTROL ON THE GERMAN-POLISH BORDER

The EU consists of 15 countries of which Finland, Germany, Austria, Italy and Greece have common boundaries with East European non-EU countries. These countries are the first receivers of illegal human traffic and consequently carry a special responsibility towards the rest of the EU to control their borders effectively.

The single market system in the EU has allowed free movement of goods and people between European countries but it has also required an increase in border control efficiency. This has been compounded by the ending of the Cold War and the consequent easing of border control measures by former Eastern Bloc countries. In 1988, 35 000 East Europeans moved from the East to the West. In 1989 the number had risen to 500 000. From 1983 to 1989, 1 million people are said to have arrived in Europe. (28) Plans to enlarge the EU by accepting 12 Eastern European countries, and possibly Turkey in 2004, have led to estimations that 335 000 workers would migrate west in the first year. After that 160 000 a year would do so until 2010. Most of them are expected to go to Germany and Austria, whilst many may come from Poland and Hungary. Germany and Austria have consequently insisted that the EU and the current EU members be entitled to prevent this movement for up to seven years to 2011. Border and immigration control is thus going to be a major activity on the German-Polish border for many years to come. (29)

Similar to the US-Mexican border, the border between Germany and Poland, separates two societies in very different stages of economic development. Poland was part of the Soviet Bloc and is thus far poorer than Germany. The wage gap between Germany and Poland is very similar to the gap between the US and Mexico. Another similarity is the tremendous volume of cross-border movement in the case of Germany, since the fall of communism. In 1995 147 million people crossed the German-Polish border. This shows an increase of 250 per cent over the crossings in 1991. Vehicle crossing figures show an increase of crossings from 7,2 million in 1990 to 60 million in 1994. (30)

As in the US, the European population has agitated for better control of the influx of people In the public mind the difference between refugees, illegal immigrants, drug traffickers and terrorists has become blurred. They see the increase in drug smuggling, terrorist activities and unwanted foreigners as a problem, which must be solved by better border control. (31)

To bear the responsibility of having a border on the edge of the EU and to control the massive traffic, the German Federal Border Police was expanded from 400 border guards in 1990 on the Polish border, to 3 300 in 1996. The Border Police budget was more than doubled between 1990 and 1995 (32)

An inhibiting factor preventing border control from increasing in efficiency is the history of Germany in World War II which inhibits the use of high-profile policing methods. Whereas the US places great emphasis on high-tech methods, Germany does not choose to do so. Also, the German military plays no role on its borders. (33)

The increase in border policing measures has evidently failed to significantly reduce the number of people attempting to cross the German-Polish border. It has caused an increase in the number and sophistication of small-scale as well as organised international smuggling groups. Between 1992 and 1993 the number of people arrested for alien smuggling increased by 250 per cent. (34)

There are important differences in the US and German situations. Poland is expected to join the EU in 2004 and consequently it was possible to draw up a treaty between Germany and Poland, which came into effect in March 1993. The agreement specifies that Poland takes back people who enter Germany illegally, and Germany pays Poland compensation for the agreement. Germany also provides some funding for Poland to increase the efficiency of policing on its own borders. Evidently Germany paid US$80 million for this purpose in 1994. The German and EU strategy is thus to use Poland and other central East European countries as a buffer zone. (35) The EU finalised an agreement with Poland on 30 July 2002 to improve control on its eastern border. Poland agreed to increase the number of its border guards by 5 300 to 18 000 within four years. It was further agreed that the Polish Border Guard which uses conscripts extensively, would become fully professional within the same period. Poland would also build 12 additional b order control stations and buy new equipment which will include helicopters and infra-red detection devices. (36)

Another major difference is that Germany has very effective internal controls. It has a compulsory registration system with national identity cards. It integrates its bureaucratic surveillance systems (education, welfare, labour, criminal justice) into a central registry to monitor the residency status of foreigners. The German border in a sense extends into German society while the US border with its fencing, floodlights and high technology concentrates its control on the border itself. (37)

5. SOUTH AFRICAN BORDER AND ENTRANCE CONTROL

Much has been written about the state of border and entrance control on the South African borders. Most of it extremely negative. There is no lack of sources to confirm the inefficiency involved, or the lack of political will, and consequently the means to change the situation.

5.1 The extent of the land border and movement of people across it

South Africa borders on five countries to the north and north-east namely Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Swaziland. Lesotho is an independent land-locked country surrounded by South African territory. The total distance of the land borders is estimated at about 3 500 km.(38) The terrain along the borders is often inhospitable and rough and at best sparsely populated and undeveloped, with no large towns or highly developed areas. The realisation that the border areas are remote and far from the urban areas is important. People who work in border areas live in a rural setting with few facilities, and the tendency in South Africa is for people, including those in government, to accord these areas a low priority.

There is no way of knowing how many people cross and re-cross the borders. For example, on the North-West Province-Botswana border in the area of the Makgobistad border post, the border divides the Baroleng tribe in two. Here and elsewhere people move freely across the border and back. Children from Botswana even cross the border and attend school in South Africa every day. Officials at the Beit Bridge border post report that people cross the Limpopo River at night and that Chinese and Pakistanis are ferried across by smugglers. (39) On the KwaZulu-Natal border with Mozambique and Swaziland it is reported that there are 67 paths used on an 80 km stretch of the Mozambique-RSA border. Evidence of vehicle crossings is also to be seen. On the Swaziland-RSA border in the area of responsibility of the border police attached to the Onverwacht border post, crossings take place at will. The fence has been cut and the paths are there as evidence. (40)

In spite of uncontrolled movement across the border, which is largely due to the remoteness and the fact that communities live on both sides of the borders, border posts do perform a function. In 2000 the Beit Bridge border post issued about 84 000 transit visas to Zimbabwe citizens alone. It processed as many as 3 000 to 5 000 people per day. Some posts like the Bray border post and the Mokopong border post on the Botswana-RSA border, experience traffic of a mere 150 and 50 people per day respectively. They are only open from 08:00 to 16:00 but they also provide Home Affairs functions, such as applications for identity documents and registration of births. (41)

Between January and December 1998 the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) arrested 35 383 illegal immigrants. In 1997 the total was 39 991. The fact that most arrests, 8 002 in 1998, took place in January after the December holidays and that numbers of people are arrested, deported and arrested again, shows that in spite of all the effort to control it, cross-border movement of people continues and takes place on large scale. (42) In the financial year 2000/2001 the SANDF apprehended 74 253 illegal immigrants. (43) The number of apprehensions is thus still increasing. The Human Sciences Research Council {HSRC) reported in 1997 that there were between three to five million illegal immigrants in South Africa. (44) It has also been estimated as between 2,4 million and 4 million people, but estimates of as much as eight million have been made. Removals take place at about 180 000 people per year and it could thus take 30 years to deport them if no new arrivals were to come and the illegal migrants had no children. (45)

5.2 Government departments responsible for border and entrance control

Many reports on efficiency as regards border control mention the lack of interdepartmental co-operation. In order to improve this, the National Interdepartmental Structure (NIDS) was established in October 1997. The departments represented on this body were obviously those involved in border control activities and were the following: South African Revenue Service (SARS), South African Police Service (SAPS--specifically the Border Police and Detectives), Department of Home Affairs, National Intelligence Agency (NIA), South African Secret Service (SASS) and the SANDF. The departments who attended NIDS meetings on an ad hoc basis were Transport, Health, Agriculture and Foreign Affairs. (46)

It is clear from the NIDS membership and its ad hoc attendees, which departments need to co-ordinate border control and entrance control. However, in February 2001, NIDS was disbanded by the Directors General Cluster for Justice, Crime Prevention and Security (JCPS). (47)

The leading departments involved in border post control are the Department of Home Affairs, which controls the entry and departure of people; Customs and Excise (a division of the SARS) which controls the importation and exportation of goods; and the Border Police, who are responsible for the policing of South Africa's international borders, which in effect means that they are tasked to detect and prevent cross-border crime. The SAPS also perform functions for Home Affairs in regard to immigration and for the SARS in the roles of Customs and Excise. These additional functions are performed at 14 of the land border posts where the complete border control function is performed by the SAPS. They also support Customs and Excise at 34 land border posts not earmarked for the movement of commercial goods and where Customs and Excise has no permanent staff. (48)

The Border Police thus plays a very central role in border control. This is further emphasised by a project called the "logical flow process" in which the police were given total control of border post control areas. In this system the SAPS manages the movement of people and goods between departmental desks where they are processed. They control the perimeter fencing and the entry and exit gates, the concept being that the SAPS maintains overall control and co-ordination between the Border Police, Home Affairs and Customs and Excise. This system was first tested at specific designated land border posts and one airport and one harbour. It is now used at all land border posts used for commercial and tourist crossings. (49)

The SANDF is responsible for border protection, which is defined as "the protection of international borders of the RSA against hostile attacks and actions". Since the 1 970s the SANDF has to a greater or lesser extent been involved with borderline control along the border between border control posts. The then South African Defence Force's (SADE) role increased in 1984 when the Norex electrical fence was constructed on the Mozambique border. (50) Prior to 1984 the Norex fence on the Zimbabwe border had been built and bases had been established in what was designated the Soutpansberg Military area. More bases on the Botswana and Mozambique borders were subsequently erected. The then South African Police (SAP) had maintained its presence during this period but withdrew in 1990 to return in 1993, when the Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993 (Act No. 200 of 1993) reallocated the borderline control function to the SAPS. The SANDF was ordered to support the SAPS the next year. The SANDF's ro le in support of the SAPS and other departments in combating crime is as follows:

-- to patrol the land border of the RSA;

-- to combat transnational crime in support of departments involved therein;

-- to conduct air patrols and maintain airspace control along the borders; and

-- to patrol the RSA's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) along the coastline. (51)

It would seem that the SANDF is more than willing to assist the SAPS in the battle against transnational or cross-border crime. However, it views the deployment of the SANDF in an internal policing role as being "limited to exceptional circumstances and subject to parliamentary approval" and further that the deployment of the SANDE "should take place only under exceptional circumstances in the RSA, with a specific time frame attached". (52) It is foreseen that the SANDF will scale down on all internal deployments over the next six years due to lack of resources. An important matter raised in this regard is that it must be recognised, that the SANDF does not have policing powers, and thus only provides limited support to the SAPS, even when greater numbers of troops are available. (53)

A formal agreement between the SAPS and SANDF was reached in 1998 giving the responsibility for border protection to the SANDF. The agreement was subsequently ratified by the Cabinet and the SANDF allocated 28 infantry companies (3 752 soldiers) and five aircraft to the task. As result of budget cuts the SANDF was forced to downsize the force to 13 companies (1 742 soldiers) and three aircraft. (54) It is reported that due to the deployment of South African soldiers in Burundi an unplanned shortfall in the defence budget has occurred. This has resulted in a further cut in the number of companies allocated to border control, to as few as a mere seven companies. The total strength of the force deployed is reported to be about 950 soldiers since 1 February 2002, when the force was downsized due to lack of funds. (55)

Some important and certainly interesting concepts regarding the duties of government departments and their roles in border and entrance control have been formulated. In the White Paper on International Migration of 31 March 1999 the statement was made that "if labour laws were completely and fully enforced migration could be more easily regulated". (56) To ensure implementation it was recommended that an Immigration Service (IS) be instituted to operate at regional level. The intention was that the IS should enforce immigration laws in co-operation with the SAPS to ensure that illegal migrants could not hide within the community. It was felt that the establishment of the IS should be accompanied by the establishment of an "additional security service". This service would be in uniform and would only have the capacity to investigate and enforce the law as regards immigration, border control and the protection of buildings and structures. The members would be specially trained in community work and could work a dditionally as agents with delegated powers for the Department of Finance to perform some aspects of custom and excise investigations. (57)

A Business South Africa (BSA) comment on the White Paper said that the additional security service would have to be costed and that careful control over it would be needed. (58) In the draft versions of the Immigration Bill of 1 July 2000 and 26 April 2001 the establishment of the new additional security service was confirmed. Under the heading "Enforcement and Monitoring" the draft Bill stated that "any illegal foreigner shall depart, unless authorised by the Department to remain in the Republic pending his or her application for a status". Further that any illegal foreigner shall be deported". (59) To carry out the tasks prescribed it was further indicated that an investigative unit be established to investigate matters falling within the department's powers, functions and duties. (60) Under the sub-heading "Border Control and investigative functions", the Bill stated that within 42 months of the commencement of the Act, consultation would take place with the Secretary for Defence and the National Commissio ner of the SAPS that certain individuals employed in those departments would become ipso facto employed in the Department of Home Affairs. Certain equipment held by those departments would be transferred to Home Affairs as well. (61)

There is no doubt that labour laws should be enforced to regulate migration more efficiently. The process used in Germany confirms this. In South Africa it seems to be difficult to enable departments to do so. When asked after a presentation on "Free Movement of People in the SADC: Prospects and Issues", at the University of Pretoria, whether the Home Affairs security service would take over some or all of the SANDF tasks, a senior Home Affairs official said no. The situation would evidently stay as it was. In all fairness the White Paper and the draft Bill, placed more emphasis on how migration control would effect and serve the community, than on border control done by the SANDF. However, BSA was quick to point out that although it supported a shift in emphasis from border control to community and work-place inspection, in order to apprehend illegal migrants, it was against penalising communities (and thus people) for harbouring them. (62) In fact the whole thrust of BSA's comment indicated that in its opin ion control of aliens should be very liberal and unprejudiced. The reason for the approach was that it was deemed to be good for business, since over-control caused additional administrative procedures.

In reply to the BSA and other comments, the Department of Home Affairs stated that it had liberalised the access of foreigners to South Africa. The new policy required that they be registered within the system so that the department could keep track of them. Having studied the conditions in some other countries, including the US, the department had concluded that those countries had failed to stop foreigners from entering and working illegally, in spite of allocating massive resources to effective border control. Once they were in the country they could work illegally without much chance of them being apprehended. (63)

The SAPS in fact had 16 internal tracing units to trace illegal migrants in various strategic areas in the country. In 2000 the units were disbanded. (64) In 1994 the internal tracing units co-operating with the Department of Home Affairs apprehended as many as 300 to 400 illegal migrants a week in the Johannesburg area and 120 a week in Durban. (65) Clearly government departments have great difficulty in co-ordinating their efforts to achieve success in the pursuit of one policy. The problem is probably caused by an extreme lack of resources in each and every department involved in border and entrance control. Since each department struggles to perform those tasks required of it, new policies causing another round of reorganisation are seen as being unnecessary. It can be concluded that the status quo with minor co-ordination changes will be maintained, unless the government itself gives border and entrance control a very high priority.

5.3 The Immigration Act, 2002 and its effect on control of land borders and the movement of people

The stipulations of the Immigration Act, 2002 (Act No. 13 of 2002) has decidedly shown that there is no intention to make border and entrance control as efficient as was intended in the White Paper on International Migration of March 1999, or the draft versions of the Immigration 811/of 1 July 2000 and 26 April 2001. In the preamble to the Act it is stated that "the Immigration Act aims at setting in place a system of immigration control which" amongst other things "ensures that border monitoring is strengthened to ensure that the borders of the Republic do not remain porous and illegal immigration may be effectively detected, reduced and deterred". (66)

The preamble also emphasises that immigration control must ensure that "the need and aspirations of the age of globalization are respected and the provisions and the spirit of the general agreement on trade in services is complied with". It is clear that the needs of the economy have high priority and that immigration control will be carried out with high standards applicable to human rights, and that xenophobia is to be countered both in government circles and civil society. (67)

The intention, not necessarily the means, to obtain better internal control over illegal entry into South Africa is definitely included in the Act. The Department of Home Affairs is tasked to inspect work-places and institutions of learning to ensure that no illegal foreigners are employed or enrolled for educational purposes. (68) The Act has given the state the required authority and legality to act against employers, learning institutions and South African citizens, including civil servants, who illegally aid foreigners to emigrate into South Africa. (69) The "illegal foreigners" themselves are liable on conviction to fines or imprisonment for entry into the country in contravention of the Act, or for failing to depart when ordered to do so. (70)

An Immigration Advisory Board is established consisting of representatives from all departments who have anything to do with entrance control, as well as representatives of civil society, and four experts in the field of immigration. (71) A liaison committee consisting of senior officials representing the departments who have functions relating to ports of entry is established under the chairpersonship of a Department of Home Affairs official. (72)

The conclusion can be drawn that internal control over illegal immigration is intended to be improved considerably. At the same time border and borderline control must be performed in a manner suitable for ease of movement of goods and persons across state borders. Lastly, an effort should be made to improve co-ordination between government departments and the private sector in regard to immigration control and the entry of persons across state borders.

There is no reference to the establishment of an additional security service or an Immigration Service. By inference it can be concluded that departments will continue to perform their border control and immigration control tasks as before.

5.4 Entrance control facilities at border posts

There are 52 land border posts along the Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Swaziland and Lesotho borders with South Africa. Of these 19 are designed to control the movement of commercial goods. There are three types of land border posts. Those classified as "A" posts have Customs and Excise (SARS), Immigration (Home Affairs) and the SAPS present; at "B" border posts two of the departments are functioning; and at those classified "C" only one department operates, which by inference will be the SAPS, since they are present at all the land border posts. (73)

Most of the land border posts lack staff and some are short of modern facilities such as facsimile machines and a reliable electricity supply. A shortage of vehicles is a common problem as is the lack of suitable offices and living quarters for officials from the SAPS, Customs and-Excise and Immigration. (74)

Beit Bridge border post which links South Africa and Zimbabwe, is the largest land port of entry into the RSA. Even there officials recently reported a lack of technology and a lack of security at the gate, with more than 200 holes in the security fence in the immediate vicinity of the border post. Staff members work in shifts with eight to 10 members per shift to process 3 000 to 5 000 people per day. Clearly there is not enough staff to do the task efficiently. (75)

Also in the Limpopo Province, Department of Home Affairs regional representatives from Polokwane (Pietersburg), Giyani and Leboagomo reported that their budgets are too small to afford good facilities. There is a lack of office accommodation for staff and the accommodation at some border posts is appalling. There is evidently not enough money to buy photo-copiers and since some service points are not computerised, no certificates can be issued at these points. The lack of vehicles to drive to rural Home Affairs offices is a common complaint. Entrance control facilities and staff are obviously lacking. (76)

In the North-West Province, the Acting Regional Director of the Department of Home Affairs reported that the budget was insufficient to buy furniture and computers. There are no subsidised vehicles available, no cellphones and no travelling and subsistence allowances. To make matters worse the removal of illegal migrants which comes out of the budget is expensive, as is their food and medical treatment. The border posts in the area lack basic facilities. For example, the Bray border post has no toilets or running water. The public who use the border post have to stand in the sun because there is no shade outside and no space inside the building for them to shelter. Ramathlabama, a commercial goods border post, has the problem that the electricity supply regularly fails. Consequently computer data is lost and there is no backup system for the computers. The computers are also not linked to the main frame in Pretoria. The Skilpadshek border post, also a commercial goods border post, has no telephones for civili an officials who are forced to use SAPS phones on request. Toilet facilities are poor. (77)

5.5 Means to achieve effective borderline control

Along the northern border, between Zimbabwe and the RSA there is a 137 kilometre electric fence. On the eastern border with Mozambique it is 62,4 kilometres long and covers the area between the southern border of the Kruger National Park and Swaziland. Prior to 1990 the fences were set on high which when touched could shock a person to death. The aim was to deter insurgents from entering the country. Since 1990 the fences are set on detect mode which sets off an alarm in substations operated by military border patrols. They then have to travel to the point indicated to apprehend the person attempting an illegal crossing. (78)

The SANDF, however, lacks soldiers, vehicles and aircraft to execute borderline control effectively. The land borders have thus been prioritised with as priority one, the Mozambique and Zimbabwe borders and priority two, the Lesotho and Swaziland borders. Priority one and two are patrolled while priority three, the Botswana and Namibian borders, have no troops allocated to them at present. (79) By July 2002 there were fewer than 1 000 soldiers patrolling priority one and two, whilst priority three was still not protected. However, the South African government decided that the army was to redeploy some of its units which it had been forced to withdraw due to lack of funds. (80) The President is reported to have said that a system of budgeting would have to be found to pay for tasks performed in support of the SAPS. (81)

5.6 Levels of efficiency in containing illegal border crossings

A system, which has such poor facilities, is hardly likely to be very effective. This is not due to a lack of attempting to make it work, and all the illegal migrants in South Africa did not arrive after 1994. Movement of people across the borders to find work has been common practise for many years and as the economies of the countries to the north grew weaker, the traffic increased. Since 1994, however, the policy has been to facilitate the cross-border movement of goods and people. The emphasis has shifted from security-related aspects to compliance with laws and the detection of crime. There is now a requirement for border control to be applied in such a manner that the country reaps maximum benefit from the global economy. There is thus much more traffic than there was prior to 1994. At the same time it is believed that the social service departments have received a greater percentage of the national budget. The other departments, including those involved in border and entrance control, have to work with smaller budget allocations. (82)

The Department of Home Affairs' figures reflect the increase in the number if illegal migrants removed from 1988 to 1995. They show that there were many illegal migrants prior to 1994 but that the numbers have increased. In 1988 there were 44 225 removals, in 1989 and 1990, 51 550 and 53 418 respectively. By 1995 the figure had increased to 157 084. This only represents a small fraction of the total number of illegal migrants when correlated with the conservative estimate of between 2,4 and 4 million illegal migrants in the RSA. At the same time the SANDF estimate is that the border patrols apprehend only a quarter of the illegal crossers and the police estimate that half of the removals will cross the border illegally again. (83) In 1999 about 180 000 illegal migrants were removed, mostly to Zimbabwe and Mozambique. It is estimated that three million foreigners have arrived in South Africa since 1994. (84) In the light of the available data one can safely assume that a very large percentage of these people e ntered the country illegally.

The extensive research done on the subject of border control by reputable researchers, whose findings are published by well-known institutes, show that control of illegal entry into the RSA is not effective. This is caused by the lack of facilities and staff at border posts and the lack of border patrol staff. The system is completely swamped by the demand for work by people living to the north of South Africa, and the need for more open borders to sustain a healthy economy in a global economic system.

5.7 Organised crime and corruption

Since South Africa changed the emphasis on border control from security to crime detection, and the borders were opened for freer commercial traffic, corruption and crime have increased dramatically. The control system's facilities and staff have been overwhelmed by the mass of people and goods moving in and out of the country.

Illegal migrants seeking permanent residence, for instance, overwhelm the Department of Home Affairs staff in the Western Cape completely. There are a mere 11 immigration officers in the province. In the Western Cape the Chinese and Russian Mafia contravene the immigration legislation, and Nigerians exploit the Refugee Act, 1998 (Act No. 130 of 1998) with too few officials available to trace people who break the law. As a result of the lack of staff there are many cases of fraudulent marriages, fraudulent late registrations of birth, and foreigners with illegal identity documents. It also is evident that South Africans are involved in helping foreigners to circumvent the laws of the land. (85)

In the Northern Province (Limpopo) as many as 18 officials of the Department of Home Affairs were questioned on suspicion of corruption in February 2001. It is reported by the Regional Director of the province that three people are dismissed from duty for fraud per month and that people entering South Africa without the proper documents can soon obtain them illegally. A SAPS superintendent stated that the main problems at the Beit Bridge border post were corruption and lack of effective procedures. According to the police it is difficult to detect organised crime since it is very well organised and it needs only two corrupt officials to circumvent the whole control system at the border post. (86)

International crime syndicates have established that South Africa is an easy target for their activities. A tremendous increase in drug smuggling, money laundering and prostitution has taken place. Nigerian drug syndicates operate in South Africa and are reported to be heavily involved in prostitution. Crime syndicates use illegal migrants to drive stolen cars to Mozambique for R2 000 a trip and should they get caught, others are always willing to take the risk to earn that amount of money. It is reported that the illegal importation of goods bypassing the payment of import duties costs South Africa as much as R17 billion a year. (87)

The illegal movement of drugs, weapons and vehicles present very serious problems for South Africa. Each of these crimes has escalated due to the increase in the movement of people across the borders and the lack of control over that movement. It is doubtful that people living in Sub-Saharan countries regard movement into South Africa without the necessary documentation as a crime. However, the lack of job opportunities sees many of them involved in criminal activities that they would otherwise possibly have avoided.

In order to improve border patrol activities liaison forums have been established between the SANDF and the defence forces of neighbouring countries. The aim is to improve communication and co-operation and in doing so, improve the efforts to combat transnational crime. This is done in conjunction with the Department of Home Affairs and the SARS. (88) A joint Zimbabwe-RSA liaison committee meets monthly to discuss amongst other things, issues of illegal entry into South Africa. Zimbabwe is very co-operative as regards the illegal entry of its citizens into South Africa, and Zimbabweans are given a Z$50 fine for leaving their country illegally following removal from South Africa. (89) For a second offence they may be fined between Z$100 and Z$150 and thereafter as much as Z$300 to Z$2 000. Some of the offenders claim to be Zimbabwean when they actually come from countries further afield in order not to be removed further away from South Africa. At the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Summit Confer ence at Midrand in 1995, the Zimbabwe president said that Zimbabwean men regarded "illegal entry into South Africa ... and working in Johannesburg, as a sign of manhood and courage". This followed after a Zimbabwean minister had requested that South Africa should not remove their citizens in too great a number because their economy could not take the strain. (90)

5.8 Cross-border game parks and border control

The game parks established or to be established on the South African land borders are called "peace parks" and Transfrontier Conservation Parks (TFCP). The term "peace park" is used to engender enthusiasm for the concept in the popular media and in official documentation and publications of, for example, the Ministry of Environmental Affairs and Tourism.

The Ministry of Environmental Affairs and Tourism stated that the establishment of TFCPs was "part of a regional collaboration aimed at the eradication of political fences in the interest of responsible environmental management and conservation with high potential for tourism growth and development". (91) The focus, according to the minister, is to develop a partnership between local people, non-governmental organisations, conservation agencies and the private sector, to enable each of these groups to obtain optimal and equitable benefits from the shared resources. (92)

The establishment of TFCPs has drawn international media attention and has been welcomed as an example of how co-operation and peace between countries in Southern Africa and the world can be cemented. The enthusiasm is drawn from the obvious advantages it will have for the preservation of wild life and the speed with which agreements have been reached. Five agreements for the establishment of TFCPs have already been signed. These include the Kgalagadi between South Africa and Botswana; the Gaza-Kruger-Gonarezhou between Zimbabwe, South Africa and Mozambique; the Maloti-Drakensberg between South Africa and Lesotho; the Lubombo between South Africa, Swaziland and Mozambique; and the Richtersveld-Ai Ais between South Africa and Namibia. (93)

The first TFCP, launched on 12 May 2000, was the 14 669 square miles Kgalagadi that united the Gemsbok National Park in Botswana with the Kalahari Gemsbok National Park in South Africa. Here no border control problem exists since the two parks are separated only by a dry riverbed with no fence at all. A single management plan was drafted to run the park as one unit and tourists may travel freely between what was two game parks. (94)

The most ambitious project and the one effecting border control the most is the Gaza-Kruger-Gonarezhou TFCP It will join the Kruger National Park to the Gonarezhou National Park in Zimbabwe and to the Coutada 16, a piece of state-owned land in the Gaza Province of Mozambique. It will eventually form a conservation area of 60 000 square miles. The problem to be overcome from a border control viewpoint is that the fence along the eastern border of the Kruger National Park not only keeps illegal migrants out, but it keeps wild animals in. The fence has been a "vital weapon protecting South Africa's flagship wildlife sanctuary from the wildlife Armageddon on the other side". Wildlife on the Mozambique side of the border is non-existent. It has been wiped out by people armed with weapons such as AK-47s, who indiscriminately shot any animal large or small. (95)

In order to make the Gaza-Kruger part of the TFCP work, the Gaza Province's part will have to be repopulated with animals crossing from South Africa. This will require that the whole fence or at least sections of it to be removed. Movement of people will be far more difficult to control whether they be illegal migrants into South Africa or poachers. As early as 1992 a senior official of the Kruger National Park said that if the eastern fence were removed, the elephants would cross into Mozambique. The situation would be "indefensible,,. (96)

Irrespective of the problems, the political will to establish the transfrontier parks is definitely there. Evidently the World Bank, Germany and the US are keen to help finance the Gaza-Kruger-Gonarezhou TFCP project and are impatient that funds already allocated are still unspent. With finances available, the planners for the development of the Mozambican part of the TFCP are considering an option to divide it into three zones. The first a tourist zone, the second a wilderness zone and the third a "resource utilisation" zone in which hunting is to be allowed. The utilisation zone would be "buffered" from the Kruger National Park by the tourist and wilderness zones. (97) The buffer would require a fence, probably electrified, as would the inhabited areas in Gaza Province where elephants could be a menace.

A further complication is that the elephants needed to repopulate the Gaza area would, according to Kruger Park rangers, have to be translocated in family units. This has been the process used to repopulate other parks in South Africa, but in this case as many as a thousand elephants will need to be moved. To prevent the elephants from moving back to their home ranges, it is thought that the eastern fence should initially remain in place. After the elephants have accepted their new range the fence would be removed and the other animals will naturally cross slowly into the available area. (98)

It would seem that new fences to surround the true wildlife regions of the Gaza-Kruger-Gonarezhou transfrontier park, could be up before the present eastern fence is removed. This will assist border control to some extent.

The Gonarezhou National Park hopefully also has a temporary problem, namely that a block of cattle ranches adjacent to it and which was supposed to become part of the park, has been invaded by squatters and poachers. This turmoil, which has occurred all over Zimbabwe, resulted in the collapse of tourism in the country. This shows how tenuous the TFCPs can be if political stability is not achieved in all the countries involved in the parks. (99)

On most of the borders of the TFCPs, border control between South Africa and the partner countries in these projects, namely Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, is not very effective at all. There is a constant movement of people across the borders. Where fences are to be erected around parks for the purpose of protecting wildlife, it could improve border control even if that is not the primary or intended purpose.

6. THE THREAT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks exposed the fundamental weaknesses of modern industrialised states in combating transnational terrorism. They are particularly vulnerable due to their economic requirements for open borders; their inadequate immigration controls; their insufficient internal anti-terrorism and anti-crime surveillance; their extensive humane bureaucratic procedures; and their open democratic societies. Terrorist organisations such as al Qaeda are reported to have their most important bases of operations in the developed industrialised states themselves. (100)

In testimony before the House International Relations Committee of the US Congress it was stated that "al Qaeda has established links in various African countries, including Somalia, Sudan, and South Africa". (101) This is hardly surprising given the fact that South Africa has porous borders, poor immigration control, a very open society, high crime rates and an over-extended public service. Identity fraud and illegal migration are essential for the establishment of global terrorist organisations in host countries. Recently the printed media repeatedly reported the extent of the illegal issuing of documents to people wanting to immigrate into South Africa. Evidently the documentation can be obtained by purchasing it from corrupt officials wanting to increase their incomes, or by simply exploiting the system.

The amount of cargo traffic which modern economies require makes rigorous cargo inspection virtually impossible. This makes industrialised states very vulnerable to mass casualty attacks by terrorist groups. A horrifying scenario could involve the smuggling of nuclear weapons in trucks or shipping containers. Such threats make the improvement of border security urgent. This has not received high priority in military and security planning as yet. (102)

South Africans of all races generally believe that the demise of apartheid and communism has made the country immune to most threats. In the light of the prominent role the country is playing in international politics this is a naive belief. No matter how good the intentions of the South African government, sooner or later it will anger extremists. This may well lead to terrorist activities in the country. In order to deter terrorist and criminal activity in South Africa, the planning for and resulting securing of the South African borders must receive much higher priority than at present.

7. CONCLUSION

In spite of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack on the US, the Bush administration has maintained a policy of freedom of movement of goods and people across US borders. This decision is based on economic requirements in the age of globalisation. However, US$38 billion has been allocated to a security plan to secure, not close, US borders. (103) Possibly South Africa should follow a similar policy.

The SANDF was forced to withdraw many of its soldiers from borderline security duties early in 2002 due to lack of funds for the purpose. At present the Defence Force has R10,8 billion, after R7,6 billion for new weaponry is deducted, to finance itself in the 2002/3 budget. The R10,8 billion has to partially provide for the deployments in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and an additional force for Rwanda, over and above SANDF activities in South Africa. (104) Such deployments are extremely expensive.

According to SANDF statistics 47 419 illegal migrants were apprehended in 2000, 37 758 in 2001 and 21 324 in the first five months of 2002. It is estimated that the apprehension of each one costs roughly R16 000,00. (105) The totals for 2000, 2001 and 2002 respectively are thus R75 870 400,00, R60 412 800,00 and R34 118 400,00 for the first five months of 2002 alone. The funding allocated to borderline control has not been sufficient to ensure satisfactory results. The SANDF could clearly ill-afford to allocate more funds to borderline control to make it effective. However, the new Defence Bill emphasises the SANDF's border control responsibility by stating that "In addition to the employment of the Defence Force by the President as contemplated in section 201(2) of the Constitution, the President or the Minister may authorise the employment of the Defence Force for service ... in order to effect national border control". (106) It is thus clear that more funding must be allocated to land border control, not o nly to the SANDF but to all departments involved.

US-Mexican border control studies show that if funds, facilities and people are allocated to border control, reasonable results can be obtained in detecting and apprehending illegal migrants. However, it also shows that in spite of the effort put into it, over-reliance on border control is a mistake. The German experience on the eastern border with Poland confirm that border control on its own cannot stop the illegal entry of people into the EU. The German example indicates that internal controls are a prerequisite for effective control.

Considerable research has been done with regard to South African border post control and borderline control and its efficiency in controlling the movement of people into and out of the country. These studies have come to the following conclusions:

-- Border post control is poor and borderline control inefficient.

-- Internal controls are not effective and millions of illegal migrants are residing in South Africa.

-- Allocation of funds, personnel and facilities for more effective border and internal control are not nearly sufficient.

-- Go-operation between state departments is poor in spite of reorganisation and agreements to improve it. Departments do not accept a single authority and accountability is not demarcated. (107)

A strategy to retain control over the movement of people and goods into and out of South Africa exists and must be executed. Essentially it consists of the following elements:

-- The allocation of more personnel, facilities and funds to border and migration control.

-- The subsequent improvement in border and internal control.

-- The drive to initiate a real African Renaissance to improve amongst other things the standard of living throughout the continent, thus hopefully influencing the push-pull factors involved in migration positively.

-- The conclusion of agreements with neighbouring countries to induce them to co-operate in border and migration control to the advantage of all the countries involved.

-- The possibility of assisting the neighbouring countries financially to upgrade their border control.

-- The fencing off of TFCPs to protect the animals in the parks and to obviate the use of parks for further illegal movement of people.

The White Paper on International Migration and the Immigration Bill included the establishment of an additional professional security service in the Department of Home Affairs which would police immigration and border control. Later the Minister of Home Affairs announced a policy envisaging the establishment of specialised courts, which would try only immigration cases and be staffed by properly trained immigration officials. (108) Both concepts are sound. However, they will probably never be put into practise. The Immigration Act, 2002, states that the Act aims to ensure that border monitoring is improved so that the borders will no longer be porous, and that illegal immigration will be effectively detected, reduced and deterred. Neither the professional security service nor the specialised courts have been included in the Act. Nevertheless, the intention is clearly stated that border and immigration control are to be improved in such a manner, that the needs of the "age of globalisation" are satisfied and t hat the South African economy has access to the contributions required from foreigners. (109)

Although research has pointed out the weaknesses in the state of border and migration control in South Africa extensively, it has not improved over the years. Other than the control at specific sections of the borders in the late 1970s and 1980s for security reasons, South Africa's borders have been porous throughout its history. It is more so now than ever before. The low priority which border control receives; the requirements of open borders to encourage trade; and the relative prosperity of South Africa in comparison with other African countries, will result in the situation remaining problematic.

Africa south of the Sahara is at present still in a state of disintegration. (110) The pressure on South Africa's borders may thus increase in future. The effects of international terrorism on South Africa are not clear yet, but after 11 September 2001 it is necessary to improve security on South Africa's borders. With the effort and means allocated to border and migration control at present, the tide of people entering South Africa from the north will not be stemmed. Unless security needs should force a change in priorities, which is unlikely, South Africa is doomed to receiving more and more impoverished people to add to the already large population of poverty-stricken people in the country.

There is no change in priorities as shown by the fact that in spite of the security threat posed by political, economic and social conditions in Zimbabwe, little has been done to improve border control on the RSA-Zimbabwe border. People bypass the Beit Bridge border post by simply going through holes in the fences. South African officials are evidently so demoralised by conditions that they make little effort to stop illegal entrants and prefer not to confront groups coming through at night. (111) A report by the chairperson of the portfolio committee on Home Affairs has confirmed that the state of affairs at the Beit Bridge border post revealed chaos and corruption. (112)

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(6.) Ibid, p 11.

(7.) Ibid, p 41.

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(18.) Ibid. p 596.

(19.) The Law Offices of Carl Shusterman, op cit, p 1.

(20.) Andreas, P, op cit, pp 596 and 597.

(21.) Ibid, pp 596, 599.

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(23.) Andreas P, op cit, p 606.

(24.) "Border Chief to. Retire after Years of Holding the Line", Dallas Morning News, 22 October 1995.

(25.) Migration News, February 1997.

(26.) Migration News, April 2002.

(27.) Schlosser, E, "In the Strawberry Fields", The Atlantic Monthly, http://www.agnet.com/atlantic/issues/95Nov/strawber.htm, 1996, p 14.

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(29.) Migration News, September 2001.

(30.) Andreas, P, op cit, p 611.

(31.) Loescher, G, op cit, p 624.

(32.) Andreas, P, op cit, p 612.

(33.) Ibid, p 612.

(34.) Ibid.

(35.) Ibid, p 613.

(36.) Business Day (Johannesburg), 31 July 2002.

(37.) Andreas, P, op cit, pp 613 and 614.

(38.) Hennop, E and C Jefferson, "Background and Purpose of Research", in Hennop, E, Jefferson, C, and A McLean (eds), The Challenge to Control, South Africa's Borders and Borderline, ISS Monograph Series, No 57, July 2001, p 17.

(39.) Republic of South Africa, Mokoena, D A, National Assembly Report of the Portfolio Committee on Home Affairs on study visits to the Department of Home Affairs in the Western Cape, Northern province and North West Province, March 2001, pp 6 and 10.

(40.) Hennop, E and A McLean, "Case Study 1: KwaZulu-Natal Border with Swaziland and Mozambique", in Hennop, E, Jefferson, C, and A McLean (eds), op cit, p 73.

(41.) Republic of South Africa, Mokoena, D A, op cit, pp 5, 7 and 9.

(42.) "Operational Statistics", Salut, Vol 6, No 2, 1999, p 6.

(43.) Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence Annual Report for the Financial Year 2000/2001, p 36.

(44.) Republic of South Africa, White Paper on International Migration, 1999, p 16.

(45.) Finansies en Tegniek, Vol 51, 12 November 1999, p 15.

(46.) Minnaar, A, op cit, p 101.

(47.) Beneke, D, "The role of the SAPS in South African Border Control Mechanisms", in Hennop, E, Jefferson, C and A McLean (eds), op cit, p 38.

(48.) Ibid, pp 27, 28 and 30.

(49.) Minnaar, A, op cit, pp 97-98.

(50.) Lusse, J F, "Are the fences still standing?" South African Soldier, Vol 1, No 1, May 2001, p 14.

(51.) Ibid.

(52.) Ibid, p 15.

(53.) Schoeman, B S, "The SANDF and the combating of crime: Making a difference?", ISSUP Bulletin 4/2002, June 2002.

(54.) Lusse, J F, op cit, pp 14-15.

(55.) Beeld (Pretoria), 28 March, 18 July and 24 July 2002.

(56.) Republic of South Africa, White Paper on International Migration, op cit, p 17.

(57.) Ibid, pp 20-21.

(58.) Business South Africa (BSA) Comment on the White Paper on International Migration, 9 May 2000, para 1.7.

(59.) Republic of South Africa, Immigration Bill, A section 75 Bill published as a draft in Government Gazette No 20889, of 15 February 2000, ver. 4/26/2001, p 20.

(60.) Ibid.

(61.) Ibid, p 31.

(62.) Business South Africa (BSA), op cit, para 2.1.

(63.) Buthelezi, M, Regulating Migration in the 21st Century, op cit, p 7.

(64.) Beneke, D, op cit, p 38.

(65.) Minnaar, A, and M Hough, Who goes there? Perspectives on Clandestine Migration and illegal Aliens in Southern Africa, HSRC Publishers, Pretoria, 1996, p 161.

(66.) Republic of South Africa, Immigration Act, 2002 (Act No. 13 of 2002), p 2.

(67.) Ibid, pp 24.

(68.) Ibid, Section 2 (2) (a).

(69.) Ibid, Sections 38, 39 and 42.

(70.) Ibid, Section 49 (1) (a) and (b).

(71.) Ibid, Section 4(1) (a) and (2).

(72.) Ibid, Section 6 (1).

(73.) Hennop, E, and C Jefferson, "Background and Purposes of Research", in Hennop, E, Jefferson, C, and A McLean (eds), op cit, p 17.

(74.) Hennop E, Jefferson, C and A McLean (eds), "Executive Summary", in Hennop, E, Jefferson, C, and A McLean (eds), op cit, p 14.

(75.) Republic of South Africa, Mokoena, D A, op cit. p 7.

(76.) Ibid, pp 7-8.

(77.) Ibid, pp 9-10.

(78.) Minnaar, A, and M Hough, op cit, p 142.

(79.) Boshoff, H J, "The Role of the SANDF in South African Border Control Mechanisms", in Hennop, E, Jefferson, C, and A McLean (eds), op cit, p 43.

(80.) The Star (Johannesburg), 25 July 2002.

(81.) Beeld (Pretoria), 26 July 2002.

(82.) Acres, M, "Border Control in the RSA since 1994: An Assessment", ISSUP Bulletin 3/2001, pp 3-4.

(83.) Minnaar, A, and M Hough, op cit, pp 144 and 162.

(84.) Migration News, March and June 2001.

(85.) Republic of South Africa, Mokoena, D A, op cit. pp 24.

(86.) Ibid, pp 5-7.

(87.) Hennop, E and C Jefferson, "Background and Purpose of Research", in Hennop, E, Jefferson, C, and A McLean (eds), op cit, p 20.

(88.) Lusse, J F, op cit, p 15.

(89.) Republic of South Africa, Mokoena, D A, op cit, p 7.

(90.) Minnaar, A, and M Hough, op cit, pp 96 and 98.

(91.) Republic of South Africa, Press release, Ministry Of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Advisory: S4 and Namibia sign agreement on transfrontier conservation area, 17 August 2001.

(92.) Republic of South Africa, Press release, Ministry Of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Speech by Valli Moosa, Signing Ceremony on the Establishment of Ai Ais-Richtersveld TFCP, 17 August 2001.

(93.) Sake Beeld (Johannesburg), 20 August 2001.

(94.) Godwin, P. "Without Borders Uniting Africa's Wildlife Reserves", National Geographic, September 2001, p 7.

(95.) Ibid. p 47.

(96.) The Star (Johannesburg), 9 May 1992.

(97.) Godwin, P. op cit, p 20.

(98.) Ibid. p 24.

(99.) Ibid, p 28.

(100.) Smith, P J, "Transnational terrorism and the al Qaeda model: Confronting new realities", Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly, Vol XXXII, No 2, Summer 2002, p 35.

(101.) Ibid,p 38.

(102.) Ibid, pp 42-43.

(103.) International Institute for Strategic Studies (London), Strategic Survey 2001/2002, op cit. p 11.

(104.) Beeld (Johannesburg), 9 August 2002.

(105.) South African Soldier, Vol 9, No 8, August 2002, pp 16-17.

(106.) Republic of South Africa, Defence Bill, version B60-2001, Chapter 3, Section 17(1)(d).

(107.) Minnaar, A, op cit, p 99.

(108.) Buthelezi, M, Regulating Migration in the 21st Century, op cit, p 8.

(109.) Republic of South Africa, lmmigration Act, 2002 (Act No. 13 of 2002), p 3.

(110.) Benjamin, D, Time News Magazine, Vol 156, No 26, 25 December 2000 - 1 January 2001, p 9.

(111.) Beeld (Johannesburg), 24 January 2002.

(112.) City Press (Johannesburg), 28 January 2002.
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Author:Kruys, Brig Gen George
Publication:Strategic Review for Southern Africa
Geographic Code:4EUGE
Date:Nov 1, 2002
Words:12294
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