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BEST PRACTICES, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR BODY WORN CAMERA PROGRAMS.

I. INTRODUCTION

The history of technology and science in the investigation of criminal acts is long and inclusive. In 1902, fingerprint evidence was used to gain a conviction in England. (1) By 1911, the first murder case using fingerprint evidence resulted in a guilty verdict in the United States. (2) By the end of the 20th century, visual and chemical comparisons used as evidence included hair strands, bite-marks, tire tracks, shoe prints, rifling marks on bullets, and extractor and firing pin marks on shell casings. (3) Eventually, however, new science led to the overturn of convictions where previous science had "proved" someone guilty. (4) This has been the case with arson investigations, rape cases, and terrorist bombings, to name a few. (5)

The most recent technological advance in the areas of police investigation and community policing is the body worn camera (BWC). (6) As of November 2014, forty-one of the 100 largest cities in America had some or all their police officers recording citizen interactions via body worn cameras and twenty-five more had plans to initiate some type of BWC program. (7) BWC programs are adopted internally through police departments' administrative processes and externally with state legislation requiring or recommending BWC programs to be adopted. (8) Much of the internal and external motivation behind the adoption of BWC programs is the research-supported belief that BWCs reduce use-of-force incidents and citizen complaints. (9)

Questions remain, however, on the full range of BWC programs' contributions. BWCs are the seemingly inevitable next step in evidence collection technology. (10) Still, they may not be a cost-effective addition to police departments throughout the United States. Going forward, municipal police departments must address the question of their contributions to (1) the administration of field operations and (2) the management of community relations. Some of the required assessments are quantifiable. The financial costs of introducing and maintaining BWC programs can be measured, as can the costs of responding to officer misconduct complaints (in and out of courtrooms) and the impact BWC programs have on successful policing practices. Less accessible factors to the evaluation of BWC programs include their impact on implicit bias among officers and community members, as well as their impact on democratic principles and civil liberties when police interactions with the public are recorded.

This article seeks to contribute to the literature on BWC programs by addressing the value of this technology through a principal-agent theoretical lens. As such, our focus is on the value of BWC programs to law enforcement agencies and personnel (agents of the public) and to community members, identified here as the principals. The principal-agent theoretical framework helps us to better understand the expectations (sometimes demands) of the component populations within a community and how police administrators ought to move forward in consideration of initiating or continuing a BWC program. While community or external dynamics are important in this consideration, they are not the only set of factors responsible for the success or failure of a BWC program in a community. Internal relationships are an equal partner in the mix. The agents (i.e., administrators, labor representatives, and police officers) constitute the internal groups affected by the dynamics of BWC policies and procedures. Their interests and capabilities must also be considered within an investigation of best practices in the use of BWC technology. In sum, we advance the call for examination of BWC programs through the lens of both principal and agent.

II. PRINCIPAL-AGENT FRAMEWORK AND EXPECTATIONS

Community members and police officers are engaged in a somewhat traditional principal-agent relationship, with the community in the role of principals, and officers in the role of agents. In Thomas Hobbes's culture-shifting work on the social contract, he believed the "passions that incline men to peace" (e.g., the "fear of death, desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living, and a hope by their industry to obtain them") compel humans to contract with a sovereign authority to modify, if not control, our inclination toward antisocial behavior. (11) This theoretical bedrock of modern governance is not lost in the law enforcement context. There is a clear connection between the work the police do in democratic societies and the desires of people to live free from harm--free from the war of "all against all" that Hobbes described. (12) Police officers in democratic societies are asked by the community to perform the dangerous and often conflict-riddled work of maintaining public safety. Police departments are given substantial public trust as agents allowed to use force, sometimes deadly force, in pursuit of public safety. In this context, community members desire professional conduct that validates their trust, supports their needs, and results in their personal safety. When these elements are missing from the relationship, or are threatened, it is rational for principals to demand responsiveness and accountability.

Problems within the principal-agent relationship arise when specified or desired goals are either not realized or when agents use methods not approved by the principal in attempts to reach desired ends. Both conditions are relevant in the policing context. Since the principal is responsible for getting the necessary and reasonable outputs produced, misdeeds of the agent should produce substantial discomfort among principals. Malfeasances either by intent or incompetence must be addressed by the principal lest they become party to the misdeeds. Waterman wrote that bureaucratic agents were complex to control. They have a tendency to exacerbate informational asymmetries to their own advantage. (13) Principal-agent researchers have observed bureaucrats employing tactics to (1) avoid responsibilities they do not favor and (2) increase their own independence. (14) More recently, it has been noted that agents exploiting information imbalances for "self-gain rather than for the collective interests of the contracting parties lead[s] to moral hazard problems." (15) In sum, if the agents develop tactics to tip the power balance to their favor, principals must develop methods to enhance their controls, or the experiment in self-governance and civil liberties is substantially threatened.

The relationship between the principal and agent in contemporary policing is not, however, one-sided. Police departments have unquestioned needs for the safety of their own members, for protection against false accusations of misconduct, and for cooperation as investigations attempt to shed light on sometimes-traumatic events. In each of these instances, community members have, from time-to-time, fallen short of these expectations for responsible behavior. Police departments are entrusted with large public budgets that must be protected against expenditures that do not materially increase their capacity to perform the contracted task of maintaining public safety. Here, the focus may turn to the agents holding principals accountable within this principal-agent relationship. Regardless of who is reviewing the data, either a member of the public or a police administrator, it is in the review of actual behavior that BWCs have perhaps the most promise. This technology is impactful when BWC data provides an objective account of behavior that falls short of social norms, though it can have a similarly important effect when cameras record individuals behaving well.

Policing agencies with existing BWC programs generally report that police and citizens experience improved behavior and more civil interactions when the BWCs are present than when they are not. (16) One experimental study from a California municipality with a population of approximately 100,000 people found that shifts with officers who wore body cameras had one-half as many forceful interactions with citizens as shifts where BWCs were not employed. (17) This is a remarkable finding in terms of the principle-agent relationship, insofar as the goal from both sides of the relationship is to minimize harmful behavior. With BWC programs, the behavior of the citizen or suspect in the police-citizen encounter is as likely to be affected as the behavior of the police when a BWC is present. (18) A positive change in behavior seems evident when the public is aware that recording is in progress at an event where police are present. (19) The result, described in greater detail below, is a lower incidence of use-of-force by police officers within departments with BWCs. (20) The same study noted a similar reduction in citizen complaints against officers. (21) Reductions in use-of-force and citizen complaints is partially a function of knowing that misdeeds can be discovered later through BWC recordings, causing a downward pressure on both negative behavior and officer use-of-force. (22)

Though the relationship between police and community is complex, the structure and intent for law enforcement in the United States creates a set of predictable expectations. The expectations, for both parties, include transparency, accountability, and safety. These expectations relate also, more generally, to respect for the place of law in a democratic society where civil liberties and moral behavior is valued. The remainder of this article focuses on what BWC programs contribute to meeting the expectation of principals and agents in this long-standing and essential relationship.

III. PROGRAM PRACTICES AND OUTCOMES

The challenge for BWC programs in municipal police departments is not whether accountability is a rational expectation. Instead, the pressing question is how accountability can be properly balanced with sometimes-conflicting needs and values at issue in this domain, including privacy, efficiency, and opportunity costs.

Perhaps the most important benefit of BWCs to the public is the accountability and transparency they provide when administered in a way that allows video and audio data to be appropriately shared. (23) BWCs help resolve questions following contentious encounters between community members, and between officers and community members, by creating an objective and reviewable record. (24) The most acute among these encounters involves the use-of-force. Given the capacity of BWCs to produce a more objective review of incidents, we are at a place in the development of police and community relations where conflicting accounts can be resolved without the lingering distaste of a disputed factual basis. Whether a community member or a police officer is found to have overstepped in the review of BWC recordings, increased transparency allows for greater legitimacy for police departments. Enhanced legitimacy, then, has a reciprocating effect on police capacity, insofar as we understand legitimacy to be essential to the capacity of police departments to work productively with victims, witnesses, and the community members at-large. In some cases, enhanced legitimacy can lead to increased compliance and a reduction of criminal activity. (25) In sum, when the principals of a community are satisfied--procedurally, substantively, or psychologically--their relationship with agents is enhanced and the work of the agents is made more effective. The data bears this out. (26)

To begin, departments that have adopted the use of BWCs experienced reduced frequency of citizen complaints filed against officers. (27) According to one particularly effective review of related research, departments have experienced between fourteen and eighty-nine percent lower rates in complaints against officer misconduct. (28) The effect of BWC programs on citizen complaints is multi-directional. Some of the enhanced performance of officers, as measured by reduced citizen complaints, results from the actual presence of BWCs in the field. As noted above, the use of BWCs has a mitigating effect on recorded individuals. More than just the presence of BWCs is impactful; they also serve as valuable training to officers by providing live scenarios. Constructive feedback from supervisors who can work through the details of officer and citizen interactions provides a high-impact training opportunity. These trainings run the gamut of improved tactical abilities, communication, problem solving, and customer service. (29) The Aberdeen, South Dakota, Police Department (APD) was one of the first adopters of BWCs, committing to use cameras in 2010 as part of a cold-weather instrument test when Taser International (now Axon) developed their BWC technology. (30) During the nearly eight years of experience, APD has developed the BWC program as the foundation of their departmental training program. (31) The recording of how situations play out in their own jurisdiction and how citizens view those interactions is key to the training of APD officers. (32) APD reported that BWCs are particularly instrumental in use-of-force cases, where recordings are used to assess citizen complaints and officer liability. (33) Again, the presence of an objective record is essential when clarifying the actions taken by all involved. Access to recorded interactions is a substantial advancement towards accountability and has had a mitigating effect on police and community relations. (34) Even still, there is more to the observed experience of BWC programs than outright success.

Though generally, studies of BWC programs have observed reductions in use-of-force and citizen complaints, there is conflict over the generalizabihty of this research. (35) The findings of one study involving the officers of eight departments, serving over two million people in total, was seemingly contrary. That study found no significant difference in use-of-force interactions between officers using BWCs and those who did not. There was also no statistically significant difference in the assault of officers by subjects (36) According to Jay Stanley of the ACLU problems resulted in Albuquerque, New Mexico from supervisors not holding officers accountable to departmental policy regarding camera activation. From a principal-agent perspective this is worrisome. According to Stanley, the policy breach occurred when officers failed to activate cameras meant to capture mandated interactions. Within the scope of existing departmental policy, this failure should have resulted in administrative sanctions, but it did not. Once a lack of consequences for failing to operate the cameras according to policy was known to officers, some chose not to activate their BWCs during incidents that later led to complaints or use of force. (37) Though the percentage of events where cameras were intentionally not activated remains unknown, it is regarded as a substantial threat to the principal-agent relationship, insofar as accountability is a well-regarded cornerstone of public policy in a democratic republic. This is particularly true of policies governing BWC programs, given their central role in the contemporary public-police relationship.

There are, however, negative unintended consequences arising from the use of BWCs in the field of police operations. Most notably is the concern that BWC programs will be detrimental to the privacy rights of citizens, which gives us a glimpse of how difficult it is to balance the needs and expectations of principals and agents in the administration of BWC programs. (38) In this consideration, we should begin with re-victimization as it presents the greatest potential for harming community members. A recent victim's feelings of being violated, exposed, and vulnerable could be amplified by the presence of a camera when the police are responding to a call for help. Problems occur within the principal-agent relationship when public disclosure laws classify BWC recordings a matter of public record and are not sensitive to the troubling nature of many police-citizen encounters. (39) On the one hand, the public may very well want BWC data to be disclosed to ensure professional conduct of their agents in the law enforcement context. On the other hand, that same public has an interest in protecting the investigative process and the safety and liberties of victims, witnesses, informants, and suspects. Some police departments address these concerns through policies that give officers discretion to determine what is appropriate to record and disseminate. (40) This approach must be weighed against the potential abuse of officers attempting to avoid recording negative contacts with community members, some of which have ended with officer use of deadly force under questionable circumstances. (41) Clearly, there is tension in the use and administration of BWC programs, which is why we believe this study situating BWC programs in the framework of the principal-agent relationship is important.

As in many instances of public policy, factions differ on what is the appropriate balance of transparency and privacy in the administration of BWC programs. Some groups seek a balance that deemphasizes the potential invasion of privacy for the greater social interest of increasing the transparency. (42) This view maintains that the essential purpose of BWCs is to prevent police abuse of power. Here, the values of accountability and public trust have become of paramount importance to inhibit cases that resemble the Michael Brown incident in Ferguson, Missouri. (43) Other groups focus primarily on exempting as much BWC footage from public disclosure laws as possible. (44) This is justified by the belief that police departments will release footage believed to not harm personal privacy or compromise investigations. (45) In sum, this approach relies on departmental expertise in managing investigations, privacy rights, and their own personnel but requires a withdrawal from the bank of public trust. For departments that have transparent and responsible standards for the treatment of BWC data, and that have earned enhanced levels of public trust, departmental discretion may be a well-suited governance strategy for BWC programs. For departments that struggle with public trust issues, we should expect substantial engagement from community advocates seeking to remove departmental discretion from the policies that govern the release of BWC recordings.

At a more granular level, there is conflict over the potential surveillance applications of BWCs to monitor crowds, micromanage officers, or identify individuals who are uninvolved in active investigations. (46) These concerns come from internal stakeholders (e.g., officers and labor unions) as well as external stakeholders (e.g., community rights advocates). (47) The absence of balanced policies governing the appropriate use of BWC technology will only exacerbate these and related conflicts. Recognizing this, the case for negotiated rulemaking in the BWC program context is particularly strong. Clearly, there is a role for police departments, legislatures, courts, and community leaders to play in the formation of informed and balanced policies to govern BWC programs.

IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

This article began with the premise that BWC technology was a logical next step in development of evidence collection. The research has shown not only intended and unintended benefits in the adoption of BWC technology in contemporary law enforcement but also looming costs that must be addressed to preserve and maximize the benefits of this new technology. We understand that less witness cooperation is needed when excited utterances, abusive behavior, and tangible harm are collected at the time of the event and are placed into evidence. BWC evidence gathered on scene at initial report sites works in an even more comprehensive way than written victim statements. Recording captures nuances not included in written reports, no matter how thorough or complete the writer is. Spontaneous statements relating to guilt are most strongly revealed by BWCs even though they may not be listed in first-responding police officer reports used for charging decisions. (48) Often, a statement which is made at initial contact might not seem relevant until facts become known. This is true not only from the point of view of prosecutors but also from the view of the defense. Exculpatory indicators may lie within BWC evidence that did not become apparent to the officers who responded to the scene.

The benefits of BWCs extend beyond the administration of guilt or innocence. They extend to the principal-agent relationship in the form of increased transparency, accountability, responsiveness, legitimacy, and trust. More narrowly, BWC programs can reduce the burden of administrative work through efficient evidence collection and can, consequently, allow for more time in the field for increasingly community-oriented police departments. (49) The evidence from BWC programs demonstrates that this new technology can assist officers in becoming more effective public servants through high-impact training and the resolution of conflicts that--when pushed--had previously been dealt with more subjectively through the adversarial litigation process. (50)

The costs associated with the adoption of BWC programs and their administration primarily include the threat to privacy rights and (sometimes) the dignity of community members. Added to these higher-order concerns for the principal-agent relationship are the financial costs associated with the adoption and proper administration of BWC programs. In a survey conducted by the Police Executive Research Forum, thirty-nine percent of respondent agencies that did not use body cams cited administrative cost as a primary barrier to adoption. (51) At a public forum in Rapid City, South Dakota, the Rapid City Police Chief identified the opportunity costs of adopting a BWC program as limiting the victim services resources available to serve the community's most vulnerable and injured segment of the population. (52) Here, the tension between accountability and constituent service was on clear display. Keeping in mind that the Rapid City Police Department is looking to advance long-desired conciliation between the department and the Native American community it serves, this tension in the consideration of adopting a BWC program was authentic. (53)

In the end, there are several paramount issues in play regarding BWCs and communities served by law enforcement agencies. Efficiency, effectiveness, transparency, accountability, and privacy top the list. There is no doubt that these issues are interwoven as a fabric. All are desirable; some are bedrock. A caveat here is that the move to the adoption of a BWC program is expected to be a permanent commitment. Once adopted and implemented, a BWC program will become the norm--for better or worse. The public will become accustomed to a program's existence and usage, character and contribution. Attempting to rollback a BWC program at this point in their historical development will most likely be unpopular and met with great resistance. Imagine the pushback if police and prosecutors decided to stop using other types of evidence, such as fingerprints or blood alcohol concentrations, in cases they investigated and prosecuted. The longer a program has been in effect, the greater the resistance to reducing, reforming, or deleting it will be. (54) Therefore, it is essential that municipal police departments "get it right" when it comes to BWC programming.

The conclusion derived from this inquiry is that, for police departments to properly serve the democratic principals who grant police departments the public trust necessary to their work, there must be adequate resources and administrative commitment to advance a successful BWC program. This includes, but is not limited to, the deliberate effort to meet the needs of democratic principals in the areas of information management and privacy rights, lest the principals resort to more stringent accountability measures for programs that have not given due consideration to these essential interests. An example of an accountability measure on the horizon was noted in a recent National Public Radio story describing the movement to turn the videos over to a neutral third-party public entity. (55) From Texas to New York, there is a growing movement maintaining that the BWC programs are in place to serve the agents rather than the principals. (56)

Some of the difficulty comes from the lack of standardization in the policies governing BWC programs, giving rise to the perception (and actuality) of manipulated or imbalanced administration of these programs. Other nuanced challenges result from the inherent tensions present in attempting to balance evidentiary needs of the agent (acting on behalf of the principals) and the liberty interests of the principal. To develop mutually beneficial BWC programing and to support the principal-agent relationship in this context, these tensions need to be addressed. Principals should be informed and included to establish support for BWC programs and all the promise these programs offer to law enforcement and the community. Police administrative and state legislative leaders should, for their part, maintain best practices for the administration and oversight of BWC programs to fulfill their mission as agents in a democratic republic.

Copyright [c] 2019. All rights reserved by Rich Braunstein, David Erickson, and the South Dakota Law

Review.

([dagger]) Rich Braunstein is a Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of South Dakota. His research interests include Native American criminal justice, community policing and voting rights. He serves as Chair of the South Dakota Advisory Committee to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights and has served as a research consultant to several state, tribal and municipal governments. Currently, he is working on a study of the impact of the Aberdeen Police Department's body worn camera program.

([dagger][dagger]) David Erickson has worked in government at the city, county, state and federal levels. He has worked as a sworn officer in parks, conservation and law enforcement for over thirty-five years. He has a MS in administrative studies from the University of South Dakota (USD), where he is a doctoral candidate and adjunct instructor.

RICH BRAUNSTEIN ([DAGGER]) & DAVID ERICKSON([DAGGER][DAGGER])

(1.) Jessica M. Sombat, Latent Justice: Dauberi's Impact on the Evaluation of Fingerprint Identification Testimony, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2819, 2833 (2002).

(2.) Id. See also Benjamin Judkins, Fingerprints as Evidence in a Victorian Case, 3 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 954, 954-55 (1912) (discussing fingerprints as accepted evidence in a trial); Fingerprint History, U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE, https://www.usmarshals.gov/usmsforkids/fingerprint_history.htm (last visited March 21, 2018) (providing a historical timeline of fingerprinting).

(3.) Veronique Greenwood, Beyond Reasonable Doubt, 230 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 30, 38 (2016).

(4.) See id. at 44 (discussing how "the first use of DNA in a criminal case led not to a conviction but to an exoneration").

(5.) Id. at 39, 44.

(6.) Brian Liebman, The Watchman Blinded: Does North Carolina Public Records Law Frustrate the Purpose of Police Body Cameras?, 94 N.C. L. REV. 344, 345 (2015).

(7.) Id.

(8.) See id. (discussing "legislation requiring law enforcement officers to wear body cameras").

(9.) Barak Ariel et al., The Effect of Police Body-Worn Cameras on Use of Force and Citizens' Complaints Against the Police: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 31 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 509, 509(2014).

(10.) Sarah Volpenhein, Some Rural Departments Embrace Police Body Cameras While Others See Barriers to Using Tech, GRAND FORKS HERALD (Nov. 29, 2015), http://www.grandforksherald.com/news/3892282-some-rural-departments-embrace-police-body-cameras-while-others-see-barriers-using-tech.

(11.) THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 78 (1994); Amy M. Schmitter, /7th and 18th Century Theories of Emotions, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Oct. 15, 2010), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/emotions-17th 18th.

(12.) THOMAS HOBBES, THE ELEMENTS OF LAW NATURAL AND POLITIC: PART l HUMAN NATURE; PART II DE CORPORE POLITICO; WITH THREE LIVES 298 (J.C.A. Gaskin ed., 1999).

(13.) 8 WATERMAN, R. W., & MEIER, K. J. PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODELS: AN EXPANSION? JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND THEORY 173-202 (1998).

(14.) H. GEORGE FREDRICKSON ET AL., THE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION THEORY PRIMER. 62 (2012).

(15.) David M. Van Slyke, Agents or Stewards: Using Theory to Understand the Government-Nonprofit Social

Service Contracting Relationship, 17 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. &THEORY 157, 162 (2006).

(16.) See Lindsay Miller ct al., Implementing a Body-Worn Camera Program: Recommendations and Lessons Learned, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST. CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERV. 1, 6 (2014), http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Free_Online_Documents/Technology/irnplementing%20a%20b ody-worn%20camera%20program.pdf (suggesting how to implement a body camera program).

(17.) Ariel, supra note 9, at 531.

(18.) See Body-Worn Camera Toolkit: Research, BUREAU OF JUST. ASSISTANCE (2017), https://www.bja.gov/bwc/Topics-Research.html (citing extensive information on policy, forms, and insights into BWC systems for all sizes of departments).

(19.) Id.

(20.) See infra Part III (describing the program practices and outcomes).

(21.) Ariel, supra note 9, at 531.

(22.) Id. at 516.

(23.) See generally infra text accompanying notes 38-41 (discussing the conditions under which the dissemination of BWC data is appropriate, as well as the concerns for harmful use of BWC recordings).

(24.) Karson Kampfe, Police-Worn Body Cameras: Balancing Privacy and Accountability Through State and Police Department Action, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1153, 1155 (2015).

(25.) Tom R. Tyler, Policing in Black and White: Ethnic Group Differences in Trust and Confidence in the Police, 8 POLICE Q. 322, 323 (2005); Ronald Weitzer & Steven A. Tuch, Determinants of Public Satisfaction with the Police, 8 POLICE Q. 279, 280 (2005).

(26.) See generally Charles M. Katz et al., Evaluating the Impact of Officer Worn Body Cameras in the Phoenix Police Department, ARIZ. STATE UNIV. CTR FOR VIOLENCE PREVENTION AND CMTY. SAFETY (2009), https://publicservice.asu.edu/sites/default/files/ppd_spi_feb_20_2015_final.pdf (summarizing the impact of body cameras); Miller, supra note 16 (suggesting how to implement a body camera program).

(27.) Miller, supra note 16, at 5-6.

(28.) Kampfe, supra note 24, at 1165.

(29.) Telephone Interview with Dave McNeil, Aberdeen Police Department Chief of Police, in Aberdeen, SD (Dec. 19, 2017).

(30.) Telephone Interview with Jay Tobin, Aberdeen Police Department Operations Division Captain, in Aberdeen, SD (Dec. 19, 2017) [hereinafter Tobin Interview],

(31.) Id.

(32.) Id.

(33.) Id.

(34.) Id.

(35.) Ariel, supra note 9, at 526; K.atz, supra note 26, at 12; Miller, supra note 16, at 51.

(36.) Ariel, supra note 9, at 750.

(37.) Jay Stanley, Police body cameras: The lessons of Albuquerque (Mar. 24, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/blog/police-body-cameras-lessons-albuquerque.

(38.) Kampfe, supra note 24, at 1181 -82.

(39.) Id. at 1182-83.

(40.) Id. at 1183-84.

(41.) Id. at 1175.

(42.) Id. at 1175-78.

(43.) Aamer Madhani, Ferguson Residents Petition for Police Body Camera Rules, USA TODAY (June 23, 2015), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/06/23/ferguson-residents-push-for-body-camera-rules/29179439/.

(44.) Kelly Freund, When Cameras are Rolling: Privacy Implications of Body Mounted Cameras on Police, 49 COLUM. J. LAW. & Soc. PROBS. 91, 113-14 (2015).

(45.) Id.

(46.) Id. at 93, 97, 103, 107.

(47.) Tami Abdollah, Officers Fear Body Cameras Raise Privacy Concerns, POLICEONE (Mar. 15, 2014), https://www.policeone.com/police-products/body-cameras/articles/6976369-Officers-fear-body-cameras-raise-privacy-concerns/; Jay Stanley, Police Body-Mounted Cameras: With Right Policies in Place, a Win For All, ACLU (Mar. 2015), https://www.aclu.org/other/police-body-mounted-cameras-right-policies-place-win-all.

(48.) Weston Morrow et al., Assessing the Impact of Police Body-Worn Cameras on Arresting. Prosecuting, and Convicting Suspects of Intimate Partner Violence, 19 POLICE Q. 303, 305 (2016).

(49.) Kampfe, supra note 24, at 1165.

(50.) Tobin Interview, supra note 30.

(51.) 3 Cost-Saving Strategies for Your Body Camera Budget, POLICEONE (Mar. 11, 2016) [hereinafter Body Camera Budget], https://www.policeone.com/police-products/body-cameras/articles/156676006-3-cost-saving-strategies-for-your-body-camera-budget/.

(52.) Karl Jegeris, Chief of Police, Rapid City Police Department, Public Forum at Mother Butler Center in Rapid City, South Dakota: Rapid City Police Department and the Native Community in Rapid City: Examining Policing Trends, Community Opinions and Best Practices (Nov. 2015).

(53.) Rich Braunstein & Tobias Schantz, Rapid City Police Department and the Native Community in Rapid City: Examining Policing Trends, Community Opinions and Best Practices, GOV'T RES. BUREAU U.S.D. 1, 2 ' (Nov. 2015), https://www.rcgov.org/index.php?option=com_docman&view=download&alias=406-pd-usd-study-report&category_slug=police-department&lternid= 149.

(54.) Miller et al., supra note 16, at 27.

(55.) Martin Kaste, Should Police Control Their Own Body Camera Footage?, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (May 25, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/05/25/529905669/should-the-police-control-their-own-body-camera-footage.

(56.) Id.
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