Arms control and disarmament in South Africa after the cold war.
The radical change in its internal and foreign policies during the late 1980s and the ending of the Cold War have led to South Africa disarming itself with regard to weapons of mass destruction. Following the first democratic election in 1994, South Africa has become a respected member of the world community in the field of arms control and disarmament. Although not always apparent in practice, South Africa attempts to act responsibly when exporting conventional weapons; is a force curbing the proliferation of light and small arms in Southern Africa; and has placed a ban on anti-personnel mines.
The purpose of this article is to assess arms control and disarmament in South Africa since the end of the Cold War. A conceptual framework is presented to provide insight into the phenomena of arms control and disarmament, whereafter an overview is given of the situation as it developed during and existed at the end of the Cold War. This is done with reference to the post-Cold War period; the introduction of disarmament; South Africa's policy concerning arms control and disarmament; South Africa's approach to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and South Africa's position concerning conventional weapons, including small and light arms.
2. DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The concept of disarmament is defined in various ways. According to Bull disarmament is "the reduction or abolition of armaments. It may be unilateral or multilateral; general or local; comprehensive or partial; controlled or uncontrolled". (1) Unilateral disarmament means action by a single state; bilateral disarmament that an agreement has been entered into by two states; and multilateral disarmament that an agreement has been entered into by more than two states, (2)
Booth states that "(d)isarmament is a continuation of strategy by a reduction of military means ... these concepts are best understood as strategies in the business of politics among nations". (3) Along similar lines, Buzan views disarmament as "the most direct--and in a sense the crudest--response to the problem of military means. Its logic is that since weapons create the problem, the solution is to get rid of them. This logic can be applied to all weapons--general and complete disarmament (GCD)--or to specific categories of weapons deemed to be particularly dangerous, such as nuclear bombs and biological warfare agents. It can be applied unilaterally or multilaterally, and can involve partial or complete elimination of the specified type(s) of weapon. The concept refers both to the process by which capabilities are reduced, and to the end condition of being disarmed". (4)
Singer identifies three different ways in which disarmament can be approached, namely the "tensions first" approach; the "political settlement" approach; and the "weapons first" approach. (5) According to the "tensions first" approach conflict can be decreased or completely eliminated through education and the improvement of relations between the parties involved. This can lead to a better understanding of the situation and greater respect and a sense of tolerance of each other. This in turn could lead to greater flexibility in disarmament negotiations and even to a willingness to disarm. (6) The "political settlement" approach contends that disarmament can only be achieved after political conflict and the accompanying tension have been resolved. Accordingly, disarmament is impossible as long as political issues, important to the parties involved, remain unresolved. (7) The "weapons first" approach is based on the idea that tension can only decrease and political conflict be resolved after the disarmament process has begun. (8)
Concerning the concept arms control, Bull describes it as international restraint in arms policy in respect of the quantity, nature, deployment and use of weapons. (9) According to Bowie, arms control includes any agreement between several parties to regulate one or other aspect of their military ability or potential. The arrangement can apply to the location, quantity, preparedness or types of military forces, weapons or facilities. (10) Bowie's definition lacks an important aspect mentioned by Schelling and Halperin, namely the need for co-operation between potential enemies. Their definition is more clear: "We mean to include all the forms of military cooperation between potential enemies, in the interest of reducing the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the political and economic costs of being prepared for it. The essential feature of arms control is the recognition of the common interest, of the possibility of reciprocation and cooperation even between political enemies with respect to their military establishments". (11)
Based on the history of arms control, Croft distinguishes between five approaches to arms control that broadened the scope of its application with the passage of time. The five approaches are arms control at the end of conflicts; arms control to enhance strategic stability; arms control to create behavioural norms; arms control to manage the proliferation of weapons; and arms control through international organisation. (12)
An undeniable relationship exists between disarmament and arms control and the concepts are often used interchangeably. According to Schelling and Halperin, in using arms control rather than disarmament, the "intention is simply to broaden the term". (13) Goldblat adds to this confusion by using the concept arms control interchangeably with arms limitation and even disarmament. (14) There are, however, distinct differences between the concepts:
--Disarmament always refers to the reduction of weapons whereas arms control could even mean an increase in weapons. Arms control is focused on control and limitation rather than reduction. (15)
--Supporters of disarmament want to be protected against the threat of weapons; supporters of arms control seek security through better control of weapons. (16)
--Supporters of disarmament believe that military power should be radically reduced; supporters of arms control believe that military power can be properly managed. (17)
--Supporters of disarmament contend that general and complete disarmament is possible; supporters of arms control argue that general and complete disarmament is impossible. (18)
--Supporters of disarmament regard the existence of arms as the cause of war and the arms race; supporters of arms control believe that there is no simple, explainable cause-and-effect relationship between the existence of arms and war. (19)
3. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA DURING THE COLD WAR
During the Cold War-era arms control and disarmament did not feature in South Africa. South Africa's policy of apartheid and its continued administration of South West Africa (Namibia) resulted in serious political and military conflict and the international isolation and estrangement of the country. (20)
In order to maintain the political status quo in South Africa and Namibia, South Africa equipped itself military-wise. (21) The United Nations (UN) arms embargoes that applied against South Africa since the 1960s, led to the establishment of Armscor and the local manufacture of conventional weapons, light and small arms, and missiles. (22) Since South Africa's military operations extended beyond its borders, the South African government spent large amounts on the training of military personnel; the mobilisation of the South African Defence Force (SADF); the manufacture of weapons; and the provision of weapons to counter-revolutionary forces in neighbouring states. (23)
In spite of the fact that South Africa at the time was party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the Geneva Protocol which forbade biological warfare, it was alleged to have manufactured biological weapons in the 1980s. South Africa also manufactured chemical weapons during the 1980s and produced six nuclear devices during the 1970s. (24) South Africa also, in co-operation with Israel, started developing ballistic missiles, (25) This process of rearmament, relating to weapons of mass-destruction (WMD), started in the 1960s and continued until the late 1980s.
What the South African situation clearly demonstrated was the fact that when a state faces a military threat within and beyond its borders, treaty obligations will not prevent it from defending itself. Thus, prior to the 1990s, there was no real arms control or disarmament effort to speak of by South Africa.
4. THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD
Following the ending of the Cold War, South Africa's strategic environment changed dramatically. This not only brought an end to superpower rivalry and the resolution of conflicts in Southern Africa, but it also affected South Africa's perception of an external conventional threat. At the same time the South African government made radical changes to its internal and foreign policies, which eventually led to the independence of Namibia and the introduction of multi-party democracy in South Africa. (26)
4.1 The introduction of disarmament
The South African government withdrew its armed forces from South West Africa (Namibia) and Angola in 1989 and subsequently started negotiations with the African National Congress (ANC) to bring the internal unrest in South Africa to an end. At the same time South Africa experienced its worst economic recession since the 1930s. As a result of budget limitations, defence expenditure was drastically reduced after 1989. (27) In 1989 South Africa's defence expenditure was the highest ever, namely R20 000 million. Subsequently it was drastically reduced to approximately R10 250 million in 1995.(28)
The structure of the defence budget also underwent drastic change. Personnel and operational expenditures were increased to the detriment of arms, equipment and expenditure on research and development. However, personnel costs increased as a result of the mobilisation of the SADF to assist the South African Police (SAP) in maintaining law and order before the 1994 general election, and also as a result of the post-election integration process and the establishment of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). Subsequently, a number of armament projects were postponed, which also resulted in a drastic reduction of expenditure on arms and equipment. (29)
Together with the decrease in expenditure, a number of arms control measures were introduced. For example, the SANDF was restructured and rationalised; several units were disbanded; and bases and installations were downsized. In addition, compulsory military service for white males was terminated in 1993 and surplus military equipment was sold or destroyed. Armscor was also divided into two separate entities in 1992. On the one hand, a new state-owned industrial company, Denel, was established and placed under control of the Minister of Public Enterprises. Denel took over most of Armscor's manufacturing, research and development facilities. On the other hand, Armscor continued to exist and remained under the control of the Minister of Defence. Armscor retained the responsibility of arms procurement for the SANDF. (30) These measures were accompanied by legislation, policy changes and controlling bodies which were established by the South African government for arms control purposes.
4.2 South Africa's arms control and disarmament policy
Since April 1994 the South African government has committed itself to a policy of non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control. This includes all WMD and extends to curbing the proliferation of conventional weapons (including light and small arms). (31) On 17 October 1994, in the UN General Assembly, the South African representative stated that: "South Africa's Government of National Unity has committed itself to a policy of non-proliferation and arms control which covers all weapons of mass destruction and extends to our concerns about the proliferation of conventional weapons. To implement this policy South Africa is in the process of taking numerous substantive steps. It is our intention to be a responsible possessor of advanced technologies".(32)
According to the White Paper on Defence, 1996, South Africa's new arms control measures were based on a recognition of the Charter of the United Nations; international legislation; acknowledged international arms control systems; and a balance of economic, ethical, political, military and security considerations. (33) According to the Defence Review of 1998 South Africa was committed to the goals of arms control and disarmament on national, regional and international levels. Accordingly, South Africa inter alia introduced a new policy on the export of conventional weapons; placed a ban on the manufacture and export of anti-personnel mines; and supported the international ban on the manufacture, use, and export of chemical-, biological- and nuclear weapons and related technologies. (34)
South African approached international trade in defence-related products in a responsible manner and, therefore, supported all resolutions concerning transparency in weapons, regional confidence-building, and the non-proliferation of WMD and conventional weapons. (35) At a national level, this control of weapons and related equipment is applied to six areas, namely conventional weapons (two areas); WMD and dual-use items; firearms, ammunition and teargas; explosives; and nuclear-related technology. (36) Each area has its own legislation and structure, although there is a measure of duplication and overlap (see the Table).
Apart from these measures, South Africa has also acceded to several multilateral agreements, and has initiated unilateral actions which have a bearing on arms control and disarmament.
5. SOUTH AFRICA'S APPROACH TO THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
The changes in the security environment in the late 1980s, as previously indicated, played an important role in South Africa's decision to denuclearise. From a South African viewpoint a nuclear deterrent was no longer regarded as a necessity. When F W de Klerk became State President in 1989, he immediately embarked on a programme which was aimed at normalising South Africa's foreign relations. In November 1989 a special committee of enquiry recommended that South Africa's nuclear programme be terminated, a decision which was approved by De Klerk. Subsequently, South Africa signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty in July 1991, and entered into an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on safety precautionary measures that came into force on 16 September 1991. During the last few years of the De Klerk regime an effort was also made to promote non-proliferation by introducing strict measures in respect of WMD and their delivery systems. As a result, the Act on the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 1993 (Act No. 87 of 1993) was promulgated which forbade South African citizens to in any way become involved in any programme aimed at the procurement of WMD or their delivery systems. (37)
Since 1994, the South African Government of National Unity has committed itself to a policy of promoting global peace and security by the elimination and the non-proliferation of WMD. To implement its non-proliferation policy, the South African cabinet accepted the following proposal of the Minister of Foreign Affairs on 31 August 1994, namely that South Africa should:
--be an active participant in the different multilateral non-proliferation regimes and supplier groups;
--openly give its support to the non-proliferation of WMD with the aim to promote peace and security;
--use its position as a member of the suppliers regime and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) for the promotion of non-proliferation; and
--ensure that control measures would not prevent developing states from gaining access to advanced technologies for development needs and peaceful purposes. (38)
5.1 The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
As a state which possesses advanced nuclear technology, South Africa shares the international community's concern about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and supports the concept of a nuclear weapon-free world. Evidence of South Africa's seriousness on this matter is, as previously indicated, its total nuclear disarmament and the signing of the NPT. (39) South Africa also played a central role in the review conference of the NPT which was held in 1995. On the one hand, the United States (US) acted on behalf of the nuclear weapon states (NWS) and attempted to put pressure on South Africa to support the unlimited extension of the validity of the NPT by the conference. On the other hand, the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) of which the majority are, together with South Africa, also members of NAM, wanted South Africa's support for a limited extension of the validity of the NPT. The Government also wanted to maintain pressure on the NWS for a firmer commitment to nuclear disarmament and access to non-nuclear weapon technology for NNWS. (40)
Because South Africa at that stage was the only country in the world to have possessed nuclear weapons and then decided to totally disarm, its representatives could speak with authority about both sides of the matter. Headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the South African delegation made an important contribution to the compromise that was reached between the NWS and the NNWS. South Africa agreed with the NWS on an unlimited extension of the validity of the NPT but at the same time applied pressure on them to honour their commitment to Article VI of the NPT. (41) This article reads as follows: "Each of the Parties to the treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control". (42)
South Africa also proposed that the following principles for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament be considered when reviewing the NPT: (43)
--a renewed commitment to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons;
--the strengthening of IAEA safety precautionary measures and full co-operation in respect of agreements in this regard;
--access to nuclear material and technology for peaceful application, for NNWS;
--progress with negotiations for a "Cut-off Convention";
--progress in decreasing nuclear arsenals;
--progress in negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban convention;
--a commitment to the establishment of regional nuclear weapon free zones; and
--binding security assurances by the NWS to the NNWS.
All these principles were included in the agreement which was reached in 1995 to extend the validity of the NPT for an unlimited period. (44)
5.2 The International Atomic Energy Agency
South Africa was a founder member of the IAEA in 1957. As the most advanced state in the field of nuclear technology in Africa, South Africa had a seat on the Agency's policy-making Council until 1977. In 1995 South Africa was again, as representative of Africa, allowed to sit on the IAEA Council. According to the Nuclear Energy Act, 1993 (Act No. 131 of 1993), the Nuclear Energy Corporation (NEC) is responsible for the implementation of the safety precautionary measures in South Africa, as agreed upon with the IAEA and as required by the NPT. (45) This agreement with the IAEA came into effect on 16 September 1991. (46)
5.3 The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
The substantive negotiations on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) took place within the Conference for Disarmament (CD) of the UN, from 1994 to 1996. The aim of the negotiations was to free the world of the testing of nuclear weapons. South Africa participated actively with a view of concluding the treaty and the South African representative was the chairperson of the first meeting of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO). As previously indicated, one of South Africa's proposals at the 1995 NPT review conference was that a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty should be concluded as soon as possible. South Africa signed the CTBT on 24 September 1996 and ratified it on 30 March 1999. (47) The Treaty provides for three monitoring stations on South African territory, namely at Boshoff, Sutherland, and on Marion Island, and also for one in the Antarctic. (48)
5.4 The African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty
South Africa's total nuclear disarmament and the signing of the NPT in 1991 paved the way for a treaty which would make Africa a nuclear weapon free zone, South Africa's participation in the negotiations to make the African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (or Pelindaba Treaty) a reality, started in 1993. South Africa also supported resolutions of the UN General Assembly for the establishment of global nuclear weapon free zones, including a nuclear weapon free zone for Africa. Following the review and extension conferences of the NPT, a meeting of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) and UN experts was held during May-June 1995 to draw up a treaty for a nuclear weapon free zone for Africa. South Africa's representative at the CD of the UN in Geneva was a member of the group of experts who considered the draft treaty, as well as proposals which were submitted by member states. South Africa subsequently accepted the draft, which was also endorsed by the OAU (49) and was made available for signing on 11 April 1996. (50) South Africa ratified the Pelindaba Treaty on 27 March 1998. (51) The Treaty is the first large-scale co-operative agreement which was concluded between post-apartheid South Africa and the rest of Africa.(52)
According to articles 12 and 13 of the Pelindaba Treaty a commission, namely the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (ACNE), had to be established to verify that the parties to the Treaty do in fact adhere to its terms. Following an OAU resolution on the implementation of the Treaty, it was decided that the headquarters of ACNE would be in South Africa. (53)
5.5 Nuclear and dual purpose export control
As part of the South African government's commitment to promote the country's image as a responsible possessor and importer/exporter of nuclear and dual purpose nuclear material and technology, South Africa became a member of the Zangger Committee (ZC) in 1993 and of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 1995. (54) The multilateral Zangger Committee defines and monitors the trade in goods and equipment which have specifically been designed for nuclear purposes. South Africa's Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs, together with the NEC, exercises control over the export of Zangger Committee type items, (55)
The NSG is also a multilateral organisation which promotes export control over nuclear related dual use equipment, material and technology. The NSG controls nuclear material, equipment and technology (part one) and nuclear-related dual use items (part two). In South Africa the NSG control measures on "part one" type items are applied by the Minister of Mineral and Energy Affairs in co-operation with the Nuclear Energy Corporation. The South African Council for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction applies NSG export control measures to "part two" dual use items. (56)
5.6 Chemical and biological weapons
As mentioned, South Africa developed the ability to manufacture chemical and biological weapons in the 1980s. In a secret investigation ordered by the then State President, F W de Klerk, into the loyalty of the South African armed forces, Lieutenant General P Steyn alleged in his report that the Seventh Medical Battalion, headed by Dr Wouter Basson, was developing a biological warfare programme named "Project Coast". On 31 March 1993 De Klerk ordered the immediate termination of the programme. (57)
Control of weapons and related equipment in the RSA Legislation Control National Conventional Arms Conventional arms Control Act, 2002; (Act No 41 of 2002). Armaments Development and Conventional arms Production Act, 1968 (Act No. 57 of 1968) Non-Proliferation of Weapons of WMD and dual-use Mass Destruction Act, 1993 (Act items No. 87 of 1993) Explosives Act, 1956 (Act No. 26 Explosives of 1956) Firearms and. Ammunition Act, Commercial and 1969 (Act No. 75 of 1969); and military application Firearms Control, 2000 (Act NO. 60 of 2000 Teargas Act, 1946 (Act No. 16 of Commercial arms and 1964). ammunition Nuclear Energy Act, 1993 (Act Nuclear material and No. 131 of 1993) related technology Legislation Structure National Conventional Arms National Conventional Arms Control Act, 2002; Control Committee (NCACC); (Act No 41 of 2002). Directorate of Conventional Arms Control (DCAC). Armaments Development and NCACC; DCAC Production Act, 1968 (Act No. 57 of 1968) Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Non-Proliferation Council Mass Destruction Act, 1993 (Act (NPC) No. 87 of 1993) Explosives Act, 1956 (Act No. 26 South African Police Service of 1956) (SAPS) Firearms and. Ammunition Act, Inspectorate of Explosives 1969 (Act No. 75 of 1969); and Firearms Control, 2000 (Act NO. 60 of 2000 Teargas Act, 1946 (Act No. 16 of SAPS 1964). Central Firearms Register Nuclear Energy Act, 1993 (Act Nuclear Energy Corporation No. 131 of 1993) (NEC) Legislation Responsible department National Conventional Arms Department of Defence Control Act, 2002; (DoD) (Act No 41 of 2002). Armaments Development and Department of Defence Production Act, 1968 (Act No. 57 (DoD) of 1968) Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Department of Trade and Mass Destruction Act, 1993 (Act Industry (DTI) No. 87 of 1993) Explosives Act, 1956 (Act No. 26 Ministry of Safety and of 1956) Security Firearms and. Ammunition Act, Ministry of Safety and 1969 (Act No. 75 of 1969); and Security Firearms Control, 2000 (Act NO. 60 of 2000 Teargas Act, 1946 (Act No. 16 of 1964). Nuclear Energy Act, 1993 (Act Department of Mineral No. 131 of 1993) and Energy Affairs Source: Republic of South Africa, White Paper on South African Defence Related Industries, 1994, Chapter 6, p 4, as updated.
5.6.1 The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
South Africa has been a party to the BTWC since 1975 and since 1991 South African experts have been taking part in BTWC meetings to draw up a verification procedure for the Convention. Since 1994 South Africa has also been an active participant in negotiations of an ad hoc group of the parties to the Convention to draw up the verification procedure. The work that is being done by the ad hoc group and the level at which South African representatives have taken part in it, has established the country as one of the primary participants in the negotiations. (58)
South Africa annually exchanges information and data about its biological ability and facilities in accordance with a standard procedure as agreed upon by the UN General Assembly. The South African Council for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, as mandated by the Act on the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 1993 (Act No. 87 of 1993) regulates the implementation of the Convention in South Africa. (59)
5. 6.2 The Chemical Weapons Convention
South Africa ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) on 13 September 1995, which came into force on 29 April 1997. The Convention, that is legally enforced in South Africa by the Council for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, (60) stipulates that states should make statements on a regular basis concerning specific military and industrial activities, including riot control, in the chemical field. The statements are verified by on-site inspection teams from the headquarters of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in The Hague, the organisation that administers the CWC. (61)
Because South Africa has a large chemical industry, it is one of nine African states who are members of the Executive Council of the OPCW. South Africa's representative was the chairperson of a preparatory commission of the OPCW for the period August 1995 to February 1996. During this period, the South African ambassador at The Hague led delegations to the US and Russia, as the largest declared possessors of chemical weapons, to persuade them to ratify the Convention. (62) Both these states ratified the CWC in 1997. (63)
In September 1994, the South African Department of Foreign Affairs a seminar in Pretoria for the national implementation of the CWC. The seminar was the first of its kind in Africa and was attended by 120 delegates, among whom were delegates from 38 African states who had signed the Convention up to that stage. The purpose of the seminar was to provide representatives from Africa with a forum where views could be exchanged in an informal manner about preparations for the implementation of the Convention as well as for a better understanding of the requirements for the implementation of the Convention at national level. South Africa has participated actively in two similar seminars which have since been held. (64)
South Africa is not a member of the Australia Group which attempts, in an informal manner, to exercise control over the proliferation of chemical and biological substances which could be used for the manufacture of chemical and biological weapons. It is, however, prepared to exercise Australia Group type of control over the export of chemical and biological substances and toxins which could be used for chemical weapons (CW) and biological and toxin weapons (BTW), and which are not covered by the terms of the CWC and the BTWC. (65)
5.7 The Missile Technology Control Regime
During the late 1980s it was alleged that South Africa had developed a ballistic missile ability. According to Albright the South African government had identified the need for a missile with a range of 3 000 kilo-metres. In response, Armscor's ballistic missile ability was developed with the help of Israel, and the two states co-operated extensively in the missile field. This relationship came to an end in 1992 when South Africa's ballistic missile activities were terminated and the technology directed at a space launching programme. (66) Since South Africa's arms industry had developed missile technologies which could be used for the development of ballistic missiles, and in the light of South Africa's support of the non-proliferation of WMD, the Act on the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 1993 also made provision for control over the movement of equipment and technologies which could be used for the manufacture of delivery systems for WMD. (67) In addition, South Africa and the US also entered into a bilateral missile-related import/export agreement on 3 October 1994 which confirmed South Africa's commitment to the non-proliferation of delivery systems. The agreement further stipulated that South Africa could import delivery systems which could be used to place satellites in outer space, in exchange for an undertaking to terminate its own space launching program. (68)
South Africa became a party to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) on 13 September 1995. The MTCR is a multilateral organisation which was established in 1987 with the purpose to prevent the proliferation of the delivery systems of WMD. It compiled guidelines for sensitive missile-related transfers between states. These guidelines were extended in 1993 to include all ballistic and cruise missiles which could be used for the delivery of WMD. (69) Presently, MTCR control measures are being implemented by the Council for the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in South Africa. (70)
From the aforesaid it is clear that the events since the late 1980s have had a definite influence on South Africa's disarmament of WMD. Not only had South Africa become the first country in the world to apply total nuclear disarmament, but it also became an important international force and participant in matters concerning disarmament of WMD.
6. CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS
Similar to WMD, the South African government has also changed its policy on conventional arms control since the late 1980s.
6.1 A commitment to conventional arms control
In order to maintain and ensure an internationally acceptable and responsible approach to conventional arms control, the South African government committed itself to the following principles: (71)
--In accordance with the UN Charter the South African government's view is that a decrease in world-wide military expenditure would have a positive influence on the social and economic development of humanity.
--In accordance with the UN Charter, the right to self-defence of sovereign states.
--The assurance that weapons transferred from one state to another are not used for the violation of the objectives of the UN Charter.
--Since excessive and destabilising increases in conventional weapons threaten national, regional and international safety and security, arms sales to states in regions where wars regularly occur, must be reviewed and evaluated on a continuous basis to limit the possible escalation of regional conflicts.
--Effective national mechanisms to control the transfer of conventional weapons and related technologies.
--Support for the UN Register of Conventional Weapons and a commitment to the provision of the necessary data and information for the Register as required by the UN.
In 1994 South Africa decided to submit information on the import and export of categories of weapons for inclusion in the UN Register for Conventional Weapons. The aims of the Register are the maintenance of international peace and security; recognition of the inherent right of states to self-defence; the reasonable but effective maintenance of regional security, peace and stability; undiminished levels of security to all states at the lowest possible levels of armament; and proper control over arms transfers based on the legitimate needs for the safety of member states. (72) South Africa's reports for the 1994-2000 period reflect information on exports and "nil" reports for imports. (73)
In 1999 South Africa signed contracts to buy arms to the value of R29.99 billion. (74) The training fighter jets, fighter jets, helicopters, corvettes and submarines which are going to be supplied, are mainly required to replace old weaponry which have served their purpose and become obsolete. (75) In return, the overseas suppliers of these weapons have undertaken to make investments in South Africa; to award contracts to South African firms; and to make return purchases in South Africa to a total amount of R104 billion. The return investment program may, however, take as long as 10-15 years to become a reality. (76) South Africa also has the option to cancel the order for 12 of the 24 Hawk training fighter jets and 19 of the 28 Gripen fighter jets before 2004. (77) The South African government has nevertheless already decided to purchase all 24 Hawk training fighter jets (78) Because of inflation the cost of these weapons has already risen to R37.5 billion and is expected to increase to approximately R50 billion (79)
6.2 The National Committee for Control of Conventional Arms
The South African cabinet approved the establishment of the National Committee for Control of Conventional Arms (NCCCA) in 1995. At the same time a set of guidelines and criteria was laid down for the NCCCA to ensure that arms trade and transfers will take place according to acceptable international standards. The organisational structure of the NCCCA consists of the following four levels. (80)
--A level to process permit applications, that involves the Directorate of Conventional Arms Control.
--A multidepartmental level to review applications according to stipulated criteria and to make recommendations.
--A level comprising of a committee consisting of Directors General of the Departments of Foreign Affairs, the South African Secret Service (SASS), and the Department of Trade and Industry, to check applications and make recommendations to the NCCCA.
--A level of political control by the NCCCA which consists of several ministers and deputy ministers, with a chairperson who is not involved in exports or in any line function in the arms industry.
This committee takes the ultimate decision and the Minister of Defence issues the permits in accordance with the Act on Arms Development and Manufacture, 1968 (Act No. 57 of 1968, as amended).
According to the National Conventional Arms Control Act, 2002 (Act No. 41 of 2002), the NCCCA at present consists of ministers or ministers and deputy ministers, as well as other members appointed by the President. The NCCCA can appoint sub-committees to execute certain functions required by the Committee. The tasks that result from the activities of the Committee or the sub-committees must be executed by the Secretariat, consisting of administrative personnel and inspectors of the Defence Secretariat. The Minister of Defence appoints these persons in co-operation with the Secretary of Defence. (81) No person is allowed to export, import, re-export, transport, market, trade or provide a service in conventional weapons, unless that person has a valid permit which authorises him/her to do so. (82)
Criticism was, however, levelled at the Bill preceding the Act. According to Nathan, the Bill ignored the ethical and political imperatives of responsibility and restraint in arms exports, and "the Cabinet has repeatedly failed to adhere to its own formal policy on arms trade". (83) According to Wilhelm, the Bill was withdrawn at one stage for redrafting because of a barrage of criticism by civil and church groups, as well as the Parliamentary Committee on Defence. "Essentially, the Bill sought to cloak all non-nuclear arms deals in secrecy, contrary to the high ideals originally intended to guide the National Conventional Arms Control Committee". (84)
In respect of receiver states, the following aspects are considered before South Africa supply any weapons to such states: (85)
--Whether the government of the states concerned respect human rights and basic freedoms.
--The receiver state's human rights record in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter of Human Rights. Special attention is given to cases where political, social, cultural, religious and legal rights are seriously violated by state authorities.
--The internal situation in receiver states and the region in the light of existing tensions and conflicts.
--The specific state's record of compliance with international agreements and treaties.
--The nature and cost of weapons that must be transferred, considering the circumstances in the receiver state in respect of legitimate security and defence needs, and the aim of minimum application of human and economic resources for weapons.
--The extent to which the arms sales are to benefit South Africa's national and foreign interests.
Arms sales and supply are avoided in cases where: (86)
--weapons are used for the violation of human rights and basic freedoms;
--South Africa's commitment to UN embargoes and other arms control agreements are violated by arms sales and supply;
--peace is threatened, regional instability is caused, or where the military balance is negatively influenced;
--weapons are used in the receiver state or re-exported for purposes which are contradictory to South African policy;
--arms provision has a negative effect on South Africa's diplomatic and trade relations with other states;
--arms provision encourages or supports terrorism;
--arms are used for other reasons than legitimate defence and security purposes;
--arms provision would exacerbate the escalation of regional conflicts.
In spite of these commitments South Africa reportedly did export arms to states with poor human rights records such as Saudi Arabia and Algeria. (87) Shortly before the start of the civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) South Africa also exported arms and equipment to states such as Namibia, Zimbabwe, Angola, Uganda and Rwanda, who were involved in the conflict. (88) In spite of clear evidence of large-scale human rights violations and instability in Uganda and Rwanda, South Africa exported, according to "Human Rights Watch", arms to the value of R18 million to these states and in 1998 arms to the value of R17 million to Rwanda. (89) South Africa's official reaction to this criticism is that human rights remain a key consideration in their country's arms exports but constitute only one ingredient of policy decisions. Other considerations include regional stability and regional balance of power. (90)
6.3 The Inhumane Weapons Convention
The Inhumane Weapons Convention is a multilateral convention which includes the following protocols:
--Protocol I which concerns weapons that could injure by non-detectable fragments.
--Protocol II which forbids the use of landmines, booby traps and related devices or limits their use.
--Protocol III which prohibits or restricts the use of incendiary weapons that could cause serious burns.
--Protocol IV prohibits the use of laser weapons that could cause permanent blindness.
The Convention entered into force in 1983 and 84 states have already ratified it. Protocol IV was added in 1995 and amended in 1996 to include internal conflicts; was made more stringent to differentiate more effectively between civil and military targets; and requires pre-warning if booby traps, landmines and related devices are used in war zones. South Africa became a party to the Convention (Protocols I, and III) on 13 September 1995, and submitted a declaration of commitment to the amended Protocols II and IV to the UN on 26 June 1998. (91)
6.4 Anti-personnel mines
Africa is one of the regions in the world that suffers most from the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel mines. These weapons have a destructive effect on civilian life after conflicts have come to an end and place tremendous limitations on efforts to rebuild and develop, especially in rural areas. In Southern Africa the landmine problem is extremely acute, particularly in Mozambique and Angola. (92)
The aspects that require most urgent attention are finding and destroying the millions of landmines which have been planted, and instituting a world-wide ban on the use of anti-personnel mines. South Africa, with its advanced knowledge of demining techniques, has already offered assistance, on a bilateral basis as well as through the UN, to states such as Mozambique and Angola in solving the landmine problems. (93)
In agreement with a UN resolution, South Africa placed a moratorium on the marketing, export and transit of all types of landmines in 1994. South Africa has also prohibited the export of all types of landmines since 1996. The South African government furthermore placed a ban on the use, development, manufacture and storage of anti-personnel mines with immediate effect from 19 February 1997. On 18 September 1997 the Oslo Diplomatic Conference chaired by South Africa accepted the Anti-Personnel Mine (APM) Convention. It placed a ban on the use, storage, manufacture and transfer of anti-personnel mines and stipulated that these mines must be destroyed. The Convention was opened for signature at Ottawa, Canada, in December 1997. South Africa signed it on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 26 June 1998. The Convention became effective on 1 March 1999. (94) However, even before acceding to the Convention, South Africa destroyed 261 423 anti-personnel mines in October 1997, which it had in storage at the time. Eighteen thousand were kept for training purposes--5 000 live mines and 13 000 "practice" mines. (95)
6.5 Small arms
There is a vast amount of illegal small arms and ammunition in circulation in Southern Africa. Because South Africa's borders are unprotected over long distances, the undetected influx of these weapons continues freely. Apart from an estimated four million licensed firearms in South Africa, there are an estimated eight million illegal small arms in circulation in South Africa. The number of licensed firearms which are stolen or lost increases every year. The extent of the problem is best demonstrated by the ease with which criminals, political antagonists and so called vigilante groups obtain weapons. Yesterday's weapons of war and political liberation have become today's weapons of crime and violence in South Africa. (96)
6. 5. 1 Causes of small arm proliferation in South Africa
The following factors give rise to small arm proliferation in South Africa:
(a) The legacy of the Cold War During the Cold War the Warsaw Pact countries, Cuba and China supplied the national liberation movements in Southern Africa, in particular in Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe and Mozambique, with massive amounts of weapons. On the other hand, Western countries and weapon manufacturers supplied South Africa with military equipment and weapons, notwithstanding the UN arms embargo. Both South Africa and the US also supplied weapons to counter-revolutionary movements in Angola. (97)
(b) The apartheid legacy
Apart from cross-border operations against the ANC, South Africa also provided military assistance to friendly organisations in neighbouring states during the Cold War. Organisations such as the Mozambique Resistance Movement (RENAMO) the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) benefited from this. Weapons manufactured by Armscor and weapons captured by South African forces in Angola and Namibia were used for this purpose Forty thousand AK-47s bought from Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Hungary and China between 1976 and 1986 were reportedly supplied to UNITA and AK-47s bought from Bulgaria and Hungary were supplied to RENAMO. One of the deadliest light weapons, namely the anti-personnel mine, which was manufactured by South Africa, was reportedly also supplied to RENAMO together with other weapons. (98)
(c) Ineffective post-conflict disarmament
Ineffective disarmament during multilateral peace operations was one of the main causes of small arm proliferation in Southern Africa. In spite of disarmament arrangements which were made by the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) when the South West African Peoples Organisation (SWAPO) and South African forces were demobilised in Namibia, many weapons were not handed in and found their way into South Africa. With the UN's UAVEM II mission in Angola, the UN forces did not have the resources to disarm the combatants. Weapons which were in fact handed in were of inferior quality, in small numbers, poorly guarded and stored in unsafe places. As in Angola the UN UNIMOZ operation in Mozambique also failed in disarming combatants. The proliferation of small arms in Mozambique became a big problem, and many of the weapons were smuggled to Malawi and South Africa.
Similarly the demobilisation and integration process after the political settlement in South Africa was also a very complicated matter. Seven different armed forces had to be amalgamated into one defence force. These forces included Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), the SADF, the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA), and the armed forces of the four TBVC states (Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei). All ANC arms storage sites in South Africa had to be declared. (99) During the integration process very little attention was, however, given to the mopping up of arms storage sites of the non-statutory forces (NSF). Six months after the democratic election Operation Rollerball was launched in October 1994 to clear out ANC arms storage sites in South Africa as well as in neighbouring countries. The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) Chief of Staff, General Nyanda, announced in February 1995 that the operation was a success, but only 70 AK-47s and 53 pistols, amongst others, were found. Many storage sites were not found and many which were found did not yield any arms or ammunition. A strong possibility exists that "lost" weapons were later used for illegal and destabilising activities. (100)
(d) Licensed weapons
As indicated, there are approximately four million licensed firearms in South Africa. The legal requirements for acquiring a firearm were not very strict during the early 1990s and weapons could be acquired fairly easily. More stringent legislation has since been enforced. A major concern, however, is the large number of firearms which are either lost or stolen every year and which then end up in the wrong hands. An estimated 30 000 stolen, licensed firearms end up in the illegal arms trade annually. (101)
(e) Loss of firearms by security forces
Another source of illegal weapons is the estimated 8 500 firearms which are lost annually by the South African Police Service (SAPS) and the SANDF or which are stolen from members of these services. Members of the SAPS and the SANDF reportedly also steal weapons themselves and then sell them in the smuggle trade. (102)
(f) The arms industry as a source
South Africa is the biggest arms manufacturer in Africa and in the mid-1980s South Africa was the tenth largest arms manufacturer in the world. Armscor developed into one of the largest industrial organisations in South Africa and weapons were, after gold and coal, South Africa's biggest export asset. Armscor however did not sell arms locally in the civilian trade, but only provided the SANDF with weapons, (103)
(g) The existence of crime syndicates, armed vigilante groups and Muslim extremist groups
Crime syndicates, vigilante groups like People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) and Muslim extremist groups like Muslims Against Oppression also contribute to the proliferation of small arms in South Africa. These groups do not operate without weapons and the use of illegal weapons is the order of the day. Cash-in-transit vehicles are regularly attacked and robbed by gangs armed with AK-47s. Because of this and also because violent crime has increased tremendously during the late 1990s, South African society has become unsafe. This resulted in the establishment of many private security companies in South Africa. This in itself gave rise to small arms proliferation in South Africa because these companies could not fulfil their duties without firearms. There are thus more weapons in circulation and the possibility of theft and/or loss therefore increases. (104)
(h) Political violence
Although political violence in South Africa has decreased since 1994, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) still managed to obtain weapons during the late 1990s in their political struggle against the ANC. Before 1994 they used a home-made firearm, called the kwasha, for which conventional ammunition could be used. After 1994 they staked using G-3 attack rifles, R-5, R-4 and R-1 rifles. These weapons undeniably contributed to the high level of political violence in Kwazulu-Natal in the late 1990s. (105)
6.5.2 The control of small arms
The South African government's position in respect of the non-proliferation of light and small arms is that there should be continuous action on national, regional and international levels which specifically focus on these arms. (106) In response it introduced the following measures to curb the proliferation of small arms:
--Progressively stricter clauses in the Arms and Ammunition Act, 1969 (Act No. 75 of 1969) together with stricter requirements for acquiring licences for firearms.(107) In 2000 the Minister of Law and Order submitted Bill No 34 of 2000 to Parliament in respect of the control of firearms in South Africa, which has since become the Firearms Control Act, 2000 (Act No. 60 of 2000). According to the Act the age restriction for the possession of a firearm is now 21; a person is allowed only one firearm for self-defence; the firearm must not be automatic; licences will have to be renewed every five years; and a new applicant will have to submit a certificate of competency to own a firearm, with the application for a firearm licence. (108)
--South Africa is committed to terminate the flow of illegal weapons across its borders. (109) Combined operations by the SANDF and the SAPS to curb increasing crime and the proliferation of small arms are undertaken from time-to-time. Because weapons enter South Africa illegally from countries such as Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland and Zambia, South Africa has introduced bilateral initiatives to address the problem. South Africa therefore entered into bilateral agreements with Mozambique and Swaziland. (110) Operation Rachel undertaken jointly by the South African and Mozambican police forces since 1995, has resulted in the destruction of 450 tons of small arms and ammunition found in arms storage sites in Mozambique. (111) During the annual operation which was carried out in Mozambique in 2001, 18 arms caches were discovered. Almost 1 000 firearms, 246 magazines, 77 hand grenades, 120 000 cartridges, 300 rockets, 647 mortars and 31 anti-personnel mines were found and destroyed. (112)
--South Africa has accepted a policy to destroy all obsolete and surplus small arms to prevent these from being used for illegal and war purposes. During 1997 the SAPS destroyed 70 tons of small arms and ammunition, including 4 504 pistols, revolvers, rifles, shotguns and home-made firearms. (113) The Department of Defence, in Operation Mouflon, has also destroyed 262 000 small arms since June 2000. The weapons were unserviceable, not in use any more or confiscated from illegal owners. (114)
--South Africa has committed itself to a policy of responsibility and accountability in the trade and transfer of all weapons. As previously indicated, the government has an arms control system which makes provision for a ministerial body, the NCCCA, to determine criteria, principles and guidelines to ensure that the trade in conventional weapons takes place in a responsible manner. (115)
--South Africa endorsed the UN General Assembly's call for an international conference on small arm proliferation. In a letter to the Secretary General of the UN South Africa requested that a plan of action against the proliferation of small arms, based on the experiences of individual states be devised. The conference was held in July 2001 and a plan of action was adopted. (116)
Control over small arms is of course not only South Africa's responsibility, since small arm proliferation is also a sub-regional and a regional problem. Unfortunately, this is not realised to the same extent by all African states. South Africa therefore has a duty to persuade its neighbouring states to view their responsibilities regarding small arms proliferation in a more serious light.
7. THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
The Conference on Disarmament (CD), the only global disarmament negotiation forum, was established by the UN during a special meeting in 1978. South Africa's admittance, together with 22 other states on 17 June 1996, was the result of several years of negotiations to extend the CD's membership of 38. South Africa is presently an active member of the CD which now has 66 member states. (117)
In March 1999 South Africa's representative informed the CD that the chairperson of the NCCCA had announced that in accordance with its policy regarding non-proliferation and arms control, the South African government had decided that all obsolete small arms must be destroyed rather than to sell it on tender as was formerly the case. The South African representative further informed the CD that the SAPS had since 1997 already destroyed 50 tons of surplus firearms and 20 tons of surplus ammunition. (118)
In January 1998 South Africa's ambassador to the UN submitted the following draft proposal to the CD: (119)
1. The Conference on Disarmament decides to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament to deliberate upon practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons as well as to identify if and when one or more such steps should be the subject of negotiations in the Conference. 2. In discharging its functions, the Ad Hoc Committee will take into account existing proposals and views as future initiatives on nuclear disarmament.
In April 1998 the South African representative at the UN Preparatory Committee for the 2000 NPT review conference, informed the Committee that consensus could not be reached in the CD about the ad hoc committee. The representative again appealed for such a subsidiary body to be instituted. (120)
The 2000 NPT review conference decided as follows about the practical execution of article VI of the NPT: "The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body". (121)
In summary, the situation in South Africa regarding conventional arms control changed dramatically towards the end of the Cold War and thereafter. During the Cold War South Africa was a country at war; a war which was fought with conventional weapons and small and light arms. Due to its international isolation, South Africa had to manufacture its own arms. There was thus no inclination towards arms control and/or disarmament prior to the 1990s. From 1989 the situation changed dramatically and expenditure on arms decreased substantially. After 1994, South Africa was accepted back into the international community and drastic steps were almost immediately taken to prevent the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and to introduce stricter and more effective legislative control over firearms and the export of conventional weapons.
The South African government's policy regarding international trade in defence-related products stipulates that a responsible approach must be followed. As is apparent from this article, the South African government leaves itself open to criticism because the policy, especially regarding the export of conventional weapons, is allegedly not always adhered to. South Africa supports all resolutions regarding transparency in weapons, regional confidence building, and the non-proliferation of WMD. The South African government also drastically changed its approach to the export of arms after the ending of the Cold War. Its commitment to arms control and disarmament is clear from the following:
--South Africa's destruction of its nuclear weapons, to become the first country in the world to implement total nuclear disarmament; the signing of the NPT in July 1991; and South Africa's central role at the 1995 NPT review conference.
--South Africa's participation in the council of the IAEA and the comprehensive safety agreement which was entered into with the IAEA in 1991.
--The contents of the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, 1993 (Act No. 87 of 1993).
--South Africa's ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1999.
--South Africa's contribution to the content of the Pelindaba Treaty and the ratification thereof in 1998.
--South Africa's membership of the Zangger Committee in 1993 and the NSG in 1995.
--The termination of South Africa's chemical and biological weapons programme in 1993.
--South Africa's participation since 1991 in an international ad hoc group to, amongst others, create a verification procedure for the BTWC.
--South Africa's ratification of the CWC in 1995.
--South Africa's hosting of a successful seminar in 1995 concerning the implementation of the CWC in Africa.
--South Africa's willingness, in spite of the fact that it is not a member of the Australia Group, to adhere to the Group's measures regarding the export of chemical and biological substances and toxins.
--South Africa's membership of the MTCR in 1995.
--The institution of strict guidelines and criteria for conventional weapon exports and transfers with the appointment of the NCCCA in 1995 and the National Conventional Arms Control Act, 2002 (Act No. 41 of 2002).
--South Africa's ban in 1996 on the export of all types of landmines, a further ban on the manufacture of anti-personnel mines in 1997, and the destruction of anti-personnel mines.
--South Africa's ratification of the APM Convention in 1998.
--Progressively stricter clauses in the Act on Arms and Ammunition, 1969, and the Firearms Control Act, 2000 with stricter requirements for the attainment of firearm licences as well as the safekeeping of firearms.
--South Africa's commitment to curb the flow of illegal weapons across its borders.
--The destruction of small arms and ammunition by the SAPS in 1997.
--Operation Rachel carried out jointly by the South African and Mozambican police forces in Mozambique since the 1990s, and which has resulted in the destruction of small arms and ammunition which have been found in arms storage sites in Mozambique.
--South Africa's membership of the UN CD in 1996.
South Africa's signing of the NPT, the Pelindaba Treaty and the CWC serve as examples of arms control and efforts to enhance strategic stability at the end of a conflict. The termination of South Africa's nuclear, chemical and biological arms programmes can also be seen as end of conflict disarmament. The guidelines and criteria which apply to the export and transfer of conventional weapons; the ban on antipersonnel mines; South Africa's ratification of the APM Convention; measures against the proliferation of small arms; and the destruction of small arms, all serve as examples of arms control by managing the proliferation of weapons.
* Based on a PhD thesis in International Politics completed at the University of Pretoria, under the supervision of Prof M Hough, during 2002.
(1.) Bull, H, The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age, 2nd edition, Frederick A Prager, New York, 1965, p vii.
(2.) Dougherty, J E, How to Think about Arms Control and Disarmament, Crane, Russak & Company, New York, 1962, p 24.
(3.) Booth, K, "Disarmament and Arms Control", in Baylis, J, et al, Contemporary Strategy Vol I: Theories and Concepts, 2nd edition, Croom Helm, London, 1987, p 140.
(4.) Buzan, B, An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations, Macmillan Press, London, 1987, p 237.
(5.) Singer, J D, Arms Control and Disarmament: Towards a Synthesis in National Security Policy, Ohio State University Press, Columbus, 1962, pp 173-176.
(7.) Ibid, pp 176-179.
(8.) Ibid, pp 179-180.
(9) Bull, H, op cit, p vii.
(10.) Bowie, R R, "Basic Requirements of Arms Control", in Brennan, D G, Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security, George Braziller, New York, 1961, p 43.
(11.) Schelling, T C and M H Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control, Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1961, p 2.
(12.) Croft, S, Strategies of Arms Control: A History and Typology, Manchester University Press, New York, 1996, pp 40-60.
(13.) Schelling, T C and M H Halperin, op cit, p 2.
(14.) Goldblat, J, Arms Control: A Guide to Negotiations and Agreements, Sage Publications, London, 1996, p 3.
(15.) Booth, K, op cit, pp 140-141.
(16.) Garnett, J, "Disarmament and Arms Control since 1945", in Martin, L (ed), Strategic Thought in the Nuclear Age, Heineman, London, 1979, pp 191-192; and Booth, K, op cit, pp 141-142.
(18.) Dougherty, J E, op cit, pp 28-31.
(19.) Bull, H, op cit, pp 4-9.
(20.) Batchelor, P and P Dunn, The Restructuring of South Africa's Defence Industry, University of Cape Town:www.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/7.6/ The%20Restructuring.htm, p 1; and Baynham, S, Military Power and Politics in Black Africa, Croom Helm, London, 1986, pp 303-304.
(21.) Baynham, S, op cit, p 297.
(22.) United Nations Security Council, resolution 181 of August 1963; resolution 182 of December 1963; resolution 418 of 1977; resolution 558 of 1984; and resolution 591 of 1986. See also Landgren, S, Embargo Disimplemented: South Africa's Military Industry, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989, p 9.
(23.) Baynham, S, op cit, pp 297,303-304 and 217; and Luckham, R, "Militarization in Africa", in SIPRI Yearbook 1985: World Armaments and Disarmament, Taylor and Francis, London, 1985, pp 316 and 317-318.
(24.) Ferm, R, "Major multilateral arms control agreements", in SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmament, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1992, p 613; Goldblat, J, op cit, p 277; The Chemical Warfare Case, 1997, pp 4, 6 and 15: www.contrast.org.truth/htm/chemical/biological_weapons. html; Landgren, S, op cit, pp 149-151; and Albright, D, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons", ISIS Report, 1994, pp 6-7, 10-11 and 16.
(25.) Landgren, S, op cit, pp 103 and 165.
(26.) Batchelor, P and P Dunn, op cit, pp 4-5.
(27.) Ibid, pp 4-5.
(28.) Cilliers, J, and M Reichardt, About Turn, Institute for Defence Policy, Halfway House, 1996, p 134.
(29.) Batchelor, P, and P Dunn, op cit, p 5.
(31.) Republic of South Africa, Department of Foreign Affairs, Wassenaar Arrangement, p 2: www.dra.gov.za/for-relations/multilateral/wassenaar.htm.
(33.) United Nations General Assembly, Statement delivered by H E Mr Vernon R W Steward, Permanent Representative of South Africa in the First Committee of the General Assembly, 49th Session, 17 October 1994.
(33.) Republic of South Africa, Defence in a Democracy: South African White Paper on Defence, 1996, p 29.
(34.) Republic of South Africa, Defence in a Democracy: South African Defence Review, 1998, p 5.
(35.) Cilliers, J, "Towards a South African Conventional Arms Trade Policy", African Security Review, Vol 4, No 4, 1995, p 6.
(36.) Republic of South Africa, White Paper on South African Defence Related Industries, Chapter Six, 1999, pp 3-4.
(37.) Beri, R, "South Africa's Nuclear Policy", Strategic Analysis, Vol XXII, No 7, 1998, p 6. www.idsa-india.org/an-oct8-2.html. According to the Act on the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 1993, "'weapon of mass destruction' means any weapon designed to kill, harm or infect people, animals or plants through the effects of a nuclear explosion or the toxic properties of a chemical warfare agent or the infectious or toxic properties of a biological warfare agent, and includes a delivery system exclusively designed, adapted or intended to deliver such weapons"; and "'delivery system' means any rocket, ballistic missile system, space launch vehicle, sounding rocket or unmanned air vehicle, including a cruise missile, target drone or reconnaissance drone, capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kilograms over a distance of not less than 300 kilometres".
(38.) Republic of South Africa, South Africa's policy on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: The Role of the Department of Foreign Affairs, South African Communication Service, Parow, 1995, pp 7-8.
(39.) Ibid, pp 9-10.
(40) Ibid, p 20.
(41.) Republic of South Africa, South Africa's policy on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction ..., op cit, pp 34-40.
(42.) Goldblat, J, op cit, p 345.
(43.) Republic of South Africa, South Africa's policy on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction ..., op cit, pp 36-37.
(44.) United Nations, "Documents of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference", in The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Vol 20, 1995, United Nations, New York, 1995, pp 23-24.
(45.) Republic of South Africa, White Paper on South African Defence Related Industries, op cit, pp 2-3.
(46.) Beri, R, op cit, p 6.
(47.) Republic of South Africa, Department of Foreign Affairs, Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), p 1. Internet: www.dra.gov.za/ for-relations/ multilateral/treaties/ctbt.htm.
(48.) Republic of South Africa, White Paper on South African Defence Related Industries, op cit, p 3.
(49.) Republic of South Africa, South Africa's policy on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction ..., op cit, pp 11-12.
(50.) Ferm, R, "Arms control and disarmament agreements", in SIPRI Yearbook 1999: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, p 721.
(51.) Republic of South Africa, White Paper on South African Defence Related Industries, op cit, p 3.
(52.) Saxena, S C, "Disarmament: The African Perspective", Strategic Analysis, Vol XXII, No 7, 1998, p 11. www.idsa-india.org/an-oct8-3.html.
(53.) Organisation of African Unity, The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (The Treaty of Pelindaba), Organisation of African Unity, pp 6, 7 and 21.
(54.) Republic of South Africa, White Paper on South African Defence Related Industries, op cit, p 3.
(57.) Mangold, T, and J Goldberg, Plague Wars: A True Story of Biological Warfare, Macmillan, London, 1999, p 267.
(58.) Republic of South Africa, Department of Foreign Affairs, Biological and Toxin Weapon Convention (BTWC), pp 1-2. www.dfa.gov.za/for-relations/ multilateral/ treaties/btwc.htm.
(59.) Republic of South Africa, White Paper on South African Defence Related Industries, op cit, p 2.
(60.) Republic of South Africa, Department of Foreign Affairs, Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), p 1: www.dfa.gov.za/for-relations/multilateral/ treaties/ cwc.htm.
(61.) Republic of South Africa, Government Gazette, No 17967, 1997, pp 1-25.
(62.) Republic of South Africa, Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), op cit, pp 1-2.
(63.) Ferm, R, "Arms control and disarmament agreements", in SIPRI Yearbook 1997: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997, p 593.
(64.) Republic of South Africa, South Africa's policy on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction ..., op cit, pp 13-14.
(65.) Republic of South Africa, White Paper on South African Defence Related Industries, op cit, p 2.
(66.) Albright, D, "South Africa's Secret Nuclear Weapons", ISIS Report, May 1994, p 16.
(67.) Republic of South Africa, South Africa's policy on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction ..., op cit, p 14.
(68.) Anthony, I and I Stock, "Multilateral military-related export control measures", in SIPRI Yearbook 1996: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, pp 550-551.
(69.) Republic of South Africa, Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), op cit, p 1.
(70.) Republic of South Africa, White Paper on South African Defence Related Industries, op cit, p 2.
(71.) Ibid, pp 5-6.
(72.) Cilliers, J, op cit, pp 6-7.
(73.) United Nations, UN Register of Conventional Arms. http://domino. un.org/ REGISTER.nsf; and "Conventional Weapons Issues", in The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Vol 24, 1999, United Nations, New York, 2000, p 110.
(74.) Hagelin, B, et al, "Transfers of major conventional weapons", in SIPRI Yearbook 2000: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 354-355.
(75.) DSEI News, 16 September 1999.
(76.) Hagelin, B, et al, op cit, pp 354-355.
(77.) Republic of South Africa, Armscor Annual Report 1999-2000, pp 11-12.
(78.) "South Africa Buying Hawk Jets", African News: Weekly News Issue, 11 April 2002, p 3, www.peacelink.it/anb-bia/week_2k2/020411d.htm; and "5 April 2002: Government goes ahead with fighter-plane deal", SAAF News: Latest News, pp 10-11, www.saairforce.co.za/news.htm.
(79.) Beeld (Pretoria), 04 May 2001.
(80.) Republic of South Africa, White Paper on South African Defence Related Industries, op cit, p 5; and Republic of South Africa: Department of Foreign Affairs, The National Conventional Arms Control Committee (NCACC), p 1, www.dfa.gov.za/for-relations/multilateral/ncacc.htm.
(81.) Republic of South Africa, National Conventional Arms Control Act, 2002 (Act No. 41 of 2002), section 5-9.
(82.) Ibid, section 13.
(83.) Nathan, L, "Up in arms: A critique of the Conventional Arms Control Bill", South African Journal on Human Rights, Vol 16, No 4, 2000, pp 703 and 712.
(84.) Wilhelm, P, "Our Strange Gun-Chums", Financial Mail (Johannesburg), Vol 159, No 4, 2000, pp 34-35.
(85.) Republic of South Africa, White Paper on South African Defence Related Industries, op cit, p 6. Also see: RSA, National Conventional Arms Control Act, op cit, section 15.
(87.) Jeppie, S, "Foreign Affairs", www.uct.ac.za./depts/religion/ foreign.htm.
(88.) Human Rights Watch, South Africa; A Question of Principle, Vol 12 No 5 (A), October 2000, Chapter VII, pp 2-3.
(89.) Ibid; and Republic of South Africa, Department of Defence, Directorate Conventional Arms Control: South African Export Statistics for Conventional Arms 1997-1999, pp 5-13, www.mil.za/SecretaryforDefence/Conventional ArmsControl/NCACC1999/ncac.htm
(90.) Human Rights Watch: South Africa; A Question of Principle, op cit, p 2.
(91.) Republic of South Africa, Department of Foreign Affairs, Convention on Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW), pp 1-2, www.dfa.gov.za/for-relations/multilateral/ treaties/ ccw.htm.
(92.) Ibid, pp 2-3.
(93.) Ibid, p 3.
(94.) Ibid, p 10.
(95.) Ibid, pp 4-6 and 10
(96.) Beri, R, "Coping with Small Arms Threat in South Africa", Strategic Analysis, Vol XXIV, No 1, 2000, p 1. www.idsa-india.org/an-apr010.html.
(97.) Cock, J, "Light Weapons Proliferation", in Cock, J and P Mckenzie, From Defence to Development: Redirecting Military Sources in South Africa, David Philip, Cape Town, 1998, pp 135-136.
(98.) Ibid, pp 136-138.
(99.) Beri, R, "Coping with Small Arms Threat", op cit, pp 3-5.
(100.) Oosthuysen, G, Small Arms Proliferation and Control in Southern Africa, South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg, 1996, p 7.
(101.) Ibid, p 5.
(102.) Beri, R, "Coping with Small Arms Threat", op cit, p 5; and Cock, J, op cit, pp 143-144.
(103.) Beri, R, "Coping with Small Arms Threat", op cit, pp 5-6.
(104.) Ibid, p 7.
(105.) Ibid, pp 7-8.
(106.) Republic of South Africa, Small Arms, pp 3 and 5. www.dfa.gov.za/ for-relations/ multilateral/arms.htm.
(107.) Ibid, p 2; and Beri, R, "Coping with Small Arms Threat", op cit, p 8.
(108.) Republic of South Africa, Bill No 34 of 2000 on the Control of Fire Arms, South Africa, 2000; and Republic of South Africa, The Firearms Control Act, 2000 (Act No. 60 of 2000), Government Gazette, No 22214, 2001.
(109.) Deen, T, "Disarmament: South Africa Leads Effort to Curb Small Arms", World News, Inter Press Service. www.oneworld.org/ips2/jan99/03 O0 001.html
(110.) Beri, R, "Coping with Small Arms Threat", op cit, p 8.
(111.) Republic of South Africa, Small Arms, op cit, pp 3-4.
(112.) Beeld (Pretoria), 21 May 2001.
(113.) Deen, T, op cit, p 1 .
(114.) Beeld (Pretoria), 28 May 2001.
(115.) Republic of South Africa, National Conventional Arms Control Act, op cit.
(116.) Deen, T, op cit, p 2; and United Nations, Press Release DC/2795: Small Arms Conference Concludes with Consensus on Adoption of Action Plan, 21 July 2001.
(117.) Republic of South Africa, Department of Foreign Affairs, Conference on Disarmament (CD), pp 1 and 3. www.dfa.gov.za/for-relations/multilateral/ cd. htm.
(118.) United Nations, Press Release DCF/362: Conference on Disarmament hears Statements on Small Arms and Landmines from South Africa and Ukraine.
(119.) United Nations, Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No 22, Statements to the Conference on Disarmament: Statement by South Africa, 20 January 1998, pp 1-2.
(120.) United Nations, The Preparatory Committee for the Year 2000 NPT Review Conference (Second Session): Statement by the Republic of South Africa, 29 April 1998, pp 2-3.
(121.) United Nations, 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,14 April-19 May 2000, Final Document, p 18.
Freddie van der Merwe Department of Political Sciences University of Pretoria*
|Printer friendly Cite/link Email Feedback|
|Author:||der Merwe, Freddie|
|Publication:||Strategic Review for Southern Africa|
|Date:||May 1, 2003|
|Previous Article:||Pursuing a functional security community in Southern Africa: is it possible after all?|
|Next Article:||Military discipline: where are we going wrong?|