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Bridging the intelligence gap in the heartland: evolving MI roles in support to domestic criminal threats.

The views and conclusions in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily present the official policies or positions of the Fort Riley Criminal Investigation Division Battalion, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, the Departments of the Army and Defense, and the U.S. Government.

The modern battlefield now extends to the heartland of the United States and into our own backyards. Clear distinctions between acts of crime and acts of war blur in the wake of these ruthless terrorist attacks. As we in the various intelligence communities respond to these now very real threats to homeland security, our nation calls us to perform many of our wartime missions domestically in support to law-enforcement operations. Performance of these wartime intelligence missions inside U.S. borders has, of course, raised several concerns. These concerns are not altogether new, having previously arisen during the Civil War and Vietnam eras.

Domestic military intelligence (MI) operations are defined procedures detailed in regulatory guidance, such as Army Regulation (AR) 381-10, U.S. Army Intelligence Activities. Since 1975, Executive Orders (EOs) have been in effect to provide our intelligence professionals with guidelines on how to perform their missions consistent with the legal rights and protections guaranteed to all U.S. persons by our Constitution. President Ronald W. Reagan issued Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, in 1981, which is still in force today. Department of Defense (DOD) Regulation 5240. 1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons, implements Executive Order 12333 within the DOD and sets forth procedures governing the activities of DOD intelligence components that affect U.S. persons. It states:
 The purpose of these procedures
 is to enable DOD intelligence
 components to carry out effectively
 their authorized functions
 while ensuring their activities that
 affect U.S. persons are carried
 out in a manner that protects the
 constitutional rights and privacy
 of such persons.

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 did not cause a change in the EO; however, they have caused the intelligence communities to re-evaluate the limits imposed on domestic intelligence operations that affect their missions. Additionally, the ramifications of these attacks did prompt a clarification of procedures by the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS) for Intelligence (DCSINT) (now the DCS G2); in particular, whether MI capabilities and resources might, in some way, be brought to bear in support of domestic law-enforcement operations. This article chronicles the initiatives of one unit's effort to combine the talents and resources of the Army's MI community with those of the Army's law-enforcement community.

Doctrinal Issues

The events of 11 September serve to identify a doctrinal "gap" between the roles, missions, and responsibilities of the MI and military law enforcement communities. Despite both communities' increased emphasis on resolving these "disconnects," there remain a number of shortfalls and gray areas within Army-approved doctrine relating to police intelligence operations (PIOs), especially as it relates to the formalized processes for the collection of information and conduct of the Police Information Assessment Process (PIAP), and development of police intelligence products (PIPs). Given that the Army only recently (within the last five years or so) assigned military police (MP) and criminal investigation division (CID) elements the wartime tasks of police and criminal intelligence operations, this weakness in our doctrine is understandable. Doctrine often captures the lessons of the last "war." However, in this area, doctrine is progressive and incorporates lessons learned while the Global War on Terrorism is still on-going.

Policy Note: Although doctrine has not traditionally addressed it, the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) has had responsibility to "collect, analyze, and disseminate to affected commands criminal intelligence pertaining to threat activities...." in all of the last three versions of AR 525-13, Antiterrorism.

Doctrinal Note: The introduction of Police Intelligence Operations was not intended to replace Military Intelligence, nor to subsume traditional MI functions, duties, or responsibilities, nor to become a separate stovepipe organization. A PIO pertains to strategic analysis of operational and tactical police operations provided to the commander and staff for decision-making.

This is not to suggest there is no doctrine relating to MI's role with respect to police and criminal intelligence operations. MI and law enforcement have been collaborating and performing these missions (and doing them well) for many years. Instead, the evolution of modern warfare has forced the Army to recognize the relevance of PIOs (and MI's contribution to these operations) in modern military undertakings and not simply their combat support relevance. This recognition is now evident across the entire operational spectrum, whether in peace-enforcement operations (as in the Balkans), in domestic force protection (FP) operations (in which we are now fully engaged), or on the physical battlefield (as in Afghanistan). There remains the need for a coherent police intelligence doctrine that adds analytic rigor to our familiar processes, generates useful police intelligence products, and communicates in terms supported commanders are accustomed to hearing.

Doctrinal Note: It is precisely with this in mind that ST 2-91.2, Intelligence Support to Installation Commander's Handbook on Force Protection, is under development.

The Fort Riley, Kansas, CID Battalion, is attempting to address some of these doctrinal issues through a local initiative. The Criminal Intelligence Management and Integration Center (CIMIC) may have far-reaching consequences.

Doctrinal Note: The following is a local tactic, technique, and procedure (TTP), not an approved doctrinal solution.

Following 11 September, and with the active sponsorship of the 24th Infantry Division (ID) (Mechanized), the Riley CID Battalion initiated an effort to "mend the seams" in MI and criminal intelligence doctrine and TTPs, both within and among the MI and MP communities. The CIMIC's aim is to improve the exchange of information and gain greater synergy between critical FP functionaries including installation-level actors (e.g., G3s, directorates of plans, training, and security (DPTSs), provost marshals, etc.) and federal, state, and local law-enforcement agencies (LEAs). To help facilitate this effort, the 24th ID (M) is taking a bold step forward into new territory. In particular, the Division G2 has attached an MI major (the co-author of this paper) full time to serve as the Battalion's S3 for the specific purpose of providing support to law-enforcement operations (not the typical MI S2 function). The expressed purpose of this first-of-its-kind arrangement is to apply time-proven MI analytical methodologies and techniques (e.g., link analysis, intelligence preparation of the battlefield [IPB], etc.) to operational law-enforcement efforts. In so doing, the Division believes this effort will improve the ability of CID to gather, index, integrate, and analyze criminal intelligence information for the purposes of thwarting crimes and catching criminals.

Battalion CIMIC

Here is how it works. The Riley Battalion's CIMIC focuses on providing support to local commanders by organizing and integrating national, regional, and local police and criminal intelligence information. It also seeks to provide enough quality information to enable installations to form a coherent, full-spectrum response to threats posed by terrorism, hate groups, extremism, gang activity, and a related lack of discipline, including illicit drug and firearms trafficking and use.

CIMIC objectives are to--

* Improve criminal and police intelligence support to installation-level commanders and help them tailor their FP activities.

* Provide all the Battalion CID elements with a common operational picture across the 13-state Fort Riley CID Battalion's area of responsibility (AOR) (see Figure 1).


* Foster closer cooperation among local and regional LEAs.

* Develop better intelligence relationships with the MI community at each supported installation and its higher headquarters while trying to help make each installation safer and more secure. Figure 2 depicts criminal intelligence relationships at the local, regional, and national levels. At the installation level, MP and CID operations are fairly well defined and practiced. Criminal intelligence operations at the national level are also reasonably well established and integrated. However, one cannot say the same of the regional police and criminal intelligence operations performed by the MPs and CID. The Fort Riley CID Battalion formed, equipped, and staffed the CIMIC to fill this regional intelligence gap.


After polling senior installation leaders across the Battalion's AOR, some common themes emerged. Among them was the view that although the CID provided excellent investigative support and was very well-connected to the local law-enforcement communities (provost marshal offices [PMOs], staff judge advocates, and local commanders), more work was necessary in the police and criminal intelligence-gathering and crime-analysis areas. Field commanders noted that they receive plenty of crime data but not enough useful information and analysis to support policy formulation and decisionmaking. The CIMIC strives to provide the missing information and analysis.

Essentially, the CIMIC is an operations center for collecting, integrating, analyzing, and disseminating regionally tailored police and criminal intelligence information. By leveraging off-the-shelf technologies (e.g., personal computers, facsimile machines [FAXs], and Internet access) and local installation support--Fort Riley provides full-time Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) access and MI manpower--the CIMIC acts as a CID regional criminal intelligence clearinghouse for the Midwestern United States. (To elaborate on this point, the CID directly distributes its criminal intelligence update to the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force [JTTF], U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms [ATF], and U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency [DEA] as well at the Kansas National Guard Bureau, highway patrol, and the Saint Louis Police Department. Indirectly, the installation CID Resident Agencies (RAs) distributed the update to each local community.)

The CIMIC enhances police and criminal intelligence support to installation-level commanders by publishing a two-part criminal intelligence digest three times a week. Figure 3 outlines the information flow.


The regional update section captures data relevant to the Battalion's AOR based on analysis driven by the commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) and priority intelligence requirements (PIRs). The national update draws, from such diverse sources as the--

* Joint staff and combatant commanders' updates.

* 902d MI Group products.

* 24th ID (M) G2 summary products (U.S. Forces Command and III Corps input).

* CID secure Internet (CIDNET).

* U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) critical information requirements (CIRs).

The district update draws from reports provided by the RA criminal intelligence submissions and installation FP fusion-cell feedback, blotter reviews, local and regional FBI input, local 902d MI Group detachment input, and other raw-data analyses. Each intelligence entry cites the sources, and we generate and disseminate the product called the "criminal intelligence summary" (CRIM INTSUM) each Monday, Wednesday, and Friday.

The CRIM INTSUM goes to CID offices and group headquarters via SIPRNET and secure-telephone-unit III (STU-III) facsimile (fax). CID offices use CRIM INTSUMs to "feed" installation FP fusion cells at their regularly scheduled meetings. At the same time, local CID representatives draw fresh intelligence information from local sources and forward it to the CIMIC to initiate its next collection, analysis, and integration cycle.

Battalion CIMIC Configuration

Figure 4 depicts the CIMIC's configuration and capabilities including access to the SIPRNET, commercial Internet, and the installation's military network (MILNET). MILNET provides access to a usual host of capabilities, plus many essential Army information management (IM) systems to which the CID has obtained read-only access (e.g., Enlisted Distribution and Assignment System [EDAS], Total Officer Personnel Management Information System [TOPMIS], Defense Eligibility Enrollment Reporting System [DEERS], etc.). Access to other web-based systems is also available including the civilian Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) that provides a regional view of civilian criminal intelligence information. The CIMIC is currently connected to both the Middle-States Organized Crime Information Center (MOCIC) permitting access to, and information-sharing with, the other five regions of the RISS network, and to the FBI's National Crime Information Center (NCIC) providing access to a computerized index of criminal justice information (including criminal-record historical information, fugitives, stolen properties, missing persons). Future capabilities may eventually include access to the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS).



The Fort Riley Battalion's CIMIC is by no means a panacea for ameliorating doctrinal shortfalls in criminal intelligence operations. It does, however, serve to create conditions suitable for addressing some crucial challenges facing MI, MP, and CID elements as they respond to a rapidly changing battlefield environment. Through the CIMIC, the Fort Riley CID Battalion, in close cooperation with the 24th ID (M) G2, is striving to improve its criminal intelligence support to local commanders and to examine new directions for further improvement. Many issues remain, but the CIMIC's efforts serve to define them better and offer possible solutions.

Major Jim Klotz is the S3 of the Fort Riley CID Battalion. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Physical Geography from the U.S. Military Academy. He has served in a variety of military intelligence assignments to include S2, 937th Engineer Group; Combat Operations Officer in the Battle Command Battle Lab-Fort Huachuca; and the U.S. Army Central Command (USARCENT) Intelligence Center during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Readers may contact MAJ Klotz via E-mail at and telephonically at (785) 239-8039.

Lieutenant Colonel Mike French is the Commander of the Fort Riley CID Battalion. He holds a Baccalaureate degree in Criminology from the University of Maryland, and Master of Business Administration and Finance degrees from Boston and Jacksonville State Universities. Readers may write to LTC French via E-mail at
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Title Annotation:military intelligence
Author:Klotz, James; French, Michael
Publication:Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin
Geographic Code:1USA
Date:Jul 1, 2003
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