Bridging the doctrine gap: a CI and HUMINT focused look at the transformation of MI doctrine.
Human Intelligence (HUMINT) and Counterintelligence (CI) are two of the most important capabilities a maneuver commander can leverage when conducting counterterrorism and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. In Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the newly created battlefield surveillance brigade (BfSB) provides additional CI and HUMINT assets to reinforce the collection efforts of tactical maneuver commanders. Although each brigade combat team (BCT) commander has a robust intelligence staff and organic Military Intelligence (MI) company equipped to plan and execute intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) within the BCT area of operations, BCT commanders have grown to rely heavily on additional CI and HUMINT assets provided by the BfSB in order remain effective in HUMINT-intensive, COIN operations such as OIF. Still in its infancy, the organization and mission of today's BfSBs look quite different than that of the force designers' intent, who forecast the maturity of the BfSB at the end of Army transformation in 2032. While the mature BfSB will provide the capability to fill collection gaps and provide much-needed situational awareness to a division commander, the doctrine of the future BfSB is largely inconsistent with the role the current BfSB is fulfilling in support of OIF.
Consisting of primarily two MI battalions, today's BfSB serves as a force provider for tactical maneuver Commanders--a role drastically different than the role force designers proscribe for the mature BfSB of the future. While these concepts have not yet been formalized into doctrine, proactive MI leaders attentive to Modularity's changes can read the writing on the wall. Because the concepts of 2032 do not support the reality of 2008, MI leaders today are left facing a "doctrine gap." If left unaddressed, this gap will allow MI leaders to choose which tenets of new or old doctrine to apply and which to ignore, thus stymieing the move towards Modularity and degrading ISR support to the combat Soldiers at the tactical level. Even FMI 3-0.1, The Modular Force does not truly define the application of current BfSB assets for a COIN mission, but rather defines the application of a BfSB that does not yet exist, designed for a mission in which tactical level commanders have sufficient ISR assets and do not rely on reinforcing assets from higher echelons.
This paper provides three key recommendations for MI leaders in the BfSB headquarters and MI battalion to consider in the application of their CI and HUMINT assets which, when applied, will provide the best support to the warfighter. First, there is no need for BfSB HUMINT assets to form a Tactical HUMINT Operations Section (THOPS) due to the establishment of the 2X capability at every echelon of CI and HUMINT operations. Second, CI Teams should operate as BfSB force designers suggest, rather than being dismantled and task organized with HUMINT collectors to perform as the Tactical HUMINT Team (THT) of the 1990s. Third, the advent of Modularity brings a paradigm shift within the MI branch from commandcentric to staff-centric operations that, when embraced, will focus MI force providers on the importance of their role in training and support, thus improving the overall readiness of MI Soldiers supporting tactical operations.
Force Design Evolution and the BfSB
Since the end of the Cold War, U.S. Army doctrine has evolved steadily to maintain the superiority of our fighting force against new threats and adversaries. The intent of the most recent doctrinal evolution moves the Army from a threat-based force toward a capabilities-based force tailored to defeat a dynamic, asymmetric enemy. Evolutions in force design commonly referred to as Modularity, accompany this move. Because the results of Task Force Modularity are transforming the Army from a division-based force to modular, brigade-based, self-contained units, a shift in our methods for ISR in collection, processing and dissemination is also taking place. (1) Essential changes in the structure of the Army's intelligence units at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels will produce the changes in ISR methodology that will increase actionable intelligence for commanders at all echelons and enable them to make better decisions more quickly.
The principal change in the intelligence apparatus at the tactical level is the creation of the division BfSB. Established after the elimination of the Force XXI Corps MI Brigade, the BfSB is designed to assist the division G2 in answering the division commander's critical information requirements and develop situational understanding of unassigned portions of the division area of operations (AO). (2) Upon the completion of transformation in 2032, the BfSB will consist principally of an MI battalion and a reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) battalion, but has the potential to receive additional collection capabilities as indicated in Figure 1.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
Because BCTs subordinate to the division will focus their operations on populated areas and lines of communication, any large portions of the division AO not consistently monitored allow an adaptive enemy to exploit gaps in collection. Doctrine gives the BfSB commander and his staff wide latitude to develop the situation in these unmonitored areas. (3) To support the collection mission of BfSB HUMINT, Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), unmanned aerial systems (UAS) and R8vS assets, force designers provided the BfSB commander a twenty Soldier intelligence section--a section of roughly equal size to a BCT intelligence section (see Figure 2). (4) When the BfSB conducts collection activities in unmonitored areas, the BfSB S2's ISR Fusion Cell conducts situation development, prepares combat assessments and provides the BFSB commander with situational awareness and actionable intelligence. (5) However, when BfSB assets reinforce BCT collection capabilities, rather than operating independently over unmonitored areas of the division AO, any reinforcing assets report the results of their collection to their supported BCT S2, not BfSB S2. While force designers identify the BfSB's capability to manage the collection mission of its own assets or reinforce BCT collection capabilities, they do not identify roles or responsibilities for the BfSB command and staff that correspond with either type of mission. This lack of specificity can lead to the attempted direction of reinforcing assets, or the analysis of intelligence that is redundant to that of the reinforced unit S2.
[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]
Tactical HUMINT Operations Section (THOPS)
According to the legacy FM 34-7-1, Tactical Human Intelligence and Counterintelligence Operation, the THOPS provides the highest level of technical control within the MI Battalion. (6) With little more than one oficer and no staff to manage CI and HUMINT operations, the THOPS performed a necessary function in the mid-1990s Balkans mission when the 2X concept was in its infancy. The U.S. Army Intelligence Center (USAIC) formalized the 2X concept with the development of the G2/S2X Course in 2005 and the 2006 publication of TC 2-22.303, The 2X Handbook. The 2X concept evolved from a one or two-person shop to consist of three components to manage all CI and HUMINT Operations at every echelon: a CI coordinating authority (CICA), a HUMINT operations cell (HOC), and an Operations Support Cell (OSC) (7). While FM 34-7-1 described the presence of a THOPS as METT-TC, TC 2-22.303 calls it "one technique that can be used" to manage CI and HUMINT operations at the corps/Joint task force level, coordinating with the C/J2X for the management of CI and HUMINT assets providing general support (GS) to the C/JTF echelon (8).
The pundits at USAIC unanimously recognize the THOPS as a ghost of legacy doctrine that continues to haunt present day operations. A USAIC Directorate of Doctrine writer, the author of the S2X Handbook, claims he was "arm twisted" to add the THOPS concept to the TC's initial draft after a barrage of dissatisfied emails from MI brigade commanders in the field who named the THOPS as a "critical element of the Corps MI Brigade." (9,10) A review of the THOPS ensued at the Directorate which produced the following report:
"During the staffing of draft TC 2-22.303, The 2X Handbook, three MI Brigade Commanders (205th, 525th and 504th) opined on the fact that the THOPS was missing from the TC, and FM 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations. The Brigade Commanders voiced their objections to Doctrine, leadership in DCD, and the DA G2 staff regarding this matter. The Commanders recommend the THOPS be included in emerging Doctrine and built into the modular force. Once the Army transitions to a new modular force design, the Corps MI Brigade will eventually go away (replaced by the BfSB) and the new Corps/Division G2 staff will include a very robust 2X section, which will be fully capable of effectively managing all CI and HUMINT assets in the Corps/ Division G2's AOIR." (11)
The principal reason why doctrine writers remain uncommitted to making the THOPS having a permanent place in CI and HUMINT doctrine is because its purpose is now redundant, little more than a holdover from legacy doctrine. In operations as recent as OIF 06-08, a THOPS "augmented" the C2X's management of HUMINT Collection Teams (HCT) GS to the Corps, performing the operational management team (OMT) function of report quality control and oversight of the GS HCTs' collection mission. However, the THOPS was situated at the MI brigade headquarters and was not co-located with either the C2X or the C2X Source Manager. The physical separation of these elements at any echelon is detrimental to the effective management of CI and HUMINT operations; proper management requires constant communication to ensure the synchronization of collection requirements, actual collection, reporting, and source management and vetting. With the THOPS removed from the equation, the MI brigade, rather than the C2X, provided guidance to the THOPS, resulting in the MI brigade's direction of GS HCT collection and requirements.
At times, the reach of the THOPS extended beyond management of the GS HCT's and bypassed division and BCT 2Xs to the direct support (DS) teams organic to the force-providing MI brigade/BfSB. The THOPS used the HUMINT reporting system to task DS HCTs--managed by 2Xs and collecting for maneuver commanders--to answer MI battalion requirements or provide reporting statistics to the MI battalion. 2Xs found such requirements redundant to those of their own commanders or irrelevant to their commander's mission. The THOPS' superluous requirements, directed by the MI Brigade/BfSB, confused 2Xs who were trained and capable of managing operations to support their respective maneuver commanders and expected only to receive collection or administrative tasks from their higher 2X element or respective S2/ G2. The THOPS' requirements also bogged down the DS HCTs, who are already troop to task by their 2X or supported unit S2/S3 with the requirements most pertinent to the supported commander.
The Director of the INSCOM Training and Doctrine Support Detachment at Fort Huachuca, and one of the designers of MI organizations in Modularity remarked that the THOPS "... does not exist in the organizational designs. MI commanders create a THOPS because they want to control reporting. This gets in the way of information flow and reporting. We do not need a THOPS because we have built a robust 2X capability. The 2X deconflicts GS team operations and reporting." (12) With the publication of TC 2-22.303, FMI 3-0.1 and Army Intelligence Comprehensive Guide to Modularity (AICGM), the intent of doctrine is apparent-the 2X apparatus was designed, created, and is now firmly in place to develop requirements for CI and HUMINT assets, as well as manage operations. It is critical that BfSB commanders at the company, battalion, and brigade level embrace "The Roles of the MI Unit and the 2X" with respect to training, planning and operations, and differentiating between OIF-style operations and future operations where the BfSB commander controls his own assets to support an ISR operations in unassigned areas of a division AO. (13)
To ensure the most effective support to the warfighter, CI and HUMINT forces provided by the BfSB's MI battalion to any echelon--corps, division or brigade--should be either under operational control (OPCON), tactical control (TALON) or DS to the gaining unit, enabling the gaining unit to decide how to provide those assets to their subordinate units. OPCON, TALON, and DS command and support relationships better enable the streamlining of requirements and operations under the supported unit 2X. In the past, MI battalion assets supporting the C/JTF in a GS relationship has resulted in the crisscrossing of MI battalion and C2X lines of operational control, resulting in disjointed operations, redundant requirements, and at times, wasted effort. To avoid this, any requirement from the C/JTF to the BfSB for HCTs or OMTs can be fulfilled by providing assets in an OPCON, TALON or DS relationship. In this manner, any assets performing THOPS-like management of Corps-level HCTs can be co-located with and properly subordinate to the C/J2X. If the C/JTF does not require such augmentation, any personnel from the BfSB set aside for a THOPS function can form HCTs or OMTs to support the BCT level, where the demand for HUMINT assets is always highest.
Theater and corps level leaders must realize that tactical maneuver commanders and their S2Xs are critically dependent on HCT and OMT support from the BfSB's MI battalion. A BCT S2X currently operating in Baghdad remarks, "I'm frankly very disappointed with the whole Corps support piece in general. We're spread so ridiculously thin in terms of HUMINT that I don't know how some of our guys can manage. It's a complete disservice to the warfighter and I personally think they should ... get them down to the maneuver units where they're most needed. I suppose if the BfSB was a division asset, then the support would be less conceptual and we'd actually feel their presence, but as it stands now, I can't say that they've been much help to us ..." (14) Any collection asset a BfSB can provide to support the tactical warfighter is a more appropriate use of HUMINT personnel than assigning them to a THOPS not co-located with the C2X or performing actions redundant to those of the 2X. (15)
The Application of CI Teams (16)
The mission of CI is to detect, identify, assess, counter, neutralize, or exploit the entire spectrum of hostile intelligence collection efforts. During the Cold War when the threat of Soviet collection was high, the Army made a substantial investment in its CI program, which left the Army HUMINT program to focus on interrogation rather than conducting any kind of source operations. The end of the Cold War and the requirement for HUMINT in the Balkans redirected the Army's focus. Because Army HUMINT collectors were little more than interrogators in the 1990s, the Army task organized them with CI Soldiers to form the Force Protection Team, a flexible asset which could leverage the strengths of both military occupational specialties (MOSs). Before 1995, the Force Protection Team consisted of three CI Soldiers, trained to conduct CI Force Protection Source Operations (CFSO), and one HUMINT Soldier trained to conduct interrogation.
After 1995, the Force Protection Team became the Tactical HUMINT Team (THT), consisting of three CI Soldiers and one HUMINT Soldier. According to the legacy FM 34-7-1, this task organization supported both the force protection plan and answering the commander's intelligence requirements (IR). (17) In 2002, Task Force Modularity implemented the recommendations of an Integrated Concept Team, reversing the ratio between CI and HUMINT capabilities at the tactical level. USAIC responded by redesigning the training program for HUMINT Soldiers to include basic skills in Military Source Operations (MSO) and expanding the training center to produce more HUMINT-trained Soldiers each year. (18) This change signified the end of HUMINT Soldiers' dependence on CI Soldiers' skills to conduct source operations. Additionally, CI agents at the strategic level assumed the majority of CI work, leaving CI agents at the tactical level to focus on providing CI oversight in HUMINT MSO and detecting threats in their AO. While the number of CI soldiers authorized at the tactical level is lower, the requirement for CI and the tasks these Soldiers perform remain.
While the task-organized THT model may have operated as doctrine intended in the Balkans mission, it was not so successful in the initial years of OIF. With such a heavy demand for HUMINT, mission requirements turned CI Soldiers away from their purpose of force protection and focused them wholly on answering commander's IR. Although CI Soldiers received different, CI-specific training than HUMINT Soldiers at USAIC, they performed identical functions in support of OIF. Not only was the Army wasting precious resources in building a capability which was not being utilized, adversarial threats against tactical units in theater went undetected and unreported. MI concept and requirements developers noticed this critical problem and made two important changes. First, CI Solders were divorced from THTs and assigned to homogenous CI Teams, designed to perform the vital mission of CFSO in areas designated by the G2/G2X. Second, THTs became HUMINT Collection Teams (HCTs), manned homogenously by HUMINT Soldiers with the sole purpose of collecting in support of the commander's IR. (19)
With the addition of CI Teams and a CI OMT to the Collection and Exploitation company of the BfSB's MI battalion, the BfSB's CI teams can perform the following critical tasks in support of tactical operations:
* Investigate events of CI interest to support PIRs and SIRS.
* Investigate the site of the terrorism, SAEDA, force protection, or sabotage event to identify key factors, threat involvement and to protect the force.
* Produce and disseminate force protection information as required/directed.
* Interview prisoners or detainees to obtain CI information and use a linguist if necessary.
* Segregate persons of CI interest to conduct further interviews.
* Assess the reliability of information gathered to maintain the fidelity of the information contributing to the common operating picture.
* Conduct CFSO to augment force protection.
* Determine and assess the enemy HUMINT, Imagery Intelligence, and SIGINT threat capabilities to protect the force and prevent exploitation or surprise from threat elements.
* Conduct product development and CI analysis to facilitate operations.
* Prepare CI reports to keep the commander informed and facilitate planning and targeting.
* Research information obtained and compare it against PIRs, SIRS, and current CI events to ensure that focus on PIR/ SIR is being maintained in operations.
* Maintain CI maps and overlays to display current information.
* Conduct mission planning for all types of CI operations to facilitate the commander's operation orders. (20)
While many of these critical functions are currently the mission of strategic CI assets, CI Soldiers operating at operational and tactical level continue to have this mission and must have the ability to perform these tasks. In the asymmetric fight, both friendly and threat capabilities are not always neatly aligned into tactical, operational, and strategic levels. While strategic CI assets may be better trained and more capable of collecting against hostile intelligence threats, those threats are directed against friendly forces at the tactical level. Strategic CI assets will investigate the threat wherever it presents itself, collecting against it for National level requirements rather than in a way that directly benefits the tactical commander.
Now, more than ever, it is imperative that tactical commanders are provided with functioning CI assets to detect and neutralize the numerous threats to our forces. The 2007 implementation of U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrine in Iraq pushed American forces from heavily fortified forward operating bases into combat outposts (COPS), small strongholds in the middle of urban areas, or to joint security stations (JSSs), shared garrisons with Iraqi military or police forces. (21) Both COPs and JSSs are surrounded by potential insurgents, active or passive supporters of the insurgency--all of which are capable collectors for the enemy. The Cole Commission Report accurately describes today's force protection threat to U.S. forces in Iraq and other areas worldwide. The report states that operating in a new world environment characterized by unconventional and transnational threats would increase U.S. forces' exposure to terrorist attacks and require a major effort in force protection and the refocusing of intelligence to fight the War on Terrorism with emphasis on collection and analysis. (22) While U.S. Army Intelligence is extremely successful at targeting terrorist networks and operations, the majority of our collection and analysis is dedicated to pursuing the enemy, rather than understanding how the enemy collects against us and deterring or thwarting preventable attacks.
Although force design has adapted to challenge these threats, BfSB CI assets have been reorganized at the unit level to reflect the THT task organization and pointed in the direction of conducting source operations alongside their HUMINT brethren. While HUMINT provides a wealth of information vital to the lethal targeting of enemy networks in Iraq, recent trends indicate U. S. led kinetic operations may not be so prevalent in the future. Coalition Forces have made great strides regarding the operational autonomy of the Iraqi military and police, as well as with the Reconciliation Movement. With Iraqi organizations becoming more capable of providing their own security, the high frequency of U.S. led targeted strikes will eventually diminish. Consequently, our close partnership with Iraqi organizations will only increase the importance of CI's role in force protection.
MI Paradigm Shift from Command-Centric Operations to Staff-Centric Operations
Of the many advances brought about by Modularity, the two most apparent are the elimination of the divisional MI battalion and the creation of the BfSB. As noted an AUSA article on Army Transformation, "this has driven significant MI growth at the BCT and battalion levels, the establishment of reinforcing MI units ... and new intelligence readiness programs ... Intelligence requirements have concurrently driven development and accelerated fielding of advanced, all-source, 'flat' network fusion analysis capabilities achieved through Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A) workstations and network access down to battalion level." (23) These advances all point to one major change in MI culture: the paradigm shift from command-centric to staff-centric operations. In a recent meeting with MI captains, the USAIC Chief of Staff stated, "Times are changing. In the future, there will be more emphasis on building a professional intelligence officer, not a commander." USAIC recognizes the shift in capabilities and operational decision making during combat operations away from MI commanders and towards G2/S2s. "It will be difficult for MI to break away from the command track," he admitted, "but the 2 drives operations" to develop targets for effects-based operations. (24)
The commander of USAIC's HUMINT training battalion agrees. "We are a command-centric organization, however we are slow to adapt to the growing lack of command opportunities in ML" For those officers fortunate enough to command MI Soldiers in the Modular force, the MI commander's role is to "train, equip, prepare, deploy and provide" MI assets to support maneuver commanders." (25) In today's asymmetric fight, the tactical warfighter relies heavily on the capabilities provided by CI and HUMINT; therefore, the role of the MI commander in ensuring Soldier readiness prior to the deployment is critical. MI commanders in all formations must embrace this important responsibility, rather than focusing on planning for the operational management or collection requirements of assets that will be provided in OPCON, TACON or DS to maneuver commanders. As reinforced in the aforementioned sections of this paper, the CI and HUMINT assets belonging to MI commanders are operationally managed by the 2X. As a staff officer, however, the 2X is not directly responsible for the training, equipping, and preparation of CI and HUMINT Soldiers.
In an effort to meet the needs identified in the field, USAIC is making great strides in both CI and HUMINT programs for enlisted Soldiers, NCOs, warrant and commissioned officers alike; however, much of the responsibility for continued training is left to MI commanders. As stated in the AICGM: "All intelligence Soldiers are trained on baseline MOS and Soldier skills necessary to perform in their career field during entry-level training. Those individual skills only begin the life-cycle of that Soldier. The more advanced skills and techniques area unit responsibility. (26) Still, several Sts and maneuver commanders continue to identify serious inadequacies with entry-level MOS 35M HUMINT collectors. A former S2 of 2-5 Cavalry and MI company commander recognizes that "many of these 10-level initial entry soldiers are not the appropriate personnel to satisfy unit needs due to their lack of life experience (recent high school graduates), lack of tactical experience (deployed within one year of being assigned to their first maneuver unit), limited interpersonal skills (inability to establish rapport with others), and youth (a cultural constraint)." (27)
While MI commanders cannot control the age of their Soldiers, they can affect their skill progression in other areas by establishing a rigorous training program based not only on their MOS skills, but on the tactical and analytical skills a well-rounded collector requires to be seen as an asset rather than a liability to their supported maneuver unit. Even the concepts behind force design evolution emphasize this important requirement: "In the current operating environment with a 360[degrees] operational environment and asymmetric threats, it is imperative that the MI Corps embrace the CSA's warrior ethos that 'Every Soldier is a Soldier first.' The intensity of this environment will increase both physical and psychological stress and demands increased individual competent judgment and decision making down to individual Soldier levels. MI Soldiers must be exposed to replications of these stresses in extremely high resolution training and education on a recurring basis." (28) It is not enough for MI commanders to plan training in a vacuum, developing training exercises that lack the authenticity of operating with an infantry patrol, conducting tactical interrogation in a high-stress situation, or a having to interact with battalion staff officers as to how his or her team's collection task, purpose, method and endstate can specifically augment a planned operation. A captain in the 525th BfSB observed that "the [pre-deployment] training the BfSB does is not adequate. We don't train with the BCTs at the [combat training centers]; instead, we hired a contractor to make up a scenario and then had our HCTs go through source meets at our MOUT site at Bragg ... very few of the BfSB's HCTs had any recent experience working with a maneuver unit and, as a result, some had difficulty understanding the needs of an Infantry battalion or company." (29)
As training must be the primary focus of the MI commander before the deployment, providing administrative and logistical support must be the focus during the deployment. Chapter One of TC 2-22.303 emphasizes the "team effort and shared operational responsibilities" of the MI commander and 2X. (30) Effective communication and expectation management between these two entities is critical; when 2Xs and MI commanders fail to communicate or have different expectations of their roles and responsibilities-or different interpretations of the command and support relationships-CI and HUMINT Soldiers suffer the consequences.
FM 2-22.3's table of Army Command and Support Relationships clearly indicates that in OPCON, TACON and DS situations the parent unit provides combat service support to the provided asset. For provided CI and HUMINT assets, this includes anything from computers, tactical equipment, vehicles, vehicle maintenance, mail and administrative support such as awards, NCOERs, and UCMJ action. It does not include providing collection requirements, intelligence analysis, source vetting or support to targeting. As collection priorities are established by the supported or gaining unit, so will the supported or gaining unit's 2X, Fusion Cell (Analysis Control Element or Team) and Targeting Cell provide any and all operational guidance and analytical support to CI and HUMINT operations. Any redundant actions by the parent unit, often headquartered apart from the supported or gaining unit's AO and possessing far less situational awareness, provide less accurate or irrelevant information to the OPCON, TACON or DS collectors. This confuses the provided CI and HUMINT Soldiers and distracts them from the operational guidance of the 2X. While the provision of logistical and administrative support may not seem a glamorous responsibility in comparison to targeting, collection planning, or directing collection efforts of CI and HUMINT assets, it is just as important.
When MI commanders focus on the operational aspects of the CI and HUMINT assets during a deployment rather than their logistical and administrative responsibilities, Soldiers suffer. For example, MI battalions recently deployed to OIF spent more effort on conducting redundant analysis, removing Soldiers from the supported/gaining unit mission to attend extraneous targeting meetings, or tallying report statistics--emphasizing quantity of reporting rather than the quality of the reporting to the supported/gaining unit. As a result of these misplaced priorities, there were delays in Soldiers' mail and vehicle maintenance, insensible RBvR leave schedules, and the redeployment of Soldiers without awards for their combat service.
Modularity introduces new systems and organization that enhance the ISR capabilities of maneuver units. These changes reflect the increasing dependence of maneuver commanders on the innovation, ability, and skill MI staff officers to plan and direct complex and challenging collection operations to support maneuver and targeting. While troop-providing MI commanders supporting operations like OIF are not directly called upon to plan or direct collection efforts, the vitality of their role in ensuring MI Soldier readiness prior to the deployment and supporting MI Soldier readiness during the deployment cannot be understated.
"Army Intelligence transformation begins with changing the behavior and expectations of both the MI leaders who produce intelligence and the combat arms consumers of intelligence." (31) This astute remark, presented at the close of the AICGM, rings especially true for any MI leaders providing CI and HUMINT assets or managing their operations. Achieving success at this critical juncture in intelligence transformation calls for MI leaders seek out and digest doctrine, understand its intent as applied to the Modular force, yet have the ability to apply it to current operations. "For MI leaders too this means moving from the current requirements orientation to an anticipatory approach to intelligence production. Instead of waiting for the question to be asked, intelligence producers must anticipate the next requirement and provide assessments/answers to relevant operational questions before they are asked." (32) In the absence of an intermediate doctrine that incorporates recent structural modifications with current mission requirements, MI leaders must heed the lessons learned identified in this paper while anticipating new challenges brought about by an ever-adapting enemy. Now is the time to eschew the bad habits of recently deployed MI brigades, exorcise the ghosts of legacy doctrine that haunt our planning and training, and gain a clear understanding of the direction in which MI is moving while realizing there are still a few years between now and 2032.
by Captain Raven Bukowski
(1.) Requirements Determination Directorate, USAIC, The Army Comprehensive Intelligence Guide to Modularity, Version 3.0, August 2007: 3. accessed 4 March 2008 at hops://icon.army.mil/MCAT/documents/filemanager.cfm.
(2.) AICGM, 175.
(3.) Task Force Modularity Presentation, slide 35.
(4.) TF Modularity Presentation, slide 32. The 20 Soldier BfSB S2 section is roughly equal to the BCT S2 section when including the BCT MI company Analysis and Integration platoon's analysts.
(5.) AICGM, 183. The purpose of the HUMINT Section has yet to be identified.
(6.) FM 34-7-1, Tactical Human Intelligence and Counterintelligence Operations, USAIC, April 2002, 7-21 and 7-22.
(7.) TC 2-22.303, The 2X Handbook, HQ, Department of the Army, June 2006, 1 to 2.
(8.) Ibid, 5-1.
(9.) USAIC Directorate of Doctrine, personal interview, 4 March 2008.
(10.) Memorandum for Futures Development and Integration Center, USAIC, Fort Huachuca, Arizona, Subject: Comments on Draft TC 2-22.303, The 2X Handbook, 14 March 2006. Provided by the CI and HUMINT Team, Concepts and Development Integration, USAIC, during personal interview, 5 March 2008.
(11.) THOPS After Action Review. Provided by the CI and HUMINT Team, Concepts and Development Integration, USAIC. Personal interview, 5 March 2008.
(12.) Director of ITRADS, U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, personal interview, 4 March 2008.
(13.) Detailed on pages 1-4 and 1-5 of TC 2-22.303.
(14.) S2X for 2BCT, 101st Airborne Division, Baghdad, Iraq, email interview, O1 May 2008.
(15.) Page 34-35 of the Operational and Organizational Concept for the Battlefield Surveillance Brigade (BfSBJ Version 3.04:5 explains that the MI BNs "... C&E company receives mission orders from the MI battalion that focus the collection of its HUMINT and CI OMTs and collection teams to support the BFSB mission" while the CI and HUMINT company's assets reinforce BCTs. I posit that in missions like OIF where the intelligence requirements are driven from the lowest (tactical) echelon, all available CI and HUMINT assets should reinforce tactical collection efforts.
(16.) "The Application of CI Teams" portion of this paper was written after close collaboration with CW2 Marc Losito, CI OMT Chief, 504th BfSB.
(17.) FM 34-7-1, Tactical Human Intelligence and Counterintelligence Operations, 7-6.
(18.) The training for MOS 35M HUMINT Soldiers has increased steadily. USAIC graduated 265 35M in 2003, 539 in 2004, 1019 in 2005, 1070 in 2006, and 1656 in 2007. Figures provided by the Tactical HUMINT Committee, HUMINT Collector Course, 111'' MI BDE, USAIC, Fort Huachuca.
(19.) While this change has been completed within the BfSB's MI Battalion, it is still in progress for the BCT MICO.
(20.) AICGM, 231.
(21.) FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, HQ, Department of the Army, December 2006.
(22.) Richard I. Spence "Army Intelligence Master Plan: Army CI and HUMINT Support to Force Protection," Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin, April-June 2003, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/army/mipb/2003_04.pdf.
(23.) Association of the United States Army, "Key Issues Relevant to Army Intelligence Transformation," Torchbearer National Security Report, July 2007; available at http://www.ausa.org/webpub/DeptILW.nsf/byid/ DRAY-75LT2E/$File/TB-Intel.pdf?OpenElement.
(24.) Chief of Staff, USAIC, Fort Huachuca, Officer Professional Development with MI Captains Career Course Class 08- 002, 28 March 2008.
(25.) Commander 309"' MI Battalion, 111'" MI Brigade, USAIC, Fort Huachuca, Personal interview, 26 February 2008.
(26.) AICGM, 602.
(27.) Major Dylan Randazzo, "Casting a Wider HUMINT Net, Enabling the Warfighter to Conduct Source Operations," Thesis, National Defense Intelligence College, 1 March 2008, 3.
(28.) AICGM, 600.
(29.) Former A/S3, 525th BfSB, email interview, 21 April 2008.
(30) TC 2-22.303, The 2X Handbook, 1-5.
(31.) AICGM, 599-600.
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|Publication:||Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin|
|Date:||Apr 1, 2008|
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