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Caught in the middle: Japanese attitude toward Indonesian independence in 1945.

Introduction

On 2 September 1945, when the Japanese delegation signed the document of surrender aboard the Missouri, the Japanese Army, and Navy issued a General Order No. 1, ordering "all military commanders both within Japan and abroad to completely disarm the Japanese forces and other military forces under Japanese command, regardless of their location ... and to surrender all weapons and equipment [to the Allied Forces] in their present status and under safe and good conditions". Accordingly, the 16th Army of the Southern General Army that had been assigned the task of occupying and ruling over Java was also placed under the supervision of the Supreme Allied Commander Southeast Asia Lord Louis Mountbatten both in name and actuality, although all its fighting force was intact.

The 16th Army in Java had, however, concretely promised "independence" to the Indonesians at the beginning of August in order to obtain utmost cooperation from the Indonesians in Japan's war efforts telling them that Japan and Indonesia are bound by the same destiny. Now the defeat in the war obliged Japan to submit to the will of its former enemies, and to suppress the Indonesian independence movement by the order of the Allies. Under such circumstances, the Japanese military administration authorities and civilian officials faced a dilemma. Although they wished to fulfill the promise they had made, they had no alternative but to obediently return to the motherland as ordered by the Allies, abiding by the wishes of their emperor.

There were, however, not a few Japanese in Indonesia who sought participation in the Indonesian independence movement for various reasons of their own, rejecting the course of action followed by the majority. We shall call the former "renunciation type" Japanese in contrast to the latter "allegiance type".

This paper is intended to examine reactions of the Japanese in Indonesia, Java in particular, following the surrender on 15 August 1945 comparing the contrasting behaviour patterns of the "allegiance type" and the "renunciation type".

I. Events Surrounding Indonesian Independence

(1) Japanese Reactions in Java on 15 August 1945

At noon on 15 August 1945 at the headquarters of the 16th Army in Jakarta, Commanding Lt. General Nagano Yuichiro and other top military officers were intently listening to the very important broadcast from Tokyo. Major General Yamamoto Moichiro, who was concurrently chief of staff of the 16th Army and superintendent of the military government, describes the situation in the following way: "All of us stood upright solemnly unable to utter a single word ... Commander Nagano left the room totteringly with a grave and sorrowful look."(1) The shock the general received from the defeat was so great that the commander who had stood at the head of 70 thousand Japanese soldiers then in Java lost the mental capacity to take command thereafter, leaving the actual leadership in the hands of General Yamamoto. Yamamoto, who held the conviction that a commander must not leave the scene in silence, instructed his staff officers "never to act on impulse and wait for subsequent orders".(2) By the phrase "act on impulse" he seems to have warned against committing suicide under the shock of defeat or calling for radical actions such as thorough resistance.

Colonel Miyamoto Shizuo, an operations staff officer who was also at the headquarters, recalls that he sensed the "smell of surrender" in strange changes in the Tokyo atmosphere starting around 10 August, immediately after the Soviet Union declared war against Japan. Miyamoto also recalls the desperation felt on the fatal days as follows:

The enemy against whom we had held up fierce fighting spirit suddenly turned into a sort of great big rock with our lives at its mercy. Under its heavy weight my thoughts turned immediately to what would happen to Japan, to the 16th Army and what should be done with the Japanese in Java....(3)

Now what were the reactions of the middle rank military officers in contrast with those of the top leadership described above? Captain Yamazaki Hajime, who was the central figure at the Education Division of the PETA (Army for the Defence of the Fatherland), wrote in his diary on 15 August 1945: "Listening in to the Emperor's broadcast we all shed bitter tears. At night, First Lieutenant Nishiyama tried to kill himself, which I succeeded in stopping."(4) The younger middle rank officers tended to believe wholeheartedly in the cause of the Greater East Asia War, and their emotional wavering was much more immediate and direct, especially those officers who were in daily touch with the Indonesian officers and men participating in the PETA.

Next let us look at the reactions of the Japanese civilians who were at the core of the military government. Saito Shizuo, a civilian Foreign Service official who played an important part in orienting the military administration as a whole in his capacity as the chief of the planning section of the military government's general affairs department, stated, "Being not in actual combat service as are military officers, we were not in such psychological strains as to think of death in direct connection with the defeat."(5) It is interesting to note that Saito and Yamamoto, both part of the elite core of the military government, were not so emotionally swayed in the immediate aftermath of the defeat. Their thinking immediately turned to practical measures they should take as bureaucrats as a consequence of the defeat.

For example, although Yamamoto's initial reaction was that of a typical military officer when he felt that he had no words to apologize to the Emperor or to the war-dead, he soon reflected that his work did not end with the defeat in the war. He realized that the Japanese military administration would be terminated only when the orders of the Allied Forces were executed, the Japanese forces disarmed and repatriated together with all the Japanese residents, and adjustments of relationships with the Indonesian people completed.(6) Saito, who claimed to have known of the deteriorating military situation through monitoring foreign broadcasts,(7) recalled that when it became certain that the war would be terminated, his mind was swirling with speculations and thoughts concerning the attitude the Allies would assume and measures the Japanese forces should take thereafter, especially with regard to winding up the Japanese military administration in Indonesia.(8)

The top leaders of the Japanese military administration, both military and civilian, were all concerned with the three major questions: (1) How to execute orders of the Allied Forces; (2) Repatriation of Japanese military forces, of civilians who worked for the armed forces, and of Japanese residents in Indonesia; (3) How to deal with the past promise of independence that the Japanese side had given to the Indonesians. Examining their thoughts and attitudes, we note that they were not so much concerned with the old promise or the question of "face", and gave more attention to how to protect national interests by adjusting to the new developments.

Next, in order to illustrate in specific terms the behavior of those Japanese who fall under the "allegiance" pattern, we shall examine the stance of the military administration leadership toward the question of Indonesian independence.

For a long time the central government of Japan was adamant about the policy of not giving independence to Indonesia, but it at last declared by means of Premier Koiso Kuniaki's pronouncement on 7 September 1944 that it "would give independence to the East Indies in the near future" (emphasis added). About one year prior to this statement, the government had proclaimed "Defend to the last the Absolute Defence Sphere".(9) The war situation, however, rapidly became unfavourable to the Japanese side, especially after the fall of Saipan in June 1944. Premier and War Minister Tojo Hideki had been cornered and stepped down, to be succeeded by Koiso Kuniaki who also was a retired army general. Subsequently in late October the naval battle at Leyte was lost, marking the virtual first step toward Japan's defeat.

Facing an imminent crisis the Government of Japan moved toward giving "independence" to Indonesia. In reality, however, the Japanese Government had neither the interest nor the mental composure to put into effect the process for granting independence to the southernmost region of the "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere". In contrast to Japan's stagnant attitude, nationalism and the move toward independence had grown rapidly in Indonesia after the Koiso statement, when the military government permitted use of the red-and-white Indonesian flag and the national anthem, forbidden since the start of the Japanese military administration. Especially noteworthy was the rise in strength of the politically conscious youth who received military and spiritual training during the occupation, and their emergence added an important new dimension to the subsequent independence movement in Indonesia.(10)

The Japanese military government authorities were in need of more vigorous cooperation from the Indonesian leadership in conducting the administration of Java, a place regarded as the "sole supply base in the South", where there was no significant fighting.(11) The Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence inaugurated in March 1945 was a reflection of this attitude on the part of the administration authorities: they had no concrete instructions from Tokyo, but progressed toward its establishment under the shock of PETA's anti-Japanese uprising in Blitar, East Java which demonstrated the Indonesian zeal for independence.

This was the politico-military situation when Field Marshal Terauchi Hisakazu, Supreme Commander of the Southern General Army and representing the Government of Japan, formally delivered the message "granting independence" to Sukarno and Hatta at Da Lat, in southern Vietnam, on 11 August.(12) It was during the very last stage before granting "independence", which was Japan's final card for winning Indonesian cooperation and support in her war efforts, that the Government of Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration on 14 August.

So it was natural that the first thing that crossed the mind of the military administration leadership in Java upon hearing about Japan's surrender was how to reconcile the Allies' orders and the pre-surrender promise of "independence" given to the Indonesians. The solution of this delicate problem would be closely related to successfully overcoming another major problem, that is, smooth and early repatriation of the Japanese in Indonesia. One question that greatly troubled the leadership of the military administration was what course of action would spare Japan from being accused by the Allies of non-obedience to their orders. To be so accused would jeopardize the "preservation of national polity" (i.e., the Emperor institution), a situation that must be avoided by all means. And this was the tacit understanding shared by all those concerned.

On 19 August, the 16th Army received a telegram from Commander Itagaki Seishiro of the Seventh Area Army who was posted at Singapore, notifying them officially that the Southern General Army would cease hostilities, "abiding by the Imperial mandate", and that they would no longer support the concept of granting independence to Indonesia.(13) The decision coincided with the course of action taken by the 16th Army since 15 August. Receiving this telegram the 16th Army reconfirmed the policy already set down, and issued the instruction to its men stating, "You must perform the final obligations involved in the surrender. Never cause any trouble to His Majesty the Great Marshal. Show the discipline in perfect order of the proud Japanese Army."(14)

Concerning the question of "independence" the 16th Army authorities made it their basic policy to "freeze the military administration as of the date of the termination of war, maintain the status quo and transfer it to the Allied Forces".(15) That indicated a stance on the part of Japan that was tantamount to stating that Japan had nothing to do with Indonesian independence, and that it was an issue between Indonesia and the Netherlands.(16)

(2) The Allied Power's Orders to the 16th Army

After the military administration authorities had set up the basic policy of distancing itself from Indonesian "independence", the next tough question was how to prevent Japanese arms and ammunitions from flowing into Indonesian hands, and to guard against emergence of Japanese men who would disobey orders and join the independence movement. Should errors be committed in handling these two problems, it would enrage the Allies and might hinder the smooth "repatriation in perfect order" of the three million Japanese men overseas.

Looking at the situation from the Indonesian side, the advance of the Allied Forces would certainly mean the return of Dutch colonialism. It was, therefore, imperative for their independence movement to reassemble men of the PETA and Heiho (Auxiliary Forces) that had been disbanded by the Japanese orders, and to obtain arms and ammunition from the Japanese military. Otherwise, the Japanese arms and ammunition would be delivered to the Allied Forces and would certainly be used against them.

As was pointed out earlier, the Japanese side did not want weapons and ammunition to flow into the hands of the Indonesians. The Allies would accuse Japan of non-obedience to their orders, and worse still, these arms might be used against Japanese themselves. Extremely wary of such a situation, the 16th Army authorities, following instructions from the Seventh Area Army, took two steps on 29 August to avoid troubles with the Indonesians concerning weaponry. First, they concentrated arms and ammunition not currently in use, and second, in the case of those arms retained as necessary, only five bullets were allocated for each weapon.(17)

Despite these precautions, there were active Indonesian attempts in various parts of the country to acquire Japanese weapons, and in some cases, they led to conflicts between the two sides. The Japanese side had "anticipated the situation where they might have to use force when all other means have been exhausted", but they stressed that they "should refrain from it unless it is considered as actual looting".(18) This guideline reflected a complex stand taken by the Japanese Army which, following Allied orders, had to make an about-face and take steps to suppress the independence movement in Indonesia.

The 16th Army staff held an operations conference on 21 September, being wedged between the Allies' orders and Indonesian nationalist pressure surrounding the weapons disposal. This conference was of particular importance for its reconfirmation of the basic policy of "absolute avoidance of any steps that might jeopardize national polity".(19) The members unanimously concluded that the best policy was to leave the matter of Indonesian independence to Indonesia and the Netherlands, and that Japanese and British forces should withdraw as soon as possible. Their conclusion was based upon the judgement that as long as the Japanese army remained in Indonesia, there would be endless difficulties in connection with the weapons and Japanese "deserters" cooperating with the Indonesian nationalists, thus inviting reprisals from the Allies.

The Japanese side decided to deal with the Indonesian demand for transfer of Japanese weapons without using force, although they were extremely wary of doing anything to "jeopardize national polity".(20) In practice, however, the manner of dealing with this problem differed from unit to unit scattered throughout the area, depending on the local commander's personality, outlook on the war and view of Indonesia. In the opinion of Saito Shizuo there were at least three distinct approaches. The first may be observed in the case of the military police in Surabaya where the Japanese complies with the Indonesian demand and delivered the weapons without use of armed force, seeing that refusal would endanger themselves; the second is illustrated in the case of the Kido unit in Semarang, whose refusal of the Indonesian demand led to serious fighting, and the third is found in the majority of cases where the Japanese side gave up the weapons after limited fighting.(21) About half of the weapons of the Japanese forces had come into the possession of the Indonesians in Central and Eastern Java by the end of 1945.(22)

During their encounters with the Indonesians over the weapons, the Japanese side suffered casualties of 402 men dead, 239 wounded and 88 missing by the beginning of November.(23) This figure was very high when we recall that the Japanese only lost 957 men during their offensive in Java against the Dutch forces. Despite these casualties the Japanese force were rebuked by the Allies for failing to carry out orders and the Japanese dilemma grew all the more serious.

It was not only concerning the weapons that Allied Forces pressed Japan to exercise firmer control. When the war ended, not a few Japanese identified themselves with the newly-born "Republic of Indonesia" for various reasons of their own, disregarding the Army's order. Many of these Japanese joined Indonesian military or paramilitary organizations and played significant parts in obtaining weapons from the Japanese army or in fighting against the Allied Forces.

The Allied side was greatly displeased with these Japanese who cooperated with the Indonesians in their struggle for independence, and on 22 October demanded that the General Army issue a statement that "those Japanese who desert their military units and fight on the Indonesian side are traitors to the Emperor".(24) The British army in Java, in particular, observed Japanese guidance behind the Indonesian armed force, and was especially afraid of participation of senior officers who were well-versed in the handling of weapons or who had extensive experience in combat operations.(25)

II. A Dilemma between the "Promise" and the New "Role"

(1) Behaviours of "Renunciation" Type

The Allies probably ordered the Japanese army to stigmatize those Japanese men who joined the Indonesian independence force as "Traitors of the Emperor" for political and psychological reasons. The Allied side was fully aware that the Japanese were in extreme fear of "jeopardizing national polity", and they used this fear to put pressure on the Japanese army to provide stricter surveillance on deserters. They assumed, in all likelihood, that the appeal would have a powerful spiritual influence on those Japanese who had chosen to join the Indonesian forces.

In this section the writer wishes to examine the conduct of the type of Japanese who identified with the Indonesians, and of the "allegiance" type, in the overall picture of Japanese responses or reactions in the post-surrender Indonesia.

Then what were the responses of the "renunciation" type Japanese who chose to stay in Indonesia? These people may be divided into two groups: (1) Those who killed themselves, and (2) those who sought to identify themselves with the newly-born "Republic of Indonesia" or the Indonesian community.

The first group can be subdivided based on their motives: (A) At the defeat of the Great Japanese Empire that had been alleged to be imperishable and everlasting, some "wanted to atone for the disloyalty to the Emperor" by committing suicide; (B) others killed themselves out of shame or guilt because Japan had pledged to share a common destiny with the Indonesians and support their independence, but betrayed them unabashedly after the defeat.

Men in the second group, who sought identification with Indonesia, may also be subdivided into (A) men who for various personal reasons decided to remain in Indonesia to live and to die as Indonesians in the kampung community, and (B) men who were enraged at the complete about-face in Japan's policy and opted to take positive action by getting involved in the Indonesian independence movement in one way or another, disobeying orders both of the Japanese and Allied Forces.(26)

When we look closer at the subsequent way of life of the latter, we find that (i) some were killed in the Independence War as "combatants"; (ii) some others survived the war and continued to stay in the "Japindo" (Japanese Indonesians), opening up a new horizon in their newly independent second homeland, regardless of whether they succeeded or not; and (iii) still some others who decided to return to Japan after Indonesian independence in December 1949. The chart below shows the groups and sub-groups:

Conduct of the Japanese in Indonesia after 15 August 1945

I. "Allegiance" type

II. "Renunciation" type

1. Those who chose to die

(A) Apologies to the Emperor

(B) Sense of responsibility and shame toward the Indonesians

2. Those who identified themselves with Indonesians

(A) Immersion into the Indonesian community

(B) Participation in the independence war

(i) Killed in the war

(ii) "Japindo"

(iii) Return to Japan

Since one of the main themes of the present paper is Japanese involvement in the independence war of Indonesia, the writer would like to take up for further discussion the men who got involved in one way or another in the Indonesian independence war against the Dutch troops.

The number of Japanese in Java under the jurisdiction of the 16th Army who fell into this category is shown in the table below. We may observe some outstanding tendencies from the data in the table.

[TABULAR DATA OMITTED]

First, no officers with the rank of major or above are found among the deserters, while 43 per cent of them (119) were ordinary soldiers, and when the figure for non-commissioned officers (70) is added, the figure reaches 68.2 per cent of the total. One reason for this difference may be that whereas those in upper ranks, the elite in the military hierarchy, had stronger military discipline and loyalty to the organization, and a very keen sense of belonging to the fatherland, the rank and file were relatively young and free from such limitations.

Secondly, non-military civilians working for the army and other civilians in general amounted to about 30 per cent of the total (84). Incidentally, out of some 68,000 Japanese staying in Java at the time of termination of war, approximately 18,000 were estimated to fall under those categories, and their "renunciation" ratio stood at 0.47 per cent. The "renunciation" ratio on the part of the military who were estimated to be about 50,000 was 0.39 per cent, and there is no significant difference between the figure for the military and for the non-military.

Thirdly, there was much difference depending on the locality. The figure was highest for West Java with 85.2 per cent (236). In particular, Bandung alone accounted for 59.9 per cent of the total number (166). This was partly because Bandung was a major concentration centre for the Japanese forces, but in addition to that, this area as a whole was the fiercest battleground of the struggles for independence, culminating in the "Bandung Sea of Fire" incident of March 1946.(27)

(2) Ichiki Tatsuo alias Abdul Rachman

Among those fluctuating minds there was a small minority of men who chose to take the "renunciation" course with a lucid mentality - criticizing Japan and identifying with the Indonesian desire for independence. Ichiki Tatsuo and Yoshizumi Tomegoro were typical of these Japanese, and the mention of these two names would be supported unanimously by those who knew the actual circumstances of the time.(28)

At the termination of war, 15 August 1945, Ichiki and Yoshizumi were respectively working at the Education Division of the PETA and the Naval Office as non-regular staff members.(29) They did not participate directly in the military administration, but their jobs put them in close touch with PETA officers and soldiers, and with young Indonesian nationalists in general. Through their daily contact with these people the two men came to feel their nationalistic desires in both spiritual and physical terms. And this probably accounts, at least in part, for their conducts after 15 August 1945.

Moreover, both Ichiki and Yoshizumi had long prewar experiences of living in Indonesia (Ichiki had married a Sundanese woman), and of particular importance in this connection is the fact that they worked as reporters for the Toindo Nippo (the East Indies Times), the only Japanese language newspaper in Indonesia during the latter part of the 1930s, thus developing a deep interest in the affairs of Indonesia. Furthermore, they shared an inclination toward the ideology of Asian solidarity and both had been expelled and declared "persona non grata" by the Dutch for their connection with the southern advance policy of the Japanese military.(30) It was natural perhaps that they had strong anti-Dutch feelings.

Of the two men Yoshizumi was active and jovial whereas Ichiki was more or less a meditative introvert, and his disappointment in and anger against the Japanese military administration, that now undertook to suppress the Indonesian desire for independence in outright contrast to their former slogans, became increasingly deep-rooted in his heart. He was convinced that the Indonesians had a solid base for independence and were ready for it, and he openly asserted his belief through his writings. In particular, he was second to none among the Japanese on the spot in understanding the firmness of Indonesian nationalism that had grown up through the medium of the Indonesian language. His insight is well revealed in his article written during the later stage of the wartime period entitled "Independence and Language - Future Course for the Indonesian Language".

In this article Ichiki asserted that in the future the "Indonesian language will be the standard tongue not only in the so-called East Indies but also in the whole southern Indonesian area defined by both geography and racial distribution". He was vehemently opposed to the views held by some in the military administration who "refused to recognize existence of the Indonesian language" saying "it should be termed the Malay language", or who said "the so-called Indonesian language should be eradicated". He wrote, "I have persistently protested against such views and made representations to my superiors about such arguments being erroneous. Moreover, I have pertinaciously stuck to using the words 'the Indonesian nation' or 'the Indonesian language' in my articles or reports written in the Malay language."(31)

At any rate, Ichiki had a firm conviction supported by his personal experiences about the "growth of the Indonesian nation and the accompanying development of the Indonesian language during the past 30 years".(32)

In view of the close relationship Ichiki had with Indonesia, it would be easy to understand the great shock he had when he learned that the promise of "independence" - indeed, the word meant only a qualified independence - that seemed close to realization was suddenly repealed completely. Ichiki must have felt indignant against the army authorities who in the name of maintaining the status quo unilaterally disbanded PETA and took away arms from them, as he had poured his heart and energy in the training of "fighters", stressing the need for military force and spiritual power that must accompany efforts toward independence.(33)

Soon after 15 August 1945 Ichiki, following an irrepressible urge, disobeyed the "Imperial mandate" and "renounced" his fatherland. Logically he had no other alternative if he wanted to express his sympathy toward Indonesian nationalism and support the independence which Japan (and Ichiki personally) had promised. As of this date, he changed his name to Abdul Rachman.(34)

Ichiki's activities after he joined the Indonesian independence forces are described in detail in a booklet entitled Sekitar Perdjuangan Sumeru Selatan [Struggles for Independence in the Southern Area of the Mt. Sumeru], edited by Captain Sukardi of the Indonesian National Army.(35) In this booklet, Ichiki is described as an instructor at the Madiun Military Academy where his main task was to write papers on subjects necessary for building up a national army. After April 1946 Ichiki began to lead guerilla troops based at a stronghold in West Java. In August, he was leading a "special scouting unit" composed of "runaway" Japanese soldiers, first in the vicinity of Bandung, and later, after the conclusion of Linggadjati Agreement, in Central Java where they engaged in hit-and-run operations.(36)

The group moved to Malang district in East Java in August 1948, still fighting a resistance war against the Dutch forces. On 9 January 1949 Ichiki was killed in battle at a small village called Dampit to the east of Malang. He was 42 years of age. About half a year prior to Ichiki's death, Yoshizumi Tomegoro, his bosom friend who had always been with him, died of lung ailment on 10 August 1948 in the Segon mountains near Blitar, East Java.

Conclusion

The Japanese sense of values made a 180 degree turnabout on 15 August 1945. Overnight, Japan's "sacred war" became an "unjust war of aggression", and the Allied Forces, "Devilish and beastly Americans and Britishers", abruptly changed into symbols of peace and democracy. The song "Fire at the Nimitz and MacArthur" was now replaced by a letter of praise entreating "Dear General MacArthur" to "please stay in Japan for ever and ever".(37) Moreover, when the use of the term the "Greater East Asia War", which had connotations of "self-sustenance and self-defence" and the "liberation of Asia", was banned by GHQ, the Japanese people came to talk about the "Pacific War" with little psychological or mental resistance.

Let us now turn over our eyes to Indonesia in 1945. From the start of the military administration, the Japanese authorities told the Indonesians that Japan and Indonesia were "bound by the same destiny", and promised independence in the framework of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, thus seeking their loyalty and submission to Japan in her efforts to carry through the "sacred war".

In the old Japan there was a saying, "A samurai's word is final". The Japanese army, however, was not true to the samurai spirit and reversed its attitude completely after 15 August 1945, saying "Japan has nothing to do with the Indonesian independence". According to their logic, involvement in the Indonesian independence meant going against the orders of the Allied Forces that ordered "maintenance of status quo", and, at the same time, a step that might jeopardize national polity.

In order to explain the sudden about-face to the Indonesians, the Japanese said that Japan's assistance in their independence would be detrimental to them as it would hurt their prestige, and that it would weaken the position of nationalist leaders who were already being labeled pro-Japanese cooperators.

The military authorities who stood at the summit of 70,000 Japanese in Java gave top priority to the task of repatriating the Japanese in "perfect order" in faithful observance of the Imperial mandate. Many Japanese were puzzled by this sudden change in values, and some were deeply troubled, remembering the pledge Japan had made concerning "independence", but altogether 98 per cent of the Japanese returned docilely to their native country.

On the other hand, there were a number of non-elite class Japanese who did not want to follow the "allegiance" type way of life. They took it upon themselves to put into effect the promise Japan had once made. Although their motives and methods differed, they wanted to accomplish something on the individual level. Putting aside the question of whether or not they really believed in the Asian solidarity principle, we may say that they chose to identity with the Indonesian people rather than follow the will of the state.

From the point of view of the "allegiance" type logic - which was the starting point of the postwar Japan - it was inexcusable to deviate from the course set by "His Majesty" as did the "renunciation" type men. The fact that until 1991 those men were labeled "deserters" or "men who fled and remained on the spot", suggests psychological discrimination on the part of "allegiance" type men against the "renunciation" type.

1 Yamamoto Moichiro, Watashi-no Indonesia - Dai Juroku Gun Jidai-no Kaiso [My Indonesia - A Memoir on the Period of My Service in the 16th Army] (Tokyo: Nihon-Indonesia Kyokai, 1979), p. 77.

2 Miyamoto Shizuo, Jawa Shusen Shori-Ki [An Account of the Disposition of the End of the Warin Java] (Tokyo: Jawa Shusen Shori-Ki Kanko-Kai, 1973), p. 47.

3 Ibid.

4 Yamazaki Hajime, Kita-ni Minami-ni [To the North, to the South] (privately published, 1977), p. 139.

5 Saito Shizuo, Watashi-no Gunsei-Ki [My Recollections of Military Administration] (Tokyo: Nihon-Indonesia Kyokai, 1977), p. 221.

6 Yamamoto, [My Indonesia], p. 78.

7 Saito, [My Recollections], p. 222.

8 Ibid., p. 174.

9 See Tanemura Sako, Daihonei Kimitsu Nitshi [Secret Diary of the Imperial headquarters] (Tokyo: Daiamondo, 1952), p. 153.

10 The most representative study on this theme is Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972).

11 Jawa Shinbun-sha (ed.), Jawa Nenkan [Almanac of Jawa] (reprinted Tokyo: Biblio Shuppan, 1973), p. 25.

12 About the meeting between Terauchi and Sukarno accompanied by other leader, see the memoir of Miyoshi Shunkichiro who served as the interpreter, "Jawa Senryo Gunsei Kaiko-roku (14)" [My Recollections of the Military Occupation in Java], Kokusai Mondai 80 (Nov. 1966): 67.

13 Yamamoto, [My Indonesia], pp. 90-91.

14 Ibid., pp. 91-92.

15 Saito, [My Recollections], p. 175.

16 Miyamoto, [The End of the War in Java], p. 75.

17 Ibid., p. 36.

18 Saito, [My Recollections], p. 226.

19 Ibid., p. 42.

20 See Kinoshita Hajime, Murdeka - Indonesia Dokuritsu Hishi [Merdeka - A Secret History of Indonesian Independence] (Tokyo: Naigai Shuppan, 1958), p. 112.

21 Saito, [My Recollections], p. 227.

22 Miyamoto, [The End of the War in Java], p. 204. On the "Semarang Incident", see Ken'ichi Goto, "Sengo Nippon-Indonesia Kankeishi Kenkyu Josetsu" [A Preliminary Study on the Postwar Japanese-Indonesian Relations], Shakai Kagaku Tokyu 117 (1994): 3-32.

23 Yamamoto, [My Indonesia], p. 165.

24 Miyamoto, [The End of the War in Java], p. 187.

25 Ibid., p. 267. See also Ian Nish, "Britain and the End of the War in Asia and the Termination of Empire", a paper presented at the International Conference on "1945 in Europe and Japan", Berlin, 6-9 Apr. 1995.

26 Motivations of persons belonging to this type of "renunciation" are categorized as follows: (1) sympathy for the Indonesian independence movement, (2) affection for the land of Indonesia, (3) feeling of repulsion against the Allies, (4) fear of being arrested as a war criminal, (5) marriage with an Indonesian woman, and (6) ambition to make a success in Indonesia. See Oku Genzo, Dasso Nihon-hei - Indonesia Dokuritsu Senso-no Kageni [Japanese Deserters - Behind the Indonesian Independence War] (Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbun-shya, 1980), p. 224.

27 The classical study on the independence struggle around the Bandung area is John Smail, Bandung in the Early Revolution, 1945-1946: A Study in the Social History of the Indonesian Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1964).

28 Ichiki and Yoshizumi are usually referred side by side. This is not only due to their strong comradeship, but also to the fact that Ichiki and Yoshizumi "represent" the Army side and Navy side respectively.

29 For the life of Ichiki written in English, see Ken'ichi Goto, "Life and Death of Abdul Rachman, 1906-1949: One Aspect of Japanese-Indonesian Relationships", Indonesia 22 (Oct. 1976): 57-68.

30 Concerning the Netherlands Indies Government's anxiety and fear of the Japanese propaganda activities in Java, see the Netherlands Information Bureau, Ten Years of Japanese Burrowing in the Netherlands East Indies (published in the United States in Feb. 1942).

31 Ichiki Tatsuo, "Dokuritsu to Gengo - Indonesia-go no Susumubeki Michi" ["Independence and Language - The Direction which Indonesian Language Should Take"], Shin Jawa 1,2 (Nov. 1944): 50.

32 Ibid., p. 51.

33 Ichiki highly evaluates the Bushido spirit (Japanese chivalry) in the true sense of the word. This is clear from the editing policy of the Pradjurit magazine for Heiho which he himself was an editor. Furthermore, Ichiki's strong wish to transplant Bushido spirit in Indonesia is suggested from the following words: "Not only words of command but also names of weapons as well as operation terms should be in Japanese. The military terms used in the Peta at present should be permanently continued." Ichiki Tatsuo ["Independence and Language"], p. 53.

34 Japanese who joined the Indonesian side usually changed their names into Indonesian ones. Ichiki's name, Abdul Rachman, was given him by the elderly Sutan Perang Bustami, a former journalist, whom Ichiki respected as a colleague in the Education Division of PETA. Interview, Colonel Kamal, Jakarta, 26 May 1977.

35 Sukardi (ed.), Sekitar Perdjuangan Sumeru Selatan (Jakarta, 1950).

36 Concerning the general political situation of Indonesia during this period, see George McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), ch. 6.

37 Hata Ikuhiko and Sodei Rinjiro, Nihon Senryo Hishi (II) [Secret History of the Allied Occupation of Japan] (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun-shya, 1977), p. 170.
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Title Annotation:The Japanese Occupation in Southeast Asia
Author:Goto, Ken'ichi
Publication:Journal of Southeast Asian Studies
Date:Mar 1, 1996
Words:6042
Previous Article:The Japanese military and Indonesian independence.
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