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Blurring the boundaries: what's new in the new antisemitism?

The question whether current manifestations of antisemitism exhibit different characteristics from those of older manifestations is not only a scholarly, but also a political one since it bears on the adequacy of both scholarly and political efforts to combat contemporary antisemitism. The link between scholarship and politics can be seen in the results of a representative survey conducted in 2009 which registered the change in the nature of antisemitic resentment. The survey revealed that 13% of Germany's population question Israel's right to exist. The challenge to Israel's very right to exist goes far beyond any so-called "acceptable criticism of Israel"; it indicates antisemitic resentment. So far so bad, one might say. Even more interesting is another number from the same survey: Among supporters of the German Left Party (Die Linke) 28% or over a quarter denied Israel's right to exist. (1) This suggests an erosion of the once commonplace equation of terms and attitudes like "left" and "progressive" on the one hand, and "non-antisemitic" on the other. It can of course be argued that the history of the political left does not in any case support the assumption of such an equation, especially in the German context since 1967. Yet within the self-perception of the political left the equation does exist and is still meaningful. This small example does not offer any hints about the driving forces of this erosion but it does indicate a mingling of what we might have expected to be incompatible attitudes. Things seem to be in flux. This is reflected somewhat in the term "new antisemitism," (2) which suggests qualitative differences between an old antisemitism, and a so-called "new antisemitism".

Yet the distinction between old and new antisemitism is the subject of manifold and often confusing debates, in which the positions range from an ardent conviction of the existence of a qualitative change (3) to total rejection not only of the change itself but even of its antisemitic character, (4) with some describing the accepted newness not as antisemitism but as Judeophobia. (5) In short there is confusion not only as regards the observed phenomena but also at the level of scholarly debates. Moreover, the scholarly controversy in all its sharpness is clearly related to distinct political positions. So not only for scholarly, but also for political reasons, it would be helpful to establish what is "new" in "new antisemitism" and what the characteristics of the qualitative change in fact are. Do these characteristicsjustify the talk of a "new antisemitism"? Or is the distinction "much too rigid" (6) on the scholarly level, and a "dangerous and potentially misleading exercise" (7) on the political level? In other words: Is there anything "new" here at all? To answer these questions we need briefly to recall what the so-called "old antisemitism" is all about.

Structural Characteristics of Antisemitism

Antisemitism as a generic term for all common and known types of enmity against Jewry includes very different resentments, prejudices and attitudes. From an antisemitic perspective, for example, Jews have been held responsible for the murder of Jesus Christ, the excesses of capitalism, and for plotting the communist world revolution. The wide range of different and even contradictory resentments comprised by antisemitism is a crucial and basic characteristic of an antisemitic mindset. At the same time, it is also a major reason for the attraction of antisemitism. The logically incoherent mixing up of prejudices with different historical roots points to an ideological formation capable of interpreting the world without regard for real societal developments. Thus antisemitism can be seen as an explanatory model "for the not understood development trends in civil society." (8)

Over and above the historical taxonomies which refer mostly to visible manifestations of antisemitic resentment such as, e.g., "religious antisemitism", "racist antisemitism", "secondary antisemitism", "antiZionist antisemitism", and "Islamist antisemitism," (9) it would be useful to analyze the structural characteristics of antisemitism. According to Haury, (10) three structuring principles characterize the ideology of antisemitism: First there is a Manichean separation, in both the perceptible and the imaginary worlds, into two parts: good and evil. This duality continuously encodes all experience. Only good and evil exist and both sides are connected only by struggle, not negotiations. Typical examples of this dichotomy are such common antisemitic contrasts and contradictions as the one described by the German terms Schaffen vs. Raffen--which basically means work vs. greed, physical labor vs. intellect, or naturalness vs. artificiality or the contrast between so-called "organic" industrial capital and "parasitic" financial capital. The confrontation between the concrete world, which is celebrated, and the abstract world, which is denigrated, becomes fundamental. The solution to this conflict can only be reached by erasing one side, in this case the evil (Jewish) side. (11)

Personification, as the second structuring principle of antisemitic ideology, is connected with the first one, the Manichean dichotomy, since complex societal processes are not only resolved into a dichotomy of good and evil, but also attributed personally. In this way, these complex societal processes can be made graspable and manageable. Reducing complexity by personification is of course not exclusive to an antisemitic world view and is frequently encountered in daily interactions, for instance in the common practice of blaming "the politicians" for the complex problems of modem society. This does not, however, affect the essential role personification plays as a basic structuring principle of antisemitic ideology, especially when it comes to collective affiliations. So, according to a conspiracy theory-minded perception, Jewry is directly responsible for the disturbing consequences of modernization.

Thirdly, this homogenizing ascription of the "other," produces an imaginary homogeneous collective and for the antisemite it is a social entity that is naturally harmonious. Particularly in times of social uncertainty, the importance of the identity-forming function of the homogenizing process cannot be overstated. The irony in this procedure lies in the inversion of cause and effect: It is the alleged threat to the community by the enemy construction of "Jewry" that enables the community to exist in the first place.

Main Features of the Qualitative Change

Awareness of the structuring principles is a sine qua non for a discussion of a possible qualitative shift towards a new antisemitic resentment. Different authors identify varying numbers of developments expressing the qualitative change. Judaken, (12) for example, mentions five vectors of transmission: 1) Holocaust denial; 2) Judeophobia in the Islamic World; 3) the anti-Israel bias of the radical left; 4) anti-Israel anti-racism; and 5) antizionism as antisemitism. Within this multi-level perspective on the process of qualitative transformation, one could say that the qualitative change in antisemitic resentment itself can be discussed in relation to three developments:

Firstly, many antisemitic narratives refer to the State of Israel, which is claimed to be responsible for all sorts of crises in the globalized world. So in the year 2003, for instance, 65% of Germany's population believed that the state of Israel was the biggest threat to world peace. According to this perception Israel ranked equal with North Korea and ahead of Iran. (13) In other words, as Irvin Cotier (14) pointed out, Israel has become the "collective Jew among the Nations". The focus on and overestimation of the relative importance of this Middle Eastern hot spot results in a "double standard" in the judgement of Israeli politics, and offers a major discursive opportunity for antisemitic narratives. The location of the first development on the permeable boundary between anti-Zionism and antisemitism is by no means surprising. It is, on the contrary, integral to the discussion on the "newness" of the "new antisemitism". According to Laqueur the whole discussion on "new antisemitism" can be reduced "to the question of whether antisemitism and anti-Zionism are two entirely distinct phenomena or whether anti-Zionism can turn into, in certain circumstances, antisemitism." (15) However, while the anti-Zionist perception of Israel is indeed a key element in contemporary antisemitic resentment, it is not the only one.

Secondly, the integrative function of antisemitism is again increasingly coming to the fore compared to previous decades. Antisemitism can be seen as a unifying bond between political parties and positions like those of the extreme right, political Islam, parts of the radical left, and the middle-class centre that otherwise might seem irreconcilable.16 Thus antisemitism, anti-Zionism, and anticapitalism can merge into one discursive formation. This attribute of antisemitic ideology cannot be considered as new. On the contrary, it is an essential as well as structural component, since a substantial characteristic of antisemitism's paranoid structure lies in the simultaneous presentation of completely contradictory stereotypes and assumptions. From a historical point of view this structural element has always played an essential part in antisemitism's success. So, for example, from the antisemitic perspective, Jewry as such was held responsible both for the excesses of capitalism and for plotting communist world revolution.

Thirdly, there is the intermingling of anti-racist, human-rights-based, and emancipatory claims on the one side, and antisemitic and anti-Zionist narratives on the other. This was clearly apparent at the 2001 UN sponsored Antiracism Conference held at Durban, South Africa. At the initiative of anti-racist NGOs, a final declaration of this "World Conference on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and related Intolerance" was charging Israel with genocide--the only nation to be cited. (17)

The confusion between genuine anti-racist arguments and antisemitic narratives that became apparent during this and the follow-up conference in 2009 (Durban II) does indeed suggest a different quality of antisemitic resentment. (18) This assumption of a different quality unfolds against the background of the quantitative strength of antisemitic resentment within Germany's population. According to one representative survey from 2011, nearly half (49%) of all Germans agreed with the statement "Jews try to take advantage of having been victims during the Nazi era." (19) Concurrently, anti-Zionism is still strong within Germany's population. According to the same survey 48% of Germany's population agree with the statement "Israel is conducting a war of extermination against the Palestinians". Surveys repeatedly reveal the same picture, and it is hardly likely that the constant level of approval of secondary and anti-Zionist coded antisemitic narratives within the German population will change significantly.

What's New in the New Antisemitism?

Do these features and characteristics justify the talk of a "new antisemitism"? Or, to put it another way, "Is there anything new in new antisemitism? Following every crisis in the Arab-Israeli conflict since the Six-Day War, books or articles by activists or scholars (20) have appeared with titles referring to the "newness" of "new antisemitsm." (21) This does not in itself prove an absence of newness but rather reflects scholars' efforts to characterize, and the difficulties in characterizing, the differences between contemporary antisemitism and its classical European form.

So when we address the issue of the "new" in "new antisemitism", we should consider the breaks and continuities within antisemitic resentment, since a focus on these breaks and continuities enables us to make temporal distinctions, to separate those elements that persist from those that change, and to distinguish those that have vanished from those newly arisen. In this perspective, viewed from the present, the breaks relate primarily to the forms of appearance and the political actors. A hundred years ago, for instance, the likelihood of antisemitic resentment being expressed in the terms of a human rights discourse was very small, because at that time it was first and foremost expressed in racial terms. The structuring principles of antisemitic ideology--Manichean separation, personification and homogenization--however remain basically the same while being refreshed, updated and extended by this new constellation of forms of appearance and political actors.

There is indeed a different antisemitism at the level of forms of appearance, discursive opportunities, and political actors that blurs the boundaries, but in the end it is old wine in new bottles. Even so, new approaches are needed to tackle these new contemporary forms of antisemitism at both the theoretical and political levels.

At the theoretical level the qualitative change has implications for the term antisemitism itself: It has become increasingly clear that a narrow definition of the phenomenon is unable adequately to explain its dynamics. For example, it is of little analytical value to apply the label of antisemitism to those who demonize the state of Israel, using anti-Zionist or antisemitic narratives. In analogy to other forms of resentment like racism, one can unintentionally utter antisemitic narratives and terms. A sociologist should not focus on intention or motive, but on analysing the antisemitic effect of such demonization in view of its societal resonance. (22) This means a reconstructive focus on the issue of if and how anti-Zionist and antisemitic narratives are becoming socially acceptable. In the words of David Hirsh: "Antisemitism should be understood as a social phenomenon that is not reducible to the intent or the self-consciousness of the social actors involved. Antisemitism is a social fact that is produced through shared meanings and exclusions; it is not an individual moral failing." (23)

So the question must be: Which factors promote and which factors prevent the development of an anti-Zionist and antisemitic hegemony in public discourse, bearing in mind that a general acceptance of anti-Zionist narratives will increase the likelihood of openly antisemitic movements?

Another problem is that we are confronted with a blurring of the boundaries between classical andmodern antisemitism. I follow here the approach and ideas of Dan Diner, who stated some years ago that the once clear-cut ideology of antisemitism is splintering into manifold und plural forms, (24) with various side effects:
   The Holocaust led to the destruction of the classic (. . .) faith
   driven form of antisemitism. Morally broken, it cannot be
   reconstituted in conceptually similar terms. Without the
   appropriate conceptual density however it is hard to describe the
   negative sentiments extended towards Jews qua Jews. All that
   remains are particles of resentment emerging from the
   disintegrating mass, which are covered by what is imagined to be
   antisemitism. Like mildew these then cover the various incriminated
   phenomena which have somehow to be associated with the Jews. When
   seen against the earlier, historic density the nature of these
   particles of resentment should perhaps be described not as being
   antisemitic but rather as antisemitising. This characteristic
   however does seem to be quite ubiquitous. (25)


Discrete elements of the classic antisemitic ideology therefore diffuse and combine with other narratives. The blurring of the boundaries between antisemitic narratives suggests an increase in the opportunities for political actors to articulate a somewhat encoded antisemitic resentment within the public sphere, (26) especially given the latent antisemitic resentment within the German population. For instance, antisemitic stereotypes presented in the guise of criticism of Israel carry no or less stigma in Germany and thus can be expressed publicly. (27)

In the year 2002, for instance, the German politician Mollemann from the German Liberal party (FPD), at that time a key player in German politics, tried this during an election campaign by blaming Ariel Sharon for everything that had gone wrong in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Rather than making openly antisemitic remarks, he employed anti-Zionist narratives and secondary antisemitic ones in order to mobilize and gain more votes. (28) The outcome of this story can be seen in two ways: firstly, the strategy was not successful at short notice. The German Liberal Party did not win the following election. In fact, their result was disappointing in relation to their expectations and the polls. Secondly, it took the rest of Germany's political and cultural elite a very long time to recognize Mollemann's behaviour as antisemitic and scandalous. Both results do not mean that there will be no testing of the boundaries in the future by a mainstream politician in Germany, especially given the latent antisemitic resentment referred to above.

Thus clarification is needed regarding the scope for gaining political influence offered by the use of structural antisemitic codes in the political arena. On the other hand, in response to the blurring of the boundaries of antisemitic ideology, institutional efforts have been made to take the blurring into account. The so-called "Working Definition on Antisemitism" proposed by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (29) is a good example of these efforts. In this "Working Definition" the following criteria for distinguishing between legitimate criticism of Israel and antisemitism are offered: firstly, the direct equation of the democratic state of Israel with the Nazi Regime; secondly, the use of classical antisemitic stereotypes such as "Old Testament-based hardness" or "vengeful Israel"; thirdly, the delegitimization of Israel; and fourthly the use of double standards such as talking about "Israeli State Terrorism" while simultaneously denying the "terrorist character of Hamas." (30)

Despite these institutional efforts to redraw the boundaries between legitimate criticism of Israel and antisemitism a dynamic grey area with nuances and ambiguities between latent and manifest antisemitism and between anti-Zionism and antisemitism still exists. In 2013 the Working Definition was dropped by the EU's Fundamental Rights Agency, a decision that seems to mirror the dynamic and contested character of the grey area between legitimate criticism of Israel and antisemitism on an institutional level.

Structurally the qualitative change is related to the fact that not only in Germany, but also in Western Europe as a whole, the use of openly antisemitic resentment expressed in traditional ethnic terms in the public sphere is widely tabooed. (31) Antisemitic resentment must, if it wants to be heard and recognized, take on different forms which are not discredited by the Shoah.

As a result the resentment splinters into manifold different forms that are legitimate in public discourse. Does this justify the talk of a "new antisemitism"?

Given the fact that antisemitism is an integral part of Western civilization and German society, whenever a "new antisemitism" or -even better--an "imported antisemitism" is discovered, one needs to ask about the function of this discovery especially in the German context. The talk about newness and especially about new antisemitic actors like Muslim youth all too often serves a discursive function of exculpation and extemalization for a latently antisemitic society like the German one. (32) From this perspective, antisemitism does not only come from abroad via, e.g., Islamist cable TV-stations, but is also always the 'antisemitism of the other' regardless of whether it is considered "old" or "new".

Yet the splintering of antisemitism's once coherent ideology into multiple antisemitisms and the mingling with the human rights discourse is only one side of the coin. On the other side more political and practical matters are to be found. And here the question of the consequences is important.

How to Deal with it Politically?

So what are the implications for action? In my opinion, taking the blurring boundaries thesis seriously implies that the simple rejection of "classical" "old" antisemitism does not logically lead to immunity from involvement in other of its multifarious and contemporary forms. Rather, the resulting manifoldness and ambiguity demand an effort of reflection.

What would such a reflexive and sensible position look like? I want to illustrate this briefly with an example: In 2003, 20 Neo-Nazis attended a rally in Munich, organized by an anti-globalization network called "Attac" (33) against the then forthcoming war against Iraq. Attac of course regards itself as anti-fascist and anti-racist and therefore anti-antisemitic. The question then is how this anti-globalization network reacted to the presence of openly antisemitic neo-Nazis in their demonstration. A qualitative content analysis of Attac's own publications, comments, statements, etc. reveals the emergence of two main positions within the network over how to deal with this issue. (34) One side, which was by far the stronger one, the so-called majority position, stressed the argument that you cannot prevent applause from the wrong quarter. They put it even more elaborately and in post-modern terms, "that there are no definite signs anymore and thus these can adopt a variety of meanings." (35)

In other words, the communication process itself is to blame. But Attac as a political actor is helpless against takeovers in general. The question of the reasons for the wrong quarter's applause is suppressed, although neo-Nazis do not tend to join any and every rally or demonstration. This was exactly the question raised by the other, the socalled minority position: the sometimes hard necessity to examine and revise one's own agenda, when it has proved to be in some way attractive to neo-Nazis. (36)

As one can see from this small example of political actors and movements, a protean, manifold, flexible resentment like antisemitism needs a reflexive approach if it is to be effectively addressed politically. This is of course even more vital if one wants to achieve a scientific approach to the subject in order to identify changing forms of antisemitism and to ". . . marshal active resistance to it." (37)

(1.) Stem, Jeder zweite nennt Israel aggressive, 2009; http://www.stem.de/pohtik/deutschland/stem-umfrage-jeder-zweite-nennt-israel-aggressiv651466.html [accessed 27/08/2014],

(2.) Doron Rabinovici, Ulrich Speck, and Natan Sznaider, eds., (2004). Neuer Antisemitismus? Eine globale Debatte. (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2004).

(3.) Alain Finkielkraut, "Im Namen des Anderen. Reflexionen uber den kommenden Antisemitismus." in Doron Rabinovici, Ulrich Speck, and Natan Sznaider, eds., Neuer Antisemitismus? Eine globale Debatte (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2004), 119-132; Robert S. Wistrich, A Lethal Obsession. From Antiquity to the Global Jihad (New York: Random House, 2010).

(4.) Brian Klug, "The Collective Jew: Israel and the New Antisemitism," Patterns of Prejudice, 37, no. 2 (2003): 117-138; Brian Klug, "Is Europe a Lost Cause? The European Debate on Antisemitism and the Middle East Conflict," Patterns of Prejudice, 39, no. 1 (2005): 46-59; Brian Klug, "Interrogating "New Anti-Semitism," Ethnic and Racial Studies, 36, no. 3 (2013): 468-482; Steven Beller, "In Zion's Hall of Mirrors: A Comment on Neuer Antisemitismus?," Patterns of Prejudice, 41, no. 2, (2007): 215-238. For an instructive case study of the French "antisemitisme nouveau" see Timothy Peace, "Un Antisemitisme Nouveau? The Debate about a 'New Antisemitism' in France," Patterns of Prejudice, 43, no. 2, (2009): 103-121.

(5.) Pierre-Andre Taguieff, Rising from the Muck: The New Anti-Semitism in Europe (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2004).

(6.) Yehuda Bauer, Antisemitism and Antizionism-new and old. In Robert Wistrich, ed., Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism in the Contemporary World (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1990), 198.

(7.) Ibid.

(8.) Reinhard Rurup, Emanzipation und Antisemitismus. Studien zur "Judenfrage" der burgerlichen Gesellschaft (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1975), 91.

(9.) Samuel Salzbom, "Die Genese des Antisemitismus in Europa," in Samuel Salzbom, Antisemitismus. Geschichte, Theorie, Empirie (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2014), 1123.

(10.) Thomas Haury, Antisemitismus von Links. Kommunistische Ideologie, Nationalismus und Antizionismus in der fruheren DDR (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2002), 105.

(11.) In coining the phrase "Erlosungsantisemitismus" (redemptive antisemitism), Saul Friedlander ["Erlosungsantisemitismus. Zur Ideologie der 'Endlosung,'" in: Saul Friedlander, den Holocaust beschreiben (Gottingen: Wallstein, 2007), 28-53] highlighted the metaphysical and religious dimensions of this structural element.

(12.) Jonathan Judaken, "So What's New? Rethinking the 'New Anti-Semitism' in a Global Age," Patterns of Prejudice, 42, no. 4-5 (2008): 538.

(13.) European Commission, Flash Eurobarometer 151. Iraq and Peace in the World. Full Report, 2003; 73; http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fll51_iraq_full_report.pdf [accessed 22/05/2015],

(14.) Irvin Cotier, (2009). Global Antisemitism. Assault on Human Rights. ISGAP Working Paper Series, 2009; http://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/ISGAP-WorkingPapers-Booklet-Cotler-09-copy.pdf [accessed 03/07/2015],

(15.) Walter Laqueur, The Changing Face of Antisemitism. From Ancient Times to the Present Day (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 7.

(16.) Monica Schwarz-Friesel, and Jehuda Reinharz, Die Sprache der Judenfeindschaft im 21. Jahrhundert (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2013).

(17.) J. Wetzel, "Der Schwierige Umgang mit Einem Phanomen--Die EU und der Antisemitismus," in Moshe Zuckermann, ed., Antisemitismus--Antizionismus--Israelkritik. Tel Aviver Jahrbuch fur deutsche Geschichte XXXIII (Gottingen: Wallstein, 2005), 90.

(18.) Elisabeth Kuebler and Matthias Falter, "Durban Reviewed: The Transformation of Antisemitismin a Cosmopolitanizing Environment," in Charles Asher Small, ed., Global Antisemitism. A Crisis of Modernity, Volume II: The Intellectual Environment (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 203-213.

(19.) Andreas Zick,Beate Kupper, Andreas Hovermann, Intolerance, Prejudice and Discrimination. A European Report, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Berlin, ed., 2011, 57; http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/do/07908-20110311.pdflaccessed 27/8/2014],

(20.) For instance Abraham Foxman, Never Again? The Threat of the New Anti-Semitism (San Francisco: Harper, 2003) and Arnold Forster and Benjamin R. Epstein, The New AntiSemitism (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974). Keith Kahn-Harris and Ben Gidley, Turbulent Times. The British Jewish Community Today (London: Continuum, 2010), 138 indicate a first use of the phrase in the 1920s by the Board of Deputies of British Jews in order to "describe the twin threat of Nazism in Germany and Mosley's Fascism at home."

(21.) Jonathan Judaken, "So What's New? Rethinking the 'New Anti-Semitism' in a Global Age," Patterns of Prejudice, 42, no. 4-5 (2008): 531-560.

(22.) David Hirsh, "Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism: Cosmopolitan Reflections," in The Yale Initiative for the Interdisciplinary Study of Antisemitism Working Paper Series. Working Paper Nr. 1 (2007).

(23.) David Hirsh, "Hostility to Israel and Antisemitism: Toward a Sociological Approach," Journal for the Study of Antisemitism, 5, (2013): 1401-1422.

(24.) Dan Diner, "Der Sarkophag zeigt Risse. Uher Israel, Palastina und die Frage eines "neuen Antisemitismus," in Doron Rabinovici, Ulrich Speck, and Natan Sznaider, eds, Neuer Antisemitismus? Eine globale Debatte (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2004), 310-328.

(25.) Diner, "Der Sarkophag zeigt Risse," 310.

(26.) Lars Rensmann, Demokratie und Judenbild. Antisemitismus in der politischen Kultur der BundesrepublikDeutschland (Opladen: Verlag fur Sozialwissenschaften, 2004).

(27.) Werner Bergmann and Wilhelm Heitmeyer, "Communicating Antisemitism, are the 'Boundaries of the Speakable' Shifting?," in Moshe Zuckermann, ed., Antisemitismus Antizionismus --Israelkritik. Tel Aviver Jahrbuch fur deutsche Geschichte XXXIII (Gottingen: Wallstein, 2005), 70-89.

(28.) Samuel Salzbom and Marc Schwietring, "Antizivilisatorische Affektmobilisierung. Zur Normalisierung des sekundaren Antisemitismus," in Michael Klundt, Samuel Salzbom, Marc Schwietring, and Gerd Wiegel, eds., Erinnern, verdrangen, vergessen. Geschichtspolitische Wege ins 21. Jahrhundert (GieBen: NBKK, 2003), 43-76.

(29.) European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, Working Definition of Antisemitism, 2005; http://fra.europa.eu/fra/material/pub/AS/AS-WorkingDefinition draft.pdf [accessed 24/12/2007].

(30.) Lars Rensmann, "Zwischen Kosmopolitanismus und Ressentiment. Zum Problem des sekundaren Antisemitismus in der deutschen Linken," in Matthias Brosch, Michael Elm, Norman GeiBler, Brigitta E. Simburger & Oliver von Wrochem, eds., Exklusive Solidaritat. Linker Antisemitismus in Deutschland. Vom Idealismus zur Antiglobalisierungsbewegung (Berlin: Metropol, 2007), 172.

(31.) Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb, "Kommunikationslatenz, Moral und offentliche Meinung: Theoretische Uberlegungen zum Antisemitismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," Kolner Zeitschrift fur Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 38, (1986): 223-246.

(32.) According to a recent report 90% of all antisemitic criminal acts in Germany 2014 were committed by right-wing extremists Amadeo-Antonio-Stiftung, Lagebild Antisemitismus der Amadeo-Antonio-Stiftung, 2015; http://www.amadeu-antonio stiftung.de/w/files/videos/aas-lagebild-antisemitismus-2015.pdf [accessed 10/03/2015]: 8.

(33.) The "Association pour la taxation des transactions pour l'aide aux citoyens" (Attac) was founded in 1998 with the aim of introducing the so-called Tobin tax on currency speculation. Starting as a single-issue movement Attac now devotes itself to a wide range of issues related to anti-globalization. While it was founded in France it now exists in over forty countries around the world. It has been active in Germany since 2001.

(34.) Holger Knothe, Eine andere Welt ist moglich--ohne Antisemitismus? Antisemitismus und Globalisierungskritik bei Attac (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2009).

(35.) Thomas Sablowski, (2004). "Fallstricke der Globalisierungskritik. Zur Diskussion uber Antisemitismus bei Attac," in Wissenschaftlicher Beirat von Attac Deutschland, eds., Globalisierungskritik und Antisemitismus. Zur Antisemitismusdiskussion in Attac (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2004), 12.

(36.) Holger Knothe, Eine andere Welt ist moglich--ohne Antisemitismus? Antisemitismus und Globalisierungskritik bei Attac (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2009), 189.

(37.) Robert Fine, "Fighting with Phantoms: A Contribution to the Debate on Antisemitism in Europe," Patterns of Prejudice, 43, no. 5, (2009): 476.

Holger Knothe, Holger Knothe is a scientific assistant in the Dept of Sociology at LudwigMaximilian University (Munich). He can be reached via email Holger.Knothe@soziologie.uni-muenchen.de
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Date:Dec 1, 2015
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