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Collaborative consumption: evaluating the convergence between terrorism and transnational organized crime and its implications for the national security of the United States.

I. INTRODUCTION

The United States indicted Jamal Yousef with one count of narco-terrorism conspiracy in July of 2009 following his arrest in New York City. (1) Yousef had allegedly been negotiating with a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agent posing as a representative of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) for the exchange of military-grade weapons for hundreds of kilograms of cocaine. (2) Yousef claimed that the weapons had been stolen from Iraq and stored in Mexico at the home of a relative who was a member of the Hezbollah organization based in Lebanon. (3)

The growing convergence of terrorism and transnational organized crime, as exemplified by the account of Jamal Yousef, may be the defining national security threat facing the United States in the twenty-first century. (4) Yet the major fallacy in the identification and assessment of this threat resides in the failure to acknowledge the extent of this convergence. (5) Examples of this disturbing trend can be seen in parts of Mexico, as well as the Tri-Border Area of Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil (TBA). (6) In these areas, increasingly sophisticated methods of cooperation between designated terrorist organizations and transnational criminal syndicates have been observed in recent years, and this pattern continues to escalate as globalization allows these groups to easily communicate and synergize operations. (7)

This Note will examine and analyze the rapidly growing collaboration of these groups in the TBA and Mexico. (8) In Part II, this Note will discuss the executive orders and legislation in the United States describing the process of designating specific groups as either a Transnational Criminal Organization (TCO) or Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). (9) Part III of this Note will examine the historical and present interactions between organized crime and terrorism in the TBA and Mexico. (10) In Part IV, this Note will analyze the growing confluence among these once-distinct groups and its implications for the national security of the United States. (11) Additionally, this Note will suggest that the United States should engage in a more comprehensive process of identification and designation of these groups to more efficiently combat the potential threat of this nexus. (12) Finally, Part V will conclude that the threat from the growing convergence of terrorist groups and TCOs is presenting a national security threat to the United States. (13)

II. FACTS

A. Designation as a TCO in the United States

On July 24, 2011, President Barack Obama issued Executive Order 13581, "Blocking Property of [TCOs]" (EO 13581), which addressed, for the first time, the gravity and potential implications of organized crime on the international economic and political arena. (14) EO 13581 specifically provides for monetary sanctions for any person who provides "financial, material or technological support" to a designated TCO. (15) Furthermore, it directs that any interest or property within the jurisdiction of the United States affiliated with the aforementioned support may not be "transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn or otherwise dealt in." (16) Lastly, it vests complete decision making and oversight for such sanctions with the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of State. (17)

For an organization to be designated a TCO it must exhibit three distinct characteristics. (18) First, the organization must consist of one or more foreign persons. (19) Second, these persons must engage in an ongoing pattern of criminal activity involving the jurisdictions of at least two foreign states. (20) Finally, the organization must threaten the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States. (21) There are currently five officially designated TCOs that fall under the jurisdiction of EO 13581. (22) This list includes: The Brother's Circle, Yakuza, Camorra, Los Zetas, Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13). (23)

For comparative purposes, "the Federal Bureau of Investigation [(FBI)] defines organized crime [as] any group having some manner of a formalized structure, whose primary objective is to obtain money through illegal activities." (24) These groups are able to maintain their positions through the use of threatened or actual violence, bribery, corruption, and extortion, and generally have a significant influence on the people in their regions or countries. (25)

The United States partially recognizes the national security threat posed by TCOs; however, it does not go far enough. (26) The implications of this growing threat can affect "public safety, public health, democratic institutions, and economic stability across the globe." (27)

B. Designation as a FTO in the United States

Approximately a decade prior to EO 13581, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13224 (EO 13224) on September 23, 2001, in response to the events of September 11, 2001. (28) The purpose of EO 13224 is to provide a streamlined process of identifying, designating, and ultimately blocking financial assets of individuals found to be affiliated with or in support of an FTO. (29) The principal responsibility for monitoring and identifying potential FTOs rests with the Bureau of Counterterrorism of the U.S. Department of State, with the Secretary of State having final approval in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of Treasury. (30) The criteria for designation as an FTO are similar to that of EO 13581. (31) The organization must be foreign to the jurisdiction of the United States. (32) The organization must engage in terrorist activity or retain the "capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism." (33) Lastly, the organization's terrorist activities must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security of the United States in general. (34) As of September 28, 2012, there are over forty designated FTOs. (35)

The United States uses two similar definitions of terrorism. (36) The United States Code defines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatants by sub-national groups or clandestine agents," usually intended to influence an audience. (37) The Department of Defense defines terrorism as the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to instill fear, intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (38) The international community has not agreed upon a global definition of terrorism. (39)

III. HISTORY

A. The Crime-Terror Nexus in the TBA

The TBA is a notorious epicenter of the incubation and collaboration of organized crime, corruption, and terrorism. (40) The Paraguayan city of Ciudad del Este, for example, functions as one of the major breeding grounds for such activities. (41) While the sources of the problem are numerous and varied, the effects reveal a "dynamic shadow economy" thriving as a result of the interlocked network of criminals and terrorists. (42) This shadow economy is so entrenched within Ciudad del Este that the area is a potent attraction for transnational criminal groups and terrorist organizations. (43)

Indigenous organized crime syndicates have been a concern among the national leaders of the TBA for some time. (44) But the presence of non-indigenous organized crime syndicates has dramatically increased over recent decades as conditions in the TBA became more appealing. (45) Organized crime groups from China, Colombia, Corsica, Ghana, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan,

Korea, Lebanon, Nigeria, Russia, and Taiwan have operated in the TBA. (46) These groups engage in numerous illegal activities, such as narcotics and arms dealing, extortion, money laundering, pirating counterfeit goods, and smuggling stolen goods, to raise funds. (47) Numerous types of goods are available for sale in small shops in the TBA including sophisticated military hardware and advanced weaponry. (48) Corrupt police forces and lax enforcement of laws provide a fertile ground for criminal enterprises. (49) In addition, permissive banking systems, lacking any form of transparency, foster the money laundering necessary for TCOs to thrive. (50)

The presence of terrorist organizations in the TBA is of particular concern. (51) The TBA has a "longstanding presence of Islamic extremist organizations." (52) For example, Hezbollah allegedly orchestrated the bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina in 1992 from the TBA. (53) Additionally, Al Qaeda has organized bases in the TBA. (54) The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) believed at one point that Al Qaeda was attempting to designate the TBA, specifically Ciudad del Este, as its main base in the Western Hemisphere. (55) The CIA and Mossad believe that the base in Ciudad del Este is intended to build on existing Al Qaeda links to narcotics, arms, and uranium trafficking in the TBA. (56) Furthermore, the base will utilize existing money laundering arrangements in association with other TCOs, notably the Chinese and Russian Mafias. (57) Other terrorist organizations, such as Islamic Jihad, FARC, and Gamaa Islamiya, have established bases in Ciudad del Este from which operations can be planned, developed, and executed. (58)

Due to the multitude of factors described above, collaboration among various terrorist organizations and transnational criminal syndicates in the TBA is the expected logical progression. (59) Joint-access to regional streams of illicit fundraising provides the necessary backbone for cooperation among the groups. (60) Numerous accounts of collaboration between otherwise distinct organizations have been reported in the TBA. (61) For example, the Hong Kong-based mafias in Paraguay maintain strong ties to Hezbollah, the political party and militant group based in Lebanon and designated FTO. (62) Similarly, two branches of the Chinese Mafia--the Sung-I and Ming families--have engaged in illegal transactions with Egypt's Gamaa Islamiya, another officially designated FTO. (63)

One notable account of wide-scale collaboration concerns the 1994 bombing of the Asociacion Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA), a Jewish community center, in Buenos Aires, Argentina that killed eighty-five people and injured hundreds more. (64) Imad Mughniyah, head of one of the armed militant wings of Hezbollah--Islamic Jihad--was likely the architect of the attack. (65) Unfortunately, the exact blueprint for the bombing is unknown. (66) The evidence, however, suggests that the conditions and factors present in the TBA allowed Hezbollah to successfully harmonize their operations in the area culminating in the deadly attack. (67) For example, the evidence suggests that the explosive materials necessary for the bomb were smuggled across the border between Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguacu. (68) It is likely that several criminal syndicates either directly or indirectly contributed to the fundraising, corruption, and smuggling that led to the attack. (69)

The United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution, which noted with concern the "close connection between international terrorism and transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money laundering, illegal arms-trafficking, and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological, and other potentially deadly materials." (70) This resolution was passed with the events of September 11, 2001 in mind, but its message is applicable to the TBA. (71) A deeply entrenched system cultivates the widespread and seamless interaction of FTOs and TCOs in the TBA. (72)

B. The Crime-Terror Nexus in Mexico

Mexico has an extensive history of primarily domestic criminal organizations and narcotics trafficking. (73) The drug trafficking organizations, or "cartels," are primarily designed to control the supply and distribution of narcotics in order to maximize their profits. (74) These cartels have been around for over a century and are known to be exceptionally dangerous and violent enterprises. (75) The cartels operate nearly seamlessly across borders in order to facilitate their operations in the most efficient manner possible. (76) The cartels have reportedly expanded their operations into areas such as petroleum smuggling, counterfeit toys, and even the avocado industry. (77)

The effects of the cartels spilling over the border harms the stability of U.S. trade, financial markets, and general border security. (78) One notable account of U.S. financial interests being implicated involves the now-defunct Wachovia Bank. (79) During a twenty-two month investigation, the DEA, Internal Revenue Service, and various other U.S. agencies uncovered billions of dollars in wire transfers and other transactions through Mexican exchanges into Wachovia accounts. (80) Wachovia was ultimately sanctioned for "failing to apply the proper anti-laundering strictures [of USD378.4 billion] ... into dollar accounts from so-called casas de cambio (CDCs) in Mexico." (81) This account demonstrates the role of the "legal" banking sector in laundering billions of dollars derived from violent drug trade across the globe. (82)

Members of Mexico's drug trafficking organizations are moving their families to U.S. cities. (83) This migration has led to an increase in violence along the U.S. border. (84) The increase in violence, specifically mass kidnappings along the border, spurred the Consulate General of the United States to issue a warning regarding the possible threat of violence by Mexican drug cartels against U.S. citizens and law enforcement personnel. (85) The consensus among law enforcement agencies is that Mexican drug trafficking organizations are now deeply imbedded in cities across the United States. (86)

The tactics generally employed by the cartels are sophisticated in nature and include the use of assassinations, kidnappings, and extortion. (87) Several members of Los Zetas, an officially designated TCO, are former Mexican special forces trained in heavy weaponry, specialized military strategy, counter surveillance, and intelligence collection. (88) The increasingly complex use of intimidation and political assassinations has caused narcotics cartels to resemble terrorist organizations. (89) For example, Mexican government officials have been decapitated by traffickers in reprisal for their role in cartel arrests. (90)

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which became effective in 1994, created a dramatic increase in trans-border commercial activity between the United States and Mexico. (91) The implementation of NAFTA greatly benefitted TCOs and terrorist groups by providing extensive opportunities to smuggle narcotics, arms, and humans across borders with little impediment. (92)

A number of TCOs have established bases in Mexico due to the high volume of commercial activity as well as the structural and transactional opportunities presented by domestic cartels. (93) Crime syndicates from Russia, Ukraine, Japan, China, and Korea are presently operating in some capacity in Mexico. (94) These organizations engage in a wide variety of illicit activities, including narcotics and arms trafficking, money laundering, and human smuggling. (95)

The existence of alliances between Russian criminal organizations and Mexican drug cartels is well established. (96) One report reveals that the Russian mafia was providing Mexican cartels with radars, grenade launchers, automatic weapons, and other military grade hardware in exchange for cocaine, amphetamines, and heroin. (97) Alliances between Asian mafias and Mexican cartels are generally for the purpose of smuggling immigrants into the United States. (98) Additionally, a newly emerging alliance between Mexican cartels and MS-13, another designated TCO, has been observed. (99) The Sinaloa cartel has likely hired scores of MS-13 members to aid in its battle against Los Zetas for territory in the narcotics trade. (100)

Historically, Mexico City has provided refuge to various delegations from terrorist organizations in exchange for promises to refrain from engaging in any relations with domestic criminal organizations. (101) Several terrorist organizations, including FARC and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, have maintained an extensive presence in Mexico City for decades. (102) Narcotics and arms trafficking deals between FARC and the Arellano Felix organization, a major Tijuanabased cartel, are well documented. (103)

Of more concern to the United States is the presence of various Islamic terrorist organizations in Mexico. (104) In 2002, an official from the National Migration Institute in Mexico stated: "We have in Mexico people linked to terrorism and we are constantly observing unusual immigration flows ... [people connected to] ETA, Hezbollah and even some with links to Osama Bin Laden." (105)

Collaboration between TCOs and FTOs in Mexico has become a concern. (106) This growing trend of collaboration is exemplified by the well-documented account of the 2011 Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States. (107) Manssor Arbabsiar and Gholam Shakuri, two Iranian nationals, along with several members of the Iran-based Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Quds Force, planned to assassinate the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States by detonating a bomb at a restaurant in Washington, D.C. (108) Arbabsiar planned to hire members of Los Zetas, a major Mexican cartel and designated TCO, to carry out the assassination plot for USD1.5 million. (109) The negotiations included plans to bomb the Israeli and Saudi embassies in Washington, D.C., as well as targets in Buenos Aires, Argentina. (110) Additionally, as part of the agreement, several tons of opium would be shipped from the Middle East to Mexico. (111) This conspiracy led a DEA administrator to remark that the "dangerous connection between drug trafficking and terrorism cannot be overstated." (112)

Mexican drug cartels often outsource a large portion of their daily criminal operations to street gangs to increase productivity. (113) One of these street gangs, noted for their brutality and proliferation, is the El Salvadorian MS-13. (114) Cells of MS-13 members operate all over the United States, notably in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Washington D.C., Boston, and Houston. (115) Each cell is tasked with specific responsibilities, such as recruitment, propaganda, prostitution, narcotics smuggling, and extortion. (116) From a U.S. foreign policy perspective, MS-13 is a designated TCO--the first and only street gang to attain such a status. (117)

The nexus between criminal organizations and terrorists groups in Mexico largely centers on the narcotics trade. (118) The funds derived from the drug trade are vital to the continued operations of various terrorist groups, such as FARC, in the region. (119) Furthermore, U.S. intelligence believes that at least forty terrorist organizations have links to the global drug trade. (120) The logistical support and tactics provided by criminal organizations are pivotal to the continued funding of terrorist organizations. (121)

IV. Analysis

FTOs and TCOs are becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish. (122) The longstanding belief that the distinguishing factor between these groups resides in the primarily political motives of terrorist organizations as compared with the primarily financial motives of criminal organizations is rapidly becoming antiquated. (123) The modern paradigm indicates that many organizations, whether terrorist or criminal, display elements of both motives. (124) When these motives align, as they frequently do, it becomes mutually beneficial for the groups to collaborate in order to increase efficiency and maximize results. (125) The collaboration among these organizations is a newly-emerging threat to the national security of the United States. (126)

To counteract this threat, the United States needs to enact more comprehensive legislation, including a more streamlined designation process. (127) Such changes will allow for a more efficient and centralized information-sharing network amongst intelligence and enforcement agencies in the United States and globally. (128) Furthermore, the legislation must not distinguish the financing of FTOs and TCOs because they have become synonymous. (129)

A. Where to Draw the Line?

The once-clear distinguishing line between FTOs and TCOs has faded and been replaced by an indeterminate fusion. (130) For example, on its face, Los Zetas is strictly a narcotics-distribution organization, and its involvement in violence is deemed to be merely inherent to the nature of the industry. (131) A closer analysis of the activities of Los Zetas reveals an appreciable overlap with the activities generally associated with terrorist organizations which, according to the U.S. Department of Defense, involve the "calculated use of unlawful violence ... to inculcate fear or to intimidate governments." (132) A tactic employed by Los Zetas is the decapitation of government officials to influence local law enforcement policies and to generate considerable fear, which serves a primarily political motive. (133) Due to the highly-skilled nature of the former Mexican special forces soldiers who have joined Los Zetas, these initiatives are likely calculated to "inculcate fear or to intimidate governments" with as much precision and effect as possible. (134)

With the use of sophisticated military-grade weaponry, Los Zetas have evolved from a narcotics organization to a paramilitary unit capable of unrestrained violence. (135) Los Zetas likely engages in premeditated, politically-motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatants, often involving clandestine agents, and its aim is usually intended to influence an audience. (136)

Finally, Los Zetas' agreement to participate in the assassination of a foreign ambassador to a foreign state under the direction of an officially designated terrorist organization fundamentally qualifies Los Zetas as a terrorist organization. (137) The process of distinguishing between political and financial motives is ineffective in the case of Los Zetas, as it fails to recognize the degree to which collaboration has facilitated the ascension of such composite organizations. (138)

B. Collaboration

The various examples of collaboration between FTOs and TCOs demonstrates that this nexus has advanced beyond the incipient stage of development, and is instead becoming the general rule rather than the exception. (139) Collaboration becomes the logical next step when the political and financial motives of the organizations align or overlap. (140) At this point, it becomes mutually beneficial to adopt techniques and strategies that serve to enhance each organization's respective position because one organization may be stronger in a given area, such as arms smuggling, than another organization. (141) The appearance of one group on any given day becomes indistinguishable from that of another group because the organizations are continuously exchanging resources and participating in homogenous activities. (142) At this point, the distinguishing line between these groups becomes senseless. (143)

Using the TBA as a case study, it becomes clear that terrorist groups and TCOs interact seamlessly in an abundance of areas, including fundraising, arms and human smuggling, forgery, and military training. (144) Classifying particular groups and subgroups based on ideology or motives alone is a futile attempt to address the problem because the strategies employed by the organizations are fundamentally the same and are designed to achieve the same objectives. (145)

The 1994 bombing of the AMIA in Buenos Aires, Argentina is a prime example in which the individual motives of each organization were, for all intents and purposes, meaningless. (146) Several criminal and terrorist organizations interacted over a period of time to coordinate the logistics necessary to conduct the attack. (147) The bomb-making materials had to be smuggled across national borders utilizing corruption and subterfuge. (148) Each participant realized the plausibility, if not probability, of the dramatic consequences of facilitating the transportation of explosives across international borders. (149) The dynamic shadow economy thriving in the TBA as a result of the interwoven network of criminals and terrorists precipitated the bombing of the AIMA. (150) Each organization that contributed a piece to the proverbial puzzle is responsible for the attack. (151) In such a situation, where numerous criminal and terrorist organizations interacted to achieve mutually beneficial results, the need for a distinction between political and financial motives becomes unwarranted. (152)

C. The Threat to the United States

The emergence of hybrid organizations is creating an aggravated threat to the national security of the United States. (153) Coordination between criminal and terrorist organizations fosters the possibility of increased opportunities to threaten the security of U.S. citizens. (154) Such organized efforts result in an increased ease of illegal border crossings; therefore, allowing for more diverse and dangerous individuals to enter the United States. (155) The account of Jamal Yousef is one example of how criminals and terrorists have infiltrated the United States via coordination with numerous organizations. (156) The plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States in Washington D.C. reveals the true extent to which U.S. national security is already at risk. (157) The assassination plan also included discussions of bombing the Saudi embassy in Washington D.C. (158) The recent inclusion of targets on American soil by criminal and terrorist groups operating in conjunction signifies the level of threat posed by this emerging trend. (159) Furthermore, the belief that Mexican cartel affiliates are targeting U.S. law enforcement personnel on American soil solidifies the notion that the emergence of hybrid organizations is rapidly becoming a national security issue. (160)

The implications for U.S. financial interests can be exemplified by the Wachovia money-laundering scandal. (161) If TCOs are already able to launder illicit funds through American banks, then the security of the American banking system has already been breached. (162) One need not be overly creative to envision the possibility of other TCOs and FTOs utilizing U.S. banks to engineer financial attacks on the U.S. financial system. (163) With such negligent, or even reckless, compliance on the part of U.S. banks, the integrity of the banking sector will be damaged. (164)

The increased threat to American national security is further demonstrated by the rapid proliferation of MS-13 on U.S soil. (165) MS-13 is already responsible for hundreds of murders in the United States, and this number is increasing as the organization grows in number and influence. (166) Beyond homicide, the gang engages in extortion, kidnapping, human smuggling, sex and drug trafficking, racketeering, and assassinations in several American cities. (167) Members of MS-13 are also used as soldiers in the Sinaloa cartel's war with Los Zetas for territory in Mexico. (168) These factors confirm that there is a transnational, sophisticated, organized, ultra-violent crime organization with close ties to other transnational crime organizations scattered across U.S. cities. (169) The threat to the national security of the United States from FTOs is not merely a possibility, but a reality. (170) The presence of MS-13 has the potential for devastating effects on the United States if the organization continues to forge alliances with other criminal and terrorist enterprises. (171) Local prosecutions and the freezing of financial assets will only go so far in impeding the growth of MS-13. (172)

D. Redundant Executive Orders

The primary inadequacy of U.S. executive orders regarding TCOs and FTOs is the creation of a distinction between the two. (173) Formulating two unique executive orders to address organizations that are operationally indistinguishable creates a counterproductive redundancy. (174) The only cognizable difference in the definitions of TCOs and FTOs indicated in the Executive Orders is that a TCO must engage in an "ongoing pattern of criminal activity involving the jurisdictions of at least two foreign states," while a FTO must engage in "terrorist activity or retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism." (175) This nuanced difference is based solely on the misconception that FTOs and TCOs are fundamentally, operationally, and financially unique organizations with minimal interaction or overlap. (176) This difference is further based on the notion that terrorist activity and criminal activity are entirely distinguishable forms of violence or wrongdoing with minimal overlap. (177) This simply is not an accurate perception of the reality of the nature of TCOs and FTOs, who continually interact in the micro view to achieve mutually beneficial results in the macro view. (178) Additionally, the emergence of organizations that exhibit tendencies of both TCOs and FTOs further demonstrates the inefficiency of distinguishing between them. (179)

A secondary inadequacy of the aforementioned EOs involves the nature of the penalty. (180) The EOs provide for "monetary sanctions" for any person who provides "material, financial, or technological support" to any designated organization. (181) The sanction can only freeze assets in accounts that fall under U.S. jurisdiction. (182) This solution will only eradicate those persons who utilize the American financial system to support TCOs or FTOs. (183) The vast majority of TCOs and FTOs operate outside of U.S. jurisdiction; thus, a monetary sanction freezing the U.S. assets of those who support terrorism or transnational crime will only go so far in protecting the national security of the U.S. (184) Furthermore, the account of the Wachovia money-laundering scandal indicates that the U.S. banking system has been manipulated on at least one occasion in the past. (185) The possibility of additional breaches is conceivable. (186) Manipulation of the U.S. banking sector only serves to abate the effect of monetary sanctions. (187)

E. Time for a Comprehensive Approach

The most practical way to counter the threat posed by the nexus between FTOs and TCOs is to bypass inane differences in the definition of each organization, and instead treat each group in a similar manner based on the level of threat posed. (188) The United States needs to focus on the areas where these groups collaborate. (189) These areas include weapons trafficking, counterfeit products, narcotics and human smuggling, and money laundering. (190) By targeting the methods in which these groups collaborate and thrive, the United States will more effectively negate the possibility of criminal enterprises threatening its national security. (191) While the use of monetary sanctions is warranted, it should not be the only strategy employed to counteract this threat. (192) Finally, utilizing various forms of law enforcement personnel, including local police agencies, the DEA, FBI, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), Border Patrol, and Interpol, is a logical solution to combatting the proliferation of hybrid organizations on American soil. (193)

The designation process needs to evolve as rapidly as these organizations themselves. (194) The United States should establish a centralized database that includes all organizations, enterprises, and factions that pose a security threat regardless of any political or ulterior motives demonstrated by the organization. (195) The database should categorize organizations based on the level of threat and potential to harm U.S. interests as well as implement the monetary sanctions already in existence. (196) A centralized database will decrease the bureaucratic nature of the current system and allow for more efficient and accurate information sharing between law enforcement agencies nationally and globally. (197)

The United States needs to target the source of the funding, weapons, and narcotics of organizations that pose a threat to it. (198) The DEA, FBI, ATF, and Border Patrol must take a proactive, rather than reactive, approach to inhibiting the spread of these materials on U.S. soil. (199) Additionally, the United States needs to foster stronger relationships with other nations, notably Central and South American states, to effectively combat the spread of weapons, narcotics, humans, and counterfeit products. (200) Interpol, in conjunction with U.S. law enforcement agencies, needs to take a proactive role in detecting the sources of funding for these organizations. (201)

V. Conclusion

The growing convergence of TCOs and FTOs is a grave national security threat facing the United States in the foreseeable future. (202) Although the United States government, specifically the Executive branch, has enacted various Executive Orders to institute financial sanctions against officially designated organizations, the threat remains as collaboration advances and hybrid organizations engage in innovative strategies to achieve their goals. (203) Extensive collaboration between TCOs and FTOs can be seen throughout the TBA, as well as in various parts of Mexico. (204) The United States needs to enact a more comprehensive piece of legislation that establishes a database for all organizations designated as a threat to the United States. (205) This will allow for greater information sharing and transparency between several law enforcement agencies to maximize coordination of their strategies to protect the national security of the United States. (206)

(1) See Indictment, United States v. Yousef, S4 08 Cr. 1213 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/May12/yousef/yousefjamals4indictment.pdf [hereinafter Indictment] (providing official indictment of Jamal Yousef); see also Anahad O'Connor, Arrest in Plot to Sell Arms to Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2009 (reporting events leading to Yousef's arrest).

(2) See O'Connor, supra note 1 (explaining background and details of Yousefs criminal activity). The weapons included one hundred M-16 assault rifles, one hundred AR-15 rifles, 2500 hand grenades, C-4 explosives, and antitank munitions. Id. ; see also Benjamin Weiser, Guilty Plea in Conspiracy Case Linked to Colombian Guerrillas, N.Y. Times, May 5, 2012 (providing update of United States v. Yousef). Yousef ultimately pleaded guilty to conspiring to sell weapons to the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). Weiser, supra. FARC is known to have carried out extensive military-style attacks on political, civilian, and economic targets throughout Colombia. See OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2011 ch. 6 (July 31, 2012), available at http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195553.htm#FARC (providing history and analysis on designated foreign terrorist organizations from each country around world). FARC has also executed U.S. missionaries working in Colombia. Id. From a United States foreign policy perspective, FARC is considered a foreign terrorist organization (FTO). Id.

(3) See Indictment, supra note 1 (alleging facts of conspiracy between Yousef and undercover U.S. agent). Hezbollah is a political and paramilitary association affiliated with the Parliament of Lebanon. See OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, supra note Error: Reference source not found (providing further information on terrorist organizations and alleged activities). From a United States foreign policy perspective, Hezbollah is considered a terrorist organization. Id.

(4) See Threat from International Organized Crime and Terrorism: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Int 'l Relations, 105th Cong. 59-63 (1997) (statement of Louise Shelley, Director, Center for Transnational Organized Crime and Corruption) [hereinafter Shelley Testimony] (discussing threats from international organized crime and terrorism). Drug trafficking, arms smuggling, human smuggling, and the growing trade in nuclear materials will all contribute to the convergence of these groups. Id. ; see also Karen Parrish, Link Grows Between Terrorism, Organized Crime, Officials Say, AM. FORCES PRESS SERVICE (Mar. 28 2012), available at http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=67721 (acknowledging transnational criminal organizations and terrorist organizations are now cooperating in ways previously unseen). A transnational criminal organization (TCO) and terrorist organization are more likely to work together than ever before. See Parrish, supra (noting shift in traditional paradigm).

(5) See generally LOUISE SHELLEY ET AL., Methods and Motives: Exploring Links Between Transnational ORGANIZED CRIME & INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (June 23, 2005), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/2n207.pdf (analyzing growing collaboration between organized crime and terrorism). As terrorist organizations and transnational criminal syndicates work together more often, they "move beyond activity appropriation to a different, closer, form of interaction." Id. at 5.

(6) See infra Part III (discussing convergence of organized crime and terrorism in Tri-Border Area and Mexico, respectively).

(7) See infra Part III (detailing accounts of cooperation between terrorist organizations and TCOs in Tri-Border Area and Mexico).

(8) See infra Part III (highlighting synergies that exist between terrorist organizations and TCOs in Tri-Border Area and Mexico).

(9) See infra Part II (discussing classifications of criminal and terrorist organizations).

(10) See infra Part III (discussing the growing convergence of terrorism and organized crime in Tri-Border Area and Mexico).

(11) See infra Part IV (analyzing convergence of terrorist and TCOs and implications on national security of United States).

(12) See infra Part IV (suggesting United States should adopt comprehensive identification and designation process for terrorist and TCOs).

(13) See infra Part V (concluding convergence between terrorist and TCOs will pose threat to security of United States).

(14) Exec. Order No. 13581, 76 Fed. Reg. 44757 (July 24, 2011) (addressing potential implications of transnational organized crime on global financial system). President Obama issued this Executive Order pursuant to his powers under both the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the National Emergency Act. Id. To invoke these pieces of legislation, the President must find that an "unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States" exists. Id.

(15) Id. (explaining persons who receive monetary sanctions and TCOs).

(16) Id. (discussing what should be done with property and other interests).

(17) See id. (describing who has decision making power). See generally Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, [section] 311-77 (providing relevant sections of USA Patriot Act). The Secretary of the Treasury was tasked with formulating regulations to increase information sharing and deter money laundering under the USA Patriot Act. See Exec. Order No. 13581, supra note Error: Reference source not found (requiring Secretary of Treasury to consult with Attorney General). The Secretary of Treasury can impose penalties and sanctions upon parties found to have participated in financial crimes related to terrorist activities. Id.

(18) See Exec. Order No. 13581, supra note Error: Reference source not found (noting three required characteristics of TCOs).

(19) See id. (requiring organization must contain at least one foreign-born member).

(20) See id. (explaining organization must pose threat to national security, foreign policy, or U.S. economy).

(21) See id. (detailing threat requirement to define TCO).

(22) See id. (noting number of officially designated organizations).

(23) See id. (listing officially designated TCOs); Ramon J. Miro, Organized Crime and Terrorist Activity in Mexico, 1999-2002 (2003) (discussing prevalence of organized crime and terrorism in Mexico). Los Zetas is the only major Mexican drug cartel designated as a TCO while the other cartels are similarly organized, influential, and violent. Miro, supra; see Jan-Albert Hootsen, Drug War Continues: "El Chapo" Guzman Not Dead After All, Globalpost, Feb. 26, 2013, available at http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/mexico/130226/drug-war-continues-joaquin-chapoguzman-not-dead (updating recent reports stating Joaquin Guzman, leader of Sinaloa cartel, was killed). The Sinaloa cartel is responsible for approximately 10,000 deaths in Mexico as well as the transportation of half of the cocaine smuggled into the United States. Hootsen, supra. The Sinaloa cartel is not designated as a TCO. Id. The city of Chicago recently designated Joaquin Guzman as its "Public Enemy No. 1," the first such designation since Al Capone. Id.

(24) See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ORGANIZED CRIME GLOSSARY OF TERMS, http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/investigate/organizedcrime/glossary (defining organized crime).

(25) See id. (observing organizations maintenance of positions).

(26) See NAT'L SEC. STAFF, STRATEGY TO COMBAT TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME: ADDRESSING CONVERGING THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY (2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/defauh/files/microsites/ 2011strategy-combat-transnational-organized-crime.pdf (recognizing security threats to United States); see also infra Part IV.D (analyzing threat posed to United States by convergence of crime and terrorism).

(27) NAT'L SEC. STAFF, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 5 (discussing implications of continued convergence of terrorist and criminal organizations).

(28) Exec. Order No. 13224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49079 (Sept. 23, 2001) (establishing process for identifying, designating, and penalizing individuals affiliated with FTOs). Exec. Order No. 13224 (EO 13224) charges the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of Treasury with enforcing economic and trade sanctions based on U.S. foreign policy decisions. Id.

(29) See id. (discussing purpose of EO 13224).

(30) See id. (describing responsibilities of officials charged with enforcement of EO 13224).

(31) See Exec. Order No. 13581, supra note 14 (detailing criteria for designation as TCO).

(32) See Exec. Order No. 13224, supra note 28 (stating requirement regarding foreign status of organization).

(33) Id. (requiring link between organization and terrorist activity).

(34) See id. (explaining terrorist purpose).

(35) See id. (stating number of FTOs).

(36) See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., Department OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 368 (Joint Publication 1-02, 2010), available at http://ra.defense.gov/documents/rtm/jp1_02.pdf (defining terrorism in general); see also 22 U.S.C. [section] 2656f(d)(2) (2004) (providing U.S. definition of terrorism).

(37) See 22 U.S.C. [section] 2656f(d)(2) (defining terrorism).

(38) See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note 36, at 368 (defining terrorism in general).

(39) See General Assembly, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee established by General Assembly Resolution 51/210 of 17 December 1996, Annex II art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/57/37 (2002), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/57/a5737.pdf (proposing universal definition of terrorism). The proposed treaty defines terrorism as:

unlawfully and intentionally, caus[ing]

(a) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or

(b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or the environment; or

(c) Damage to property, places, facilities, or systems referred to in paragraph 1(b) of this article, resulting or likely to result in major economic loss, when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.

Id.

(40) See SHELLEY ET AL., supra note 5 (discussing organization of transnational criminal groups). The Tri-Border Area of Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil (TBA) serves as a base for Yakuza as well as Colombian and other Latin American syndicates to launder money and smuggle narcotics and arms. Id. at 60. Several terrorist groups are also suspected of conducting operations out of the TBA, including Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, Gamaa Islamiya, and FARC. Id.

(41) See generally LAVERLE BERRY ET AL., NATIONS HOSPITABLE TO ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORISM (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/Nats_Hospitable.pdf (describing locations where terrorism and crime often convalesce). Ciudad del Este has been described as an "oasis for informants and spies; peddlers of contraband and counterfeit products; traffickers in drugs, weapons, and humans; common criminals; mafias; undocumented Arabs; and terrorists." Id. at 176.

(42) See SHELLEY ET AL., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 60-61 (describing conditions in Ciudad del Este breeding illicit activity). Among the sources of the problem are arbitrarily enforced tax laws, a dense and diversified population, huge disparities in income, and minimal border patrol. Id. Ciudad del Este sits at the international border where Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil meet. Id. at 60. It has been estimated that approximately 40,000 people and 2000 vehicles, including freight trucks, cross the bridge between Ciudad del Este and Fox do Iguacu, a Brazilian city, daily without being checked. Id. at 61. The three nations blame each other for allowing such rampant criminal activities to persist, yet little has been achieved in alleviating the issue. Id. at 59. The resulting shadow economy has been estimated at between 40% and 50% of Paraguay's national gross domestic product. Id. at 61.

(43) See id. at 60-61 (examining increased cooperation between organized crime and terrorism).

(44) See BERRY ET AL., supra note 41, at 173-74, 182-83 (describing presence of indigenous organized crime in Ciudad del Este). The Brazilian and Paraguayan mafias both maintain a strong presence in the TBA. Id.

(45) See id. at 173-74 (analyzing reasons for increased proliferation of organized crime and terrorism in TBA).

(46) Id. at 173, 184 (evaluating increased presence of international crime organizations in TBA). The presence of Chinese-speaking syndicates is notable. Id. at 184. The Chinese mafia extorts an exorbitant amount money from local Chinese-owned businesses in Sao Paulo, estimated at USD1.6 million annually. Id. at 185. Additionally, Russian and Chechen gangs have been operating in Argentina and Brazil. Id. at 86. The Brazilian and Russian mafias have engaged in numerous arms-for-narcotics transactions over the years. Id. at 187. The increased presence of AK-47s, Russian-made semiautomatic rifles, in Rio de Janeiro can be attributed to these transactions. Id.

(47) See id. at 184-87 (describing illicit means of raising funds in TBA).

(48) SHELLEY ET AL., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 61 (noting abundance of counterfeit and illegal goods in TBA).

(49) Id. at 64 (summarizing systemic conditions present fostering development and spread of black market activity); see also TRANSPARENCY INT'L, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2012 (2012), available at http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results (ranking nations based on perceived corruption). Paraguay's government itself is highly corrupt. See TRANSPARENCY INT'L, supra. It was ranked 150th in the 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index. Id.

(50) See SHELLEY ET AL., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 65 (identifying financial transactions and money laundering as economic watch points). It fIwas estimated that half of all banking transactions in Ciudad del Este in 2003 involved a corrupt source. Id.

(51) See id. at 60-61 (describing lack of transparency in domestic banking sector).

(52) See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2001 78-79 (2002), available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/10319.pdf (indicating presence of Hezbollah and Hamas in TBA since early 1990s).

(53) SHELLEY ET AL., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 60 (suggesting Hezbollah might have utilized conditions in TBA to bomb Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires).

(54) BERRY ET AL., supra note 41, at 194 (discussing Al Qaeda's presence in TBA). Osama bin Laden visited the TBA in 1995. Id. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the alleged mastermind of the September 11, 2001 attacks, also spent twenty days in Foz do Iguacu in 1998. Id.

(55) Id. at 195 (examining presence of Al Qaeda in TBA).

(56) See id. (predicting Al Qaeda's reliance on Ciudad del Este base to further current terrorist incentives).

(57) See id. (forecasting Al Qaeda's Ciudad del Este base would improve their money laundering relationships).

(58) See SHELLEY ET AL., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 60 (characterizing Ciudad del Este as "center of operations" for numerous terrorist groups).

(59) See YVON DANDURAND & VIVIENNE CHIN, LINKS BETWEEN TERRORISM AND OTHER FORMS OF CRIME (Dec. 2004) (demonstrating connections between terrorist and criminal organizations); JOHN ROLLINS & LIANA SUN WYLER, TERRORISM AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME: FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 6-20 (June 11, 2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41004.pdf (detailing patterns of interaction among international terrorist and crime groups).

(60) See ROLLINS & WYLER, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 6-7 (highlighting reasons for cooperation between otherwise distinct organizations). Although some barriers prevent cooperation, "motivations such as greed or necessity for organizational viability or expansion may induce some groups to welcome or seek out external partners." Id. at 7.

(61) See BERRY ET AL., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 185-87 (emphasizing specific examples of collaboration between otherwise distinct groups in TBA).

(62) See id. at 185 (describing strong ties among FTOs); SHELLEY ET AL., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 62 (discussing relationship between Hong Kong criminal groups and Hezbollah). The nature of the cooperation between the Hong Kong crime families and Hezbollah revolves around the smuggling of contraband. SHELLEY ET AL., supra note 5, at 62; see also Exec. Order No. 13224, supra note Error: Reference source not found (listing FTOs).

(63) See SHELLEY ET AL., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 62 (discussing relationship between Chinese mafias and Egypt's Gamaa Islamiya); see also Exec. Order No. 13224, supra note Error: Reference source not found (itemizing FTOs).

(64) See SHELLEY ET AL., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 59 (describing bombings in Buenos Aires); Berry et al., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 192 (providing account of Buenos Aires' bombing).

(65) See SHELLEY ET AL., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 59 (recognizing Hezbolla as bombing culprit); BERRY ET AL., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 192 (establishing Imad Mughniyah's potential involvement with bombing). In 1999, Argentine law enforcement agencies issued arrest warrants for Imad Mughniyah. BERRY ET AL., supra note 41, at 192.

(66) See BERRY ET AL., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 192 (stating clues indicate bombs may have come from Foz do Iguacu).

(67) See SHELLEY ET AL., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 59-64 (describing ease of crime and terrorism in TBA); Berry et al., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 174-95 (suggesting poor immigration control and corrupt government officials allow terrorists to thrive).

(68) See SHELLEY ET AL., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 60 (explaining TBA's lack of regulation and detection); Berry et al., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 192 (highlighting ease of transporting illicit cargo across international borders).

(69) See BERRY ET AL., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 178-93 (demonstrating connections between organized crime syndicates and terrorist organizations).

(70) See Press Release, Security Council, Sec. Council Unanimously Adopts Wide-Ranging Anti-Terrorism Resolution; Calls for Suppressing Fin., Improving Int'l Cooperation, U.N. Press Release SC/7158 (Sept. 28, 2001) (establishing resolution 1373 illustrates need to coordinate international security protections for international terrorism and TCO).

(71) See id. (stating resolution 1373 was established to reaffirm condemnation of terrorist acts).

(72) See BERRY ET AL., supra note Error: Reference source not found (illustrating systems of organized crime in Ciudad del Este); Shelley et al., supra note Error: Reference source not found (detailing relationship between international organized crime and terrorism).

(73) See JUNE S. BEITTEL, MEXICO'S DRUG TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS: SOURCE AND SCOPE OF THE RISING VIOLENCE (Apr. 15, 2013) (examining Mexico's violent criminal history during President Calderon administration).

(74) See id. at 14-18 (defining and describing cartel structure); see also Central Intelligence Agency, The World FACTBOOK, TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES: MEXICO: ILLICIT DRUGS, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mx.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2014) (discussing Mexican economy). The United Nations has estimated that the drug trafficking business in Mexico is worth at least USD142 billion. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, supra.

(75) See Beittel, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 22-27 (detailing drug trafficking related homicides in Mexico from 2006 to 2012). One estimate concludes that there were 11,583 drug trafficking related homicides in Mexico in 2010 alone. Id. at 24. Other sources have estimated "total numbers attributed to organized crime exceeded 15,270." Id.; see also DAVID A. SHIRK, DRUG VIOLENCE IN MEXICO: DATA AND ANALYSIS FROM 2001-2009 (Jan. 2010), available at http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2010/04/drug_violence.pdf (analyzing drug-related violence in Mexico from 2001 to 2009); CORY MOLZAHN ET AL., DRUG VIOLENCE IN MEXICO: DATA AND ANALYSIS THROUGH 2011, (Mar. 2012), (analyzing drug-related violence in Mexico through 2011). "On average, for every day of 2011, forty-seven people were killed, three of whom were tortured, one of whom was decapitated, two of whom were women, and ten of whom were young people whose lives ended in organized-crime-related violence." MOLZAHN ET AL., supra, at 20.

(76) See Beittel, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 14-18 (describing how Mexican cartels operate).

(77) See Grace Wyler, The Mexican Drug Cartels are a National Security Issue, BUS. INSIDER (June 13, 2011), http://www.businessinsider.com/why-the-us-needs-to-stop-fighting-the-drug-war-and-start-fighting-the-cartels2011-6 (explaining expansion of drug cartels into other industries). The U.S. Government estimates that the cartels generate approximately USD38 billion annually. Id.

(78) See id. (noting strain cartels have placed on U.S. criminal justice system and law enforcement).

(79) See Ed Vulliamy, How a Big U.S. Bank Laundered Billions from Mexico's Murderous Drug Gangs, THE GUARDIAN, Apr. 2, 2011 (discussing cartels' money laundering techniques).

(80) See id. (tracing paper trail leading U.S. officials to Wachovia Bank).

(81) See id. (summarizing involvement of Wachovia Bank in money-laundering scandal).

(82) See id. (explaining how Wachovia Bank enables cocaine cartels to continue operations).

(83) See Grace Wyler, Mexican Cartels are Moving to the U.S., Bus. INSIDER (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.businessinsider.com/mexican-cartels-are-moving-to-the-us-20n-4 (describing alert issued by National Drug Intelligence Center).

(84) See id. (detailing various drug cartels and their presence in U.S. cities). Mexican trafficking cartels are currently operating in approximately 230 American cities. Id.

(85) See Message from Matamoros Warden, Consulado General De Los Estados Unidos, Regarding Possible Threat to American Citizens (Apr. 8, 2011) http://spanish.matamoros.usconsulate.gov/2wm04082011.html [hereinafter Matamoros Warden Message] (stating specific crimes and geographic areas of concern). The biggest threat against law enforcement from Mexican criminal gangs exists in Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon and San Luis Potosi. Id.

(86) See Wyler, supra note Error: Reference source not found (discussing drug cartel involvement throughout U.S. cities). The Sinaloa cartel, with the largest presence in the United States, is in approximately seventy-five U.S. cities. Id. The Gulf Cartel and Los Zetas are currently in thirty-seven cities while the Juraez Cartel has established operations in thirty-three cities. Id. In addition, the Adrian Beltran Leyva organization, in approximately thirty cities, and the Tijuana cartel, in about twenty-one cities, also have a strong presence in the United States. Id.

(87) See BEITTEL, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 20 (detailing surge in violence due to drug cartel conflict over drug trade). Recent estimates indicate that since 2007, kidnapping in Mexico has increased by 188%, armed robbery has increased by 47%, and extortion by 101%. Id. at 20.

(88) See Sylvia M. Longmire & John P. Longmire, Redefining Terrorism: Why Mexican Drug Trafficking Is More Than Just Organized Crime, 1 J. of Strategic Security 35, 41 (2008), http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1044&context=jss (describing Los Zetas and their involvement in violent crimes). Los Zetas are known as the enforcement power of the Gulf Cartel and are more technically advanced, sophisticated, and connected. Id.

(89) See id. at 50 (arguing Mexican drug trafficking organizations be redefined as terrorist organizations). One benefit to redefining Mexican drug trafficking organizations as terrorist organizations is that it provides much needed extra funding from Homeland Security, which earmarks the majority of its funding for counterterrorism. Id.

(90) See id. at 43 (discussing decapitations of Mexican officials).

(91) See MIRO, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 3 (discussing effect of North American Free Trade Agreement).

(92) See id. (detailing unintended benefits of North American Free Trade Agreement for drug organizations). "For Mexico's drug and alien smuggling networks, the growth in trans-border commerce, as manifested in soaring levels of over land passenger and commercial vehicle traffic, has provided an ever expanding 'hay stack' in which the 'needles' of illicit narcotics and illegal aliens can be more easily concealed." Id.

(93) See id. at 29-41 (mentioning domestic and foreign TCOs in Mexico).

(94) See generally Miro, supra note Error: Reference source not found (describing foreign TCOs operating in Mexico). The Russian syndicate is comprised of various Soviet-era alliances. Id. at 29. These include mafias from Armenia, Hungary, Serbia, Poland, Chechnya, Georgia, and Albania. Id. For example, Russian criminal organizations, such as the Poldolskaya and Mazukinskaya, as well as Ukrainian and Asian organized crime groups, like the Japanese Yazuka gangs, Chinese 'Snakeheads,' and Korean Mafia, are active in Mexico. Id. at 29-34.

(95) See id. at 32 (discussing presence of various criminal organizations in area).

(96) See id. at 29 (detailing relationship between Russian criminal organizations and Mexican drug cartels). According to Mexican media reports, "Mexican drug traffickers established formal alliances with Russian organized crime groups as early as 1992." Id.

(97) See Inder M. Bugarin, Arma la Mafia Rusa a Narcos Mexicanos [The Russian Mafia Arms Mexican Drug Traffickers], REFORMA, Feb. 3, 1998 (reporting details of illicit transaction between Russian mafia and Mexican drug cartels).

(98) See MIRO, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 32 (describing alliances between Asian and Mexican criminal organizations).

(99) See Kevin Johnson, Always on Guard in Nueva Laredo, USA TODAY, May 17, 2006 (observing formation of new alliance). Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) is a Central American gang that has a reputation for brutality with an everincreasing presence in the United States. Id.

(100) Id. (detailing Sinaloa cartel's master plan). This violence along the border has largely remained on the Mexican side; however, there are signs that this competition and brutality is becoming a problem for the United States as well. Id.

(101) See MIRO, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 41 (outlining Mexico City's approach with respect to terrorist organizations).

(102) Id. (describing longstanding presence of certain terrorist groups).

(103) See id. at 42 (detailing deals between two specific organizations as result of Mexico City safe haven).

(104) See id. at 43 (specifying U.S.'s main concern).

(105) Id. at 44 (discussing ties to Islamist terrorist organization); see also Fernando Paniagua, Encuentran en Mexico vinculos con al-Qaeda [Mexican Links to Al-Qaeda Discovered], El Norte, Jan. 18 2002 (describing Mexican links to Al-Qaeda).

(106) See MIRO, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 41-43 (observing presence of Islamist terrorist organizations in Mexico).

(107) See ROLLINS & WYLER, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 8-9 (noting 2011 Iranian plot); see also Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Man Pleads Guilty in New York to Conspiring with Iranian Military Officials to Assassinate Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States (Oct. 17, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/October/12-ag-1251.html [hereinafter Conspiracy to Assassinate Saudi Ambassador] (commenting on drug trafficking connection with assassination plot).

(108) See ROLLINS & WYLER, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 9 (describing how 2011 Iranian plot was prevented by United States agents). See generally Compl., United States v. Arbabsiar, 11MAG2617 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/us-v-arbabsiar-shakuri-complaint.pdf (alleging facts of conspiracy).

(109) See ROLLINS & WYLER, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 9 (specifying Arbabsiar's plan to hire Los Zetas for USD1.5 million).

(110) Id. (describing negotiations to bomb embassies).

(111) Id. (outlining plans to transport opium from Middle East to Mexico).

(112) See Conspiracy to Assassinate Saudi Ambassador, supra note 107 (noting how collaboration between transnational criminal and terrorist organizations threatens U.S. national security).

(113) See U.S. National Intelligence Council, The Threat to U.S. National Security Posed by Transnational Organized Crime (2011), http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Special%20Report_The%20Threat%20to%20U.S.%20National %20Security%20Posed%20by%20Transnational%20Organized%20Crime.pdf [hereinafter NIC] (illustrating outsourcing of criminal operations).

(114) Id. (examining proliferation of MS-13); see also Adam Elkus, Gangs, Terrorists, and Trade, FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS (Apr. 12, 2007), http://www.fpif.org/articles/gangs_terrorists_and_trade (discussing MS-13 group). Although members of MS-13 are overwhelmingly of Central American descent, El Salvadorians who fled during the Salvadoran Civil War founded the gang in Los Angeles. Elkus, supra.

(115) See Elkus, supra note 114 (noting operations of MS-13 members). Members of MS-13, or "Maras," are known to carry AK-47s, M16s, and other military grade weaponry. Id. There are over 70,000 active members of MS-13. Id. MS-13 could evolve into a paramilitary organization similar to Los Zetas or FARC. Id. ; see infra Part IV.D (assessing threat posed to United States by MS-13).

(116) See Elkus, supra note 114 (describing tasks of MS-13 cells).

(117) See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Sanctions Latin American Criminal Organization (Oct. 11, 2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1733.aspx (discussing measures United States has taken to counter spread of MS-13). MS-13 is responsible for a multitude of crimes that "directly threaten the welfare and security of U.S. citizens." Id. The criminal nature of MS-13 is demonstrated in one of their mottos: "'Mata, roba, viola, controla' ('Kill, steal, rape, control')." Id.; see also Exec. Order. No. 13581, supra note 14 (describing Act as addressing organized crime).

(118) See, e.g., Longmire & Longmire, supra note 88 (analyzing narcotics trade in Mexico).

(119) See NIC, supra note 113 (stating purpose of funds). It is estimated that global narcotics trafficking generates between USD750 billion and USD1 trillion annually. Id. The estimated annual dollar value of global money laundering is between USD1.3 trillion and USD3.3 trillion, or between 2% and 5% of the world's gross domestic product. Id.

(120) Id. (considering terrorist links to global drug trade).

(121) Id. (discussing connection of criminal organization to terrorist organization).

(122) See SHELLEY ET AL., supra note 5, at 5 (stating difficulty of distinguishing between organizations). These groups are beginning to "move beyond activity appropriation to a different, closer, form of interaction." Id.

(123) See id. at 5-6 (addressing need for reevaluation of designation process of organizations at issue); see Parrish, supra note 4 (acknowledging such organizations now cooperate in ways previously unseen); see ROLLINS & WYLER, supra note 59 (considering links of international crime to terrorism).

(124) See infra Part IV.B (characterizing U.S. distinction between organizations as arbitrary and outdated).

(125) See DANDURAND & CHIN, supra note 59 (assessing connections of crime to terrorism in TBA).

(126) See Exec. Order No. 13581, supra note Error: Reference source not found (establishing procedure and prerequisites for designation as TCO); Exec. Order No. 13224, supra note Error: Reference source not found (establishing procedure and prerequisites for designations as FTO); infra Part IV.D (discussing threat to United States' national security).

(127) See infra Part IV.E (arguing United States should establish centralized database of all organizations threatening national security).

(128) See NAT'L SEC. STAFF, supra note Error: Reference source not found (analyzing elevated risks TCOs pose to U.S. national security and defense resources). TCOs have the potential to threaten "public safety, public health, democratic institutions, and economic stability across the globe." Id. at 5-11; see also infra Part IV.E (discussing how centralized database will provide for more efficient information sharing between law enforcement agencies).

(129) See Longmire & Longmire, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 51 (mentioning how funds derived from illicit narcotics trade enables drug cartels engagement in various criminal enterprises); SHELLEY ET AL., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 44-58 (assessing various areas where terrorist groups and TCOs overlap); infra Part IV.C (analyzing existing collaboration between TCOs and FTOs). Each organization contributes something in exchange for something else. Longmire & Longmire, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 51. This cycle, occurring en masse, allows organizations to diversify into additional illicit areas. Id.

(130) See DANDURAND & CHIN, supra note Error: Reference source not found (assessing connections between crime and terrorism in TBA); see Shelley et al., supra note 5, at 44-58 (determining various areas where terrorist groups and TCOs overlap); see Berry et al., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 173-74 (detailing numerous interactions between terrorist organizations and TCOs in TBA).

(131) See BEITTEL, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 6-9 (explaining nature of narcotics trafficking industry in Mexico); see also SHIRK, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 10 (noting increased violence of drug wars in Mexico). Homicide is a rampant problem in Mexico as a result of the escalation in violence surrounding the drug wars. SHIRK, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 5.

(132) See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 546 (stating Department of Defense definition of terrorism); BEITTEL, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 15 (discussing Los Zetas group). Several members of Los Zetas are former Mexican special forces. Beittel, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 15. These individuals are highly trained and capable of orchestrating military style attacks on enemy combatants. Id.

(133) See Longmire & Longmire, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 42-47 (providing examples of violence used by Mexican drug cartels). Decapitation is used to induce fear as a means of cooperation. Id. at 43. See generally SHIRK, supra note Error: Reference source not found (highlighting examples of tactics used by Mexican drug cartels, specifically killings).

(134) See Longmire & Longmire, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 41-47 (examining tactical violence used by Mexican criminal organizations and military training of many Los Zetas's members); see also U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 546 (stating Department of Defense definition of terrorism).

(135) See Bugarin, supra note Error: Reference source not found (discussing weapons deals between Russian criminal organizations and Mexican drug cartels). The deals included radar systems, grenade launchers, automatic weapons, and other military grade hardware. Id. This type of arsenal would allow Los Zetas to engage in military style attacks that produce extensive violence. Id.; see also Longmire & Longmire, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 41 (noting extensive formal military training Los Zetas members have received).

(136) See BEITTEL, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 6-9 (analyzing history and violence of Mexican drug wars); see also U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 546 (stating Department of Defense definition of terrorism).

(137) See ROLLINS & WYLER, supra note 59, at 9 (discussing assassination plot on Saudi ambassador to United States). See generally Complaint, supra note Error: Reference source not found (explaining plot in more detail).

(138) See Shelley Testimony, supra note Error: Reference source not found (discussing possible threats from these hybrid organizations); infra Part IV.E (arguing separate Executive Orders designating organization as TCO or FTO lacks appreciation of their cooperation). See generally SHELLEY ET AL., supra note Error: Reference source not found (arguing methods of terrorist groups and TCOs are more important than motives).

(139) See SHELLEY ET AL., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 60 (discussing convergence of crime and terrorism in TBA). Factors such as lax enforcement of laws, corrupt police agencies, and a lack of government transparency all contribute to the convergence of crime and terrorism in the TBA. Id. at 51-52, 60, 64.

(140) See DANDURAND & CHIN, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 12 (highlighting overlap of financial motives in drug trade and terrorism); Berry et al., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 172 (exemplifying potential of numerous interactions between terrorist organizations and transnational criminal groups).

(141) See DANDURAND & CHIN, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 11-12 (explaining interaction amongst terrorist organizations); Miro, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 2, 5 (discussing establishment of cooperative networks).

(142) See SHELLEY ET AL., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 62 (discussing collaboration between Hong Kong crime families and Hezbollah in TBA); Miro, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 1, 22, 24, 31 (indicating existence of negotiations between Asian mafias and Mexican drug cartels). The Asian mafias and Mexican cartels generally collude to engage in human smuggling. Miro, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 22. See generally Bugarin, supra note Error: Reference source not found (exploring reports of Russian mafia providing Mexican cartels with military grade weapons in exchange for drugs).

(143) See infra Part IV.E (asserting distinction between TCOs and FTOs in Executive Orders 13581 and 13224 as redundant and asinine); see also Exec. Order No. 13581, supra note Error: Reference source not found (establishing procedures and prerequisites for TCO designation); Exec. Order No. 13224, supra note Error: Reference source not found (establishing procedures and prerequisites for FTO designation).

(144) See BERRY ET AL., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 173 (describing TBA as ideal geographic, social, exonomic, and political area for organized crime). Ciudad del Este has been depicted as an "oasis for informants and spies; peddlers of contraband and counterfeit products; traffickers in drugs, weapons, and humans; common criminals; mafias; undocumented Arabs; and terrorists." Id.

(145) See Exec. Order No. 13581, supra note Error: Reference source not found (establishing procedure and prerequisites for designation as TCO); Exec. Order No. 13224, supra note Error: Reference source not found (outlining procedure and prerequisites for designations as FTO); infra Part IV.E (disputing against distinction between TCOs and FTOs). See generally Shelley et al., supra note Error: Reference source not found (arguing methods of terrorists and TCOs more important than motives in deterring threats).

(146) See BERRY ET AL., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 192-93 (detailing 1994 bombing of Asociacion Mutual Israelita Argentina). The bombing of the Asociacion Mutual Israelita Argentina (AMIA) killed eighty-five people. Id.

(147) See id. (discussing Hezbollah, Mughniyah, Hamas, and Iranian government official cooperation in AMIA bombing).

(148) See id. (evidencing explosive materials used in AMIA bombing were smuggled from Foz do Iguaca, Brazil).

(149) See id. at 178-93 (suggesting likelihood of numerous organizations either directly or indirectly had knowledge of conspiracy in AMIA bombing).

(150) See SHELLEY ET AL., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 60 (arguing arbitrarily enforced laws, dense, diversified population, income disparities, and minimal border patrol furnished "shadow economy"). Poor oversight has allowed military weapons to be readily available within the shadow economy. Id.

(151) See Berry et al., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 178-93 (explaining events leading up to and contributing factors in 1994 bombing of AMIA).

(152) See U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 546 (defining terrorism by Department of Defense); FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note Error: Reference source not found and accompanying text (defining organized crime by Federal Bureau of Investigation); Rollins & Wyler, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 6-7 (demonstrating motivation for alliance amongst terrorist organizations for mutual benefit); infra Part IV.E (arguing distinction between TCOs and FTOs in Executive Orders 13581 and 13224 is unnecessary).

(153) See generally Shelley Testimony, supra note Error: Reference source not found (discussing threats to United States from international organized crime and terrorism). Drug trafficking, arms smuggling, human smuggling, and the growing trade in nuclear materials will contribute to the convergence of these groups and thus increase the threat to the United States. Id.

(154) Id. (citing need for synchronization of efforts to combat threat); see also Matamoros Warden Message, supra note Error: Reference source not found (discussing warning issued by Consulate General of United States of possible violence against American personnel).

(155) See Wyler, supra note Error: Reference source not found (noting how effects of cartels could "spill ovef' border and harm general stability of United States).

(156) See, e.g., Indictment, supra note 1 (detailing weapons-for-cocaine conspiracy involving FARC, Hezbollah, Iraq, and Mexico); O'Connor, supra note Error: Reference source not found (describing narco-terrorism conspiracy).

(157) See Complaint, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 6-7 (exposing conspiracy with undercover agents posing as members of drug cartel). See generally ROLLINS & WYLER, supra note 59, at 9 (examining conspiracy with members of drug cartel to assassinate Saudi Ambassador to United States).

(158) See Conspiracy to Assassinate Saudi Ambassador, supra note Error: Reference source not found (highlighting extent of conspiracy plans).

(159) See, e.g., ROLLINS & WYLER, supra note 59, at 26 (analyzing threats posed by cooperation between TCOs and terrorist groups).

(160) See Matamoros Warden Message, supra note Error: Reference source not found (indicating possibility of violence by Mexican drug cartels against Americans); see also Wyler, supra note Error: Reference source not found (noting movement of Mexican drug cartel members and their families to U.S. cities).

(161) See Vulliamy, supra note Error: Reference source not found (exposing Wachovia's involvement in Mexican drug cartels' money laundering). The investigation revealed that various members of Mexico's drug cartels wired billions of dollars through Mexican exchanges into Wachovia accounts over a lengthy period of time. Id.

(162) See id. (exploring Wachovia banking scandal).

(163) See id. (recognizing possibility of future financial terrorism geared towards U.S. financial structure).

(164) See id. (criticizing banking system for lack of responsibility yielding largest action under U.S. Bank Secrecy Act). Wachovia was ultimately sanctioned for "failing to apply the proper anti-laundering strictures of USD378.4 billion into dollar accounts from so-called casas de cambio (CDCs) in Mexico." Id.

(165) See Elkus, supra note Error: Reference source not found (providing history of MS-13).

(166) Id. (observing tendency of members of MS-13 to carry AK-47s, M16s, and other military grade weaponry). There are over 70,000 active members of MS-13 globally. Id.

(167) See id. (addressing fear of MS-13 potentially evolving into paramilitary organization similar to Los Zetas and FARC).

(168) See The Threat to U.S. National Security Posed by Transnational Organized Crime, supra note Error: Reference source not found (expounding on members of MS-13 hired as foot soldiers in Mexican drug wars).

(169) See Elkus, supra note Error: Reference source not found (highlighting prevalence of MS-13 across United States).

(170) See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note Error: Reference source not found (characterizing MS-13 as TCO responsible for numerous crimes directly threatening welfare and security).

(171) See id. (noting serious threat posed by MS-13).

(172) See infra Part IV.F (suggesting additions to U.S. strategy to combat nexus between TCOs and FTOs); infra Part IV.E (discussing shortcomings of Executive Orders 13581 and 13224); see also Exec. Order No. 13581, supra note Error: Reference source not found (detailing establishment of monetary sanctions for persons providing "financial, material or technological support" to TCOs); Exec. Order No. 13224, supra note Error: Reference source not found (describing process identifying, designating, and blocking financial interests of individuals supporting FTOs).

(173) See Exec. Order No.13581, supra note Error: Reference source not found (examining process of identifying TCOs and monetary sanctions for persons associated with such organizations); see Exec. Order No. 13224, supra note Error: Reference source not found (articulating process of identifying, designating, and blocking financial interests of individuals affiliated with supporting FTOs).

(174) See supra Part IV.C (analyzing levels of cooperation observed between TCOs and FTOs).

(175) See Exec. Order No. 13581, supra note Error: Reference source not found (determining process for identifying and designating TCOs); see also Exec. Order No. 13224, supra note Error: Reference source not found (defining process for preventing and punishing FTOs and those affiliated with them).

(176) See supra Part IV.B-C (discussing similarities between TCOs and FTOs and analyzing collaboration efforts).

(177) See supra Part IV.B-C (stressing difficulty in distinguishing TCOs and FTOs from foreign policy perspective and highlighting examples of collaboration); see also Rollins & Wyler, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 1 (recognizing willingness of organizations to assist one another for their mutual benefit).

(178) See supra Part IV.C (describing examples of collaboration between TCOs and FTOs); see also BERRY ET AL., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 192 (discussing bombing of AMIA). The 1994 bombing of the AMIA is a prime example of TCOs and FTOs collaborating logistically to achieve a greater result. BERRY ET AL., supra note 41 at 192. The conditions in the TBA allowed the harmonization of operations that culminated in the bombing. Id. The attack killed eight-five people. Id.

(179) See supra Part IV.B (arguing difficulties in classifying groups like Los Zetas because they exhibit tendencies of TCOs and FTOs); see also Longmire & Longmire, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 41 (examining tactical violence by Mexican criminal organizations and military training received by Los Zetas' members).

(180) See Exec. Order No. 13581, supra note Error: Reference source not found (explaining method of identification of TCOs and furnishing of sanctions against their members); Exec. Order No. 13224, supra note Error: Reference source not found (suggesting how to prevent allocation of financial support to TCOs).

(181) See Exec. Order No. 13581, supra note Error: Reference source not found (detailing TCOs); Exec. Order No. 13224, supra note Error: Reference source not found (outlining FTOs).

(182) See Exec. Order No. 13581, supra note Error: Reference source not found (stating EO 13581 provides sanctions for supporters of TCOs). It directs that any interest or property within the jurisdiction of the United States affiliated with the aforementioned support may not be "transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn or otherwise dealt in". Id.; see also Exec. Order No. 13224, supra note Error: Reference source not found (limiting transfer of assets of FTOs).

(183) See supra notes Error: Reference source not found-Error: Reference source not found and accompanying text (discussing Wachovia bank scandal).

(184) See e.g., BERRY ET AL., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 173-95 (exploring effect of crime and terrorism on illicit transactions in Ciudad del Este).

(185) See Vulliamy, supra note Error: Reference source not found (reporting on money-laundering scandal involving Wachovia and Mexican drug cartels); supra Part III.B (explaining Wachovia banking scandal). Billions of dollars of wire transfers through Mexican exchanges into Wachovia accounts were discovered during the investigation. Vulliamy, supra note Error: Reference source not found.

(186) See NAT'L SEC. STAFF, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 20 (demonstrating continued concern for criminal organizations infiltration into legitimate financial systems). "The United States remains intent on improving the transparency of the international financial system, including an effort to expose vulnerabilities that could be exploited by terrorist and other illicit financial networks." Id.

(187) Id. (discussing banking sanctions as a possible remedy to illicit money-laundering).

(188) See SHELLEY ET AL., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 50 (explaining both methods and motives of each organization should be focal point in designation process).

(189) See BERRY ET AL., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 173-95 (detailing numerous examples of interaction between terrorist organizations and TCOs in TBA); supra Part IV.C (analyzing areas where TCOs and FTOs collaborate); see also Bugarin, supra note Error: Reference source not found (discussing weapons deals between Russian mafia and Mexican drug cartels).

(190) See ROLLINS & WYLER, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 2-3 (giving examples of collaboration between Mexican drug cartels and other criminal and terrorist organizations). See generally BERRY ET AL., supra note Error: Reference source not found (explaining various areas where criminal organizations and terrorist groups tend to collaborate). Conspiracy to assassinate is another area where TCOs and FTOs have been known to collude. See BERRY ET AL., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 8-9 (discussing use of violence by terrorist and criminal groups). The plot to murder the Saudi ambassador to the United States is an example of this collusion. Id. at 9.

(191) See supra Part IV.D (analyzing threat to United States posed by collaboration of TCOs and FTOs). The threats range from financial manipulation to assassination attempts to street-level violence. See supra Part IV.D.

(192) See Exec. Order No. 13581, supra note Error: Reference source not found (outlining monetary sanction to counteract TCOs); Exec. Order No. 13224, supra note Error: Reference source not found (exploring property and monetary sanctions pertaining to FTOs); see supra Part IV.E (assessing redundancy of named EOs).

(193) See Wyler, supra note Error: Reference source not found (discussing recent increase in violence along Mexico-U.S. border). These are the situations where law enforcement agencies, including Border Patrol, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and Drug Enforcement Administration, become vital to the preservation of safety on American soil. See id. (suggesting collaboration between government agencies, embassies, and border checkpoints)._

(194) See supra Part IV.E (arguing EOs 13581 and 13224 do not acknowledge how criminal and terrorist organizations are becoming indistinguishable).

(195) See supra Part IV.E (noting inefficiencies of TCO and FTO categorization). The database designation process would decrease the emphasis placed on the distinction between "terrorist activities" and "criminal activities." See supra Part IV.E. Instead, the distinguishing factors should include the level of threat posed by a given organization, its affiliations with other threatening organizations, sources of funding, and its arsenal's capabilities. See supra Part IV.E.

(196) See supra Part IV.E (articulating redundancy of EOs 13581 and 13224).

(197) See supra Part II.A-B (discussing complicated process of designation as TCO or FTO under U.S. bureaucracy).

(198) See BERRY ET AL., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 174-82 (discussing combination of factors present in TBA which incubate and facilitate illicit economy). See generally MIRO, supra note Error: Reference source not found (noting pervasiveness of narcotics and arms trafficking, money laundering, and human smuggling in Mexico).

(199) See Matamoros Warden Message, supra note Error: Reference source not found (detailing warning issued by Consulate General of possible violence against American law enforcement by drug cartels).

(200) See ROLLINS & WYLER, supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 21-27 (exploring U.S. government collaboration with other nations). See generally Longmire & Longmire, supra note Error: Reference source not found (discussing relationship between U.S. and Mexico on status of drug wars).

(201) See supra Part IV.D (highlighting threat to United States posed by coordination amongst transnational criminal and terrorist organizations).

(202) See supra Part IV.C-D (assessing collaboration between TCOs and FTOs and threat posed to United States by convergence).

(203) See Exec. Order No. 13581, supra note Error: Reference source not found (applying sanctions to TCOs); EO 13224, supra note Error: Reference source not found (discussing sanctions applicable to FTOs); supra Part IV.E (addressing redundancy of these two EOs); see also supra Part IV.C (analyzing areas where TCOs and FTOs collaborate).

(204) See BERRY ET AL., supra note Error: Reference source not found, at 168-72, 182-95 (exploring criminal and terrorist activities as well a collaboration between such groups in Mexico and TBA); supra Part III.A-B (evaluating growing convergence of terrorist organizations and criminal organizations in TBA and Mexico); see also MIRO, supra note Error: Reference source not found (articulating prevalence of illicit activities including drug and weapons trafficking, and human smuggling in Mexico).

(205) See supra Part IV.F (discussing need for more comprehensive approach by focusing on areas where these two organizations often collaborate). These areas include weapons trafficking, counterfeit products, narcotics and human smuggling, and money laundering. See supra Part IV.F.

(206) Seesupra Part IV.F (recognizing benefits of instituting sweeping legislation). The end goal should be to end the bureaucratic nature of the current system. See supra Part IV.F.
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Author:Gallagher, Robert W., Jr.
Publication:Suffolk Transnational Law Review
Date:Mar 22, 2014
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