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Civil society and anti-corruption: experiences from Albania, Kosovo and Serbia.


With the introduction of the good governance agenda in the 90s, corruption has been increasingly recognized as an impediment in democratic functioning and economic development. The rising salience of corruption (and anti-corruption) is demonstrated by the frequency of citations in world press: while in the beginning of 90s, corruption was mentioned approximately 800 times, by 2000 this number had reached 1200 (Bryane, 2004). Notably, a large part of the sector has been concentrated on the European post-communist countries.


Albania, Kosovo and Serbia have all had turbulent recent history with fervent changes and troublesome transitions--creating favorable conditions for breeding corruption. Kosovo has gone through decades of de-investment, a conflict, international administration and state-building. Serbia, on the other hand, has been at the center of the fall-out of Yugoslavia, having inherited the secret state structures of the Communist regime, and then suffered international isolation during Milosevic's regime. Meanwhile, Albania faced civil war as pyramid structures collapsed. Transitions have been difficult for all post-communist countries, but the political, social and economic turmoil after the fall of communism have put an additional strain on the already fragile institutions of these countries. While their experiences might be different (yet interconnected), Albania, Kosovo and Serbia have much in common, among which a post-communist past, widespread corruption and much donor and EU influence.

Despite a decade of heavy investment in anti-corruption, concerns about corruption have increased. In polls, 80 to 90% of respondents in Albania, Kosovo and Serbia find corruption and bribery harmful (Gallup International, 2008). An analysis of the civil society sector is not only necessary to understand its role in changing institutional behavior, but will also serve as a guide for policy-makers, donors and civil society practitioners. The experience of these three countries is insightful evidence into the elements that make anti-corruption projects successful or not.

The goal of this research is to explore the impact of civil society organizations in the field of anti-corruption, and compare these experiences to each other. Furthermore, it looks into specific projects within these countries looking for elements which make these projects successful and tries to identify practices which could be transferred to other organizations and countries.

The first part presents the theoretical grounding on the question why should civil society contribute to curbing corruption and what tools it has in its hands. The second part is the methodology and limitations encountered in the study. The third part diagnoses corruption in these countries, based on the typology developed by Alina Mungiu-Pippidi. Before diving into experiences of civil society organizations, the fourth chapter explores the strengths and weaknesses of investigative journalism in fighting corruption. The fifth part assesses civil society in Albania, Kosovo and Serbia, followed by impact assessment of the civil society in anti-corruption and experiences that organizations have had with their projects.

1. Civil Society and Anti-corruption

Nowadays, some authors argue that formal political institutions, such as administrative control and judicial structures, have had a small effect in CEE, whereas among the systems that work are the watchdog role of the press and NGOs (Schmidt, 2007). International organizations have increasingly sought civil society involvement in anticorruption since the 90s, leading to the establishment of civil society involvement as a central theme in anti-corruption (Schmidt, 2007). Nowadays, the Organization for Economic Community and Development firmly states "civil society plays a key role in fighting corruption" (OECD, 2003:8).


A large part of the civil society sector in the region has, in one way or another, been involved in anti-corruption work. In most of the region, first steps were made towards establishing a successful cooperation between the executive and NGO-s (Ralchev, 2004). This involvement has been catalyzed by the attention that international donors have paid to anticorruption projects (Ralchev, 2004). To illustrate, Figure 2 shows that projects strengthening civil society constitute the second largest segment of USAID aid directed at reducing corruption (second only to Fiscal/Customs) (USAID, 2010). In response to escalating perceptions of corruption, donors increasingly undertook anti-corruption initiatives. These programs were conducted by anyone who could conduct them: universities, consulting companies, NGO-s, individual contractors and divisions within national governments (Bryane, 2004).

The discourse of international organizations promoting good governance has been to support civil society organizations in the fight against corruption. Despite popular convictions, actual evidence of success is rather scarce. The impact of civil society programs is increasingly questioned and establishing the link between curbed corruption and civil society actions is not easy (Grimes, 2008). As the area is new, the evidence of long-term successful programs or projects is mainly inconclusive (Bryane, 2004), thus the usefulness of anti-corruption campaigns, creation of new institutions or passage of laws, as well as much of the traditional public sector management and legal reform approaches may have been overrated (Kaufmann, 2003).

1.1. Civil Society Tools to Fight Corruption

Civil society organizations are expected to build partnerships, provide links between public and business actors, and between international actors and domestic contexts through information, mediation and education (Schmidt, 2007). Civil society is generally involved in civic monitoring of corruption through regular corruption perception indexes, anti-corruption public awareness campaigns, consulting and expertise sharing, anti-corruption education courses, and anti-corruption initiatives both on national and local level (Ralchev, 2004). The following three dimensions, with a naming and shaming sub-dimension for public awareness, are the main tools to fight corruption:

1. Raising public awareness,

a. Naming and shaming

2. Providing analyses and recommendation, and

3. Training through seminars, workshops and lectures

2. Methodology

This paper is a comparative case study with three cases. I have done three levels of analysis: macro, meso and micro level. At the macro level, civil societies of Albania, Kosovo and Serbia are compared against each other based on ratings provided by USAID on NGO sustainability and Freedom House Civil Society score.

At the meso level, I have assessed the impact of the civil society anti-corruption sector based on the model developed by Helmut Anheier in the book "Civil Society: Measurement, Policy and Evaluation." The model looks at four dimensions: policy impact, public awareness, media coverage and expert opinion. Because of lack of reliable data, I have adjusted policy impact to impact on legislation, where I have used three indicators: 1. Invitation to participate in Anti-corruption strategy drafting, 2. Participation in Anticorruption strategy drafting and 3. Amendments in legislation as a result of civil society involvement. For the first two indicators, I have developed a dichotomous value of Yes and No, scored with 1 and 0, respectively. Meanwhile, for the third value I have four values: 0 = never, 1=sometimes, 3=often, and 4=always. The largest score on the legislative impact a country can have is 6, which would indicate a very high impact of civil society organizations in legislative processes. Media coverage, is the number of hits that "corruption + respective country" gets on a Southeast European Times news website. For public awareness, I have used a dichotomous value again: Positive or Negative, which I have based on the change in attitudes between 2008 and 2009 in Albania, Kosovo and Serbia on acceptability/unacceptability of using money to evade the law or receive preferential treatment in public institutions. A positive score means that the acceptability for bribing has decreased and vice versa. Meanwhile, a negative score indicates lower unacceptability and higher acceptability of bribing behavior. Finally, the value on expert opinion is based on the question asked to donors, journalists and independent analysts: "how do you rate civil society actions in fighting corruption?"

In the micro level, I have analyzed three projects that were deemed successful by various stakeholders for each country. To measure the impact of the projects and develop a best practices guide, I have developed a framework aiming to identify the elements which make civil society projects successful and what is the impact they have. The elements are: cooperation with institutions, media coverage, and anti-corruption target/aim. I have measured impact across three dimensions: legal: what has been the legislative impact; institutional: has the project had an impact on modus operandi of the targeted institution; and social: have people become more involved with the targeted institution, or has it changed the perception about the institution in question. For anti-corruption target, I have developed three values: high politics, administrative corruption or transparency. The other indicators are scored qualitatively from Low to High, based on submitted evaluation reports and interviews.

In the course of my field research, I have interviewed 30 stakeholders from government agencies, independent agencies, donors, activists and journalists. A full list of interviewees is available with the bibliography. Project scoring is done based on project evaluations I have gathered and interviews I have conducted. The rest of the data is from reports by international organizations, where those are available.

2.1. Limitations

A thorough study of corruption in the region requires an analysis of historical causes, transitional causes and a modeling of the corrupt networks of politicians, public office holders, business people and criminals. But, accessing such data requires much more time for research--especially since my study addresses three countries. Also, in terms of the extent of a study, more research is needed in the role of transnational actors and how this role varies across these three countries given that the international community has varying leverage and influence. Furthermore, understanding the civil society development and impact in social processes in each of these countries would require an in-depth analysis which is beyond the scope of this study.

Time--The restricted time period during which I had to complete field research has limited the number of officials, experts and practitioners I have met. Having to condense three countries in this period has been an additional strain. Also, the field research had to be conducted in January, which posed additional challenges as organizations are usually consolidating their objectives for the coming year in this period. Considering how dispersed and competitive the civil society sector is in these countries, a longer research period would have been beneficial.

Capital Centered--My research has focused in Tirana, Prishtina and Belgrade. While staying in capitals is reasonable as civil society organizations are mainly located there, this study is not able to present the stories of small local organizations.

Organizational memory--The dynamism of the past decade in the region has resulted in many organizations coming and leaving, large movements of people between organizations and sectors, and an army of consultants who are very difficult to trace. Many stories about activities conducted by different organizations remain buried in hard-disks and are now difficult to access. Also, a number of programs have been implemented, completed, but never evaluated. As the constellation within the sector and organizations have changed, traces of old activities are difficult to find.

Data--Both in the field of anti-corruption and in the civil society sector, data is dispersed and difficult to find. Also, it is difficult to find comparable data as sometimes particular rankings or information is not available for all countries. To illustrate, Transparency International does not calculate a Corruption Perception Index for Kosovo and does not include Albania in the Global Barometer of Corruption; CIVICUS has a report for Serbia and will include Albania in its second phase, but Kosovo is not mentioned. Many similar challenges have surfaced due to Kosovo's novelty as a state and incomplete representation of international organizations in the region. As a result, the pool of data for this comparative study is comparably small.

Considering the growing nature of the anti-corruption sector, it is clear that more research is needed on the past activities. A good impact analysis of civil society projects in the region would have to extend over a longer period of time and include organizations in smaller municipalities as well. Future research should also attempt to address the role of rule of law institutions and international organizations, which, due to time and space limitations, are not a part of this study. Also, the availability of comparable systematic data is crucial for future studies, a grievance which needs to be addressed by international organizations.

3. Corruption in Albania, Kosovo and Serbia

Corruption in Albania, Kosovo and Serbia is endemic (Pesic, 2007; European Commission, 2009; European Commission, 2009). The state of affairs is compatible with the view of the Western critics who find corruption a natural outcome of communism's allocation by the state and lack of political and economic competition (Klitgaard, 1988: 206). The practice of communist regimes to favor a select group of few-the nomenklatura and the undue influence that the executive had on the independent branches of government, has left heavy marks on the institutional culture of public institutions (2). Moreover, the transitional tasks they have undertaken are inherently high of corruption.

3.1. Corruption over Time

Tracing World Bank's governance indicator of control of corruption reveals underlying socio-economic and political trends. Figure 2 shows how Albania's percentile rank dropped significantly following the collapse of pyramid schemes in 1996-1997. Since then, Albania has made slow but steady progress. Nevertheless, it has still not reached the level prior to the 1996/1997 turmoil.


Kosovo starts from a very low point in 2003, and it has improved since. Its transitional and uncertain political status created a vacuum resulting in lack of laws and regulations (Nazi, 2003). The greatest improvement in control of corruption is between 2004 and 2005, when Kosovo's provisional institutions were growing and the Anti-corruption Agency was established.

Serbia's percentile rank hit an all time low (and the lowest in comparison to the other two countries a part of this study) in 2000, to significantly improve in 2002 and progress steadily since. Its improvement can be partially attributed to coming to power of pro-democratic Zoran Binoice in 2001. Other studies have also found that this period was perceived as the least corrupt in recent Serbian history (Pesic, 2007). Since then, Serbia has consistently improved its governance score.

The differing paths in Fig. 5 show not only the evolution of control of corruption, but also reflect underlying political and socio-economic trends. When compared among each other, in 2008 Serbia comes out as the best performer in the group, followed by Albania, then Kosovo. In Control of Corruption, Serbia and Kosovo are the best and worst performing countries, respectively, even when compared to the regional average and income group average (see Appendix 2). Despite progress and variation, control of corruption remains low in all three countries: neighboring Slovenia scores around 80% on this indicator.




Governance indicators are useful in providing cross-country comparisons, but numbers and rankings never tell the full story. Improvement in control of corruption will not necessarily indicate that there has been a change of culture in the institutions or that corruption has actually curbed, as rankings are not immune to images of regimes.

3.2. Typology of Corruption

To illustrate the underlying forces in states and markets, and diagnose corruption, I will apply the corruption typology developed by Mungiu-Pippidi, as seen in the table 1.

The ownership of the state is discussed in the context of state capture, with particular care for political party financing; distribution of public goods is assessed through the privatization of publicly owned enterprises; and social acceptability of corruption through perception and experience public opinion polls. Finally, to understand the distinction between public and private, I look at how public officials treat the budget: is there evidence to suggest that public procurement contracts are used to establish or maintain networks of interest.

3.3. State Capture

State capture is a form of grand corruption where firms make private payments to public officials in order to influence the design of laws, rules and decrees (World Bank, 2003). State capture manifests itself through private purchase of legislative votes, private purchase of executive decrees, private purchase of court decisions and illicit political party financing. Firms buy public goods on a la carte basis, affecting the way that they are provided to the general public (Hellman J., Jones G.& Kaufmann D., 2003). In a high state capture situation, some firms receive preferential treatment, which create a wide range of policy and institutional distortions, generating highly concentrated gains to a select number of sectors and groups (Gray & Anderson, 2006: 17).

The extent of political corruption and state capture in transition countries is captured in World Bank's study Anti-corruption in Transition. In a comparative study of 33 countries in transition, Serbia and Albania have among the highest levels of state capture, ranking closely with Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Gray,C. & Anderson J., 2006:32). Furthermore, Albania is one of the few countries, along with Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, where the situation has worsened between 2002 and 2005 (Gray,C. & Anderson J., 2006: 39). While this indicator is not available for Kosovo, one of the findings of a study commissioned by the German Bundeswahr was that Kosovo's state is captured by criminal elements. (Institute for European Policy, 2007).


3.3.1. Political Party Financing

When discussing state capture, touching upon political party financing is crucial. Lack of transparency in this area bears consequences by creating hidden networks and interests. These entrenched networks of interest work in the following way: businesses support financially relevant political parties, which, when in power, will in return protect economic markets, fix tenders and auctions, and pass favorable legislation for these businesses (Pesic, 2007). In situations where business contributions are small, political parties generate wealth through fraud public procurement and tender procedures (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006)-the outcome is similar, a mix of vested interests between public and business actors.

Political party financing is also one of the main concerns raised by the European Commission in its Progress Report for Albania in 2009. The existing legislation is deficient from a both punitive and preventive perspective. From a preventive perspective, political parties have no obligation to report private donations; from a punitive perspective, the body in charge of dealing with this thematic area has no power to investigate political party financial declarations (European Commission, 2009).

In Kosovo, the draft law on political party financing has been in the assembly for a long time. The extended period it has taken the assembly to pass the law demonstrates lack of will on the part of the government to regulate political party financing (European Commission, 2009). The legal void is filled by an UNMIK regulation, which in practice has been completely neglected by political parties as they constantly fail to comply with it (Kosovo Democratic Institute, 2010).

Even though Serbia passed the law on political party financing in 2003, it is deficient in its controlling mechanisms and so far has not been effectively applied (Pesic, 2007: 10). In fact, political parties are often quoted as the centre of corruption in Serbia. (3) None of the political parties' reports ever list the names of well-known wealthy businessmen who are known to be financing political parties (Global Integrity, 2009).

To sum up, political parties have constantly failed to comply with existing legislation. Meanwhile, networks of power remain generally unexplored and covered partly by fear of reprisal. Undisclosed campaign financing is risky since groups that fund elections of officials expect help in the legislative process (Rose-Ackerman, 1999: 133) and returns in the form of favors. Undisclosed sources of funding create an opportunity for political parties and businesses to interact in an extra-legal zone marked by practices of favoritism. In all these situations, the biggest cost is borne by the average citizen.

3.4. Public Procurement

Scandals that surface in the press often involve procurement of goods and services by the state. Bribes can not only determine who obtains a contract, but also the size and specification of government purchases (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Fraudulent public procurement procedures are costly for the state; they cause diversion of scarce public funds and lead to inefficient public services.

The High State Control of Albania has found violations of the new Law on Public Procurement in 60% of the cases. For the time period 2007-2008 and the first 9 months of 2009, the cost of these violations to operational and capital expenses was estimated to around 359 million [euro] (KLSH, 2009), of which 93% occurs during the procurement process (Freedom House, 2009). Even though some progress has been made in movement towards e-procurement procedures, the success of the reform is yet to be seen (European Commission, 2009).

In Kosovo, public procurement is cited as the biggest source of corruption. The public sector is the main force on the demand side by creating a wide array of rent-seeking opportunities. Experts estimate that companies in Kosovo pay about 15 to 20 percent of the tender value to ministers/politicians/public officials (4). A recent study found that the value of single source tenders has increased from 50 to 164 million Euros within a year (IPOL, 2010), which is an estimated 15% of the Kosovo budget. Moreover, recent reports suggest preferential treatment of groups and businesses close to ministers in power (BIRN, 2010).

Similarly, Serbia's public procurement procedures have been scrutinized by both local and international actors, and the effect has been devastating for its economy. Serbia spends around 4 billion [euro] Euros in public procurement, which makes the state susceptible to corruption (Danas, 2009). The Director of the Directorate for Public Procurement recently announced that Serbia loses 800 million [euro] annually (Blic, 2010).

The high losses incurred by the state in public procurement procedures as a result of special interest groups or exercised favoritism show that, for public officials, distinction between private and public is poor.

3.5. Privatization

Privatization processes across the world have been tainted with corruption, and the region is no exception. The integrity of the process is especially important in post-communist countries where the state was in possession of entire economies, as the process of transferring assets to private ownership is fraught with corruption opportunities (Rose-Ackerman, 1999:35).

The first democratically elected government in Albania decided to complete the privatization process rather quickly, seeing it as a gateway to market economy. But, the process favored those with political connections and lacked transparency (Nurellari, 2001). The process was flawed in many ways, from having two institutions responsible for the same process, to frequent changes in the legislation (Nurellari, 2001). More importantly, privatization happened in a period of scarce media, thus influencing public scrutiny and competition. The privatization process in Albania is not complete; a number of sectors remain under state control.

Kosovo has just entered its 43rd wave of privatization and most of the publicly owned enterprises have been privatized so far. Under UNMIK administration, the Kosovo Trust Agency was mandated with the privatization of SOE-s, a mandate that since independence is being carried out by the Kosovo Privatization Agency. Despite claims by public officials that Kosovo's privatization is one of the most successful cases in the region, the process has been tainted with potential agreements between bidders, blackmailing and threats. Civil society reports on privatization have found numerous irregularities in the process. In fact, irregularities are so grave that they have pushed away foreign direct investment (CFP 2010).

Serbia's privatization process has been one of the longest and most cumbersome. The first privatization program, in the form of an employee-buyout scheme, was launched in 1990 (Milovanovic, 2007). The second privatization program was based on free distribution of shares to employees. The scheme was beneficial for both employees and managers of the companies: whereby managers designed schemes to manipulate small shareholders into selling their shares cheaply thus concentrating power, employees thought that holding shares would be beneficial in keeping the job (Milovanovic, 2007). Serbia accepted the sale privatization model in 2001 after much pressure from the World Bank (Milovanovic, 2007). The results of the final form of privatization have been rather modest, where only a quarter of socially owned enterprises have been privatized by 2006, and a remaining 2,000 waiting to be privatized (Milovanovic, 2007). The different kinds of privatization have created powerful stakeholders who are outside of the state but have an influence on the state--thus, reinforcing the state capture model.

The distribution of public goods, in this case sale of publicly owned enterprises, has not been conducted through a fair process based on established criteria.

3.6. Experience and Perception of Corruption

Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI) ranks Albania and Serbia very close to each other, on the 95th and 89th rank, with scores of 3.5 and 3.2, respectively (Transparency International). On this index, the only country from the region ranking lower is Bosnia and Herzegovina, while FYR of Macedonia, Montenegro and Croatia all have lower levels of perceived corruption at 3.8, 3.9 and 4.1, respectively. By contrast, Slovenia, another member of the Yugoslav federation, has a score of 6.6 (from a possible 7) (Transparency International). Over time, both Albania and Serbia have progressed. However, corruption is endemic in these countries, as a rating of about 5 would indicate 'bearable' levels of corruption (Pesic, 2007). CPI ranking is not available for Kosovo.

When it comes to experience with corruption, the majority of Albanian respondents (51.4%) have faced a bribe situation in 2009, as opposed to 19.7 percent Kosovars and 17.7 percent Serbs (Gallup International, 2009). This information is confirmed for Serbia and Kosovo by the Global Corruption Barometer (Transparency International, 2009). In 5.9 percent of the cases in Albania the bribe was expected by a government official, compared to 8.8 percent in Kosovo and 4.4 percent in Serbia (Gallup International, 2009). The situation has worsened only in Kosovo, where in 2008 2.8 percent of the respondents said that the bribe was extorted from a government official (Gallup International, 2009).

87.9% Albanians, 89.4% Kosovars and 88.4% Serbs believe it is necessary to stop corruption for the region's peace and development (Gallup International, 2008). Serbs rank corruption as the fourth most important issue (Pesic, 2007), while Kosovars believe that corruption is the second most pressing issue at the moment (UNDP 2010). These attitudes are matched with low and decreasing trust in institutions. To illustrate, in Kosovo in three months the Prime Minister's approval rate has dropped by 20%, reaching an all time low of 36% (UNDP 2010). Similarly, low satisfaction is persistent in Albania and Serbia as well, with 39.6 and 22.7 percent approval rates for the work of the prime-minister (Gallup International, 2009).

3.7. Summary

Albania, Kosovo and Serbia all fall in the typical competitive particularistic type. The competitive political party system created uneven power distribution, whereas the ownership of the state is contested due to links between political parties and businesses demonstrated by high state capture, observable in the mystery that surrounds political financing. A part of the heritage of communist regimes has been a poor distinction between public and private goods, meanwhile privatization processes marked by scandals show unfair and unpredictable distribution of public goods. Finally, public polls indicate low social acceptance for corruption.

4. Freedom of the Media and Investigative Reporting

4.1. Freedom of the Media

Before going into the tri-level analysis of civil society organization, the merits of the media need to be discussed. Corruption scandals in independent press are known to have spurred reform in a number of political systems (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Thus, not only is independent press crucial for dissemination of information, it is also necessary for a functional democracy. Even though independent media are crucial for delivering impartial information, in the region it leaves much to be desired.

In Albania, a dangerous triangle persists between the media, political parties and businesses. Newspapers are aligned along the two main political parties, the Democratic Party and the Socialist Party. Media outlets which diverge from this path face numerous difficulties, as illustrated by the case of newspaper Tema. Tema's chief editor, Mero Bazi, has been physically assaulted three times in the past year (5). Apart from personal physical assaults against the editor, the newspaper faced financial pressures as the public institutions withdrew their advertising and was thrown out of its facilities (6). Tema was finally shut down in January 2010.

Political pressure on the media has only intensified during this administration's mandate in Kosovo. OSCE has criticized Kosovo politicians for using the media as a mouthpiece (Freedom House, 2009). Current Kosovo government has firmed the grip on the media. To illustrate, the General Manager of the public broadcaster-RTK--resigned during 2009 due to increased political pressure. A public letter by the European Association of Public was addressed to the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Hashim Thaci, asking to respect the integrity of RTK and not interfere with its independency (7). As long as public advertising remains the main source of revenue newspapers that struggle to maintain independence will face constant pressure from public institutions (8).

In Serbia there is a dominance of broadcasting media over the press. The media market is characterized by transition (Djokovic, 2007). Tabloids are the most popular media and all newspapers are privately owned, with the exception of Politika (Freedom House, 2009). In 2008, the government suggested 6 new members to the board of Politika, who were accepted, followed by the replacement of the Editor-in-chief the same year (Freedom House, 2009). These acts were considered as meddling with the independence of the media; the leaving editor-in-chief called the act a 'beginning of a media purge' (Freedom House, 2009: 452). Brutal attacks on media freedom are not very common nowadays, at least not compared to the pressure during Milosevic's period; however, the emerging pressure on media freedom is coming from local and foreign capital (Djokovic, 2007).

4.2. Experiences with Investigative Journalism

In the field of anti-corruption, investigative journalism plays a crucial role. Naming and shaming is one of the most powerful tools that civil society has at hand for social mobilization. Investigative journalism has made considerable progress in the fight against corruption--especially in naming and shaming. Albania's, Kosovo's and Serbia's investigative journalism are organized in different forms, however each played a role in shaping public perception.

Albania's well known investigative show, called Fiks Fare, is broadcasted since 2002 on Top Channel, a private TV station. The show addresses corruption, fraud and illegal activities through humor and satire, employing a simple language. At first sight an entertaining show (with dancers and music), the journalists in the show have uncovered scandals nationwide. The show has shed light mainly on administrative corruption, but there have also been instances where respected public figures were found under scruitiny. In terms of networks of investigative journalists, Albania is the only country in the region that does not have a Balkan Investigative Reporters Network (BIRN) office. However, the National Endowment for Democracy has supported a fairly successful training of 8 or 10 investigative journalists, which has led to a general improvement of the quality of writing (BIRN, 2008). Investigative reporting in Albania is only in its inception stage.

In Kosovo, the culture of the media is yet to be developed. The 90s left a void in journalism especially, as apart from a couple of newspapers, local media were non-existent. BIRN office in Kosovo is the main platform for both training and practicing investigative reporting. BIRN Kosovo prepares a weekly show called Jeta n'Kosove (Life in Kosovo) which is broadcasted on the public broadcaster, RTK, and is the most viewed show on current affairs in Kosovo--having reached peak viewership of 300,000 (9). The show's success can be attributed to the quality of the work, salience of the issues presented and the fierceness (and charisma) of the (main) presenter-Jeta Xharra. During municipal elections, the show organized public debates for mayors-seeking accountability from public officials. Organized around BIRN, Kosovo's investigative reporting is slowly but surely developing.

Investigative journalism in Serbia is considered to be largely neglected. Even though a number of attempts have been made at consolidating this area, the outcomes have been rather limited. Most media outlets seem to be rather reluctant to fund investigative stories (Djokovic, 2007). B92, a major independent media company, has a show-Insajder-which has had considerable impact in shaping public opinion. The show has picked up taboo and sensitive topics for the Serbian society. The investigative nature of the show has resulted in a lot of popularity, but also serious attacks from radical fractions of the society. As a result, the show's presenter has been guarded by the police.

Donors are increasingly paying attention to investigative journalism in the fight against corruption. The civil society component of a UNDP anti-corruption project in Kosovo is giving prizes to investigative journalists who have uncovered corrupt affairs. Such prizes are meant to stimulate investigative reporting, but the impact is yet to be seen especially since the prizes are modest whereas investigative reporters are often subject of abuse and threats.

4.3. Summary

The strength of investigative reporting lies in its wide appeal, equipping it with potential for social mobilization. Growing networks of investigative reporters across the region are a positive trend which has already had impact on the fight against corruption. So far, a number of officials in all three countries have been held accountable in respective courts, as a result of research produced by investigative reporters. However, investigative reporting comes at a price. Firstly, it takes a lot of courage to treat these issues publicly, considering the vested interests and mixed criminal-political-business networks that exist in the region. Investigative reporters have been called to public lynching and traitors of the state for touching upon these subjects (10). Secondly, even when the cases are prepared, the public official has been 'named and shamed' and put before a court, the story ends there. Despite numerous revelations of corrupt activities by office holders and high public officials, no verdict has been brought yet. At the moment, investigative reporting is raising public awareness about the harms of corruption--which it does much more effectively than brochures and fliers. Table 2 provides an overview of how the countries compare to each other.

5. Civil Society in Albania, Kosovo and Serbia

Civil society in the Western Balkans faces two main challenges: resource constraint and consolidation. The sector continues to depend on donor funding, with small movements towards diversification in Kosovo and Albania (USAID, 2008). High donor dependency has come at a price of diverging interests between the public and civil society representatives. Donor dependency is especially stigmatized in Serbia when it comes to human rights organizations, which are considered traitors by a part of the society (USAID, 2008).

The USAID ranking on the NGO sustainability index, places Albania most favorably with a score 3.8, followed closely by Kosovo at 3.9, and Serbia at 4.4, where 1 is complete consolidation and 7 early transition. The main challenge for the sector shared by all three countries seems to be financial viability, where Serbia's score puts it in an early transition stage (USAID, 2008) (see Appendix III for detailed scores). This data contradicts Freedom House scores where Serbia is doing comparably best on a general civil society score and Kosovo is doing worst (Freedom House, 2009) (see Appendix III-2).

Apart from these studies, holistic comparative studies with regards to size, scope and values of the sector are missing, indicating a rather fragmented sector. Across board, experts find that civil society in Albania, Kosovo and Serbia is weak (11).

Surprisingly, another trait of the civil society sector seems to be lack of transparency in their operations. Some civil society organizations were very difficult to reach: responded less frequently to emails and were more reluctant to share information about project financing and evaluation. USAID's report confirms this view by emphasizing that civil society organizations need to be more proactive in communicating their activities to the public (USAID, 2008).

6. Impact Assessment of Civil Society Organizations in the Anti-Corruption Sector

The following section will focus on assessing the impact of civil society organizations in the anti-corruption sector, based on Anheier's methodology (2003: 102), which was briefly described earlier in the paper. The final part will look at how these three countries compared one to the other.

6.1. Albania

Following the collapse of Albanian economy in mid-90s, anti-corruption became a central topic in the donor and NGO community. The trend continued until 2005, when the Democratic Party, under the leadership of Sali Berisha, came to power on an anti-corruption ticket.

Albania has a comparative advantage of having broad constituent based organizations like Mjaft! and Citizens Advocacy Organization. In the past years, NGO-s have increased their visibility in Albania, especially so the anti-corruption NGOs. The high level of trust in these organizations is illustrated by the rising awareness among the public on the role that civil society plays in fighting corruption: between 2007 and 2008 there was a 10% increase (USAID, 2008).

Legal/Policy Impact: The legal impact of civil society organizations in the anti-corruption sector in Albania has been moderate. Civil society organizations are invited to participate in legislation drafting. These invitations are often refused as civil society representatives believe the government passes invitations due to EU and donor pressure, while finals legislative acts are a result of political party bargaining. Albania gets a score of 3.

Media Coverage: The media generally portray positively NGO's role in civil society (USAID, 2008). Media coverage of anti-corruption activities--whether protests, report publishing, or rankings--is high. A search of "Albania + corruption" on SEE times produces 80 hits.

Public Awareness: Between 2008 and 2009, the percentage of people who think that it is acceptable to use money to get government contracts has increased from 17.8% to 18.7%. Higher acceptability is found also in using money for getting better healthcare and avoiding traffic fines. The trend is accompanied by a decrease in percentage of people who think it is unacceptable to use money to get government contracts, get better healthcare of avoid traffic fines.

Expert opinion: Coalition forming has been mentioned as a positive event; however, interviewees from donor organizations and media repeatedly classified civil society activities as weak.

6.2. Kosovo

Kosovo's quest for independence in the 90s, emergence from war and early stages of institution building, have contributed to neglecting corruption as a prime issue. Under pressure from international presence, Kosovo's ability to curb corruption is being increasingly emphasized as a key ingredient for a European future. Kosovo has a network of anti-corruption organizations which cooperate closely with one another, among which are Cohu and Fol'08. Cohu plays a watchdog role, whereas Fol'08 is renowned for civic activism.

Legal/Policy Impact: Due to strong international presence and influence in Kosovo, the newly-adopted legislation is usually in-line with EU standards/expectations. (12). Kosovo also has an independent Anti-corruption Agency, which has generally collaborated closely with civil society organizations. However, this relationship has deteriorated during the drafting procedure of the Anticorruption Strategy, whereby anti-corruption organizations boycotted the Agency's invitation to participate in drafting. Civil society organizations are invited for consultations during legislation drafting procedures. So far, the response has been rather positive. Kosovo gets a score of 4.

Media Coverage: In March 2010, every day there has been at least one article or opinion piece about corruption in Express, a Kosovo daily. Additionally, the test "Kosovo + corruption" on SEE times has also produced around 80 hits.

Public Awareness: Kosovo citizens are responding positively to public awareness campaigns. There is decreasing acceptability of using money to get better healthcare, get a government contract or avoid paying traffic fines. These changes are associated with rising unacceptability of such actions. However, the differences are very small, often amounting to less than 1% (see Appendix IV).

Expert opinion: Experts and independent journalists have pointed to a number of situations where anti-corruption organizations have played an important role in decision-making processes. Case in point is the privatization of the energy company where civil society organizations raised considerable public awareness, which was met with response from policy-makers and international organizations. However, the contribution of the sector in curbing corruption remains weak.

6.3. Serbia

The anti-corruption sector has played an important role in advancing policies and practices, crucial for Serbia's EU aspirations. However, the actual impact achieved is much lower than the effort put forward (Milivojevic, 2006). In anti-corruption, Transparency Serbia is singled out repeatedly as being a very successful anti-corruption organization. Serbia's experience with access to official documents is especially valuable.

Legal/Policy Impact: Civil society has been involved in lawmaking, where Transparency Serbia has played a major role. In Serbia, too, institutions invite civil society representatives to participate in drafting laws and engage in consultation processes. Similarly to other countries, these actions are viewed as donor-driven and cosmetic, primarily. Often, laws that pass in the parliament are different from the outcome of the consultation process. This has led to alienation on the part of civil society in these broad processes. Civil society in Serbia has both been invited and participated in Anti-corruption strategy drafting. Serbia gets a score of 4.

Media Coverage: The test on SEE times produces around 80 hits for Serbia as well.

Public Awareness: Acceptability of bribery is decreasing in Serbia as well. Consequently, Serbian respondents find it increasingly unacceptable to evade their duties as citizens by way of bribery, or use bribery to receive preferential treatment (see Appendix IV for more detail).

Expert opinion: The impact on better governance is imited. Organizations are reluctant to take on projects which tackle specific areas or deal with political corruption. The role of civil society as a watchdog is weak.

7. What Works?

The evidence below is a collection of 9 project stories with varying goals and objectives all deemed successful. It also includes one major project in Albania, which had abundant funding to begin with but the long term impact is considered questionable.

7.1. Albania's (success) stories

After an initial multi-million dollar influx in the anti-corruption sector nowadays, there are no 'big bang' projects, and civil society organizations, as well as donors, are focusing more on tightening the space where corruption occurs. Often, these projects are not labeled anti-corruption projects--even though the ultimate aim is to reduce corruption.

Between 2001 and 2005 USAID funded a large civil society anti-corruption project, which established the Albanian Coalition for Anti-corruption--a broad umbrella organization that at its inception had over 200 member organizations. (13) The coalition worked closely with the government and contributed with its expertise in legislation drafting. The most important outcome of the coalition was establishing the Civil Advocacy Organization, which sent suspect cases of corruption to the Prosecutors office (14). CAO's initial success made it a model to be reproduced. As the funds ran out, the number of members in the ACAC decreased and the effectiveness and sustainability of CAO as an organization was put to a test when the leader-Kreshnik Spahiu-left the organization and joined public institutions (15). Furthermore, the public grew disillusioned because of the discrepancy between its perceptions and project objectives. In fact, the program had been successful in fulfilling its objectives-establishing institutions-but corruption remained rampant.

By contrast, increased funding is directed towards projects that are not waving the anticorruption flag. USAID has implemented a successful project for business registration the aim of which is to actually reduce corruption, but it has not been themed as an anticorruption project. New businesses can now register in one day for less than 1 Euro, whereas before the Business Registration Center businesses used to spend up to 4,000 Euros in bribes and the procedure took months (16). Similar centers have been established for other registrations and license attainment (European Commission, 2009). The BRC has been successful in cutting red-tape and has had a high impact in changing the culture of the registering institution. The project's first round of evaluation showed a high satisfaction among the population.

Despite success stories, corruption perception is among the highest in Europe. One explanation is that administrative corruption is decreasing, while grand corruption is on the rise and has become more centralized (17). Albanian civil society has attempted to address this issue by adopting a model taken from the Romanian Academic Society. Mjaft!, a civic movement organization, formed the Coalition for a Clean Parliament. By using elections as entry point, the model combines investigative reporting with an incentive structure for party leaders, to 'clean up' the political party lists-the desired outcome being a clean parliament. The impact of the project is mixed: it was initially successful, with a high number of organizations joining the movement, and it got the backing of the former president of Albania--Alfred Mojsiu-a figure of unity in Albania (18). The most important outcome is that 8 blacklisted MP candidates failed to make it on the final party list (19). However, during the process, due to threats, uncertainty and allegiances, many organizations withdrew from the coalition-leaving Mjaft! alone (20). Additionally, political parties were unwilling to share their lists with the coalition. Finally, some concerns have been raised with regard to the accuracy of the information published (21).

In transparency, Partners Albania runs a relatively small project in five municipalities, aiming to increase transparency by publishing price lists of municipal services. Citizen response has been very positive: both trust and satisfaction with municipal services has increased. Such projects have a high impact on changing the culture of the institutions in place, and increasing exchange between citizens and institutions. Yet, the success of these projects is limited to the local level, where citizens deal with municipal administrations on daily basis.

7.2. Kosovo's success stories

Kosovo's civil society fight against corruption is young. The sector is marked by a few organizations which specialize in different tools, rather than different dimensions of corruption. Civil society organizations which in Schmidt's term could be coined 'uncivil,' face difficulties in attaining funds and civil society has to follow the priorities and rules of donors. There are instances when funding was cut because the activities of the organization were not in line with donor philosophy (22).

Most interviewees cited the Balkan Investigative Reporters Network's project of monitoring public services-courts, healthcare, and education--as a success. Its success lays in BIRN's unique platform-the show Jeta n'Kosove. Through the show, abuses by public officials are broadcasted, giving the project a strong naming and shaming component (23). A tangible impact has been a number of success stories where investigations have been started against mid-level officials (24). The project ranks high on both sustainability and social impact.

Local initiatives have stemmed in Kosovo too, one of the most powerful of which is INPO--Initiative for Progress based in Ferizaj. The initiative has been successful in fostering grassroots civic activism and increasing citizen participation through fostering a debate culture. One of the most successful projects has focused on public procurement law in southern Kosovo, whose activities included public debates, assisting municipalities with transparency legislation and doing an evaluation of municipal services through a population survey. Their activities receive wide media coverage.

A broad coalition of civil society organizations has targeted political corruption in 6 major political parties in the period before elections. 30 journalists were hired to investigate the background of candidates for Members of Parliament. The advantage of the campaign in Kosovo was that Kosovo's elections were held with open party lists, therefore the impact was bigger. The coalition came up with a list of 55 names who were considered undignified to enter the parliament, which was publicized in the media and 5,000 leaflets were printed with the list of abuses by the candidates. An intermediate report by one of the members of the coalition quotes a 60% rate of success in two Kosovo regions, where out of 13 blacklisted candidates, 7 did not enter the parliament (Iniciativa per Progres, 2007).

7.3. Serbia's success stories

In the fight against corruption, CSO's in Serbia cover the main forms in which corruption manifests. A major success in establishing public accountability and government transparency has been achieved in the field of freedom of information, more specifically right to access official documents-a large part of which can be attributed to civil society contribution. The work of most organizations in the field of anti-corruption continues to mainly consist of educational activities--in the form of seminars, trainings, etc., and advocacy (25). Structural obstacles to long term, targeted projects are the availability of donor funding for short periods and lack of people with expertise in specific thematic areas (26).

A coalition of 19 civil society organizations was funded by the Fund for Open Society Serbia. Organizations sent requests for accessing documents to a variety of institutions in order to determine the problem in the system and accustom institutions with such requests. The coalition participated in drafting legislation on secret documents and amending existing legislation in the area of freedom of information. Nowadays, an independent government agency--Poverenik, monitors the application of this law. The initial beneficiary group included journalists, but the right is now widely used by the public. What sets this project apart is the high impact it has had on legislative, social and institutional dimensions. The impact of the program has been a changed institutional culture, where public officials and civil servants across all levels of institutions now respond to citizens' requests.

A similar coalition of 8 CSO-s and FOSS was formed in 2006 targeting fiscal transparency of local budgets. As Serbian government still uses linear budgets, the reading of budgets is rather difficult. Staff members were trained to read budgets and do comparative analysis of local budgets. In this context, coalitions have played an important role by removing individual connections and placing the monitoring on a macro perspective --beyond familial connections. The project has had legislative impact and raised public awareness about budgetary processes. In fact, the success of the project in meeting its objectives has led to its repetition at the central level. A positive externality of the project has been the increasing interest among donor organizations to target these areas. The tools used in both these projects funded by the OSI has been on identifying systematic failures in public institutions and addressing them through citizen empowerment, while naming and shaming has been de-emphasized, used only as cases to illustrate the systemic failures or as a confirmation (27).

Transparency Serbia has targeted high corruption, mainly through focusing on efficient public procurement. In this area, it has worked with institutional capacity building. Consistent with Transparency International's work, Transparency Serbia addresses gaps in the system. It generally has a good cooperation with political parties and good media coverage (28).

7.4. Summary

Most successful projects seem to be those dealing with government transparency or one specific problem area. Across these three countries at least one successful project has been a result of a coalition among organizations. Such exchange and cooperation is necessary, especially if one considers the outflow of human resources and expertise from the civil society sector towards public institutions, whether because of pro-democratic governments or more opportunities. (Tables measuring each projects impact and detailing activities are available at Appendix VI)

8. Conclusion

If Albania, Kosovo and Serbia want a European future they must show serious and concerted effort to effectively prevent and curb corruption. Furthermore, citizens are consistently identifying corruption as a top concern signaling a public outcry against the status quo (IDRA 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009; Pesic; UNDP 2010); and, while international control of corruption rankings show incremental progress, corruption remains widepsread. Where unemployment, poverty and dissatisfaction with government are high, corruption creates economic distortions which lead to even more inefficient public services and hampers FDI (CFP 2010).

A major anti-corruption project has been launched by the European Commission in Albania in 2009. Corruption was the theme for civil society grants by the European Commission and World Bank in Albania and Kosovo, respectively. Corruption remains a high-stake-high-priority issue.

At first sight, these countries appear similar: they share a communist heritage, rank low in controlling corruption and have undergone processes which have facilitated the spread of corruption; they want a future in the EU and have benefited from foreign assistance; the distinction between the private and public realm is weak or non-existing; businesses, politicians and criminals are intertwined in complicated networks of power. Corruption is embedded in the way the market functions, institutions operate and state exists. So why should civil society fix this and how can a "weak" civil society do it?

I have argued that civil society is a pillar of democracy and it contributes to the well-functioning of states by acting as a voice of those who are not heard, correcting state failures, or providing analysis and expert opinion. This study has attempted to assess the impact of civil society organizations in Albania, Kosovo and Serbia and identify the elements that make successful activities.

There are many underlying elements which have made civil society impact weak. Constant migration towards the public sector and limited human capacities found in these countries have not helped the cause of either civil society or anti-corruption. Additionally, donor funding, especially multi-lateral donors', has been directed towards programs that target legislative processes or institution formation. Most importantly, corruption in these countries is political and is built within the structures of political parties. Regardless how large and costly anti-corruption campaigns are and how much red-tape is cut, citizens will continue thinking that corruption is high until ties between businesses and politicians are cut, and illegal networks kept out of public life.

Donors and international organizations have worked in the field of anti-corruption longest in Albania. The experience with the ACAC can serve as a lesson in many aspects: firstly, not 'to take a bigger byte than can be chewed'-programs designed for Albania should be matched to the existing capacities in Albania. Secondly, support-financial and human-needs to be consistent over a longer period of time in order to make these organizations sustainable. The Coalition for Clean Parliament demonstrates that success of civil society projects depends on the legal environment. The impact of the coalition could have potentially been greater if MPs were elected with open lists. Albania's experience in anticorruption is consistent with what Bryane describes as the two waves of anti-corruption activities: big public awareness campaigns, followed by more targeted projects (Bryane, 2004).

Prior to Kosovo's independence, civil society has played a crucial role in three processes which have marked this period: the Ahtisaari final status settlement, the constitution and lobbying for the recognition of statehood. With Kosovo's independence, a considerable number of NGO's are moving towards specializing in certain areas, and redefining their goals and strategies (USAID, 2008). Donor dependency is still a major issue, as priorities and organizations visions and strategies are often-times influenced by funding.

In the anti-corruption sector, civil society organizations are involved in legislative processes and receive media coverage. However, experts point out that while there are cases where civil society has been effective in mobilizing public, the overall impact in the fight against corruption is weak. Experience in Kosovo shows that monitoring of public institutions, combined with naming and shaming practices, can (to some extent) be successful. Finally, even though many corrupt officials remain in power today, the coalition for clean parliament was a positive movement in Kosovo's young political life.

The experience in Serbia shows that small coalitions between civil society organizations can be fairly successful if they are sustained over a longer period and have a specific mission, rather than broad goals and objectives. The challenge is that not too many organizations are either ready or able to work that way. Interviewees have mentioned that the main sources of corruption in Serbia are political parties, yet no project has targeted political parties so far. Furthermore, the sector has been weakened with Serbia's emergence from Milosevic's regime as civil society actors and organizations, integrated into public institutions. Serbia's most successful stories, especially with regards to right to access official documents, indicate that empowerment and education are crucial for enlightened citizenry, which can seek accountability from public institutions.

Finally, the role of independent media needs to be emphasized. Quality investigative reporting, as seen in the cases of Brankica Stankovic and Jeta Xharra, while dangerous, is very rewarding. Investigative reporting increases social cohesion and actively demands accountability from public officials.

So, what has been the impact of civil society activism and is there an interest in continuing support for civil society in this sector? The time of leaflets, brochures, anti-corruption seminars and trainings, seems to be over, luckily. The sector certainly has a role to play as a system of checks and balances for the state; evidence also shows that civil society can be successful in increasing transparency and working as an intermediary between the state and the public, especially at the local level. When it comes to political corruption, while results might be still modest, the projects in Albania and Kosovo show that there is a window of opportunity for organizations which are willing to deal with more controversial issues.

There is no one recipe for success, nor will corruption ever be curbed completely. But the future of these countries depends on their ability to become functional democracies, and civil society should play a role in that.


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List of interviewed people


Antuen Skenderi, Policy and Development Director, Mjaft!

Ivi Kaso, Director, Department of Anti-corruption and administrative control, Council of Ministers

Helena Papa, Coordinator, Department of Anti-corruption and administrative control, Council of Ministers

Stefano Failla, Civil Society Officer, European Commission

Stefano Calabretta, Anti-corruption Officer, European Commission

Quentin Reed, Anti-corruption expert, Council of Europe

Rajmonda Duka, Director, Partners Albania

Gledis Gjipali, European Movement Albania

Leonard Bahillari, Journalist, Korrieri

Emirjon Senja, Journalist, Shekulli


Hasan Preteni, Director, Kosovo Anti-corruption Agency

Aiko Watanabe, Programme Analyst, Democratic Governance, UNDP

Delphine Freymann, Task Manager, Anti-corruption project, European Commission

George Mills, Anti-corruption expert, EULEX Avni Zogiani, Director, Cohu Ramadan Ilazi, Director, Fol08

Merita Mustafa, Programme Manager-Anticorruption and Transparency, Kosovo Democratic Institute (Transparency Chapter in Kosovo)

Krenar Gashi, Research Director, KIPRED (also former journalist with BIRN)

Krenare Maloku, Programme Manager, Balkan Investigative Reporting Network

Ylli Hoxha, Director, Club for Foreign Policy


Verica Barac, Head of the Council for the Fight against Corruption

Katarina Jozic, Legal Advisor, YUCOM

Nemanja Nenadic, Programme Director, Transparency Serbia

Danilo Pejovic, Financial Director, Transparency Serbia

Pavlina Filipova, Program Officer, Balkan Trust for Democracy

Nathan Koeshall, Program Officer, Balkan Trust for Democracy

Dusan Jordovic, Program Director, LINET

Miodrag Milosavljevic, Project Coordinator, Fund for Open Society

Nevena Ruzic, Chief of Cabinet, Poverenik

Dusan Teleskovic, Journalist, Politika

(1) Lejla Sadiku is a graduate student at Hertie School of Governance. This paper was written with the support of Goran Buldioski, Open Society Institute.

(2) Interview with Verica Barac, January 2010

(3) LINET interview

(4) Off the record Interview in Prishtina, January 2010

(5) Interview newspaper Shekulli, January 2010

(6) Interviews with journalists in Tirana, January 2010

(7) Letter by the European Association of the Public Broadcasters

(8) The Post and Telekom of Kosovo, a POE< withdrew its advertising from the independent daily Koha Ditore, after its team discovered cases of corrupt affairs in the PTK

(9) Interview with Krenare Maloku, Prishtina, January 2010

(10) Case of Jeta Xharra in Kosovo and Brankica Stankovic in Belgrade

(11) Interviews with donors in Belgrade, Prishtina and Tirana

(12) Interview with Delphine Freymann, Prishtina January 2010

(13) Interview Ardi Dhima, IPLS, Tirana January 2010

(14) Interview Ardi Dhima, IPLS, Tirana, January 2010

(15) Interview Ardi Dhima, IPLS, Tirana January 2010

(16) Interview, Council of Ministers, January 2010 Tirana

(17) Interview Ardian Dhima, IPLS, Tirana, January 2010

(18) Interview with Antuen Skenderi, Mjaft!, Tirana January 2010

(19) Interview with Antuen Skenderi, Mjaft!, Tirana January 2010

(20) Interview with Antuen Skenderi, Mjaft!, Tirana January 2010

(21) Interview with journalist, Tirana, January 2010

(22) Interview with Avni Zogiani, Cohu, Prishtina January 2010

(23) Interview Krenare Maloku, BIRN, Pristina, January 2010

(24) Interview with Krenare Maloku, BIRN, Prishtina, January 2010

(25) Interview with Miodrag Milosavljevic, FOSS, Belgrade January 2010

(26) Interview with Miodrag Milosavljevic, FOSS, Belgrade January 2010

(27) Interview with Miodrag Milosavljevic, FOSS, Belgrade January 2010

(28) Interview with Nemanja Nenadic, Transparency Serbia, Belgrade January 2010

(29) Interview with Miodrag Milosavljevic, FOSS, Belgrade January 2010

(30) Interview with Dusan Jordovic, LINET, Belgrade January 2010
Table 1: Comparing the impact of anti-corruption CSO-s in Albania,
Kosovo and Serbia

Dimension           Albania     Kosovo     Serbia

Legal Impact           3          4          4
Media coverage         80         80         80
Public awareness    Negative   Positive   Positive
Expert opinion        Weak       Weak       Weak

(source: Anheier 2003 and author's own)

Table 2: Independent media and strength of investigative
reporting-comparatively-FH score and author's own

                                         Albania   Kosovo     Serbia

                  Independent Media        3.75     5.50      3.75

Investigative   Popularity of main IR      High     High      High
reporting       TV show (as a measure
                 social mobilization

                     Main target           Low     Mid/High   Grand
                mid-judges, higher
                  public officials;
                     and tycoons)

                Impact (follow-up by        Low     Low/Mid    Mid

Figure 6: Typology of Corruption (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006)

Table 1--A Typology of Corruption

I. Regime            II. Power      III. "Ownership"
                    Distribution      of the State

Patrimonialism/       Monopoly           One or
  Pure                                 few owners

Competitive          Uneven and         Contested
  particularism       disputed

Universalism      Relatively equal     Autonomous

I. Regime         IV. Distribution      V. Social      VI. Public/
                  of Public Goods     Acceptability      Private
                                      of Corruption    Distinction

Patrimonialism/      Unfair but         Moderate           No
  Pure              predictable

Competitive          Unfair and            Low            Poor
  particularism    unpredictable

Universalism          Fair and          Very low          Sharp
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Author:Sadiku, Lejla
Publication:Romanian Journal of Political Science
Date:Sep 1, 2010
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