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Army Intelligence Master Plan. (Leadership Notes).

As with all of the Intelligence Community, the Army Intelligence Master Plan (AIMP) office reacted with shock and outrage at the attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001, mixed with introspection and the questions: "Could we have prevented this?" "Could we have anticipated the use of commercial aircraft to attack structures that are icons of our society?" Their use only served to highlight discussions already underway regarding terrorist threats, asymmetric means of delivery, and ways to counter them.

That these threats were under discussion, however, brought us no solace. On the contrary, our conclusions regarding these attacks in many respects validated our notions of a future very different from the past, and our need for change to deal with the new realities, In a larger sense, September 11 also validated the impetus for Transformation of the Army as a whole. If anything, the future had arrived sooner than expected, revealed by a threat last seen in the battle-tossed seas around Okinawa.

Some see asymmetric warfare as a war--

* In which our adversaries do not fight by "the rules."

* In which there are no limits on their selection of targets.

* That violates the tenants of the Law of War regarding the deliberate murder of the noncombatants.

* In which the terrorist organizations have such effective operations security (OPSEC) and compartmentalization that their operations are virtually impenetrable to U.S. Intelligence.

We do not buy it! While the rules are different--or ignored--terrorists cannot ignore the laws of physics or the requirements to plan and execute their operations. Indeed, they must recruit, train, command, control, and communicate with their members as well as move to conduct their attacks. These functions vary from the Cold War-era Soviets in the much smaller size and greater flexibility of the terrorist organizations, their more secretive nature, and their deliberate attempts to avoid becoming predictable. This, however, does not mean they are immune from detection, only that their indicators and vulnerabilities--and they are present--are disparate. We also believe we can counter these asymmetries with other asymmetries; we believe the United States is capable of asymmetries beyond the reach of any other nation or armed force on the planet. This includes resources, technology, doctrine, training, and the skill of our soldiers. In this latter category, Army Intelligence plays a central role by conducting t he most sophisticated analysis in the history of warfare.

Here is our idea of asymmetric warfare. A terrorist dies in his cave before he can ever do harm to another U.S. citizen, killed by a weapon he never heard or saw, after identification by sensors of which he is unaware, fused in an all-source fashion using automated tools and analytical methodologies.

One of the truisms of Military Intelligence is that we must think like the enemy. That is hard to do when his actions include the deliberate murder of innocents, a crime directed not only at the United States but also to all of civilization. Unfortunately, however, we must accomplish this if we are to counter the threat. In the following article, Mr. Brad Andrew provides considerably more detail on how the emerging threats, asymmetric warfare, the Homeland Security aspects of Army Transformation, and the evolution of Army Intelligence are interwoven into the future of Military Intelligence.

RELATED ARTICLE: MI Corps Hall of Fame Inductees

The Military Intelligence Corps honored its latest inductees into the Hall of Fame on 28 June 2002: Colonel Richard Allenbaugh, Lieutenant General (LTG) Donald Kerrick, Chief Warrant Officer Five Michael Maroney, LTG Ira Owens and Major Walter Unrath.

Collin Agee (Lieutenant colonel, u.s. Army, Retired) is a Futures Analyst on the Army Intelligence Master Plan office. His Ml assignments included J2 Operations for U.S. Forces in Haiti, XVIII Airborne corps Analysis and control Element (ACE) chief, and G2, 10th Mountain Division (Light). He has earned a Master of Military Arts and Science degree from the School for Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), and a Bachelor of Science degree in National Security and Public Affairs from the U.S. Military Academy. Readers may contact him via E-mail at collin.agee@hqda.army.mil and telephonically at (703) 601-0391.
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Article Details
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Author:Agee, Collin A.
Publication:Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin
Article Type:Brief Article
Geographic Code:1USA
Date:Jul 1, 2002
Words:690
Previous Article:CIA support to Operation Enduring Freedom.
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