An impossible dream becomes reality: A.I. Spiridovich and the personal security of Nicholas II.
A close study of his life and work, noteworthy topics in their own right, illuminates important elements of late Imperial Russian politics and culture. To start with, the Russian government was not without outstandingly talented officials. Yet the culture they operated in imposed severe restraints on their ability to make good on that talent. In particular, the all-encompassing role of interpersonal relationships, including overwhelming loyalty toward nasbi (ours) and relative negligence toward "ne nashi" (not ours), strongly influenced how even the most professional officials operated. As William Fuller has argued, Russian government officials
... instinctively understood something about late imperial politics that many historians have overlooked: kinship and personal relationships were often more important than unofficial or professional ones. One reason for this was the structure of the imperial government itself, which was guaranteed to produce enmity both laterally (among the ministries), and vertically (within the ministries). The conflicting institutional interests of the ministers meant that groups of them would always be at odds, regardless of who was in office ... Thus, in addition to the official place he occupied in the ministerial hierarchy, the typical bureaucrat also filled a specific position in the subterranean hierarchy of his patronage group. This system meant that there was a perpetual war among the factions within every ministry, for the satisfaction of any official[']s personal ambition depended completely on the discomfiture and disgrace of networks antagonistic to his own. (4)
Similarly, the hyper-centrality to the entire political system of the figure of the emperor swayed the behavior of even senior officials, not always for the best. Gaining access to the emperor could dramatically foster career advancement or enhance one's power, prestige, and wealth. The hope for such benefits surely motivated D. F. Trepov giving up his positions simultaneously as governor-general of St. Petersburg and deputy interior minister for police affairs to accept the formally inferior post of commandant of the court in October 1906. (5)
Born into a provincial gentry family in 1873, Spiridovich was educated at the Arakcheev Cadet Corps in Nizhnii Novgorod and the Paul Military School in St. Petersburg. (6) He spent seven years in the 105th Orenburg Infantry regiment before taking a post at Sergei Zubatov (1864-1917)'s security bureau in Moscow in December 1899. (7) Zubatov took a great liking to him (becoming the godfather of Spiridovich's daughter Kseniia) and soon entrusted him with important responsibilities, including several months heading a security bureau in Taurida Province (located in Ukraine today) from August 1902 during an official visit by the tsar to the Crimea. (8)
In December 1902, Zubatov arranged Spiridovich's appointment as director of the newly created Kiev Security Bureau. Almost immediately, in January, his team captured a leading Socialist-Revolutionary terrorist M. M. Mel'nikov and, more important, in May, G. A. Gershuni (1870-1908), who had masterminded the assassinations of Interior Minister D. S. Sipiagin (1853-1902) and of I. M. Obolenskii and N. M. Bogdanovich, the governors of Kharkov and Ufa Provinces. Gershuni's ensnarement brought Spiridovich a flood of honors, including twenty-two congratulatory telegrams and letters, a major promotion, and two thousand rubles. (9)
Spridovich remained a "golden boy" of the imperial security police--for a while. In June 1904, E. P. Mednikov, Zubatov's right-hand man, wrote to him saying that the Kiev security bureau was "the best in the country" at that time. (10) Also, when revolution struck in 1905 and bombs were going off around the country--one killed Grand Duke Sergei Aleksandrovich (1857-1905) as his carriage exited the Kremlin in February--Kiev remained relatively calm. On 30 April 1905, however, Spiridovich was shot and wounded in Kiev by Petr Rudenko, an erstwhile informant. This was certainly not the first or the last time when a police agent had run amok--one can point to G.P. Sudeikin in 1883, S. G. Karpov in 1909, and P.A. Stolypin in 1911 (see below)--but it did tend to place in question Spiridovich's capacities as a security officer. (11) (Spiridovich's wife apparently went insane from complications resulting from the shock of actually witnessing the act.) (12)
After a period of convalescence abroad, at government expense, at the end of 1905 Spiridovich was called to St. Petersburg by D. F. Trepov, the palace commandant since October 1905, as noted above, and offered a job protecting the emperor. (13) A staunch monarchist, Spiridovich likened the appointment to a "dream, which only yesterday would have seemed impossible." (14) The dream continued for a solid decade. We know a lot about this work in part thanks to his two-volume Les dernieres annees de la corn de Tsarsko'ie-Selo, published in Paris in 1928 from a typescript housed at the Yale University Library Archives, and his three-volume account, Velikaia voina i fevral'skaia revoliutsiia, which together cover the entire period. (15)
Before the revolution of 1905, four separate forces--mostly grandly accoutered sentinels--protected the emperor, his family, and the imperial residences. (16) Typically of the imperial bureaucracy, they had been created on four separate occasions, were entirely uncoordinated, overlapped to some extent, and apparently could not be abolished or reorganized. (17) Therefore, Trepov instituted an entirely new force and selected Spiridovich, whom he esteemed from his service as city governor of Moscow, to head it. Yet he could not get any new funding, so he arranged to "cannibalize" an existing body, the 250-man security guard (Okbrannaia agentura), then attached to the St. Petersburg security bureau. (18) This is the squad Spiridovich was placed in charge of. Its central mission was to protect the emperor and his family when they traveled outside the Imperial residences, though his job also required him in practice to help protect them within the Imperial palaces and their grounds. Certainly, as the authors of a major study have concluded, his "charm, personal magnetism, intelligence, and deftness enabled him to gain solid footing within the Imperial court," a minefield of intrigue. (19) Now there were five security forces protecting the emperor and his family, each one subordinated to Trepov, but none coordinated with any other.
Spiridovich's team deployed no secret informants (despite its name--Okbrannaia agentura). It consisted of four gendarme officers in addition to the 250 former non-commissioned officers of St. Petersburg guard regiments. Many of the force's agents were trained specifically to recognize known terrorists. A contingent of these surveillants always accompanied the emperor and his family on travels both inside the empire and abroad. (20) Spiridovich's job was complicated by the fact that Nicholas liked to move around spontaneously and hated when those protecting him made themselves obvious. (21)
The new security force was doubtless timely. Political terrorists plotted attack after attack against senior officials--and Nicholas himself--in 1906. Eleven alleged attempts on the emperor failed or were foiled, but terrorists killed the former Moscow governor-general, General A. A. Kozlov, on 2 July as he promenaded in a Peterhof park, mistaking him for Trepov. (22) On 12 August, Socialist-Revolutionary-Maximalists set off a bomb at Prime Minister Stolypin's state dacha, killing 37 people. The very next day, 13 August, G. I. Min, who had personally supervised the crushing of the Moscow armed uprising in December 1905, was fatally shot by a Socialist-Revolutionary terrorist in plain sight of his wife and daughter on the platform at the Novyi Petergof train station, only a few kilometers away from where Nicholas was residing in the Alexandria Park. (23) These attacks were only the most sensational ones. In all, at least 233 violent attacks against government officials, most of them lethal, took place in Russia from 4 June to 20 August 1906. (24) Naturally, the emperor was shaken. He also resented being cooped up in the lower palace at Peterhof as if "under house arrest." (25) Most important for Spiridovich, the attacks close to the emperor's residence called into question the measures to ensure the emperor's security. (26)
From the moment of his appointment, Spiridovich labored to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the Okbrannaia agentura, instituting numerous innovations in training and operations. He instilled quasi-military discipline into his subordinates, dressed them in uniforms, encouraged 128 men with various medals and awards for meritorious effort in 1906 and 1907, imposed dozens of fines for misbehavior, and fired 27 men in 1906, about half for drunkenness. (27)
Among the very first--if not the first--of his acts upon coming into office was to establish a library for the general edification of his men. By November 1907, it contained 738 volumes, including the classics of Russian literature; works by Karl Marx, Georgii Plekhanov (1856-1918), and Maxim Gorky (1868-1936); and the radical Vladimir Burtsev (1862-1942)'s emigre journal Byloe. He rejected with astonishment the proposal of a member of the library staff to remove some books for their "worthlessness [negodnost']." (28) One of his goals was to impart to his men a love for reading. In a letter of 30 August 1907, he wrote that they "no longer fear books." (29) During the squad's frequent down time, Spiridovich personally taught his men about history, literature, and what E. D. Hirsch calls "cultural literacy"--for Spiridovich that meant terms like Poltava, Mednyi vsadnik (the famed Bronze Horseman statue of Peter the Great in St. Petersburg), and "Ruslan and Liudmila." (30) He also inaugurated courses for his surveillants on history, geography, and the history of the revolutionary movement (in particular political terrorism). He outfitted a "museum of terrorism" with photos, maps, posters, and models of bombs. He imposed on his men physical training, including working out on exercise equipment, shooting with pistols, riding bicycles, and skiing. They were examined on all these endeavors. He even taught them table manners. Some were sent to the St. Petersburg security bureau for specialized training. A few were sent to Europe to become familiar with revolutionary emigres. (31)
Spiridovich was apparently the first official in Russia to propose creating a permanent office to scrutinize the identity of people living and traveling in the suburban towns (and in their vicinity) where the emperor maintained residences--Tsarskoe Selo, Novyi Petergof, Gatchina, and Pavlovsk. He proposed such an office in February 1906 and submitted a draft proposal of guidelines for its operations in September. It began to function officially only in 1908, but unofficially his men and local police began to keep better track of people in those places already in 1906. (32) Suspicious people who appeared within close proximity to the Imperial residences were carefully scrutinized and written up. (33) (It seems that Spiridovich was also the first Russian official to institute a specialized police canine service beginning in late 1907.) (34)
The closest scrape Spiridovich's team had in 1906 came in September when leading Socialist-Revolutionary terrorists recruited A. Naumov, the son of the Peterhof postmaster. He attempted to lure one of the members of Nicholas's personal guard, the Cossack N. A. Ratimov, into an assassination plan. Ratimov met with him a few times but reported to his superiors when Naumov's intentions became obvious. Spiridovich questioned Ratimov and then handed the case over to the head of the security police in St. Petersburg, A. V. Gerasimov. The latter arranged several more carefully orchestrated meetings between the two men and then arrested 26 people implicated in the conspiracy on 31 March 1907. (35)
Terrorist attacks against government officials, as well as fourteen alleged plots against Nicholas, continued throughout 1907. (36) The emperor still could not be permitted to travel, but he insisted on making trips throughout the summer and into the fall aboard his yacht Shtandart among the Finnish skerries (small, rocky coastal islands). He loved this area where he could enjoy nature with very little worry of running into human inhabitants. In fact, throughout his reign he apparently spent 366 days there. When his party was aboard their ship, Nicholas's personal captain was responsible for their safety. The minute they disembarked, Spiridovich and a large proportion of his men took over. Some of these voyages were lengthy, for example, from 19 August to 6 October 1907. (37) During these travels, the tsar devoted significant attention to his chief of security, who at the very least had the favor of being often in his presence. Nicholas even granted him permission to photograph him and his family at will. (38) He thus became something akin to an official court photographer, which was quite a feat, given the Imperial couple's devotion to privacy. (39) To "the gendarme with the tsar on the brain," as Kolokolov's title aptly puts it, this was very heaven. (40)
The year 1908 commenced amid great tension with reported plots targeting Prime Minister Stolypin and other officials. (41) Nicholas himself came fairly close to a violent end. The fickle secret informant Evno Azef (1869-1918) helped the Russian police foil a Socialist-Revolutionary plot in June when Nicholas met with his cousin King Edward VII of England in the port city Reval (Tallinn) aboard the Shtandart (the emperor's first voyage outside the skerries since the Revolution of 1905). The disloyal Azef failed to alert them in September to a plan to recruit and arm two sailors scheduled to be aboard the cruiser Riurik as it arrived newly built from Glasgow at the Kronstadt fortress. (42) Nicholas lived only because these sailors could not find it in themselves at the last minute to raise their guns against the tsar.
Bitter squabbles among party leaders in late 1908 and especially the unmasking of Azef as a police spy in early 1909 caused the Socialist-Revolutionaries--the main perpetrators of political terror in Russia--to disintegrate as a party. (43) Loosely or unaffiliated splinter groups continued to carry out terrorist operations, as did a few Socialist-Revolutionaries--for example when A. A. Petrov killed S. G. Karpov, the head of the St. Petersburg security bureau, in his St. Petersburg apartment in December. (44) Yet, in general, the threats to the emperor and his officials diminished significantly. (45)
Thus, Nicholas began to travel both throughout the empire and abroad. Spiridovich's job became both more complicated and presumably more interesting. In June 1909, he traveled twice to Poltava to prepare the ground for the official celebration of the 200th anniversary of Peter the Great's victory. (46) Among the operations involved was the establishment of a temporary registration bureau, on the model of the ones created in the Imperial suburban towns. Henceforth, this precaution would be included in the preparations for the tsar's travels throughout the empire. (47) Over the next two years, Nicholas traveled repeatedly within Russia--to Riga, the Crimea, Reval, Kiev, and Chernigov--and abroad--to Sweden, Italy, Germany, and Denmark. (48) In every case, Spiridovich managed the security preparations and accompanied the emperor wherever he went. The cost of these trips for the Okbrannaia agentura was rather high. For example, when 159 agents, 17 police dogs, and 2 cars were transported to the Crimea in fall 1909, the round-trip tickets for the agents alone (in third class) cost 6,009 rubles. (49)
The appointment of P.G. Kurlov as deputy minister of the interior and commander of the Gendarme Corps in January 1909 altered the security protocols for the emperor's travels. Until then, local administrative officials, like governors and governors-general, played important roles in ensuring the safety of the emperor and his retinue. Kurlov insisted on concentrating authority for these operations entirely in his own hands. (50) In practice, most of the day-to-day responsibilities for these operations rested with the official whose men had the most experience protecting the tsar during his travels: Spiridovich.
Surprisingly, Nicholas only began to visit St. Petersburg in the winter of 1910. (51) After the first of such trips (since the revolution of 1905), senior officials held a conference to improve his security and to establish clear lines of authority and cooperation among the various government agencies with a stake in the matter. The official procedure consisted in Spiridovich's team bearing responsibility until the emperor reached the city limits, at which point the city governor assumed responsibility, but it seems that in practice the Okbrannaia agentura was still de facto in charge. (52) Such mid-level conferences apparently met on a regular basis to discuss best practices for ensuring the tsar's security. (53)
In January 1910, Kurlov asked Spiridovich to prepare a course of lectures for gendarme officers on the history of the revolutionary movement in Russia and how to combat it. For this purpose, he collected masses of primary source material--especially legal and illegal revolutionary publications--from security agencies across the empire. He presented a cycle of twenty-seven lectures on the history of socialist political movements in the West and in Russia to gendarme officers in a new training program that debuted in November 1910 at Tsarskoe Selo. Spiridovich found the sixty officers in his course enthusiastic and highly curious, though he lamented that he could find no other text to assign to his students than Alphons Thun's history of the Russian revolutionary movement, which had been translated into Russian by V. N. Zasulich (1849-1919), among others, and published with a preface by G. V. Plekhanov in St. Petersburg in 1906. He also gave them programs, leaflets, and other brief imprints of the main revolutionary parties. (54)
Spiridovich continued over the next several years to devour revolutionary publications, security police reports, documentation from judicial investigations, and kindred materials, as well as to converse from time to time with radicals and police informants. Gradually, he built up a library of 4,000 or 5,000 volumes. (55) The fruit of his research was the first volume of Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii, which was published by the official press of the Gendarme Corps in early 1914. (56) book focused on the Social-Democratic party. This was unusual, since imperial government officials typically feared the Socialist-Revolutionaries far more, given their orientation toward political terrorism. Still, one should remember that Spiridovich was a disciple of Zubatov who set up officially sponsored labor organizations. (57) In any event, this was the first major history of the Russian Social Democrat party ever written. (58) (The second volume, on the Socialist-Revolutionaries, was issued by the same press in 1916. It was also the first solid history of that party.) (59)
As early as February 1911, Kurlov and Spiridovich began making preparations for protecting the emperor's security in Kiev and nearby towns during a state visit planned for late August and early September. As usual, Kurlov bore final responsibility for the security arrangements, while Spiridovich handled most of the details. In practice, many details slipped through both their hands--in particular: Who was in charge of Prime Minister P. A. Stolypin (1862-1911)'s security? He was to stay in the governor-general's residence, but this official did not bear direct responsibility for his protection. (60) To make matters vastly worse, toward the end of these preparations, when nearly everything was in place, the Kiev security chief, N. N. Kuliabko, Spiridovich's brother-in-law, received a visit from one of his erstwhile informants, D. G. Bogrov (1887-1911). (61) He claimed that a terrorist operation was afoot and offered to help thwart it. Kuliabko, who bore primary responsibility for Stolypin's safety, provided Bogrov with access to the venues the emperor was to visit, in the hope he would point out the alleged terrorists. Spiridovich was present during at least one meeting with Bogrov, but he later denied knowing of plans to admit Bogrov to the municipal theater. (62) Apparently, no additional security measures were undertaken. (63)
Spiridovich presumably let his personal feelings for his brother-in-law influence his professional judgment. (64) He seems to have promoted his career from at least 1902. There is archival evidence of Kuliabko periodically committing petty embezzlement beginning in 1904, yet it seems that Spiridovich continued to help him along and into his old job in Kiev in 1907, as head of the security bureau, a position Kuliabko held until the fateful moment in 1911. (65)
The tragic story of 1 September 1911 (according to the Old-Style calendar then in use in Russia) is well known. (66) Prime Minister Stolypin was already in disgrace before he arrived in late August in Kiev, where he faced disrespectful treatment by many high officials and dignitaries. He did not even sit in the tsar's box during the official performance of Rimsky-Korsakov's opera The Tale of Tsar Saltan, but in the parterre. Still, the municipal theater was full of government officials and policemen. (67) What could go wrong? For one thing, the prime minister had not brought to Kiev his personal bodyguards. (68) During the second intermission, Bogrov advanced to point blank range and shot the Prime Minister twice. He died four days later in hospital. (69)
Starting on 7 September 1911, by imperial order, M. I. Trusevich, a former director of the police department, undertook a detailed investigation of the crime (Spiridovich, at the insistence of the emperor, remained at his post even during the investigation). (70) It produced nine volumes of evidence and led in March 1912 to an accusation of official malfeasance by the four men responsible for security during the Kiev celebrations--P. G. Kurlov; a vice-director of the police department, M. N. Verigin; A. I. Spiridovich; and N. N. Kuliabko. Next, a thorough judicial investigation was undertaken by Senator N. S. Shul'gin beginning in June. Although six of the eleven members of the State Council who reviewed the findings concluded that only Kuliabko was guilty, the case advanced toward a trial since the Council's chair and the interior minister sided with the minority. In early January 1913, however, Nicholas decided to drop the charges against the four defendants, as an offering of thanksgiving for his son's recovery from a harsh flare-up of his illness. (71) The tsar admitted to V. N. Kokovtsov (1853-1943), the new prime minister, that it was wrong legally speaking, but he was so happy about his son that "it seems to me that everyone around me should rejoice, and I should do as much good as possible." (72) Of the four, only Spiridovich retained his post (until August 1916), fully thanks to the good grace of Nicholas.
There can be some doubt about whether Spiridovich was aware of his brother-in-law's plan to give Bogrov access to the theater in Kiev, though not much. It seems supremely unlikely that Kuliabko would have kept such a secret from his staunchest patron. But then, why would a professional of the highest caliber take such a risk? One plausible explanation is that he believed that Bogrov's story of revolutionary terrorists coming to do evil deeds was true and knew that if he could capture them with the informer's help, then the awards and prizes for meritorious service would be truly rich. (73)
It is also apparently the case that none of the four accused of malfeasance liked Stolypin. A bystander overheard a heated conversation in a hotel in Sevastopol' between Kurlov and Spiridovich less than a month before the tragedy. (74) The former apparently lamented that Stolypin's contradictory orders were driving him to distraction, while the latter allegedly claimed that he and his colleagues had rejoiced when Stolypin's cherished project to establish zemstva (institutions of local self-government instituted in 1864 during the Great Reform era) in nine western provinces was rejected by the State Council in March 1911 (Stolypin then persuaded Nicholas II to override their veto with an executive order). (75) Spiridovich added that they would have celebrated Stolypin's expected retirement with a "grandiose picnic" but that unfortunately "our hopes had not been realized." (76) In a political culture where one gave everything for one's own and far less to all others, it seems quite likely that Spiridovich and his colleagues simply did not try their hardest to protect him. (77) One can assert with little qualification that Spiridovich was guilty, at the very least, of serious negligence and malfeasance.
Contemporaries (and some scholars) accused the four of plotting to murder Stolypin for careerist reasons. (78) As one historian has plausibly argued, however,
There was no carefully planned conspiracy against Stolypin. He fell prey to a different, a more terrible kind of conspiracy which rendered the monarchy powerless and in a few years led to its collapse. It was a conspiracy of mediocrity and incompetence. (79)
Following the Kiev tragedy, no more significant terrorist killings took place in Russia, and threats to the emperor were practically nonexistent. Spiridovich worked fanatically to handle the security arrangements in concert with central and, now also, local officials. (80) For example, there were the big festivities to commemorate Russia's victory in the war of 1812, which took Nicholas to Moscow and Borodino. In anticipation of these travels, the police department director S. P. Beletskii, Spiridovich, Spiridovich's boss V. A. Dediulin (appointed court commandant in September 1906), and the city governor, provincial governor, and governor general of Moscow all met in the building of the Gendarme Corps in St. Petersburg to discuss the security arrangements. (81) The tercentenary celebrations of 1913 involved even more complicated security operations because the emperor traveled to Moscow, several towns on the Golden Ring in its environs, and Nizhnii Novgorod. (82) There seemed to be no centrally planned attacks afoot, but some bomb threats were registered in St. Petersburg, and of course every precaution still had to be taken. (83) On the eve of the festivities, Beletskii chaired a commission intended to approve official procedures (drafted by Spiridovich) for protecting the tsar during his travels and especially to coordinate better the work of gendarmes, regular police, security police, and local administrators. (84)
V. F. Dzhunkovskii, until then the governor of Moscow, was appointed deputy minister of the interior and commander of the Gendarme Corps in January 1913. Like Kurlov, he took an active role in protecting the tsar. (85) Dzhunkovskii had mostly only very good things to say about Spiridovich, which was unusual for him in regard to security policeman past or present, but he did add that it was necessary to keep tight control over him, cause he was "not particularly solid morally." (86) (Presumably, he had in mind Spiridovich's divorce from his mentally ill first wife and immediate marriage to a divorced singer in 1915.) (87) In any event, Dzhunkovskii and Spiridovich traveled extensively to prepare the tricentenary and other official visits over the following two years, with the more junior official bearing far greater responsibility for the details of the security arrangements. (88)
When war broke out and patriotic sentiment waxed strong, terrorist threats to the emperor diminished still further. Most Socialist-Revolutionaries in Russia were caught up in the enthusiasm for the war; many joined the armed forces. (89) As Spiridovich wrote elsewhere, although threats from Russians had diminished--indeed had become "unthinkable"--those from Germans residing in Russia increased. Among them "there might be some young fanatic ready under the conditions of heightened social tension to carry out an attack to the glory of his homeland." (90) On 3 August 1914, Nicholas and his family traveled to Moscow in observance of the ancient tradition required by declarations of war. (91) In the fall, he spent two extended periods at military headquarters, on the way visiting numerous towns with military hospitals. In each case, Spiridovich or his assistants had to travel to these localities, often with little advance notice, to make preparations. (92) In September 1915, the Emperor took formal personal charge of military operations and settled quasi-permanently at military headquarters in Mogilev. Again, Spiridovich was in charge of the security arrangements, at least sometimes accompanying the tsar on his long afternoon walks in the environs of headquarters. (93)
Spiridovich periodically returned to Tsarskoe Selo on official business. During his absences, Spiridovich sent the palace commandant, V. N. Voeikov (appointed in December 1913), who nearly always remained with Nicholas at military headquarters, regular reports summarizing information about public opinion throughout society, from the revolutionary underground to liberal and conservative political spheres. Presumably he had always furnished such reports during face-to-face contact with his superior, but their separation during the war has left a paper trail that might not otherwise have formed. As Boris Kolokolov notes, the reports indicate that Spiridovich had "broad contacts not only in court, military, and financial-business circles, and within the security police, but also among political parties, representatives of the State Duma, and journalists." (94)
Back on 6 May 1915 (the tsar's birthday), Spiridovich had been promoted to the rank of general-maior and transferred from the Gendarme Corps to the army infantry, though placed at the disposal of the palace commandant. (95) He had begun actively seeking a more stable and prestigious position within the government, such as a city or provincial governorship, at the latest in January 1915. (96) Unfortunately, he had lost his right to a state pension, under the strict rules of the Russian civil service, when he had taken the post with the palace commandant. He was passed over for a series of positions, but in mid-August 1916 the emperor confirmed him as city governor of Yalta--a plum job if there ever was one, with the city's natural beauty and luxurious palaces of Russia's beau monde, including numerous Imperial residences. (97) Before his departure, he enjoyed an emotional tete-a-tete with the emperor and a rather awkward one with the empress. (98)
Spiridovich spent several months organizing activities in support of the war effort and active soldiers and their families. During this time he remained in contact with the emperor, who heartily encouraged his work. (99) On 16 February 1917, he received a cable from the Ministry of the Interior summoning him immediately to the capital. Upon his arrival on the 20th, he learned that the ultimate initiative for the summons was the emperor's. Awaiting a meeting with him, he made the rounds of various police and administrative officials. What he heard from them set his teeth on edge. Over the next few days, the February Revolution began, but even the head of the Petrograd security police, K. I. Globachev, did not seem to realize what was happening. As late as the 26th, by which point Globachev understood clearly that revolution was engulfing the city, the minister of the interior, A. D. Protopopov, was full of a naive confidence that order would easily be maintained. (100)
The tsar never scheduled a meeting with Spiridovich; a few days later, on 2 March 1917, he abdicated. Probably Nicholas had wanted to appoint him to a senior position in the capital. (101) Perhaps Spiridovich could have made a difference in those troubled times, though just as likely he could not have, given the overwhelming force of popular discontent. In any event, on the very day of the abdication Spiridovich was arrested and placed in the Peter and Paul Fortress. (102)
For several months Spiridovich remained there, whence he was summoned a number of times for interrogation by the Extraordinary Investigating Commission. (103) (The Commission found no basis upon which to bring charges against Spiridovich--or any other official.) (104) The poet A. A. Blok, a member of the Commission, observed Spiridovich in prison on 10 June. He was, wrote Blok, "a general who resembles a captain. Awkwardly peasant-like, big and young. He spoke very practically. Had no requests, save for walks. And suddenly turning his back to the soldiers and, silently heaving, he wept." (105) On 12 August 1917, thanks to the ministrations of an attending physician, 1.1. Manukhin, he was transferred to the hospital in Kresty Prison. (106) On 2 October, he was released on bail but forbidden to leave Petrograd. (107) He was then rearrested by the Bolsheviks but again released. (108) While in the Peter and Paul Fortress for the second time, Spiridovich met V. L. Burtsev, who had been arrested by the Bolsheviks the day of their coup. He confided to Burtsev many details about security policing under the monarchy, and the two men played cards, sometime in December 1917 or January 1918, with the Socialist-Revolutionaries S. P. Mel'gunov (1879-1956) and N. D. Avksent'ev (1878-1943), as well as the Kadet (liberal politician) N. M. Kishkin. In gratitude, Burtsev, who was released in February 1918, may have helped Spiridovich to escape from Russia via Ukraine. (109)
One final episode, which occurred while Spiridovich was still in the Crimea, seems worth recounting given his devotion to the emperor. On 13 October 1918, he visited the Kharaks Palace on Cape Ai-Todor near Yalta to see the Dowager Empress Maria Fedorova. She recorded the encounter in her diary, describing how he "threw himself upon his knees, weeping, and began kissing my hands." (110) It is very interesting, but of course sad, that the empress admitted that she was quite relieved when he left. Surely, both were acutely aware of the news of the emperor's death the previous July (his entire family had been murdered in Ekaterinburg, but the other deaths had not been reported). (111)
In emigration, Spiridovich was by far the most prolific former security policeman and probably the most prolific former Russian government official. He revised and reprinted his monographs on the Social-Democratic and Socialist-Revolutionary parties, first in Petrograd (when it came out, he was already in the south), (112) then in Paris, (113) and again in Paris. (114) He published three memoirs of his service in Russia--for a total of six volumes--an account from his early service to the attempt on his life in Kiev in 1905, (115) the two volumes running from 1906 to 1914, (116) and three more on the period 1914-1917. (117) Each book provides broad context and analysis of Russian political and institutional history. Finally, he published a study of Rasputin and his role in late Imperial Russia. (118)
In addition, he wrote numerous (mostly unpublished) analytical and descriptive texts on various topics, such as a series for Russkoe vremiia (Paris) in 1927 on Peter the Great's visit to Paris in 1717. (119) Among his most interesting occasional writings was a series of essays on anti-Semitism in late Imperial Russia. (120) In them, Spiridovich argued that many senior administrative and police officials in Russia were not anti-Semitic and that most were at considerable pains to protect Jews from popular violence. (121) It seems that he was mostly correct in these assessments. (122)
From 1922 until 1938, he presented lectures--often several times a year--at a wide variety of Russian-language venues in Paris on topics ranging from the role of the individual personality (lichnost') in history to women in the Russian revolutionary movement. (123) An inveterate scribbler, he wrote brief portraits of numerous Russian revolutionaries and members of the Imperial family. (124) He also collected hundreds of newspaper clippings and bound them into many scrapbooks on Russian politics and society. (125) He lived, wrote, and lectured in Paris for many years, then moved to New York in 1950, where he died two years later. (126)
The story of Spiridovich's service sheds light on important aspects of late Imperial Russian politics and culture. First, the bureaucracy could boast some men of exceptional talent. The "gendarme with the tsar on the brain" had an impressive (though far from flawless) record in security policing and helping ensure the emperor's physical security and a uniquely remarkable record in historical scholarship. Second, his failures stemmed pretty directly from a key element of Russian political culture--an emphasis on interpersonal relationships. It was more a government of men than of laws--the opposite of what John Adams wanted for America. His blind and almost unthinking patronage of his sister's husband and his apparent disregard for the security of an official not belonging to his own patron-client network resulted in a political catastrophe of the first order. Also, his willingness to trust Rudenko and Bogrov, though perhaps operationally reasonable, was, to say the least, dangerous. Finally, the emperor occupied the center of the political system in a dramatic way. What made Spiridovich consider his position a "dream job" was precisely the access it gave him to the tsar. The main reason, it seems, why Kurlov (and later Dzhunkovskii) wished to concentrate authority for the tsar's security in his own hands was to gain more such access. This policy surely contributed to the tragedy of 1 September 1911. Finally, Stolypin did not occupy the "sacred center" of the political system and that was presumably another reason why Spiridovich and his codefendants did not work harder to protect him.
(1.) As a commentator on the Russian revolutionary movements, see Manfred Hildermeier, The Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party Before the First World War, New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000; for Rasputin, see Joseph T. Fuhrmann, Rasputin: The Untold Story, Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2013; for his views on the Romanov court, see Greg King and Penny Wilson, The Resurrection of the Romanovs: Anastasia, Anna Anderson, and the World's Greatest Royal Mystery, Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2011; and for his discussions about the secret police, see, for example, Z.I. Peregudova, Politicheskii sysk Rossii, 1890-1917, Moscow: Rosspen, 2000. During his lifetime, a few of his works were translated into French, see, for example, Alexandre Spiridovich, Les dernieres annees de la cour de Tzarskoie-Selo, 2 vols, Paris: Payot, 1928; Alexandre Spiridovitch, Histoire du terrorisme russe, 1886-1917, Paris: Payot, 1930; Alexandre Spiridovitch, Raspoutine, 1863-1916, d'apres les documents russes et les archives privees de l'auteur, Paris: Payot, 1935.
(2.) Boris Kolokolov, Zbandarm s tsarem v golove: Zhiznennyi put' rukovoditelia lichnoi okhrany Nikolaia II (Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 2009). I am grateful to Vlad Marinich for bringing this book to my attention. Some of Spiridovich's works have been reissued in Russia after the collapse of communism, see for example A.I. Spiridovich, Zapiski zhandarma, Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura, 1991; and A.I. Spiridovich, Istoriia bol'shevizma v Rossii ot vozniknoveniia do zakhvata vlasti, 1883-1903-1917, s prilozheniem dokumentov i portretov, Moscow: Airis Press, 2007.
(3.) On konspirativnost' and konspiratsiia within the security police, see Jonathan Daly, Autocracy under Siege: Security Police and Opposition in Russia, 1866-1905, DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois UP, 1998, 94.
(4.) See William C. Fuller, Jr., The Foe Within: Fantasies of Treason and the End of Imperial Russia, Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2006, 70. Iain Lauchlin has found a similar endemic disposition within the ranks of the security police; see Iain Lauchlin, Russian Hide-and-Seek: The Tsarist Secret Police in St. Petersburg, 1906-1914, Helsinki: SKS-FLS, 2002, 175-81.
(5.) Lauchlin, Russian Hide-and-Seek, 178; "Trepov, Dm. Fed.," in Padenie tsarskogo rezhima: Stenograficheskie otchety doprosov i pokazanii dannykh v 1917 g. v Chrezvychainoi Sledstvennoi Komissii Vremennogo Pravitel'stva, ed. P.E. Shchegolev, 7 vols, Leningrad and Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo [from here: Gosizdat], 1925, vol. 7, 425.
(6.) For extensive biographical details, see Kolokolov, Zhandarm.
(7.) "Spiridovich, Al-dr Iv.," in Shchegolev, ed., Padenie tsarskogo rezhima, vol. 7, 420.
(8.) Mednikov to Spiridovich, 5 June 1903, in B.P. Koz'min, ed., S.V. Zubatov i ego korrespondenty: Sredi okhrannikov, zhandarmov i provokatorov, Moscow and Leningrad: Gosizdat, 1928, 202; "Zubatov, Sergei Vasilevich," A.I. Spiridovich Collection, Yale University Archives, Box 2; A.I. Spiridovich, "Pri tsarskom rezhime," in Arkhiv Russkoi revoliutsii, ed. I.V. Gessen, 22 vols., The Hague: Mouton, 1969 [orig.: Berlin, 1934], vol. 15, 157-8.
(9.) Police Department report, 22 September 1903, GARF [State Archive of the Russian Federation], fond [f.] 102, OO, 1902, delo [d.] 825, listy [11.] 214, 220 obratno [ob.]-221; Spiridovich, "Pri tsarskom rezhime," 158, 161-7; Mednikov to Spiridovich, 30 January, 14 February, and 2 May 1903, in "Pis'ma Mednikova Spiridovichu," Krasnyi arkhiv 17, 1926, 196-7, 199-200, 217n; Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 97-101, 110-19.
(10.) Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 124, 126.
(11.) Lauchlin, Russian Hide-and-Seek, 217.
(12.) Spiridovich, Histoire du terrorisme russe, 233; Spiridovich, "Pri tsarskom rezhime," 201-6; Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 154, 308.
(13.) A.A. Mosolov, Pri dvore poslednego Rossiiskogo imperatora: Zapiski nachal'nika kantseliarii Ministerstva Imperatorskogo Dvora, Moscow; Ankor, 1993, 170.
(14.) Alexandre Spiridovich, Les dernieres annees, vol. 1, 21. The original typescripts are in Spiridovich Papers, Yale University Library Archives, boxes 10 and 15.
(15.) A.I. Spiridovich, Velikaia voina i fevral'skaia revoliutsiia, 1914-1917gg., 3 vols, New York; Vseslavianskoe izdatel'stvo, 1960; also published as three volumes in one: A.I. Spiridovich, Velikaia voina i fevral'skaia revoliutsiia, 1914-1917gg., Minsk: Kharvest, 2004.
(16.) For extensive details on these forces, see E.A. Murov, ed., Istoriia gosudarstvennoi okhrany Rossii. Sobstvennaia Ego Imperatorskogo Velichestva okhrana, 1881-1917, Moscow: MediaPress, 2006.
(17.) Spiridovich, Derni'eres annees, vol. 1, 28-32; Jonathan W. Daly, The Watchful State: Security Police and Opposition in Russia, 1906-1917, DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois UP, 2004, 18-19; Lauchlin, Russian Hide-and-Seek, 124-5, 183.
(18.) Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 155-58; Lauchlin, Russian Hide-and-Seek, 193-4.
(19.) As quoted from Murov, ed., Istoriia gosudarstvennoi okhrany Rossii, 229.
(20.) Spiridovich testimony, in Shchegolev, ed., Padenie tsarskogo rezhima, vol. 3, 27-8; V.K. Agafonov, Zagranichnaia okhranka: Sostavleno po sekretnym dokumentam Zagranichnoi Agentury i Departamenta Politsii, Moscow: Kniga, 1918, 121.
(21.) Murov, ed., Istoriia gosudarstvennoi okhrany Rossii, 229-30.
(22.) Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 173, 175; Daly, Watchful State, 33.
(23.) Daly, Watchful State, 40.
(24.) Daly, Watchful State, 35.
(25.) Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 168-72.
(26.) Spiridovich, Dernieres annees, vol. 1, 112.
(27.) Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 200-6.
(28.) Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 209.
(29.) Spiridovich, Dernieres annees, vol. 1, 135; Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 208.
(30.) See E.D. Hirsch, Cultural Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know, New York: Vintage, 1988. Aleksandr Pushkin (1799-1837), then and now seen as Russia's greatest poet, wrote the poem "Ruslan and Liudmila" in 1820. The Battle of Poltava of 1709 was a signal Russian victory over Sweden during the Great Northern War (1700-1721).
(31.) Murov, ed., Istoriia gosudarstvennoi okhrany Rossii, 231.
(32.) Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 210-20.
(33.) Murov, ed., Istoriia gosudarstvennoi okhrany Rossii, 231.
(34.) Ibid., 224-30.
(35.) Spiridovich, Dernieres annees, vol. 1, 148-53; A.V. Gerasimov, Na lezvii s terroristami, Paris: YMCA-Press, 1985, 102-7; Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 180-88; Daly, Watchful State, 64.
(36.) Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 175-77.
(37.) Ibid., 240-412.
(38.) Spiridovich, Dernieres annees, vol. 1, 210.
(39.) Murov, ed., Istoriia gosudarstvennoi okhrany Rossii, 229.
(40.) See for example Spiridovich, Dernieres annees, vol. 1, 231, 251, 256.
(41.) Spiridovich, Dernieres annees, vol. 1, 236-7.
(42.) Spiridovitch, Histoire du terrorisme russe, 513-15, 531; Spiridovich, Dernieres annees, vol. 1, 252, 280-1; R.A. Gorodnitskii, Boevaia organizatsiia partii sotsialistov-revoliutsionerov v 1901-1911 gg., Moscow: Rosspen, 1998, 143-46. One scholar denies Azef's disloyalty: See Anna Geifman, Entangled in Terror: The Azef Affair and the Russian Revolution, Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2000, 102-3.
(43.) Spiridovitch, Histoire du terrorisme russe, 531, 567-68, 594-96, 602-7, 620-24; K.N. Morozov, Partiia sotsialistov-revoliutionnerov v 1907-1914 gg., Moscow: Rosspen, 1998, 195-223; Gorodnitskii, Boevaia organizatsiia, 238.
(44.) Daly, Watchful State, 105-6.
(45.) On the alleged plots against the tsar in 1909, see Spiridovich, Dernieres annees, vol. 1, 415-19.
(46.) Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 231; Spiridovich, Dernieres annees, vol. 1, 332-3.
(47.) Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 220-21; Peregodova, Politicheskii sysk, 130-3.
(48.) Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 231-40; Murov, ed., Istoriia gosudarstvennoi okhrany Rossii, 330-3.
(49.) Dvortsovoi komendant to Police Department director, 22 April 1910, GARF, f. 102, D-l, 1910, d. 7, 11. 21-22.
(50.) K.G. Liashenko and Z.I. Peregudova, "Prilozhenie," in Taina ubiistva Stolypina, ed. P.A. Pozhigailo, Moscow: Rosspen, 2003, 8-41: 10-12, 34; Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 259-61.
(51.) Murov, ed., Istoriia gosudarstvennoi okhrany Rossii, 312.
(52.) Spiridovich, Dernieres annees, vol. 1, 419-21.
(53.) See, for example, "Spisok chlenov osobogo soveshchaniia," GARF, f. 102, opis [op.] 295, d. 1, II. 12-12 ob.
(54.) "Konspekt lektsii," GARF, f. 102, op. 253, d. 243, 11. 1-146; A. A. Sergeev, "Zhandarmyistoriki: Bibliograficheskaia zametka," Golos minuvshego 9-10, 1917, 376-7; Spiridovich, Dernieres annees, vol. 1, 427-37; Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 316-21.
(55.) Murov, ed., lstoriia gosudarstvennoi okbrany Rossii, 232.
(56.) A.I. Spiridovich, Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii, vol. 1, St. Petersburg: Tip. OKZh, 1914; Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 321-7, 333, 337; Peregodova, Politicheskii sysk, 346-8.
(57.) Jeremiah Schneiderman, Sergei Zubatov and Revolutionary Marxism: The Struggle for the Working Class in Tsarist Russia, Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1976.
(58.) Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 337.
(59.) A.I. Spiridovich, Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v Rossii, vol. 2, St. Petersburg: Tip. OKZh, 1916.
(60.) Liashenko and Peregudova, "Prilozhenie," 35-6.
(61.) Bogrov testimony in Pozhigailo, ed., Taina ubiistva Stolypina, 80-1, 88, 95.
(62.) Spiridovich, Derni'eres annees, vol. 2, 121-3.
(63.) Liashenko and Peregudova, "Prilozhenie," 8-9.
(64.) See Charles A. Ruud and Sergei A. Stepanov, Fontanka 16: The Tsar's Secret Police, Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's UP, 1999, 181-2; Lauchlin, Russian Hide-and-Seek, 179, 187.
(65.) Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 310-15; Liashenko and Peregudova, "Prilozhenie," 40.
(66.) See, for example, Abraham Ascher, P.A. Stolypin: The Search for Stability in Late Imperial Russia, Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 2001, 368-89; Ruud and Stepanov, Fontanka 16, 178-200.
(67.) Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 266; Spiridovich, Dernieres annees, vol. 2, 112-14; Ruud and Stepanov, Fontanka 16, 188-9.
(68.) Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 269.
(69.) Ascher, P.A. Stolypin, 371-3.
(70.) State Council to Interior Ministry, 5 January 1913, RGIA [Russian State Historical Archive], f. 1284, op. 250, d. 15, 1. 87; P.G. Kurlov, Gibel' imperatorskoi Rossii, Berlin: Otto Kirchner, 1923, 135.
(71.) Bogrov testimony in Pozhigailo, ed., Taina ubiistva Stolypina, 80-1, 88, 95.
(72.) Kolokolov, Zbandarm, 278-81; Liashenko and Peregudova, "Prilozhenie,"18-21; Ruud and Stepanov, Fontanka 16, 196-7.
(73.) Kolokolov, Zbandarm, 284-85; Liashenko and Peregudova, "Prilozhenie," 41, 45.
(74.) M.G. Danilevskii to Senator M.I. Trusevich, 17 September 1911, in Pozhigailo, ed., Taina ubiistva Stolypina, 104-6.
(75.) On the debacle, see Ascher, P.A. Stolypin, 330-62.
(76.) As quoted from M.G. Danilevskii to Senator M.I. Trusevich, in Pozhigailo, ed., Taina ubiistva Stolypina, 105.
(77.) Such is the conclusion of Liashenko and Peregudova, "Prilozhenie," 44-5.
(78.) Liashenko and Peregudova, "Prilozhenie," 29-30.
(79.) S.A. Stepanov, Zagadki ubiistva Stolypina, Moscow: Progress-Akademiia, 1995, 222.
(80.) Murov, ed., Istoriia gosudarstvennoi okhrany Rossii, 233.
(81.) Spiridovich, Dernieres annees, vol. 2, 182; Murov, ed., Istoriia gosudarstvennoi okhrany Rossii, 320-4.
(82.) Murov, ed., Istoriia gosudarstvennoi okhrany Rossii, 324-30.
(83.) Spiridovich, Dernieres annees, vol. 2, 319-20; Daly, Watchful State, 139; Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 350.
(84.) Spiridovich, Dernieres annees, vol. 2, 322-3.
(85.) Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 348; Spiridovich, Dernieres annees, vol. 2, 323.
(86.) V. F. Dzhunkovskii, Vospominaniia, ed. A. L. Lapina, 2 vols, Moscow: Izdatel'stvo imeni Sabashnikovykh, 1997, vol. 2, 163. On Dzhunkovskii's relations with security policemen, see A.Iu. Dunaeva, Reformy politsii v Rossii nachala XX veka i Vladimir Fedrovich Dzhunkovskii, Moskva: Ob'edinennaia redaktsiia MVD Rossii, 2012, 214-29.
(87.) Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 303-9.
(88.) Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 350-5.
(89.) Spiridovich, Histoire du terrorisme russe, 647.
(90.) As quoted in Spiridovich, Velikaia voina, in Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 363.
(91.) Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 362, 367.
(92.) Ibid., 365-6.
(93.) Ibid., 271-2.
(94.) Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 410-21, 437-8; the quotation is on ibid., 437-8.
(95.) Service records on Spiridovich, RGM, f. 1284, op. 250, d. 25, 1. 39 ob.
(96.) Voeikov to Maklakov, 27 January 1915, RGIA, f. 1284, op. 250, d. 25, 1. 2.
(97.) Report from Headquarters, 19 May 1916, RGIA, f. 1284, op. 250, d. 25, 1. 7; report of Interior Ministry, 24 June 1916, RGIA, f. 1284, op. 250, d. 25, 1. 9; Khvostov to emperor, 12 August 1916, RGIA, f. 1284, op. 250, d. 25, 1. 19; Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 399-405, 442-43; Murov, ed., Istoriia gosudarstvennoi okhrany Rossii, 234.
(98.) Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 406-7.
(99.) Ibid., 443-6.
(100.) Spiridovich, Velikaia voina, vol. 3, 79, 99-107, 115.
(101.) Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 450-1.
(102.) Ibid., 457.
(103.) Ibid., 469-86.
(104.) A.Ia. Avrekh, "Chrezvychainaia sledstvennaia komissiia Vremennogo pravitel'stva: Zamysel i ispolnenie," Istoricheskie zapiski 118, 1990, 72-101; Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 492-3.
(105.) Aleksandr Blok, Poslednie dni Imperatorskoi vlasti, ed. S.S. Lesnevskii and Z.I. Peregudova, Moscow: Progress-Pleiada, 2012, 120.
(106.) A.I. Spiridovich, "'Protokoly' i antisemitizm vo Frantsii," Spiridovich Papers, Yale University Library Archives, box 26, envelope, p. 3; Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 487-8.
(107.) Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 489-90.
(108.) Spiridovich, Dernieres annees, vol. 1, 16.
(109.) S.P. Melgunov, Vospominaniia i dnevniki, 2 vols, Paris: Les editeurs reunis, 1964, vol. 1, 141. Kolokolov doubts this meeting occurred, because he was unable to read Spiridovich's memoir on this point and he found no mention of his re-arrest in archival sources. Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 491-92.
(110.) Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 495.
(111.) Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution, New York: Vintage Books, 1991, 780-4.
(112.) A.I. Spiridovich, Partiia sotsialistov-revoliutsionerov i ee predshestvenniki, 1886-1916, rev. ed., Petrograd: Voennaia tipografiia, 1918.
(113.) A.I. Spiridovich, Istoriia bol'shevizma v Rossii ot vosniknoveniia do zakhvata vlasti, 1883-1903-1917, Paris: Franko-Russkaia Pechat', 1922.
(114.) Spiridovich, Histoire du terrorisme russe (1930). On these studies, see V. Alekseev, "Spiridovich i ego 'Istoriia revoliutsionnogo dvizheniia v Rossii,'" Krasnyi arkhiv 26, 1928, 213-20; Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 321-47. (115.) Spiridovich, "Pri tsarskom rezhime" (1934).
(116.) Spiridovich, Dernieres annees (1928).
(117.) Spiridovich, Velikaia voina (1960-1962).
(118.) Spiridovitch, Raspoutine (1935).
(119.) A.I. Spiridovich, "Petr velikii v Parizhe (po frantsuzskim dokumentam)," Spiridovich Papers, Yale University Library Archives, boxes 20-21.
(120.) Jonathan Daly, ed., "A.I. Spiridovich: Okhrana i antisemitizm v dorevoliutsionnoi Rossii," Voprosy istorii 8, 2003: 3-36.
(121.) The originals are found in typescript in the Spiridovich Papers, Yale University Library Archives, box 26, envelope.
(122.) S.A. Stepanov, Chernaia sotnia v Rossii (1905-1914 gg.), Moscow: Rosvuznauka, 1992.
(123.) Kolokolov, Zhandarm, 500--4; Spiridovich Papers, Yale University Library Archives, boxes 9, 20 (folder 6), 22.
(124.) Spiridovich Papers, Yale University Library Archives, boxes 7 and 17.
(125.) See them in the Widener Library at Harvard University and the Spiridovich Papers at Yale University Library Archives. The Yale collection contains twenty-seven boxes of documents, including his lecture notes; outlines, timelines, and drafts for his books and articles; and copies of his published articles.
(126.) Letter to the editor, by Spiridovich's wife, Life, 14 May 1956.
Jonathan Daly is Professor of History at the University of Illinois at Chicago. He has authored Autocracy under Siege: Security Police and Opposition in Russia, 1866-1905 (1998), The Watchful State: Security Police and Opposition in Russia, 1906-1917 (2004), and The Rise of Western Power: A Comparative History of Western Civilization (2014) and co-edited Russia in War and Revolution, 1914-1922: A Documentary History (2009).
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