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Before Soviet Jewry's happy ending: the Cold War and America's long debate over Jackson-Vanik, 1976-1989.


In both popular media and in mainstream academic scholarship, the Jackson-Vanik amendment--which linked Soviet-American trade relations to the question of Soviet Jewish emigration--is portrayed as a largely successful effort to facilitate Jewish emigration. This article sheds light on a revisionist perspective, focusing on the debates over the amendment's effectiveness that took place between the amendment's passage in Congress and the USSR's final years. The research shows that the decline in emigration during the mid-1970s and the early 1980s led many Americans--including politicians, journalists, and Jewish leaders--to question the effectiveness of Jackson-Vanik's hardline approach. In the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, some called for the suspending the amendment or for granting the USSR a one-year waiver from Jackson-Vanik as a gesture of goodwill, but moderate voices were drowned out by Jewish activists who valued principle over pragmatism. Particular attention is paid to an alleged "missed opportunity" in 1979, a year when Soviet leaders boosted emigration and attempted to reach out to compromise with American Jewish leaders. Overall, this article argues that a more nuanced portrayed of the amendment's legacy is required in light of the source material that it presents.


When the Jackson-Vanik amendment was finally repealed in December 2012, Jewish groups around the country, though generally noting the time for its repeal was long overdue, portrayed the historic legacy of the bill in positive, almost mythological terms. (1) Decades after the fall of the Soviet Union and the emigration of over a million Jews, the American Jewish community typically recalls the amendment as a moment of triumph. (2) Proponents characterized the passage of the amendment as a proud moment in American history, an instance when the United States Congress had the courage to advocate for a more moral foreign policy, one that stood up for repressed and defenseless Soviet Jews. (3) Others lauded the amendment for its role in confronting the Soviet Union, and some even argued that the Jackson-Vanik amendment helped bring down the Soviet Union by denying it economic benefits. (4) Lastly, the amendment is portrayed--even in respected scholarly works (5)--as having helped the people who needed it most, the Jews of the Soviet Union. (6)

While the campaign for the Jackson-Vanik amendment certainly brought greater attention to the cause of Soviet Jewish emigration, its legacy at different historical moments was far more complicated than many people today remember. With the exception of several years during the late 1970s, Soviet Jewish emigration underwent a steep decline in both the mid-1970s and the bulk of the 1980s. (7) Those who lauded the "long-term success" of the amendment--success largely intertwined with the decline of the Soviet Union--forget that there may have been a large opportunity cost, as alternatives to the confrontational amendment may have led to the release of event greater numbers during the 1970s and 1980s. (8) Whether one could categorize Jackson-Vanik as a success or failure depended on when and who was writing. During dips in emigration, some argued that Jackson-Vanik backfired, or claimed that there was a missed opportunity to increase Soviet Jewish emigration, while others were unyielding in their insistence that Jackson-Vanik worked no matter what current realities were.

This paper will explore how debates of the effectiveness and legacy of the Jackson-Vanik amendment varied throughout time--and how changing views on its utility were used to support different policy positions. During the initial dip in emigration following the amendment's passage in 1975, groups largely interpreted the events as they wanted to--as supporters saw Jackson's efforts as a valiant effort rather than a failure. When emigration rose in 1978-1979, those who seriously considered softening Jackson-Vanik or granting the USSR a one-year waiver--such as the American Jewish Congress, amendment cosponsor Representative Charles Vanik, and Senator Adlai Stevenson III--were in the minority. (9) Rather than interpreting the rise in emigration as an opportunity to engage constructively with the Soviet Union, many instead took it as a sign that confrontation was the most effective method, and thus clung more tightly to the amendment. (10) In small part due to the Jewish community's lack of flexibility--and in large part due to the broader negative turn in Soviet-American relations--the sudden rise in emigration from 1978-1980 was reversed in subsequent years. (11) The drop in emigration from 1981-1987 led many to wonder if Jackson-Vanik was a failure, whereas others vehemently disagreed. (12) Yet by the very end of the 1980s, when Soviet leaders permitted more emigration in hope of ending the "economic cold war" with the United States, there became widespread sentiment that the amendment had accomplished its goals and that the USSR had earned a waiver from Jackson-Vanik.

Overview: The Jackson-Vanik Amendment, 1972-1975

Approved by Congress in 1974 and signed by President Gerald Ford in January 1975, the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the 1974 Trade Act denied "normal trade relations, programs of credits, credit guarantees, or investment guarantees," commercial agreements, and Most Favored Nation status (MFN) to all nonmarket economy countries that prohibited emigration, taxed emigrants, or punished those applying to emigrate. (13) Though the amendment was written in general terms, it was specifically crafted with Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union in mind. The amendment stemmed from efforts led by Washington Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson in 1972. (14) Over the course of two years, Jackson and his allies would marshal together a powerful coalition of support for the amendment. Importantly, the final draft of the 1974 Trade Act included a waiver clause that allowed Congress and the President to grant annual exemptions to countries that offered "assurances" on emigration. (15)

While the Jackson-Vanik amendment is frequently cited as a prime example of the role of domestic politics in foreign policy-making, it should be pointed out that impetus for Jackson-Vanik amendment came neither from lobbyist groups nor from grassroots sources. Rather, as Paula Stern points out, it was Senator Jackson himself who pushed forward the idea of linking the Soviet Jewish emigration issue to US-Soviet trade. It was only afterward that Jewish organizations and labor groups came aboard; but once they did, they helped Jackson garner the support of other politicians. Jackson, who had performed poorly in the 1972 Democratic presidential primaries, may have viewed the cause of Soviet Jewry as an ideal vehicle for his future presidential ambitions, as both Jews and unions were central components of the Democratic Party. The amendment was motivated in part by humanitarian concerns, but also fit Jackson's ideological orientation, which reflexively opposed the project of detente that Nixon's trade reforms hoped to supplement. (16)

Though Jackson's motivations may have been entirely genuine, the amendment undeniably raised his national profile, showcasing his legislative abilities and commitment to these issues. Jackson proved adept at pulling together a coalition in Congress. Within a matter of months, Jackson was able to bring together over seventy senators to cosponsor his initial proposal in 1972. (17) While this was a strong show of support, it must be noted that co-sponsorship was a symbolic act that did not require a commitment to any final bill, particularly since the 92nd Congress was about to be adjourned. (18) Even Nixon, convinced by Jackson that it would be unwise to make the cause of Soviet Jewry a "Democratic issue" before the upcoming presidential election, allowed his closest congressional allies to become cosponsors. (19) This political tactic likely annoyed Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who was particular wary of any domestic threats to his project of detente. (20)

Throughout the bulk of the 9Srd Congress (1973-1975), the administration sought out some way to keep Jackson's proposal from harming detente, which was also threatened by the 1973 war and pressure from conservative Republicans. While Nixon first hoped to dilute the proposal via congressional intermediaries, when Jackson ultimately undermined all such efforts, the administration relented and allowed Jackson to become part of the negotiation process with the Soviets. (21) Though this gave Jackson considerable power and prestige, it also forced him to prioritize his motives. Jackson came to the talk with an apparent willingness to compromise, and expressed to Kissinger that he would be satisfied if the Soviet Union were willing to allow 60,000Jews to immigrate a year. (22) Kissinger, who negotiated on the behalf of the administration, did not seem to believe this figure was out of the realm of possibility.

Unfortunately, the widest gap between Jackson and the Soviets was not about numbers, but was linked to their fundamental disagreement on whether an agreement on emigration would be public or private. Soviet leaders privately expressed a willingness to release many more Jews in exchange for MFN status, but they were unwilling to state a number publicly or give the assurances necessary for a waiver. (23) To publicly acknowledge that the United State had such leverage over Soviet domestic affairs would have greatly weakened Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, and though quietly waiving emigration taxes and accepting emigration requests was within the bounds of acceptable to him, openly bowing to American pressure was not. On the other end, Jackson, an ambitious politician, required public evidence that his effort had borne fruit. Hoping to bridge the gap, Kissinger claimed to Jackson and others that he had received assurances of the 60,000 annual emigration figure and remained vague during his congressional testimony, even though Soviet leaders had sent him a letter explicitly stating that there were no such assurances. (24)

Meanwhile Jackson was triumphant. He claimed victory during press conferences, much to Brezhnev's chagrin. The "waiver compromise" negotiated by Kissinger and Jackson would have helped the USSR receive an exception from the law if they made emigration assurances, but the Soviets publicly made clear that they had never made the specific assurances that Kissinger had claimed. (25) Compounding Soviet frustrations, Congress also adopted an amendment that placed a ceiling on credit that the Soviet Union could receive from the United States. (26) This amendment, the so-called Stevenson amendment, "limited Soviet import credits to $300 million over a five year period, prohibited credits for production of gas and oil" and capped energy exploration credits; some argue that it was this amendment rather than Jackson-Vanik that angered the USSR, and this may well have been the case. (27) In either case, soon after, the Soviets repudiated the whole exchange with Kissinger and Jackson, and subsequently made no effort to comply with any bargain on emigration. In the end, not only did the 1974 Trade Bill and its amendments harm detente, it precipitated a reduction in Jewish emigration from the USSR.

In retrospect, it seems that Jackson-Vanik was likely to fail in the short-term. The public, confrontational tactics of Henry Jackson were unlikely to succeed against a regime that cautiously guarded its sovereignty and its self-image. Any move to increase emigration allowances directly after the agreement only would have exuded weakness. Yet those who supported Jackson-Vanik did not blame Jackson for the drop, nor did they publically call the amendment a failure even though emigration numbers dipped from their 1973 peak of 34,733 down to 29,628, 13,221, 14,261, and 16,736 in 1974,1975,1976, and 1977, respectively. (28) Whether the amendment inhibited potential emigration or not, the passage of the Jackson-Vanik amendment was a "feel-good" moment for most American pro-emigrations activists; as David Harris notes, he "felt chills down his spine" when hearing of its passage. (29) Jackson-Vanik clearly raised the issue to a level of presidential importance--which may not have occurred otherwise--and the debate around it likely gave way to the sudden increases in emigration in the early 1970s. But when it came to short-term results for Soviet Jews, the passage of Jackson-Vanik was a victory in principle but not in practice. In the end, its role in "problematizing" the emigration issue and its status as a "feel-good" moment of confrontation against the USSR helped to solidify the feeling among many Jews that it was a landmark achievement.


The drop in emigration numbers after the passage of the amendment eventually raised concerns within the organized Jewish community. According to Marshall Goldman, Bertram Gold of the American Jewish Committee (AJC) and Phil Baum of the American Jewish Congress (AJCongress) were the first to go public in their call for a reexamination of the Jackson-Vanik amendment.30 In a June 1976 article titled "Rethinking Jackson-Vanik: A New Approach to Soviet Jewish Immigration?" Baum, AJCongress's executive director, questioned whether the amendment was effective considering that immigration had dipped since 1973. (31) Though this was a position at odds with many in the Jewish community, it was not far from the position of President Gerald Ford, who claimed that quiet diplomacy would be more effective in facilitating emigration. (32) AJCongress faced considerable criticism from the more confrontational Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry (SSSJ) and the Union of Councils for Soviet Jewry (UCSJ). On the other hand, Nahum Goldmann of the World Jewish Congress went even farther than Baum by saying that he supported Kissinger's view that "the adoption of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment caused the present decease in Jewish emigration from the USSR." (33)

In June 1978, leaders of AJCongress testified in front of the US Congress, offering their support for a bill that would have extended further credits to the Soviet Union for grain purchases, a move that indirectly contravened the terms of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. (34) Though some congressmen, such as Representative Jonathan Bingham (D-NY), "a staunch supporter of Soviet Jewry," lauded AJCongress's statement as "a significant development" that "demonstrates the willingness of Americans to respond reasonably and even generously to the concrete steps by the Soviets to improve relations and abide by internationally recognized principles of humanitarianism," many disagreed, including Senator Jackson. (35) The SSSJ, for example, claimed that the AJCongress action was "ill-timed at best and lacking in understanding of the thrust of Jackson's legislation," while the National Conference on Soviet Jewry (NCSJ), who AJCongress had hoped would stand with them, said that easing trade restrictions was not "a proper undertaking at this time." (36)

AJCongress's testimony came at a time when there was a sizeable bump in Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union in 1978 and 1979, where the numbers reached 28,865 and 51,320, respectively. (37) Henry Feingold notes that this rise took place during the SALT II talks as well as soon after the first Jackson-Vanik waiver was given to China, perhaps encouraging the Soviets that they too could benefit from a waiver. (38) It is also possible that Soviet concern over growing US-China ties led the USSR to shift its policies. Some in the Jewish community saw this as an opportunity to engage with the Soviet regime in a constructive manner. Soviet diplomats, believing that engagement with the Jewish community was the best way to get Congress to reconsider its stance on the amendment, set up meetings with Jewish leaders for private, off-the-record discussions. There, it was suggested that the Jackson-Vanik amendment had served its purpose and now it was time for its removal. (39) Even Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin participated in one of these meetings. Since the Soviet Union had begun increasing the number of immigrations as a sign of good faith, Dobrynin noted to the leaders, "We responded; we gave you the sign. Now what is your counter response?" (40)

In April of 1979, in the context of the Soviets' loosening of emigration restrictions, President Jimmy Carter stated, "I personally favor the extension of the most-favored-nation treatment to both the Soviet Union and China if it can be done in compliance with existing laws," a move that could have encouraged Jewish community leaders to engage in a compromise. (41) Rather than engaging, most active groups doubled-down on their support for the amendment, according to scholar Marshall Goldman. Hardline groups demanded that AJCongress not move forward, particularly considering that prominent dissidents and resfuseniks such as Anatoly Sharansky, Yuri Orlov, and others languished in prison. (42) Eugene Gold of the NCSJ wrote in the New York Times that "We can't understand, nor do we support, the rush to alter a perfectly good piece of legislation ... the Jackson-Vanik Amendment has literally and figuratively given tens of thousands of Soviet Jews an opportunity for new lives as Jews." (43) Nevertheless, AJCongress, during a congressional hearing on July 14, 1979, announced its support for a one-year waiver of the Jackson-Vanik amendment in light of the unprecedented outflow of emigrants, citing the fact that even Representative Vanik seemed open to the idea of a waiver. (44) But AJCongress remained in the minority, and few other Jewish organizations climbed aboard. Instead of viewing increased emigration as an opportunity to work with the Soviets toward a practical solution on emigration, many Jewish organizations thought they the Soviets' willingness to compromise was a sign that Jackson-Vanik was working, and that ultimately the regime would capitulate further. (45)

Though there were some congressmen, such as Senator Stevenson, who strongly supported loosening up on the USSR, (46) most in Congress opposed the Carter administration's efforts to pass a waiver. Senator John Heinz (R-PA) was among them, claiming, "it is only due to Jackson-Vanik that we have a softening of the Soviet position of Jewish emigration ... the Soviets respect strength and take advantage of weakness. It will be a sign of weakness if we soften Jackson-Vanik." (47) In the end, Congress voted to extend MFN status only to the People's Republic of China, not to the USSR, a move that further antagonized Soviet leaders. Even Vanik was aware that giving a waiver to China but not the USSR would result in "serious consequences," as it soon did. (48) The Soviet Immigration Agency, OVIR, responded by significantly curtailing the number of visas approved. It is important to note that this shift came in May 1979--before, not after, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that December. According to Goldman, the American move was viewed by the Soviets as "a clear signal that there was no point in moving to accommodate or seek compromise with the United States." (49) Goldman, a Harvard-educated expert on Soviet affairs, even suspected that "the denial of MFN status may have even removed a major restraint Soviet leaders may have had about their December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan." (50) That invasion and the subsequent American response caused significant damage to US-Soviet relations, making a breakthrough on emigration in the early 1980s appear unlikely.

Looking back on the events of 1978-1979, Goldman, who was closely involved in crafting AJCongress's position on the events, believes that the era represents a great missed opportunity on the behalf of the Jewish community. According to his logic, the Jewish community's inflexibility on the issue may have prevented tens if not hundreds of thousands of Jews from leaving sooner. The Jackson-Vanik amendment, according to Goldman, put America in a prime position to negotiate in the late 1970s, but by not using the leverage constructively, virtually all Soviet Jews remained trapped for the bulk of the 1980s. "Supporters of the J VA refused to acknowledge any need for change," Goldman claimed, and as a result, "as useful as the JVA was initially, by the mid-1980s it had become a barrier, in effect, a lost opportunity." (51)

In Goldman's view, Jewish leaders were acting as though confrontation with the Soviet Union was an end in and of itself, disconnected from practical needs to come to some sort of understanding with the regime. That being said, a major impediment to any reform in the USSR's favor was its own policies on Jewish emigre issues. The same time that Soviet leaders were allowing record numbers of Jews to leave the county, the regime was dealing harshly with imprisoned refusenik leaders. This put Jewish organizations in a very awkward position, and allowed hardline groups to drown out the efforts of AJCongress and others. Congressional leaders, who may have been quite inclined to accept a waiver otherwise, found it difficult to compromise with stories and images of Sharansky and others in the news. (52) The collapse of Soviet-American relations in late 1979 in conjunction with the lack of reciprocal movement to reward increased emigration set the stage for the 1980s, in which immigration would drop from 51,320 in 1979 to a low of only 876Jews in 1984. (53)


According to Gal Beckerman, "Soviet Jewry as a cause gained a huge boost with Reagan's presidency. The individual refusenik struggling against a repressive Communist regime fit perfectly into Reagan's narrative." (54) More so than his three immediate predecessors, Ronald Reagan shared the confrontational attitude of many leading Jewish activists. Both the president and Secretary of State George Shultz met with refusenik wife Avital Sharansky, and the president stated unapologetically in February 1983, "the issue of Soviet Jewry is of high priority to the administration." (55) On a similar note, when Shultz met with his Soviet counterpart Andrei Gromyko, he began by raising "human rights 'problems of Jews, dissidents and families divided by Soviet refusal to allow immigration'" and "objected to Gromyko's calling these concerns a 10th rate issue," according to Shultz's memoirs. (56) Yet though Reagan was perceived as being good for the American movement for Soviet Jewry, in part because he emphasized the plight of imprisoned refuseniks, his support for "the cause" did not quickly translate into tangible results. Reagan's first five years in office coincided with the worst period for Soviet Jewish emigration since the Jackson-Vanik amendment was implemented. The activists who were imprisoned during the Carter years remained in jail, while the number of emigrants averaged only 1,000 during the years 1983-1986. Despite the Reagan administration's continued support for the Jackson-Vanik amendment, US-Soviet trade hit a record high during Reagan's first term yet trade was not effectively used as leverage to push for emigration during this time, perhaps due to the lack of trust between the leadership of the two superpowers. (57)

Meanwhile, arguments that the Jackson-Vanik amendment was counterproductive to Soviet Jewish emigration became more prominent, as those who predicted its failure could now point to poor emigration figures as evidence. In summer 1982, former president Richard Nixon wrote that Jewish emigration increased from 1,000 to 35,000 during his time in office due to "private pressure" and "quiet diplomacy," emphasizing that "they will give up more in private than they will in public." (58) Nixon argued that the Jackson-Vanik amendment put Soviets on the spot and potential Jewish emigrants suffered as a result. (59) That same year Kissinger repeated his rejection of linking trade and emigration in his memoirs, also noting that when working with the Soviets, it was key when trying to make trade deals to not to do so "in such a way that they lose face." (60) Interestingly, as early as 1983, Shultz agreed that "quiet diplomacy" led to results more often than "counterproductive public embarrassment of Moscow," yet no effective "quiet diplomacy" took place for several years. (61)

Officials were not the only ones to take note of the dip in emigration. According to Fred Lazin, the great decline in Jewish emigration "demoralized and frustrated the Soviet Jewish advocacy movement in the United States. It confirmed fears that their own efforts on behalf of the Soviet Jews had been less than effective." (62) By 1983, Jewish publications were noting discontent with the amendment, as Boston's Jewish Advocate noted, "the current decline in Soviet Jewish emigration has convinced some people that the bill is no longer effective." (63) Yet many in the Jewish community did not question Jackson-Vanik and consistently resisted talk of a waiver or a suspension. B'nai B'rith "once more reaffirmed its strong support of the Jackson-Vanik amendment," which the organization termed "a milestone in human rights legislation" that would "always stand as an incentive for the Soviets to honor the right of emigration." (64) Dr. William Korey of B'nai B'rith rejected the arguments of Nixon and others, claiming that the 1972-1973 bump in emigration was caused by Soviet Jewish courage and international outcry, and declared that the Jackson-Vanik amendment did not "obstruct the flow of immigration, but rather symbolizes American commitment to human rights." (65)

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the death of Senator Henry Jackson in September 1983 was met with sadness as well as a reconfirmation of support for the amendment that carried his name. (66) In a statement that indicated his belief that the amendment increased Jewish emigration, AJC President Howard I. Friedman claimed that Jackson's name would "forever be associated with American legislation that has already helped more than a quarter of a million Jews emigrate from the Soviet Union to freedom," while AJCongress leaders lauded the deceased, noting that his "tremendous efforts on behalf of Soviet Jewry helped free thousands of men, women and children from Communist oppression." (67) Similar sentiments came from leaders of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, and the American Jewish Heritage Committee. (68)

In line with his prior stance, Korey used the occasion of Jackson's death to further make the case that Jackson-Vanik increased Jewish emigration. While his point that the yet-to-be-enacted amendment was vital for the 1973-1974 immigration boost, much of the rest of his case appeared somewhat labored, on the one hand crediting the amendment for the rise in immigration from 1976-1979, ignoring the drop after 1973, and on the other blaming any disappointments after 1974 on the related amendment that limited credit. (69) Any increase in emigration was attributed to Jackson-Vanik, whereas any drop was linked to outside factors, yet his tone still seemed quite defensive. This is not to say that outside factors were not important; they certainly were, as no one can doubt the importance of internal Soviet politics. Nor does anyone question that the overall context of US-Soviet relations was a key variable in emigration, but hardline Jackson-Vanik proponents seemed to forget the role that their confrontational attitude played in preventing those relations from warming, particularly at key moments in 1974 and 1979. (70)

Despite the malaise caused by the drop in emigration, the American movement for Soviet Jewry soldiered on, as groups continued to hold events and lobby officials. (71) But stagnation in the movement created some anxiety. Desperation led some Jewish leaders to call for experimentation, floating ideas such as pushing for strengthening Jackson-Vanik or increased engagement with the USSR. (72) On February 18, 1985, Jacqueline Levine, leader of the National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council, suggested that the Jewish community reconsider its stance on the amendment if the Soviets showed any signs of goodwill toward potential emigres. (73) Levine further noted that the United States may have made a mistake by not granting the USSR greater trade benefits in 1979 when emigration was at its highest, further emphasizing that such a strategic move could have given America more leverage if the Soviets started reducing emigration in the 1980s. (74) Various Jewish organizations voiced their disagreement with Levine, including B'nai B'rith and the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews, which warned that "with the Jackson-Vanik Amendment coming under considerable criticism of late, and pressure being placed on the Administration and Congress to ease restrictions, the historical facts ... serve as a reminder of the importance of continued support" for the amendment. (75)

The next year, one of the most prominent members of Congress followed Levine's lead in questioning the utility of the amendment. In April 1986, Senator Robert Dole (R-KS)--then-Senate Majority Leader, former vice presidential running mate to Gerald Ford, and future presidential candidate in 1988 and 1996--became the first congressional leader to float the idea that it might be time to search for a more "effective alternative" to Jackson-Vanik. The congressional leader suggested that the Jackson-Vanik amendment be temporarily suspended as "an encouragement and incentive to the Soviets to take another look at their human rights policies," arguing, "maybe it's time we ask the administration to work with the Congress to fashion some new approach." (76) During his address to the American Committee on East-West Accord, which promoted US-Soviet trade, Dole said, "I think it is fair to say [the Jackson-Vanik amendment] has met with mixed results ... the Soviets are offended by the fact that we try to impose restrictions and try to say 'unless we do this, we are not going to trade with you.'" (77) He suggested that various alternatives be explored, including a one-year goodwill suspension that would be extended if the Soviets "loosen up on emigration." (78) He noted that he was responding to the flexibility expressed by Jewish leaders, and that he would not move forward without their support, but underlined a fact apparent to all: "Despite the well-publicized release of a few of the better known refuseniks, for most Soviet Jews wishing to emigrate, matters are only getting worse." (79)

Dole's speeches elicited criticism from some Jewish groups. Hyman Bookbinder of the American Jewish Committee responded that "Mr. Dole has got it backwards. He should call on the Soviets to improve the situation," adding, "my feeling is that there isn't a chance in a million that this present Congress would suspend the law," although "they might be willing to consider the waiver provision" (80) if Soviets first lifted emigration restrictions. (81) But despite the defiant rhetoric of some Jewish groups, Dole's statement reflected the reality that the period between 1983 and 1986 was particularly disheartening for those supporting Soviet Jewish emigration. During those four years, annual emigration ranged between 876 and 1,114 individuals, which led more people than ever to publically question whether Jackson-Vanik was a liability. One moment of optimism during the period emerged when Mikhail Gorbachev was chosen as Soviet leader in March 1985, but the low emigration numbers during his first year in power led many to think that even that small glimmer of hope was misplaced. "The community [of activists] was demoralized" according to Beckerman, unwilling to compromise unless in response to Soviet action, and they saw Gorbachev as "just a newer, friendlier mask hiding the same monstrous face." (82) Yet over the next several years, events would unfold that exceeded even the wildest dreams of the activists, and by 1989, the situation was transformed so drastically that even staunch supporters of Jackson-Vanik were arguing that it was time for a waiver.


At the same time that Americans were increasingly questioning the utility of the Jackson-Vanik amendment, events within the Soviet Union and in US-Soviet relations helped shift the ground in favor of increased immigration. Though Gorbachev's rise did not accompany immediate gains on the issue, the new General Secretary and President Reagan did begin to slowly build a more positive relationship that helped relieve tensions, particularly at the Geneva Summit in November 1985 and the Reykjavik Summit the following October. In light of the long-stagnating Soviet economy, Gorbachev had decided that it was necessary to open up the country and to tone down expensive conflict with the Americans in order to revitalize the ailing superpower. Since Gorbachev first entered office, Reagan and Shultz consistently pushed him hard on the refusenik issue, particularly regarding the imprisonment of Antatoly Sharansky. (83) Gorbachev eventually cooperated; in 1986, an agreement was reached that allowed Sharansky to be freed in a prisoner exchange. (84)

Sharansky's release was a much-needed victory for the stagnating movement; soon after his release, Sharansky traveled to the United States to help revitalize American Jewish efforts to free Soviet Jews. In May 1986-- while Dole was still making the opposing argument--Sharansky argued forcefully in front of a packed meeting hall of the Presidents' Conference of Major Jewish Organizations that American leaders should "not agree to cancel the Jackson-Vanik legislation until some 400,000Jews leave the Soviet Union," emphasizing that Jews should continue their strong public stance on the issue. (85) In an August 1986 article, Wolf Blitzer declared that "the debate in the United States over the continued value of the Jackson-Vanik 'Freedom of Emigration' Amendment has been dropped," noting that Sharansky's "public statements strongly opposing any change in Jackson-Vanik during his recent highly publicized trip ... helped to kill some of the talk about amending the amendment." (86) Blitzer also cited the continued Soviet harassment of Jews and low emigration rates as major reasons why "it was clear now that United States is not going to ease the Jackson-Vanik restrictions unilaterally in advance of some serious changes in Soviet policy," something that the Senate Majority Leader had been advocating only three months prior. But after the Sharansky visit, seven Jewish organizations from across the political spectrum issued a statement stating declaring, "We vigorously reiterate our support for the principles and the policies represented by the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and affirm that we strongly oppose any legislation to repeal of modify it." (87)

Over the course of the next few years, diplomatic efforts made use of the opening of the Soviet Union to push forth more emigration, efforts that were backed by a reenergized American activist movement. In November 1986, the Soviet Union announced a shift in policy that would allow for more emigration, which Jews had been hoping for since Gorbachev's ascent to office. Richard Schifter, the Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, claims that the rhetorical tactic of welcoming improvements but always pushing for more was central in "bringing about a whole series of changes that resulted, by 1991, in almost free emigration." (88) While there is no doubt that the Reagan administration's tactful diplomacy on the issue during his second term in office helped, more important than rhetoric were the new realities in the Soviet Union--primarily, a more desperate situation and the ascent of a leader who was determined to make major changes in both domestic and foreign policy. Schifter found the Soviet Foreign Ministry to be surprisingly helpful, eventually becoming an ally in the process of facilitating emigration. (89) Moreover, the Reagan administration also tried, more effectively than previous administrations, to use domestic displays of American support for emigration to convey the point. Reagan himself repeatedly reminded Gorbachev during his December 1987 Washington visit of the 200,000-person rally for Soviet Jewry that had occurred days earlier. (90) At that rally, Jewish organizations confirmed their strong support for Jackson-Vanik, in part because recently released refuseniks staunchly approved of the tactic. Many refuseniks, such as Yuli Edelshtein, suggested that Americans should go even further beyond the amendment using the confrontational tactic of tying trade to emigration. A number of members of Congress, led by Representative Jack Kemp (R-NY) pushed for legislation that would allow Reagan to suspend loans previously issued to the USSR for human rights violations. (91) Indeed, as a Wall Street Journal article from 1987 noted, government officials frequently looked to Jewish leaders on how to deal with the Soviets on emigration--and by the end of 1987, American Jewish leaders were embracing more a more unyielding stance on Jackson-Vanik, partially due to the urgings of prominent refuseniks who supported a confrontational approach. (92)

Meanwhile, unlike Brezhnev had in the 1970s, Gorbachev did not respond to confrontation with defiance. Instead, after the rally, Gorbachev indicated in a meeting with congressional leaders that the USSR might soon become more flexible in permitting more Jewish immigration, especially by using "state secrets" less frequently as a reason for denying visas. (93) For Americans, it was a sign that Soviet leadership had changed in a meaningful way. By the time Gorbachev left Washington in mid-December 1987, Schifter said that he and other administration officials "were reasonably optimistic that the human right situation in the Soviet Union, generally, would improve, and so would Soviet emigration policy." (94)

That impression was correct. Emigration in 1988 reached 19,343, nearly triple the 1987 figure and higher than the sum of all emigration from 1982-1987. (95) While at the beginning of 1988, both the NCSJ and the UCSJ were dismayed that the 1987 figures were not higher, by the end of 1988 the NCSJ appeared cautiously optimistic while UCSJ and the SSSJ vehemently opposed liberalization of trade until the Soviets opened their gates entirely. (96) The progress made in 1988 led former Representative Charles Vanik to remark with optimism that he could soon "see hopeful circumstances where Congress and the Administration would provide a waiver under the law," a statement made in response to Gorbechev's recent comment that dismissed the Jackson-Vanik amendment as anachronistic. (97) Though gaining MFN status was not a life-or-death issue for the Soviets, it would have led to increased trade, as import tariffs for Soviet goods were still ten times higher than goods from other countries. (98) That same month, however, Congress was even considering raising the bar with legislation that would have established "a broad human rights standard as an additional test for the lower tariffs. Moscow wants to boost exports and to signify the status of equal trading partner." (99) By 1988, for Gorbachev, Jackson-Vanik seemed more like an annoyance than a challenge to Soviet sovereignty. (100) Soviet-American relations were headed in a positive direction, and meeting waiver requirements would both solidify them and ideally boost the Soviet economy, which was also in the midst of liberalization. Though Gorbachev feared the effect increased Jewish emigration would have on brain drain and other domestic dynamics, moving beyond the antagonistic relationship caused by Jackson-Vanik became the priority. When the USSR under Gorbachev began issuing significantly more visas, it appeared that Jackson-Vanik was finally "working." For the hawks, this meant until the very end, there was a need to push the Soviet Union even further. Yet for most people, by 1989 or 1990, Gorbachev had done enough to earn the USSR the waiver that American officials had hoped to grant fifteen years prior. In February 1989, numerous Jewish organizations expressed their flexibility on the trade issue, with some urging that it was necessary to reward Gorbachev now for the progress on emigration in order to support him against hardline communists. AJCongress voted to seek a temporary lifting of restrictions for amendment, and associate executive director Phil Baum underlined that "a waiver of Jackson-Vanik ... would thus shore up Gorbachev's position--and hence his ability to continue his improved policies toward the Jews." (101) On a related note, the NCSJ and eighteen other Jewish groups issued a statement that they were "reviewing and assessing US-Soviet trade policy in acknowledgment of positive changes for Soviet Jews." (102) But despite that, the NCSJ did not recommend a waiver by summer 1989, and along with many other supporters of the amendment, including former Jackson aide Richard Perle and Seymour D. Reich of B'nai B'rith, remained quite cautious, warning against any premature measures. (103) But the tide continued to shift. By May, Charles Vanik was openly calling for a waiver. "With the Soviet levels of immigration, and its dynamic effort to relax its regulations on religion and culture, why should the USSR be denied most-favored nation status under a Jackson-Vanik waiver?" Vanik asked. (104) The same month, former Senator Adiai E. Stevenson III, who had pushed the amendment to the 1974 Trade Bill limiting Soviet credit, penned an op-ed for The Seattle Times and Foreign Affairs calling Jackson-Vanik "a prototype of self-defeating policies in superpower relations." (105) Stevenson and Alton Frye, the vice president of the Council on Foreign Relations, argued that the amendment was "conceptually flawed, and it proved counterproductive in operation" and should be repealed immediately. (106) Secretary of State James Baker, along with most politicians still in office, were far more cautious to make changes to their stance on Jackson -Vanik. (107) It was not until the December 1989 Malta Summit, after a year of unprecedented emigration, that the Bush administration seemed open to ending trade restrictions and ending the economic aspects of the Cold War. (108) It took another twelve months, and the strong support of agricultural and corporate interest, but in December 1990, President George H. W. Bush finally signed a partial waiver of Jackson-Vanik for the USSR, which left Jewish groups largely satisfied. (109)


Two editorials--both written after the partial waiver was signed in December 1990--summed up two unequivocal though common views on the legacy of Jackson-Vanik. On December 21, The Jewish Exponent opined that:
   The Jackson-Vanik amendment ... represents a governmental success
   story ... [the amendment] has been justly credited with having a
   significant impact on Soviet Jewish emigration. Even more
   important, it kept the issue of Soviet Jewry ... on the
   front-burner while the Cold War was at its height. (110)

A week prior, a New York Times, editorial argued that:
   Jackson-Vanik was never more than an irritant, and hardly a spur to
   emigration. The flow of Soviet emigres rose and fell with the ups
   and downs in US-Soviet relations ... with the signing of SALT I,
   32,000 Soviet Jews were allowed out. In 1974, when Jackson-Vanik
   was voted, departures fell to 21,000, then to 13,000 in 1975. (111)

Both editorials contained elements of truth. It was the Jackson-Vanik amendment that turned the issue of Soviet Jewry into a priority of the federal government, as The Jewish Exponent stated. Yet the New York Times editorial-- which generally reflected the view expressed by foreign policy realists, Nixon administration officials, and by the late 1970s, a minority of congressmen and a few Jewish leaders such as Nahum Goldmann--was correct in stating the passage of the Jackson-Vanik served primarily as an irritant in US-Soviet relations for most of its history; emigration seemed most closely linked to trends in broader diplomatic relations than anything else. Yet the New York Times ignored the pivotal role that Jackson-Vanik played in making the issue something that the American and Soviet leaders needed to deal with in their diplomatic agendas. It also failed to note the crucial role that Soviet Jewry activists played in keeping the issue politically relevant enough that the USSR would yield when the country was in crisis. On the other hand, The Jewish Exponent refused to acknowledge the negative role that Jackson-Vanik played in the two great dips in emigration (1974-1977 and 1980-1986) nor the damage that Jackson-Vanik's confrontational approach did to positive US-Soviet relations, which were necessary to facilitate emigration. Their view can be in part reconciled by acknowledging that the threat of Jackson-Vanik--in part responsible for the 1972-1974 emigration boost--was far more effective than the amendment once it became law. (112)

The Jewish Exponent editorial echoed the view of many within the Jewish activist establishment. When emigration fell in the mid-1970s, they denied that there was a problem. When the number of emigrants rose in 1979 to over 50,000, they fought efforts to suspend the law or grant a waiver. This contrasted with the policies of groups such as the American Jewish Congress, which was concerned by the drop in emigration during the mid-1970s and thought that 1979 was a moment when flexibility was needed. Most of the debate within the Jewish community remained within such bounds--there was generally consensus that Jackson-Vanik was a milestone, but some argued for flexibility at certain moments while others disagreed. For hardliners, Jackson-Vanik was a "policy of principle" that must be abided by, whereas others argued that confrontation was only supposed to be a means to an end, not an end itself. (113)

Another aspect of the debate was whether America missed a historic opportunity to compromise with the Soviets on emigration in 1979. William Korey of B'nai B'rith countered that the drop in emigration was caused solely by the invasion of Afghanistan, not by any inflexibility on the Jewish issue. (114) Not only does Marshall Goldman make a strong argument that Jewish organizations' inflexibility was a cause for the drop in emigration, but also Ambassador Petrus Buwalda noted that the reduction in emigration came before the invasion. (115) Moreover, there are other signs that the 1979 emigration figure--51,530--should have warranted a positive response by the Americans. In 1987, after years of low emigration, former refusnik Natan Sharansky said that a waiver could be considered after "at least 50,000 of our brothers every year will be able to leave the Soviet Union." (116) Ironically, it was the refusenik imprisonment issue in general and Sharansky's case in particularly that made many Jewish organizations hesitant to support any loosening of trade restrictions in 1979. (117)

Understanding the centrality of the refusnik prisoner issue in the American movement for Soviet Jewry is extremely important. In the debates over waiving Jackson-Vanik, many American politicians typically looked to Jewish organizations for signs on how to act, while, to a varying degree, Jewish organizations listened to the prominent Soviet dissidents, who tended to push a confrontational approach. Sharansky's trip to the United States in 1986 lent credence to "holding strong" on Jackson-Vanik, just as images of his imprisonment made it hard for Jewish organizations to compromise earlier. From the start of the Jackson-Vanik debates in 1972, non-Jewish Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov's support helped convince more Americans about the need to take a hard, "principled" stance. (118)

Finally, one cannot forget another factor that is key to understanding the psychology behind the later debates on Jackson-Vanik: the legacy of the Holocaust. The idea that American Jews had remained "silent" while European Jewry suffered in the 1940s remained pervasive in Jewish discourse. Though Nixon and others tried to convince Jewish activists of the merits of "quiet diplomacy" over direct confrontation with the USSR in the struggle for Soviet Jewry, for many American Jews, the idea of being "quiet" while images of imprisoned Jews loomed seemed instinctively wrong. The passage of the Jackson-Vanik amendment felt so powerful for American Jews in part because it represented the opposite of "silence." For many, Jackson-Vanik was proof of Jews' full integration into American society and politics--it showed that they no longer needed to fear antisemitism when lobbying to protect their coreligionists. It may be one reason why many Jewish organizations, activists, and even politicians were slow to abandon a policy of confrontation, which focused more on principles than on the practical aim of maximizing annual Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. It is certainly a reason why, no matter how complicated its history may be, the legacy of Jackson-Vanik for so many in the Jewish community today remains powerful and positive.


(1) Ron Kampeas "At the Behest of Jewish Groups, Congress Rids Russia of Jackson-Vanik Restraints," JTA, November 14, 2012.

(2) Jacqueline McLaren Miller, "The Next Round on Jackson-Vanik," East-West Institute, March 14, 2012.

(3) David Harris, "End a Cold War Relic," International Herald Tribune, December 20, 1974.

(4) Miller, "The Next Round on Jackson-Vanik."

(5) Hasia Diner, The Jews of the United States, 1654-2000 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 344.

(6) "Jewish Groups Praise Russia's Removal from Jackson-Vanik," Jweekly, November 12, 2012.

(7) Fred Lazin, The Struggle for Soviet Jewry in American Politics: Israel Versus the American Jewish Establishment (New York: Lexington Books, 2005), 308-09; see chart in appendix.

(8) Henry Feingold, "Silent No More" Saving the Jews of Russia, The American Jewish Effort, 1967-1989 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2007), 145. Miller, "The Next Round on Jackson-Vanik."

(9) Robert E. Segal, "Why Soviet are Opening Doors," Jewish Advocate, May 17, 1979. Marshall I. Goldman, "Jackson-Vanik: A Dissent" in A Second Exodus: The American Movement to Free Soviet Jewry, ed. Murray Friedman and Albert D. Chemin, 115-23 (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1999), 121.

(10) "Cautions on Soviet Trade," Jewish Advocate, May 31, 1979.

(11) Goldman, "Jackson-Vanik," 121.

(12) David Friedman, "Sen. Dole Favors Jackson-Vanik Changes if Soviets Ease Policies," The Jewish Exponent, May 9, 1986.

(13) "19 USC [section] 2432 - Freedom of emigration in East-West trade (Full Text of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment)" Legal Information Institute, 2013.

(14) Though the amendment was named after Senator Jackson and his cosponsor, the idea of an amendment linking emigration and trade did not come from Jackson himself. See Fred Lazin, The Struggle for Soviet Jewry in American Politics: Israel Versus the American Jewish Establishment (New York: Lexington Books, 2005), 72n153 for a full account of the debate over the origin of the idea.

(15) Ibid.

(16) Regarding the impetus for Jackson-Vanik, see Paula Stem, Water's Edge: Domestic Politics and the Making of American Foreign Policy (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979), 21; and Feingold, "Silent No More," 115. On Jackson's opposition to detente, see Stern, Water's Edge, 19-22.

(17) Feingold, "Silent No More, "42.

(18) Stern, Water's Edge, 35, 42.

(19) Ibid., 39.

(20) Ibid.

(21) Ibid., 57.

(22) William Korey, "Jackson-Vanik: A Policy of Principle," in A Second Exodus: The American Movement to Free Soviet Jewry, ed. Murray Friedman and Albert D. Chemin, 97-114 (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1999), 109.

(23) Stern, Water's Edge, 137.

(24) Ibid.

(25) Ibid., 179-81.

(26) Ibid., 186.

(27) Lazin, The Struggle for Soviet Jewry, 50.

(28) Ibid., 318.

(29) David Harris, "End a Cold War Relic," International Herald Tribune, December 20, 1974.

(30) Goldman, "Jackson-Vanik," 118.

(31) Ibid., 117-18.

(32) "Ford, Carter Are Rapped on Jackson-Vanik," The Jewish Exponent, Philadelphia, September 24, 1976.

(33) "Goldmann Raps Jackson-Vanik," The Jewish Exponent, Philadelphia, November 12, 1976.

(34) Goldman, "Jackson-Vanik," 118.

(35) David Gross, "Ups and Downs of Jackson-Vanik," The Jewish Exponent, June 23, 1978.

(36) Ibid.

(37) Lazin, The Struggle for Soviet Jewry, 308-09; Feingold, "Silent No More," 219.

(38) Ibid.

(39) Goldman, "Jackson-Vanik," 119.

(40) Ibid.

(41) Wolf Blitzer, "Waiver For Jackson-Vanik?" The Jewish Exponent, May 11, 1979.

(42) Ibid.

(43) Ibid.

(44) David Landau, "MFN To USSR on a Trail Basis" Jewish Advocate, July 26, 1989. "Cautions on Soviet Trade," Jewish Advocate, May 31, 1979.

(45) Goldman, "Jackson-Vanik," 121.

(46) "Trading Survival with the Soviets," Jewish Advocate, March 15, 1979.

(47) Rahel Musleah, "Heinz on USSR: 'Offer Carrot, Keep Stick'" The Jewish Exponent, Philadelphia, June 6, 1979.

(48) "Cautions on Soviet Trade," Jewish Advocate, May 31, 1979.

(49) Goldman, "Jackson-Vanik," 121.

(50) Ibid.

(51) Ibid.

(52) Blitzer, "Waiver For Jackson-Vanik?"

(53) Lazin, The Struggle for Soviet Jewry, 308-09.

(54) Gal Beckerman, When They Come for Us, We'll Be Gone: The Epic Struggle to Save Soviet Jewry (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2010), 419.

(55) Lazin, The Struggle for Soviet Jewry, 183.

(56) Ibid.

(57) Feingold, "Silent No More," 229.

(58) "Rejects Assertion Jackson-Vanik Law Harmed Soviet Jewish Immigration," Jewish Advocate, June 2, 1983.

(59) Ibid.

(60) Ibid.

(61) Lazin, The Struggle for Soviet Jewry, 183.

(62) Lazin, The Struggle for Soviet Jewry, 181.

(63) "B'nai B'rith Presses for Human Rights," Jewish Advocate, July 7, 1983.

(64) Ibid.

(65) "Rejects Assertion."

(66) Yitzhak Rabi, "Jewish Leaders Voice Sorrow Over Death of Sen. Jackson," Jewish Advocate, September 8,1983.

(67) "Jewish Community Joins in Mourning Jackson," The Jewish Exponent, September 9, 1983.

(68) Ibid.

(69) William Korey, "Jackson-Vanik: It Has Worked Well," The Christian Science Monitor, October 20, 1983.

(70) Wolf Blitzer, "Many Await Next Strategic Move for Soviet Jewry," Jewish Advocate, August 29, 1985.

(71) Judith Antonelli, "'Caravan of Freedom' Dramatizes Sorry Plight of Soviet Jews," Jewish Advocate, December 6, 1984.

(72) Irving Greenberg, "Soviet Jewry Effort Needs a Push," The Jewish Exponent, May 17, 1985.

(73) Blitzer, "Many Await Next Strategic Move."

(74) Ibid.

(75) Ibid.

(76) Clyde H. Farnsworth, "Dole Proposes Suspension of Law Restricting Soviet Trade," The New York Times, April 25, 1986.

(77) Friedman, "Sen. Dole Favors Jackson-Vanik Changes."

(78) Ibid.

(79) Ibid.

(80) It is important to note the distinction between a suspension and a waiver. As former Jackson aide Richard Perle notes in the article--Thomas L. Friedman, "Bush Gets Appeal for Freer Trading With Soviets," The New York Times, May 5, 1989--a waiver would require emigration "assurances" from the USSR, while a suspension would be a unilateral act undertaken by Congress on a trial basis. Many of the proposals mentioned in the paper, such as AJ Congress's 1979 appeal for granting the USSR a one-year trial of MFN status and Vanik's similar suggestion in 1989, were unilateral and according to Perle's standard, and would thus require a modification of the legislation rather than utilization of a waiver, which could only be granted following required actions from the Soviet Union.

(81) Farnsworth, "Dole Proposes Suspension."

(82) Beckerman, "When They Come For Us," 458-59.

(83) Ibid., 474-78.

(84) Ibid., 479.

(85) Marc H. Tanenbaum, "Shcharansky--Unifying Force." Jewish Advocate, May 22, 1986.

(86) Wolf Blitzer, "Jackson-Vanik is Here to Stay," The Jewish Exponent, August 1, 1986.

(87) Ibid.

(88) Richard Schifter, "American Diplomacy, 1985-1989" in A Second Exodus: The American Movement to Free Soviet Jewry, ed. Murray Friedman and Albert D. Chernin, 136-57 (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1999), 139.

(89) Ibid., 145.

(90) Ibid, 146-47. "Thousands Raise Voices in D.C.," The Jewish Exponent, December 11, 1987.

(91) Ibid.

(92) Ibid. Robert S. Greenberger, "U.S. Looks to Jewish Leaders for Cues On Prodding Soviets Over Emigration," Wall Street Journal, May 18, 1987.

(93) Wolf Blitzer, "Gorbachev Offers Helpful Hint," The Jewish Exponent, December 11, 1987.

(94) Schifter, "American Diplomacy," 147.

(95) Lazin, The Struggle for Soviet Jewry, 308-09.

(96) Ibid., 227.

(97) "Co-Author as Alive as Law," The New York Times, June 5, 1988.

(98) Ibid.

(99) Clyde H. Farnsworth, "Rights Measure Disturbs Hopes for Soviet Trade," The New York Times, June 5, 1988.

(100) "Remember the Refuseniks?" The New York Times, December 14, 1990.

(101) Robert Pear, "Some Jews Favor Easing Soviet Trade Curbs," The New York Times, February 5, 1989.

(102) Ibid.

(103) Seymour Reich, "Letter: On Soviet Relations; Don't Discard Jackson-Vanik," The New York Times, November 18, 1989. Friedman, "Bush Gets Appeal."

(104) Friedman, "Bush Gets Appeal."

(105) Adlai E. Stevenson and Alton Frye, "Dump Jackson-Vanik--Time for a New Approach to Soviet Trade," The Seattle Times, May 28, 1989.

(106) Ibid.

(107) Friedman, "Bush Gets Appeal."

(108) Francis X. Clines, "The Malta Summit; Economic Pledges Cheer Soviet Aides," The New York Times, December 4, 1989.

(109) "Jackson-Vanik: A Powerful Weapon in Liberty's Arsenal," The Jewish Exponent, December 21, 1990.

(110) Ibid.

(111) "Remember the Refuseniks?" The New York Times, December 14, 1990.

(112) Frankel, "They Did not Dwell Alone," 311-12.

(113) Reich, "On Soviet Relations."

(114) Korey, "Jackson-Vanik: It Has Worked Well."

(115) Goldman, "Jackson-Vanik," 121. Petrus Buwalda, They Did Not Dwell Alone: Jewish Emigration from the Soviet Union 1967-1990 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997) 139-40. See table on page 222 for monthly emigration figures from 1979.

(116) Greenberger, "U.S. Looks to Jewish Leaders."

(117) Goldman, "Jackson-Vanik," 121.

(118) Reich, "On Soviet Relations."
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