Conflict prevention and the Responsibility to Protect.
According to the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), the Responsibility to Protect concept comprises three responsibilities relating to deadly conflict and other human-made catastrophes: to prevent, to react, and to rebuild. (1) The responsibility to react has received significant political and scholarly attention and has dominated debates about the adoption of the responsibility-to-protect principle by the UN General Assembly at the 2005 World Summit. (2) Likewise, the responsibility to rebuild has been accompanied by renewed interest in questions of justice after war (the so-called jus post bellum) and was institutionalized by the World Summit through the creation of the UN's Peace-building Commission. Despite being described as the "single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect," the responsibility to prevent to prevent has been relatively neglected. (3) In the World Summit's Outcome Document, the UN's commitment to conflict prevention was kept separate from its commitment to the Responsibility to Protect, and states committed only to help establish an "early warning" capability for the UN and to support the secretary-general's Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide. (4) The call of the ICISS for measures to centralize preventive efforts, tackle the root causes of conflict, and enhance direct prevention capabilities was overlooked in favor of this focus on early warning.
The purpose of this article is threefold. First, it examines progress with, changes to, and attitudes toward the responsibility to prevent since the release of The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in 2001. Second, it seeks to explain the relative neglect of the responsibility to prevent and the reluctance of even advocates of the R2P to lobby for reform in this area. Finally the article explores ways of developing the "responsibility to prevent" and making good on the vision set out by the ICISS.
Prevention in the Responsibility to Protect
It goes without saying that the prevention of deadly conflict is one of the fundamental goals of the UN. The preamble to the UN Charter commits the organization to "saving future generations" from the "scourge of war." In 1955, Dag Hammarskjold identified the prevention and solving of conflicts as the organization's most significant function. (5) Indeed, UN peacekeeping itself grew out of Hammarskjold's belief that the primary contribution that the world organization could make to international peace and security was in the prevention and resolution of conflict, and not in the enforcement of collective will as envisaged by the drafters of the Charter. The case for conflict prevention was strengthened in 1997 when the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict estimated that even a maximal commitment to direct and structural conflict prevention would cost less than half the price of intervention and subsequent rebuilding. (6) Nevertheless, the UN's conflict prevention function developed in an ad hoc fashion and was based mainly on the secretary-general's preventive diplomacy and crisis management and the proliferation of social, economic, cultural, and humanitarian organizations under the UN umbrella, none of which has been integrated into a system of conflict prevention. Prominent commentators have therefore commented that "in general at the UN, conflict prevention is preached more often than it is practiced." (7)
From 2000, partly in response to such criticisms, Kofi Annan's UN adopted a range of measures designed to institutionalize conflict prevention and enhance the UN's capacity. In 2000, the UN Development Programme announced its intention to focus on conflict prevention and set aside 20 percent of its Track 3 funding for preventive measures linked to peacebuilding. (8) In his 2001 report Prevention of Armed Conflict, Annan urged the UN Secretariat and member states to foster a "culture of conflict prevention." (9) In its follow-up to the report, the Security Council passed Resolution 1366 (30 August 2001), which affirmed the centrality of conflict prevention to the council's work, welcomed the creation of a central fund for the provision of conflict prevention training for UN staff, called for the development of regional conflict prevention capacity, and promised to "employ all appropriate means" to prevent violent conflict.
Meanwhile, a host of institutional mechanisms for preventing violent conflict was developed by regional organizations. These include the 1993 Mechanism for Conflict Prevention of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and a variety of measures put into effect by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in the Baltic, Balkans, Caucasus, and Central Asia. (10) The European Union (EU), in addition to being a conflict prevention mechanism in itself, deployed a series of Conflict Prevention Assessment Missions to assess at-risk countries such as Indonesia, Nepal, and Fiji and propose conflict prevention strategies. (11) Collectively, these measures coincided with a marked decline in the global incidence of violent conflict in the past two decades, but analysts contend that the decline is a product of assertive conflict resolving and peacekeeping on the part of the UN and regional organizations, not the successful prevention of new conflicts. (12)
It was this apparent gap--between rhetorical support for prevention and the level of tangible commitment to achieving it--that the ICISS attempted to address with its "responsibility to prevent." (13) Underlying the commission's recommendations was Annan's argument that the world needed to move from a "culture of reaction" to a "culture of prevention." (14) This challenge had already been taken up in part. In July 2001, the G8 set out its Rome Initiative on Conflict Prevention, focusing on measures dealing with small arms trade, conflict diamonds, child soldiers, the role of women in development, and the private sector. (15) At the same time, Britain set up two conflict prevention pools: the Global Conflict Prevention Pool and a pool dedicated to Africa. (16) These initiatives notwithstanding, the need to do better in relation to prevention was a constantly recurring theme of ICISS global consultations. (17) Reflecting long-standing views about the different types of prevention, the commission divided its recommendations into the areas of "early warning," tackling root causes, and "direct prevention." Ironically, given that early warning was the only element of the responsibility to prevent explicitly adopted by the General Assembly, the ICISS opened its discussion by noting that failings associated with early warning are often overstated and that the nub of the problem tends to lie not in predicting the outbreak of violent conflict but in generating the political will to act on these predictions. (18) As is now known only too well, mass killing in Bosnia, genocide in Rwanda, and the reign of terror in Darfur were all predicted before the event--the latter two by senior UN officials. However, the ICISS found that more accurate analysis of warning signs might identify earlier opportunities for constructive third-party engagement, and it is partly as a result of these possibilities that a number of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), such as the World Bank, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as ReliefWeb, have developed their own early warning mechanisms. The ICISS recommended that UN headquarters develop the capability to collate this information, including sensitive intelligence from member states. (19)
Given the sheer diversity of the potential root causes of violent conflict, it is not surprising that the commission's recommendations in this area were more opaque. In keeping with the overall tenor of its findings, the ICISS called for the Security Council to play a leading role and identified four key dimensions of root cause prevention: political (relating to good governance, human rights, and confidence building); economic (relating to poverty, inequality, and economic opportunity); legal (relating to the rule of law and accountability); and military (relating to disarmament, reintegration, and sectoral reform). (20) These four dimensions also shaped the commission's recommendations in relation to direct prevention. In this regard, the political dimension referred to the secretary-general's preventive diplomacy; the economic dimension referred to the use of positive and negative inducements; the legal dimension referred to a range of measures from mediation to legal sanctions; and the military dimension--considered the most limited in scope--referred to preventive deployments. (21) To actualize this agenda, the ICISS called for the creation of a pool of unrestricted development funding that might be used for root cause and direct prevention and the centralization of efforts by UN headquarters, making it a "repository of best practice tools and strategies." (22)
The ICISS also identified two political problems connected with the proposed shift to a culture of prevention that were likely to mitigate against host-state cooperation. The first was that at-risk states were likely to resist external prevention efforts on the grounds that "internationalization" is the start of a slippery slope toward intervention, a problem made much more acute by the Bush doctrine's insistence that the United States has a right to use force to prevent the emergence of threats. (23) Second, the commission pointed out that states worry that third-party intervention might inadvertently legitimize rebel forces by awarding them the status of negotiating partner. To remedy these problems, it recommended that international actors display sensitivity to these concerns and take care to craft their preventive efforts in a "nonintrusive" fashion in the first instance. (24)
Despite stressing the critical importance of conflict prevention, the commission stopped short of making concrete proposals other than the call to centralize the world's conflict prevention efforts and develop early warning capacity. It also stopped short of offering guidelines for prevention equivalent to the just-cause thresholds and precautionary principles set out to guide decisions about whether to react militarily to humanitarian catastrophes. What is more, the commission avoided explicit discussion of the single most pressing dilemma in relation to the responsibility to prevent: the question of how to translate early warning signs into a commitment to act on the part of specific actors and consensus about how to act.
A UN High-Level Panel commissioned by the secretary-general in 2003 carried out the groundwork for the World Summit. Its task was to translate ideas such as those put forth by the ICISS into concrete policy proposals that the secretary-general could take to the General Assembly. The panel's final report, presented in late 2004, adopted much of the language of The Responsibility to Protect and, on the question of intervention, many of its recommendations as well. The responsibility to prevent, however, was effectively jettisoned in favor of an approach that combined the prevention of deadly conflict with the prevention of a range of other ills, including environmental calamities, poverty, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and infectious disease, and wider aspects of prevention together with economic development. (25) Having widened the scope of prevention, the panel confined itself mainly to reiterating well-established policy proposals. Thus, for example, it called for states to reaffirm their commitment to the Millennium Development Goals target of 0.7 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) directed toward foreign aid, but it overlooked the recommendation of the ICISS that a portion of this aid be held in an unrestricted UN account for use in conflict prevention efforts. On the specific question of preventing interstate and intrastate war, the panel made nine recommendations:
(1.) The Security Council should be prepared to refer matters to the International Criminal Court.
(2.) The UN and other agencies should work toward cooperative agreements about the management of natural resources.
(3.) The UN should develop frameworks for minority rights and for the protection of democratic governments from unconstitutional overthrow.
(4.) The UN should expedite negotiations on the marking and tracing of small arms.
(5.) Member states should give accurate reports to the UN Register of Conventional Arms.
(6.) A training facility should be created for special representatives to the secretary-general.
(7.) The UN's Department of Political Affairs should be given additional resources for preventive diplomacy.
(8.) The UN should create a mediation support capacity, develop its competence on thematic issues, increase its interaction with other agencies, and consult with civil society during peace processes.
(9.) Parties to conflicts should make constructive use of preventive peacekeepers. (26)
Thus, in place of the "culture of prevention," the High-Level Panel put forth nine discrete proposals. Although each is useful in itself, not all are overtly connected to conflict prevention, let alone the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities; there is no call for states to assume a responsibility to prevent; the focus of the ICISS on centralization was eschewed; and the thorny question of bridging the gap between early warning, practical commitment, and the generation of consensus was overlooked entirely. Moreover, each of the nine recommendations pointed to work already under way. Given the fact that the High-Level Panel replaced the innovation of the responsibility to prevent with calls for the UN and its members to continue work to which they were already committed, it is not surprising that the preventive element of the R2P received much less attention than the other aspects.
Arguably the most significant institutional development between the R2P and the World Summit was the creation of the UN Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, which was inspired, Annan argued, by the recommendations put forth by the ICISS and High-Level Panel. (27) Created in 2004, the special adviser was given four tasks, which reflected some of the underlying concerns of the ICISS: to collect information about violence that, if not prevented or halted, might lead to genocide; to act as an early warning mechanism through the secretary-general and Security Council; to make policy recommendations to the Security Council; and to liase with other UN agencies on the prevention of genocide.
The idea encapsulated by the creation of the special adviser was that the UN could take a lead in institutionalizing elements of the responsibility to prevent in relation to a narrower set of issues (the ICISS just-cause thresholds rather than violent conflict per se). This found some support in the United States. A high-profile US task force on UN reform, funded by the US Institute of Peace and chaired by George Mitchell and Newt Gingrich, recommended that the US administration assess what bilateral measures might enhance the capabilities of regional and other international organizations to prevent genocide, mass killing, and massive human rights violations. It also endorsed the Office of the Special Adviser and called for it to receive significantly greater resources to enable it to play an important role in early warning. (28) Others, such as the Non-Aligned Movement and the African Union (AU), indicated their acquiescence with this narrower understanding of the responsibility to prevent. Both indicated that the limitations on sovereign authority incumbent with this concept be reserved for grave emergencies such as genocide. (29) In its joint statement on UN reform, for example, the Non-Aligned Movement insisted that "any effort to transform the United Nations into an effective instrument for preventing conflict" should take into account the need for states to respect international law and the importance of sustainable development. (30) The movement's consensus on the R2P omitted any mention of prevention, however, as did the AU's position paper on UN reform. (31)
Some states went further, calling for conflict prevention to be removed altogether or included under an alternative rubric. Pakistan, for example, argued that conflict prevention was best supported by recognition of a state's "right to develop." (32) Likewise, although China demurred from specifically referring to conflict prevention in the lead-up to the World Summit, it had earlier maintained--in its response to the secretary-general's Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict (2001)--that the key to conflict prevention lay in the recognition of "the basic norms guiding state-to-state relations," a thinly veiled reference to sovereignty and nonintervention. (33) Furthermore, prior to the 2005 World Summit, China maintained that prevention was an important task for the Security Council and insisted that all action justified by reference to the R2P be authorized by the Council. (34)
There was, however, some dissent from these efforts to limit the scope of the responsibility to prevent. A handful of states, including Canada, New Zealand, Japan, Sweden, Mexico, and Rwanda, argued that conflict prevention be given a central place in any World Summit statement concerning the R2P. In its submission to the UN's High-Level Panel, the Canadian government argued that the special adviser model could be used to widen preventive efforts by permitting the offices of the UN emergency relief coordinator and UN special rapporteurs to brief the Security Council on a monthly basis. (35) Canada was supported in its endeavor by Japan and the European Union, which argued that the World Summit's responsibility-to-protect clause should represent the principle as a continuum of "prevention, response, development assistance and capacity building," with the use of force as a last resort. (36) Mexico, too, supported the idea that the concept as a whole would be legitimized and strengthened if presented as a continuum beginning with prevention, which in turn entailed a commitment to international development and capacity-building assistance. (37) New Zealand and Sweden, meanwhile, argued that the responsibility-to-protect clause ought to contain a strong commitment to prevention and insisted that this was hardly controversial given that much of the World Summit's Draft Outcome Document was given over to setting out measures addressing "root cause" issues. (38) Finally, supported by Singapore, Rwanda endorsed efforts to include prevention in the responsibility-to-protect clause and called for incitement to commit genocide to be specifically prohibited.
These proposals attracted only a modest degree of attention and support. Instead of looking at ways of increasing the emphasis on prevention, most member states preferred to focus on the wording of the High-Level Panel's piecemeal recommendations. In this vein of picking through the High-Level Panel's recommendations, the Non-Aligned Movement supported the call for the UN Secretariat to receive more resources for preventive diplomacy, suggesting that the reallocation of existing funds rather than new funds be used to provide additional support to the good offices function of the secretary-general. For its part, the AU embraced more openly some of the High-Level Panel's recommendations. In particular, it called for a commission to study the development of norms to govern natural resources in countries emerging from or at risk of conflict, supported the panel's recommendation for the establishment of a framework for minority rights, and welcomed the panel's call for at-risk countries to make greater use of preventive peacekeeping operations. (39) Tellingly, however, the AU urged that regional organizations take the initiative in this domain but, in the spirit of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, maintained that this did not amount to an abdication of responsibility on the part of the UN.
In the first two iterations of the World Summit Outcome Document (3 June 2005 and 22 July 2005), there was no mention of conflict prevention in the paragraphs committing states to the Responsibility to Protect. However, paragraphs in these drafts on the pacific settlement of disputes contained a commitment to establish a culture of conflict prevention and "ensure that conflict prevention is a centrepiece of effective multilateralism and UN Reform" (draft, par. 74). After protracted negotiations, the final draft inserted into the responsibility-to-protect component references to early warning and to the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide at the expense of watering down other passages on conflict prevention. The commitment to make conflict prevention the centerpiece of the UN system was dropped, and states agreed not to follow up on their declaration to provide additional support to the good offices function of the secretary-general. What this means in practice is that while the General Assembly affirmed the idea that strengthening the UN's preventive diplomacy capacity would be a good idea, it was not prepared to instruct the secretariat to reform itself along these lines and made no plans to follow up with measures to make this commitment a reality. Thus, although the World Summit agreed to institute a "culture of prevention," it chose not to define it or specify measures that would make it a reality, limiting itself instead to a pledge to strengthen the UN's early warning capacity and to statements endorsing measures already in place.
The following section examines why the responsibility to prevent has been relatively neglected.
The Politics of Prevention
At least three factors have contributed to the relative neglect of the responsibility to prevent: the inherent difficulty of translating a commitment to prevention into coherent policy, the impact of the place of prevention in the war on terrorism, and the question of authority and agency. These explanations are not mutually exclusive and have together made it difficult for proponents of the responsibility to prevent to make significant headway. I briefly consider each set of factors in turn.
Dilemma of Comprehensiveness
The first set of inhibitors to actualizing the responsibility to prevent relates to what Edward Luck has described as the "dilemma of comprehensiveness." According to Luck, "It appears as if the advocates of prevention have tried to make it be all things to all people; but in the process it could end up meaning very little to anybody." (40) The problem is actually somewhat deeper than this. It is not so much that advocates of prevention have made it appear amorphous as it is that policymakers and scholars have been made to realize that because there is a bewildering range of structural and direct causes of violent conflict, genuine conflict prevention entails a similarly bewildering range of policies and potentially vast political and economic commitment. While advocates of conflict prevention point, with some merit, to the argument that even structural prevention is far cheaper than reaction, they have--to date--been unable to resolve two associated problems.
First, conflict prevention commands significant costs prior to the out-break of violent conflict and grants political leaders no clear way of proving that the commitment of resources yields the desired result. In other words, conflict prevention requires governments to ask their citizens to commit resources to regions not yet in conflict and, if violence is averted, leaves them open to to accusation that they have wasted precious tax monies averting nonexistent conflicts. As Rwanda and Darfur show only too well, it is difficult enough to secure the political will necessary for a serious commitment to halting genocide and mass killing once they are under way. Kofi Annan himself noted this problem when opening the Security Council's debate on conflict prevention in 2000. He lamented the "worrying lack of political will" among member states to commit the necessary resources and pointed to the need for governments to show leadership in arguing the case for prevention to their publics. (41) This view has since been echoed by advocates of the Responsibility to Protect who optimistically point out that increasing global uptake of the principle, demonstrated by the 2005 World Summit Declaration, has created an opportunity to persuade "instinctively internationalist"-minded governments to show the necessary leadership in this area. (42) However, in 2006, Annan reported an "unacceptable gap" between the rhetoric and action on conflict prevention. (43) That this gap is linked to problems identifying and "selling" the allocation of resources to conflict prevention can be seen by comparing member states' contribution to the UN's prevention trust fund and their annual contribution to reacting to conflicts that have already erupted. By 2005, the UN's Trust Fund for Preventive Action had received US$33 million from thirty-five donors. This compares to an annual running cost of around US$5 billion for the UN's peace operations. This suggests that states are willing to contribute to international peace and security efforts but that advocates of conflict prevention have notyet succeeded in persuading governments of their case. Analysts have long argued that this is because it is difficult to draw direct causal links between preventive action and the absence of conflict. (44)
The second issue relating to the dilemma of comprehensiveness is that there is no agreement about just how comprehensive the responsibility to prevent needs to be. For policymakers, conflict prevention tends to be associated with early warning, preventive diplomacy, and crisis management. Even here, though, engagement with conflict prevention can involve diplomatic processes ranging from mediation to coercive diplomacy; economic considerations such as sanctions, trade, humanitarian, and financial aid; military measures such as deterrence, embargoes, and peacekeeping; and a variety of legal questions. (45) Most analyses, however, insist that although these more immediate concerns might reduce the chances of a dispute resulting in violent conflict, they will not prevent the emergence of violent disputes in the first place. According to many writers, meeting this challenge requires a much deeper commitment to structural prevention. Thus, for instance, if we accept the proposition that chronic economic inequality makes vulnerable societies more prone to civil war stuuctural prevention demands economic reform to stamp out inequality. Such reform may well require changes to the way the global economy itself is organized. (46) In addition to deep economic change, prevention advocates point to good governance, human and minority rights, environmental protection, security sector reform, reform of the legal system, and a range of other areas as crucial elements for the prevention of violent conflict. (47) The problem here for those interested in generating a culture of prevention is threefold. Given the sheer range of policy areas, it is difficult to discern measures specific to conflict prevention and measures related to development and security more broadly. (48) Furthermore, the absence of discernible limits encourages wariness among states keen not to publicly commit themselves to additional costs without tangible benefits. Finally, the absence of discernible limits is also concerning to the states likely to be on the receiving end of preventive measures who worry--not unreasonably in the wake of Kosovo and Iraq--that a broader license for interference in their affairs in the name of conflict prevention might be used as a pretext for self-interested interventionism by the powerful. (49)
To be fair, the ICISS attempted to remedy this problem by setting out the four areas--political/diplomatic, economic, legal, and military--that it argued ran through every element of conflict prevention. However, the ICISS approach was replaced by the High-Level Panel's wider definition of "international threat," which emphasized WMD proliferation and terrorism and the General Assembly's preoccupation with economic development. While those concerns are laudable in themselves, the stretching of prevention in this way exacerbated the dilemma of comprehensiveness, encouraging states to adopt the piecemeal and underfunded approach to conflict prevention charted above.
The War on Terrorism
This brings us to the second set of factors that have inhibited the development of the responsibility to prevent--factors relating to the war on terrorism. The war on terrorism has had two principal effects on debates about conflict prevention. It has skewed attention in the West especially away from the prevention of deadly conflicts toward the prevention of terrorism and WMD proliferation. It is no coincidence that the majority of conflict prevention initiatives described earlier was instituted before September 11, 2001. Since then, although a general interest in intrastate conflict around the world has remained, efforts have tended to focus on measures designed to prevent terrorist attacks against the West at the expense of other parts of the world that are at risk of descending into violence and, potentially, genocide. Thomas Weiss, the ICISS director of research, argued that the West's political will to act in humanitarian emergencies had "evaporated" due to its obsession with Afghanistan, Iraq, and the war on terrorism. (50) Indeed, since 2001, the West's financial and troop contribution to UN peace operations has declined in both absolute and relative terms, primarily because of its commitments to war on terrorism--related operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. (51)
In addition, the adoption of a strategy of preemption/prevention by the United States and its allies has made other states more reluctant to espouse measures that might make it easier for powerful states to interfere in their domestic affairs. This wariness is only heightened by the fact that advocates of a broader US right to use force preventively have attempted to garner legitimacy by using language similar to that of The Responsibility to Protect. In one high-profile piece, for example, Lee Feinstein and Ann-Marie Slaughter suggested a new principle to guide global governance: "the duty to prevent." (52) The new principle, they argued, was warranted by the fact that "we live in a world of old rules and new threats." (53) Although the Security Council is the most appropriate forum for dealing with these new threats, of which terrorism and WMD proliferation are considered the most grave, they argued that the burden of proof needs to be shifted from the states who believe themselves to be threatened to those suspected of WMD proliferation and collusion with terrorists. In such cases, waiting to preempt an imminent attack "is usually impractical because suspected facilities are often difficult to spot or hit." (54) They continue, "This is not to suggest that the use of [preemptive] force should be discounted as ineffective but that the most effective action is preventive." (55) Feinstein and Slaughter therefore argued that preventive action may involve the unilateral use of force in cases where the UN or relevant regional organizations have proven unwilling to mandate it. (56)
In the wake of September 11, these ideas found their way into US declaratory policy. In its 2002 National Security Strategy, the US administration claimed a new right of preemptive self-defense. The Strategy insisted that
given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today's threat, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries' choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first. (57)
The administration argued that the concept of "imminent threat" should be expanded to permit military action "even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack." (58) This basic proposition was repeated in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. However, the Strategy was criticized for being deliberately misleading in using the term preemption to refer to what is in essence a strategy of prevention. (59) The problem though is not so much with what the Strategy itself says but with the Bush administration's actual policies, and there was an important disjuncture between the Strategy and US rhetoric. (60) Thus, in a speech to the German parliament in May 2002, Bush argued that the United States would be prepared to use force against "rogues," whether or not those rogues had displayed a specific intent to attack the United States or its allies and before they acquired the means of doing so. (61) Thus, in its public statements, the US administration has implied that it supports a right of preventive war, not the more limited right of expanded preemption claimed in the Strategy. To make matters worse, the 2003 invasion of Iraq was portrayed as an exercise of preventive war--particularly by Vice-President Dick Cheney. (62)
There is considerable evidence that the adoption of "preventive war" by the United States and its allies has increased global wariness to projects--such as the responsibility to prevent--that entail limitations on state sovereignty. Speaking in his capacity as South Korea's foreign minister, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon argued that the UN should create clear mechanisms and modalities to limit the extent to which the Responsibility to Protect could be invoked to override sovereignty. (63) Although Russia supported the rhetoric of the R2P, it shared China's view that no action should be taken without Security Council approval, argued that the UN was already equipped to deal with humanitarian crises, and suggested that, by countenancing infringements on state sovereignty, the Responsibility to Protect risked undermining the Charter. (64) In a similar vein, India counseled against the concept by arguing that the Security Council was already sufficiently empowered to act in humanitarian emergencies and by observing that failure to act in the past was caused by a lack of political will, not a lack of authority. (65) For its part, the Group of 77 suggested that the R2P be revised to emphasize theprinciples of territorial integrity and sovereignty. (66) In the wake of Iraq, states worried that principles involving a denigration of sovereignty might be used by the powerful to justify interference in the affairs of the weak.
The global war on terrorism has therefore had at least two, largely negative, consequences for attempts to build a meaningful consensus around the responsibility to prevent. On the one hand, conflict prevention and humanitarian activism have been replaced on the West's order of priorities by terrorists and WMD proliferators. Evident throughout the negotiations prior to the World Summit was a determination, especially on the part of the United States, to avoid taking on new commitments. On the other hand, the advent of another form of prevention has served to heighten concerns that a meaningful responsibility to prevent might be used to justify hegemonic interventionism.
A third problem, one that the responsibility to prevent shares with other elements of the R2P, is that--beyond the host state having primary responsibility--it is not clear where the responsibility to act lies. Does it lie with the UN, with regional organizations, with functional organizations such as the World Bank, with individual states, or all of the above? Resolving questions of authority and agency in relation to conflict prevention is particularly difficult because those questions go to the heart of what states are entitled to do within their borders, the nature of international authority, and the role of culture in shaping and preventing violent conflict. However, imprecision in this matter is, in the long run, more troublesome because the whole concept of responsibility is rendered meaningless without a related concept of where that responsibility resides. Thus, the world's response to the crisis in Darfur has been characterized by disagreements about where responsibility ought to lie--with the host government, the African Union, or the UN Security Council--and these disagreements themselves have served to stymie collective efforts to respond to the unfolding emergency. (67)
As I noted earlier, since the 1990s, the majority of conflict prevention initiatives has been launched at the regional level. This has created an uneven system wherein some regions (especially Europe) are replete with institutions backed by significant resources designed to prevent violent conflict, while others--such as the Middle East and East Asia--have barely any regional institutional settings for conflict prevention. Other regions, especially Africa, have developed paper institutions that lack the necessary capability to effect structural prevention, while Southeast Asia has eschewed an institutional approach to conflict prevention, preferring the quiet diplomacy of the "ASEAN Way" instead.
The regionalization of conflict prevention institutions has the benefit that, in theory at least, the institutions developed will be sensitive to regional norms and therefore better able to tailor and target appropriate responses. In addition, advocates of regionalism have argued that regional bodies are better able to understand local dynamics of conflict, therefore helping to overcome the dilemma of comprehensiveness by focusing only on those elements of conflict prevention that are instrumentally and culturally appropriate. Such arguments have long been made in relation to peacekeeping by regional organizations and are problematic for similar reasons. Regional organizations differ markedly in their capacity and mandate. A regional focus therefore delivers the weight of conflict prevention efforts to the world's richest regions, traditionally the areas least in need of conflict prevention. Exacerbating the problem, a regional focus can attract resources away from global institutions. On the one hand, this makes it more difficult for global organizations to fill the gaps in regions with poor institutional capacity. In addition, effective coordination across agencies is made more difficult. On the other hand, a regional focus makes it less likely that global organizations will succeed in forging a consensus on global level preventive measures, such as controls on the arms trade, natural resource management, and trade reform designed to lessen chronic inequality in conflict-prone areas.
Both the ICISS and High-Level Panel recommended a degree of centralization in order to avoid these problems and improve coordination. To be fair, the World Summit made some headway in this regard, particularly in its proposals relating to early warning and the strengthening of the good offices function of the secretary-general. However, the piecemeal approach adopted by the High-Level Panel and endorsed by member states militates against centralization, reducing the political purchase of the responsibility to prevent by disaggregating it from specific institutions.
Together, the dilemma of comprehensiveness, the war on terrorism, and questions about the locus of responsibility have contributed to the sidelining of the responsibility to prevent, charted in the first part of this article. In the final part, I sketch out two principles that might begin to overcome these problems and restore conflict prevention to the prominent place afforded to it by the ICISS.
Principles of Prevention
The Responsibility to Protect adopted two strategies aimed at changing behavior, both connected to the enabling and constraining role of language. Indeed, the importance of language in shaping the way the world responds to humanitarian crises was acknowledged by three of its key progenitors. (68) The first strategy was to set down the parameters of responsibility. That is, by defining the circumstances in which international society should assume responsibility for preventing, halting, and rebuilding after a humanitarian emergency, the ICISS aimed to make it more difficult for states to shirk their responsibilities. (69) By shifting the presumption away from sovereigntyand toward responsibility, states members would be obliged to publicly justify their position on matters relating to conflict prevention. (70) On the one hand, by creating common benchmarks, these measures would empower activist governments and domestic publics by enabling them to insist that Security Council members especially live up to their responsibilities and take action. On the other hand, forcing states to publicly defend their position by reference to the principles set out in The Responsibility to Protect would constrain governments that oppose action or fail to match their commitment with material resources for selfish reasons. (71) The ICISS presumed that persuading states to commit to a responsibility to prevent would make it harder for them to shirk that responsibility and easier to forge future consensus on specific issues.
The second strategy, closely allied to the first, was to use language to guard against potential abuse and therefore allay fears about the erosion of sovereignty. According to the ICISS commissioners, the just-cause thresholds and precautionary principles relating to intervention constituted an important barrier to abuse. By establishing a common framework, the Responsibility to Protect would make it harder for states to abuse humanitarian claims to justify interfering in the affairs of the weak. (72)
There is a clear relationship between this logic and the World Summit's focus on early warning. Theoretically, states that have signed up to the Responsibility to Protect ought to find it difficult to justify failure to take collective preventive action because of the dissonance between public commitment and actual practice. In practice, however, the world's failure to act on early warning signs, and then evidence of an advanced level of killing and forced displacement in Darfur, suggests flaws with this logic. Indeed, the Darfur experience exposes two profound problems associated with a language-based approach to behavior change. The first is the problem of indeterminacy. Once principles have been propagated and established as a norm, the propagators of the norm cannot control its application. There is no guarantee that in the face of early warning signs states would agree on the gravity of the threat, its nature, and the best way of preventing it. (73) The problem of indeterminacy means that there is nothing to prevent states from using the Responsibility to Protect's inhibiting mechanism to eliminate preventive action by arguing, for example, that the threat is not sufficiently grave to warrant making a potentially costly commitment. This problem is particularly acute in relation to prevention, which is an inherently speculative domain. This is precisely how several Security Council members used responsibility-to-protect language in 2003-2004 to oppose preventive action in relation to Darfur. (74)
The second problem is that the Responsibility to Protect relies on the idea that governments can be persuaded to make significant financial and social capital commitments by the force of international and domestic opinion.
Put simply, the basic proposition is that if the states were to commit to The Responsibility to Protect, they could be held to account by their fellow states, world society, and domestic electorates. This, the argument suggests, would significantly strengthen the moral authority of those actors lobbying for decisive preventive action. However, this view not only overlooks the problem of indeterminacy but is also based on an unproven assumption that external pressure can persuade states to act in humanitarian crises.
These challenges cannot be entirely overcome, but their chronic effects may be alleviated by measures designed to give weight to the responsibility to prevent by (1) granting individual states specific responsibilities related to the pursuit of their own foreign policy; and (2) locating a specific and carefully delimited range of prevention measures within an institutional setting. Although there is a long path to a global consensus on prevention, these two initiatives might enable the formation of coalitions of like-minded states. (75) Thus, it is not expected that these proposals will be widely taken up in the first instance. The idea behind them is that if they are taken up by those internationalist-minded states that have already made a strong commitment to the Responsibility to Protect, they will both directly contribute to prevention and encourage others to follow in their footsteps. This is precisely the strategy adopted by advocates of the Responsibility to Protect more broadly. (76)
(1.) Do no harm. The idea that prevention, reaction, and rebuilding are discrete acts perpetuates the myth that the interveners are not already implicated in the potential crises in which they are intervening. However, humanitarian activism is but one aspect of wider relations between societies and states. (77) It is often the very policies of outside states, nonstate actors, international organizations, and the international financial institutions (IFIs) that exacerbate the grinding poverty, inequality, poor governance, and patrimonial politics that are often identified as the root causes of armed conflict. In almost every case, those who react to a humanitarian crisis are already related to the targets in one way or another and in many high-profile cases have actually contributed to the seeds of conflict. Thus, for example, the French role during and immediately after Rwanda's genocide needs to be seen not as a discrete intervention by a disinterested state but as part of a wider set of client-donor and economic relations related to French interests in Africa. (78) Similarly, it is not possible to understand the demise of Yugoslavia without understanding the role that Western states and IFIs played in the collapse of the Yugoslav economy. (79) Although critics could argue that almost any engagement in the neoliberal world economy contributes to the root causes of violence, the rather direct nature of the relationship between the role of the French government in Rwanda and the IFIs in Yugoslavia suggests a useful benchmark for delineating the parameters of responsibility.
The first principle for operationalizing the responsibility to prevent should therefore be a commitment to "do no harm." In other words, governments should scrutinize their foreign, defense, environment, and trade policies and change behaviors that might contribute to the root causes or to the direct triggers of violent conflict. Civil society organizations can also play an important role here by holding governments and others to account in relation to the prevention commitments that they have already made. This is a commitment that all states can make but that only those states--such as Canada, members of the European Union, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan--that have already signaled a strong commitment to the Responsibility to Protect and an intention to incorporate that responsibility into their foreign policies are likely to make in the medium term. Though it may involve sacrificing interests and money accrued through trade deals that contribute to violent conflict, it requires no additional resources, because it is a negative rather than positive commitment--that is, it is a commitment to refrain from a particular course of action on the grounds that it might contribute to causing deadly violence. It remains a somewhat "idealistic" proposal, but not one without precedents. Canada's "Talisman affair" and the (albeit flawed) ethical restrictions imposed on foreign trade by the British government indicate that like-minded governments are already aware of duties to minimize harm. (80)
These cases, and the examples of Rwanda and Yugoslavia, suggest that it is possible to identify practical limits to the responsibility to do no harm, minimizing though not eliminating the dilemma of comprehensiveness discussed earlier. However, gray areas are inevitable. In gray-area cases, governments would be held to account and encouraged to justify their actions by reference to the do no harm principle. Despite these limitations, the principle has the potential to exert a profound influence on at-risk societies by removing some of the political or economic grievances that cause war and some of the factors that enable the outbreak of war. This principle has the added advantage of relating abstract principles of conflict prevention with the everyday practice of government. It provides a nationally specific set of benchmarks that civil societies and opposition parties can use to hold their governments to account.
(2.) Institutional focus. The second element of a reinvigorated responsibility to prevent involves agreement on how likely major crises are to be identified, what measures are necessary to prevent them, and whose responsibility this is. Significant progress has been made in relation to the first concern relating to early warning. There is broad agreement that UN headquarters should develop its early warning capacity, act as a clearing house for information, coordinate the response of UN agencies, and provide timely advice to the Security Council. The special adviser is an important step in this regard but, as the Canadian government argued, this mechanism ought to be expanded.(81)
There has been much less, if any, progress in relation to specific measures and the locus of responsibility. The ICISS report identified a way around the dilemma of comprehensiveness by pointing toward four areas of activity (political, legal, economic, military) and demonstrating that these areas crossed the divide between structural and direct prevention. Unfortunately, this way of approaching the problem was rejected by the High-Level Panel in favor of a broader approach to prevention that added terrorism and WMD to the mix and lumped structural prevention together with economic development. Although elements of development are critical to structural prevention, a central part of the challenge of resolving the dilemma of comprehensiveness is to distinguish between them by identifying more precisely which elements of development are vital components of conflict prevention. Of course, development activists and many of the G-77 states argue that development is critical to conflict prevention and that decoupling them is likely to devalue already limited global commitment to development. However, there is no evidence to suggest that treating development and structural prevention as synonymous has helped either cause.
In its discussion on intervention, The Responsibility to Protect also set out a useful way of conceptualizing the locus of responsibility in a meaningful fashion. The ICISS proposed a three-layered distribution of responsibility. At all three levels, one could envisage an important role for the UN's early warning mechanism in providing information. Primary responsibility lay with the host state. Secondary responsibility lay with the domestic authorities working in partnership with outside agencies. If the primary and secondary levels failed to ameliorate the problem, international organizations would assume responsibility. (82) At this third level of responsibility, the ICISS argued that the primary responsibility lay with the Security Council directing the combined efforts of the UN system. If the Security Council were deadlocked, activist states and the UN secretariat should approach the General Assembly for a consensus on how to proceed and, if that failed, work through regional organizations. (83)
The question of who decides on the appropriate level of responsibility was aired several times during the ICISS global consultations and remains vexed. One suggestion that received some support during the consultation process was for the creation of a panel of eminent persons or judicial overseers to determine the status of particular crises. This received little support from the Permanent Five countries in particular. (84) In practice, as the Darfur case shows, the question of level of responsibility has become highly politicized precisely because it is connected to questions of authority and intervention.
The ICISS therefore set out a way of addressing the twin problems of comprehensiveness and the locus of authority. Although it did not develop comprehensive solutions, it clearly marked out a road map that has, by and large, been ignored by international society. Returning to that road map is important if the responsibility to prevent is to be actualized. The most fruitful way of achieving that is by cultivating the political will of those like-minded states that have already declared their commitment to the Responsibility to Protect.
Alex J. Bellamy is professor of international relations at the University of Queens-land, Australia. His most recent book is The Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Genocide and Mass Atrocities (2009).
This article is based on a paper presented at a conference on conflict prevention, "Before the Crisis Breaks," organized by the Peace and Conflict Society, University of Toronto, 2-4 February 2007. The author is very grateful to the organizers for inviting and encouraging him to think about the responsibility to prevent. He also thanks Gareth Evans, Paul D. Williams, the anonymous reviewers, and especially Sara E. Davies for their comments and criticisms on earlier versions of the article.
(1.) International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: ICISS, 2001). Hereafter, Responsibility to Protect refers to the report and Responsibility to Protect refers to the concept.
(2.) For example, S. N. Macfarlane, C. J. Thielking, and Thomas G. Weiss, "The Responsibility to Protect: Is Anyone Interested in Humanitarian Intervention?" Third World Quarterly, 25, no. 5 (2004): 977-992.
(3.) Ramesh Thakur, The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 257.
(4.) United Nations, "2005 World Summit Outcome," A/60/L.1.UN 2005, 20 September 2005, pars. 138, 140.
(5.) "Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization," General Assembly, A/2911, 15 September 1955.
(6.) Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report (Washington, DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict 1997).
(7.) Fen Osler Hampson and David M. Malone, "Introduction: Making Conflict Prevention a Priority," in F O. Hampson and D. M. Malone, eds., From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002), p. 4
(8.) Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse, and Hugh Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Polity, 2006), p. 124.
(9.) Kofi Annan, "Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the SecretaryGeneral," A/55/985-S/2001/574, 7 June 2001.
(10.) D. Chigas, "The OSCE," in A. Chayes and A. H. Chayes, eds., Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World (Washington,DC: Brookings Institution, 1996).
(11.) See Alice Ackerman, "The Idea and Practice of Conflict Prevention," Journal of Peace Research 40, no. 3 (2003): 339-347.
(12.) Human Security Centre, Human Security Report 2005 (Vancouver: Human Security Centre, 2005).
(13.) See Ken Menkhaus, "Conflict Prevention and Human Security: Issues and Challenges," Conflict, Security and Development 4, no. 3 (2004): 420.
(14.) ICISS, Responsibility to Protect, p. 27.
(15.) See John J. Kirton and Radoslava N. Stefanova, eds., The G8, the United Nations and Conflict Prevention. (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2004).
(16.) See Paul D. Williams, British Foreign Policy Under New Labour, 1997-2005 (London: Palgrave, 2005), pp. 79,85, 148.
(17.) ICISS, Responsibility to Protect, p. 19.
(18.) Ibid., p. 21.
(19.) Ibid., pp. 21-22.
(20.) Ibid., p. 23.
(21.) Ibid., p. 25.
(22.) Ibid., p. 26.
(23.) Ibid., p. 25.
(25.) High-Level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change: A More Secure World--Our Shared Responsibility, A/59/565, 2 December 2004, par. 25.
(26.) Summarized from A More Secure World, pars. 90-104.
(27.) Kofi Annan, "Action Plan to Prevent Genocide," SG/SM/9197 AFR/893, 7 April 2004.
(28.) Task Force on the United Nations, American Interests and UN Reform (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2005), p. 33.
(29.) African Union, "Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations," African Union Executive Council, Ext/EX.CL/2(VII), 7-8 March 2005; Non-Aligned Movement, "Statement by Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement Concerning the Draft Outcome Document of the High-Level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly," 21 June 2005.
(30.) Non-Aligned Movement, "Statement," p. 2.
(31.) Ibid., p. 5; African Union, "Common African Position," p. 5.
(32.) Reform the UN, "State-by-State Positions on the Responsibility to Protect," 15 August 2005, www. reformtheun. org/index.php/issues/100-theme=alt42005, p. 8.
(33.) UN Security Council, S/PV 4334, 21 June 2001.
(34.) People's Republic of China, "Position Paper of the People's Republic of China on United Nations Reforms," 7 June 2005, pp. 10-12.
(35.) Government of Canada, "Non-Paper on The Responsibility to Protect and the Evolution of the United Nations' Peace and Security Mandate: Submission to the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change," 2005, par. 6.3.
(36.) Reform the UN, "State-by-State," p. 5.
(37.) Ibid., p. 7.
(38.) Ibid., pp. 8, 10.
(39.) African Union, "Common African Position," p. 3.
(40.) Luck, "Prevention," p. 256.
(41.) UN Security Council, S/PV.4174, 20 July 2000, p. 4.
(42.) See Maria Banda, "The Responsibility to Protect: Moving the Agenda For ward," Report for the United Nations Association of Canada, March 2007.
(43.) Kofi Annan, "Progress Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict," A/60/ 891, 18 July 2006, p. 4.
(44.) For example, John Burton, Global Conflict: The Domestic Sources of International Crisis (Brighton, UK: Wheatsheaf, 1984); and Michael Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 1996).
(45.) See Peter Wallensteen, ed., Preventing Future Conflicts: Past Record and Future Challenges (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 1998).
(46.) For example, Paul Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press/World Bank, 2003).
(47.) Hugh Miall, "Global Governance and Conflict Prevention," in Fergal Cochrane, Rosaleen Duffy, and Jan Selby, eds., Global Governance, Conflict and Resistance (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave, 2003), pp. 59-77.
(48.) Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts, p. 35.
(49.) Ramesh Thakur, "Iraq and the Responsibility to Protect," Behind the Headlines 61, no. 1 (2004): 1-16.
(50.) Thomas G. Weiss, "The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era," Security Dialogue 35, no. 2 (2004): 135.
(51.) Set out in detail in Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, "The West and Contemporary Peace Operations," Journal of Peace Research, forthcoming.
(52.) Lee Feinstein and Anne-Marie Slaughter, "A Duty to Prevent," Foreign Affairs 83, no. 1 (2004): 136-150.
(53.) Ibid., p. 138.
(54.) Ibid., p. 147.
(56.) Ibid., pp. 148-149.
(57.) The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The White House, 2002), p. 15.
(59.) Ian Johnstone, "US-UN Relations After Iraq: The End of the World (Order) As We Know It?" European Journal of International Law 15, no. 4 (2004): 832.
(60.) Chris Brown, "Self-Defense in an Imperfect World," Ethics and International Affairs 17, no. 1 (2003): 2.
(61.) George W. Bush, speech to the German Parliament, 23 May 2002, in Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 140.
(62.) Alex J. Bellamy, Just Wars: From Cicero to Iraq (Oxford: Polity, 2006), pp. 175-178.
(63.) Statement by H. E. Ban Ki-moon, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea, at the General Debate of the 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 18 September 2005, www.un.org/webcast/ga/60/statements/kor050918eng. pdf.
(64.) Yevgeny Primakov, "UN Process, Not Humanitarian Intervention, Is World's Best Hope," New Perspectives Quarterly, 2 September 2004, www.digitalnpq. org/global_services/global%viewpoint/02-09-04primakov.html.
(65.) Anita Inder Singh, "UN at Sixty: New Strategies a Must for Effectiveness," The Tribune: On-Line, Edition (Chandigarh, India), 30 September 2005, www.tribune india.com/2005/20050930/edit.htm#4.
(66.) Statement by H. E. Ambassador Stafford Neil, Permanent Representative of Jamaica to the United Nations and Chairman of the Group of 77, on the Report of the Secretary-General Entitled "In Larger Freedom," 6 April 2005, www.g77.org/Speeches/040405.htm.
(67.) Set out in Alex J. Bellamy, "A Responsibility to Protect or a Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention After Iraq," Ethics and International Affairs 19, no. 2 (2005).
(68.) Lloyd Axworthy,Gareth Evans, and Ramesh Thakur, "Responsibility to Protect: Redefining Sovereignty," MacArthur Newsletter, Summer 2005,p. 9.
(69.) See Gareth Evans and Mohammed Sahnoun, "The Responsibility to Protect," Foreign Affairs 81, no. 6 (2002): 99-110.
(70.) ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, pars. 6.19-6.21.
(71.) Nicholas J. Wheeler, "Legitimating Humanitarian Intervention: Principles and Procedures," Melbourne Journal of International Law 2, no. 2 (2001): 566.
(72.) Ramesh Thakur, "No More Rwandas: Intervention, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect," Humanitarian Exchange, http://odihpn.org/report.asp--ID=2605.
(73.) Wheeler, "Legitimating Humanitarian Intervention," p. 566.
(74.) UN Security Council, S/PV.5027, 2 September 2004, esp. p. 3.
(75.) See Menkhaus,'"Conflict Prevention."
(76.) Banda, "The Responsibility to Protect," pp. 12-17.
(77.) See Paul D. Williams, "Indifference and Intervention: International Society and Human Rights in Africa," International Journal of Human Rights 5, no. 2 (2001).
(78.) Daniela Kroslak, The Role of France in the Rwandan Genocide (London: Hurst, 2007).
(79.) Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995).
(80.) See "Talisman Oil Operations Prolong Sudan Civil War," Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 11 November 2000, www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2000/02/14/ talisman000214.html; and Williams, British Foreign Policy.
(81.) Government of Canada, "Non-Paper," par. 6.3.
(82.) ICISS, Responsibility to Protect, par. 6.11.
(83.) Ibid., par. 6.29-6.40.
(84.) Ibid., vol. 2.
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|Date:||Apr 1, 2008|
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