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Appendix C. prior-year legislative activity.

FY2011

FY2011 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 6523/H.R. 5136/S. 3454)

House (H.R. 5136)

Section 1060 of the FY2011 defense authorization bill (H.R. 5136) as reported by the House Armed Services Committee (H.Rept. 111-491 of May 21, 2010) states that:
   The Secretary of Defense shall, in consultation with the Joint
   Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of the regional combatant
   commands, submit to the congressional defense committees, not later
   than March 15, 2011, a comprehensive strategic assessment of the
   current and future strategic challenges posed to the United States
   by potential competitors out through 2021, with particular
   attention paid to those challenges posed by the military
   modernization of the People's Republic of China, Iran, North Korea,
   and Russia.


In discussing Section 1060, the committee's report states:
   The committee notes that it received testimony from the Quadrennial
   Defense Review (QDR) Independent Panel that, although useful, the
   QDR needs to be a long-term, twenty year study that addresses the
   issues that are of concern to Congress. The committee also received
   testimony that the 2010 QDR was a budget constrained exercise,
   which was fiscally responsible but may have limited more ambitious
   questioning of assumptions and creative thinking because basic
   budget and end-strength assumptions were not challenged. (page 372)


Section 1234 of H.R. 5136 as reported by the committee would require a report on U.S. efforts to defend against any threats posed by the advanced anti-access capabilities of potentially hostile foreign countries, and amend the law that requires DOD to submit an annual report on military and security developments involving China to include a section on China's anti-access and area denial capabilities. The text of Section 1234 is as follows:

SEC. 1234. REPORT ON UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO DEFEND AGAINST THREATS POSED BY THE ADVANCED ANTI-ACCESS CAPABILITIES OF POTENTIALLY HOSTILE FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

(a) Congressional Finding- Congress finds that the report of the 2010 Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review finds that ' Anti-access strategies seek to deny outside countries the ability to project power into a region, thereby allowing aggression or other destabilizing actions to be conducted by the anti-access power. Without dominant capabilities to project power, the integrity of U.S. alliances and security partnerships could be called into question, reducing U.S. security and influence and increasing the possibility of conflict.'.

(b) Sense of Congress- It is the sense of Congress that, in light of the finding in subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense should ensure that the United States has the appropriate authorities, capabilities, and force structure to defend against any threats posed by the advanced anti-access capabilities of potentially hostile foreign countries.

(c) Report- Not later than April 1, 2011, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report on United States efforts to defend against any threats posed by the advanced anti-access capabilities of potentially hostile foreign countries.

(d) Matters to Be Included- The report required under subsection (c) shall include the following:

(1) An assessment of any threats posed by the advanced anti-access capabilities of potentially hostile foreign countries, including an identification of the foreign countries with such capabilities, the nature of such capabilities, and the possible advances in such capabilities over the next 10 years.

(2) A description of any efforts by the Department of Defense since the release of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review to address the finding in subsection (a).

(3) A description of the authorities, capabilities, and force structure that the United States may require over the next 10 years to address the finding in subsection (a).

(e) Form- The report required under subsection (c) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex if necessary.

(f) Modification of Other Reports

(1) CONCERNING THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA- Section 1202(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (P.L. 106-65; 113 Stat. 781; 10 U.S.C. 113 note), as most recently amended by section 1246 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (P.L. 111-84; 123 Stat. 2544), is further amended--

(A) by redesignating paragraphs (10) through (12) as paragraphs (11) through (13), respectively; and

(B) by inserting after paragraph (9) the following:

'(10) Developments in China's anti-access and area denial capabilities.'.

(2) CONCERNING IRAN- Section 1245(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (P.L. 111-84; 123 Stat. 2542) is amended by adding at the end the following:

'(5) A description and assessment of Iran's anti-access and area denial strategy and capabilities.'.

In discussing Section 1234, the committee's report states:
   For the purposes of this section, to the extent possible, the
   committee encourages the Department to utilize information provided
   to Congress in the Annual Report on Military and Security
   Developments Involving the People's Republic of China, required by
   section 1201 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
   Year 2000 (P.L. 106-65), as most recently amended by section 1246
   of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010
   (P.L. 111-84;) and the Annual Report on the Military Power of Iran
   as required by Section 1245 of the National Defense Authorization
   Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (P.L. 111-84). (Page 395)


The committee's report also states:
      Annual Report on Security Developments Involving the People's
   Republic of China

   Section 1246 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
   Year 2010 (P.L. 111-84) expanded the scope of the Annual Department
   of Defense Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of
   China to include information on developments regarding U.S.
   engagement and cooperation with China on security matters,
   including through military-to-military contacts, and the U.S.
   strategy for such engagement and cooperation in the future. The
   report was due on March 1, 2010. The committee is disappointed that
   the report has not been delivered, as the information provided by
   the Administration in this report will inform the committee's
   assessments on a range of critical matters involving China. The
   committee requests that the Department of Defense submit the report
   to the committee at the earliest possible date, and in the interim,
   provide the committee with complete and timely information on all
   significant security developments involving China. (Page 382)


Senate (S. 3454)

Section 1064 of the FY2011 defense authorization bill (S. 3454) as reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee (S.Rept. 111-201 of June 4, 2010) would require a report on U.S. efforts to defend against any potential future threats posed by the anti-access and area-denial capabilities of potentially hostile nation-states. The text of Section 1064 is as follows:

SEC. 1064. REPORT ON UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO DEFEND AGAINST THREATS POSED BY THE ANTI-ACCESS AND AREA-DENIAL CAPABILITIES OF CERTAIN NATION-STATES.

(a) Finding- Congress finds that the 2010 report on the Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review concludes that ' [a]nti-access strategies seek to deny outside countries the ability to project power into a region, thereby allowing aggression or other destabilizing actions to be conducted by the anti-access power. Without dominant capabilities to project power, the integrity of United States alliances and security partnerships could be called into question, reducing United States security and influence and increasing the possibility of conflict'.

(b) Sense of Congress- It is the sense of Congress that, in light of the finding in subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense should ensure that the United States has the appropriate authorities, capabilities, and force structure to defend against any potential future threats posed by the anti-access and area-denial capabilities of potentially hostile foreign countries.

(c) Report- Not later than February 1, 2011, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report on United States efforts to defend against any potential future threats posed by the anti-access and area-denial capabilities of potentially hostile nation-states.

(d) Elements- The report required under subsection (c) shall include the following:

(1) An assessment of any potential future threats posed by the anti-access and area-denial capabilities of potentially hostile foreign countries, including an identification of the foreign countries with such capabilities, the nature of such capabilities, and the possible advances in such capabilities over the next 10 years.

(2) A description of any efforts by the Department of Defense to address the potential future threats posed by the anti-access and area-denial capabilities of potentially hostile foreign countries.

(3) A description of the authorities, capabilities, and force structure that the United States may require over the next 10 years to address the threats posed by the anti-access and areadenial capabilities of potentially hostile foreign countries.

(e) Form- The report required under subsection (c) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex if necessary.

(f) Definitions- In this section:

(1) The term ' anti-access', with respect to capabilities, means any action that has the effect of slowing the deployment of friendly forces into a theater, preventing such forces from operating from certain locations within that theater, or causing such forces to operate from distances farther from the locus of conflict than such forces would normally prefer.

(2) The term 'area-denial', with respect to capabilities, means operations aimed to prevent freedom of action of friendly forces in the more narrow confines of the area under a potentially hostile nation-state's direct control, including actions by an adversary in the air, on land, and on and under the sea to contest and prevent joint operations within a defended battlespace.

Regarding Section 1064, the committee's report states:

Report on United States efforts to defend against threats posed by the anti-access and area-denial capabilities of certain nation-states (sec. 1064)

The committee recommends a provision that would require the Secretary of Defense, not later than February 1, 2011, to submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report on the Department's efforts to defend against threats posed by the anti-access and area-denial capabilities of potentially hostile nation states. The report should include a description of any efforts by the Department to address findings in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report regarding advanced anti-access capabilities of foreign countries. The report should also include a discussion of current and future U.S. long-range strike capabilities in the context of countering anti-access and area-denial strategies.

The committee is concerned by the emergence of what the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report described as "anti-access strategies [that] seek to deny outside countries the ability to project power into a region, thereby allowing aggression or other destabilizing actions to be conducted by the anti-access power." The committee believes it is essential that the U.S. Armed Forces maintain the capability to project power globally in light of growing anti-access challenges. The global presence and reach of U.S. forces protects U.S. interests, provides stability and reassures our many allies and security partners. The committee expects that as anti-access threats emerge, the United States will develop the necessary capabilities and security partnerships, to meet those threats.

In this regard, the committee notes that the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force have initiated a dialogue addressing means by which our air and naval forces may more effectively work together in the face of anti-access challenges. The committee encourages the Chief of Naval Operations and Air Force Chief of Staff to work together with the purpose of overcoming emergent anti-access challenges.

Additionally, the committee notes its displeasure that the Department of Defense has failed to submit the Annual Report on the Military and Security Developments involving the People's Republic of China, as required by Section 1202 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (P.L. 106-65) by the statutory deadline of March 1. The timely submission of this report is required by law, and the committee expects it to be presented to Congress as required. (Pages 194-195)

Final Version (H.R. 6523)

Section 1238 of the FY2011 defense authorization bill (H.R. 6523) that was passed by the Senate and House on December 22, 2010, states:

SEC. 1238. REPORT ON UNITED STATES EFFORTS TO DEFEND AGAINST THREATS POSED BY THE ANTI-ACCESS AND AREA-DENIAL CAPABILITIES OF CERTAIN NATION-STATES.

(a) Finding- Congress finds that the 2010 report on the Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review concludes that '[a]nti-access strategies seek to deny outside countries the ability to project power into a region, thereby allowing aggression or other destabilizing actions to be conducted by the anti-access power. Without dominant capabilities to project power, the integrity of United States alliances and security partnerships could be called into question, reducing United States security and influence and increasing the possibility of conflict'.

(b) Sense of Congress- It is the sense of Congress that, in light of the finding in subsection (a), the Secretary of Defense should ensure that the United States has the appropriate authorities, capabilities, and force structure to defend against any potential future threats posed by the anti-access and area-denial capabilities of potentially hostile foreign countries.

(c) Report- Not later than April 1, 2011, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a report on United States efforts to defend against any potential future threats posed by the anti-access and area-denial capabilities of potentially hostile nation-states.

(d) Elements- The report required under subsection (c) shall include the following:

(1) An assessment of any potential future threats posed by the anti-access and area-denial capabilities of potentially hostile foreign countries, including an identification of the foreign countries with such capabilities, the nature of such capabilities, and the possible advances in such capabilities over the next 10 years.

(2) A description of any efforts by the Department of Defense to address the potential future threats posed by the anti-access and area-denial capabilities of potentially hostile foreign countries.

(3) A description of the authorities, capabilities, and force structure that the United States may require over the next 10 years to address the threats posed by the anti-access and areadenial capabilities of potentially hostile foreign countries.

(e) Form- The report required under subsection (c) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex if necessary.

(f) Definitions- In this section--

(1) the term ' anti-access', with respect to capabilities, means any action that has the effect of slowing the deployment of friendly forces into a theater, preventing such forces from operating from certain locations within that theater, or causing such forces to operate from distances farther from the locus of conflict than such forces would normally prefer; and

(2) the term 'area-denial', with respect to capabilities, means operations aimed to prevent freedom of action of friendly forces in the more narrow confines of the area under a potentially hostile nation-state's direct control, including actions by an adversary in the air, on land, and on and under the sea to contest and prevent joint operations within a defended battlespace.

FY2010

FY2010 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84)

House

The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 111-166 of June 18, 2009) on H.R. 2647, states:

The committee welcomes recent positive exchanges between the navies of the U.S. and the People's Republic of China. Such exchanges are particularly important given the harassment of an unarmed U.S. ship, the U.S.N. S. Impeccable, by Chinese ships in international waters on March 8, 2009. This incident violated China's requirement under international law to operate with due regard for the rights and safety of other lawful users of the sea.

The committee urges more U.S.-China engagement and cooperation on maritime issues of mutual concern. The committee also supports the Administration's call for Chinese ships to act responsibly and refrain from provocative activities that could lead to miscalculation or a collision at sea, endangering vessels and the lives of U.S. and Chinese mariners. (Pages 412413)

Section 1233 of H.R. 2647 would amend the current statute requiring DOD to submit an annual report to Congress on China's military power. The text of Section 1233 is as follows:

SEC. 1233. ANNUAL REPORT ON MILITARY AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

(a) Annual Report- Subsection (a) of section 1202 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (P.L. 106-65; 113 Stat. 781; 10 U.S.C. 113 note) is amended--

(1) in the first sentence, by striking 'on the current and future military strategy of the People's Republic of China' and inserting 'on military and security developments involving the People's Republic of China';

(2) in the second sentence--

(A) by striking 'on the People's Liberation Army' and inserting 'of the People's Liberation Army'; and

(B) by striking 'Chinese grand strategy, security strategy,' and inserting 'Chinese security strategy'; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new sentence: 'The report shall also address United States-China engagement and cooperation on security matters during the period covered by the report, including through United States-China military-to-military contacts, and the United States strategy for such engagement and cooperation in the future.'.

(b) Matters to Be Included- Subsection (b) of such section, as amended by section 1263 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181; 122 Stat. 407), is further amended--

(1) in paragraph (1)--

(A) by striking 'goals of' inserting 'goals and factors shaping'; and

(B) by striking 'Chinese grand strategy, security strategy,' and inserting 'Chinese security strategy';

(2) by amending paragraph (2) to read as follows:

'(2) Trends in Chinese security and military behavior that would be designed to achieve, or that are inconsistent with, the goals described in paragraph (1).';

(3) in paragraph (6)--

(A) by inserting 'and training' after 'military doctrine'; and

(B) by striking ', focusing on (but not limited to) efforts to exploit a transformation in military affairs or to conduct preemptive strikes'; and

(4) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:

'(10) In consultation with the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of State, developments regarding United States-China engagement and cooperation on security matters.

'(11) The current state of United States military-to-military contacts with the People's Liberation Army, which shall include the following:

'(A) A comprehensive and coordinated strategy for such military-to-military contacts and updates to the strategy.

'(B) A summary of all such military-to-military contacts during the period covered by the report, including a summary of topics discussed and questions asked by the Chinese participants in those contacts.

'(C) A description of such military-to-military contacts scheduled for the 12-month period following the period covered by the report and the plan for future contacts.

'(D) The Secretary's assessment of the benefits the Chinese expect to gain from such military-to-military contacts.

'(E) The Secretary's assessment of the benefits the Department of Defense expects to gain from such military-to-military contacts, and any concerns regarding such contacts.

'(F) The Secretary's assessment of how such military-to-military contacts fit into the larger security relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

'(12) Other military and security developments involving the People's Republic of China that the Secretary of Defense considers relevant to United States national security.'.

(c) Conforming Amendment- Such section is further amended in the heading by striking 'military power of' and inserting 'military and security developments involving'.

(d) Repeals- Section 1201 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (P.L. 106-65; 113 Stat. 779; 10 U.S.C. 168 note) is amended by striking subsections (e) and (f).

(e) Effective Date-

(1) IN GENERAL- The amendments made by this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, and shall apply with respect to reports required to be submitted under subsection (a) of section 1202 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, as so amended, on or after that date.

(2) STRATEGY AND UPDATES FOR MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS WITH PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY- The requirement to include the strategy described in paragraph (11)(A) of section 1202(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, as so amended, in the report required to be submitted under section 1202(a) of such Act, as so amended, shall apply with respect to the first report required to be submitted under section 1202(a) of such Act on or after the date of the enactment of this Act. The requirement to include updates to such strategy shall apply with respect to each subsequent report required to be submitted under section 1202(a) of such Act on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

Regarding Section 1233, the committee's report stated:

This section would amend section 1202 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (P.L. 106-65) by changing the title of the report to "Annual Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China," and by making certain clarifying and technical changes.

This section would also expand the scope of the report. It would require the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State and Secretary of Energy, to provide analyses and forecasts of developments regarding U.S. engagement and cooperation with the People's Republic of China on security matters, such engagement and cooperation through military-to-military contacts, and the U.S. strategy for such engagement and cooperation in the future. Specifically, the committee requests the Secretary to provide information regarding U.S.-China engagement and cooperation in the areas of: counter-terrorism; counter-piracy; maritime safety; strategic capabilities, including space, nuclear and cyber warfare capabilities; nuclear policy and strategy; nonproliferation, including export controls, border security, and illicit arms transfers and interdictions; energy and environmental security; peacekeeping; humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, including in the area of military medicine; crisis management, including use of the "defense hotline"; regional security issues, including in the Taiwan Strait and South and East China Seas and on the Korean peninsula; and regional security organizations and other mechanisms.

In addition, this section would incorporate the reporting requirement under section 1201 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (P.L. 106-65) on U.S.-China military-to-military contacts into the reporting requirement under section 1202 of that Act. It would also include a new requirement for a comprehensive and coordinated strategy for U.S.-China military-to-military contacts.

This section would further require the Secretary of Defense to provide additional information regarding military and security developments involving China that the Secretary considers relevant to U.S. national security. (Page 423)

Senate

The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 111-35 of July 2, 2009) on the FY2010 defense authorization bill (S. 1390), states:

The Department of Defense's Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has included a brief description of the PRC concept of the "three warfares", generally identified as psychological warfare, media warfare, and legal warfare. These concepts, also referred to as ' 'nonmilitary warfare concepts", have also been the subject of hearings before the United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission and were discussed in some detail in the Commission's 2008 report to Congress. The March 2009 harassment of the USNS Impeccable by Chinese ships in the South China Sea stands as a recent example of how the PRC may be using the concept of "legal warfare", for instance, to influence regional events. The committee urges the Secretary of Defense to examine the implications of the ' 'three warfares" on United States military affairs in the region and requests the Secretary to provide additional detail on each of them, including examples and trends, in the 2010 report to Congress. (Page 195)

Conference

Section 1246 of the conference report (H.Rept. 111-288 of October 7, 2009) on H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 of October 28, 2009, amends the current statute requiring DOD to submit an annual report to Congress on China's military power. The text of Section 1246 is as follows:

SEC. 1246. ANNUAL REPORT ON MILITARY AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

(a) ANNUAL REPORT.--Subsection (a) of section 1202 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (P.L. 106-65; 113 Stat. 781; 10 U.S.C. 113 note) is amended--

(1) in the first sentence, by striking "on the current and future military strategy of the People's Republic of China" and inserting "on military and security developments involving the People's Republic of China";

(2) in the second sentence--

(A) by striking "on the People's Liberation Army" and inserting "of the People's Liberation Army"; and

(B) by striking " Chinese grand strategy, security strategy," and inserting "Chinese security strategy"; and

(3) by adding at the end the following new sentence: ' 'The report shall also address United States-China engagement and cooperation on security matters during the period covered by the report, including through United States-China military-to-military contacts, and the United States strategy for such engagement and cooperation in the future.".

(b) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.--Subsection (b) of such section, as amended by section 1263 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181; 122 Stat. 407), is further amended--

(1) in paragraph (1)--

(A) by striking "goals of" inserting "goals and factors shaping"; and

(B) by striking " Chinese grand strategy, security strategy," and inserting "Chinese security strategy";

(2) by amending paragraph (2) to read as follows:

"(2) Trends in Chinese security and military behavior that would be designed to achieve, or that are inconsistent with, the goals described in paragraph (1).";

(3) in paragraph (6)--

(A) by inserting "and training" after "military doctrine"; and

(B) by striking ", focusing on (but not limited to) efforts to exploit a transformation in military affairs or to conduct preemptive strikes"; and

(4) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:

"(10) In consultation with the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of State, developments regarding United States-China engagement and cooperation on security matters.

"(11) The current state of United States military-to-military contacts with the People's Liberation Army, which shall include the following:

"(A) A comprehensive and coordinated strategy for such military-to-military contacts and updates to the strategy.

"(B) A summary of all such military-to-military contacts during the period covered by the report, including a summary of topics discussed and questions asked by the Chinese participants in those contacts.

"(C) A description of such military-to-military contacts scheduled for the 12-month period following the period covered by the report and the plan for future contacts.

"(D) The Secretary's assessment of the benefits the Chinese expect to gain from such military-to-military contacts.

"(E) The Secretary's assessment of the benefits the Department of Defense expects to gain from such military-to-military contacts, and any concerns regarding such contacts.

"(F) The Secretary's assessment of how such military-to-military contacts fit into the larger security relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

"(12) Other military and security developments involving the People's Republic of China that the Secretary of Defense considers relevant to United States national security.".

(c) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.--Such section is further amended in the heading by striking "MILITARY POWER OF" and inserting "MILITARY AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING".

(d) REPEALS.--Section 1201 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (P.L. 106-65; 113 Stat. 779; 10 U.S.C. 168 note) is amended by striking subsections (e) and (f).

(e) EFFECTIVE DATE.--

(1) IN GENERAL.--The amendments made by this section shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, and shall apply with respect to reports required to be submitted under subsection (a) of section 1202 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, as so amended, on or after that date.

(2) STRATEGY AND UPDATES FOR MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS WITH PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY.--The requirement to include the strategy described in paragraph (11)(A) of section 1202(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, as so amended, in the report required to be submitted under section 1202(a) of such Act, as so amended, shall apply with respect to the first report required to be submitted under section 1202(a) of such Act on or after the date of the enactment of this Act. The requirement to include updates to such strategy shall apply with respect to each subsequent report required to be submitted under section 1202(a) of such Act on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

Regarding Section 1246, the conference report states:

Annual report on military and security developments involving the People's Republic of China (sec. 1246)

The House bill contained a provision (sec. 1233) that would amend section 1202 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (P.L. 106-65) by changing the title of the report to "Annual Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China" and by making certain clarifying and technical changes. The provision would also expand the scope of the report to include information regarding U.S. engagement and cooperation with China on security matters, and information on additional developments involving China that the Secretary of Defense considers relevant to national security. In addition, the provision would repeal the reporting requirements on military-tomilitary contacts under sections 1201(e) and (f) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 and add these requirements to the reporting requirements under section 1202 of that Act. Details of the provision's reporting requirements are set forth in the report accompanying the House bill (H.Rept. 111-166).

The Senate amendment contained no similar provision.

The Senate recedes.

The conferees encourage the Secretary to further examine the implications of China's concepts of psychological warfare, media warfare, and legal warfare on U.S. military affairs in the region and include additional detail on each of these concepts, including examples and trends, in the fiscal year 2010 report to Congress required under this section. (Page 842)

FY2009

FY2009 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5658/S. 3001)

House

The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 110-652 of May 16, 2008) on H.R. 5658, stated the following regarding the development of an anti-air warfare target for simulating Threat D, which some press reports suggest might be a term that refers to an ASCM with a flight profile similar that of the SS-N-27 Sizzler: (173)
   The committee is pleased to note the anticipated source selection
   for the development of a Threat D missile target development
   program in the summer of 2008. The committee remains concerned that
   the estimated initial operating capability of such a target in 2014
   creates substantial risk during the interim period. The committee
   encourages the Secretary to accelerate the target development
   program to the maximum extent practicable. In addition, the
   committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to notify the
   congressional defense committees in writing if the estimated
   initial operating capability of the Threat D target is delayed more
   than 90 days or if the costs associated with such program exceeds
   10 percent of programmed funding. The committee further directs the
   Secretary to provide such notification within 30 days, along with
   the reasons for such delay or cost overrun and a mitigation plan
   consisting of actions that could restore the program to its
   original timeline. (Page 204)


FY2008

FY2008 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 1585/S. 1547/H.R. 4986/P.L. 110-181)

House

Section 1244 of the House-reported version of the FY2008 defense authorization bill (H.R. 1585) stated:

SEC. 1244. SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING THE STRATEGIC MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

It is the sense of Congress that--

(1) United States military war-fighting capabilities are potentially threatened by the strategic military capabilities and intentions of the People's Republic of China, as demonstrated by--

(A) the October 2006 undetected broach of a Chinese SONG-class diesel-electric submarine in close proximity of the USS Kitty Hawk in international waters; and

(B) the January 2007 test of a direct ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon, posing a potential threat to United States military assets in space;

(2) it is in the national security interests of the United States to make every effort to understand China's strategic military capabilities and intentions; and

(3) as part of such an effort, the Secretary of Defense should expand efforts to develop an accurate assessment of China's strategic military modernization, particularly with regard to its sea- and space-based strategic capabilities.

Senate

The Senate-passed version of the FY2008 defense authorization bill (S. 1547; S.Rept. 110-77 of June 5, 2007) did not contain a provision analogous to Section 1244 of the House-passed version of H.R. 1585 (see above).

Conference

The conference report (H.Rept. 110-477 of December 6, 2007) on H.R. 1585 did not contain a provision analogous to the Sec. 1244 of the House-passed version of H.R. 1585. The conference report stated:
   The conferees note China's continued investment in strategic
   military capabilities that could be used to support power
   projection and access denial operations beyond the Asia Pacific
   region, and the lack of transparency surrounding the strategic
   military capabilities and intentions relating to China's military
   modernization. The Pentagon's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
   Report (QDR) found that China is at a strategic crossroads and
   that, "of the major and emerging powers, China has the greatest
   potential to compete militarily with the United States." The
   conferees note that during the last year, China demonstrated such
   potential, including the October 2006 broach of a Chinese
   SONG-class diesel-electric submarine in close proximity to the USS
   Kitty Hawk aircraft carrier in international waters and the January
   2007 test of a direct ascent anti-satellite missile against a
   Chinese weather satellite in low-earth orbit.

   The conferees encourage the Secretary of Defense to expand efforts
   to develop an accurate assessment and understanding of China's
   strategic military modernization and strategic intentions,
   particularly with regard to its sea- and space-based strategic
   capabilities. (Page 1031)


H.R. 1585 was vetoed by the President on December 28, 2008. A new bill, H.R. 4986, was passed with changes that took into account the President's objection to certain parts of H.R. 1585. The President's objection to certain parts of H.R. 1585 did not relate to the passage quoted above. H.R. 4986 was signed into law as P.L. 110-181 of January 28, 2008. Except for the changes made by Congress to take into account the President's objection to certain parts of H.R. 1585, H.Rept. 110-477 in effect serves as the conference report for H.R. 4986.

Author Contact Information

Ronald O'Rourke

Specialist in Naval Affairs

rorourke@crs.loc.gov, 7-7610

(1) Viola Gienger, "U.S. Concern Over China's Military Intent Growing, Mullen Says," Bloomberg.com, June 10, 2010. See also Daniel Ten Kate, "U.S. Criticism Of China's Military May Overshadow Asian Security Meeting," Bloomberg.com, July 15, 2010; and Jon Rabiroff, "Mullen Moves From 'Curious' To 'Concerned' Over China's Military," Stripes.com, July 21, 2010. A September 30, 2010, press report states:

Adm. Mullen said during a breakfast meeting hosted by the Christian Science Monitor that China's military is making a "tremendous investment" in naval forces and is "very aggressive in the waters off their east coast, South China Sea, East China Sea, even ... in the waters in the Yellow Sea."

"A country has a right to build its defense capability tied to its national interests. I don't have any problem with that," Adm. Mullen said. "It's the kinds of capabilities that will prevent others, that prevent access, which is one of their overarching strategic objectives, as best I can tell, although sometimes it's difficult to see what their strategy is."

(Bill Gertz, "Inside the Ring," Washington Times, September 30, 2010. Ellipsis as in original.)

(2) Source: Transcript of media availability with Secretary Gates en route to Beijing, China, from Andrews Air Force Base, accessed online on January 11, 2011, at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4748.

(3) U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress [on] Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2010. Washington, 2010. Hereafter 2010 DOD CMSD. The 2009 and earlier editions of the report were known as the China military power report. The 2009 edition is cited as 2009 DOD CMP, and earlier editions are cited similarly.

(4) Office of Naval Intelligence, The People's Liberation Army Navy, A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics, Suitland (MD), Office of Naval Intelligence, August 2009. 46 pp. (Hereafter 2009 ONI Report.)

(5) Unless otherwise indicated, shipbuilding program information in this section is taken from Jane's Fighting Ships 2010-2011, and previous editions. Other sources of information on these shipbuilding programs may disagree regarding projected ship commissioning dates or other details, but sources present similar overall pictures regarding PLA Navy shipbuilding.

(6) China ordered its first four Russian-made Kilo-class submarines in 1993, and its four Russian-made Sovremennyclass destroyers in 1996. China laid the keel on its first Song (Type 039) class submarine in 1991, its first Luhu (Type 052) class destroyer in 1990, its Luhai (Type 051B) class destroyer in 1996, and its first Jiangwei I (Type 053 H2G) class frigate in 1990.

(7) First-in-class ships whose keels were laid down in 1990 or 1991 (see previous footnote) likely reflect design work done in the latter 1980s.

(8) C4ISR stands for command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

(9) For a discussion of improvements in personnel, training, and exercises, see 2009 ONI Report, pp. 31-40.

(10) For example, Vice Admiral David J. Dorsett, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance, stated the following at a January 5, 2011, meeting with defense reporters:

Sophisticated in a joint warfighting, complex combat environment. I don't see China with those capabilities right now. I see them delivering individual components, individual weapon systems. Those things are being developed. But as soon as they acquire that proficiency, the question is how competent are they really going to be?

So one of the areas that I focus on is how good are they at developing their operational proficiency to manage across the spectrum of warfare? And that's one where I don't want to get the assessment wrong. I don't want to underestimate or overestimate. I want to get it pretty right about when we think they're going to become operationally proficient. We're not seeing that. We're seeing it in individual elements of warfare, but not across the joint spectrum of the fight.

(Source: Transcript of Defense Writers Group roundtable with Vice Admiral David J. Dorsett, Deputy CNO for Information Warfare. Dorsett expands on the points at other places in the transcript.)

(11) DOD states that "China continues to rely on foreign suppliers for some propulsion units and, to a lesser degree, fire control systems, cruise missiles, ship-to-air missiles, torpedo systems, sensors, and other advanced electronics." (2010 DOD CMSD, p. 44.) For an additional discussion, see John Pomfret, "Military Strength Is Eluding China," Washington Post, December 25, 2010: 1.

(12) DOD states that "the PLA remains untested in modern combat. This lack of operational experience continues to complicate outside assessment of the progress of China's military transformation." (2010DOD CMSD, p. 22)

(13) 2010 DOD CMSD, p. 12.

(14) 2010 DOD CMSD, p. 31.

(15) The August 2009 ONI report, for example, states that a 2004 expansion in missions for China's Navy "levied new requirements on the PLA(N) to prepare for contingencies beyond the immediacy of Taiwan, such as addressing China's economic dependence on sea lines of communication." 2009 ONI Report, p. 9.

(16) For a map depicting maritime perimeters in the Western Pacific that China refers to as the first and second island chains, see 2010 DOD CMSD, p. 23.

(17) 2010 DOD CMSD, p. 33. DOD also states that

China continues to invest in military programs designed to improve extended-range power projection. Current trends in China's military capabilities are a major factor in changing East Asian military balances, and could provide China with a force capable of conducting a range of military operations in Asia well beyond Taiwan....

Analysis of China's weapons development and deployment patterns suggests Beijing is already looking at contingencies beyond Taiwan as it builds its force.... Advanced destroyers and submarines could protect and advance China's maritime interests up to and beyond the second island chain.... Over the long term, improvements in China's C4ISR, including space-based and over-the-horizon sensors, could enable Beijing to identify, track, and target military activities deep into the western Pacific Ocean.

(2010 DOD CMSD, p. 37.)

(18) 2010 DOD CMSD, p. 29.

(19) Yoichi Kato, "U.S. Commander Says China Aims to Be A 'Global Military' Power," Asahi.com (Asahi Shimbun), December 28, 2010.

(20) Depending on their ranges, these theater-range ballistic missiles can be divided into short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs, MRBMs, and IRBMs, respectively).

(21) 2010 DOD CMSD, p. 2. See also 2009 ONI Report, pp. 26-27. For further discussion of China's ASBM-development effort and its potential implications for U.S. naval forces, see Craig Hooper and Christopher Albon, "Get Off the Fainting Couch," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 2010: 42-47; Andrew S. Erickson, "Ballistic Trajectory-- China Develops New Anti-Ship Missile," Jane's Intelligence Review, January 4, 2010; Michael S. Chase, Andrew S. Erickson and Christopher Yeaw, "Chinese Theater and Strategic Missile Force Modernization and its Implications for the United States," The Journal of Strategic Studies, February 2009: 67-114; Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, "On the Verge of a Game-Changer," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 2009: 26-32; Andrew Erickson, "Facing A New Missile Threat From China, How The U.S. Should Respond To China's Development Of Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile Systems," CBSNews.com, May 28, 2009; Andrew S. Erickson, "Chinese ASBM Development: Knowns and Unknowns," China Brief, June 24, 2009: 4-8; Andrew S. Erickson and David D. Yang, "Using the Land to Control the Sea? Chinese Analysts Consider the Antiship Ballistic Missile," Naval War College Review, Autumn 2009: 53-86; Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin, "China's Antiship Ballistic Missile, Developments and Missing Links," Naval War College Review, Autumn 2009: 87-115; Mark Stokes, "China's Evolving Conventional Strategic Strike Capability, The Antiship Ballistic Missile Challenge to U.S. Maritime Operations in the Western Pacific and Beyond, Project 2049 Institute, September 14, 2009. 123 pp.

(22) 2009 ONI Report, p. 26.

(23) Yoichi Kato, "U.S. Commander Says China Aims to Be A 'Global Military' Power," Asahi.com (Asahi Shimbun), December 28, 2010.

(24) Yoichi Kato, "U.S. Commander Says China Aims to Be A 'Global Military' Power," Asahi.com (Asahi Shimbun), December 28, 2010. See also Andrew Erickson and Gabe Collins, "China Deploys World's First Long-Range, LandBased 'Carrier Killer': DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Reaches "Initial Operational Capability" IOC," China SignPost, December 26, 2010; Bill Gertz, "China Has Carrier-Killer Missile, U.S. Admiral Says," Washington Times, December 28, 2010: 1; Associated Press, "China Moving Toward Deploying Anti-Carrier Missile," Washington Post, December 28, 2010; Kathrin Hille, "Chinese Missile Shifts Power In Pacific," Financial Times, December 29, 2010: 1.

An August 26, 2010, news report stated:

A ballistic missile under development in China for the purpose of deterring and attacking U.S. aircraft carriers in the western Pacific is close to becoming operational, according to Adm. Robert Willard, commander of U.S. Pacific Command.

Willard provided the assessment in a recent round table discussion with Japanese media in Tokyo....

Asked how he perceives the current status of development [of China's anti-ship ballistic missile], Willard said, "To our knowledge, it has undergone repeated tests and it is probably very close to being operational."

(Yoichi Kato, "China's Anti-Ship Missile Is Nearly Operational,"Asahi.com (Asahi Shimbun), August 26, 2010.)

On March 23, 2010, Admiral Willard testified that China was "developing and testing a conventional anti-ship ballistic missile based on the DF-21/CSS-5 MRBM designed specifically to target aircraft carriers." (Statement of Admiral Robert F. Willard, U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Before the House Armed Services Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture, March 23, 2010, p. 14.) Some observers believe this was the first time that a DOD official stated publicly that China's ASBM was not only in development, but that is had reached the testing stage. (See, for example, Wendell Minnick, "Chinese Anti-Ship Missile Could Alter U.S. Power," Defense News, April 5, 2010: 6; and Greg Torode, "Beijing Testing 'Carrier Killer,' U.S. Warns, South China Morning Post, April 3, 2010.)

(25) Tony Capaccio, "China's Anti-Ship Missiles Aren't Effective Yet, U.S. Navy Says," Bloomberg.com, January 3, 2011.

(26) "Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Information Dominance (N2/N6): China Has Space-Based & Non-SpaceBased C2 + ISR 'capable of providing the targeting information necessary to employ the DF-21D' Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM)," blog entry dated January 4, 2011, accessed by CRS on January 7, 2011, at http://www.andrewerickson.com/.

(27) Source: Transcript of Defense Writers Group roundtable with Vice Admiral David J. Dorsett, Deputy CNO for Information Warfare. Material in brackets as in the transcript. The transcript shows "BF-21" and "BF-21B;" the excerpt as shown here corrects the transcribing error to "DF-21" and "DF-21D."

(28) Source: Transcript of media availability with Secretary Gates en route to Beijing, China, from Andrews Air Force Base, accessed online on January 11, 2011, at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript. aspx?transcriptid=4748.

(29) "China to Test-Fire New Anti-Ship Missile," The Chosen Ilbo (English edition) (english.chosen.com), August 16, 2010.

(30) Eric Talmadge, "AP Enterprise: Chinese 'Carrier-Killer' Missile Raises Concerns of Pacific Power Shift," Canadian Press, August 5, 2010.

(31) Tony Capaccio, "China's New Missile May Create A 'No-Go Zone' For U.S. Fleet," Blooomberg.com, November 17, 2009.

(32) Robert Wall and Bettina H. Chavanne, "Reaching Out," Aviation Week & Space Technology, August 23/30, 2010: 30.

(33) Bill Sweetman, "Chinese J-20 Stealth Fighter In Taxi Tests,"AviationWeek.com, January 3, 2011. See also Jeremy Page, "A Chinese Stealth Challenge," Wall Street Journal, January 5, 2011: 1; Phil Stewart, "U.S. Downplays Chinese Stealth Fighter Status," Reuters. com, January 5, 2011; Agence France-Presse, "US Downplays Concern Over Chinese Stealth Fighter," DefenseNews.com, January 6, 2011; Tony Capaccio, "China's J-20 Stealth Fighter Meant to Counter F-22, F-35, U.S. Navy Says," Bloomberg.com, January 6, 2011.

(34) See, for example, David A. Fulgham, et al, "Stealth Slayer?" Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 17, 2011: 20-21, and Dave Majumdar, "U.S. Opinions Vary Over China's Stealthy J-20," Defense News, January 24, 2011: 16. For an in-depth discussion of the J-20, see Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel B. Collins, "China's New Project 718/J-20 Fighter: Development outlook and strategic implications," China SignPost, January 17, 2011, 13 pp.

(35) 2010 DOD CMSD, p. 33.

(36) 2009 ONI Report, pp. 28-29.

(37) 2009 ONI Report, p. 20.

(38) Some sources state that a successor to the Shang class SSN design, called the Type 095 SSN design, is in development.

(39) Some observers believe the Yuan class to be a variant of the Song class and refer to the Yuan class as the Type 039A. The August 2009 ONI report states that the Yuan class may be equipped with an air-independent propulsion (AIP) system. (2009 ONI Report, p. 23.)

(40) A graph in the August 2009 ONI report shows that the Jin-class SSBN is quieter than China's earlier Xia-class SSBN, but less quiet than Russia's Delta III-class SSBN, and that the Shang-class SSN is quieter than China's earlier Han-class SSN, but less quiet than Russia's Victor III-class SSN. The graph shows that the Song-class SS is quieter than the less capable 877 version of the Kilo class, but not as quiet as the more capable 636 version of the Kilo class. (Two of China's 12 Kilos are 877 models, the other 10 are 636s.) The graph shows that the Yuan class is quieter than the Song class, but still not as quiet as the 636 version of the Kilo class. (2009 ONI Report, p. 22.)

(41) The August 2009 ONI report states that the Yuan class may incorporate quieting technology from the Kilo class, and that it may be equipped with an air-independent propulsion (AIP) system. (2009 ONI Report, p. 23.)

(42) See, for example, Ted Parsons, "China Launches New SSK," Jane's Defence Weekly, September 22, 2010: 16. A similar article was published as Ted Parsons, "Launch of Mystery Chinese SSK Fuels Submarine Race in Asia," Jane's Navy International, October 2010: 4.

(43) 2010 DOD CMSD, pp. 2-3.

(44) Lyle Goldstein and Shannon Knight, "Coming Without Shadows, Leaving Without Footprints," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 2010: 30-35.

(45) See, for example, 2009 ONI report, p. 29.

(46) 2009 ONI Report, p. 21. The report states on page 46 that "Because approximately three-quarters of the current submarine force will still be operational in 10-15 years, new submarine construction is expected to add approximately 10 platforms to the force." See also the graph on page 45, which shows the submarine force leveling off in size around 2015.

(47) 2009 DOD CMP, p. 24.

(48) 2010 DOD CMSD, pp. 35 (figure), and 66 (table).

(49) 2010 DOD CMSD, p. 34.

(50) The August 2009 ONI report states that "Beginning in early 2006, PRC-owned media has reported statements from high-level officials on China's intent to build aircraft carriers."

(51) 2010 DOD CMSD, p. 2. DOD also states that

China has an aircraft carrier research and design program, which includes continued renovations to the former Soviet Kuznetsov-class Hull-2, the ex-VARYAG. Beginning in early 2006 with the release of China's 11th Five Year Plan (2006-2010), PRC-owned media reported high-level government and military official statements on China's intent to build aircraft carriers. In April 2009 PRC Navy Commander Admiral Wu Shengli stated that "China will develop its fleet of aircraft carriers in a harmonious manner. We will prudently decide the policy [we will follow with regard to building aircraft carriers]. I am willing to listen to the views of experts from the navies of other countries and to seek opinions from our country." While meeting with Japanese Defense Minister Yasukazu Hamada in March 2009, PRC Minister of Defense General Liang Guanglie stressed that China is the only big nation that does not have aircraft carriers and stated that "China cannot be without aircraft carriers forever."

China continues to show interest in procuring Su-33 carrier-borne fighters from Russia. Since 2006 China and Russia had been in negotiations for the sale of 50 Su-33 Flanker-D fighters at a cost of up to $2.5 billion. These negotiations reportedly stalled after Russia refused a request from China for an initial delivery of two trial aircraft. Russian defense ministry sources confirmed that the refusal was due to findings that China had produced its own copycat version of the Su-27SK fighter jet.

The PLA Navy has reportedly decided to initiate a program to train 50 navy pilots to operate fixedwing aircraft from an aircraft carrier. In May 2009, Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim announced that the Brazilian Navy would provide training to PLA Navy officers in aircraft carrier operations.

Analysts in and out of government project that China will not have an operational, domestically produced carrier and associated ships before 2015. However, changes in China's shipbuilding capability and degree of foreign assistance to the program could alter those projections. In March 2009, PLA Navy Admiral Wu Huayang stated that "China is capable of building aircraft carriers. We have such strength. Building aircraft carriers requires economic and technological strength.

Given the level of development in our country, I think we have such strength." The PLA Navy is considering building multiple carriers by 2020.

(2010 DOD CMSD, p. 48)

(52) 2009 ONI Report, p. 17. The report similarly states on page 1 that China "is refurbishing [the Varyag] and plans to build its own [aircraft carrier] within the next five to ten years," and on page 19 that "the PRC will likely have an operational, domestically produced carrier sometime after 2015." The report states on page 19 that the Varyag "is expected to become operational in the 2010 to 2012 timeframe, and will likely be used to develop basic proficiencies in carrier operations." For a press article discussing China's aircraft carrier program, see Richard Scott, "Joining the Club," Jane's Defence Weekly, November 17, 2010: 29-31.

(53) Agence France-Presse, "China Restores Soviet Aircraft Carrier: Expert," DefenseNews. com, January 19, 2011.

(54) Benjamin Kang Lim, "China Speeds Plans To Launch Aircraft Carrier: Sources," Reuters.com, December 23, 2010.

(55) For comparison, the U.S. Navy's Midway (CV-41), Forrestal (CV-59), and Kitty Hawk (CV-63) class conventionally powered carriers, none of which is still in service, had displacements of 69,000 to 85,000 tons, and could operate air wings of 70 or more aircraft, most of which were CTOL airplanes. The Navy's current Nimitz (CVN-68) class nuclear- powered aircraft carriers displace about 100,000 tons and operate air wings or 70 or more aircraft, most of which are CTOL airplanes. Additional points of comparison include the French aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle (commissioned in 2001), which has a displacement of about 42,000 tons, and aircraft carriers that the United Kingdom and France plan to commission into service between 2014 and 2016, which are to have displacements of 65,000 to 70,000 tons. The Charles de Gaulle can operate an air wing of about 36 aircraft, and the future UK and French carriers are to operate air wings of about 40 to 45 aircraft.

(56) Kenji Minemura, "Beijing Admits It Is Building An Aircraft Carrier," Asahi.com (Asahi Shimbun), December 17, 2010. For follow-on press reports based on this initial report, see Kathrin Hille and Mure Dickie, "China Reveals Aircraft Carrier Plans," FT.com (Financial Times), December 17, 2010 (a similar story was published as Kathrin Hille, "China Reveals Aircraft Carrier Plans," Financial Times, December 18, 2010: 1); Kathrin Hille, "Carriers Back China's Global Reach," Financial Times, December 18, 2010.

(57) Mark Dodd, "Don't Fear Chinese Carrier Fleet: US Admiral," The Australian, October 1, 2010: 2.

(58) 2009 ONI Report, p. 16. This comment may relate not solely to China's surface combatants (e.g., destroyers, frigates, and fast attack craft), but to China's entire surface fleet, which includes other types of ships as well, such as aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, and auxiliary and support ships.

(59) 2009 ONI Report, p. 18.

(60) 2010 DOD CMSD, p. 3.

(61) 2007 DOD CMP, p. 3. The DOD report spells Sovremenny with two "y"s at the end.

(62) 2008 DOD CMP, p. 2.

(63) Norman Friedman, "Russian Arms Industry Foundering," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 2009: 90-91.

(64) One observer says the limited production runs of these four designs to date "might be financially related, or may relate to debate over what ships should follow the Type 051C air defence and Type 052C multi-role classes, or that once the Type 054A [frigate design] is accepted as the future missile frigate design, three or four of the major warship shipyards will all be assigned to construction of this design, delaying a future CG/DDG class." (Keith Jacobs, "PLANavy Update," Naval Forces, No. 1, 2007: 24.) Another observer stated I 2007 that "It looks like [the] 052C [class] was stopped for a few years due to [the] JiangNan relocation [and the] sorting out [of] all the issues on [the] 052B/C [designs]. ("2018--deadline for Taiwan invasion?" a September 22, 2007, entry in a blog on China naval and air power maintained by an author called "Feng," available online at http://china-pla.blogspot.com/2007/09/2018-deadline- fortaiwan-invasion.html.)

(65) Jane's Fighting Ships 2010-2011, p. 134.

(66) See, for example, the blog entry dated November 7, 2010, available online at http://www.informationdissemination.net/ 2010/11/2010-is-start-of-plans-second-building.html.

(67) 2007 DOD CMP, pp. 3-4

(68) The August 2009 report from the Office of Naval Intelligence states that "the Luyang II DDG possesses a sophisticated phased-array radar system similar to the western AEGIS radar system." 2009 ONI Report, p. 1. Another author states that "the Chinese bought their active-array destroyer radar from the Ukrainian Kvant organization, which is unlikely to have the resources to develop the project much further." (Norman Friedman, "Russian Arms Industry Foundering," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 2009: 90-91.)

(69) 2007 DOD CMP, p. 3.

(70) France sold a modified version of the La Fayette-class design to Taiwan; the six ships that Taiwan built to the design entered service in 1996-1998.

(71) 2010 DOD CMSD, p. 3.

(72) Jane's Fighting Ships 2010-2011, p. 149.

(73) 2009 ONI Report, p. 20. For further discussion of the Houbei class, see John Patch, "A Thoroughbred Ship-Killer," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 2010: 48-53.

(74) A blog entry dated November 20, 2010, available online at http://www.informationdissemination.net/2010/11/ updates-around-chinese-shipyards.html, shows photographs of an apparent second Type 071 class ship and states that this ship was launched "in the past 2 days." (Launched means that the ship's construction has progressed to the point where the ship can be put into the water for the final phase of its construction.) See also the blog entry dated November 7, 2010, available online at http://www.informationdissemination.net/ 2010/11/2010-is-start-of-plans-secondbuilding.html.

(75) On June 30, 2010, it was reported that the Type 071 amphibious ship was one of three ships forming the sixth anti- piracy naval group sent by China to waters of Somalia for anti-piracy operations. "China Sends Sixth Naval Escort Flotilla to Gulf of Aden," Xinhua, June 30, 2010. (The story carries a mistaken dateline of July 30.)

(76) 2009 DOD CMP, p. viii.

(77) For a recent article discussing these systems, see Andrew S. Erickson, "Eyes in the Sky," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 2010: 36-41.

(78) 2010 DOD CMSD, p. 2.

(79) 2010 DOD CMSD, p. 45 (figure).

(80) 2009 ONI Report, p. 46.

(81) 2010 DOD CMSD, p. 2.

(82) 2010 DOD CMSD, p. 45 (figure).

(83) Mark Magnier, "China Regrets Sub Incident, Japan Says," Los Angeles Times, November 17, 2004; Martin Fackler, "Japanese Pursuit Of Chinese Sub Raises Tensions," Wall Street Journal, November 15, 2004: 20; Kenji Hall, "Japan: Unidentified sub is Chinese," NavyTimes.com (AssociatedPress), November 12, 2004. See also 2006DOD CMP, pp. 11-12.

(84) Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, U.S. Navy, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Statement for the Record [before the] Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 16 February 2005, p. 16-17. See also Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, Vice Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, U.S. Navy, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Statement For the Record [before the] Senate Armed Services Committee, 17 March 2005, p. 17.

(85) Timothy Hu, "Ready, steady, go ... ," Jane's Defence Weekly, April 13, 2005: 27; "China Sub Tracked By U.S. Off Guam Before Japan Intrusion," Japan Times, November 17, 2004.

(86) Bill Gertz, "China Sub Secretly Stalked U.S. Fleet," Washington Times, November 13, 2006: 13; Philip Creed, "Navy Confirms Chinese Sub Spotted Near Carrier," NavyTimes.com, November 13, 2006; Bill Gertz, "Defenses On [sic] Subs To Be Reviewed," Washington Times, November 14, 2006; En-Lai Yeoh, "Fallon Confirms Chinese Stalked Carrier," NavyTimes.com, November 14, 2006; Bill Gertz, "Admiral Says Sub Risked A Shootout," Washington Times, November 15, 2006; Jeff Schogol, "Admiral Disputes Report That Kitty Hawk, Chinese Sub Could Have Clashed," Mideast Starts and Stripes, November 17, 2006.

(87) Associated Press, "China Denies Reports That Sub Followed Kitty Hawk," NavyTimes.com, November 16, 2006. A shorter version of the same story was published as Associated Press, "China Denies Sub Followed A Group Of U.S. Warships," Asian Wall Street Journal, November 17, 2006: 11.

(88) Andrew S. Erickson and Juston D. Mikolay, "Welcome China to the Fight Against Pirates," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March 2009: 36.

(89) For a discussion of China's anti-piracy operations in waters off Somalia, see Andrew S. Erickson, "Chinese Sea Power in Action: The Counterpiracy Mission in the Gulf of Aden and Beyond," which is Chapter 7 (pages 295-376) of Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell, editors, The PLA At Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China's Military, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 2010, available at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/ pubs/display.cfm?pubID=995.

(90) 2010 DOD CMSD, p. 8.

(91) Greg Torode, "PLA Navy Ships Enter Gulf For The First Time," South China Morning Post, March 27, 2010: 1.

(92) "Chinese Naval Flotilla In Greece After Anti-Piracy Mission," GreekReporter.com (via Zinhua), August 12, 2010; Christopher P. Cavas, "Chinese Warships Tour the Mediterranean," DefenseNews.com, August 9, 2010.

(93) Mure Dickie, "Japan Seeks Answers Over Chinese Warships," Financial Times, April 13, 2010; Jay Alabaster, "Tokyo Wary Of Chinese Military Vessels," Washington Times, April 14, 2010; Greg Torode, "Exercises Show PLA Navy's New Strength," South China Morning Post, April 18, 2010: 1; "Japan Protests Over Chinese Helicopter's FlyBy," Agence France-Presse, April 21, 2010; "Japan: Protest Over Chinese Helicopter," New York Times, April 22, 2010; "China's Naval Drills Near Japan 'Not A Threat,'" Singapore Straits Times, April 24, 2010: 59; "China Envoy Says Naval Chopper Fly-By Was Japan's Fault (Updated)," Agence France-Presse, April 27, 2010; L. C. Russell Hsiao, "In A Fortnight," China Brief, April 29, 2010: 1-2.

(94) Christopher D. Yung et al, China's Out of Area Naval Operations: Case Studies, Trajectories, Obstacles, and Potential Solutions, Washington, National Defense University Press, December 2010. (Institute for National Strategic Studies, China Strategic Perspectives, No. 3.) 65 pp.

(95) One press report in 2005, for example, stated:
   China is building up military forces and setting up bases along sea
   lanes from the Middle East to project its power overseas and
   protect its oil shipments, according to a previously undisclosed
   internal report prepared for Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld.

   "China is building strategic relationships along the sea lanes from
   the Middle East to the South China Sea in ways that suggest
   defensive and offensive positioning to protect China's energy
   interests, but also to serve broad security objectives," said the
   report sponsored by the director, Net Assessment, who heads Mr.
   Rumsfeld's office on future-oriented strategies.

   The Washington Times obtained a copy of the report, titled "Energy
   Futures in Asia," which was produced by defense contractor Booz
   Allen Hamilton.

   The internal report stated that China is adopting a "string of
   pearls" strategy of bases and diplomatic ties stretching from the
   Middle East to southern China.


The press report stated that China is:

* operating an eavesdropping post and building a naval base at Gwadar, Pakistan, near the Persian Gulf;

* building a container port facility at Chittagong, Bangladesh, and seeking "much more extensive naval and commercial access" in Bangladesh;

* building naval bases in Burma, which is near the Strait of Malacca;

* operating electronic intelligence-gathering facilities on islands in the Bay of Bengal and near the Strait of Malacca;

* building a railway line from China through Cambodia to the sea;

* improving its ability to project air and sea power into the South China Sea from mainland China and Hainan Island;

* considering funding a $20-billion canal that would cross the Kra Isthmus of Thailand, which would allow ships to bypass the Strait of Malacca and permit China to establish port facilities there.

Bill Gertz, "China Builds Up Strategic Sea Lanes," Washington Times, January 18, 2005, p. 1. See also Daniel J. Kostecka, "The Chinese Navy's Emerging Support Network in the Indian Ocean," China Brief, July 22, 1010: 3-5; Edward Cody, "China Builds A Smaller, Stronger Military," Washington Post, April 12, 2005, p. 1; Indrani Bagchi, "China Eyeing Base in Bay of Bengal?" Times of India, August 9, 2008, posted online at http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/ China_eyeing_base_in_Bay_of_Bengal/articleshow/3343799.cms; Eric Ellis, "Pearls for the Orient, " Sydney Morning Herald, July 9, 2010.

(96) One observer, for example, states that

Much of the discussion regarding China's maritime ambitions in the Indian Ocean has revolved around the so-called "String of Pearls" strategy that Beijing is alleged to be pursuing. As part of this strategic construct it is claimed that Beijing is building a comprehensive network of naval bases stretching from southern China to Pakistan. This theory, a creation of a 2004 U.S. Department of Defense contractor study entitled Energy Futures in Asia, is now accepted as fact by many in official and unofficial circles. While the study contains some useful arguments, certain elements of it have been selectively quoted as singular evidence of Beijing's strategic intent in this region. In spite of the lack of evidentiary proof supporting the assertion that China intends to turn these facilities into military bases, claims regarding future bases in these locations for the Chinese Navy continue to this day, particularly in the United States and India....

Despite almost a decade of speculation there appears to be no hard evidence that suggests China plans to base warships in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka or the Maldives, or that these nations even desire a Chinese military presence. In fact, all three of these nations' proximity to India and their desires to balance their relations between India and China indicate that China will not develop military facilities in these countries. While the Chinese are heavily investing in developing infrastructure for improved access into the Indian Ocean, which in turn is helping it gain political influence in these countries, the extent to which it has improved access and infrastructure will translate into basing arrangements remains to be seen.

China will no doubt continue to maintain positive relationships with Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and the Maldives, but this does not mean China will seek to establish a military presence in any of these countries or that such a presence would even be permitted as it would not only undermine their security, it would do very little to enhance China's. Recent denials of future Chinese naval bases in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka by leaders of those nations and the Maldives' reliance on India for security assistance should be taken as clear signs that such arrangements are farther from reach than some may think, and reflect the growing concerns over the intentions of these nations regarding the possibility of Chinese military bases on their soil.

(Daniel J. Kostecka, "Hambantota, Chittagong, and the Maldives--Unlikely Pearls for the Chinese Navy," China Brief, November 19, 2010: 8-11; see also Daniel J. Kostecka, "Places and Bases: The Chinese Navy's Emerging Support Network in the Indian Ocean," Naval War College Review, Winter 2011: 59-78; and Daniel J. Kostecka, "The Chinese Navy's Emerging Support Network in the Indian Ocean," China Brief, July 22, 2010: 5.)

(97) 2009 ONI Report, p. 40. See also Dean Chang, "The Chinese Navy's Budding Overseas Presence," Heritage Foundation Web Memo, No. 2752, January 11, 2010, 3 pp; and Wendell Minnick, "Chinese Expeditions Boost Naval Expertise," DefenseNews.com, January 11, 2010.

(98) These include types (as opposed to numbers or aggregate tonnage) of ships; types and numbers of aircraft; the sophistication of sensors, weapons, C4ISR systems, and networking capabilities; supporting maintenance and logistics capabilities; doctrine and tactics; the quality, education, and training of personnel; and the realism and complexity of exercises.

(99) Differences in capabilities of ships of a given type can arise from a number of other factors, including sensors, weapons, C4ISR systems, networking capabilities, stealth features, damage-control features, cruising range, maximum speed, and reliability and maintainability (which can affect the amount of time the ship is available for operation).

(100) For an article discussing this issue, see Joseph Carrigan, "Aging Tigers, Mighty Dragons: China's bifurcated Surface Fleet," China Brief, September 24, 2010: 2-6.

(101) 2010 DOD CMSD, p. 45 (figure).

(102) The August 2009 ONI report states with regard to China's navy that "even if naval force sizes remain steady or even decrease, overall naval capabilities can be expected to increase as forces gain multimission capabilities." (2009 ONI Report, p. 46.)

(103) Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, p. 60.

(104) Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 2010, pp. 31-34. The report on the 2010 QDR uses the terms China, Chinese, anti-access (with or without the hyphen), and area-denial (with or without the hyphen) a total of 34 times, compared to a total of 18 times in the report on the 2006 QDR, and 16 times in the report on the 2001 QDR. Subtracting out the uses of anti-access and area denial, the report on the 2001 QDR used the terms China or Chinese zero times; the report on the 2006 QDR used them 16 times; and the report on the 2010 QDR used them 11 times.

(105) For more on the air-sea battle concept, see Jan van Tol with Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich, and Jim Thomas, AirSea Battle[:] A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept, Washington, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010, 123 pp.; and Andrew F. Krepinevich, Why AirSea Battle?, Washington, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010, 40 pp.

(106) Andrew Burt, "Final AirSea Study Being Briefed To Mabus And Donley This Month," Inside the Navy, January 10, 2011.

(107) John T. Bennett, "China Language Softened In Final Version Of QDR," Defense News, February 7, 2010: 8.

(108) Wendell Minnick, "U.S. QDR Uses Veiled Language on China," DefenseNews.com, February 18, 2010.

(109) Item entitled "QDR soft on China, in Bill Gertz, "Inside the Ring," Washington Times, February 18, 2010: 8.

(110) Stephen J. Hadley and William J. Perry, co-chairmen, et al., The QDR in Perspective: Meeting America's National Security Needs In the 21st Century, The Final Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel, Washington, 2010, Figure 3-2 on page 58.

(111) Letter dated August 11, 2010, from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to the chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, pp. 3 and 4. The ellipsis in the second paragraph appears in the letter.

(112) Andrew F. Krepinevich, "China's 'Finlandization' Strategy in the Pacific," Wall Street Journal, September 11, 2010.

(113) Seth Cropsey, "Keeping the Pacific Pacific," ForeignAffairs.com, September 27, 2010.

(114) Robert D. Kaplan, "While U.S. Is Distracted, China Develops Sea Power," Washington Post, September 26, 2010: A25.

(115) Jim Talent, "The Gates Legacy," Weekly Standard, December 13, 2010: 27.

(116) Andrea Shalal-Esa, "China Prism Focuses Pentagon Budget On New Weapons," Reuters.com, January 25, 2011.

(117) For more on the SSGNs, see CRS Report RS21007, Navy Trident Submarine Conversion (SSGN) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

(118) For further discussion, see CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke

(119) The Navy stated that this proposal was driven by a change over the last two years in the Navy's assessment of threats that U.S. Navy forces will face in coming years from ASCMs, ballistic missiles, and submarines operating in blue waters. Although the Navy in making this proposal did not highlight China by name, the Navy's references to ballistic missiles and to submarines operating in blue waters can be viewed, at least in part, as a reference to Chinese ballistic missiles (including ASBMs) and Chinese submarines. (In discussing ASCMs, the Navy cited a general proliferation of ASCMs to various actors, including the Hezbollah organization.) For further discussion, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

(122) Daniel Goure, "The Overblown Anti-Access, Area Denial Threat," Lexington Institute Early Warning Blog, October 23, 2009, accessed at http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/ the-overblown-anti-access-area-denial-threat?a=1&c=1171.

(123) For more on the CVN-78 program, see CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

(124) For more on the Virginia-class program, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

(125) For more on the DDG-51 program, including the planned Flight III version, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

(126) For more on the program to add a BMD capability to existing Aegis cruisers and destroyers, see CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

(127) The question of whether the U.S. Navy concentrates too much of its combat capability in a relatively small number of high-value units, and whether it should shift over time to a more highly distributed fleet architecture, has been debated at various times over the years, in various contexts. Much of the discussion concerns whether the Navy should start procuring smaller aircraft carriers as complements or replacements for its current large aircraft carriers.

Supporters of shifting to a more highly distributed fleet architecture argue that that the Navy's current architecture, including its force of 11 large aircraft carriers, in effect puts too many of the Navy's combat-capability eggs into a relatively small number of baskets on which an adversary can concentrate its surveillance and targeting systems and its anti-ship weapons. They argue that although a large Navy aircraft carrier can absorb hits from multiple conventional weapons without sinking, a smaller number of enemy weapons might cause damage sufficient to stop the carrier's aviation operations, thus eliminating the ship's primary combat capability and providing the attacker with what is known as a "mission kill." A more highly distributed fleet architecture, they argue, would make it more difficult for China to target the Navy and reduce the possibility of the Navy experiencing a significant reduction in combat capability due to the loss in battle of a relatively small number of high-value units.

Opponents of shifting to a more highly distributed fleet architecture argue that large carriers and other large ships are not only more capable, but proportionately more capable, than smaller ships, that larger ships are capable of fielding highly capable systems for defending themselves, and that they are much better able than smaller ships to withstand the effects of enemy weapons, due to their larger size, extensive armoring and interior compartmentalization, and extensive damage-control systems. A more highly distributed fleet architecture, they argue, would be less capable or more expensive than today's fleet architecture. Opponents of shifting to a more highly distributed fleet architecture argue could also argue that the Navy has already taken an important (but not excessive) step toward fielding a more distributed fleet architecture through its plan to acquire 55 Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), which are small, fast surface combatants with modular, "plug-and-flight" mission payloads. (For more on the LCS program, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.)

The issue of Navy fleet architecture, including the question of whether the Navy should shift over time to a more highly distributed fleet architecture, was examined in a report by DOD's Office of Force Transformation (OFT) that was submitted to Congress in 2005. OFT's report, along with two other reports on Navy fleet architecture that were submitted to Congress in 2005, are discussed at length in CRS Report RL33955, Navy Force Structure: Alternative Force Structure Studies of2005--Backgroundfor Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. The functions carried out by OFT have since been redistributed to other DOD offices. See also Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., The New Navy Fighting Machine: A Study of the Connections Between Contemporary Policy, Strategy, Sea Power, Naval Operations, and the Composition of the United States Fleet, Monterey (CA), Naval Postgraduate School, August 2009, 68 pp.

(128) For more on the F-35 program, see CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background

and Issues for Congress, by Jeremiah Gertler.

(129) For more on the F/A-18E/F and EA-18G programs, see CRS Report RL30624, Navy F/A-18E/F and EA-18G Aircraft Procurement and Strike Fighter Shortfall: Background and Issues for Congress, by Jeremiah Gertler.

(130) The Navy is currently developing a stealthy, long-range, unmanned combat air system (UCAS) for use in the Navy's carrier air wings. The demonstration program for the system is called UCAS-D. The subsequent production version of the aircraft is called N-UCAS, with the N standing for Navy. Some observers, including analysts at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), believe that N-UCAS would be highly useful, if not critical, for countering improved Chinese maritime military forces. N-UCASs, they argue, could be launched from a carrier shortly after the ship leaves port in Hawaii, be refueled in flight, and arrive in the Taiwan Strait area in a matter of hours, permitting the carrier air wing to contribute to U.S. operations there days before the carrier itself would arrive. They also argue that N-UCASs would permit Navy carriers to operate effectively while remaining outside the reach of China's anti-access weapons, including ASBMs. (Thomas P. Ehrhard and Robert O. Work, The Unmanned Combat Air System Carrier Demonstration Program: A New Dawn For Naval Aviation?, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Washington, 2007. 39 pp. [CSBA Backgrounder, May 10, 2007]. The authors briefed key points from this document on July 11, 2007, in room S-211 of the Capitol.) Another observer states that China's deployment of ASBM's and supporting surveillance and targeting systems "argues for a stealth long-range attack aircraft as part of the [carrier] airwing to provide more flexibility on how we employ our carriers." (James Lyons, "China's One World?" Washington Times, August 24, 2008: B1).

(131) One observer argues that active defenses alone are unlikely to succeed, and that the U.S. Navy should place stronger emphasis on passive defenses; see Marshall Hoyler, "China's 'Antiaccess' Ballistic Missiles and U.S. Active Defense," Naval War College Review, Autumn 2010: 84-105.

For additional discussions of options for countering ASBMs, see Sam J. Tangredi, "No Game Changer for China," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 2010: 24-29; and Loren B. Thompson, "China's New "Carrier-Killing" Missile Is Overrated," Lexington Institute (Early Warning Blog), August 9, 2010 (available online at http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/chinas-new-carrier- killing-missile-is-overrated?a=1&c=1171). See also Craig Hooper and Christopher Albon, "Get Off the Fainting Couch," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 2010: 42- 47.

(132) For more on the SM-3, including the Block IIA version, and the planned successor to the SM-2 Block IV, see CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

(133) For more on SSLs and FELs, see CRS Report R41526, Navy Shipboard Lasers for Surface, Air, and Missile Defense: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

(134) Regarding the option of systems for generating radar-opaque smoke clouds, Thomas J. Culora, "The Strategic Implications of Obscurants," Naval War College Review, Summer 2010: 73-84.

(135) Andrew Burt, "Carriers Could Use Evasive Tactics Against Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles," Inside the Navy, December 20, 2010.

(136) Source: Transcript of interview, as appended to Richard McGregor, "US Fleet Chief Voices Doubts On Chinese Navy," Financial Times, January 18, 2011.

(137) Source: Transcript of Defense Writers Group roundtable with Vice Admiral David J. Dorsett, Deputy CNO for Information Warfare. Material in brackets as in the transcript.

(138) See, for example, Otto Kreisher, "As Underwater Threat Re-Emerges, Navy Renews Emphasis On ASW," Seapower, October 2004, p. 15, and Jason Ma, "ASW Concept Of Operations Sees 'Sensor-Rich' Way Of Fighting Subs," Inside the Navy, February 7, 2005.

(139) Jason Ma, "Autonomous ASW Sensor Field Seen As High-Risk Technical Hurdle," Inside the Navy, June 6, 2005. See also Jason Ma, "Navy's Surface Warfare Chief Cites Progress In ASW Development," Inside the Navy, January 17, 2005. More recent press reports discuss research on ASW concepts involving bottom-based sensors, sensor networks, and unmanned vehicles; see Richard Scott, "GLINT In the Eye: NURC Explores Novel Autonomous Concepts For Future ASW," Jane's International Defence Review, January 2010: 34-35; Richard Scott, "DARPA Goes Deep With ASW Sensor Network," Jane's International Defence Review, March 2010: 13; Richard Scott, "Ghost In The Machine: DARPA Sets Course Towards Future Unmanned ASW Trail Ship," Jane's Navy International, April 2010: 10-11; Norman Friedman, "The Robots Arrive," Naval Forces, No. IV, 2010: 40-42, 44, 46; Bill Sweetman, "Darpa Funds Unmanned Boat For Submarine Stalking," Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, January 6, 2011: 5.

(140) For an article discussing torpedo defense systems, including ATTs, see Richard Scott, "Ships Shore Up," Jane's Defence Weekly, September 1, 2010: 22-23, 25, 27.

(141) U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, 2006. (February 6, 2006) p. 47.

(142) For more on this proposal, see CRS Report R40248, Navy Nuclear Aircraft Carrier (CVN) Homeporting at Mayport: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

(143) Source: Slide entitled "Strategic Laydown Summary," in Navy briefing entitled "Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for the Proposed Homeporting of Additional Surface Ships at Naval Station Mayport, FL, dated November 18, 2008, and presented to CRS on December 5, 2008. For more on the Navy's proposed 313-ship fleet, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

(144) Shifting additional ships from the Atlantic Fleet to the Pacific Fleet might reduce the Navy's ability to maintain forward deployments in, and surge ships quickly to, the Persian Gulf/Northern Arabian Sea area because the transit distance from the U.S. Atlantic Coast to the Persian Gulf/Northern Arabian Sea area using the Suez canal is less than the transit distance from the U.S. Pacific Coast to the Persian Gulf/Northern Arabian Sea area. If, however, the ships shifted from the Atlantic Fleet to the Pacific Fleet were homeported at Hawaii, Guam, or Japan rather than on the U.S. Pacific Coast, there might be no reduction in the Navy's ability to maintain forward deployments in, and surge ships quickly to, the Persian Gulf/Northern Arabian Sea area.

(145) Andrew Burt, "U.S. Considering Increasing Military Presence in Pacific Region," Inside the Navy, October 18, 2010.

(146) Anne Gearan and Matthew Lee, "U.S., Australia Expand Ties To Keep An Eye On China," Arizona Republic (Phoenix), November 7, 2010. See also Brendan Nicholson, "US Forces Get Nod Share Our Bases," The Weekend Australian, November 6, 2010: 1; and Hamish McDonald, "US Sets Eyes On Southern Defence Outposts," Sydney Morning Herald, November 6, 2010: 6.

(147) "US Seeks To Expand Military Presence in Asia," BBC News (www.bbc.co.uk), November 7, 2010.

(148) Andrew Burt, "Clinton: Increased U.S. Naval Presence In Singapore Part of Larger Shift," Inside the Navy, November 8, 2010.

(149) U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Increasing the Mission Capability of the Attack Submarine Force, Washington, CBO, 2002. (A CBO Study, March 2002), 41 pp.

(150) Letter dated July 23, 2010, from Senators John Cornyn, John McCain, James Risch, Pat Roberts, and James Inhofe, to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, available online at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/fp_uploaded_documents/ 100723_SJC%20letter%20to%20SECDEF%20re%20%20late%20Chinese %20military%20power%20report%20%28J ULY%202010%29%20-%20signed%20scanned.pdf. See also Bill Gertz, "Senators Rap Pentagon's Delay On China Report, Washington Times, July 26, 2010: 8; Wendell Minnick, "U.S. Senators Demand DoD Release China Report," DefenseNews.com, July 24, 2010; Josh Rogin, "Where Is The Pentagon Report On The Chinese Military?" The Cable (thecable.foreignpolicy.com), July 23, 1020.

(151) For further information on this issue, see CRS Report RL31183, China's Maritime Territorial Claims: Implications for U.S. Interests, by Kerry Dumbaugh et al. This archived report is dated November 12, 2001.

(152) See 2010 DOD CMSD, p. 16. DOD states that

The South China Sea plays an important role in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia security considerations. Northeast Asia relies heavily on the flow of oil and commerce through South China Sea shipping lanes, including 80 percent of the crude oil to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. China claims sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel island groups--claims disputed in whole or part by Brunei, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Taiwan, which occupies Itu Aba in the Spratly Islands, also claims all four island groups in the South China Sea. In 2009, China protested claims made by Malaysia and Vietnam and reiterated it has "indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters and enjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof."

(2010 DOD CMSD, p. 17.)

DOD also states that

Tensions over disputed claims in the South China Sea resurfaced in 2007 following almost five years of relative stability in the region. Competition for resources, including oil and gas reserves, and fishing resources most likely fueled the rising tension, although other factors, such as nationalism, also contributed. China's primary interests in the South China Sea are related to securing its extensive sovereignty claims in the region and exercising its rights as they relate to exploiting regional natural resources. Additionally, a stronger regional military presence would position China for force projection, blockade, and surveillance operations to influence the critical sea lanes in the region--through which some 50 percent of global merchant traffic passes. The combination of these interests likely contributes to China's sensitivity over the presence of foreign military assets conducting routine military operations in waters beyond China's territorial limits.

In response to the 2004 articulation of the PLA's "New Historic Missions," China's senior military leaders began developing concepts for an expanded regional maritime strategy and presence. For example, in 2006, PLA Navy Commander Wu Shengli called for a "powerful navy to protect fishing, resource development and strategic passageways for energy." Many of these ideas echo the debates in the late 1980s and early 1990s over building PLA naval capabilities. However, the rise of Taiwan contingency planning as the dominant driver of PLA force modernization in the mid1990s, and especially after 2001, largely sidelined these discussions. China's probable plans to base the Type 094 SSBN (JIN-class) at Hainan Island raises the potential that the PLA Navy would consider conducting strategic patrols in the waters of the South China Sea requiring Beijing to provide for a more robust conventional military presence to ensure the protection of its sea-based deterrent. Such an increased PLA presence including surface, sub-surface, and airborne platforms, and possibly one or more of China's future aircraft carriers, would provide the PLA with an enhanced extended range power projection capability and could alter regional balances, disrupting the delicate status quo established by the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea.

(2010 DOD CMSD p. 39)

(153) Peter A. Dutton, "Through A Chinese Lens," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 2010: 26-27.

(154) Bruce Stokes, "China's New Red Line At Sea," National Journal, July 3, 2010.

(155) Remarks by Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, National Convention Center, Hanoi, Vietnam, July 23, 2010, available online at http://www.state.gov/secretary/ rm/2010/07/145095.htm. See also Michael Wines, "Behind Gusts Of A Military Chill: A More Forceful China," New York Times, June 9, 2010; Mark Landler, "Offering to Aid Talks, U.S. Challenges China on Disputed Islands," New York Times, July 23, 2010; Daniel Ten Kate and Nicole Gaouette, "U.S. Says Settling South China Sea Disputes 'Leading Diplomatic Priority," Bloomberg.com, July 23, 2010; Andrew Jacobs, "China Warns U.S. To Stay Out Of Islands Dispute," New York Times, July 27, 2010; ; John Pomfret, "U.S. Takes Tougher Stance With China," Washington Post, July 30, 2010: 1; John Pomfret, "China Renews Claim To South China Sea, Vows Freedom Of Passage," Washington Post, July 31, 2010: 7.

(156) Remarks by Secretary Gates at SEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus, accessed online at http://www.defense.gov/ transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4700. The previous day, Secretary Gates, in response to a question at a press conference, stated that

as we have made clear in the past, the U.S. has a longstanding national interest in freedom of navigation and open access to Asia's maritime commons. We believe that--we don't take sides in this. We don't have any territorial claims of our own, but we believe that these issues are best resolved through negotiation and collaboration and within a framework of customary international law, above all the United Nations Law of the Sea.

(Transcript of Joint Press Conference with Secretary Gates and Gen. Thanh from Hanoi, Vietnam, accessed online at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/ transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4699.)

(157) Adam Entous, "In Asia, Tone Lightens On Sea Disputes," Wall Street Journal, October 13, 2010: 15. See also Thom Shanker, "U.S. And China Soften Tone Over Disputed Seas," New York Times, October 13, 2010; Paul Richter, "China Seeks To Ease Tensions," Los Angeles Times, October 13, 2010: 4.

(158) "China Retracts Policy on S. China Sea, Tells U.S.," TheMainichiDaily News, October 23, 2010.

(159) "China Opposes Foreign Warships, Planes Entering Yellow Sea and Adjacent Waters,"Xinhua, July 8, 2010.

(160) The Navy states that in the last five years, individual Navy ships have operated in the Yellow Sea for a total of several hundred ship days, that individual Navy ships have made five port calls at the South Korean port of Inchon, on the Yellow Sea, and that a total of more than a dozen Navy ships have participated in multiple-ship operations and exercises in the Yellow Sea for a total of more than 100 ship days, including two instances (the most recent being in October 2009) involving an aircraft carrier. (Source: U.S. Navy information paper dated July 26, 2010, on U.S. Navy operations in the Yellow Sea during the past five years, provided to CRS on August 6, 2010, by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs.)

(161) See, for example, John Pomfret, "U.S., South Korea Set To Announce Military Exercises," Washington Post, July 15, 2010: 15; Brian Spegele , "U.S., China Avoid Tiff Over Plans For Naval Exercises Off Korean Coast," Wall Street Journal, July 16, 2010: 12; Elisabeth Bumiller, "Major Ship In U.S. Fleet Will Visit South Korea," New York Times, July 20, 2010; Elisabeth Bumiller and Edward Wong, "China Warily Eyes U.S.-Korea Drills," New York Times, July 21, 2010; Sig Christenson, "Gates Orders Naval Maneuvers As 'Clear Message' To N. Korea," San Antonio ExpressNews, July 21, 2010; Bill Gertz, "Inside the Ring," Washington Times, July 22, 2010: 7; Jon Rabiroff, "Mullen Moves From 'Curious' To 'Concerned' Over China's Military," Stripes.com, July 21, 2010; Evan Ramstad, "U.S., South Korea Navies Drill," Wall Street Journal, July 27, 2010: 27; John Pomfret, "U.S. Takes Tougher Stance With China," Washington Post, July 30, 2010: 1; William Cole, "Sub Training Ends RIMPAC," Honolulu Star-Advertiser, July 31, 2010.

(162) For more on this incident, see CRS Report RL30946, China-U.S. Aircraft Collision Incident of April 2001: Assessments and Policy Implications, coordinated by Shirley A. Kan. This report, dated October 10, 2001, is out of print and available directly from Ronald O'Rourke or Shirley A. Kan.

(163) "China Opposes Any Military Acts in Exclusive Economic Zone Without Permission," Xinhua, November 26, 2010, accessed online on December 1, 2010 at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-11/26/c_13624036.htm.

(164) Christopher J. Castelli, "U.S., Chinese Views Clash In Sino-U.S. Maritime Safety Talks," Inside the Navy, November 22, 2010.

(165) Jonathan G. Odom, "The True 'Lies' of the Impeccable Incident: What Really Happened, Who Disregarded International law, and Why Every Nation (Outside of China) Should Be Concerned," Michigan State Journal of International Law, Vol. 18, No. 3 (May 2010), 42 pp. (The quoted passages appear on pages 30 and 39.) See also Peter A. Dutton, "Through A Chinese Lens," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 2010: 24-29; James Manicom, "China's Claims to an Extended Continental Shelf in the East China Sea: Meaning and Implications," China Brief, July 9, 2009: 9-11; Peter Dutton and John Garofano, "China Undermines Maritime Laws," Far Eastern Economic Review (online), April 3, 2009 (available online at http://www.feer.com/essays/2009/april /china-undermines-maritime-laws); and Raul Pedrozo, "Close Encounters At Sea, The USNS Impeccable Incident," Naval War College Review, Summer 2009: 101111. For additional discussion, see CRS Report RL31183, China's Maritime Territorial Claims: Implications for U.S. Interests, by Kerry Dumbaugh et al.

(166) Peter A. Dutton, "Through A Chinese Lens," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 2010: 28-29.

(167) 2010 DOD CMSD, p. 26.

(168) 2010 DOD CMSD, p. 55.

(169) Greg Sheridan, "China Actions Meant As Test, Hillary Clinton Says," TheAustralian.com.au, November 9, 2010.

(170) Patrick Cronin and Paul Giarra, "China's Dangerous Arrogance," The Diplomat, July 23, 2010 (available online at http://the-diplomat.com/2010/07/23/ china%e2%80%99s-dangerous-arrogance/).

(171) Andrew F. Krepinevich, "China's 'Finlandization' Strategy in the Pacific," Wall Street Journal, September 11, 2010.

(172) Statement of Admiral Robert F. Willard, U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Before the House Armed Services Committee on U.S. Pacific Command Posture, March 23, 2010, pp. 3, 4, 12-17.

(173) See "United States: The Supersonic Anti-Ship Missile Threat," Stratfor.com, April 18, available online at http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/ united_states_supersonic_anti_ship_missile_threat?ip_auth_redirect=1; Tony Capaccio, "Navy Can't Test Defense Against China's Sizzler," Until 2014," Bloomberg.com, April 3, 2008; Chris Johnson, "Navy Issues Draft Request For Threat-D Target Development," Inside the Navy, July 30, 2007; Chris Johnson, "Industry Day Planned To Develop Threat-D Target For Ship Tests," Inside the Navy, July 9, 2007; and Chris Johnson, "Pentagon: Lack Of Threat-D Target Hinders Testing For New Vessels," Inside the Navy, January 22, 2007. See also the transcript of the March 12, 2008, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee on the posture of the Pacific Command.
Table 1. PLA Navy Submarine Commissionings

Actual (1995-2010) and Projected (2011-2014)

                                                             Annual
        Jin    Shang                Ming    Song     Yuan     total
       (Type   (Type    Kilo SS    (Type    (Type   (Type    for all
       094)    093)    (Russian-    035)    039)     041)     types
       SSBN     SSN      made)     SS (b)    SS     SS (a)    shown

1995                     2 (d)       1                          3
1996                                 1                          1
1997                                 2                          2
1998                     1 (d)       2                          3
1999                     1 (d)                1                 2
2000                                 1                          1
2001                                 1        2                 3
2002                                 1                          1
2003                                          2                 2
2004                       1                  3                 4
2005                       4                  3                 7
2006             1         3                2 (e)     1         7
2007     1     1 (f)                                            2
2008                                                            0
2009     1                                            2         3
2010                                                  1         1
2011                                                            0
2012     1                                            1         2
2013     1                                           n/a       n/a
2014   l (g)                                         n/a       n/a

                       Cumulative
        Cumulative     total for
       total for all     modern
           types         attack
           shown       boats (c)

1995         3              2
1996         4              2
1997         6              2
1998         9              3
1999        11              5
2000        12              5
2001        15              7
2002        16              7
2003        18              9
2004        22             13
2005        29             20
2006        36             27
2007        38             28
2008        38             28
2009        41             30
2010        42             31
2011        42             31
2012        44             32
2013       n/a            n/a
2014       n/a            n/a

Source: Jane's Fighting Ships 2010-2011, and previous editions.

Note: n/a = data not available.

(a.) Some observers believe the Yuan class to be a variant of the
Song class and refer to the Yuan class as the Type 039A.

(b.) Figures for Ming-class boats are when the boats were launched
(i.e., put into the water for final construction). Actual
commissioning dates for these boats may have been later.

(c.) This total excludes the Jin-class SSBNs and the Ming-class SSs.

(d.) First four Kilo-class boats, commissioned in the 1990s, are to
be refitted in Russia; upgrades are likely to include installation of
SS-N-27 ASCM. Jane's reports that the first of the two boats shown in
the table as entering service in 1995 was commissioned into service
on December 15, 1994, while it was still in Russia, and arrived in
China by transporter ship in February 1995.

(e.) No further units expected after the 12th and 13th shown for
2006.

(f.) Jane's Fighting Ships 2010-2011 states that production of the
two Shang-class boats shown in the table may be followed by
production of a new SSN design possibly known as the Type 095 class.
A graph on page 22 of 2009 ONI Report suggests that ONI expects the
first Type 095 to enter service in 2015.

(g.) A total of six Jin-class boats is expected by Jane's, with the
sixth unit projected to be commissioned in 2016.

Table 2. PLA Navy Destroyer Commissionings

        Sovre-
         menny     Luhu   Luhai   Luyang I   Lyugang II   Louzhou
       (Russian-   (Type  (Type    (Type       (Type       (Type
         made)     052)   051B)    052B)       052C)       051C)

1994                1
1995
1996                1
1997
1998
1999       1                1
2000
2001       1
2002
2003
2004                                 2           1
2005       1                                     1
2006       1                                                 1
2007                                                         1
2008
2009
2010

       Annual   Cumulative
       total      total

1994     1           1
1995     0           1
1996     1           2
1997     0           2
1998     0           2
1999     2           4
2000     0           4
2001     1           5
2002     0           5
2003     0           5
2004     3           8
2005     2          10
2006     2          12
2007     1          13
2008     0          13
2009     0          13
2010     0          13

Source: Jane's Fighting Ships 2010-2011, and previous editions.

Table 3. PLA Navy Frigate Commissionings

Actual (1991-2010) and Projected (2011-2012)

         Jiangwei I     Jiangwei II    Jiangkai I   Jiangkai II
       (Type 053 H2G)   (Type 053H3)   (Type 054)   (Type 054A)

1991         1
1992         1
1993         1
1994         1
1995
1996
1997
1998                         1
1999                         4
2000                         1
2001
2002                         2
2003
2004
2005                         2             1
2006                                       1
2007
2008                                                     4
2009
2010                                                     2
2011
2012                                                     2

       Annual   Cumulative
       total      total

1991     1           1
1992     1           2
1993     1           3
1994     1           4
1995     0           4
1996     0           4
1997     0           4
1998     1           5
1999     4           9
2000     1          10
2001     0          10
2002     2          12
2003     0          12
2004     0          12
2005     3          15
2006     1          16
2007     0          16
2008     4          20
2009     0          20
2010     2          22
2011     0          22
2012     2          24

Source: Jane's Fighting Ships 2010-2011, and previous editions.

Table 4. Numbers of PLA Navy Ships and Aircraft Provided by Office of
Naval Intelligence (ONI)

(Figures include both older and less capable units and newer and more
capable units)

                                          1990   1995   2000   2005

Ships
Ballistic missile submarines               1      1      1      2
Attack submarines (SSNs and SSs)           80     82     65     58
  SSNs                                     5      5      5      6
  SSs                                      75     77     60     52
Aircraft carriers                          0      0      0      0
Destroyers                                 14     18     21     25
Frigates                                   35     35     37     42
Subtotal above ships                      130    136    124    127

Missile-armed attack craft                200    165    100     75
Amphibious ships                           65     70     60     56
  Large ships (LPDs/LHDs)                  0      0      0      0
  Smaller ships                            65     70     60     56
Mine warfare ships                        n/a    n/a    n/a    n/a
Major auxiliary ships                     n/a    n/a    n/a    n/a
Minor auxiliary ships and support craft   n/a    n/a    n/a    n/a

Aircraft
Land-based maritime strike aircraft       n/a    n/a    n/a    n/a
Carrier-based fighters                     0      0      0      0
Helicopters                               n/a    n/a    n/a    n/a
Subtotal above aircraft                   n/a    n/a    n/a    n/a

                                                   Projection
                                          2009      for 2015

Ships
Ballistic missile submarines               3        4 or 5?
Attack submarines (SSNs and SSs)           59         ~70
  SSNs                                     6          n/a
  SSs                                      53         n/a
Aircraft carriers                          0           1?
Destroyers                                 26         ~26
Frigates                                   48         ~45
Subtotal above ships                      136    ~146 or ~147?

Missile-armed attack craft                80+         n/a
Amphibious ships                           58         n/a
  Large ships (LPDs/LHDs)                  1          ~6?
  Smaller ships                            57         n/a
Mine warfare ships                         40         n/a
Major auxiliary ships                      50         n/a
Minor auxiliary ships and support craft   250+        n/a

Aircraft
Land-based maritime strike aircraft       ~145        ~255
Carrier-based fighters                     0          ~60
Helicopters                               ~34         ~153
Subtotal above aircraft                   ~179        ~468

                                            Projection
                                             for 2020

Ships
Ballistic missile submarines                 4 or 5?
Attack submarines (SSNs and SSs)               ~72
  SSNs                                         n/a
  SSs                                          n/a
Aircraft carriers                               2?
Destroyers                                     ~26
Frigates                                       ~42
Subtotal above ships                      ~146 or ~147?

Missile-armed attack craft                     n/a
Amphibious ships                               n/a
  Large ships (LPDs/LHDs)                      ~6?
  Smaller ships                                n/a
Mine warfare ships                             n/a
Major auxiliary ships                          n/a
Minor auxiliary ships and support craft        n/a

Aircraft
Land-based maritime strike aircraft            ~258
Carrier-based fighters                         ~90
Helicopters                                    ~157
Subtotal above aircraft                        ~505

Source: Prepared by CRS. Source for 2009, 2015, and 2020: 2009 ONI
report, page 18 (text and table), page 21 (text), and (for figures
not available on pages 18 or 21), page 45 (CRS estimates based on
visual inspection of ONI graph entitled "Estimated PLA[N] Force
Levels"). Source for 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005: Navy data provided
to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, July 9, 2010.

Notes: n-a is not available. The use of question marks for the
projected figures for ballistic missile submarines, aircraft,
carriers, and major amphibious ships (LPDs and LHDs) for 2015 and
2020 reflects the difficulty of resolving these numbers visually from
the graph on page 45 of the ONI report. The graph shows more major
amphibious ships than ballistic missile submarines, and more
ballistic missile submarines than aircraft carriers. Figures in this
table for aircraft carriers include the ex-Ukrainian carrier Varyag,
which is likely to enter service before any new-construction
indigenous carrier. The ONI report states on page 19 that China "will
likely have an operational, domestically produced carrier sometime
after 2015." Such a ship, plus the Varyag, would give China a force
of 2 operational carriers sometime after 2015.

The graph on page 45 shows a combined total of amphibious ships and
landing craft of about 244 in 2009, about 261 projected for 2015, and
about 253 projected for 2015.

Since the graph on page 45 of the ONI report is entitled "Estimated
PLA[N] Force Levels," aircraft numbers shown in the table presumably
do not include Chinese air force (PLAAF) aircraft that may be capable
of attacking ships or conducting other maritime operations.

Table 5. Numbers of PLA Navy Ships Presented in Annual DOD Reports to
Congress

(Figures include both older and less capable units and newer and more
capable units)

                                            2000    2002   2003   2004

Nuclear-powered attack submarines            5       5            n/a
                                                           ~ 60
Diesel attack submarines                    ~60     ~ 50          n/a
Destroyers                                  ~20                   n/a
                                                    ~ 60   > 60
Frigates                                    ~40                   n/a
Missile-armed coastal patrol craft          n/a     ~ 50   ~ 50   n/a
Amphibious tank landing ships (LSTs) and   almost   ~ 40   > 40   n/a
  amphibious transport dock ships (LPDs)     50
Amphibious medium landing ships (LSMs)                            n/a

                                           2005   2006   2007   2008

Nuclear-powered attack submarines            6      5      5      5

Diesel attack submarines                    51     50     53     54
Destroyers                                  21     25     25     29

Frigates                                    43     45     47     45
Missile-armed coastal patrol craft          51     45     41     45
Amphibious tank landing ships (LSTs) and    20     25     25     26
  amphibious transport dock ships (LPDs)
Amphibious medium landing ships (LSMs)      23     25     25     28

                                           2009   2010

Nuclear-powered attack submarines            6      6

Diesel attack submarines                    54     54
Destroyers                                  27     25

Frigates                                    48     49
Missile-armed coastal patrol craft          70     85
Amphibious tank landing ships (LSTs) and    27     27
  amphibious transport dock ships (LPDs)
Amphibious medium landing ships (LSMs)      28     28

Source: Table prepared by CRS based on data in 2002-2010 editions of
annual DOD report to Congress on military and security developments
involving China (known for 2009 and prior editions as the report on
China military power).

Note: n/a means data not available in report.
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Title Annotation:China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities--Background and Issues for Congress
Author:O'Rourke, Ronald
Publication:Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports and Issue Briefs
Geographic Code:1USA
Date:Feb 1, 2011
Words:17158
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