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Cleric-diplomats and the sixteenth-century French state.

Most historians of sixteenth-century France now agree that royal authority, despite some of the treatises on politics written during the period, was not absolute. Royal authority, recent historians suggest, was a system of patrons, clients, and brokers of power who formed a network that enabled the ultimate patron, the king, to rule effectively. Since power is usually identified as being political and military, sixteenth-century clergy have been seen as members of powerful families, rather than as figures struggling for power in their own right. This article will recount how many of the upper clergy in sixteenth-century France held political positions that made them major players in preserving royal control as Europe was increasingly divided into various Catholic and Protestant camps.(1)

The importance of cleric-diplomats to royal policy arose from their unique relationship with the monarchy. These cleric-diplomats provided a powerful support group on two levels. Because the French monarchy controlled all clerical patronage and had reserved to itself the responsibility for naming ambassadors, the king was able by judicious appointment to create a patron-client network that was loyal to no one but himself. Since Louis XI and the creation of a systematically organized diplomatic institution in the late fifteenth century, the kings of France had personally appointed all ambassadors. They gradually chose more clerics - especially those high in the ecclesiastical hierarchy - than non-clerics. Ambassadors needed to be learned and able to communicate in a number of foreign languages with men and women of all classes, but especially with powerful men and women. They needed to be tactful and witty, good conversationalists, and pleasant company. In France, such men were most often found in the church.(2)

Other factors made clerics more attractive as diplomatic agents than other nobles. In 1516, Francois I had signed a Concordat with the pope that allowed the French kings to appoint their own candidates to vacant ecclesiastical sees. This meant that those clerics who supported the state and served the king could foresee the possibility of a tangible reward in the revenues of a prestigious see and in the honor of clerical promotion. It meant, too, that the upper clergy could afford to be more loyal to the king than to the pope. Consequently, the Concordat was useful to the king as an instrument for acquiring a pool of loyal supporters who could afford to wait for their pay when the economy of the monarchy was at a low ebb. And, maybe less incidentally, these clerical diplomats could give the king an edge where precedence was concerned. Protocol determined that a country's rank governed the order of precedence, but in some places and at some times, high-ranking clergy superseded the diplomatic representative of a higher ranking state. For example, the bishop of Auxerre who was sent as ambassador to Rome in 1558, had the task of wrenching papal support from Spain back to France. One battle in this conflict was over precedence between the Spanish ambassador and the French bishop. Although the bishop ultimately lost the war and was unsuccessful in his major task, his fierce fight to assert his country's prestige and his aggressive defense of his own right for precedence won him the respect of the pope. In 1561, he was awarded a cardinal's hat.(3)

French kings used their power to elevate clerics and to appoint ambassadors who were supportive of royal policy. Possibly the king chose as ambassadors those clergy most likely to question the rigid, partisan dogma of papal politics and Roman theology, since he could then be certain they would support the royal interest vigorously. The cleric-diplomats might simply have been more willing to take risks for their own personal and family aggrandizement. Possibly the tolerance they had to practice in their dealings with foreign courts - whether Roman Catholic, Protestant, or Islamic - made them more supportive of creative, even tolerant solutions to French problems. Whatever the reason, the French clergy in the diplomatic corps during the sixteenth century, when the French central government was in the greatest danger of collapse, were some of the king's staunchest and most skilled supporters.

French cleric-diplomats often supported solutions that were politique, which meant they were partisans of the French monarchy regardless of their religious convictions. Many cleric-diplomats subscribed to the belief that religious coexistence was preferable to the ravages of continued civil war and the possible destruction of the state. Although there were no political parties in the sixteenth century, there was a politique mentality espoused by supporters, who while loosely organized, were active in the struggle for political unity in France. Politique cleric-diplomats helped keep the French monarchy stable in the face of challenges from Huguenots, French Calvinists who appeared after 1559, and the Catholic League, supported by King Philip II of Spain, which put religious orthodoxy above the French king.(4)

There were many reasons why the French monarchy survived the challenges of religious and noble rebellion during the late sixteenth century and became more powerful. One reason relates to the politique sympathies of cleric-diplomats who chose to serve the monarch rather than the pope. First, a strong tradition of French constitutional theory partly created and written by cleric-diplomats lionized a strong monarchy. Second, the creation and development of a pragmatic policy identified that constitutional theory with the supporters of the politique cause and with the idea that religion was less important than the survival of the monarchy as the foundation of French government. Many of the cleric-diplomats of this period came to be identified as politique, probably because of their humanist sympathies. Finally, these cleric-diplomats helped preserve the French monarchy as one variety of a client-broker system directly and primarily responsive to the interests of the monarchy - whether identified with Catherine de Medici, one of her sons, or Henri IV.(5)

The foundation of sixteenth-century French political theory was Claude de Seyssel's Monarchy of France, which was presented to Francois I in 1515, two years after Machiavelli wrote his Prince and a year before Erasmus's and Castiglione's manuals of princely behavior appeared. Seyssel's description of a monarchy limited by religion, justice, and polity was written to encourage Francois I, a potentially strong ruler, to follow in the powerful footsteps of Louis XII. When Seyssel wrote, there were few clouds on the horizon of French political development either from religion or from factious nobles who were still content to seek power and fame on the Italian battlefields.(6)

Seyssel was a civil lawyer who emphasized the limits of royal power by casting them in terms of the law. Absolute royal power was limited by religion, both as institution and as moral and ethical guide. The religious authority of the papacy was also constrained by the Gallican tradition, which since 1407 had pressed for the relative independence of the national French church from papal discipline and the pope's appointive power. The king was also limited by justice, in the traditional sense of divine, natural, and human law and in the more pragmatic sense of the French system of law making and enforcement by the courts and parlements. Finally, Seyssel saw the king as limited by polity, which he defined as the permanent and natural laws and customs of the people of France. These limits, according to Seyssel, actually served to increase the monarch's power. As the king listened to the advice and will of his people, the church, and the judicial courts, his prestige and stature would increase and his people would be more docile and obedient to his instruction. Far from describing a system of absolute government, Seyssel fixed the source and safeguard of royal power in a corporate state.(7)

Out of Seyssel's theoretical construction of political power derived both absolutist ideology and the doctrine of popular sovereignty. The evolution of French constitutional thought during the sixteenth century required the formal treatises of legists to define and delimit legal terminology, the writings of contemporary historians to uncover the sources of political thought and practice, and finally, the pamphlet literature of a wide and discursive variety of ideologues. By the beginning of the seventeenth century, a form of politics had emerged that presupposed a unified authority holding power as property under which all citizens were subjects. In France civic peace required a secularized concept of the state separate from any particular religious faith. The politiques worked to create such a structure.(8)

Most of the major mainstream political theorists of the sixteenth century were, like Seyssel, civil lawyers. They were pragmatic men whose efforts to describe or prescribe a theory of government, while tainted by their individual religious and class prejudices, were directed primarily at establishing a strong and secure French state. Influenced by Roman law, seventeenth-century political writers were inclined to place the king at the head of the constitutional pyramid and above the law. Still, like Seyssel, they held an essentially static theory of the state that left little theoretical room or necessity for the king to change the law.(9)

The death of Henri II in 1559 ushered in a long period of weak French rulers who were often at the mercy of noble or religious factions. During the last forty years of the sixteenth century, class and religious interests occasionally conspired to challenge the very existence of the monarchy. However, Gallican and politique writers - both French Protestants and French Catholics - supported a strong monarchy to balance the formidable power of the Guise nobles, related by birth to the wife of the new king, Francois II. These two groups created a variety of theories around the central pole of politique thought. For example, Francois Hotman, who wrote the Francogallia in 1573 to justify revolution by the people in the face of tyranny and a broken contract, was asked by Henri de Navarre in 1585 to refute the Catholic League's goal of justifying revolution in order to preserve Roman Catholic orthodoxy. Hotman complied and concluded that the king had no right to alienate the property of government by tolerating religious usurpation. Hotman then rewrote the Francogallia to fit the circumstantial needs of the age, particularly those of his legitimate Huguenot king. While Hotman was revising his own political stance, he watched as the Catholic League pamphleteers appropriated arguments for rebellion from the Francogallia.(10)

The Huguenots and the Roman Catholic Leaguers were unable to alter in their own interest the political theory of the late sixteenth century because their arguments too clearly changed with circumstances and political necessity. In fact, the most prolific spokesmen of Protestant and Catholic party positions were the pamphleteers. Only a theorist and philosopher such as Jean Bodin could rise above the partisan arguments of these propagandists. Bodin's youthful activities and personal feelings are as unclear as his religious sympathies are irrelevant.(11)

In spite of the possible contradictions in his personal beliefs, Bodin wrote The Republic, in 1576, to express views closest to those of the politiques. When Henri IV, newly converted to Roman Catholicism, led a procession into Paris in 1594, he did so under the banner of Bodin, the Salic law disallowing female succession and absolute monarchy. This politique success unleashed a flood of literature aggrandizing absolute monarchy. Legal practice, Gallican custom, and conservatism all served to keep prescriptive political theory on a fairly narrow track that was consistent with a doctrine of absolute monarchical power.(12)

The only cleric-diplomat actually involved in the creation of an incipient politique theory of government was Seyssel. An illegitimate son, he became a cleric late in life after the king had persuaded the pope to grant a dispensation allowing Seyssel to be invested with the archbishopric of Marseilles. He had also served on missions to Germany and Geneva. Technically Seyssel was a cleric-diplomat and he was the only theorist who was. Although Bodin also served the king or his family much of his life, he had left the monastery at an early age. Chancellor Michel de L'Hopital was not a cleric and he served other important patrons in addition to the king. Francois Hotman served as a diplomat for Henri IV, but he was not a cleric, and he was more Huguenot than politique until 1576. Nevertheless, it is this politique doctrine that the cleric-diplomats embodied as they continued to work loyally for the king in the face of papal and even occasional French Catholic Church opposition.(13)

The French monarchy also received support for politique organizations from cleric-diplomats during the years when the monarchy's survival appeared most doubtful. Like other politiques, the cleric-diplomats believed that state unity, coupled with stability and state sovereignty, was more important than religious uniformity. There is little doubt that such an association of views existed. By 1563 the name politique was popularly associated with those who supported the divine right of the monarch and insisted on the king's right to establish and enforce the laws of the Commonwealth. Although these numerous and disparate factions were clearly united only by a very loose and rudimentary organization, they had in common a commitment to royal power and an opposition to religious involvement in government.(14)

Most politiques were Roman Catholic, albeit Gallican in sympathy, united in their willingness to tolerate the Huguenot religion and to give Huguenots civil liberties. However, until 1589 and the death of Henri III, the Huguenots were still fighting for their security and even for the soul of the king; they had no time or inclination for tolerance. L'Hopital died in 1573, but the following year the Huguenots appealed to Henri de Damville-Montmorency, the governor of Languedoc, as leader of the politiques to form an alliance for their mutual interest. In 1575 politiques and Huguenots met in Languedoc and agreed to the Articles of Union. The subsequent actions of this union favored Huguenot policy rather than politique aims until 1584, when Alencon died and Navarre became an official heir to the throne. After 1589, when Henri III died, Henri IV had only to defeat the League and its extra-national supporters to take power. Huguenot and politique policy and theory became the same.(15)

The members of the politique party or parties were seldom workers in the agricultural sphere nor were they often found among the bourgeoisie. Most shopkeepers based their political loyalties on religious and family interests rather than on sophisticated long-term philosophical or political principles. Most of the politiques were nobles - usually nobles of the robe whose status and privilege depended on the king. Some were younger sons, like Damville. Most politiques identified themselves closely with the king to whom they owed their rank, power, and privilege. The cleric-diplomats fell into this category, with sixteen identified as coming from noble families, one from Italy, and two who were anobli (new nobles). The social status of sixteen of these men is unknown, although most were from substantial families.(16)

During the sixteenth century there were more than 113 permanent ambassadors appointed by regents or by the king. Most of these men might be called career diplomats, who served for a number of years and in various locations. Of these, thirty-five, or one-third, were clerics. Most of these cleric-diplomats had been appointed before 1563, but as many clerics served after 1563 as did lay diplomats. Only two clerics had died before 1535 - that is, before the Protestant revolution would have been seen as a significant movement; thirteen had died before 1563 - the date when the term politique had acquired its new meaning; twenty-two lived during the French religious wars. All of these clerics had to come to terms with the religious diversity of France in the sixteenth century. The extent and availability of information about these cleric-diplomats varies, but with the exception of four, about whom almost no information is available, all thirty-five figure in the statistical analysis of this category of politiques.(17)

Most of the cleric-diplomats were too busy actively serving the king to write down their political philosophies, although some written evidence is available in the diplomatic and family correspondence of twenty-one of them. In the case of seven, additional literary evidence of their views exists. For the remainder, evidence of politique attitudes must be ascertained from more indirect sources.

Contemporaries occasionally viewed those sympathetic to and supportive of Renaissance learning as also sympathetic to Protestant beliefs. In fact, seventeen of these men were humanists, three were not, and fifteen held unknown views about the new learning. Seven of these cleric-diplomats corresponded with Erasmus, Bude, Rabelais, and other humanists. One cleric gave the poet Ronsard, his cousin, a job as secretary; and Etienne Dolet served as secretary to the bishop of Limoges. The bishop of St. Flour and his brother, the bishop of Lavaur, were known by their contemporaries as reformers and humanists.(18)

The spectrum of religious commitment indicates that five cleric-diplomats were clearly orthodox in their views (two of these having died before 1535, while two others of this group of five were also identified by their own behavior as professional, rather than spiritual, clerics). Eight clerics tolerated Huguenots, three were both tolerant and under possible suspicion of heresy, and another was identified as both orthodox and tolerant. One bishop was openly suspected or accused of heresy, two were self-identified apostates, and the religious commitment of fifteen of the cleric-diplomats is unknown.

George d'Armagnac, archbishop of Avignon, was one humanist cleric, well-educated and committed to protecting men of letters. He was an almost fanatically orthodox churchman, described as "very attached to the religion." An illegitimate son of a count, he was reared by a cardinal who was a relative. In his career in the church, d'Armagnac was made, in turn, bishop of Rhodes and archbishop of Toulouse, and, in 1544, he was created a cardinal. He died in 1585 at the age of eighty-four in his final seat at Avignon. Among his correspondence are letters sent to reprove the anti-Catholic license of the queen of Navarre, and to the bishop of Lascar, for condoning the queen's activities. The bishop of Lascar subsequently had to appear before the Inquisition in 1563 with seven other French bishops suspected of Calvinism, while Cardinal d'Armagnac has an almost dean bill of health with respect to his religious affiliation. D'Armagnac nevertheless protected men of letters, introduced them to Francois I, and invited many humanists into his household. This was enough to generate suspicion by contemporaries that he was a politique despite his known zeal for Catholicism.(19)

Some cleric-diplomats were more sympathetic to the Huguenots than others, but none favored a policy persecuting Roman Catholics. As diplomats, they carried out the royal policy without question. The bishop of Poitiers, in England, counseled Henry VIII to divorce Catherine of Aragon in order to secure his marriage to the Duchesse d'Alencon. However, the English monarch married Anne Boleyn and thwarted French royal hopes. In another English venture, the archbishop of Bordeaux incurred papal wrath when he argued that Henry VIII's excommunication should be withdrawn in order to preserve European Christendom. Closer to home, the archbishop of Bordeaux and the bishop of Limoges were both vigorous supporters of the Gallican church, notably in confrontations with Rome. Another cleric-diplomat, the archbishop of Vienne, counseled the French king to treat the Huguenots softly as the best way to reestablish royal power. The bishop of Orleans was a voice for peace. Seldom in his diocese, he even asked the king to intercede with the canons of the see to allow him to wear a beard against ecclesiastical custom. Henri II did so in a letter claiming that he intended to send the bishop to a diplomatic post where he would be better received wearing a beard. The bishop counseled the king to favor peace with the Huguenots as the most beneficial policy for France, saying that peace could not be too dearly bought.(20)

These cleric-diplomats chose in some cases to carry out the king's orders in the face of papal opposition and censure. Two were even indicted by papal officials for their diplomatic activities, for their humanist sympathies, or for apostasy. For thirteen of them, there is no evidence that they suffered papal censure for their role as royal servants; sixteen of them clearly did not. Three were either not confirmed in their royally appointed sees or otherwise had their ecclesiastical professions limited by papal actions.(21)

Two of the cleric-diplomats were among those hailed before the Roman Inquisition in 1563 with the bishop of Lascar. When they did not appear, they were subsequently condemned for heresy. Catherine de Medici, as regent, was undaunted by the indictment. Not only did she order one of them to sit as a delegate at the Council of Trent, but she also named him to succeed an apostatized cardinal as bishop of Beauvais. In 1572 Catherine sent another to Poland to do battle with papal and imperial ambassadors in order to secure the Polish throne for her son, Henri d'Anjou. Papal disapproval may have affected the opinions of the contemporaries of these cleric-diplomats, but it certainly had no effect on the royal attitude or apparently on the attitude of French ecclesiastical officials.(22)

The attitudes and activities of these cleric-diplomats regarding their ecclesiastical responsibilities indicated whether or not they rigorously imposed orthodoxy in their dioceses. Several held multiple sees and rarely spent time in them, but many put a great deal of energy into reform so as to check Protestant opinion or to re-enforce orthodoxy.

The geographical provenance of these cleric-diplomats indicates little because they came from all areas. The largest number, eight, came from Languedoc, Navarre, and Gascony. There is no certain place identified with nine of the clerics, but one was Italian, one came from Brittany, six from Normandy and other northern provinces, while six came from the central territories and four from two families in the Limousin.(23)

Many of the cleric-diplomats can also be associated with the politique party or parties by their network of patrons and relatives. Although Francois de Noailles began his career sponsored by the Chatillon family, he looked successfully to the Guises for favor while Francois II was king, and ended his career as a client of Villeroy, Catherine's secretary of state. The Noailles family also had close ties with the queen of Navarre and with the Montmorencies. Later in the century, Francois' nephew, another albeit non-clerical Noailles diplomat, was one of the first nobles openly to support Henri de Navarre against the Catholic League. However, it is risky to assume that family members always thought alike and worked together. The bishop of Valence and Die, a noted diplomat, was known for his ambivalent, almost Calvinist, sermons, and it was rumored that he was married. Certainly he had a legitimized son who assisted him openly in his diplomatic activities. However, the bishop and his brother, a famed military leader and staunch anti-Huguenot, were not members of the same network of patrons and clients. Personal choice continued to be significant. After the bishop of Valence died, his son hastened to throw in his lot with the Catholic League. However, when the League party faced defeat at the hands of Henri IV, the son's wife, using her own family's ties with the king, was able to get her husband reinstated at court and even made a marshall. Evidence of practice, opinion, patronage, and, to a lesser extent, family connection thus identify almost one-third of the cleric-diplomats appointed during the sixteenth century as politiques, and associates them with a politique philosophy.(24)

The politique cleric-diplomats were Frenchmen first. They conceded not that religion was unimportant but that national integrity was more important. With their help, the French monarchy and a unified French state triumphed over the Holy League, over those French nobles who were ready to challenge royal authority, and over the militant Catholics in Rome and Calvinists in Geneva. The politiques, clerical as well as secular, helped save their country from religious partition and the monarchy from destruction.

1 For example see J. Russell Major, "The Renaissance Monarchy as Seen by Erasmus, More, Seyssel, and Machiavelli," in Action and Conviction in Early Modern Europe: Essays in Memory of E. H. Harbison, ed. Theodore K. Rabb and Jerrold E. Seigel (Princeton, 1969), 17-31; H. H. Rowen, The King's State: Proprietary Dynasticism in Modern France (Rutgers, 1980), 27-42; Roland Mousnier, "Les Fidelities et les clienteles en France, aux XVI, XVII, et XVIII siecles," Histoire sociale 15 (1982): 35-46. For a more comprehensive bibliography on this topic see Sharon Kettering, "Patronage in Early Modern France," French Historical Studies 17 (1992): 839-62; idem, Patrons, Brokers, and Clients in Seventeenth-Century France (Oxford, 1986).

2 Antoine Degert, "Le clerge de France et les origines de la diplomatie Francaise," Revue d'Histoire de l'Eglise de France 9 (1923): 321-46.

3 "Babou de la Bourdaisiere (Philibert II)," Dictionnaire de Biographie Francaise, 4:1033-4.

4 Mark Greengrass, "Noble Affinities in Early Modern France: The Case of Henri I de Montmorency, Constable of France," European History Quarterly 16 (1986): 275-311; Robert R. Harding, Anatomy of a Power Elite (New Haven, 1978). For attempts to define politique see Mack P. Holt, The Duke of Anjou and the Politique Struggle during the Wars of Religion (Cambridge, 1986), 2; De Lamar Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism. Bernardino de Mendoza and the French Catholic League (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), 34-5; E. M. Beame, "The Development of Politique Thought during the French Religious Wars (1560-1595)," (Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois, 1957), 353.

5 William Farr Church, Constitutional Thought in Sixteenth-Century France (New York, 1941), 10; E. M. Beame, "Development of Politique Thought," 356-7, 360; Frederic J. Baumgartner, Change and Continuity in the French Episcopate. The Bishops and the Wars of Religion, 1547-1610 (Durham, 1986), 123-9. Baumgartner deals with the upper clergy in general, touching on the role of clerics as politiques, but does not specifically address the political role of the cleric-diplomats.

6 Claude de Seyssel, The Monarchy of France, trans. J. H. Hexter, ed., annot., intro. Donald R. Kelley (New Haven, 1981), 49-65; J. Russell Major, "The Renaissance Monarchy," 24-5.

7 Seyssel, The Monarchy of France, 49-65; for Gallicanism see Baumgartner, Change and Continuity, 6-7.

8 J. W. Allen, A History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century (London, 1928), 275; Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, vol. 2: The Age of Reformation (Cambridge, 1978), 350-2; E. Armstrong, "The Political Theory of the Huguenots," The English Historical Review 4 (1889): 13-40.

9 Church, Constitutional Thought in Sixteenth-Century France, 73.

10 Donald Kelley, Francois Hotman: A Revolutionary's Ordeal (Princeton, 1973), 296, 298-9; Church, Constitutional Thought in Sixteenth-Century France, 158; De Lamar Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism (Cambridge, Mass., 1964), 48; Beatrice Reynolds, Proponents of Limited Monarchy in Sixteenth-Century France Francis Hotman and Jean Bodin (New York, 1931), 78; Paul Lawrence Rose, "Bodin and the Bourbon Succession to the French Throne, 1583-1594," Sixteenth Century Journal 9 (1978): 77.

11 Jean Bodin, The Six Bookes of a Commonweale, ed. Kenneth Douglas McRae, (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), A5-A8; Reynolds, Proponents of Limited Monarchy, 184; Paul Lawrence Rose, "The Politique and the Prophet: Bodin and the Catholic League 1589-1594," The Historical Journal 21 (1978): 789, 808.

12 Edmund Dickerman, "The Conversion of Henry IV: 'Paris is well worth a Mass' in Psychological Perspective," The Catholic Historical Review 63 (January 1977): 6, 13; Michael W. Wolfe, The Conversion of Henri IV: Politics, Power, and Religious Belief in Early Modern France (Cambridge, Masse, 1993), 35.

13 Seyssel, The Monarchy of France, 15-6; Major, "The Renaissance Monarchy," 27; Fleury Vindry, Les Ambassadeurs Francais Permanents au XVIe Siecle (Paris, 1903), 49.

14 Beame, "The Development of Politique Thought," 17-22.

15 Franklin Palm, Politics and Religion in Sixteenth-Century France: A Study of the Career of Henry of Montmorency-Damville, Uncrowned King of the South (New York, 1927), ch. 5; Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism, 223; Beame, "The Development of Politique Thought," 17-22; for a spectrum of politique thought see E. M. Beame, "The Limits of Toleration in Sixteenth-Century France," Studies in the Renaissance 13 (1966): 250-65; Rose, "the Politique and the Prophet," 783.

16 Baumgartner, Change and Continuity, appendix II, 210-35.

17 Vindry, Les Ambassadeurs Francais, passim; M. Michaud, Biographie Universelle ancienne et moderne (Paris, 1854-[65]); Nouvelle Biographie Generale depuis les temps recules jusqu'a 1850-60 (Paris, 1855); Dictionnaire de Biographie Francaise, ed. Balleau, Barroux, Prevost, (Paris, 1939).

18 "Baif (Lazare de)," Michaud, 2:623; "Baif (Lazare de)," Dictionnaire de Biographie Francaise, 4:1222-6; "Langeac ou Langhac (Jean de)," Michaud, 23:172-3; "Langeac ou Langhac (Jean de)," Nouvelle Biographie, 29:392-3; Robert Kalas, "Wealth, Place and Power in Sixteenth-Century France: The Rise of the Selve and Noailles Families," (Ph.D. diss., New York University, 1982), 400, 403.

19 "Armagnac (George de)," Michaud, 2:231-2; Philippe Tamizey de Larroque, Correspondance du cardinal d'Armagnac, (Paris, 1874); Idem., "Le cardinal d'Armagnac et Jacques de Germigny," Revue des Questions Historiques 33 (1883): 181-204; Idem., Jacques de Germigny et le cardinal d'Armagnac (Paris, 1883); Leonce Couture, "Le Ordinal Georges d'Armagnac," Gascony 16 (1875): 341-78; R. Rey, "Le Cardinal Georges d'Armagnac, Colegat a Avignon (1566-1585)," Annales du Midi 10 (1898): 120-54, 273-306; Degert, "Proces de Huit Eveques Francais suspects de Calvinisme," Revue des Questions Historiques 76 (1904): 79.

20 "Gramont (Gabriel de)," Dictionnaire de Biographie Francaise, 16:930; "Gramont (Gabriel de)" Michaud, 17:323; "Gramont (Gabriel de)," Nouvelle Biographie 21:620; "Du Bellay (Jean)," Dictionnaire de Biographie Francaise, 11:892-3; "Bellay (Jean du)," Michaud, 3:552-53; "Bellay (Jean du)," Nouvelle Biographie, 5:227-8; "Langeac ou Langhac (Jean de)," Michaud, 23:172-3; "Langeac ou Langhac (Jean de)," Nouvelle Biographie, 29:392-3; "Marillac (Charles de)," Michaud, 26:660; "Marillac," Nouvelle Biographie, 33:763-4; "Morvilliers (Jean de)," Michaud, 29:383-4; "Morvillier," Nouvelle Biographie, 36:699-702; Pierre de Vaissiere, Charles de Marillac (Paris, 1896); Baguenault de Puchesse, Jean de Morvillier (Paris, 1870).

21 "Du Bellay (Jean)," Dictionnaire de Biographie Francaise, 11:892-3; "Bellay (Jean du)," Michaud, 3:552-3; "Bellay (Jean du)," Nouvelle Biographie, 5:227-8; "Foix (Paul de)," Michaud, 14:285-7; "Foix (Paul de)," Nouvelle Biographie, 18:50-2; "Noailles (Gilles de)," Michaud, 30:615-7; "Noailles (Gilles de)," Nouvelle Biographie, 38:116-8; See also L'abbe Antoine Degert, Histoire des Eveques de Dax (Dax, 1899).

22 Degert, "Proces de Huit Eveques Francais," 79; "Noailles (Francois de)," Michaud, 30: 615-7; "Noailles (Francois de)," Nouvelle Biographie, 38:116-8; See also Degert, Histoire des Eveques de Dax; Philippe Tamizey de Larroque, "Francois de Noailles, Eveque de Dax," Revue de Gascogne 6 (1865); "Montluc (Jean de)," Michaud, 29:165; "Montluc (Jean de)," Nouvelle Biographie, 36:321; Hector Reynaud, Jean de Monluc, Eveque de Valence et de Die (Geneva, 1971); Henri de Noailles, Henri de Valois et la Pologne en 1572 (Paris, 1867); Hector de ha Ferriere, "L'election du Duc d'Anjou au Trone de Pologne," Revue des Questions Historiques 44 (1888): 448-506.

23 Vindry, Dictionnaire de Biographie Francaise; Michaud, Nouvelle Biographie, passim.

24 Kettering, Patrons, Brokers and Clients in Seventeenth-Century France, 29; Louis Paris, Les papiers des Noailles de la Bibliotheque du Louvre (Paris, 1865), 2:259, 299; Kalas, "Wealth, Place, and Power in Sixteenth-Century France," ch. 6; "Montluc," Michaud, 29:165-6.

Loretta T. Burns is a professor of history at Mankaro State University, Minnesota.
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