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Consciousness, self-consciousness and the unconscious.

Nothing is more fundamental to psycho-therapy than the idea of the unconscious--that is, if there is any such thing. In a section of Being and Nothingness that has become fundamental for existential psycho-analysis, Sartre vehemently denied that there was any such thing as the unconscious and attributed its construction to 'bad faith', the attempt to alleviate the burden of freedom by pretending that there was much about ourselves (our conscious existence, our motives, our interests) we were not responsible for. Just as we hand our bodies over to doctors for diagnosis, expecting from them a suitable cure for physical ills, so we do the same with our souls, expecting from psycho-analysts a suitable cure for spiritual ills. Sartre's existential psycho-analysis was something like a call for self-analysis, a demand that each person take responsibility for what he has become through past actions, recognising that (s)he has it in him to change the course of his life by freely changing the pattern of his decisions.

Most of us do think we know what it is to be conscious, and accept the distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness. With regard to the unconscious however, some of us admit that we know very little, and are fully aware of the inconsistencies in the accounts offered by the experts in the field. I am not just talking about the inconsistencies between the Freudian, Jungian and Adlerian conceptions of the unconscious, for example, but inconsistencies within the Freudian conception itself. Freud changed his mind so often on the question of consciousness that it is perfectly reasonable to conclude that he had no coherent conception. And how the commentaries have revelled in these inconsistencies, developing out of them as radically incompatible accounts of his thinking as: Freud, the sexual revolutionary; Freud, the social revolutionary; Freud, the traditionalist; Freud the moralist; Freud, the immoralist!1

So it might be as well to start off with a few definitions. I propose to define 'Consciousness' as awareness of the other (anything the self can be conscious 'of' in any way whatever), together with an awareness that the self is not itself what it is conscious 'of'. The latter qualification is important. For any creature endowed with sense organs is conscious. That is, it sees, hears, smells etc., something other than itself. But it is doubtful whether insects are capable of distinguishing themselves from what they are conscious of; and, if they were, it might be impossible for them to enjoy the instinctive 'knowledge' of their environment we know them to possess.

I propose to define 'Self-consciousness' as awareness of the self as if it were something other. That is, self-consciousness arises insofar, and only insofar, as the self is capable of making itself other to itself, and recognising that the other it has become for itself is, nevertheless, nothing other than its very own self. In other words again, self-consciousness involves a strange conjunction of attachment and detachment, so strange that many have refused to believe in the possibility of an independent form of consciousness deserving to be called 'self-conscious', regarding self-consciousness as a typically philosophical aberration, reducible to some alternative form of conscious existence, most frequently, an epi-phenomenal effect of language.

So what about the unconscious? Though Freud was by no means the first to posit something like an unconscious dimension of consciousness (2), it is conventional to attribute this discovery to him, or at least to credit him with the invention of a method capable of shedding light on the dimension in question. We also know that Jung qualified Freud's unconscious as 'personal', proposing, as an extension to the personal unconscious, what he called a 'collective' unconscious. But before I go on to explain why I would like to add to this duality a third term, for which I would propose the name: 'universal' unconscious, I first need to lay my cards on the table.

I have written my own phenomenological philosophy, reconciling and integrating analytic philosophy with phenomenology, in general, and transcendental with ontological phenomenology, in particular. It is therefore difficult for me to think about the being of human being without presupposing the categories and methodology of my 'genetic' ontology. However, because Being and Becoming is highly systematic, I also like to think that it is possible to reproduce its basic structures in just a few, simple and intelligible, words (3).

The relevance of this procedure for the topic under discussion is clear. I want to talk about the unconscious, ego-consciousness and self-consciousness. And the three stages of my genetic ontology are entitled: 'Originary', 'Objective' and 'Reflective'--the first being readily aligned with the unconscious, the second with ego consciousness, the third with what might be called 'self-consciousness'. Further, by 'genetic' I mean a developmental method showing how consciousness moves through these stages in an ordered progression. Crucial however to the cyclical form of my ontology is a fourth and final stage, which I envisage as the reflective recuperation of the first and most original stage. Merleau-Ponty, in a memorable phrase, called phenomenological ontology: 'reflection on the unreflected', a phrase perfectly adjusted to my conception of a fourth and final stage envisaged as the reflective recuperation of the first stage. The relevance of my fourth and final stage to the work of psycho-therapy is obvious. Could psychoanalysis not itself be, in essence, a matter of reflecting upon the unreflected origins of consciousness, and so of achieving some kind of final integration of ego-consciousness with the unconscious?

To reinforce this threefold nomenclature, I might add that I call consciousness at the first and most original stage 'projective' (following Heidegger), consciousness at the second stage 'positional' (following Sartre), and consciousness at the third stage 'intentional' (following Husserl). I also reserve the name 'Integral' for the conclusive form of consciousness. And I need hardly say that we owe this name largely to Jung and his disciples. In the context of the sort of genetic methodology I employ, it is implied that the growth and development of consciousness is a matter of evolving out of an originally projective, through a derivatively positional, and so on to a conclusively intentional consciousness--with this absolutely crucial qualification, that I treat the emergence of intentional consciousness as the means by which we are able to complete the circuit, come to terms with what we are by nature--before positional consciousness broke the connection, and so made us the un-natural beings we have since become.

Following Hegel, I sub-divide each of the three major stages in the genesis of consciousness along the same lines. Just as Hegel habitually distinguished an In-itself, For-itself and In-and-For-itself of each of his three major stages, so I distinguish an originary, objective and reflective sub-stage of each of my three main stages. I have also chosen to call the investigation of the Originary stage, a doctrine of Soul, the investigation of the Objective stage, a doctrine of Mind and the investigation of the reflective stage a doctrine of Spirit, hoping thereby to both bring notions like soul and spirit back into philosophy, and to confer upon them a new, and quite specific, meaning (nearer to the German than the English). In his Anthropology, Hegel distinguishes a Natural, a Feeling and an Actual Soul, and I follow this example with regard to the sub-stages of the first and most original stage, distinguishing a Natural, a World and an Actual Soul, whose differentiation follows from a principle I call: 'ontological delimitation of transcendence'.

By 'transcendence' I mean a being-out-of-the self of the self in what is other than itself. This notion should already be familiar to us, thanks to Heidegger's insistence upon a being-in-the-world of human being (4). Inherence in being is what characterises the doctrine of soul as a whole, but the sphere of inherence suffers a progressive restriction, from being, through the world, to the self. What Heidegger calls our ' Seinsverlassenheif (loss of being) and to which he attributes the need for a philosophy dedicated to restoring the being-relation, I would call a loss of that inherence in being which characterized our being originally. Primordial human being felt itself to be one with being, a part of the natural world, and his mythicoreligious constructions were devoted to exploring this being-relation, which might just as well be called a relation to the natural world. Hence the title the Natural Soul, characteristic of the being-in-being of human being. We owe to Husserl the concept of a Lebenswelt or Life-world and I, in conjunction with Heidegger, derive therefrom the idea of a restriction of the inherence in being to a surrounding world. Hence the title the World Soul (rather than Feeling Soul), characteristic of the being-in-the-world of human being. The need for a further restriction of the inherence in being to the self comes from the need to prepare the way for that dramatic polarization of consciousness which changes nothing and yet makes a world of difference. Human being now takes that 'one turn' (uni-verse) which puts it en route for science and technology, and whose historical inauguration can be traced back to the philosophy of Descartes. Instead of the belonging together of human being and being, self and world, we now find ourselves confronted with the familiar Cartesian dichotomies: mind-body, subject-object, ego-alter-ego.

What has all this got to do with the unconscious?

Following Heidegger, I see the relation of consciousness and being as an inverse relation, the more consciousness, the less being ('Je mehr Bewusstsein, doch desto weniger Sein'). That is, the growth and development of consciousness is paid for at a price, the price of a loss of the original sense of our inherence in being. The further back we go, either in the genesis of individual human being or in that of the species, the less the human being in question is conscious of itself and its world, and the more it leads its life in an unconscious integration with its natural surroundings. Once ego-consciousness has effected its disjunction from the world, it tends to use the concept of 'instinct' or 'drive' to mark this element of inherence, thereby treating Primordial human being as consciously deficient, and so remaining blind to what such a primordial consciousness made possible in the first place. It is only now, after centuries over which the ego consciousness we have developed, and of which we are so proud, has repeatedly brought us to the brink of destruction that we are beginning to think about the 'harmony' a more naturally inclined human being might have been able to impart.

We all know how Freud deployed his notion of the unconscious. Starting with ego consciousness, he attributed to the latter a capacity to repress certain conscious contents stemming from its past experience (normally the more painful ones), which contents thereby became 'unconscious'. And we all know why Jung chose to call this notion of the unconscious 'personal'--because it failed to come to terms with what Jung saw as a more fundamental, because im-personal and so collective, unconscious. Implicitly therefore, Jung set up a genetic relation between the more universal, because collective, unconscious and Freud's more restrictive personal unconscious. Not merely did he treat the latter as an outcome of the former, he went on to treat the 'ego' as itself a complex, one among the many other complexes latent in the collective unconscious, but which retained the unique power to abstract itself from the other unconscious complexes and so come to dominate, manipulate and control the rest, driving them all back into that state of unconsciousness Freud attributed to 'repression'. The contents of Freud's personal unconscious could be identified and described by getting the patient to talk about his life, his experiences and how he had tried to deal with them, primarily by means of the free-association talk therapy for which his psycho-analysis is best known. To collect the evidence he needed to develop his notion of a collective unconscious, Jung, on the other hand, had to draw on his masterly command of mythical literature, where he found, in quite distinct cultures, between which there could have been no communication, similar mythical constructions. From which he drew the conclusion that it was the original interaction of human being with one and the same planetary configuration that accounted for these otherwise inexplicable coincidences.

And so what of my yet more universal unconscious? Beginnings, origins, points of departure are always the most difficult things to identity and describe. I accuse Heidegger of not having been sufficiently radical in his choice of world as the starting point for his notion of being-in. And it is easy enough to see how being-in-the-world can be conceived as the delimitation of a yet more fundamental being-in-being. And difficult to see what could be still more primordial. But what on earth do we mean by such an absolutely original being-in-being of human being? All sorts of hints and suggestions can be gleaned from a variety of disciplines, including of course, philosophy. Plato and the Neo-platonists talked of our participation in the ONE, and this notion of an ultimate unity has haunted philosophical thinking ever since. In medieval philosophy, it was taken over and baptised in the name of God, with mystic union as the supreme ideal. I like to think of Leibniz' 'petites perceptions' as his attempt to do justice to the universality of consciousness. Ap-perception is the name Leibniz gave to those perceptions of which we are aware and which bear upon the world of which we are actually conscious. But over and beyond the limited scope of such apperceptions, there were, or so he thought, underlying perceptions, which reached to the very limits of the universe. Bergson called 'pure perception' this limitless extension of our perceptual consciousness, and went on to propose a temporal equivalent, 'pure memory', in which nothing is forgotten (5). Even sub-atomic physics is making us more and more aware of the way in which all events are interconnected, captured in the image of a butterfly, the flapping of whose wings inaugurates a thunderstorm!

Needless to say, the overall stage of Objective consciousness is also subdivided into three. But the three fold sub-division of objective consciousness into Instrumentality, Factual and Formal thought need not trouble us, since it has little bearing on the question of the unconscious. For Objective consciousness, the high point of conscious development comes with the emergence of formal thought: logic and mathematics. Whose application to the real world gives us mathematical science, the most powerful tool human being has ever yet developed, so powerful its development over the last few centuries presently threatens the earth. We all remember that Kant once said there was only as much science in a discipline as there was mathematics in it. No wonder Piaget made of 'formal operations' the culminating stage (sensori-motor, concrete and formal operations) of his three stage child psychology. And it is precisely this conclusion I refuse to accept, inasmuch as it precludes the possibility of a yet higher stage, represented by transcendental philosophy, and which I pick up with my third stage of Reflective consciousness.

More to the point is my threefold sub-division of Reflective consciousness into an existential, an epistemological and a spiritual sub-stage. I think of Husserl as having continued the Kantian tradition in another way. And such is my admiration for this 'philosopher of infinite tasks' that I see his transcendental phenomenology as more or less definitive of what might be meant by an epistemological conception of reflective consciousness. For all that, I see him as having missed the opportunity to bring out the existential and the spiritual implications of his transcendental phenomenology. As we all know, his phenomenological method can be seen as a pincer movement encompassing a preliminary Reduction (negative moment) followed by a conclusive Constitution (positive moment). The world is first called in question: our naive assumptions about its being and its being as it is (its 'Sein' and its 'So-sein', as the Germans would say) are suspended, bracketed. Only insofar as the being of the world has been 'reduced' to a pure succession of appearances does it then become possible for transcendental consciousness to constitute the objectivity of different regions of being on the basis of the subjective structures held responsible (severally and individually) for the specifically objective status of the region in question. But what could possibly motivate any such suspension of belief with respect to the objective reality of the world?

I ask this question, not just because it has frequently been asked but because I think I have an answer. Prior to the suspension of belief in the reality of the world, there is, and must be, a preliminary suspension of belief with regard to the reality of the self. And it is the existential philosophers who have made us aware of the critical importance of just such a self-suspension. Kierkegaard's calling in question of the self, captured in his notion of anxiety or despair, (6) is taken over by Heidegger and used by him, in Being and Time, to account for the inauthenticity of the 'They' (das Man). It is our being-with others that takes us away from ourselves; and so if we ever want to find our way back to our authentic selves again, we must first cut ourselves off from those who have cut us off from ourselves. Sartre pushed this thesis further still, claiming that the self is always, and inevitably, in 'bad faith', and that any attempt to be sincere merely conceals the radical impossibility of being self (the self 'is what it is not and is not what it is', is the formula he uses to express this dilemma). It is the recognition, in anguish, that the self we have become is not our true self but a self we have adopted (a 'persona') for socio-political reasons, which compels us to call in question our very own selves, and so to begin the quest for authentic self-understanding. It is the turning inward implicit in this preliminary existential reduction of the self-which provides the motive for the more comprehensive reduction embracing the world.

But this is not the end of the matter. To be sure, the correspondence theory of truth that regulates our understanding of the world on the objective plane has now been replaced by what might be called a 'correlational' theory of truth, one that obliges us to analyse the correlations that prevail between the different modes of appearing to us of things, on the one hand, and the subjective structures we impose upon such modes to elicit from them the relevant objectivity, on the other--different, of course, for physical objects of perception, imaginary objects, memorial objects, formal objects, temporal objects, and so on (7). But spiritual literature is full of an 'objective' that surpasses that of either correspondence or correlation, namely, a coincidence of Soul and God, of Atman and Brahmin, of the One with the ONE, or at least a potential for such a coincidence. (8) The very fact that Husserl ends up with a transcendental consciousness he is ready to call 'absolute' implies that we are moving in the right direction (9). The radical inwardness of Husserl's transcendentally inspired reflection confirms the age-old truth that the way to God is through the self. I would even go so far as to say that Husserl's life-long practise of phenomenological reflection effects what Buddhists have in mind when they talk of 'mind-full-ness'10. But Husserl never developed these implications of his thinking.

What is the relevance of this talk about an ultimately spiritual sub-stage of Reflective consciousness, capable of making contact with the absolute in an ultimate coincidence of the One with the ONE? Nothing less than this: it confirms the need for an absolutely original point of departure in a being-in-being of human being. There is religion only because human being is originally integrated in being. Obscurely at first, and then with ever increasing insight, human being has come to understand this unconscious origin as a possibility that can be reproduced consciously. Mystical literature is the attempt to give conscious expression to an originally unconscious experience of the being-in-being of human being (11).

Implicitly therefore, the spiritual sub-stage of Reflective consciousness attests to what I call an 'ontological transposition', a reference back to the origin of the very possibility made available by Reflective consciousness. Indeed, it is this reference back that justifies my cyclical conception of ontological philosophy, and which applies just as well to the epistemological as to the existential sub-stage. It is my contention that ontological philosophy (the philosophy of the depths) is only possible in the aftermath of transcendental philosophy (the philosophy of the heights)--Aristotle after Plato, Hegel after Kant, Heidegger after Husserl--to which we might even want to add Marx after Hegel. Since a philosophy of depths tries to deal with what we are from the first, and by our very nature, one might expect such a philosophy to appear on the scene first. But what comes first, in the order of being, necessarily comes last in the order of analysis. For nothing is more difficult to think than what we are first and foremost. To think the immediacy of our being a body and our being in the world, the abstruse and abstract resources of transcendental philosophy are needed. So Heidegger's attempt to represent his own phenomenological initiative as not just an alternative to Husserl's transcendental method but as the right way of doing phenomenology contradicts itself. No Husserl, no Heidegger (12).

This notion of an 'ontological transposition' also puts me on the track of what I call the three 'Ideals of Being Human'. In his Dialectic, the second part of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant proposed three transcendental Ideas (or Ideals of Pure Reason), but in a negative way, as illusory inferences. For all that, his transcendental psychology (bearing on the soul), cosmology (bearing on the world) and theology (bearing on God) were all strictly derived from the three categories of relation--improperly applied beyond the limits of actual or possible experience. In a more positive way, Hegel proposed as the culmination of his dialectical methodology what he called an 'Absolute Consciousness', whose three constituent topics were: Art, Religion and Philosophy. Given the cyclical form of his philosophy, these three topics ought to have been grounded in three correspondingly original sub-stages of his philosophy. I have tried to trace these topics back to their origin in the original stages of his Phenomenology, his Logic and his Encyclopedia--without success. Perhaps it was because he was himself a Philosopher that Hegel wanted us to believe that the highest cause to which a human being could commit himself was that of ... Philosophy! Since philosophy is the discipline by means of which the three ultimate ideals of being human are identified and distinguished, I question whether it can itself figure as one of the three ideals. Art and Religion always have been, and will always be, with us (13). But philosophy? All around the world, departments of philosophy are being closed down; and given the inability of philosophers today to do what philosophers have always done in the past, namely, construct a philosophy, I do not find this depreciation at all unreasonable.

So what are the ultimate Ideals of being human, and how can they be grounded in the very being of human being? From the standpoint of Being and Becoming, an answer is forthcoming. The fourth and final stage of an Integral consciousness is generated through a reflective recuperation of the first and original stage. From the reflective recuperation of the Actual Soul, I derive Self-Actualization; from the reflective recuperation of the World Soul, I derive Art; and from the reflective recuperation of the Natural Soul, I derive Religion.

Let us reverse this order and start with the Ideal of Religion, indicative of the most extensive sphere of inherence. In his Ethics, Spinoza defined substance through an ultimate union of Nature and God (Deus siuve Natura). The word that has replaced Spinoza's 'substance' in contemporary phenomenological ontology is 'being', and it need hardly be said that this word has a respectable ancestry that reaches right back to Aristotle, if not beyond to Parmenides. But the reference to Spinoza deserves to be recalled, since it shows how 'being' can be conceived as the ultimate coincidence of the natural and the spiritual. Heidegger would undoubtedly have deplored my attempt to develop a theology out of the being-in-being of human being. But, in his Systematic Theology, Tillich did indeed take Heidegger's ontological philosophy as his justification for developing an ontological theology along lines I have found very helpful.

What Hegel calls the Feeling Soul in his Anthropology, I call the World soul, primarily with a view to retaining, in the name for this sub-stage, a reference to that in which the soul has its being (being, the world, the self). But I am only too happy to acknowledge Hegel's reasons for preferring the term 'Feeling'. For I treat feeling as the dominant faculty at the stage of the World Soul. What the self projects when it projects its self upon the world is, of course, its feelings, its affective reactions to what it receives in the way of sensible impressions. And what could be more evident than the central role of feeling in Art. Indeed, I define art as the attempt to 'recuperate the life of feeling in the form of a work that both embodies and evokes emotion'. This is not the place to develop my aesthetics, even in outline. Suffice it to say that in his Art and the Creative Unconscious, Eric Neumann offered an account of art, inspired by Jungian psychoanalysis, which confirms the unconscious source of artistic inspiration.

And finally Self-actualization, the reflective recuperation of the Actual Soul. In his Psychology of Being, Maslow made extensive use of the term 'self-actualization' to denote the highest need in a hierarchy of needs ranging from a material base (food, drink, sex), through the intermediary levels of social integration, to the highest, spiritual level of self-actualization (14). It would not be an exaggeration to say that psycho-therapy is largely dedicated to the task of helping individuals along the way to self-actualization. And who should be better placed to understand this appreciation than the readers of this journal?

To sum up: the highest Ideals of being human, our very reason for being here on earth, are: Self-actualization, Art, Religion. Rooted in what we have been taught to call the 'unconscious', these latent possibilities, grounded in a certain conception of the being of human being, can nevertheless be brought to light as ideals, but only by pursuing the long and laborious path of a genetic ontology, concluding with a fourth and final stage that represents the reflective recuperation of the origin. In his Ursprung und Gegenwart (translated as the Ever Present Origin), Jean Gebser offered a wide-ranging examination of art and science, myth, religion and philosophy, law and politics, with a view to demonstrating the emergence of what he calls an Integral consciousness, a vision he was later able to find confirmed in the writings of the Indian philosopher, Sri Aurobindo, who developed his thinking in two complementary works, as philosophical psychology in The Synthesis of Yoga and as philosophical theology in The Life Divine.

But perhaps the theological ideal of Religion and the psychological ideal of Self-actualization are not so far removed from each other as it might appear. If the way to God is through the self, then the many Yogic systems (India's equivalent of psycho-analysis) that have been developed in India over thousands of years can serve as a framework for that 'raising of consciousness' which brings human being into the proximity of universal Spirit. For the development of consciousness not only has repercussions for the transformation of that particular spirit we each and every one of us represent in our person, it also enables us to make contact with Universal Spirit. No wonder Sri Aurobindo concluded that the emergence of an Integral consciousness deserves to be seen as the most momentous transformation still awaiting the being of human being (15).

The significance of this discovery of an Integral consciousness can be most dramatically brought out through a contrast with the views of latter day existentialists, who presented the tragedy of being human as that of a being who cannot but seek meaning there, where no meaning is to be found, in a material universe that occurred 'by accident', and which remains entirely indifferent to our existence. Animals do not despair, because they lack the intelligence to raise the question of the meaning of being. But any being that has effected the transition to the objective stage learns to think, and so become susceptible to existential despair--or so the story goes. However, there is a way out: by first negotiating the transition to Reflective consciousness (16), it then becomes possible to effect that reflective recuperation of the origin through which the three ideals of being human are disclosed. The root of our being is--the unconscious. But without self-consciousness, a radically reflective consciousness capable of overcoming the limitations of ego-consciousness, it is impossible for us humans to come to terms with the root sources of our being, and so to find in this dis-covery ... our reason for being.

Christopher Macann, now retired, was formerly professeur de philosophie a l'universite de Bordeaux III.

Contact: Chateau de Passirac, 16480 Passirac, France.

Tel: 00 33 5 4598 0962



(1) To display the variety of Freudian interpretations I like to use three texts: Marcuse's Eros and Civilization to exemplify: Freud the social revolutionary, Norman O. Brown's Life against Death, to exemplify: Freud the sexual revolutionary and Philip Rief's Freud: The Mind of the Moralist, to exemplify: Freud the puritan. Only Ricoeur's Freud and Philosophy is able to discriminate between alternative interpretations, and this precisely because it is as much about interpretation in philosophy as it is about Freud.

(2) Freud is said to have borrowed the term 'Id' from Grodeck's: das Buch von Es.

(3) Being and Becoming, Online Originals, London and Bordeaux, 2007.

(4) Heidegger's Being and Time is rather obviously organised in two parts, on Being and on Time. But the first part is grounded in what he calls the being-in-the-world of Dasein, analysed out into the one who is in, the world in which it exists and the structure of being-in as such, whose three dimensions are then brought together through an examination of the unitary structure of Care (Sorge).

(5) See especially Matter and Memory.

(6) See particularly Kierkegaard's Sickness unto Death.

(7) 'Correlation' is nowhere more explicitly described than in the noeticonoematic correlations Husserl outlines in Ideas I.

(8) Following Plotinus, I employ the word 'ONE' for God. And whereas the personal pronoun I use for the unconsciousness is the 'It', and for ego-consciousness, the 'I', I reserve the word the 'One' for the self of reflective consciousness, thereby opening the way for the play on words: the 'union of the One with the ONE'.

(9) See section 49 of Husserl's Ideas I entitled: 'Absolute Consciousness as the Residuum After the Annihilation of the World'. The world ceases to exist in itself and becomes merely for consciousness.

(10) Perhaps the best known text in Buddhist literature is the Dhammapada, which opens with a chapter on Mindfulness, whose first words are translated by Max Mueller as: 'We are the result of what we have thought.'

(11) Evelyn Underhill's: Mysticism is still the best book in English on mysticism, even though its concentration on Islamic and Christian sources leaves a noticeable gap in Indian references.

(12) In Presence and Coincidence (Kluwer Academic, Phaenomenologica 119) I examined the transition from Husserl to Heidegger in the light of my structure of an 'ontological transposition'.

(13) Whitehead claimed that Religion and Science are the two most powerful forces in human thinking.

(14) In his Toward a Psychology of Being, Maslow was obviously influenced by Heidegger and Jaspers, whose difficult thinking he shows little sign of having mastered. And despite the extensive use he makes of existentialism, he dismisses Kierkegaard as a 'high IQ whiner'!

(15) Aster Patel, one of Aurobindo's most knowledgeable commentators, has recently written a book: The Integral Human Existence.

(16) Sartre, following Heidegger, rejected anything like a transcendental consciousness, even while calling his best known work a 'study in phenomenological ontology'.
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Author:Macann, Christopher
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Date:Jul 1, 2015
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