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Capital stocks and productivity in industrial nations.

1. Introduction

Differences in physical capital intensity are frequently thought to be important determinants of differences in both productivity levels and growth rates across nations. But quantifying the impact of physical capital on productivity requires estimates of capital stocks which are measured on a consistent basis across countries. Official estimates of the stocks of physical capital are available for most industrialised countries but assumptions underlying their measurement by the statistical offices are in many ways not internationally comparable. This article uses a standardised method to measure capital stocks and employs these estimates to quantify the impact of differences in capital stocks on both levels and growth rates of labour productivity. The analysis is carried out for five industrial nations: the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Japan.

The article first presents relative levels of output per worker hour, both for the whole economy and manufacturing, for the five countries. It draws on estimates of labour productivity levels in manufacturing which were mostly published in the National Institute Economic Review, i.e. Van Ark (1990), O'Mahony (1992a), Van Ark (1992), and on Pilat and Van Ark (1991) and updates these estimates to 1989. Estimates for the total economy are derived using data primarily from the OECD.

Section 3 discusses the issues involved in consistently measuring capital stocks across countries. Estimates of gross physical capital stocks are presented together with an indication of the sensitivity of the results to changes in the underlying measurement method. Section 4 looks at the contribution of physical capital to countries' relative productivity levels in 1989, the latest year for which it was possible to obtain data for all five countries. Section 5 then examines time series on relative productivity levels and the contribution of physical capital to productivity growth.

2. Relative labour productivity levels

Table 1 shows labour productivity levels relative to the UK for 1989 in both the total economy and manufacturing. The economy-wide estimates were derived by deflating gross domestic product by GDP purchasing power parities for 1985. The manufacturing estimates used price ratios for producer goods to convert output to a common currency; details of the methodology used is outlined in Van Ark (1990) and O'Mahony (1992a). The manufacturing estimates for France, Germany and the United States were binary comparisons with the UK for 1984, 1987 and 1987, respectively, whereas the Japanese estimate was derived by linking two binary comparisons for Japan and the US and the US and the UK, both for 1987. The estimates were updated to 1989 using growth rates of real output and labour input (annual hours worked) for each country. The resulting estimates, together with a description of data sources, are shown in Table 1.

Table 1 shows that, in general, the UK labour productivity performance in 1989 was poor relative to other major industrial nations. For the aggregate economy only Japan had lower levels of GDP per worker hour than the UK in 1989. In manufacturing all four countries had higher productivity levels than the UK and the productivity gaps were larger than those for the aggregate economy. In Japan, the large difference between manufacturing and aggregate economy relative productivity levels reflects low productivity levels in that country in agriculture, mining and some service sectors (see Pilat (1992)).
Table 1. Relative output per worker hour, 1989


 Total Economy Manufacturing

United States 134.1 158.1
Germany 113.1 116.3
France 115.2 124.2
Japan 82.0 124.3

Sources: Total Economy: GDP in 1985 prices and employment
primarily from OECD 'National Accounts', converted to US$ using
1985 GDP purchasing power parities from OECD (1985), and from
Summers and Heston (1991). Annual average hours worked per year
for the US from OECD 'National Accounts' (total manhours
divided by total employment); UK, own calculations using hours
per week from 'The New Earnings Survey, 1989', Department of
Employment and weeks per year using data on holidays and time
lost due to strikes from The Department of Employment Gazette,
Dept. of Employment, various issues and data on time lost due
to illness and maternity leave from Social Security Statistics,
Dept. of Health and Social Security, various issues; Germany,
France and Japan from Maddison (1990). Manufacturing: US/UK
from Van Ark (1992), Germany/UK from O'Mahony (1992a),
France/UK from Van Ark (1990) and Japan/US from Pilat and Van
Ark (1991), updated to 1989 using national accounts estimates
for real output and employment in manufacturing for each

Differences in output per worker hour across countries will depend on the relative amounts of physical capital available to each worker. Section four presents estimates of the contribution of physical capital in explaining relative levels of labour productivity. Prior to doing so it is necessary to briefly outline the methodology used to estimate stocks of physical capital in a consistent way across countries.

3. Relative capital stocks

The measurement of the stocks of structures and equipment used in this article are derived by the perpetual inventory method (PIM), the method used by the statistical offices in most advanced countries. The PIM builds up physical capital stocks by cumulating past investments for time periods during which the assets are assumed to remain productive. International estimates of physical capital based on the PIM therefore depend on obtaining real investment flows which must be measured on a consistent basis across countries and on having reliable information on the productive life of assets. Advanced industrial nations employ similar methodologies in constructing their national accounts and hence investment flows but there are some difficulties in comparing investment goods deflators. The productive life of assets depends on the average service lives of assets and the form of the retirement distribution around the service life. Differences across countries in assumptions on service lives have the greatest impact on the consistent measurement of capital stocks and so are considered in some detail below. Problems which arise from using different retirement distributions or different methods of constructing investment deflators are considered at the end of this section.

The estimates used throughout this article are gross capital stocks so that assets are assumed to retain their productive capacity up to the point when they are retired or removed from the productive process. Net capital stocks allow additionally for depreciation. Gross capital stocks are generally considered the most appropriate measure of the productive potential of fixed capital unless depreciation accurately measures deterioration in the productive capacity of assets as they age.

For each country j the gross capital stock, K, at the end of time t is given by:

|Mathematical Expression Omitted~

where I denotes gross real investment and R denotes retirements from the capital stock. Suppose an asset is assumed to be productive for v years, after which time it is retired, then equation (1) can be rewritten as:

|Mathematical Expression Omitted~

In practice the capital stock is composed of a number of different types of assets which physically deteriorate at different rates so that retirements are assumed to occur at some range of values around |v.sup.j~.

It is obvious from (2) that the capital stock level for country j will be very sensitive to the assumed service life |v.sub.j~. Table 2 shows the service life assumptions, as used by the statistical offices in each country, for the whole economy and for manufacturing. It shows considerable variation across countries. In general the UK service lives are higher than in other countries whereas those for Japan are lower. The UK lives appear to be particularly long for structures in manufacturing and for equipment in both the aggregate economy and manufacturing.

The official service lives shown in Table 2 are not, however, based on very reliable information. In particular they are not derived from any comprehensive surveys of the age of assets but rather are based on asset lives for tax purposes (which rarely reflect physical durability), on surveys where the sample size is too small to be representative or on the opinions of experts which are often no more than informed guesses (see Blades (1991) for a discussion of the sources used for service lives in a number of countries). Obtaining reliable information on service lives is extremely difficult and costly since the users TABULAR DATA OMITTED of capital assets often do not know the precise date at which assets have been scrapped in the past.

Since statistical offices do not, in general, undertake comprehensive surveys of asset lives, we may well ask if it is desirable that international comparisons of physical capital stocks should be influenced by the different service life assumptions used in each country's official estimates. The uncertainty over the reliability of service lives has prompted some authors (e.g. Maddison (1990), (1992), Summers and Heston (1991)) to assume the same service life in each country. The issue of whether these differences in service lives across countries are plausible and the sensitivity of capital stocks to variations in service lives and retirement distributions are discussed in some detail in O'Mahony(1993). Here the arguments are briefly summarised.

It is likely that the service lives of assets will vary across countries since firms will face different incentives when deciding whether to keep an existing asset in production or to replace it by a new asset. It has been argued, for example, that the relatively higher labour costs in the United States to those in European countries imply relatively higher maintenance costs and hence provide an incentive for firms to replace assets earlier in the US. Also the age of retirements will depend on differences in the taxation of assets across countries.

There are a number of reasons for questioning whether the official lives accurately reflect these different incentives. Firstly the little direct evidence that exists, in particular for machine tools (see Bacon and Eltis (1974) and Prais (1986)), does not support the large differences in equipment lives shown in Table 2. Secondly it is clear that higher relative labour costs in the United States should lead to greater capital intensity in that country than in say the United Kingdom. But if the official service lives are employed for manufacturing, then capital per worker turns out to be higher in the UK. This suggests that relative input prices on their own are not sufficient to justify the magnitude of the official service life differences in those two countries. Also, in comparison with Germany, France and Japan the US assumptions on equipment are generally longer despite the likelihood of higher American maintenance costs. Finally OECD (1991) examined the implications of the tax systems in OECD countries for investment incentives. The results showed that depreciation allowances were more generous in the UK than in the other four countries which would provide incentives for quicker retirement, but the official lives imply the opposite.

The official service lives are therefore unlikely to be good indicators of the true extent of international differences in service lives of capital assets. In the absence of reliable information the only sensible alternative is to assume identical service lives in all countries. This is not to say that assets are retired at exactly the same time in each country but rather that the errors from assuming standard lives are lower than those using official lives. With standard lives cross country comparisons depend primarily on differences in investment flows which are more accurately measured.

Table 3 shows real gross capital stocks for 1989 for each of the five countries assuming the service lives for both equipment and structures are the same in each country and equal to those used in the American official estimates. The figure for the total economy is built up from estimates for eight broad sectors, one of which is manufacturing.(1) The retirement distribution is assumed to be the same for all countries and to equal that employed in the UK, namely that assets are retired uniformly in the range 20 per cent above and below the average service life. Finally, the capital stocks were converted to a common currency using the 1985 purchasing power parities for machinery and structures from OECD (1985).

For both the aggregate economy and manufacturing, capital intensity in 1989 was lower in the UK than in the other four industrial nations. Thus some part of the labour productivity gap between the UK and these countries will be due to lower levels of capital per worker. Before estimating the contribution of capital to productivity we need to first see how sensitive the estimates are to the assumptions underlying the measurement procedure adopted in this article.

We first consider the sensitivity of the estimates to the service life assumptions. We calculated gross capital stocks in 1989 using the official service lives from Table 2 but maintaining the assumption of fixed service lives and a uniform retirement distribution. Table 4 shows the per cent by which the gross capital stocks using official lives TABULAR DATA OMITTED are above or below those using US lives. For both the aggregate economy and manufacturing the use of official service lives results in considerably higher total capital stocks for the UK; this is true for both equipment and structures. In Germany and France the use of official lives makes little difference to the size of the total capital stock although for Germany this results from non-negligible offsetting differences in equipment and structures. For Japan official lives yield considerably lower equipment and hence total capital stocks.

From Tables 3 and 4 we see that capital per worker-hour in UK manufacturing is about two thirds the American level using standardised lives whereas capital per worker is about the same in the two countries if official lives are used. The latter, as mentioned above, is not consistent with what we would expect given the relative prices of labour and capital in the two countries. Also historical evidence for the immediate post-war period based on physical measures of capital stocks show capital per worker in US manufacturing to be over twice that in the UK (see Broadberry (1992a) for a discussion of historical levels of capital stocks). This is consistent with capital stocks based on standardised and not official lives.
Table 4. The sensitivity of capital stocks to asset lives:
effect of difference between official and standardised

 (per cent, 1989)

 Total economy Manufacturing
 T E S T E S

United Kingdom 25.9 31.4 20.5 44.9 39.4 61.2
Germany 4.9 -7.7 12.4 0.8 -10.9 23.4
France -0.4 1.6 -1.7 1.6 0.0 5.4
Japan -10.4 -26.9 -0.2 -19.5 -29.8 4.1

Notes: T = total assets, E = equipment, S = structures. The
figures shown are estimates using official lives minus
estimates using US lives, as a per cent of the latter. As in
Table 3 the estimates for the total economy are aggregates of
capital stocks for eight sectors.

Table 4 shows quite clearly that gross capital stocks are very sensitive to the service life assumptions. We might ask if the use of net capital stocks would help alleviate this problem. In fact, as shown in O'Mahony (1993), net capital stocks tend to be more sensitive to increases in service lives. Increasing the service life by one year from v to v+1 adds investment in year t-v-1 to the gross capital stock. In the case of net capital stocks, since the depreciation formula depends on the service life, an increase of one year adds a proportion of all periods investment from the current period back to time t-v-1. If investment is rising over time (as has been true in all five countries over the long run) net capital stocks will be more sensitive than gross capital stocks to changes in service lives.

Comparisons of the capital stock estimates in Table 3 with those produced by statistical offices will be affected not only by the service life assumed but also by whether that service life is assumed to be fixed over time and the level of detail (both number of sectors and types of asset) used in the official calculations. Most countries assume fixed service lives but asset lives are assumed to decline over time in Germany in all sectors and in the UK in manufacturing. This introduces a further source of noncomparability into the official estimates. It may well be the case that service lives have been declining due to say more rapid technical progress (but see Blades (1991) for arguments against declining service lives). This decline would however be occurring in all countries, possibly at different rates. At present we do not have sufficient information to take account of declining lives, hence our use of the fixed life assumption.

The average service life of equipment may also decline over time because of compositional change in favour of using more short lived assets. In the US the service lives are assumed to be fixed for each asset but the official estimates are built up from a very large number of asset types and sectors. This results in a decline in the average service life of equipment in all sectors due primarily to the increasing share of investment in office machinery, which is assumed to have a very short service life (see O'Mahony 1993 for details). Ideally we should follow the US methodology and construct capital stocks for a large number of asset types since all countries are likely to have experienced increased shares of office machinery. Unfortunately the required information is not available for the other four countries to take account of this. Therefore we have used a single life for equipment in the US for each sector.

The official estimates also differ in the assumed form of the retirement distributions around the mean service life. In practice the distributions used in most countries are approximations to the normal distribution. O'Mahony (1993) shows that differences in retirement distributions have a negligible impact on relative capital stocks (see also Blades (1991) for a similar conclusion).

Finally we mention the sensitivity of the estimates to which years' investment PPPs are used to convert the capital stocks to a common currency. The 1975 and 1985 PPPs give very similar results for total capital stocks. The 1980 PPPs give somewhat different results, in particular for the UK/US comparison, but that year's PPPs were found to be in general not consistent with estimates for other years (see Blades and Roberts (1987) for a discussion). Disaggregating by asset type, however, shows that the use of different years PPPs has a large impact on equipment, in particular relative to the US, but only marginally affects structures.

The sensitivity of relative stocks of equipment to different years PPPs may be due to measurement errors in the latter but it would also be consistent with systematic differences in the methods used by statistical offices in constructing investment deflators. In fact it turns out that countries do vary in the method used to deflate office machinery since both the US and Germany attempt to take account of changes in the quality of computing equipment over time. The adjustment for quality change in Germany implies that the price of office machinery has more than halved in the past two decades whereas the official office machinery price index in the UK and France shows no change in the same period.(2) Of more consequence is the use of a hedonic price index for office machinery in the US which results in a tenfold decrease in the quality adjusted price of computers between 1970 and 1989. Examination of PPPs for office machinery over this time period shows very little change in its relative price across countries so that the changing relative prices implied by the investment deflators for this asset is a methodological rather than a real difference.

Of the five countries considered here separate data on investment in office machinery is available only for the US so that it was not possible to allow for differences in the treatment of office machinery in the capital stock estimates presented in Table 3 above. But, using base year 1985, O'Mahony (1993) estimates that the US hedonic price index implies about a 10 per cent lower stock of equipment in the aggregate economy than would be the case if a general equipment deflator was used. This translates to only about a 4 per cent lower total capital stock. Therefore the measurement bias due to differences in the method used to construct investment deflators is relatively small.

4. Capital's contribution to relative productivity levels

The most commonly used method to measure the contribution of inputs to relative output is growth accounting. Suppose the production function is Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale and assume its parameters are the same across countries. Letting Y denote real output, L denote labour input (annual hours worked) and as before let K denote real tangible physical capital stocks, then joint factor productivity in country j relative to that in the United Kingdom (u) is given by:

ln RJFP = ln (|Y.sub.j~/|Y.sub.u~) - |Alpha~ ln (|L.sub.j~/|L.sub.u~) - (1-|Alpha~ ln (|K.sub.j~/Kju) (3)

where |Alpha~ is labour's share in value added. With constant returns to scale (3) can be rewritten as:

ln(|Y.sub.j~/|Y.sub.u~) - ln(|L.sub.j~/|L.sub.u~) = (1-|Alpha~) ln (|K.sub.j~/|L.sub.j~)/(|K.sub.u~/|L.sub.u~) + ln RJFP (4)

The first term on the right hand side of equation (4) measures the contribution of physical capital to explaining relative labour productivity and RJFP measures the residual relative labour productivity when account is taken of differences in capital intensity in the two countries.

Estimates of relative joint factor productivity from (4) are subject to the usual limitations of growth accounting, in particular its dependence on the assumptions of price taking behaviour and constant returns to scale. Recent contributions to growth theory (e.g. Romer (1986)) have questioned the validity of the growth accounting coefficients and suggest that they may understate the importance of capital in explaining relative levels or growth of productivity. In these models some of the benefits to capital accumulation are assumed to be external to the firms or agents undertaking the investments and hence raise the social value of capital accumulation above that implied by traditional growth accounting. The external benefits are generally based on some idea of learning effects from capital accumulation. In this case joint factor productivity is given by:

ln RJFP = ln(|Y.sub.j~/|Y.sub.u~) - ||Alpha~.sub.1~ ln (|L.sub.j~/|L.sub.u~) - ||Alpha~.sub.2~ ln(|K.sub.j~/|K.sub.u~) (5)

where ||Alpha~.sub.1~ + ||Alpha~.sub.2~ 1, and relative output per unit of labour input is given by:

ln(|Y.sub.j~/|Y.sub.u~) - ln(|L.sub.j~/|L.sub.u~) = (1-||Alpha~.sub.1~) ln(|K.sub.j~/|L.sub.j~)/(|K.sub.u~/|L.sub.u~) + (||Alpha~.sub.1~ +

||Alpha~.sub.2~ - 1) ln (|K.sub.j~/|K.sub.u~) + ln RJFP (6)

so that the absolute values of capital stocks, and not just capital intensity, affect relative productivity.

Empirical evidence from a wide range of sources, however, suggest that external effects from tangible physical capital are unimportant, i.e. (||Alpha~.sub.1~ + ||Alpha~.sub.2~) is close to one. For example, econometric evidence in Barro and Martin (1991) for US states, Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) for a cross section of nations, Oulton (1992) for UK manufacturing growth and O'Mahony (1992b) for UK and German manufacturing all yield coefficients on physical capital close to capital's share of value added, the growth accounting weight. In what follows we therefore use the growth accounting weights for this form of capital accumulation.

Table 5 shows the percent of relative labour productivity explained by differences in physical capital and relative joint factor productivity for 1989. For the aggregate economy about half the UK productivity gap with the US and almost all the gap with France can be explained by differences in capital intensity whereas the UK productivity gap with Germany is more than explained by differences in capital intensity. Therefore in comparison with these three countries the UK's lower stocks of capital per worker-hour is an important determinant of her lower output per man-hour. With Japan the opposite conclusion emerges, ie. Japan's relatively low labour productivity compared to the UK cannot be explained by differences in capital intensity. When account is taken of of differences in capital at the aggregate economy level Japan's joint factor productivity is reduced to about 30 per cent below that in the UK in 1989.

Table 5 shows that, in manufacturing, differences in physical capital explain considerably less of the UK's lower labour productivity with the US, Germany and France than was the case for the aggregate economy but some of the gap with Japan can now be explained by differences in capital intensity. This partly reflects the fact that capital's share of value added at about 0.33 for the aggregate economy is greater than capital's share of manufacturing value added (about 0.25). In manufacturing the UK's productivity disadvantage remains substantial against the US when allowance is made for differences in capital intensity. The manufacturing joint factor productivity gap also remains large against France and Japan but is close to being eliminated against Germany.

5. The growth in relative productivity, 1960-89

This section examines the time pattern of relative productivity from 1960 to 1989. The former date was chosen as the starting point since we believe estimates of gross physical capital stocks before that date are not very reliable as they are heavily influenced by uncertain pre-war investment flows. We first consider the aggregate economy and then look at trends in manufacturing productivity. There is ample evidence of a narrowing of GDP labour productivity gaps in industrial nations over time (see Baumol (1986)). We will be interested to see if this is also true for joint factor productivity at the aggregate level and for both labour and joint factor productivity in manufacturing.

Table 6 shows relative labour productivity, capital intensity and joint factor productivity for the aggregate economy in 1960. Charts 1 to 3 shows the time series for the three decades from 1960 to 1989. For the aggregate economy the dispersion of labour productivity levels across the five countries was greater in 1960 than in 1989 and, to a lesser extent this is also true of joint factor productivity. But examination of the charts shows that any trend towards convergence in the latter occurred primarily in the 1960s. In other words, differences in the rate at which countries invested in physical capital explains much of the observed trend towards convergence in these five countries.


In 1960 both labour productivity and capital intensity were considerably higher in the US relative to the UK than was the case in 1989 but relative US to UK joint factor productivity was similar in the two years. Therefore the UK's relatively greater investment in physical capital in the past three decades can explain much of the narrowing of her labour productivity gaps with the US. The UK's position relative to the other three countries is however very different. Table 6 shows a deterioration in the UK's relative performance, both for labour and joint factor productivity relative to all three countries but the charts show that much of this occurred in the 1960s. Britain's lower investment in physical capital can partly explain her deterioration against Germany and Japan but has little explanatory power relative to France.
Table 6. Relative productivity and capital intensity, 1960,
total economy

 UK = 100

 Output per Capital per Joint Factor
 worker-hour worker-hour productivity

United States 172.1 334.0 115.2
Germany 79.1 134.0 71.8
France 82.6 136.5 74.8
Japan 33.1 52.9 40.9

Turning now to manufacturing, Table 7, which shows the position in 1960, implies considerable narrowing of both the labour and joint factor productivity gaps. Charts 4 to 6 show that the trend in US/UK labour productivity can be partly explained by the decline in capital intensity in the US relative to the UK but its explanatory power is much less than for the aggregate economy since there is also a considerable narrowing of the joint factor productivity gap between these two countries. In manufacturing the deterioration in Britain's productivity relative to Germany, France and Japan continued well into the 1970s. The manufacturing sectors in all three countries invested more in physical capital than did British manufacturing but only relative to Japan does this explain a significant amount of Britain's relative decline.

6. Conclusion

This article set out to measure the contribution of physical capital in explaining labour productivity in Britain relative to other industrialised countries. There are a number of differences in methodology used by statistical offices in constructing gross capital stocks of which differences in assumptions on the service lives of assets is by far the most important. In this article we use a standardised methodology which, as far as possible, takes account of these differences. We believe this gives a more accurate picture than merely taking published official data without regard to differences in method.

The article shows that Britain's low relative capital intensity is important in explaining her poor relative labour productivity levels in 1989 and that the explanatory power of capital is greater for the aggregate economy than for manufacturing. Differences in the rates of investment in physical capital can also help explain cross country relative labour productivity growth, in particular in comparing Britain with the US and Japan. The fact that the empirical evidence does not support a greater weight on physical capital in growth accounting exercises may give the impression that differences in capital intensity do not matter. This article has shown that this impression is misleading, i.e. differences in physical capital remain important in understanding differences in labour productivity levels and growth rates across industrialised nations.
Table 7. Relative productivity and capital intensity, 1960,

 UK = 100

 Output per Capital per Joint factor
 worker-hour worker-hour productivity

United States 254.6 236.4 205.3
Germany 110.2 114.9 106.4
France 92.6 84.9 96.5
Japan 50.3 40.9 62.9

Sources: as in Tables 1, 3 and 5.

The conclusions of this article are however dependent on the assumptions used to measure relative capital stocks. We acknowledge that much work needs to be done to have confidence in cross country differences in capital stocks. This probably would involve comprehensive surveys of the lives of assets and would require more international cooperation by statistical offices.


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(1) The eight sectors are agriculture, forestry & fishing; mining & utilities; manufacturing; construction; transport & communication; retailing & repairing; finance, insurance, real estate & business services; and other services including public administration. Gross capital stocks at the sectoral level for the five countries are available in O'Mahony (1993).

(2) In Japan a single deflator is used for all assets so that it is not clear if any allowance is made for changes in the quality of office machinery.

Statistical Appendix

Italics are used where NIESR has added estimates to figures elsewhere--for instance, when an estimated later figure is added.



Table 4. C.S.O. survey of manufacturers' investment intentions

Percentage increase in investment expenditure

Survey date(a) Manufacturing

Dec. 1980 -15 to -20
Dec. 1981 -11 to -14
Dec. 1982 0 to 5
Dec. 1983 + 9
Dec. 1984 + 7
Dec. 1985 - 2
May 1986 + 3
Dec. 1986 + 2
May 1987 + 6
Dec. 1987 +11
May 1988 +16
Dec. 1988 +11
May 1989 +15
Dec. 1989 + 1
May 1990 + 1
Dec. 1990 - 3
May 1991 -14
Dec. 1991 + 2
May 1992 - 2

(a) December survey is for forthcoming year over current year,
May survey for current year over previous year. Survey now

















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Author:O'Mahony, Mary O.
Publication:National Institute Economic Review
Date:Aug 1, 1993
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