Civil-Military Relations and Concordance Theory: A Case Study of Pakistan (1988-93).
The article attempts to apply the concordance model of Rebecca Schiff's on Pakistan from 1988-93. The findings of the article have observed some contradictions and problem of oversimplification in the model with reference to Pakistan. The finding did not support her argument that concordance amid the three stake holders on four indicators could prevent military intervention in politics. In fact the results of this study are different than the model's beliefs.
Rebecca L. Schiff's 'Theory of concordance' argues that disagreement between three stake holders - military elite, civil elite and citizenry - on four indicators: social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, the method of recruiting military personnel and the style of the military is the cause of military intervention in politics. It does not argue that absolute concordance is required between the three partners to prevent military rule but indicates that greater discordance will increase the possibility of martial law. The concordance theory also includes institutional and cultural changes that promote or prevent military's political role.1 In the light of this discussion, the article attempts to test the concordance theory against the case study of Pakistan in the time frame of 1988-1993.2 The study will evaluate whether concordance theory was the cause of delaying martial law in the said time frame or not.
Before beginning this debate it is essential to define stakeholders and indicators of concordance theory with special reference to Pakistan.
Citizenry: Citizenry was not a partner in power sharing3 so this stakeholder of Schiff's theory is irrelevant in this case study.
The military: According to concordance theory military means 'the armed forces and the personnel'.4 In Pakistan only military elite entered into the process of negotiation with the political leadership, whereas armed personnel have no decision making role.5 So in this case the later part of the Schiff's definition of military is irrelevant.
The political leadership / civilian elite: Schiff's defines political leadership in the context of functions. According to her it is required to figure out who represents government and effects the decisions related to support, mission and composition of the armed forces. This indicator excludes nature of the government institutions and method of selection of leadership and only include political actor that affects decisions related to armed forces. She indicates that 'cabinet, presidents, prime minister, party leaders, parliaments and monarchies are all possible forms of government elites'.6 In Pakistan it is civil and military elite that effects the composition and functioning of the military. As far as the financial requirement of the nation's army is concerned it could not be cut off by the political elite. The military elite had made it clear through its behavior that its financial interests had to be safeguarded and should not be touched upon.7
The political decision making process: The political decision-making process includes institutional organisations of society which affects the functioning of military and its satisfaction. According to Schiff this indictor includes following factors: budget, size, materials and equipment, and structure. In this context she mentions that the nature of government, either democratic or authoritarian, is not important but it is important to identify the channel which determines the organisational and institutional decisions of the military.
She argues: budgets, materials, size, and structure are issues decided upon by open parliaments, closed cabinets, special committees, and political elites, and may involve the participation of military officers. Often the military makes its need known through a governmental channel or agency that takes into consideration both military and societal resources and requirements.8
In Pakistan military elite directly sends its needs to politicians. The army needs have always been fulfilled irrespective of the status of economy and needs of society. Even taxation was increased to give lion's share to army in the budget. In Pakistan the army has remained as a privileged class due to bad law and order situation of the country caused by internal and external security threats.9
Social composition of the official corps: The concordance theory has emphasized upon professional elite of the armed forces. Schiff's idea of professional elite was based on Samuel P. Huntington theory on civil-military relations. Schiff has explained this indicator in these words:
Most modern militaries have an officer corps that is in charge of broad institutional and day-to-day functioning of the armed forces; these are the career soldiers who dedicate their lives to soldiering and to the development of the military and the definition of its relationship to the rest of society. The officer is distinguished from the rank-and-file soldier, and, as leaders of the armed forces, the officer corps can provide not only the critical links between the citizenry and the military but also between the military and the government.10
She further explained that usually in a democratic society the social composition of the army is based on broader representation of the constituencies. 11 But this broader representation is not a necessary requirement of concordance theory. The social composition of Pakistan's army elite can be sought through market share approach. The market share of each province, the Federal Capital (Islamabad), Azad Kashmir, Northern Areas and Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) on army official level during the selected time frame is provided in the Table 1.
Table 1: Market Share of the Pakistan Army
Province###Market share of army
The social composition of Pakistan army was not based on broader constituencies. The composition depicts over representation of Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and under representation of rest of the areas. 12 As army officials were drawn from the Pakistan Military Academy, therefore, mostly representatives of Punjab and KPK remained the military elite. In Pakistan military elite had belonged to landlord families, successful professionals and prominent families. The social composition did not support the army's status of being the national representative. 13
Recruitment: The third indicator of concordance theory is related to the method of enlisting the citizenry into armed forces. 14 The method of recruitment can be coercive or persuasive. The coercive recruitment is an indicator of lack of concordance between citizenry and military whereas persuasive recruitment was a symbol of concordance. In Pakistan, the recruitment of army is completely voluntary as per Article 39 'Participation of people in Armed Forces' of 1973 constitution.
The article stated that 'state shall enable people from all parts of Pakistan to participate in the armed forces of Pakistan'. 15 In Pakistan army personnel were largely drawn from lower middle class of the society which was not politically powerful. 16 Hence this indicator is irrelevant against the case study of Pakistan.
Style of military: Schiff defined this indicator as:
This indicator basically refers to the outlook of armed forces, peoples' views about them and beliefs that served as a driving force behind them. This indicator focused on relationship between army and the society in historical and cultural context. It seeks the attitude of military elite towards citizen in cultural context. 17
In Pakistan the military is an obvious power. 18 The martial laws were frequent and army had consciously politicized its role to a great extent. It had collaborated with the civilian elites for the ouster of governments and had great influence on political decision making. 19 But even-though people had great respect for the armed forces and they considered it a noble institution, 20 their attitude is also embedded in the history and culture of the region. Pakistan has a tradition to respect the source of power, irrespective of their performance, and at that time (1988-1990) army was the most powerful institution. 21
Application of concordance theory: 1988-1990
Army-government relations: Army, a powerful institution at the time, had reservations on the transfer of power to the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). Thus Benazir Bhutto could form the government only after a deal was struck between the army and PPP. According to Javed Ashraf the deal was made, as at that point, Benazir was young and immature and there was a general impression that she would try to take revenge from the army. The deal covered the following points:
1. Benazir would not take revenge from Zia's family;
2. whatever had been done on Kashmir and Afghan policy would not be undone;
3. and army should be kept on board regarding decisions on foreign policy.22
The PPP leaders, however, revealed that only two terms were imposed for transfer of power to them, i.e. do not interfere in army affairs and do not take any revenge from the armed forces. The high army officials had denied having any deal with the PPP and stated that it had recommended nothing more than some suggestions.23 This deal took place at the behest of the establishment (civil-military bureaucracy).24 The two other matters concerning the deal were that Sahibzada Yaqub should be given the office of foreign minister and Ishaq Khan should be nominated for the presidency.25 The army choice of Yaqub was for the reason that it did not authorize the PPP to execute the nuclear policy and foreign policy, especially connected to the Kashmir issue and India.26 Benazir met with Ishaq Khan and Aslam Baig when transfer of power was being delayed without any reason. At this point of time transfer of power was not possible without the assent of army.27
Ishaq Khan deliberately delayed the transfer of power as it was hard for him to acknowledge PPP in the place of the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI).28 The international community, which had anticipated reinstallation of democracy, also put pressure on the president. Ishaq finally nominated Benazir as the Prime Minister on 1 December 1988.29 On 23 March 1989 she announced the 'Medal of Democracy' for the armed forces.30 The medal was essential to appease the army as 'without the support of army no government could be toppled in Pakistan' and Benazir wanted to complete her term.31 She praised the role of army and stated that the medal was for the aspiration of the armed forces for supporting the process of democratization fully.32 This medal was an attempt to appease Aslam Baig, Ishaq Khan and legacy of martial law; both of them were powerful and were not letting the government to exercise its constitutional authority.33 The army and ISI always controlled Afghan and Kashmir policies.
The ISI repeatedly mentioned to the foreign minister and foreign secretary that these issues were our mandate to decide.34 On 6 March 1989, the Afghan mujahideen had attacked Jalalabad with the support of ISI. This attack was planned by the ISI but Benazir was not informed about it. Benazir kept silent and let the press to bring critical articles against the ISI. The newspaper articles had played an important role to uncover the role of army in Afghan policy.35 On 24 May 1989, Benazir replaced Director General of the ISI, Major General Hamid Gul, by Lieutenant General (retired) Shamsur Rehman Kallue. Hamid Gul was promoted as Lieutenant General and posted to Multan.36 This action of Benazir was of great significance as it was contrary to the desire of the president. Picking a retired army officer to head ISI also annoyed the General Head Quarters (GHQ).37 On 6 August 1990 Nawa-i-Waqt and The Nation had published the news that the assemblies would be dissoluted today.38
Benazir government was unaware of any such development. She considered it disinformation and a conspiracy of the IJI.39 It is said that in fact the decision to oust the PPP government was taken in the corps commanders' meeting that was held in Rawalpindi on 21 January 1990.40 The PPP leaders claimed that only the president was responsible for the dissolution of Benazir's government. Lt. General Alam Jan Mahsood, however, revealed that, at the start of 1990, army had decided to overthrow Benazir's government. In August 1989 Benazir was in disagreement with the army and the president (when she decided to retire the naval chief, Admiral Iftikar Ahmed Sirohey on the suggestion of General Nasirullah Baber and Iftikhar Gillani). It was elucidated by one of the senior bureaucrats that Nasirullah Baber and Iftikhar Gillani had dragged Benazir into an 'unnecessary conflict' with the president and the army.
He stated that Iftikhar Gillani had informed her that 'no constitution could make the President the appointing authority (for the services chiefs) and that this power of retirement belong to the Prime Minister'.41 It was mentioned by a high official in the PPP government that president invited Iftikhar and urged that the premier 'should not insist on her position'. He agreed with Ishaq, yet proposed to Benazir that she should remain resolute on her stance.42 The advice of the cabinet members made a major contribution in putting Benazir government in a mess. Aslam Baig's role in the whole term of Benazir was dubious. The PPP stressed that the army chief was consulted and he agreed on the retirement of the naval chief but afterwards he behaved as if he was ignorant about it.43
It is pertinent to note here that according to the provision 243 (1) of the constitution the federal government should have the control and command of the armed forces; however in reality it was the other way as army was running the political system. The army always wanted to have an individual in authority that could preserve its benefits and did not intrude in its business.44 Ishaq was with the army. He and Aslam Baig did not allow Benazir to exercise her authority and to complete her term.45 It was the army and bureaucratic president that bypassed the constitution and controlled the constitutional powers which should have been exercised by the elected people. The civil-military relations in this era had gone through following phases:
* Firstly, Benazir surrendered before the military and struck a deal for coming to power.
* Secondly, after assuming office, she had appeased the military and abandoned the constitutional powers to the military.
* Thirdly when she started to make decisions which were constitutional prerogative of the government then discordance started to emerge and resulted in the toppling of the government.
In the first two stages the concordance enabled the martial law possibility to get materialized. Schiff's theory could not explain that what would be the meaning of cooperative relationship between the partners-military and politics. In Pakistan the existence and fall of the political governments is not possible without the cooperation of military. In fact, in this government, the concordance between the president and military elite and discordance between political and military elite had caused the dissolution.
Application of concordance theory: 1990-93
The role of the army in the 1990 elections was noticeable. Lt general Assad Durrani, the chief of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in 1990, admitted later that Baig consigned him the job to distribute funds among politicians who were opposing PPP in the 1990 election. Hamid Gul also accepted that he was architect of the IJI which was hostile to Benazir.46
Formation of the cabinet (1990-1993): The IJI government was supported by civil-military bureaucracy. Even the new cabinet was formed after intimate consultation and advice of the president and the army.47/48 Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, the army's nomination in the former government, continued with the same portfolio (foreign minister) in the IJI government.49 The important ministry of finance and economic affairs was allotted to Sartaj Aziz who was member of the Senate and confidant of Ishaq.50 The ministries of information, religious affairs, Kashmir, state and frontier regions were run by two former bureaucrats (Roedad Khan and Ijlal Haider Zaidi) who were appointed as advisors with the rank and status equivalent to minister on the recommendation of civil-military bureaucracy.51 Since elections to formation of government civil-military relation were cooperative.
Nawaz Sharif-army relations: Establishment assumed Nawaz Sharif to serve as puppet, as he and his government was by product of establishment's efforts. The disagreements between the army and Nawaz emerged when he started to take decisions against the interest of the military elite. Army's flag ranked leadership, Director General ISI, Major General Assad Durrani, and Lieutenant General Hamid Gul, turned against Nawaz. Durrani became a threat to Nawaz when he decided to remove him. He made several efforts to destabilize the government by personally supervised disinformation campaigns against key ministers. Gul was also not in high spirits when he was transferred to Taxila. Being the founder of the IJI he was hopeful to get important political role but that did not happen.52 On 2 March 1992 ISI chief, Duranni, was replaced by the Lt. General Javed Naser.53 Naser was selected by Nawaz.
Nawaz had bypassed the procedure for his selection as he did not observe a panel of proposed name by the GHQ. The profile of Javed was highly religious and at that point military was promoting its moderate and liberal image. The changes in ISI took place when Afghanistan entered into the serious political phase. The GHQ did not like it as it did not believe that it was the right time for such massive changes.54
Nawaz-Ishaq relations: Both Nawaz and Ishaq were products of the establishment and were also heavily relying on its support; yet the establishment was disappointed when they turned against each other.55 On 20 December 1991 Ishaq addressed the joint session of the parliament.56 Throughout the presidential address the opposition under the leadership of Benazir raised slogans against Ishaq; Nawaz did not intervene and kept silent during the episode.57 When after the presidential address, journalists asked Nawaz whether Ishaq would be nominated for another term, he answered that matter was not yet decided and that the party would decide it.58 Ishaq and Nawaz had different choices for the office of Chief of the Army Staff (COAS), after the death sudden of General Asif Nawaz.59
Ishaq's choice was General Waheed Kaker and Nawaz was reportedly supporting General Rahim Bhatti to which Ishaq objected as he was to retire. This annoyed Nawaz60 and he started the campaign for the cancellation of Eighth Amendment. A day before prime minister's address to the nation, Nawaz tried to meet Waheed. But Brigadier Shami told Nawaz that the COAS was not feeling well and, therefore, he would meet him next day. Nawaz got the hint as hardly after one hour of Shami's talk with Nawaz, Waheed met Ishaq in the presidency.61 Nawaz later confided there was no disagreement between him and Ishaq on the appointment of Waheed.62
Problems for Nawaz: Nawaz faced another crisis within the party. On 19 March 1993 the President of Pakistan Muslim League (PML) Muhammad Khan Junejo died in USA.63 After his death Nawaz called a meeting of PML Council and got himself elected as President of the PML.64 This action was objected by several PML members; and even many federal ministers (including, Sardar Asif Ahmad Ali, Roedad, Hamid Nasir Chattha, Anwar Saifullah, Jam Mashooq Ali and Mir Hazar Khan Bajrani) resigned as a protest. Ishaq took full advantage of this situation and persuaded the aggrieved members of PML to oppose Nawaz.65 All the Members of the National Assembly (MNAs) and Senators from FATA announced their support for Ishaq.66 Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and all the three alliances namely, the Pakistan Democratic Alliance (PDA), National Democratic Alliance (NDA), Islamic Democratic Front (IDF) had unanimously agreed to support Ishaq Khan on the dissolution of the assemblies.67
In fact the opposition played a vital role in making Ishaq's mind about removing Nawaz. Ishaq had meetings with the opposition. The opponents of Nawaz had multiplied in a short period of time. To dissolve the government bureaucracy served as a bridge to connect the presidency, opposition and the military. The meeting of the corps commanders headed by the COAS was held in the first week of July 1993 to discuss the political situation of the country. In the meeting it was decided that Nawaz should suggest to the president to dissolve the assemblies.68 Roedad conveyed the message of COAS to the president that he would support any presidential action which was according to the constitution.69 On 17 April 1993 Nawaz addressed the nation and exposed the conspiracy hatched against the government by Ishaq Khan and said that he would not take dictation from the presidency. He explained about the horse-trading in the capital.
He mentioned that every third person of his party was promised a ministry by Ishaq Khan and his younger brother Shahbaz Sharif was offered prime ministership.70 After this episode three meetings took place between the president and the prime minister to settle their differences but these meetings could not patch up their misunderstandings and differences.71
Dissolution of the National Assembly: The crisis culminated with the dissolution of the National Assembly and dismissal of the government by the president on 18 April 1993. Ishaq made use of Nawaz words in support of his action by explaining that Nawaz planned to subvert the constitution as he himself mentioned that he would not take dictation from the president. He explained that I had never given dictation to him as I was required under the constitution to advise the government. Nawaz criticized Ishaq for collaborating with the PPP in the dismissal of the government. The PML decided to challenge the dissolution order in the Supreme Court.72 Nawaz asked for the resignation of Ishaq as he believed that he was not worthy to be the symbol of federation.
On 19 April 1993 Gauhar Ayub had filed a constitution petition against the dissolution of the National Assembly in the Lahore High Court.73 On 26 May 1993 the court decided for the restoration of the National Assembly, the prime minister and the cabinet immediately.74
Tragic end of a democratic rule: In July 1993 the series of meetings took place among the troika (Ishaq-Nawaz-Waheed) to manage the crisis.75 The opposition was also taken into confidence by Ishaq and Waheed.76 With the efforts of Waheed a formula was at last agreed by Ishaq and Nawaz. In accordance with the formula, on 18 July 1993, Nawaz recommended the dissolution of National Assembly and then also resigned. Ishaq dissolved the Assembly and, thereafter, stepped down from presidency.77 The first time fall of Nawaz government was the cause of discordance between the president and prime minister and concordance between civil and military elite. The discordance occurred on political decisions and appointment of military high command. The second time fall was the byproduct of concordance between civil-military elite.
1988-1990: In this case the fall of government was the result of concordance between president and military against the government. Besides this time the discordance amid three stakeholders had not happened at all, therefore, Schiff's model is inadequate to explain this episode of change.
1990-1993 - 19 April 1993: Concordance between portion of political elite (president and opposition)-military elite against government had resulted in dissolution of assembly on 18 July 1993 - interesting in this case, complete concordance between civil-military elite had caused the dissolution of assemblies which is entirely contrary to the Schiff's theory. The notion of concordance was the key reason of increasing the chances of martial law.
With reference to Pakistan it is complicated to figure out the law of causation that controls politics. Either in concordance or discordance the military elite remained the decisive force in politics. The role of bureaucratic president, that brought all the stakeholders on the agreement of dissolving government, is difficult to categorize in concordance theory as in Pakistan 'civil elite' mostly means bureaucratic elite, separate from political elite. In Pakistan the power indicators were also less than described by Schiff, such as the citizenry had no political influence. The politics in developing countries is not simple. It is mostly controlled by the most organised institution which in this case was military and bureaucratic elite.
1 Rebecca L. Schiff, 'Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance', Armed Forces and Society, 22:1 (Fall 1995), p.10.
2 From 1988 to 1993 there were two civilian governments in Pakistan. The tenure of first government was from 22 December 1988 to 6 August 1990 which was formed by the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). Tenure of the second government was from 6 November 1990 to 18 July 1993 which was formed by Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI). See Dawn, Karachi, 23 December 1988, 7 August 1990, 7 November 1990, 19 July1993.
3 Hamid Khan, Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, 2nded. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012), p.574.
4 Rebecca L. Schiff, op.cit., p.12.
5 Hassan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan: 1947-1997 (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publishers, 2000), pp.147-48.
6 Rebecca L. Schiff, op.cit., p.12.
7 Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Inc: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy (London: Pluto Press, 2007), pp.151-52.
8 Rebacca L. Schiff, op.cit., pp.15-16.
9 Hasan Akari Rizvi, op.cit., p.270.
10 Rebacca L. Schiff, op.cit., p.15.
11 Rebaccal L. Schiff's has explained this point through an example of India during British colonial period when army was drawn from particular Indian castes and classes. The example has taken from Stephan P. Cohen, The Indian Army (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), pp.50-62.
12 Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), pp.40-41.
13 Carey Schofield, Inside the Pakistan Army: A Woman's Experience on the Frontline of War on Terror (London: Biteback Publishing Ltd., 2011), pp.16-17.
14 Rebacca L. Schiff, op.cit., p.17.
15 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan: [As Modified up to the 28th February, 2012] (Islamabad: National Assembly of Pakistan, 2012), p.20.
16 Carey Schofield, op.cit., p.16.
17 Rebacca L. Schiff, op.cit., p.17.
18 Carey Schofield, op.cit., p.13.
19 Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A New History (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012), p.151.
20 Hasan Askari Rizvi, op.cit., p.270.
21 Carey Schofield, op.cit., pp.15-16.
22 Javed Ashraf, Senator Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam), PML (Q), personal interview, 16 September 2011. Javed Ashraf has served as Director General Military Intelligence (1990-91), Master General of Ordinance (1991-1992), Director General Inter-Services Intelligence (1993-95).
23 Ahmad Salim, Chay August Kay Baad: Intakhabi M'arkoon Aur Mehalati Sazishoon Ki Kahani (Urdu) (Lahore: Nigarshat, 1990), pp.14-15.
24 Senator Safdar Abbasi, PPP, personal interview, Islamabad, 10 January 2011. He has been Political Assistant to Benazir (1986-1988) and Political Secretary to Benazir Bhutto when she became Prime Minister in 1988.
25 Muhammad Farooq Qureshi, Nawaz Sharif: Aik Hukmaran-Aik Siyasatdan (Urdu) (Lahore: Qoumi Publishers, 1994), pp.18-19.
26 MNA Aftab Ahmad Sherpao, the Pakistan Peoples Party (Sherpao), PPP (S), personal interview, Islamabad, 12 May 2011. He has served as Chief Minister of NWFP in the tenure of Benazir. Maroof Raza (ed.), Generals and Governments in India and Pakistan (New Delhi, Har-Anand Publications Pvt. Ltd., 2001), p.100.
27 Raziud Din Razi and Shakir Hussain Shakir, General Mirza Aslam Baig: Martial Law Aur Jamhoriat (Urdu) (Multan: Kitab Nagar, 1989), pp.80-82.
28 MNA Aftab Ahmad Sherpao, the PPP (S), personal interview, 12 May 2011.
29 Tahir Kamran, Democracy and Governance (Lahore: South Asia Partnership-Pakistan, 2008), p.140. Sayed Qasim Mahmood (ed.), Encyclopedia Pakistanica (Urdu) (Karachi: Shahkar Book Foundation, 1998), p.317.
30 Zafarullah Khan, Political Parties in Pakistan; Disabled by Design (Islamabad: Freedom Publishers, 2004), p.xii.
31 Iqbal Haider, personal interview, Karachi, 16 October 2011. Iqbal Haider has served as Advisor to the Chief Minister Sindh from January 1989 till February 1990.
32 Razi ud Din Razi and Shakir Hussain Shakir, General Mirza Aslam Baig: Martial Law Aur Jamhoriat (Urdu) (Multan: Kitab Nagar, 1989), pp.84-86.
33 MNA Aftab Ahmad Sherpao, personal interview.
34 MNA Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), PML (N), personal interview, Islamabad, p.14, September 2011. Shahid Khaqan Abbasi held the office of Chairman of National Assembly Standing Committee on Defence (1990-1997).
35 Babar Ali, 'Benazir: Five Months On', Economic and Political Weekly 24, no.22 (June, 1989), p.1217, available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4394894
36 Dawn, Karachi, 25 May 1989.
37 Abbas Nasir, 'The New Deal', The Herald, Karachi, April, 1990, p.30.
38 Nawa-i-Waqt (Urdu), Rawalpindi, 6 August 1990. The Nation, Lahore, August 6, 1990.
39 Muhammad Farooq Qureshi, Nawaz Sharif: Aik Hukmaran-Aik Sayasatdan (Urdu) (Lahore: Qoumi Publishers, 1994), p.24.
40 Iqbal Akhund, Benazir Haqoomat: Pahla Dor Kia Khoia, Kia Payia? (Urdu). Trans. Fahmida Riaz (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.296. Iqbal Akhund, Trial and Error: The Advent and Eclipse of Benazir Bhutto (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000), p.305.
41 Zahid Hussain, 'The Ides of August', Newsline, August 1992, Karachi, p.69.
43 Ibid., pp.69-70.
44 Maroof Raza ed., Generals and Governments in India and Pakistan (New Delhi, Har-Anand Publications Pvt Ltd, 2001), p.103.
45 Iqbal Haider, personal interview.
46 Muhammad Ali Shaikh, Benazir Bhutto: A Political Biography (Karachi: Orient Books Publishing House, 2000), p.199.
47 Ihtashamul Haque, 'Cabinet Coup', The Herald, Karachi, November / December 1990, p.65.
48 Ayaz Mir, 'The Age of Mediocrity', ibid., p.62.
49 MNA, Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, personal interview.
50 Dawn, Karachi, 11 November 1990. Muhammad Ali Chirag, Tareekh-e-Pakistan (Urdu) (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publishers, 2001), p.503. Ihtashamul Haque, op.cit., p.65.
51 Dawn, Karachi, 11 November 1990.
52 Ihtashamul Haque, op.cit., pp.25-26.
53 Dawn, 3 March 1992.
54 Maleeha Lodhi and Zahid Hussain, 'Power Play in Islamabad', Newsline, Karachi, June 1992, pp.26-28.
55 Muhammad Ali Shaikh, Benazir Bhutto: A Political Biography (Karachi: Orient Books Publishing House, 2000), p.208.
56 Muhammad Munir, The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan: Being a Commentary on the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 (Lahore: PLD Publishers, 1999), pp.211-12.
57 Dawn, 21 December 1991.
58 Saeed Mehdi interview by Mazhar Abbas, ARY News, 'Do Tok', 23 May 2010, part 1 (broadcast).
60 Dawn, 19 April 1993. Saeed Mehdi interview by Mazhar Abbas, op.cit., part 2 (broadcast).
61 Saeed Mehdi interview by Mazhar Abbas, op.cit.
62 Dawn, 20 April 1993.
64 Sardar Muhammad Chaudhry, Nawaz Sharif: Tehri Rahon Ka Seedha Musafir (Urdu) (Lahore: Qaumi Publishers, 200), p.172.
65 Hafeez Gauhar, Pakistan Ka Hukmaran: Aik Sachi Aur Karwe Kitab, Gahur Publications, n.d, p.289.
66 Dawn, 1 April 1993.
67 Ibid., 3 April 1993.
68 Roedad Khan, Pakistan-A Dream Gone Sour (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), p.132.
69 Dawn, Karachi, 18 April 1993. Jang (Urdu), Lahore, 18 April 1993. Ian Talbot, op.cit., p.146.
71 Dawn, 20 April 1993.
72 Dawn, 19 April 1993.
73 Jang (Urdu), Lahore, 23 April 1993.
74 Dawn, 27 May 1993.
75 Ibid., Islamabad, 16 July 1993.
76 Ibid., 16 July 1993. Dawn, Islamabad, 17 July 1993.
77 Ibid., 18 July 1993.
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|Article Type:||Case study|
|Date:||Jun 30, 2018|
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