Chief's Logistics Review.
In September 1999, the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force (CSAF) directed a top-to-bottom review of base-level logistics processes. The review was titled the CSAF Logistics Review (CLR), and the purpose was simple: improve our Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF) combat readiness. Members from the headquarters staff, as well as operators and logisticians from all the major commands (MAJCOM), jointly participated in the review. The MAJCOM participants identified wing-level operations and logistics issues and recommended ways to strengthen processes to fix disconnects and gaps. The recommendations provide methods to enhance policy, procedures, training, discipline, and enforcement.
Numerous circumstances contributed to the need for the CLR. Following the highly successful Desert Storm campaign, the Air Force embraced the objective wing concept-a significant change to the traditional wing organizational structure. We also replaced very detailed regulations and manuals with less specific instructions and policy directives. At the same time, we downsized the force by 25-35 percent and entered an era of sustained high ops tempo with Northern and Southern Watch rotations, a presence in the Balkans, and humanitarian missions worldwide. Implementing the EAF concept helped provide predictability to the ops tempo, but our five-skill-level manning shortage continues to put an extreme burden on our core work force supporting the ongoing deployments. All these changes impact our ability to maintain EAF readiness.
Our operational needs have changed with EAF objectives, yet the processes to support them have remained largely unchanged. We simply adapted old processes to new concepts. Without a doubt, we have the most capable Air Force in the world--manned with the finest--and given a job to do, our logisticians will always succeed. However, it is time to rethink the processes and match our support to current operational concepts. CLR is aimed at doing just that. The CLR recommendations are all about restoring the emphasis on policy, procedures, training, discipline, and enforcement to improve our EAF readiness.
From September 1999 to July 2000, we conducted the review with participation of all MAJCOMs and presented the findings to the MAJCOM commanders in October 2000. After presenting additional information to the MAJCOM commanders in February 2001, we were given the go-ahead to test the initiatives at locations throughout the Air Force. The tests began this summer and will last about 6 months. Based on test results, we will develop recommendations and present them for approval prior to implementing tested CLR initiatives Air Force-wide.
I want to assure you that this review was not directed because anyone or any unit failed to perform the mission; rather, it is designed to improve our ability to support EAF operational concepts. We have the finest air force in the world, and the CLR will only make it better.
This article explains in detail the process and initiatives associated with the CLR. It begins with the driving forces behind CLR and culminates with an explanation of the test and evaluation processes.
The CLR is about looking to the future, defining better ways of providing logistics support to meet the dynamic requirements of the EAF. Since the shift to the EAF concept in October 1999, the operations community has implemented initiatives to make the Air Force more expeditionary, placing a premium on rapid deployment and employment of light forces and a smooth shift to sustainment in support of extended operations. The focus of the logistics community during this time has been on reducing the logistics footprint to speed deployment execution. The CLR shifts this focus to improving the execution of logistics processes. Through initiatives aimed at process improvement and realignment, improved focus on fleet capability, and enhanced technical training and officer development, the CLR seeks to position the logistics community more firmly in support of EAF operations.
The Motivation for a Logistics Review
A briefing presented to the Chief in September 1999, by General John P. Jumper, then Commander, United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), was a key catalyst for the CLR. The briefing, entitled Posturing Aircraft Maintenance for Combat Readiness, highlighted declining readiness trends and degraded warfighting skills, referencing experiences during Operation Allied Force/Operation Noble Anvil (OAF/ONA).  Subsequent to this briefing, the Chief directed a top-to-bottom review of logistics processes and training programs to identify actions required to resolve deficiencies that contribute to declining readiness trends in aircraft maintenance.
Responding to the Challenge
The CLR began with a memorandum to MAJCOM commanders enlisting their support to conduct a 1-year review of our logistics processes, with an eye toward recommending changes that facilitate the EAF. 
CLR goals and guidelines included:
* Keeping turbulence at a minimum by evaluating processes rather than organizations.
* Relating all changes/adjustments to the EAF, specifically whether changes should be made for more centralized or decentralized support for home and deployed forces.
* Considering leadership development for officers--look at both logisticians and operators.
* Developing changes or adjustments within constrained funding boundaries.
The Chief emphasized keeping turbulence at a minimum by concentrating on the most feasible wing-level process improvements and evaluating options by how they affect EAF implementation. Over the course of the study, the emphasis on EAF objectives led to the following expected impacts:
* Improve not mission-capable maintenance rate by 10 percent by 2004.
* Improve retention of five-level maintenance personnel to desired levels (approximately 55/75 percent).
* Produce a more professionally trained and capable force across all logistics disciplines.
* Stabilize flying-hour program execution.
* Continue officer development for both logistics and rated officers.
* Enhance contingency planning, deployment, and execution.
* Instill same level of concern for fleet health as for sortie production.
* Instill balanced focus for fleet health and sortie production.
Enabling the EAF Through a Balanced Focus
To meet EAF time lines, units must deploy and set up support production processes quickly. Deploying units, therefore, must minimize equipment and support taken during the initial deployment. This, in turn, demands a support system that can deliver sufficient resources to sustain operations. These goals alone would require an analysis to determine if the current support processes can meet these new time pressures.
But an even larger issue faces the Air Force. While wings must respond to daily sortie production requirements, they must also maintain aircraft for other possible simultaneous or future engagements. When these demands compete, tradeoffs must be made. In an earlier RAND Project Air Force  study, Dahlman and Thaler noted:
On the most basic level, United States Air Force (USAF) wings and squadrons are designed to produce two overarching and intimately connected outputs related to readiness. The first is the ability to provide current military capabilities; i.e., the activities universally associated with operational readiness. If a wing had to go to war now, how well would its capabilities match up with the demands levied by the combatant commanders in chief (CINCs)? Are the right numbers of personnel trained appropriately? Is equipment in good working condition with an adequate level of supplies? Can the requisite number of effective sorties be generated?
The current production of future capabilities, while usually receiving less attention, is equally important ... DoD and USAF guidance on and the management of readiness traditionally emphasize operational readiness, and the requirements for maintaining this readiness are explicit. The production of future capabilities, through the rejuvenation of human capital by on-the-job training (OJT), however, is not normally recognized as a separate and equally important tasking that is embedded in units. As units are deployed to support contingency operations, they must trade off building future capabilities for providing current ones. The longer this continues, the more units must postpone or scale back upgrade training and life-cycle maintenance of aircraft. Future commanders will then have a less experienced, less capable force from which to draw. 
Future fleet health and growing the human capital necessary to produce readiness in the future is not receiving enough attention. The tradeoff decisions between fleet health for daily sortie production requirements and investment in human capital through training, as well as other initiatives that contribute to future fleet health, are being made in favor of near-term capability. CLR participants recognize this imbalance, so achieving a balance became an underlying theme for the effort.
Methodology and MAJCOM Inputs
The CLR methodology focused on MAJCOMs and wings. Air Staff and RAND Project Air Force researchers developed and refined the formal methodology, building a study matrix outlining participants, time lines, evaluation metrics, core process definitions, and a list of potential targets of opportunity (ToO) for logistics process improvement.
The MAJCOMs were directly involved in establishing an initial set of ToO and asked to identify problems and solutions associated with each. MAJCOM representatives agreed on a final set of ten basic ToO, cutting across all the core logistics functions, and then were asked to address each in detail through formal written input (Table 1).
The MAJCOM input highlighted a wide range of challenges facing wing-level logisticians, but a number of core issues repeatedly surfaced for each area (Table 2).
MAJCOMs were asked to provide, in collaboration with their peers, a second round of submissions on specific process improvements for each ToO (Table 3). These submissions generated MAJCOM solution statements that addressed the previously identified problem statements. The solution statements were grouped into four process focus areas, within which the options were analyzed.
Four Process Focus Areas
The ToO and MAJCOM inputs were grouped into four process focus areas: technical training and officer development, materiel management, contingency planning, and sortie production and fleet health management (Figure 1).
The first focus area is training and officer development, and the second process focus area is materiel management. The supply management and transportation ToO were mapped into the materiel-management process focus area. Contingency planning, the third focus area, is defined as those activities associated with deployment planning and execution. The logistics plans ToO provided the basis for problems and solution options within the contingency planning process focus area. Finally, the fourth process focus area, sortie production and fleet health management, is defined as those activities associated with sortie generation (organizational-level maintenance), intermediate-level maintenance, and long-term health of the fleet. MAJCOM inputs associated with the following ToO were mapped into the sortie production and fleet health management process focus area: maintenance management, maintenance inspections, maintenance repairs, sortie generation, and ammunition storage/management.
MAJCOMs submitted more than 5,000 inputs that were distilled into 618 individual problem statements with associated solutions. Of those, 423 were within the scope of the CLR. The remaining 195 were deemed outside the scope primarily because they did not focus on wing-level logistics processes. Items beyond the scope of CLR were forwarded to the appropriate Air Staff agency for consideration in future policy and programming decisions. The 423 core CLR problem-and-solution options were analyzed within one of the four process focus areas and refined for presentation to senior Air Force leaders.
MAJCOM, Air Staff, and RAND Project Air Force representatives analyzed the MAJCOM inputs for common themes and improvement strategies in each of the process focus areas, as outlined below.
Technical Training and Officer Development
Training for all logistics officers needs improvement. One problem is the somewhat haphazard nature of the current process. For example, there is no training plan that spans a logistics officer's career, and OJT is not standardized across wings. A second problem is that the opportunities for formal training, after completion of technical school, are limited. Furthermore, there is no requirement that officers complete the courses offered. The training situation was similar in the past, but deficiencies were overcome in several ways, including more comprehensive basic technical school training, closer monitoring of logistics careers, performance recognition by the Air Force Personnel Center under Palace Log, and finally, diligent and competent mentoring. Mentors provide opportunities to attend secondary schools or field training detachment classes, as well as their own training and education.
In addition to training and mentoring, there are problems with career paths for maintenance and logistics officers. Too much emphasis on crossflow into other logistics functional areas detracts from the development of core competencies. The emphasis on crossflow results from the orientation of the 21L (logistician) career path, which is geared to the development of generalists. The 21L designation requires acquisition of a second AFSC, mandating crossflow. Since wartime unit type codes are usually mated with specific AFSCs, generalists are in less demand for AEF deployments, calling into question the utility of the generalist in wartime scenarios.
The crossflow and career development issues resulted in an initiative to refine the core logistics officer career field. The foundation of the refinement effort is establishing dual-track logistics officer career paths. The dual-track concept aligns aircraft maintenance and munitions/missile maintenance in one track and supply, transportation, and logistics plans in another. Officers will gain experience and qualifications in their core track or path with some amount of crossflowing between the two tracks. The details of the dual-track concept are still being formulated, with the goal of developing officers with greater depth of experience.
Complementing the logistics career path refinement is development of a logistics weapons school. Lessons learned from Desert Storm and, most recently, Operation Allied Force highlighted deficiencies in logistics officer training. The difficulties confronted by company-grade logistics officers, deployed forward and placed in key decision-making positions, centered on a lack of understanding and ability to integrate the combat support resources available to them to meet operational requirements. The Air Combat Command is leading the effort to develop an indepth PhD-level logistics officer weapons school curriculum for a select group of highly qualified, company-grade logisticians. The logistics weapons school will train a small number of officers each year, creating highly skilled operational logisticians competent in producing the following logistics effects: mobilization, deployment, beddown, sustainment, combat employment, redeployment, reconstitution, and command and control. In addition to honing logistics skills, the school will provide instructional tools, enabling the graduates to return to their units and teach other wing-level logisticians in the art and science of logistics. Ultimately, this provides warfighting commanders with special expertise in the application of expeditionary logistics.
A final point for improving officer development regards rated officers who require maintenance training. This is particularly important in light of the increasing need to balance current sortie requirements with future capability. Without appropriate training, the officers who command maintenance functions may not be prepared to understand the intricacies of balancing sortie production and fleet health. There is a need for more senior noncommissioned officer (NCO) training to better prepare them to assume expanded leadership roles under EAF operational concepts. Finally, Air Force training policy should be changed to synchronize training cycles with the AEF rotational cycle.
The MAJCOMs agreed to integrate the wing-level materiel management processes into a single authority responsible for base-level supply and transportation functions. This could be achieved by combining the current supply squadron and transportation squadron into a new squadron focused on base-level materiel management, thus streamlining processes and eliminating overlapping functions. The advent of RSS and improved information technology have made base-level integration of these management processes more feasible.
Combining the squadrons also makes sense for better supporting the AEF concept. Computer technology in the RSS makes it possible to oversee all Air Force supplies. That took us a giant step beyond overseeing what is in the base supply warehouse. Armed with the ability to see all assets of the type needed, the next decision becomes selecting the one that can most quickly be moved to the place where it is needed. That brought together supply and transportation thinking in new ways.
Forming regional supply squadrons also reduced the size of the base supply operation. What is left of base supply is the cargo-receiving, storing, and issuing functions that are very similar to the transportation squadron's receiving, temporary storage, delivery, pickup, packaging, and shipping duties. Combining these functions under one squadron commander reduces the handoffs and complexity of the base distribution system and synergizes some of the processes in ways that could reduce handling time.
Improvements will also be made in making timely and accessible mission-capability status reports by RSS available to their customers. Specific RSS support responsibilities should be established in the operation plan or negotiated between the RSS and the supported organizations.
Recommendations for contingency planning included improvements in planning and execution policy as well as base-support planning and site-survey policy. Many of these suggestions stem from experience in OAF/ONA. The most popular suggestion was updating Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-403, Air Force Deployment Planning, and AFI 10-404, Air Force Base Support Planning Policy, to include more detailed guidance for deployment and site surveys. Next, commands requested a standard, detailed deployment process and structure that clearly defines the tasks to be accomplished and the organization responsible for performing each action. They also suggested clearly defining the flow of deployment task assignments to each wing.
The MAJCOMs believe the current alignment of contingency planning activities and, more specifically, the logistics plans function inhibit wing-level contingency planning and execution. Some commands have logistics planning in the logistics support squadron, other commands have logistics planning in the wing planning office, and still other commands have some mix of these two structures. After extensive evaluation, there is a consensus among MAJCOMs that the alignment of logistics planning needs to be standardized. MAJCOMs view standardization as key to both officer development and smooth execution of deployment processes execution. MAJCOMs suggested two options for standardization: aligning all logistics plans functions under the wing logistics group or the wing planning function.
Sortie Production and Fleet Health
MAJCOMs indicated that balancing current sortie production requirements with maintaining fleet health for future requirements is not receiving enough attention. Better focus by wing commanders, operations group commanders, and logistics group commanders on metrics for both fleet health management and current sortie production requirements should improve both near- and long-term capabilities. To ensure such focus, training courses will include instruction on the proper use of metrics and their contribution to the quality of maintenance. Such metrics could contribute to fleet health assessments, quality assurance, maintenance analysis, and data collection and integrity enforcement. MAJCOMs also recommended enforcing policy on the use of metrics. This may be instituted at various levels of command, beginning with changing Air Force instructions and other directives. Wing practices may be monitored through regular reporting to higher levels, staff assistance visits, and inspector general inspections for complianc e. MAJCOMS did not note specific faults with existing metrics, but all felt that a standard set of metrics should be created for managing sortie production and fleet health balance, guidance in AFI 21-101 and MAJCOM supplements should be strengthened, and more should be done to ensure compliance at every level. Wing commanders should ensure local strategies are in place to bring together data flowing from the two groups with aircraft maintenance responsibilities, and such data should meet MAJCOM reporting requirements. All commands emphasized the need to continue improving and simplifying data recording, maintenance data system accuracy, and availability of decision support tools as a means to improve performance.
MAJCOMs generally agreed on the need to improve maintenance policy detail and enforce compliance. The main recommendation was to update the current 21 series Air Force instructions and provide more detailed policy for maintenance scheduling and analysis to assist daily decision making. The MAJCOMs also recognized the need for supplemental updates to bring about wing-level and functional management guidance changes.
The review concluded that aligning fleet health functions under the logistics group would serve to better balance sortie generation and long-term fleet health requirements. This alignment will be tested as a near-term test initiative. The MOC, maintenance analysis, PS&D, quality assurance, and phase inspection sections would be consolidated under the logistics group. The MOC will remain a vital activity that coordinates maintenance actions between organizations. Sortie generation maintenance (on-equipment) remains in the operations squadrons under the operations group. MAJCOMs favored strengthening planning and scheduling coordination between the operations group and logistics group and increasing attention to metrics at group and wing levels. Finally, clearly defined lines of authority for the operations group commander and logistics group commander responsibilities will ensure proper balance of sortie production and fleet health needs.
Other areas where weaknesses in knowledge imply the need for improved training on sortie production and fleet health management include aircraft scheduling, aircraft battle damage repair, war reserve materiel management, computerized systems and analysis, and production supervisor/expediter basics. Several mechanisms are available to improve training, including an expanded role for the logistics training flight, increasing the availability of training managers, and improving the Career Field Education Training Plan.
Better training, including cross-utilization training and training in agile work force tasks that are mission design series (MDS)/AFSC-specific, can help realize more efficient use of personnel. The Air Force would benefit if more three-level personnel could deploy for expeditionary operations. This would reduce the stress of excessive deployments for more senior personnel and help maintain the proper seniority mix needed for OJT of three-level personnel at home bases. A process to accomplish this should consider three-level maintenance upgrade training at such locations.
In general, maintenance efficiency could be improved with better policy enforcement. This requires training in the importance of the policies and in methods of ensuring their enforcement. Specific areas where better enforcement is needed include maintenance documentation, quality assurance, and technical orders.
The Air Force has a wealth of experience in developing job performance aids in maintenance at levels from junior technician to senior leadership. At the technical level, conversion from general technical orders to job performance guides has decreased training requirements and improved the accuracy of maintenance troubleshooting and repair actions. At the top level, a handbook developed years ago for USAFE wing commanders and the more recent Senior Level Maintenance Course have helped provide greater maintenance knowledge to higher ranking operators. Most MAJCOMs noted the need for a senior leaders' analysis handbook and a scheduling and planning quick-reference guide. There may be additional opportunities for leveraging investments in logistics decision support tools that should also be considered.
The consolidated recommendations resulted in a set of must-do and should-do solutions and implementation actions (Table 4). The recommended solutions were presented to each MAJCOM commander, whose comments were incorporated prior to being presented at Corona Fall in October 2000.
With few exceptions, the recommendations received widespread support and were approved for testing. The Chief asked that some recommendations undergo additional analysis. These were subsequently approved for testing. Prior to implementation across the Air Force, however, the Chief of Staff asked that the initiatives be tested over a 6-month period, resulting in CLR phase 2 testing and implementation.
Next Steps--Implementing and Evaluating Process Improvements
For CLR phase 2, it was necessary to classify initiatives according to their evaluation and implementation time line. Some, such as policy refinement, were already underway as a function of day-to-day business at the Air Staff. Others, focused on the near term, were appropriate for CLR field testing. Still others were more strategic in nature and could be implemented only over several years. Below are, first, near-term initiatives--or those that will undergo implementation testing at selected sites beginning in summer 2001--with subsequent implementation across the Air Force (subject to favorable test results). We then discuss long-term initiatives or those that have implementation and evaluation lead times extending beyond 2001. Finally, we discuss continuous refinement initiatives already underway, either as a result of previous efforts (for example, regional supply squadrons) or policy revisions that are accomplished routinely.
Near-Term Test Initiatives
Near-term test initiatives focus on process improvement and realignment of responsibilities for key processes. In materiel management, these initiatives will examine the integration of wing-level supply and transportation processes and alignment of those functions under a single squadron. In the contingency planning process focus area, initiatives include aligning the logistics planning responsibilities under the logistics group commander, with one test placing logistics plans functions in the logistics support squadron, and the second placing them within the new squadron created to integrate supply and transportation processes.
Other near-term initiatives are in sortie production and fleet health. These include evaluating the impact on long-term fleet health of a renewed focus on metrics and the publication of a metrics handbook and aligning the responsibility for core fleet health functions (that is, MOC; phase; quality assurance; analysis; and plans, scheduling, and documentation) under the logistics group.
The tests of these initiatives have two goals. The first is to evaluate the impact of the initiatives on wing-level process performance. Measuring the impact on wing-level processes is difficult because of the short duration of the test and possibility of confounding effects. The test will, therefore, include both qualitative and quantitative measures. Air Staff and RAND Project Air Force teams will gather quantitative data on process performance over the 6-month test period. The quantitative results may indicate little change in performance, but the qualitative analysis, conducted through focused and open-ended interviews, will help in determining causal relationships between the process changes and quantitative measurement results. The second purpose is to ensure the initiatives do not produce unintended results in related logistics processes. The results of this analysis will be used to formulate final implementation recommendations to the Chief of Staff and senior Air Force leaders.
Long-Term Evaluation Initiatives
While the process improvement and realignment initiatives have a near-term focus, the officer development and technical training initiatives being developed by Air Staff and MAJCOM teams are more strategic or long term. Because the Centralized Intermediate Repair Facility (CIRF) test period extends beyond 2001, it is also in this category.
The officer development team is focusing attention on refining the core logistics career paths. First on its agenda is the move to a dual-track logistics officer career path. Aligning aircraft maintenance and munitions/missile maintenance in one track and supply, transportation, and logistics plans in another track will create the dual-track career path. In considering alternatives to the current crossflow policy, the team is researching methods for creating officers with more depth in a few core logistics functions, rather than, as currently done, less experience across many logistics functions. Additionally, the team is defining specific experience and qualification gates that logistics officers would pass through during their career. Other initiatives seek to develop job performance aids and courses for both logistics and flying squadron commanders, providing them the tools needed to balance the needs of day-today sortie production and long-term fleet health maintenance.
The technical training team is working initiatives to improve and sustain the experience level of the enlisted force by improving cross-utilization training, standardizing MDS training requirements and documentation, training for wartime tasks such as tank buildup and battle damage repair, and increasing training opportunities through improved management and availability of training managers. Another key initiative underway is the development of a course for maintenance senior noncommissioned officers on the use of metrics and tradeoff analysis in balancing the needs of daily sortie production and long-term fleet health.
Establishing the logistics weapons school will take an extended period of time. The process entails identifying a cadre of personnel to stand up the school, preparing facilities, and developing the initial course curriculum. The cadre will refine, then validate the curriculum, targeting January 2003 as the first class start date.
The CLR validated the need to continue defining the peacetime and wartime benefits of the CIRF concept. The CIRF concept, which proved invaluable during QAF/ONA, is in the initial test/implementation stages for F-15 avionics, low-altitude navigation and targeting infrared for night, and electronic warfare systems, as well as engines and phase inspections.
The testing of CIRFs will extend beyond the 6-month period and evaluate their effectiveness in supporting the AEF 7/8 and 9/10 rotations. The objectives of the CIRF tests are to:
* Analyze logistics footprint during AEF rotation deployments,
* Evaluate CIRF capabilities to support deployed unit's mission,
* Exercise decision authority between RSS, CIRFs, and transportation,
* Evaluate logistics costs, and
* Evaluate maintenance manpower trigger points at CIRFs. 
Both Air Staff and RAND Project Air Force will evaluate the test results and make recommendations on CIRF policies and procedures prior to implementation of the concept throughout the Air Force.
Continuous Refinement Initiatives
In addition to enhancements to officer development and technical training for improving the skills of the logistics corps, the CLR also recognized the need for improvements in policy, specifically those that govern maintenance activities and force deployment and beddown. Maintenance policy is being revised to include detailed guidance that had been dropped. These revisions include a renewed emphasis on discipline and policy enforcement. Similar changes have already been made to the force deployment and beddown policies.
The CLR validated the ongoing efforts regarding RSS that are critical for expeditionary operations. The RSS effort focused on refining policies and procedures regarding the role of the RSS in supporting contingency operations, including pipeline metrics and decision support tools facilitating the RSS role as a combat support command-and-control node. These changes will enable the RSS to complement CIRF implementation.
The initiatives resulting from the CLR are designed to create a core logistics capability enabling the EAF to respond quickly and conduct sustained operations anywhere in the world. Realizing that potential, however, depends on Air Force recognition of the importance of balancing current day requirements with future needs. The Air Force must embrace different ways of doing business to deal with some of the fundamental problems that the MAJCOMs identified, many of which concerned the current imbalance between daily operations and future needs. Both operators and support personnel must understand the tradeoffs necessary in striking a balance between producing sorties now and producing continuous fleet health and growing human capital to meet future operational requirements. Operations and support personnel must share a set of proven metrics that bring day-to-day progress in attaining this balance, and wing leadership must act to attain a balance and improve human capital.
The CLR highlights the need to improve technical training in officer development and, thus, develop human capital necessary for supporting EAF operations. Many CLR initiatives aim to invest in the human capital and provide the tools needed for continued development of the logistics corps.
While achieving a balance between daily sortie production and maintaining a healthy fleet for future needs are critical to the expeditionary force, contingency planning and materiel management are also critical for quick deployment, immediate employment, and support of expeditionary operations. Recent history has proven the value of quick deployment and rapid resupply.
The CLR recommendations are aggressive, but they are tempered by a cautious approach to implementation. The test period can help ensure the initiatives are steps in the right direction and refine the initiatives to produce the desired impacts. However, the full impact of these initiatives will not be realized for years.
(1.) Gen John P. Jumper, "Posturing Aircraft Maintenance for Combat Readiness" briefing. Washington DC: HQ, USAF, Sep 99.
(2.) Gen Michael E. Ryan, "Air Force Logistics" memorandum, Washington DC: HQ, USAF, 4 Oct 99.
(3.) Lt Gen Michael E. Zettler. "Chief of Staff Logistics Review" briefing, Washington DC: HQ, USAF, 3 Oct 00.
(4.) RAND Project Air Force is the Air Force federally funded research and development center for studies and analyses.
(5.) C. J. Dahlman and D. E. Thaler, Assessing Unit Readiness: case Study of an Air Force Fighter Wing, RAND, DB-296-AF, 2000.
(7.) CLR CIRF Test Plan (Draft), HQ USAF/ ILM, Apr 00.
General Zettler is the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff, Installations and Logistics.
CLR Targets of Opportunity
1 Maintenance Management
1.1 Describe how best to provide available aircraft to support EAF.
1.1.1 Consider how maintenance is controlled day-to-day and month-to-month (for example, maintenance operations center processes, production superintendent responsibilities).
1.1.2 Consider how maintenance and operations scheduling can be better utilized to provide best support for aerospace expeditionary force (AEF) flying schedules.
1.2 Describe how best to provide analysis for maintenance actions.
1.2.1 Consider predictive capability and deficiency analysis.
1.2.2 Consider deployment of logistics/maintenance information systems.
1.2.3 Consider management of database requirements.
1.3 Describe how best to provide senior-level control and accountability for maintenance actions.
1.3.1 Consider maintenance authority levels.
1.3.2 Consider balance between operational requirements and health of fleet (determinations/timing of deferred maintenance actions).
1.4 Describe how to best provide increased maintenance discipline.
1.4.1 Consider quality assurance requirements/techniques.
1.4.2 Consider technical order usage enforcement.
1.4.3 Consider maintenance documentation enforcement.
1.4.4 Consider maintenance standardization.
2 Maintenance Inspections (scheduled and unscheduled maintenance)
2.1 Describe how to best optimize scheduled inspections.
2.1.1 Consider time change/time compliance technical order/in-process inspections, requirements, and timing.
2.1.2 Consider phase/periodic fleet management.
2.1.3 Consider phase/periodic quality.
2.1.4 Consider manpower requirements.
3 Maintenance Repairs
3.1 Describe how to best provide standardization of repair processes across different organizations.
3.1.1 Consider aircrew protection processes (survival equipment, life support, egress).
3.1.2 Consider aerospace ground equipment (AGE)/munitions trailer/hydraulic maintenance processes.
4 Sortie Generation
4.1 Describe how to best provide maintenance capability of skills (Air Force specialty codes [AFSC]) that bridge multiple organizations.
4.1.1 Consider electroenvironmental processes.
4.1.2 Consider armament/weapons processes.
5.1 Describe how to increase priority of and best provide maintenance upgrade and recurring training (enlisted).
5.1.1 Consider advocacy/champion for maintenance training at the base level.
6 Ammo Storage and Management
6.1 Describe how to best provide capability to store and maintain special weapons (for example, nuclear and so forth).
7 Supply Management
7.1 Describe how to best capture demand/compute requirements to support weapon systems.
7.1.1 Consider tailoring kits as appropriate to wartime taskings.
7.1.2 Consider method of developing reachback to support deployed operations.
8 Transportation Management
8.1 Describe how to best develop plans for and operation of transportation portions of base deployment operations.
8.1.1 Consider methods of using centralized control center (for example, air terminal operations center/wing operations center) for peacetime and wartime operations.
8.1.2 Consider special purpose vehicle maintenance capability to maintain AGE or munitions trailers.
8.1.3 Consider vehicle operations capability to operate refueling trucks or other delivery vehicles.
9 Logistics Plans
9.1 Describe how to best direct deployment (command and control).
9.1.1 Consider needs for standardization of logistics plans processes to support EAF/AEF deployments and mobility.
9.2 Describe how to best conduct strategic and war planning.
9.2.1 Consider Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) qualifications and currency (potential of development of training database).
9.2.2 Consider site survey currency.
9.2.3 Consider base support plans currency.
9.2.4 Consider host-tenant support agreements currency.
9.3 Describe how to best manage war reserve materiel.
9.3.1 Consider prepositioned equipment ownership and management.
10 Officer Development
10.1 Describe how to best train, educate, and sustain logistics officers (for example, career development).
10.1.1 Consider accession AFSCs and training in development of career paths.
10.1.2 Consider on-the-job logistics officer training program standardization upon initial base arrival (after technical school).
10.1.3 Consider recurring training and life-cycle training requirements.
10.1.4 Consider crossflow or career-broadening opportunities and staging points.
10.1.5 Consider field grade officer utilization in development of career paths.
10.1.6 Consider retention benefits.
Table 2. Common MAJCOM Problem Statements Target of Opportunity MAJCOM Problem Statements 1. Maintenance Management * Maintenance operations center (MOC) organizational alignment prevents effective scheduling and coordination of maintenance activities. * Authority for maintenance is split between two groups and impedes effective maintenance processes. 2. Maintenance Inspections * Scheduled maintenance is sacrificed to fill short-term operations requirements. 3. Maintenance Repairs * Life-support, survival equipment, and egress systems perform very similar core tasks that could be performed by one specialized flight. 4. Sortie Generation * Functional management and effective streamlined use of armament personnel are limited. 5. Training * No single point of contact for logistics training management. 6. Ammo Storage/Management * Combat Ammunition System has shortfalls. 7. Supply Management * No command-and-control structure to support multiple AEF worldwide deployments. 8. Transportation Management * Deployment command and control system is slow. * Deployment guidance is insufficient. 9. Logistics Plans * Lack of guidance negatively impacts ability to lead deployment operations. 10. Officer Development * Logistics officer training is nonstandard, haphazard, and not mandated. Table 3. Common MAJCOM Solution Statements Target of Opportunity MAJCOM Solution Statements 1. Maintenance Management * Authorize MOC to resume control functions. * Centralize aircraft fleet management and planning functions. * Align maintenance under experienced, professional maintainers. 2. Maintenance Inspections * Centralize phase scheduling and plans scheduling and documentation (PS&D) under organization responsible for fleet health. 3. Maintenance Repairs * Investigate realignment of tasks for life-support, survival equipment, and egress systems into a single AFSC. 4. Sortie Generation * Centralize all armament personnel under single group commander. 5. Training * Centralize training management within the wing under the logistics group (LG). 6. Ammo Storage/Management * Upgrade or replace combat arms storage. 7. Supply Management * Redesign readiness spares packages to enable flexible deployments. * Require regional supply squadrons (RSS) to provide timely mission-capable status to customers. 8. Transportation Management * Reorganize/realign the deployment structure and information flow. * Revise deployment guidance and standardize critical steps. 9. Logistics Plans * Revise deployment guidance to standardize organization and process. 10. Officer Development * Develop Air Force training policy to standardize OJT for logistics officers Table 4. CLR Proposed Initiatives and Implementation Actions  Focus Areas Technical Training Options Must-Do Initiatives Implementation Actions * Enhance technical training. * Redefine training manager duty policy. * Increase availability of * Devote training manager to training managers. production training. * Standardize and enforce * Standardize MDS minimum training of wartime tasks. upgrade requirements/ documentation. * Develop Air Force-wide standardized curriculum for wartime tasks such as fuel tank buildup, aircraft battle damage repair, aircraft scheduling, war reserve materiel management, and so forth. * Develop a process for units to utilize three levels at AEF contingency locations-- must include three-level maintenance upgrade training at such locations. * Change Air Force recurring * Match recurring training training timing to coincide with AEF cycles. with AEF cycles. * Train logistics senior NCOs * Develop technical leadership in technical leadership course for senior NCOs that development. teaches: * Relationship of maintenance metrics to management decisions. * Long-term fleet health discipline. Officer Development Options Must-Do Initiatives Implementation Actions * Refine core logistics * Establish training/ career-field management and experience gates for logistics crossflow policy. officers. * Develop weapons school for * Create logistics course logistics officers. integrated with weapons school at Nellis AFB. * Improve crossflow management. * Publish specific logistics officer crossflow policy to guide commander decisions. Should-Do Initiatives Implementation Actions * Align logistics officer * Implement two officer career career paths into two track paths: (maintenance/munitions and * Logistics: transportation/ materiel management/planning); supply/logistics plans. include initial skills and * Maintenance: aircraft/ advanced train requirements. munitions/missiles. * Ensure crossflow between the two. * Outline development process to grow senior logisticians in consonance with developing aerospace leaders. Materiel Management Options Must-Do Initiatives Implementation Actions * Provide guidance for * Develop overarching command materiel management pipeline and control (C2) policy to analysis. support EAF. * Develop specific metrics * Define performance for materiel management indicators for moving parts activities to drive pipeline from flight line to end performance in support of destination. operational requirements. * Refine Air Force policy to ensure spares are equitably distributed during AEFs/ contingencies. * Improve RSS policy. * Build standard Air Force RSS policy/procedures. * Continue to develop and * Define for peacetime, refine policy to address RSS wartime, and contingency responsibilities in support of operations. contingency operations. * Incorporate lessons learned from air war over Serbia. * Develop training on RSS * Develop training to enable processes, tools, and metrics. rapid deployment. * Develop standard Air Force tools and metrics. Should-Do Initiatives Implementation Actions * Create single authority for * Combine wing supply and distribution process. transportation squadrons. * Enhance combat support C2 at * Develop standard Air Force regional activities. logistics C2 processes and procedures for AEF/ contingencies. * Add capabilities to RSS to * Identify standard Air Force improve C2 decision support. C2 suite of tools to be used * Provide tools for reachback, in regional supply squadron. visibility, and followup. Contingency Planning Options Must-Do Initiatives Implementation Actions * Create and report metrics * Develop operational goals for contingency planning and metrics for expeditionary against EAF goals. combat support (ECS) planning activities. * Develop specific metrics for * Develop ECS readiness each wing commander to assess reporting structure. site survey, deployment, and beddown timing. * Improve policy for * Standardize Air Force site deployments and site surey process. surveys. * Ensure more definitive EAF * Establish specific wing, guidance in deployment MAJCOM, and Air Force policy. responsibilities for information gathering and standard Air Force suite of tools. * Refine policies, * Redirect EAF/contingency standardization, and policy to guide beddown integration for EAF site planning actions before/ surveys. during deployments. * Create JOPES certification * Identify requirements for policy and track training Air Force-wide JOPES-trained qualifications. cadre. * Develop and institutionalize training and tracking via ECS readiness reporting. Should-Do-Initiatives Implementation Actions * Standardize logistics plans * Wing plans remains under LG. accountable for wing plans. * Assign all logistics planners under the LG. * Make LG accountable for logistics plan development, deployment training, and execution. Sortie Production/Fleet Management Options Must-do Initiatives Implementation Actions * Place increased emphasis on * Rewrite AFI 21-101, sortie production and fleet Maintenance Management of health processes. Aircraft. * Specify policy, procedures, training, discipline, and enforcement. * Spell out OG/LG responsibilities. * Combat air force and tactical airlift wing. * OG-sortie production; LG- fleet health. * Air Force Special Operations Center/Air National Guard/Air Force Reserve Command/Air Force Space Command and Air Mobility Command strategic wings remain as is. * Provide policy for current * Establish specific metrics versus future readiness to drive balance between tradoff analysis. daily sortie production and * Develop specific matrics long-term fleet health. for each wing commander to drive balance between operations requirments and fleet health. * Develop senior leaders' * Write how-to book to guide metrics handbook. senior maintenance decision making. * Assist rated officers and * Identify leading and lagging logisticians in interpreting indicators. metrics. * Recognize/manage trends. * Improve enlisted maintenance * Improve cross-utilization training. training. * Use personnel more * Develop cross-utilization effectively: revitalize training task list for each cross-utilization training MDS Air Force specialty and standardize AFSC task combination. training records. * Standardize MDS training folders. * Improve logistics and rated * Develop maintenance course officer maintenance for commanders. Mandatory training. for OG/LG maintenance/flying * Integrate rated officer squadron commenders prior maintenance metrics course. to command. * Direct mandatory senior leader maintenance training for operations group and flying squadron commanders. * Determine reqirements/ * Place MOC under the LG, location of MOC. accountable to an O-4 or higher maintenance operations officer (MOO). * MOO also responsible for PS&D, quality assurance, and analysis. Should-Do Initiatives Implementation Actions. * Regionalize intermediate * Determine appropriate peace repair facilities for and wartime regionalized wartime and peacetime. repair requirements. * Avionics, LANTIRN, * Write implementation concept electronic warfare systems of operations. * Engines * Munitions * Phase inspections
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|Title Annotation:||U.S. Air Force|
|Author:||E. Zettler, Liecutenant General Michael|
|Publication:||Air Force Journal of Logistics|
|Date:||Jun 22, 2001|
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