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An untapped resource for stabilization and reconstruction: the United States Air Force.

Editorial Abstract: The US military has extensive experience with peacekeeping, nation building, infrastructure repair, and other activities below the level of major combat operations. Despite successes in traditional combat operations, however, the postconflict phase continues to baffle US policy makers. Offering one possible solution, the author proposes using the Air Force's On-Scene Commanders' Course at Air University--among other resources--to increase training for postconflict operations.

The U.S. government-civilian agencies and the DoD do not have sufficient experience in multiagency activities and lack training and educational programs.... It is essential that multiple agencies employ shared collaboration, decision-making aids, and execution tools to assess, plan, and execute integrated operations.

While the Department [of Defense] cannot control or assume responsibility for multi-agency integration, it seems clear that success will require the leadership of the agency with the greatest stake in most operations--the DoD.

--Defense Science Board Summer Study on Transformation: A Progress Assessment, vol. 1, 2006

THE US MILITARY has had extensive experience in the area commonly referred to as stabilization and reconstruction operations, encompassing missions such as peacekeeping, nation building, infrastructure repair, and a multitude of activities below major combat operations. Unfortunately, despite all the successes in traditional combat operations, the inevitable postconflict phase continues to baffle US policy makers. Stability operations constitute what Nancy Roberts refers to as a "wicked problem," whereby no agreement exists on the root causes of postconflict instability and even less consensus on the solutions. (1) This situation leads to long and costly endeavors for the United States and for military personnel in particular. For example, the past three years of military operations in Iraq have cost taxpayers approximately $226 billion with approximately $33 billion in funding for security assistance and reconstruction projects. (2) Clearly, problems regarding the security and stability of postconflict environments such as Iraq frequently remain unsolved after large expenditures in terms of effort, funding, and lives. Although the United States can muster incredible financial and personnel resources for such operations, this article seeks to review their organization and to determine whether we have overlooked any of the Air Force's training assets. Specifically, it assesses the applicability of Air University's On-Scene Commanders' Course as a means of increasing training for postconflict operations and asserts that anything less than a complete evaluation of such resources will result in their inefficient use and the exposure of US personnel to unnecessary risk.

Roles and Missions: The Debate over Culture in the Department of Defense

A significant gap exists between success in traditional combat operations and the ability to control the stabilization phase. (3) However, we have come to realize that we should not view constabulary and stabilization functions as a diversion of scarce resources but as a key determinant of the ultimate success of armed conflict. (4) The US military will be called upon to ensure that an area remains stable, that nation-building progresses, and that autonomy returns to indigenous populations. We should view our inability to perform consistently in the stabilization and reconstruction realm as seriously as we strive for success in combat operations. James Carafano and Dana Dillon succinctly summarize the key issue: "The United States should be just as efficient in fighting for peace as in fighting battles. Winning the peace is part of winning wars. As in preparing for combat, sound planning for peace requires the right organizations, training, and preparation." (5)

Obstacles to Successful Postconflict Operations

Two major obstacles may be largely responsible for problems in civilian-military integration and training. First, military culture and, hence, military personnel's perceptions of their roles in postconflict operations must accommodate the realities of current missions. Second, civilian military integration must increase in order to enhance the opportunities for success. Although now actively directed to emphasize the mission area of stabilization and reconstruction, the US military needs to improve its flexibility in changing from combat to stability operations and its integration with civilian institutions.

The United States frequently relies on its military to provide the preponderance of implementation personnel for stabilization and reconstruction operations. Unfortunately, success in such operations has been sporadic at best. Clearly, the military has unequalled expeditionary, equipment, and logistic capabilities. However, the current culture and organization of resources may not support the most efficient results in postconflict environments. The "stuckee" theory of Gen Anthony Zinni, former commander of US Central Command, rings true when he asserts that no other realistic opportunities exist to fill the gap between major combat operations and creation of a stable environment returned to indigenous control (fig. 1). (6)

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

Nation building and peacekeeping are not new to the military. Beginning after World War II in Germany and Japan and continuing through Korea into the 1990s, the United States has seen significant involvements in peacekeeping operations. Unfortunately, one could best describe the efforts as ad hoc since the military serves as executive agent with little planning or coordination with other agencies. Although we use the military because of its unmatched expeditionary capabilities, many people agree that civilians are more appropriate for nation-building activities, particularly those involving humanitarian agencies. (7) However, since US taxpayers fund the military's expeditionary capabilities to the sum of approximately $400 billion per year, it may not be reasonable to expect the creation of a parallel capability in the civilian sector.

Indeed, postconflict operations must frequently conform to political decisions geared towards how best to return indigenous control of a region after the military has secured it. Therefore, stabilization and reconstruction seek to combine three aspects: military capabilities, organization, and culture; civilian oversight and direction; and external-internal civil-military cooperation. The optimal stability operation would organize the military more effectively and create better integration between civilian and military capabilities. Condoleezza Rice, national security advisor at the time, summarized this quandary by noting that "there's nothing wrong with nation building, but not when it is done by the American military." (8) We must assess all of the Department of Defense's (DOD) training resources to ensure the best combination of skill sets for conducting postconflict operations and increasing civilian-military cooperation. An expansion of training and cooperation opportunities will allow more efficient accomplishment of tasks after conflict has concluded (fig. 2).

[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]

A reassessment of the military's organization and resources would provide a foundation for improving results in postconflict environments. The military's "tradition of forgetting" and its priorities must change in light of the new threats and taskings of the post-Cold War and post-9/11 eras. (9) The US military must more fully appreciate the importance of integration with nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and humanitarian organizations. Clearly, we should not consider the military a long-term solution. Political and humanitarian considerations should replace military leadership as soon as possible, relegating the military to a supporting role. Our forces can build a bridge between active hostilities and the ability of the indigenous population to settle differences through a political and legal process. Even though the military can provide resources, logistics, command and control (C2), and intelligence, "politics and politicians ... must secure the changes and solutions to the causes of the conflict." (10) US armed forces can begin making stabilization and reconstruction a higher priority by identifying resources and personnel most appropriate for postconflict operations. Indeed, we may already have training resources that would enhance opportunities for civilian-military integration.

The Role of the Military

A substantive debate in the executive and legislative branches regarding the military's role in stability operations frequently addresses three core issues. (11) The first concerns the suitability of military personnel for stabilization and reconstruction operations. Many analysts and senior officers point to questions regarding their use because current training, doctrine, and philosophy still leave personnel unprepared for such operations. Many people consider our training oriented towards subduing an enemy in a nonpermissive environment rather than cultivating the law-enforcement and negotiating skills required after the cessation of hostilities. Thomas Donnelly effectively captures this policy dilemma when he asserts that "the preferred American way of war is to dash about the planet, zapping its enemies from afar, and then prepare for the next sally. It is, essentially, a raiding strategy on a global scale, the sort of approach more fitting for lesser powers than superpowers." (12) Unfortunately, this approach continually leaves a gap in US capabilities to control events after the completion of major combat operations. However, because stabilization and reconstruction activities must begin before that point, we may need military personnel to assure the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Although one hears the argument that a military presence confuses the objective/neutral status of civilian personnel, ensuring a secure and stable environment for these workers means that the military must address its effectiveness in stabilization missions and its integration with civilian capabilities and institutions. (13)

The second core issue involves the effect of this mission area on readiness to conduct major combat operations. Realizing that military involvement following conflict would not diminish, many individuals began to reframe the debate not in terms of the military's suitability or adequacy but by maintaining that its current structure and size do not leave room for both stabilization/reconstruction and the primary mission of fighting. Thus, the debate shifted from the military's eschewing nontraditional roles to its not having the structure to perform both roles simultaneously. (14) However, one cannot say for certain whether or not a complete review of all DOD resources has occurred to ensure that we have brought all military capabilities to bear.

Finally, armed forces currently tasked to perform both substantive postconflict operations and major combat operations will continue to face strains on equipment and personnel. Specifically, stabilization and reconstruction taskings impose additional wear on equipment and increase deployments for personnel in an all-volunteer force, reducing their readiness for major combat operations and therefore necessitating a significant debate about the military's roles and missions. (15) We will certainly need military forces after the fighting, but how should we structure the force to better address this mission area? Robert Kaplan summarizes the imperative to develop an integrated system of civilian and military capabilities by asserting that the US military has emerged as the "world's most effective emergency relief organization" because of its ability to deploy quickly, establish security, and provide unequalled logistics support. (16) To assure full effectiveness, the military must determine whether its organization of resources meets doctrinal requirements for stability operations.

This discussion regarding the roles-and-missions debate and the need for greater civilian-military integration raises a follow-on question: to what strategy and policy guidance should the military look in order to organize itself for postconflict operations? Additionally, do any similarities in taskings for these operations exist between the DOD and other government agencies?

The Military's Strategic Guidance for Postconflict Environments

The debates over military structure, training, and doctrine as well as the need to integrate with other government agencies are intriguing because the disconnects do not seem to stem from a lack of strategic-level guidance or planning. Multiple sources of doctrine and policy that direct increased training and coordination should provide sufficient authority to better integrate stabilization and reconstruction operations into the military and increase civilian-military cooperation--for example, the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL); creation of the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS); Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, 28 November 2005; and National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, 7 December 2005. One can now turn to assessing similarities in strategic guidance and determining any appropriate training resources available within the Air Force.

The Universal Joint Task List

The UJTL serves as the authoritative strategic source for determining tasks needed to carry out the national military strategy. Specifically, it "serve [s] as the foundation for capabilities-based planning across the range of military operations." (17) Perhaps the most basic "to do" list for the US military, this guidance also establishes a relational hierarchy of mandates that link specific tasks to the national military strategy (fig. 3):

* strategy: overarching military requirements to support national security strategy

* end state: "the set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander's objectives"

* effect: "a change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom"

* mission: the task and purpose of a military operation

* capability: "ability to execute a specified course of action"

* task: specific skill that allows the military to provide a capability and fulfill taskings (18)

[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]

Although many requirements described in the UJTL are applicable to stabilization and reconstruction operations, five tasks have particular relevance:

* Cooperate with and support NGOs / private voluntary organizations (PVO).

* Provide governmentwide support.

* Coordinate activities within the interagency process.

* Conduct civil-military operations.

* Foster interagency relations. (19)

Public Law 108-447 and the State Department's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

Many aspects of the UJTL have parallels in the congressional intent of Public Law 108-447, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, which endorsed the creation of the S/CRS. (20) These two developments can provide synergies for improvements in stabilization and reconstruction operations. The S/CRS, a new ambassador-level agency, intends to answer a perceived lack of oversight regarding the transition from active hostilities to stable control by the local population. (21) Specifically, Public law 108-447 outlines four major task areas designed to improve stabilization and reconstruction operations:

* Determine and document resources outside the military.

* Develop nonmilitary responses to postconflict crises.

* Serve as the executive agent for US response by coordinating US response plans.

* Coordinate training of civilian personnel. (22)

Department of Defense Directive 3000.05

DODD 3000.05 ensures that "stability operations are a core U.S. military mission ... [that] shall be given priority comparable to combat operations. (23) Importantly, this policy provides clear guidance to increase training and integration in US government agencies and aide organizations. Some specific highlights include the following:

* "Coordinate DoD relations with the Department of State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization."

* "Identify DoD-wide stability operations capabilities."

* "Develop a process to facilitate information sharing for stability operations among the DoD Components, and relevant U.S. Departments and agencies, ... NGOs, and members of the Private Sector."

* "Develop opportunities for personnel from other U.S. Departments and agencies, foreign governments, International Organizations, and NGOs to participate, as appropriate, in DoD training related to stability operations." (24)

National Security Presidential Directive 44

NSPD 44 identifies the secretary of state (as delegated to the S/CRS) as executive agent for deliberate and crisis planning for stabilization and reconstruction operations so as to ensure the effective combination of individual agencies' capabilities. (25) The document specifically directs that "the Secretaries of State and Defense will integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans ... [and] will develop a general framework for fully coordinating stabilization and reconstruction activities and military operations at all levels." (26) One can collapse the numerous and wide-ranging responsibilities assigned to the Department of State into five general areas of responsibility:

* "Develop detailed contingency plans for integrated United States Government reconstruction and stabilization efforts."

* "Coordinate United States Government responses for reconstruction and stabilization with the Secretary of Defense."

* "Coordinate reconstruction and stabilization activities ... [with] international and regional organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private sector entities."

* "Lead United States Government development of a strong civilian response capability including necessary surge capabilities."

* "Identify lessons learned and integrate them into operations." (27)

The "fog of peace" in postconflict operations creates opportunities for confusion and duplication of effort. (28) Most seriously, an ineffective policy of stability operations leads to unnecessary risks for personnel and a waste of scarce resources for the US taxpayer. Fortunately, as indicated above, we seem to have a high level of congruence in policy directives and congressional intent. One existing training resource in particular could be used to satisfy the concerns of both the postconflict literature and policy directives for US agencies tasked with stabilization operations.

The Air Force's On-Scene Commanders' Course
 U.S. personnel ... rarely have an opportunity
 to train with the representatives of the other
 U.S. agencies, non-governmental organizations,
 and the international actors with whom
 they will have to work in the field.

 --Play to Win: Final Report of
 the Bi-Partisan Commission on
 Post-Conflict Reconstruction,
 January 2003


Multiple after-action reports and analyses have asserted that stabilization and reconstruction require a different skill set than major combat operations. (29) The Air Force's On-Scene Commanders' Course may provide an avenue to increase opportunities for success in postconflict operations. By expanding DOD personnel's attendance at this course and by including individuals outside the DOD, we would increase the pool of personnel with skill sets needed for stability operations as well as the understanding of both civilian and military members.

Several studies address the importance of education and training in stabilization operations. In Educating International Security Practitioners, James Smith and others thoroughly review the nexus of military education and the requirements of the twenty-first-century security environment, finding that major changes are necessary to ensure that US forces can switch from war to peace. (30) Perhaps more powerfully, Leonard Wong and others in Strategic Leadership Competencies recognize the need for developing an integrated leadership-development program to address the requirements of postconflict operations. (31) In addition, Wong's adaptive leader concept argues that stabilization and reconstruction duties may make better officers, albeit not in their traditional specialties. (32) The report of the Fifteenth Annual Strategy Conference hosted by the US Army's Strategic Studies Institute also argues convincingly for increasing training and education opportunities for personnel engaged in stabilization and reconstruction operations, contending that we must create new leadership capabilities to address stabilization. It notes that more training and education will help reduce the gaps between prescriptions and results in operations following hostilities. (33) Finally, in his review of the first year of Operation Enduring Freedom, William Flavin describes the importance of civilian-military cooperation in facilitating the transition between the military's security-focused operations and civilian nation-building and stability operations. (34)

Specific Course Elements

During a four-day workshop involving seminar presentations, hands-on exercises, and presentations by subject-matter experts, 14-17 students will cover topics such as (1) major-accident/disaster-response policies, (2) legal/media orientation, (3) medical responses, (4) responses to accidents involving hazardous materials, (5) mishap investigation and reporting, (6) terrorism, (7) identification and disposal of explosive ordnance, (8) posttraumatic-stress debriefing, (9) Office of Special Investigations, and (10) contingency contracting. Created in 1980 after a Titan 11 ICBM accident in Damascus, Arkansas, the course aims to create a better crisis-management response and leadership capability as well as teach leaders how to integrate various response agencies. It has the following goals:

* Provide emergency/contingency-response training.

* Emphasize peacetime techniques and response to weapons of mass destruction.

* Teach C2 functions during emergency/ contingency situations.

* Teach situation assessment, communications, planning, public affairs, and logistics support. (35)

The course currently trains approximately 400 people per year through a combination of in-residence instruction at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, and various teams that travel to sponsoring organizations within the Air Force--the only DOD agency that provides a separate academic experience for teaching crisis-management and integrated--response skills. (36) Training includes responding to contingency and crisis situations by integrating and managing various agencies, including civilian resources, as appropriate. A dialogue must begin to determine how to expand this course to more personnel, particularly those involved in stabilization and reconstruction operations.

Major Benefits

The On-Scene Commanders' Course can make a valuable contribution to postconflict operations for several reasons. In addition to following Patrick Donahoe's call for leaders who can quickly transition from combat to stability operations, the course would help solve the problem of multiple authorities, cultures, and priorities by providing a standardized experience for postconflict personnel. (37) Using the class's common framework would allow responding agencies to establish better understandings of capabilities, authorities, and C2 issues. The course would afford more opportunities to learn common practices and integration procedures as well as exchange ideas in a week-long seminar. Indeed, this Air Force resource may go a long way towards answering the taskings of DODD 3000.05 together with Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson's call for civilian agencies to create new programs to better integrate their capabilities and appreciate the "maze of competing and conflicting entities." (38) The course could also provide a valuable training baseline for deployable civilian teams, perhaps as a capstone course prior to deployment.

Second, the course would allow the civilian community to leverage the best practices of the Air Force. It would support a suggestion from a task force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations to create additional civilian-military training to increase cooperation and would allow the Department of State to solidify its role as executive agent without expending funds to create training programs from scratch. (39) In addition, an expanded audience for the On-Scene Commanders' Course would comply with a Defense Science Board study that calls for increased cooperation between the Departments of Defense and State. (40) This Air Force resource would allow the military to increase training for and appreciation of stabilization and reconstruction tasks; furthermore, it would help create similar synergies in the civilian sector and make this skill set a core competency for the Department of State.

Third, expanding attendance would reflect an appreciation for what Karl Rohr has termed "progressive reconstruction." (41) That is, the On-Scene Commanders' Course could hone crisis-management capabilities and integrative skills needed in postconflict operations. By combining military and civilian attendees from the entire spectrum of supporting agencies, it could further their understanding of an increasingly blurry line between combat and stability operations. The most effective stabilization operation does not occur after active hostilities have ceased. Rather, combat and stabilization should occur as objectives are secured.

Fourth, the course would directly support an initiative to create a pool of deployable civilian teams well versed in crisis management and the integration of multiple-response agencies. It would also substantively contribute to the creation of a "U.S. training center for complex contingency operations." (42) Civilian attendance at the course could create deployable expertise that would easily integrate with other agencies within Rohr's progressive-reconstruction concept. Course materials provided by the Air Force could assist in the creation of a national training center for stabilization and reconstruction.

The value of the On-Scene Commanders' Course lies in its ability to answer questions in multiple areas of strategic guidance for postconflict operations. With minor alterations, this resource could become part of the repertoire of resources available to the United States as it tries to enhance its capabilities for stability operations. Indeed, this course lies at the nexus of overlapping strategic guidance.

Untapped Air Force Resources?
 If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with
 no thought for the after-effect ... it is almost
 certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing
 the germs of another war.

 --B. H. Liddell Hart
 Strategy


Although the Air Force is not the executive agent for postconflict operations, it may have resources available to help improve results. Seeking to begin a larger debate in the Air Force regarding resources applicable to stability operations, this article has reviewed key issues regarding the training and personnel involved in a growing mission area for the DOD. Specifically, it has analyzed common themes in the literature of postconflict stabilization and has assessed Air Force training and personnel resources that might increase opportunities for success. The article's findings indicate that the service could favorably affect stabilization operations, offering the On-Scene Commanders' Course as an example of leveraging existing training courses that satisfy many tasks which have parallels in the stabilization literature and after-action reports from postconflict operations. The Air Force could modify this course to create varying levels of support for the DOD and other government agencies, allowing them to tailor its materials as necessary. Possible changes include the following:

* Increase Air University's capacity to accommodate additional in-residence attendees. * Increase the use of mobile training teams to deliver the course to sponsoring agencies.

* Create a distance-learning curriculum.

* Make course materials available to other agencies.

This continuum would create a wide variety of options for agencies to improve their joint training and crisis-management skills.

The On-Scene Commanders' Course addresses many issues highlighted in scholarly studies and doctrinal guidance. Specifically, one finds several similarities between the course and the strategic guidance for postconflict operations as embodied in the UJTL, the S/CRS, DODD 3000.05, and NSPD 44 (fig. 4). In addition, the literature on stabilization and reconstruction also finds parallels in course topics such as enhancing civilian-military integration, increasing training and education, and reviewing all DOD assets for postconflict operations.

[FIGURE 4 OMITTED]

Perhaps most importantly, this article has sought to stimulate the dialogue needed to fully develop the ideas it has presented. Clearly, the Air Force can make its training resources available for a wider mission. Only informed discussion will enable national leaders to conduct a complete review of how the United States organizes its training and resources for the wicked problem of postconflict operations, a process that would hopefully reduce the number of our people placed in harm's way. (43)

Notes

(1.) Nancy C. Roberts, "Coping with Wicked Problems: The Case of Afghanistan," in Learning from International Public Management Reform, vol. 11A, ed. Lawrence Jones, James Guthrie, and Peter Steane (New York: Elsevier, 2001), 353-75. Roberts's typology identifies three types of problems: (1) simple problems agree on the identification of the problem and its solution; (2) complex problems agree on the definition of the problem but find disagreements between stakeholders on the solution; and (3) wicked problems find disagreements between stakeholders regarding problem identification and an acceptable solution.

(2.) There are numerous analyses of the cost of operations in Iraq. See, for example, Steven M. Kosiak, Three Years Later: The Cost of US Military Operations in Iraq (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 20 March 2006), http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/Archive/U.20060320.IragCosts3/ U.20060320.IragCosts3.pdf; and idem, The Cost of US Military Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan through Fiscal Year 2006 and Beyond (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 4 January 2006), http:// www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/Archive/U.20060104.WarSpending/ U.20060104.WarSpending.pdf.

(3.) Thomas Donnelly, The Military We Need: The Defense Requirements of the Bush Doctrine (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute Press, 2005), 1.

(4.) Michael Mandelbaum, "Foreign Policy as Social Work," Foreign Affairs 75, no. 1 (January/February 1996): 16.

(5.) James Jay Carafano, PhD, and Dana R. Dillon, "Winning the Peace: Principles for Post-Conflict Operations," Backgrounder no. 1859 (Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 13 June 2005), 2, http://www.heritage.org/ Research/NationalSecurity/bg1859.cfm.

(6.) Play to Win: Final Report of the Bi-Partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Association of the US Army, January 2003), http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/playtowin.pdf

(7.) Nina M. Serafino and Martin A. Weiss, Peacekeeping and Post-Conflict Capabilities: The State Department's Office for Reconstruction and Stabilization, CRS Report for Congress, RS22031 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 19 January 2005), 2, http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs//data/2005/ upl-meta-crs-7335/RS22031_2005Jan19.pdf?PHPSESSID= 53189f779609308d469ff719bd8e0fe8.

(8.) Condoleezza Rice, "Foundation for a Nation," Washington Post, 29 October 2001, A-17.

(9.) Carafano and Dillon, "Winning the Peace," 4.

(10.) US Department of State, Peacekeeping. What Works? America's Future Peacekeeping Policy, Conference Report (Washington, DC: Bureau of Intelligence and Research, February 1994), 3.

(11.) For a discussion of the three core issues, see Nina M. Serafino, Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, IB94040 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 25 June 2005), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/48837.pdf.

(12.) Donnelly, Military We Need, 51.

(13.) Serafino, Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations, 5-7.

(14.) Ibid., 9. 15. Ibid., 10.

(16.) Robert D. Kaplan, "U.S. Forces: The World's Best Relief Group," New York Times, 12 October 2005.

(17.) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3500.04D, Universal Joint Task List, 1 August 2005, A-1, http://www.dtic.mil/cjcs_directives/cdata/unlimit/m350004.pdf.

(18.) Ibid., A-4 through A-6.

(19.) Ibid., B-C-B-148-49, B-C-A-191, B-C-A-194, B-CC-92, and D-15.

(20.) For provisions of the S/CRS, see Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, Public Law 108-447, 108th Cong., 2d sess., 8 December 2004, http://clinton.senate.gov/features/darfur/documents/ 2004.12.08_Consolidated _Approps_Act_2005.pdf.

(21.) Nina M. Serafino and Martin A. Weiss, Peacekeeping and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on Civilian Capabilities, CRS Report for Congress, RL32862 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 28 June 2005), 1, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32862.pdf. An updated version of 26 January 2006 also provides a good summary of the creation of the S/CRS.

(22.) Serafino and Weiss, Peacekeeping and Post-Conflict Capabilities, 5.

(23.) Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, 28 November 2005, 2, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/d300005_112805/ d300005p.pdf.

(24.) Ibid., pays. 5.1.2, 5.1.4, 5.1.9, and 5.3.5.

(25.) National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 44, Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, 7 December 2005, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.pdf

(26.) Ibid., 5.

(27.) Ibid., "Responsibilities of the Department of State," 3-4 (pars. 3, 5, 6, 9, and 10).

(28.) Manfred K. Rotermund, The Fog of Peace: Finding the End-State of Hostilities (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, November 1999), 47-52, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ PUB305.pdf.

(29.) See especially Stephen J. Blank, Afghanistan and Beyond: Reflections on the Future of Warfare (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 28 June 1993), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/ pdffiles/PUB121.pdf; Carafano and Dillon, "Winning the Peace"; LTC Patrick J. Donahoe, "Preparing Leaders for Nationbuilding," Military Review 84, no. 3 (May-June 2004): 24-26, http://usacac.army.mil/cac/milreview/ download/English/MayJun04/don.pdf; William Flavin, Civil Military Operations, Afghanistan: Observations on Civil Military Operations during the First Year of Operation Enduring Freedom (Carlisle, PA: US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 23 March 2004); Rotermund, Fog of Peace; James M. Smith et al., Educating International Security Practitioners: Preparing to Face the Demands of the 21st Century International Security Environment (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, July 2001), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB280.pdf; Brian G. Watson, Reshaping the Expeditionary Army to Win Decisively: The Case for Greater Stabilization Capacity in the Modular Force (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, August 2005), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB621.pdf; Leonard Wong, Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, July 2004), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB411.pdf; and Leonard Wong et al., Strategic Leadership Competencies (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, September 2003), http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB382.pdf.

(30.) Smith et al., Educating International Security Practitioners.

(31.) Leonard Wong et al., Strategic Leadership Competencies.

(32.) Wong, Developing Adaptive Leaders, 7.

(33.) Lloyd J. Matthews, Winning the War by Winning the Peace: Strategy for Conflict and Post-Conflict in the 21st Century, Conference Report of the Fifteenth Annual Strategy Conference, 13-15 April 2004 (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, December 2004), 1-3, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ PUB591.pdf.

(34.) Flavin, Civil Military Operations, Afghanistan, see also NATO Allied Joint Publication 9-0, Civil Military Operations, June 2002, par. 0212.

(35.) "USAF On-Scene Commanders' Course," Commanders' Professional Development School, http://commandersschool.maxwell.af.mil/ On_Scene_Commanders_Homepage.htm (accessed 5 October 2005).

(36.) Niel Krosner, course director, United States Air Force On-Scene Commanders' Course, interview by the author, 5 October 2005.

(37.) Donahoe, "Preparing Leaders for Nationbuilding," 26.

(38.) Hans Binnendijk and Stuart E. Johnson, eds., Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2004), 109, http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/S&R_book/S&R.pdf.

(39.) In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities, Report of an Independent Task Force (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2005), xiii, 11, http://www .cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Post-Conflict _Capabilities_final.pdf.

(40.) Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, December 2004), vi, http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-12-DSB_SS_Report_Final.pdf.

(41.) Karl C. Rohr, "Progressive Reconstruction: Melding Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare with Nation Building and Stability Operations," Marine Corps Gazette 88 (April 2004): 48. See also Watson, Reshaping the Expedition my Army, 9-10.

(42.) Senate, Civilian Post-Conflict Reconstruction Capabilities, Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, a Statement by Dr. John J. Hamre, President and CEO of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 108th Cong., 2d sess., 3 March 2004, n.p., http://www.csis.org/media/csis/congress/ts040303hamre.pdf

(43.) Roberts, "Coping with Wicked Problems," 353-75. See also note 2.

Maj William Fischer, USAF *

* The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance of Karen Guttieri, assistant professor of national security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. This article is based on the author's master's thesis, available online at http://library.nps.navy.mil/uhtbin/cgisirsi/ Mon+Sep+25+12:01:04+PDT+2006/SIRSI/0/518/0/06Jun_ Fischer.pdf/Content/1?new_gateway_db=HYPERION.
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Author:Fischer, William
Publication:Air & Space Power Journal
Geographic Code:1USA
Date:Mar 22, 2007
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