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Antony, Fulvia, and the ghost of Clodius in 47 B.C.

The creation of a political image based at best on a tenuous reality is a fragile and delicate process. None knew it better than Gaius Julius Caesar. Early in his career, he had fostered the belief that he was the heir of the 'true' Marian/popularis tradition with some credibility and lasting success. He presented himself as the great general in the Gallic commentaries and for good reasons this image too gained widespread popularity. There were other important but sometimes less convincing messages to follow. The commentarii on the civil war sought passionately to justify his part in the outbreak of hostilities: this was the published form of a process his intermediaries had begun in the first months of hostilities whereby they stressed his respect for peace and the traditional order, even when he himself was busy ignoring both. In an effort to reinforce this 'constitutional' regard, Caesar returned to Rome from Spain in 49 to establish a 'properly elected' government with himself and P. Servilius Isauricus as consuls; the correct number of praetors (all eligible to hold the office), aediles, and quaestors. The dictatorship was cast aside after a mere eleven days; Rome was to function as it always had. The uprising of Marcus Caelius Rufus and Titus Annius Milo in 48 B.C.(2) ruined this admirable picture and brought home to Caesar the realities of attempting to dominate Rome by leaving the constitution in its traditional form and hoping for the best from the supporters he had entrusted with office. Moreover, the chaos of civil war and urban disorder combined to allow others to project their own policies and power struggles. The absent Caesar was again reminded of the unpredictability of Roman politics and the independence of her politicians. In 47, it was Mark Antony and P. Cornelius Dolabella who caused greatest trouble. In this same year Antony married Fulvia, the widow of Clodius, the people's hero and former rival to Caesar for popularity. Caelius, Antony, Dolabella, and, in her own way, Fulvia contributed to the constitutional crises which led directly to Caesar's increasing autocracy. This in turn owed much to the fact that Roman aristocrats were not yet prepared to accept a dictator's new ground rules but competed as they had done in the previous decade, yet with new levels of disorder to assist them.

Caelius' loyalty to the Caesarian cause had never been wholehearted, but he himself ascribed the immediate cause of his dissatisfaction in 48 to dolor,(3) in this case that Caesar had created his trusted lieutenant Gaius Trebonius urban praetor instead of him. This was a new phenomenon and we must note its importance. For the first time, it was in the power of an individual to make such a decision and the losers could now hold an individual to blame for their lack of success. Caelius expressed his anger in rebellion, but far from allowing it to `unhinge his mind',(4) he implemented a rational programme which exposed a major weakness in Caesar's power.(5) This plan was to cut Caesar off from Italy, first by using the unrest of the urban population to create chaos, then through Milo to extend the rebellion to the countryside.(6) An important feature of the plan was to win people over with promises of more extensive debt reform, and so to undermine Caesar's popularity.(7) What erupted was no less than full-scale rioting(8) but the consul Isauricus acted swiftly to prevent Caelius from taking over the city, and his colleague in Greece could breathe a sigh of relief. Even so, while order had been restored, the important image of Caesar the popularis remained to be re-established.

From the way the various protagonists in the struggle of 48 used the slogans of the fifties, one could be forgiven for thinking them merely convenient phrases. Caelius and Milo, both well practiced in the use of violence as a political weapon, appealed to popularis traditions to win support, even though they were easily remembered and identified as `anti-Clodian' optimates.(9) They fought against the proclaimed popularis, Caesar, who had just invaded Italy `in order to defend tribunician rights', but once they were beaten, this `popularis' dictator commended Isauricus, an ex-optimate who joined him to gain a consulship, for using direct force and traditional means such as the senatus consultum ultimum to re-establish his domination. But twisted as they were in the hands of Caesar, Caelius, and Isauricus, the image and language of the populares of the previous decade were still powerful political slogans. Furthermore, popularity was still an important component in politics. In his own account of the uprising, Caesar is at great pains to deny Caelius' popularity, although Dio emphasizes it. Significantly too, Caesar takes the trouble to remind his readers that Milo, Caelius' ally, was the murderer of Clodius.(10) Civil war had interrupted the processes which would have found replacements for Clodius as new leaders of the urban plebe. Caelius attempted to use this vacuum for his own advancement.

Caesar himself was in Greece when the trouble broke out and, once embroiled, he could not return to the capital before he had successfully concluded his campaigns in Egypt and the East. He had to deal with the reawakening of popular unrest in Rome by remote control. The chosen solution was to postpone elections and by exploiting the archaic idea of the dictatorship to place the city under a Roman equivalent of martial law. He faced a particular difficulty. Although Isauricus had countered the immediate crisis, his `optimate' tactics did not fit well with Caesar's popularis image. To solve this problem, he chose as magister equitum another popularis. Mark Antony returned from Greece in late 48 to take up this position and so became the sole official administrator of the city. His brief was to maintain order but we might also speculate that he was meant to re-establish Caesar's standing as a popular champion. If so, he failed to do either, but the reasons for this go beyond general incompetence. The temptation to turn the situation to his own advantage was too much. Nor was he the first to see the possibilities. Dolabella, tribune of the plebs for this year, was another ready to try his luck. So too was Fulvia, the widow of Clodius, although the path she had to travel to do so was somewhat more unusual. All three had either long-standing claims on the Clodian version of popularis tradition or had means to develop them. Once their struggle for personal power developed, Caesar himself, for a time at least, became a relatively unimportant factor.

Antony's interest in popular politics had developed since the late fifties. Earlier in the decade, he had extended his notoriety by using the resources of his family background and friendships with other politicians.(11) These resources included the large Antonian clientela(12) and access to wealth, arising both from the family's business interests in the East(13) and from a possibly lucrative first marriage to Fadia, the daughter of a freedman.(14)

Antony drew some political benefit from his genial personality. Even Cicero, who from at least 49 did not like him,(15) was prepared to regard some of his earlier misdemeanours as harmless.(16) Bluff good humour, moderate intelligence, at least a passing interest in literature, and an ability to be the life and soul of a social gathering all contributed to make him a charming companion and to bind many important people to him. He had a lieutenant's ability to follow orders and a willingness to listen to advice, even (one might say especially) from intelligent women.(17) These attributes made Antony able to handle some situations very well.(18) There was a more important side to his personality, however, which contributed to his political survival. Antony was ruthless in his quest for pre-eminence. When he did make errors which had the potential to destroy his position, or when he saw an opportunity for faster advancement, he was willing to place the blame on a convenient scapegoat or to disregard previous loyalties, however important they had been. His desertion of Fulvia's memory in 40, and, much later, of Lepidus, Sextus Pompey, and Octavia, produced significant political gains. This characteristic, which Caesar discovered to his cost in 47, gives the sharp edge to Antony's personality which Syme's portrait lacks, especially when he attributes Antony's actions to a `sentiment of loyalty' or describes him as a `frank and chivalrous soldier'. In this context, one wonders what became of Fadia.(19)

Two episodes demonstrate Antony's early prominence, the extent of his political resources, and his perceived talent. In one instance, he was considered to be so valuable that he could demand a prefecture from Aulus Gabinius during his proconsulship in Syria in 55, even though the first plan had been that he should participate only as a private citizen.(20) In 50, he was elected to the augurate.(21) Although the greater credit for this achievement is rightly given to Caesar and Curio,(22) his election ahead of the older, more influential, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus(23) was facilitated by the support afforded by the pro-Antonian voters of Cisalpine Gaul,(24) and the fact that his grandfather had been an augur.(25) Cicero's charge that Antony could not have carried a single tribe without help from Curio and Caesar(26) is proved tendentious by his own remarks in the correspondence.(27)

On the other hand, these resources were often offset by Antony's inability to use them to their best advantage. This had little to do with his propensity for drinking, gambling, and `wenching' (the last, in fact, furthered his career dramatically). Antony's more serious failures were in the realms of administration, leadership, and, eventually, generalship. Even Syme admits Antony's deficiencies as a leader when he discusses the consulship Of 44:2', `Moreover', he states, `Antonius may have lacked the taste, and perhaps the faculty, for long designs; the earlier months of his guidance of Roman politics do not provide convincing evidence.' Syme has made this serious fault into a virtue. His self-confessed `timid and perverse admiration' has led him to make Antony into a misunderstood hero. In actual fact, Antony often needed assistance to carry through the policies which his ambition and resources led him to espouse.

For example, when Antony first campaigned for the quaestorship, his vacillating policies damaged his chances of immediate success and forced him to change his whole strategy.(29) He had travelled from Gaul to seek this junior office at the end of 53, but found himself caught up with the aftermath of the murder of Clodius in the following January. On arriving at Rome, he had approached Cicero in order to seek his assistance,(30) and this was forthcoming, particularly because Antony had made a recent attempt on Clodius' life himself. After Clodius had actually been killed, however, Antony changed sides completely and became one of the subscriptores at Milo's trial, thus throwing himself in with the Clodian populares.(31) Linderski and Kaminska-Linderski(32) propose a carefully constructed hypothesis arguing that this so ruined his chance of election to the quaestorship that he abandoned the campaign until the following year. Although he and his brother Gaius were eventually successful, election in early 52 should have been possible in the first instance for a nobilis with all the assets which Antony possessed. On their argument it appears that Antony rushed his fences in his effort to fill the vacuum in leadership provided by circumstance. He saw that Clodius' death left an opportunity for someone to snatch his supporters, his clientela, and his place among the urban plebe, but indecision and youth prevented him from completely achieving his ambition at this stage.

Although this setback occurred, Antony's efforts must have had some success. All three Antonii, Marcus, Gaius, and Lucius, had a following among the urban plebs in the late fifties. Cicero describes Lucius Antonius, a mere quaestor in 50, as adulescens potens. He warns his fellow governor, Q. Minucius Thermus, that the brothers should be respected because they would be tribunes of the plebs in three successive years.(33) Both warnings denote Cicero's perception of their influence among the urban population and the political path they had chosen to take.(34)

The Clodian following retained some of the glamour attached to its former leader. However, the most effective leaders were convicted and exiled and so were left to cast themselves upon Caesar's mercy. It was this circumstance which gave Fulvia, the widow of Clodius, an opportunity to make herself conspicuous. Her actions of dragging Clodius' body into the street(35) and along with her mother Sempronia giving evidence at Milo's trial(36) placed her in the minds of the crowd as Clodius' avenger, and thus a person who was prepared to involve herself in and contribute to the fortunes of his political heirs.

It is an impossible and perhaps fruitless task to assess the extent of Fulvia's political importance before Clodius' death. The evidence for any activity in this early period is scanty and hard to read.(37) Munzer and Syme have both attempted to give her a strong `political lineage', thus making her one of a family of politically-minded women, but this must remain a matter for conjecture.(38) Fulvia and her mother Sempronia were charged with directing Clodius' policies concerning the appropriation of Cicero's house as a shrine to Libertas in 58, but this too rests on reconstruction and guesswork.(39) Babcock, in his seminal work on Fulvia, suggests that she provided each of her husbands with money, but it has recently been argued that her father Bambalio, who was not nobilis as Babcock suggests, was still alive and would therefore have remained in control of all but Fulvia's dowry.(40) The only piece of evidence which can legitimately be used is that Fulvia was so constantly at Clodius' side that Cicero in his defence of Milo used her absence on the occasion of the murder to prove that Clodius was planning to attack Milo rather than the reverse.(41) Although it is circumstantial, account should also be taken of the opportunities granted to Fulvia as the wife of Clodius to become well known to the group identified by Vanderbroeck as `intermediate leaders',(42) but this is the extent of the evidence as we have it.

Far more significance should be placed on the `career' made possible to Fulvia first by Clodius' death and secondly (and more significantly) by the onset of civil war. From 52, she had a unique asset to offer any future husband which did not depend on inheritance or background: she was the widow of the people's hero, the mother of his children, the visible symbol and reminder of his presence. Until Clodius' son was able to take over the patronage of the Clodian clientela for himself, a chosen husband could use his marriage to Fulvia to extend his own interests. This is what Caesar had done with the Marian and Cinnan clientelae in the seventies. Through his connection with the wife of Marius, his aunt, and the daughter of Cinna, his wife, together with the fortunate removal of other possible rivals, Caesar had emerged as the `natural' leader of the populares.(43) Fulvia, as a female, had to marry an effective and ambitious partner if she was to wield power. If she chose to use such an asset actively, and the evidence is that she did,(44) she had the opportunity to remain politically important for as long as such symbolism had any force.

Diana Delia attempts to refute arguments for such active involvement by Fulvia at any stage of her life. In many respects, her study provides points of revision to the common portrait of Fulvia,(45) but its extremely cautious and conservative conclusions are ultimately unconvincing. She dismisses Balsdon's early positivist approach(46) but does not make it clear why this portrait is unacceptable. As I see it, Balsdon's characterization makes no distinction between the Fulvia who emerges from the bulk of the evidence and the grotesque caricature created by Octavian. Then, in her efforts to negate Fulvia's significance, Delia suggests that Cicero's early silence in his speeches is an indication of her ultimate unimportance. Again, she misses the point. Cicero's treatment of Fulvia develops over time. In the published version of the defence of Milo, she appears as a good and dutiful wife. Later, when Cicero wanted to criticize her, he describes her as cruel, greedy, far too involved in politics, and constantly, and improperly, at the side of whichever husband she had at the time.(47) This is admittedly tame when it is compared with the treatment meted out to Clodia in 56, but it is highly indicative of Fulvia's interest in politics. Furthermore, its tameness indicates a degree of truth not probable in the standard accusations of lurid vice. Furthermore, Delia is somewhat selective in her treatment of the Ciceronian evidence, dismissing the pro Milone and the Philippics as biased, without considering the necessary and sensitive studies which allow these works to be useful tools to the historian,(48) and pays no attention at all to the evidence in the letters.

As part of this thesis, Delia denies any political implication in Fulvia's actions after Clodius' death, ascribing them to acceptable expressions of grief. Unless the accounts are very wrong, however, there is a difference between what Fulvia was doing and `normal' behaviour. Dragging the body into the street where it was viewed by an irate mob is not a simple matter of `appearing at a funeral'; moreover, Fulvia and Sempronia did not merely appear at the trial. They gave evidence against Milo, and it was taken last, a sign that the prosecution held it in high regard.

The symbolic importance of Fulvia at the end of the decade was heightened by circumstances. The Clodian tribunes and captains had been forced out of Rome by Pompey and the optimates. Others, such as Antony and Q. Fufius Calenus, were acting as Caesar's legates in Gaul. Fulvia herself managed to remain in Rome among Clodius' greatest devotees long after the other recognized leaders had left Rome and thus she had every opportunity to extend her influence which was to become manifest in the forties. The major beneficiary of this influence in 51 was C. Scribonius Curio, who married her soon after his return from Asia.(49) Antony benefited on this occasion because he was Curio's friend.(50)

The sudden upsurge in Curio's influence has been noted,(51) but we do well to remember just how dramatic the change was and that this should be placed in the context of his marriage to Fulvia. From having been an optimate for the previous nine years, Curio became the continuator and heir of Clodius' popularis policies. He changed his plans and campaigned for the tribunate instead of the aedileship;(52) then when he had succeeded in being elected suffect tribune was influential in winning Antony's augurate for him; the election of this probably took place in the comitia tributa, where he had (suddenly) become an important figure;(53) his legislation as a tribune in 50 put forward agrarian reform and other traditionally popularist measures;(54) Caesar, after rejecting a previous offer of alliance, suddenly offered to pay his enormous debts in return for his support.(55) The changes of fortune and policy all occurred after Curio attained the advantages which Fulvia brought with her. Moreover, Curio was a person who needed to be guided and organized. Even his closest friend, Caelius, admitted he was erratic. There is every reason to believe that Fulvia provided such skills. It is little wonder that Curio instantly became important both to Caesar and the urban Clodian following.

Assisting Caesar in the Senate by his veto did not stop Curio from carrying out a parallel (Clodian/Fulvian) programme of legislation.(56) Both facets of Curio's policy worked together. Occasionally he did allow one line to interfere with the other,(57) which underlines the fact that he was both `Caesar's tribune' and somewhat more than that. Rather than seeing Curio as `independent' (an ambiguous term in any political system, but especially so in the highly charged atmosphere of Rome in this period), one should note his place as the new leader of a resurrected Clodian coterie, which made him interesting and useful to Caesar. To drive home the point, accepting Caesar's bounty and working in his interests did not preclude a Roman noble from developing his own interests both before and after 49.

In the last years of the fifties, Caesar, the absent popularis, had to monitor carefully the activities of the popular leaders in Rome, and to draw as many of them as possible under his protection. By late 50 he had reason to be pleased with his success, for he could count on Antony, Curio, and Q. Fufius Calenus, as well as the Clodian exiles T. Plancus Bursa and Q. Pompeius Rufus and the disgraced Sallust.(58) In addition, Caesar had used Curio to draw in M. Caelius, thereby extending his influence, even if only temporarily, over the younger, brighter optimates who had opposed Clodius. The much younger Dolabella had also declared himself for Caesar. Plutarch's comment that Curio brought Antony into Caesar's camp is surely mistaken.(59) Anthony had been serving as Caesar's officer from perhaps as early as 53, after his return from Syria.(60) He is described as legatus in late 52,(61) and was later well known as Caesar's quaestor.(62) It is more likely that the reverse of the statement is true, that Antony assisted in bringing Curio over to Caesar. If this were so, then he performed a signal service for Caesar, for gaining Curio meant attaching Fulvia, who provided direct access to the Clodian clientela in the city. Such valuable political connections served to increase Antony's standing with Caesar, and to set him apart from other officers in his army.(63)

Antony was particularly prominent among the ranks of Caesar's favoured, for he combined such services as these with the right political colours and some military experience. His tribunate in 49 began with his defence of Caesar in the senate,(64) a flight to Gaul and a rapidly granted (and totally anomalous) command at Sulmo in February,(65) followed by the commission to govern Italy in Caesar's absence,(66) which he held by late April. This last, his most important task, was carried out less than successfully,(67) yet Caesar refused to listen to criticism of his unruly lieutenant,(68) and Antony enjoyed another year of extreme high favour before his career came to a temporary halt. There were several reasons for this: Caesar was in need of officers, and Antony's reliability in this regard had never been questioned;(69) although many had been unhappy with his administration in 49, he had worked hard to assist the people who counted, especially the urban praetor Lepidus and Caesar's agents, Oppius and Balbus, by preparing and sponsoring legislation;(70) his healthy disregard for constitutional practice earned him the approbation of the men who were creating a unique place in the state for Caesar (and themselves). When Caesar and his consilium searched for a person to be placed in charge of Rome in 47 as magister equitum, they could take into account his popularity with the soldiers(71) and his following in Rome. These resources made him an excellent foil to Caelius, who had done his best to destroy Caesar's own standing with the plebe. Curio might have been a better choice, but he had been killed in Africa. It was a dangerous policy, but although military intervention had quelled the uprising of Caelius and Milo, Caesar still needed to win back the good will of the urban population. This was the task which faced Antony.

The atmosphere in the city in 47 was one of tension and apprehension.(72) The attempted rebellion of Caelius over debt reform had left a residue of suspicion, and there were also real fears that Caesar's return would mean wholesale slaughter. Confiscation of property had begun. The scale of this has been played down by the Caesarian sources, and by modern commentators inclined to believe what Caesar said of himself, but in fact it was extensive.(73) In addition, the city was confronted by a completely new form of administration, where instead of a body of magistrates, Antony was to be the sole holder of imperium, and his lack of tact was of little assistance. He wore a sword and kept troops at his command inside the pomerium. Antony's lack of tact and the use of military trappings caused problems even before the outbreak of gang warfare, and resulted in a loss of popularity for Caesar. When these earliest outbreaks of violence occurred, he proved unable to control them.(74)

Matters became worse.(75) At the beginning of the year, Antony began to battle with Caesar's other partisans in the city.(76) The chief offenders were L. Trebellius, C. Asinius Pollio, and P. Cornelius Dolabella, who fought fiercely over the introduction of a different set of laws concerning debt. Once again, the Second Philippic is not the only source for Antony's less than satisfactory tenure of office. Cicero's account is short and includes few details. Dio, on the other hand, includes the competition between Trebellius and Dolabella;(77) an account of senatorial edicts;(78) Antony's swing between the two tribunes; the use of troops;(79) the lack of success of any of his measures, including installing his uncle Lucius Caesar as praefectus urbi.(80) Plutarch notes the significant fact that Asinius Pollio was also involved in the affair, though on the side of conservatism.(81) Appian appears to have used Asinius at this point, for not only is criticism of Antony and the serious nature of the riots suppressed, but so is Pollio's part in the proceedings. The result is a truncated account of the mutiny of the soldiers and nothing else.(82)

Dolabella's underlying motivation at what was, after all, the effective beginning of his career, was the extension of his influence with the urban plebe, and the prevention of any of the other contenders from achieving this position for himself. The civil war had not changed certain conditions and rules of politics. As the example of Caelius had shown, the clientela in the city had no recognized leader. Those men who had been prominent just before the outbreak of civil war were either out of the city or had been killed in the initial years of the turmoil.(83) At first, Antony supported Dolabella because he saw this as a method of increasing his popularity, but that policy changed dramatically when he realized that the tribune had become a rival leader.(84) From then on, Antony was more concerned to outdo a rival than to fulfil his commission of keeping the peace for Caesar's benefit. The crisis of 47, therefore, grew from an attempt by two nobiles to increase their personal power in order to secure an important place in the scheme of things should Caesar not return, or to have bargaining power with him if he did.(85) Antony's methods were singularly clumsy and heavyhanded, but even after losing popularity with the plebs for using troops, he emerged as a force to be reckoned with both in Caesar's equation and within the Clodian enclave.

Both contenders for popular leadership were supremely conscious of the publicity value of their associations with former populares and the problems which could arise from connections with the status quo. Dolabella in particular realized this, and adopted the attitudes and strategies of the great Clodius. He exchanged his patrician status for plebeian and stood for the tribunate, and then, if Purser's emendation is correct, erected a statue to Clodius.(86) In the same year he caused Cicero some heartache by mooting a divorce from Tullia.(87) It is possible that he wished to be rid of her because she was the daughter of the man who had authorized the execution of the Catilinarian conspirators and had been the persistent and vociferous enemy of a man Dolabella had publicly honoured with a statue and had set up as his model. Earlier in 49, Antony had refused to recall from exile his uncle Gaius Antonius,(88) who had led an army against Catiline, and in 47, he divorced his wife Antonia, the daughter of the same man.(89) Although Antony initially did his best to appear helpful to Cicero at the end of 48, he was less and less inclined to be so and Cicero was increasingly disinclined to view him as an ally.(90) Links with the men who stood against Catiline were thus perceived to be greatly disadvantageous to a would-be leader of the plebe, whereas connections to Clodius or Catiline were potentially a source of great political power. It would indeed be fascinating to know whether Antony at this stage began to publicize his relationship to the `murdered' conspirator, P. Lentulus Sura, or whether this other masterstroke was developed as a specific rod for Cicero's back later in the decade.(91)

Fulvia, the most visible link to Clodius' former empire, was once again an important widow. She could offer any new husband her money, her talents as a political organizer, and the clientela she had retained in the city. Moreover, her husband would also become the step-father of Clodius' children. Antony perceived the advantages which such a marriage alliance would bring him in his battle with Dolabella. Antonia had to be sacrificed. The manner of her departure shows Antony and Fulvia in partnership. Antonia was publicly accused of adultery with Dolabella. At one stroke, Antony had given just cause for removing an inconvenient wife, while retaining part of her dowry and disgracing his rival.(92)

Plurarch gives us hints of the fundamental importance to Antony of this marriage by introducing Fulvia into his biography as Clodius' widow and, moreover, as a woman whose political interests were well known.(93) He attributes to it Caesar's willingness to forgive and reinstate Antony,(94) and he is correct to do so, but not because Antony had suddenly become any more virtuous under Fulvia's guiding influence. Rather, Antony and Fulvia, once in alliance, became a formidable political force in the city. From the period of Antony's consulship until her death, she became his guiding influence. Traces of policies formerly Clodian can be perceived during that consulship: for example, Clodius' chief organizer, Sextus Cloelius, was recalled from exile; the interests of Clodius' son were promoted; the old grex Clodii gathered to support Antony, including Q. Fufius Calenus, Plancus Bursa, and Sextus Cloelius, who either fought his battles in the senate, gave him advice, or were officers in his army. At least later in that year, the relationship between the consular Calenus and Fulvia was very close. Together with Julia, they marshalled sympathy and publicity for Antony's plight in January 43, and for months staved off the hostis declaration which Cicero so badly wanted. Without the Clodian connection in 44-43, Antony would have found it impossible to withstand the attacks of Octavian's backers and Cicero's senate.(95) Fulvia herself was conspicuous throughout Antony's consulship. She influenced the decision to confirm Deiotarus in his kingdom and was with Antony in Brundisium when he faced the mutinous soldiers from Macedonia. Possibly, too, she played some part in the decision to confer citizenship on the Sicilians.(96)

The Perusine war of 41 illustrates best the talents of Antony's third wife. Throughout the uprising, Fulvia poured her energy into maintaining Antony's popularity with the soldiers, which was being undermined by the overtures of Octavian. To that end, she travelled constantly with her children to the various settlements to remind the veterans of the continued patronage of their general.(97) We see here the deliberate attempt to extend her (and Antony's) power and influence into Italy by means better recognized in the later period when the domus Caesans was firmly established.(98) The extent of Fulvia's involvement is indicated by the personal hostility which Octavian's forces showed towards her when they inscribed their sling-shot pellets with obscene graffiti bearing references to, among other things, the over-used state of her genitalia, even though she was not in Perusia at the time, but in nearby Praeneste.(99) Notably, this is the first time that Fulvia is actually accused of immoral behaviour. Unfortunately for her chances of success, the policies of Antony's brother Lucius followed a different line, and her concentration on the need to maintain popularity with the veterans was muddled by Lucius' sentimental feeling for the landowners they were dispossessing.(100) Nevertheless, Fulvia did her best to marry the two opposite policies, and might have successfully toppled Octavian, had Antony and his generals supported her, instead of sitting on the fence. When Perusia fell, she immediately set about retrieving a situation which was far from hopeless. Sextus Pompey was one possible ally, Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus another. These two men controlled the seas around Italy and for separate reasons could not hope for an alliance with Caesar's adopted son. Antony finally moved with two hundred warships, but it was too late.(101) Fulvia died, and her death caused the whole policy to fall apart. Antony dropped Sextus, took Ahenobarbus under his wing, and allowed Fulvia to be blamed for the whole affair. His concurrence with her plans was allowed to drop from the record, but his regrets at her passing were possibly genuine. She had made it possible for him to survive Caesar's displeasure, and then to withstand Octavian, a position of strength denied him until Cleopatra provided him with different advantages. After Fulvia's death, Antony was never able to regain his reputation and influence in the city or in Italy.(102)

This was the woman whom Antony married in 47, in a successful bid to create a place for himself as a leader in Roman politics. Just as with his late consulship, one can argue that Antony's ambition would have drowned in gang warfare or withered in the face of the displeasure Caesar felt on being forced to return to Rome, had it not been for the increased power and prestige which the marriage to Clodius' widow provided. Although Caesar was supposedly the all-powerful dictator, it had not been possible for him to mete out the punishment upon Antony and Dolabella which he thought they deserved.(103) Marriage to Fulvia and the fact that Caesar had to take account of the power which individuals were still able to wield best explains how the disgraced Antony could return in triumph as consul in 44, with one brother beside him as praetor and another as tribune, both of whom could work assiduously to extend the Antonian control of the city.

Caesar had to face the fact that his representatives had chosen to spend their year in extending their own standing with the plebs urbana in Rome by every possible method rather than in carrying out his orders to maintain peace and stability. Yet their loyalty had not previously been in doubt, as Caelius' had been. They had not been passed over for office or offended in any other way. On the contrary, they had no reason to believe that they were not among the most favoured of Caesar's proteges. Caesar had to realize, and so must the scholar of this period, that the basic trends of the fifties in Roman politics (especially in the city itself, from which the dictator was so often absent) did not stop because of Caesar's domination. Although they lived under the shadow of a dictator, the natural ambitions of young Roman nobles did not die.(104) The gangs were still there to be exploited by popularist leaders who had the nerve and the will to throw their hat into the ring. Clodius had organized the colleges in such a way that his death did not mean the disintegration of the Clodian kingdom.(105) What the conditions of civil war had done was to allow Fulvia to attain power, however unoffficial, in her own right. This base had been denied the renegade Caelius when he roused the plebs in 48. He turned rather to Milo. Dolabella attempted to utilize the Clodian image, and gained great power from it. Antony had the most to offer Fulvia, and so this time was the chief beneficiary. When his own power and the imperium of the magister equitum were added to the advantages provided by Fulvia, he became a force not entirely in Caesar's control.

Caesar's solutions at the end of 47 show how powerful the ghost of Clodius had remained. On returning to Rome in September, he was forced to reinforce his popularist image. More legislation concerning debt was passed, colonies were proposed, and other benefits promised. As well, the truncated consulships for that year were given to Q. Fufius Calenus, Clodius' former associate, and P. Vatinius, another popularis, but neither was allowed to operate independently. Their office was carried out under Caesar's watchful eye.(106) When he left for Africa, the city was placed under the tried and tested (and unexciting) M. Aemilius Lepidus as consul, and his own close associate and secretary, Aulus Hirtius, as urban praetor.(107) At the same time he took the precaution of outlawing all the collegia except the ancient and traditional ones.(108) But the seeds of tension between the conservatives in the senate, the popular leaders such as Antony, and Caesar's inner coterie intent on keeping its position were thus sown, to culminate in the assassination of the dictator and the three-way scramble for power which followed it in 44.(109)

Antony, Fulvia, and Dolabella could build up their power only because Caesar was continually absent. This factor is stressed by the sources: they operated with the idea that Caesar would not return, or if he did, they would be too powerful to remove. Conditions of civil war and urban unrest particularly favoured Fulvia. Her' position as Clodius' widow and the fact that the conditions of war left her in Rome while most of the men who would in the normal course of events have competed for leadership were dying or campaigning gave her a unique advantage. Ambition provided the necessary stimulus. By understanding these factors and `writing her, and indeed the memory of Clodius, back into the equation' of the politics of 47, we can understand both the importance of such men as Antony and how difficult the absentee dictator found it to control the political situation he had done so much to create.


(1.) This paper was first read at the University of Queensland in October 1990. It has subsequently been delivered in different forms at the Universities of Reading, Sydney, Bristol, and Exeter. I thank all those who took part in the lively discussion which took place each time and for the valuable comments which were made. In particular I thank A. M. Stone, J. Barlow, T. P. Wiseman, and T. Wiedemann for their timely corrections and criticisms. References to Shackleton Bailey's numbering are given with each citation of Cicero's correspondence.

(2.) B. Ciu. 3.20-22; Dio 42.22-25.

(3.) Fam. 8.15.[149]; 16[153]; 17.[156]2: colons causa; Dio 42.22.2.

(4.) Tyrrell and Purser's explanation for his actions (D. R. Shackleton Bailey, Cicero's Letters to Atticus, 6 vols [Cambridge, 1966] [afterwards CLA], 1.497).

(5.) Fam. 8.17.[156]2: `equidem iam effeci ut maxime plebs et, qui antea noster fun', populus uester esset.'

(6.) B. Ciu. 3.21; Dio 42.23.2.

(7.) Caelius recognized that the difficulty of controlling the city from a distance was one of Caesar's major weaknesses (Fam. 8.17.[156]2: `uos dormitis nec haec adhuc mihi uidemini intellegere, qua nos pateamus et quam imbecilli').

(8.) Dio 42.22-23.

(9.) Although Caelius had been one of the young men who had `hung about' Catiline in the late sixties and had been a pupil of Crassus (sic. Cael. 8-14), he had been a prominent supporter of Milo at his trial (Asc. Mil. 33C; 34C; 37C; 55C; B. Marshall, A Historical Commentary on Asconius [Columbia, 1985], pp. 163, 171, 194).

(10.) B. Ciu. 3.20-1; Dio 42.22.4:[GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII].

(11.) Antony had had to overcome his father's reputation for incompetence (MRR 2.101-2; E. S. Gruen, Last Generation of the Roman Republic [Berkeley, 1974], p. 22) and his uncle's infamia, caused first by his expulsion from the Senate in 70 (Comment. Pet. 8; Asc. Tog.Cand. 75; Gruen, Last Generation, p. 134), and then his conviction for extortion in 59. The family had money, however. N. K. Rauh, Senators and Businessmen in the Roman Republic 242-44 B.C. (diss., Ann Arbor, 1986), pp. 436-7 provides details of Gaius' wide financial concerns, including profiteering from Sulla's proscriptions. More respectably, M. Antonius, his grandfather, had been an augur, consul (MRR 2.1), censor (MRR 2.6), and one of the leading orators of his generation (sic. Brut. 138-42). The family of Antony's mother Julia was more than respectable. She and her brother Lucius, the consul of 64 (Aft. 1.1.[10]2), were distantly related to Caesar (App. 2.63). Lucius was regarded as a certainty for the elections in 64. He was an augur from at least 80 (Macrob. Sat. 13.13.11; MRR 3.110). He maintained his position in the Senate from at least the sixties until 43.

(12.) Bononia, for example, was part of the Antonian clientela (Suet. Aug. 17.2; E. Badian, Foreign Clientelae [Oxford, 1958], p. 309). Cisalpine Gaul was important to the Antonii (Phil. 2.76; L. R. Taylor, Voting Districts of the Roman Republic [Ann Arbor, 1966], p. 207; R. Frei-Stolba, Untersuchungen zu den Wahlen in den romischen Kaiserzeit [Zurich, 1967], p. 57; H. Bruhns, Caesar und die romische Obersicht in den jahren 49-44 B.C. [Gottingen, 1978], p. 146). Crawford (Coinage and money under the Roman Republic [London, 1985], p. 183, n. 18) suggests that the clientela dates from M. Antonius' (cos 99) involvement with land distributions in the area. That the area was a family stronghold may explain Gaius Antonius' strategy of campaigning outside Rome for the consulship of 63 Comment. Pet. 8) and Cicero's comment that Cisalpine Gaul would be important in that year (Aft. 1.1.[19]2)

(13.) Rauh, Senators and Businessmen, pp. 432-5. According to inscriptions from the area,the family had been prominent from the middle of the second century. Shatzman (Senatorial wealth and Roman politics [Collections Latomus, Bruxelles, 1975], p. 298) concludes that Antony's capital was `not altogether insignificant'. He was rich enough to lend money to Quintus Cicero in 58 (QFr. 1.3.[3]7).

(14.) Att. 16.11.[420] 1; Phil. 2.3; E. Huzar, `Mark Antony: marriage versus career', CJ, 81 (1986), 97-8. Even if the association were not legitimate, Antony stood to profit from it.

(15.) Att. 10.8.[199]10; 13.[205]1; 16. [208] 5; 14.3.[357]2.

(16.) Att. 10.13.[205]1.

(17.) Apart from the more obvious examples of Fulvia and Cleopatra, one should not overlook Antony's mother, a redoubtable woman in the best tradition of the Roman matrona (Plus. Ant. 1-2.1; 20.3; App. 4.37; Dio 47.8.5; C.B.R. Pelling, Plutarch's Life of Antony [Cambridge, 1988], p. 117). There are hints that when she could be, she was constantly at Antony's side, even among the drunks and actors' who according to Cicero followed Antony around Italy during his tribunate in 49 (Phil. 2.58; Plut. Ant. 9.4). If she were prepared to countenance what was an unusual retinue for a tribune, I would argue that it was because of her interest in political affairs, rather than for Cicero's reason, that Antony required her to attend to the needs of his mistress. Also indicative of a close relationship between the two is Phil. 2.49; `aude dicere te prius ad parentem tuam uenisse quam me'. According to Appian, Julia took part in the negotiations surrounding the treaty of Brundisium (App. 5.63, also Pelling, Antony, pp. 117, 204).

(18.) For example, the Senate meeting on March 17, 44 and the meeting of leading Senators on the previous evening (Nic. Dam. Vit. Aug. 105; R. Syme, The Roman Revolution [Oxford, 1939], p. 98).

(19.) Syme, Roman Revolution, pp. 104-5. Huzar (CJ, 81 [1986], 98) euphemistically puns, `Fadia faded from Antony's life'.

(20.) Plut. Ant. 3.1; E. Huzar, Mark Antony (Beckenham, 1978), pp. 27-9. Antony was twenty-five years of age at the time. His successful request gave him the opportunity to command troops against Aristobulus of Judaea and Archelaus in Alexandria (Plus. Ant. 3; Jos. AJ, 14.84; 86; 92; BJ 1.162; 165; 171-2) and to increase his wealth (Rauh, Senators and Businessmen, p. 439).

(21.) Fam. 8.14.[97]1.

(22.) Caesar: Fam. 8.14. [97]1; Hirtius, B. Can 8.50.1. Curio: Fam. 8.14.[97]1; Phil. 3.4; Plut. Ant.

(23.) Ahenobarbus had been influential in the electoral processes (particularly the comitia centuriata) since the sixties (Aft. 1.1 [10]4).

(24.) Antony obtained assistance from Cisapline Gaul (B. Gall. 8.50). Caesar travelled to the area after the election to thank the voters for their support and to seek help for his approaching election. In this way, he was making the most of Antony's electoral support as well as his own clientela. See also L. C. Hayne, `The political astuteness of the Antonii', Acta Classica 47 (1978), 100.

(25.) On the importance of ancestors in the augurate for one's own success, see E. S. Staveley, `The conduct of elections during an interregnum', Historia 3 (1954), 209ff.; D. R. Shackleton Bailey, Cicero: epistulae ad familiares, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1977) [afterwards CEF], 1.430.

(26.) Phil. 2.4.

(27.) Fam. 2.18.[115]2.

(28.) Roman Revoluton, p. 108.

(29.) Hirtius (B. Gall. 8.2.1) refers to Antony as Caesar's quaestor in 51, although we know he campaigned for 52 (Phil. 2.49).

(30.) Phil. 2.49. Caesar had asked Cicero to assist Antony.

(31.) Mil. 40-1; Asc. Mil. 36 41C; Marshall, Asconius, p. 189. The earlier quarrel between Antony and Clodius possibly even sprang from rivalry for popularity in Clodius' stronghold, especially as it arose during Antony's first major political campaign.

(32.) J. Linderski & A. Kaminska-Linderski, `The quaestorship of M. Antonius', Phoenix 28 (1974), 213-23. This reconstruction has been accepted by Shackleton Bailey (CEF 1.455) and T.R.S. Broughton (MRR 3.19-20).

(33.) Fam. 2.18.[115]2: `... tris fratris summo loco natos, promptos, non indisertos ... quos uideo deinceps tribunos pl. per triennium fore.'

(34.) In the late forties, Lucius had built up such a following that he was named patron of all thirty-five tribes (Phil. 7.26; 13.26).

(35.) Asc. Mil. 28 32C.

(36.) Asc. Mil. 35 40C.

(37.) Val. Max. 3.5.3; C. Babcock, `The early career of Fulvia', AJP 86 (1965), 20.

(38.) Syme (Sallust [Berkeley, 1974], p. 135) believes that her mother Sempronia was the sister of the Sempronia of the Catilinarian Conspiracy and is followed by Earl (`The early career of Sallust', Historia 15 [1966], 309). Munzer (RE II.4 `Sempronia' 102; 103) postulates that the mother of Decimus Brutus was possibly the daughter of Gaius Gracchus, where Sempronia, the mother of Fulvia, was the daughter of Sempronia Tuditana. Recent tendencies to accept either relationship as established should be rejected (e.g. R. A. Bauman, Women and Politics in Ancient Rome [Routledge, 1992], p. 83).

(39.) Dom. 139. Cicero here refers to the sister of a L. Pinarius Natta, the pontifex who presided over the dedication of Cicero's house. Taylor has argued convincingly that in all probability, this was Fulvia herself (`Caesar's colleagues in the pontifical college', AJP 63 [1942], 396-7).

(40.) Babcock, `Fulvia', 4; Delia, `Fulvia reconsidered', p. 198; below n. 45. The key passage for this remains Phil. 3.16: `tuae coniugis, bonae feminae, locupletis quidem certe, Bambalio quidam peter, homo nullo numero. nihil illo contemptius, qui propter haesitantiam linguae stuporemque cordis cognomen ex contumelia traxerit.' In the context, Cicero is implying that Fulvia was wealthy not through inheritance but through her ill-gotten gains. Her father, therefore, was not necessarily important to the equation. Her maternal grandfather Tuditanus, by contrast, was nobilis but a mad wastrel. I thank Mr Patrick Tansey for alerting me to the full significance of this passage in ascertaining Fulvia's social status. I should also alert the reader who has no Latin to a bad error in the Loeb translation of the Philippics at this point. For At aaus nobilis, Cicero clearly refers to Fulvia's grandfather Tuditanus. The given translation reads, `But his (Bambalio's?) grandfather was noble'. A very unhelpful mistranslation only matched by a similar error at 13.26.

(41.) Eg. Mil. 28. This should be compared to Fulvia's activity in 44 where her travels with Antony were viewed as highly political.

(42.) P. Vanderbroeck, Popular Leadership and collective behavior in the late Roman Republic ca. 80-50B.C. (Amsterdam, 1987), pp. 52-5. Note Fulvia's later support for the gang leader and legal adviser, Sextus Cloelius, whom Caesar rejected (below p. 192).

(43.) Plut. Caes. 5-6; Suet. Iul. 1. It is significant that all Caesar's much publicized links with Marius and Cinna were through these two women. As was pointed out in the Exeter Research seminar by Richard Seaford, one should remember, if only in passing, the relevant examples of our own century. In the Philippines, former president Corazon Aquino was quickly identified with her murdered husband's policies and this was the most important factor in her ability to overthrow the existing government. The recent examples of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka all show the phenomenon of female political leaders whose claim to leadership and political power is based on their relationship to male relatives who have attained hero status. Bangladesh is particularly interesting in that the main rival of Begum Zia, whose husband was murdered in 1981, is Sheikh Hasina, daughter of Bangladesh's first prime minister who was murdered in 1971.

(44.) For example, yell. Pat. 2.74.2 shows Fulvia's remarkable energy, which comes through in the source material even when that material does its best to depict it as a vice.

(45.) D. Delia, `Fulvia reconsidered', in S. Pomeroy (ed.), Women's History and Ancient History (North Carolina, 1990), pp. 197-217. One very valid point of the paper corrects the belief that Fulvia had a Phrygian city named after her. Delia argues cogently (p. 202) that the inscription on the relevant coin more probably refers to Octavia. Fulvia's influence was centred in Rome and then widened to include Italy, but never the East. Delia's corrections of Babcock's thesis that Fulvia's importance was due to wealth has been noted (above n. 40). But to deny her influence completely is to do Fulvia less than credit and takes no account of the specific circumstances which allowed its growth.

(46.) Delia, `Fulvia reconsidered', p. 197.

(47.) Cruelty: Phil. 2.113; 3.4; 6.4; 13.18; avarice: Phil. 1.33; 2.95; 3.10; 16; 6.4; interest in politics: Att. 14.12.(366)1; Mil. 28; 55; Phil. 5.22.

(48.) Delia, `Fulvia reconsidered', pp. 199-200.

(49.) Babcock, `Fulvia', 25.

(50.) Babcock, (`Fulvia', 5-6) and Linderski & Kaminska-Linderski (`Antonius', 222) see Fulvia's hand in Antony's change of sides in early,52. This may well be correct, although Cicero's comment in the Second Philippic (2.48) is so elliptical that it is difficult to say exactly what the nature of their relationship was. It is enough to say at this point that Antony should be placed in the circle of Curio and Fulvia in 51-50, and that, in consequence, his career benefited. Nevertheless, Curio enjoyed the more obvious change of fortune in 50.

(51.) Babcock, `Fulvia', 9. For Curio's career 51-50, W. C. Lacey, `The tribunate of Curio', Historia 10 (1961), 318-29. Lacey commendably stresses that Curio had a life apart from Caesar, but does not examine the very probable situation that Curio was doing more than one thing at a time (ibid. 20).

(52.) Babcock, `Fulvia', 9.

(53.) Plut. Ant. 5.1: [GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]. On the comitia tributa, L. R. Taylor (Party Politics in the Age of Caesar [Berkeley, 1949], pp. 93-4). She proposes that the pontifical and augural elections were the province of this assembly after Labienus' law of 63, on the grounds that Caesar was elected pontifex maximus over important optimates. As Caesar did very well in the elections for the tribunate in that year, it would be interesting to know whether Curio presided over the concilium plebis on that occasion

(54.) Lacey, `Curio', 323-6.

(55.) Fam. 8.4.[81]2; 6.[88]5; Tac. Ann. 11.7; Suet, Iul. 29.2; Plut. Caes. 29.3; Ant. 5.2; App. 2.26.

(56.) Lacey, `Curio', 323-6.

(57.) Fam. 8.11.[91]2.

(59.) Q. Fufius Calenus, a former Clodian supporter, was already one of Caesar's legates (B. Gall. 8.39; Fam. 8.1.[71]4). For the early careers of T. Plancus Bursa, Q. Pompeius Rufus, and Sallust, Vanderbroeck, Popular Leadership, pp. 202, 204, 205.

(59.) Plut. Ant. 5.1; Pelling, Antony, p. 127.

(60.) Phil. 2.49.

(61.) B. Gall. 7.81.6, from Autumn 52. This is possibly an anomaly, for Antony was merely quaestor designatus at the time. It is the first of many signals of favour in this period (W. B. Tyrrell, `Labienus' departure from Caesar in January 49 B.C.', Historia 21 [1972], 438).

(62.) Fam. 2.15.[96]4; Att. 6.6.[121]4; 7.8.[131]5. Pompey called Caesar Antony's quaestor in 50 (ibid.). Linderski & Kaminska-Linderski (`Antonius', 216) suggests that Pompey used this term even after Antony had been elected tribune in order to emphasize his personal relationship with Caesar. It also served the purpose of putting Antony in his place.

(63.) Tyrrell (`Labienus' departure', 438) offers the favour shown towards Antony as a reason for Labienus' dissatisfaction with Caesar.

(64.) Plut. Ant. 5.2-3; App. 2.33; MRR 2.258.

(65.) B. Ciu. 1.18; Dio 41.1.2.

(66.) Plut. Ant 6.4; App. 2.41

(67.) Att. 10.8[199]; 10.[201]; 11.[202]; 12.[203];especially, 13.[205]1: `tu Antoni leones pertimescas caue. nihil est illo homine iucundius. attende [GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] euocauit litteris e municipiis denos et IIII uiros. uenerunt ad uillam eius mane. primum dormiit ad H III, deinde, cum esset nuntiatum uenisse Neopolitanos et Cumanos ... postridie redire iussit; lauari se uelle et [GREEK TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]. hoc here effecit. hodie autem in Aenariam transire constituit ut exsulibus reditum polliceretur.' Also Plut. Ant. 6; App. 2.48. The letters from Cicero written in 49 are significant because they reveal his attitude to Antony long before the commencement of the feud which produced the Second Philippic, and some of the reasons for his later prejudice. Syme (Roman Revolution, p. 105) states that it is `necessary to forget both the Philippics and the War of Actium' in assessing Antony. Caution and sensitivity are required in dealing with both, but the letters should not be treated with the same disdain. Nor should the fact escape us that this evidence indicates that the Second Philippic, as with all good propaganda, had a factual basis. See above p. 188 for a discussion of similar oversights in Delia's arguments.

(68.) Plut. Ant. 6.5.

(69.) B. Ciu. 3.24-30; 34.1; 40.5, 46.

(70.) Dio 41.15.2; 17.3; 36.2.

(71.) Plut. Ant. 4.3; 6.5, but cf. Pelling, Antony, p. 132.

(72.) Dio 42.27; Huzar, Mark Antony, p. 65.

(73.) Hirtius had passed the rogatio Hirtia in 48 giving Caesar the right to appropriate property (CIL 12.2.604; Phil. 13.32). Dio (42.20.1) dates the law to 48. Yavetz (Julius Caesar and his Public Image [London, 1983], p. 76) denies Caesar's extensive use of the powers granted to him by this law. This attests the enduring nature of the propaganda of the period, but the many auctions and problems of inheritance and possession alluded to in Cicero's letters (Fam. 9.10.[217]3; 17.[195]; 13.4. [318]; 5.[319]; 29.[282]; 15.17.[214]2; also Phil. 2.103-105) would suggest that clementua was highly selective. Keppie (Colonisation and Veteran Settlements in Italy 47-14 B.C. [London, 1983], p.55) is more discerning when he questions Caesar's ability to finance the settlement of his veterans without resorting to such fund-raising measures.

(74.) Dio 42.27.3-4.

(75.) Phil. 2.62-7; Plut. Ant. 8.3-10.1; App. 2.92; Dio 42.29-33, Liv. Per. 113.

(76.) Att. 11.12.[223]4 (March); 14.[225]2; 11.23.[232]3.

(77.) 42.29-33, possibly based on Livy, as was Plutarch (cf. Per. 113).

(78.) 42.29.2-4.

(79.) 42.32.1-3.

(80.) 42.31.3; 33.1.

(81.) Ant. 9.1. Livy was possibly responsible for these details also (Per. 113).

(82.) For Appian's use of Pollio as a source of and the ramifications of this for our knowledge of Pollio's career, see A. B. Bosworth, `Asinius Pollio and Augustus', Historia 21 (1972), 468; 471; A. M. Gowing, `Appian and Cassius' speech before Philippi', Phoenix 44 (1990), 158-82.

(83.) Especially Curio (B. Ciu. 2.42; MRR 2.263).

(84.) Plut. Ant. 9.2-3; Dio 42.29.3, 31.1-2.

(85.) Dio 42.33.1.

(86.) Dolabella's adoption: Dio 42.29.2; the statue to Clodius: Att. 11.23.[232] 3. The reference is based on a conjecture by Purser, which Shackleton Bailey describes as brilliant (CLA 5.291).

(87.) Att. 11.23.[232]4: `nunc quidem ipse uidetur denuntiare.'

(88.) Phil. 2.98.

(89.) Phil. 2.99.

(90.) Att. 11.7.[217] 2; 11.12.[223]4. Antony appealed to direct orders from Caesar to explain why he could not allow Cicero to return to Rome (December 47). Later (March 47) when Atticus suggested that Cicero request help from Antony, Cicero admits to not knowing what he should ask for (`nihil enim mihi venit in mentem quod scribendum putem').

(91.) Phil. 2.14; 18; Plut. Ant. 2.2; Dio 45.42.6; 46.2.3; 20.5. Much of the Second Philippic is devoted to answering charges of being `anti-people' with which Antony was needling Cicero very effectively. Again we must note that those who would deny any value to the document (Syme, Roman Revolution, p. 105; Delia, `Fulvia Reconsidered', 200) are too quick to overlook this aspect of it.

(92) Phil. 2.99. The amount of detail given in this anecdote (and the reflection upon Cicero's own daughter and a former son-in-law whom he had not yet completely cast aside) suggests that the story is in most respects true. Cicero makes it clear that Antony's reasons for such churlish behaviour principally involved his forthcoming marriage to Fulvia: `alia condicione quaesita et ante perspecta.'

(93.) Plut. Ant. 10.3. Plutarch confuses the chronology at several points and so places the marriage after Caesar's return from Egypt. It suited his picture of `Antony reclaimed' to place the marriage late (felling, Antony, p. 142). However, their eldest son Antyllus was used as a hostage in 44 (Phil. 1.31; 2.90; 12.1), which would suggest an earlier date than that which is given. Even so, Antyllus could only have been at the most three years of age in 44. Cicero's date of very early in the year (Phil. 2.99) makes better sense.

(94.) Plut. Ant. 10.2.

(95.) Sextus Cloelius: Att. 14.13.[367]6; 13a.[367a]2; 13b.[397b]3; Phil. 1.3; 2.9 (Cloelius as Antony's adviser). This was not a new policy (13a.[367a]2: `a Caesare petit ut Sex. Cloelium restitueret'). Clodius' son: Att. 14.13a.[367a]2-3; 13b.[367b]4; T. Plancus Bursa: Phil. 6.10; 10.22; 13.27; Q. Fufius Calenus: ad Brut. 2.4; 17.1; Phil. 12.1-3; App. 3.51; Dio 46.1 ff.

(96.) Deiotarus: Att. 14.12.[366]1; Phil. 2.95. Brundisium: Phil. 3.4; 5.22; 13.18. Sicilians: Att. 14.12[366]1. Cicero's account to Atticus of the grant of citizenship to the Sicilians immediately precedes his description of Deiotarus' expensive return to grace. He makes the telling comment, `Deiotari nostri cause non similis?' Also, R.A. Bauman, Lawyers in Roman Transitional Politics (Muncher, 1985), p.56; Women and Politics, p. 84.

(97.) App. 5.14; 19; Plut. Ant. 30.1; Vell. Pat. 2.74.2; Dio 48.10-12.

(98.) The picture of Fulvia as an imperial prototype is sketched by Bauman (Women and Politics, pp. 89-90). He stresses how different Fulvia was from her contemporaries, Mucia and Hortensia, who, as he puts it, seem `quite happy in their supporting roles'.

(99.) J. Hallett, `Perusinae glances and the changing image of Octavian', AJAH 2 (1977), 151-71.

(100.) App. 5.19. For a different reading of the proceedings, Bauman, Women and Politics, pp. 87-8.

(101.) Plut. Ant. 30.2. There is confusion in Plutarch's account where Fulvia dies before Antony could reach her. Nevertheless, in his version, her letter caused him to change his plans and sail with two hundred warships for Brundisium. Appian stresses Fulvia's jealousy of Cleopatra, but he too makes it clear that Fulvia persuaded Antony to return to Italy to face Octavian (5.52). Fulvia knew that her ambitious husband would break his agreement with Octavian, and was banking on this and the support of his generals (App. 5.33; Bosworth, Historia 21 [1972], 470ff.; cf Syme, Roman Revolution, p. 208). A closer survey of her clear-sighted strategies in this period, and her ability to make Antony move, however late, should cause us to relegate the belief that she died heartbroken and eaten up with jealousy of Cleopatra as popular (and unlikely) fancy. As Pelling points out (Antony, p. 199), she had more reason to be concerned about Glaphyra, if she had had the time or the inclination to think about it.

(102.) The plan to blame Fulvia for the whole affair and let bygones be bygones can be traced directly to Octavian's adviser, Cocceius (App. 5.62; less specifically, Plut. Ant. 30.3). It finds its way to Dio (48.28.2-3). Embellishments, such as Fulvia's alleged jealousy, could be added later. Antony's conscience possibly received additional encouragement from his mother Julia, who espoused a policy of reconciliation and who therefore might have urged him to sacrifice Fulvia (App. 5.63; Pelling, Antony, pp. 117, 204).

(103.) Plut. Ant. 11.3.

(104.) Especially interesting on this point is H. Frisch (Cicero's Fight for the Republic [Copenhagen, 1946], p.37), who stresses the independent nature and sovereignty of the men with whom Caesar and others had to deal in the fifties and forties.

(105.) Vanderbroeck (Popular Leadership, pp. 141, 168) comments that Clodius alone out of all the popular leaders had organized support among what he termed the plebs contionalis (ibid., pp. 81-92) in such a way that the power he held could be maintained after he had finished his term as tribune and then by others after his death.

(106.) Debt laws: Dio 42.51; consulships of Calenus and Vatinius: MRR 2.286.

(107.) MRR 2.293-4.

(108.) Suet. Iul. 42.3.

(109.) On these men see J. Malitz, `Die Kanzlei Caesars-herrschaftsorganisation zwischen Republik und Prinzipat', Historia, 36 (1987), 51-72 and K. E. Welch, ` The praefectura urbis of 45 B.C. and the ambitions of L. Cornelius Balbus', Antichthon 24 (1990), 53-69.
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Author:Welch, Kathryn E.
Publication:Greece & Rome
Date:Oct 1, 1995
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