An alien presence: the long, sad history of correspondence study at the University of Chicago.
Even before he accepted the position of founding president of the "new" University of Chicago (there had been an earlier, short--lived attempt), Harper began drafting the plans for a unique institution. In Official Bulletin No. 1 (the first of six), Harper announced that he intended to build a university like no other. It would consist of three major divisions: the "University Proper," University Extension, and University Publication Work. (He would subsequently add two additional divisions: Laboratories and Museums and University Affiliates.) The University Proper would be the most conventional; Extension and Publication confirmed his commitment to the dissemination of the knowledge generated within the University well beyond Chicago (University of Chicago 1891).
Official Bulletin No. 6 laid out the organization of University Extension. This division would consist of five departments: Lecture--Study, ClassStudy (conventional courses at off--campus sites), Correspondence--Study, Examinations, and District Organization and Training (University of Chicago 1892a). For the first time, a major American university would make the organized dissemination of knowledge to a larger public an integral and important component of its mission.
Scholars have differed as to the degree to which Harper drew upon the design of the Chautauqua Assembly in bringing correspondence study into the University of Chicago's structure. Joseph Gould's book on Chautauqua asserts that Harper made its structure a prototype for the University (Gould 1961, 60). Maureen Fay found some antecedents to University Extension in Chautauqua, but she also noted distinct differences in organization and curriculum. For example, Harper had originally developed his model for conducting correspondence study during his tenure at the Baptist Union Theological Seminary. He then used it as a template for revising Chautauqua's courses (Fay 1976, 2, 7).
Chicago's Correspondence--Study department met immediate skepticism. As a 1900 University bulletin stated, "Like all innovations, this one had to establish the right to exist" (President's Papers, box 20, folder 10).
POLICIES AND PROFESSORS
Harper's first policy dispute--which occurred before the first course was written or the first student enrolled--centered on correspondence study. In December 1891, he hired his first two academic stars. Political economist J. Laurence Laughlin (who brought along a graduate student named Thorstein Veblen) and Latin scholar William G. Hale agreed to leave Cornell. They were apparently prima donnas, in addition to being celebrity professors. When they learned that Harper intended to allow students, including graduate students, to earn up to half their required credits by correspondence study, they accused him of encroaching on faculty prerogatives. They insisted that Harper travel to Ithaca to discuss this issue, as well as numerous other complaints about inadequate provisions for faculty governance.
Harper took a train to Ithaca to try to mollify them. He made several concessions, some having to do with correspondence study (Storr 1966). According to the first University Calendar, two--thirds of the work for graduate degrees had to be done in residence, which effectively capped correspondence study at one--third of required credit--hours (University of Chicago 1892b). This was not the only concession to traditionalists that Harper felt compelled to make. Official Bulletin No. 6, which defined the operations of all University Extension departments, stated that students who completed University correspondence courses could receive academic credit only if they travelled to Chicago to take both university entrance examinations and the final examinations for each course (University of Chicago 1892a).
Policies that demanded travel to the University and placed a limit on the applicability of correspondence courses contradicted the whole philosophy behind Harper's commitment to teaching and learning at a distance. Such policies virtually conceded to its critics the suspect nature of correspondence study. As other postsecondary institutions began to offer correspondence study programs, they followed this lead, often embracing restrictions that went well beyond those of the University of Chicago.
Harper professed the primacy of research in the University's mission. In order to drive that point home, while also affirming the University's intention to disseminate knowledge, he created a bifurcated faculty. The faculty of the University Proper would concentrate their attention on research and resident instruction. University Extension would have an autonomous faculty, the primary mission of which would be instruction, rather than research. They would write and grade correspondence courses, travel extensively to present extension lectures, in the fashion of British universities, and teach courses at off--campus sites in the evening.
President Harper hoped the research--oriented professors of the University Proper would develop respect for the teaching--centered role of the University Extension faculty. Indeed, he placed himself on the Extension faculty roster (University of Chicago 1892a). However, the University Proper faculty scorned the Extension faculty, never accepting them as legitimate professors, much less equals. Harper constantly fielded complaints from Extension faculty about unfair treatment and inferior status (Pittman 1996, 21-24).
Correspondence--Study suffered the consequences of a serious administrative flaw. From the very beginning, the department had to support itself entirely from tuition revenues. Harper readily admitted that inadequate funding would prevent it from reaching its potential. Its self-sustaining financial operations forced the imposition of fees that were too high to attract the large, geographically scattered, and diverse audience he had envisioned in Official Bulletin No. 6. Further, Harper believed that the selection of courses was not broad enough to maintain a successful program. Correcting these flaws would require a substantial and reliable source of funding (Harper 1903).
Harper was one of the most successful fund--raisers of his age. But the demands of the various university divisions and departments were unrelenting. Other needs always seemed more pressing than support for a department that had already shown that it could make its own way. Every year Correspondence Secretary Hervey Mallory dutifully asked that his department be considered for extra funding. (2) Each year, Harper, then his successors, denied the request (Dunkel and Fay 1978, 9-10).
In addition to creating a hardship for Correspondence--Study and its students, Harper's practice of denying funding, continued by subsequent presidents, sent a message to the University Proper faculty about the department's vague and tenuous connection to the University's mission. On the other hand, Correspondence--Study's self--sustaining funding model enabled it to survive. By the time of Harper's death in 1905, it was the only original Division of Extension department still in operation.
THE AGE OF MALLORY
Harper's prestige and that of the University of Chicago were critical to the establishment of correspondence study as a teaching format within large, respected, research--oriented universities. But correspondence instruction was only one of his concerns, and one to which he gave ever-diminishing attention. More proximate leadership was critical to the long--term success of Correspondence--Study. Hervey Mallory had come to Chicago from Yale as one of Harper's graduate students in 1892. In 1898, unsatisfied with a couple of earlier appointees, Harper named him Correspondence--Study Secretary, a post he would hold until his retirement in 1933.
Mallory proved an able administrator. However, Harper was a micromanager who frequently involved himself in faculty disputes and even in providing advice to some individual students. On one occasion, Harper even noticed that two keys on one of Correspondence--Study's typewriter were out of alignment. On September 18, 1899, he sent a terse note to Mallory, telling him to see to it right away (Pittman 1996, 24--26; Harper Papers, box 5, folder 6).
After Harper's death, and as the University of Chicago's correspondence program grew, Mallory became a national leader in the field. In 1915, representatives from twenty--two major postsecondary institutions met in Madison, Wisconsin, to found the National University Extension Association (NUEA). Those present hoped NUEA could create a legitimate, defined structure and role for extension divisions--including correspondence departments--and thus achieve academic credibility within the American University (Edelson 1990).
The majority of delegates at Madison wanted to limit the NUEA to institutions of "university grade." Mallory and his counterpart at the University of Wisconsin, William H. Lighty, represented the most renowned of the correspondence educators present. They insisted that only major state and private universities should be granted membership. To include small colleges, normal schools, and proprietary institutions would invite comparisons with their correspondence programs, and thus hamper the NUEA's efforts to build academic credibility and earn respect among the faculty at the highest levels of the academy (Proceedings of the First National University Extension Conference 1915, 218-219).
Mallory worked in other ways to elevate the image and stature of correspondence study at large universities. With his Indiana University colleague, Walton Bittner, he wrote the first survey of practice in university academic credit correspondence programs, University Teaching by Mail (1933). Mallory became the second NUEA president and promoted the drafting of standards for the conduct of nonresidential instruction, including correspondence courses.
As correspondence study became more popular and well--known as a means of instruction in higher education, its practitioners faced growing opposition from both inside and outside the academy. Profit--seeking, proprietary schools became well--known for superficiality, misleading advertising, and even fraud. This led to guilt by association in the public mind, and more importantly within university faculties. Critics delighted in attributing the sins of some of the seediest practitioners with the method of instruction. The criticism, and even ridicule, bedeviled all university correspondence programs. However, due to its greater visibility, critics frequently singled out the University of Chicago program for special scrutiny.
Thorstein Veblen, arguably the greatest of all American economists, served on the University of Chicago faculty throughout Harper's presidency. He wrote a long, stinging attack on the funding and governance of higher education, and its links to capitalist philanthropy, in The Higher Learning in America (1918). His subtitle, A Memorandum on the Conduct of Universities by Business Men, reveals his point of view. Veblen ridiculed the celebrity presidents of the day--who he called "captains of erudition" for their dependence on the captains of industry (also known as "robber barons"). His book was also a personal attack on Harper, who he despised. Veblen's colleagues persuaded him not to publish it until after Harper's death and his own departure from the University of Chicago.
In The Higher Learning in America, Veblen characterized Harper's goal of democratizing access to higher education through extension work-including correspondence study--as frills to please and deceive an ignorant public. Like many academics of the day--and up to the present--he believed such egalitarian efforts were foolish. Extension was as harmful to the true purposes of the university as football or fraternities.
Veblen's criticisms soon seemed mild, compared with the next attack on correspondence study. Abraham Flexner had become an influential educational critic with his 1910 report on medical education, funded by the Carnegie Corporation. In 1930, he published a series of lectures entitled Universities: American, English, German. In it, he agreed with Veblen's narrow, European view of the limits of a university. In particular, he disliked the idea of universities having public service missions. The fact that such institutions as Columbia University and the University of Chicago had adopted such democratic practices and ideals struck him as evidence of the deterioration of scholarly standards. In particular, he found it appalling that Chicago offered high school level correspondence courses that aspiring students could use to qualify for admission (Flexner 1930, 55).
Flexner had a great deal more to say about the disgrace of otherwise reputable schools offering academic work via correspondence:
Now, correspondence courses may have their uses; and in a country where postage is cheap and superficiality rampant, they are likely to spring up; but that the prestige of the University of Chicago should be used to bamboozle well--meaning but untrained persons with the notion that they can thus receive a high school or college education is scandalous. It is only fair to say that resentment is rife among the great scholars and scientists on the faculties of Columbia, Chicago, and other institutions. (Flexner 1930, 147)
Thus, not only was Chicago lowering its standards and scamming students, he said, it was alienating the most distinguished members of its faculty.
To some extent Chicago's program was vulnerable to Flexner's criticism. Like Columbia, it advertised in the middle--brow press. Unlike the proprietary schools, however, its ads tended to be written in a straightforward manner and a bland tone. That it advertised at all no doubt seemed outlandish to Flexner and the audience for whom he was writing. However, defenders of the Chicago program might well have asked how--other than through advertising--could a correspondence program perform its assigned role of broadening its university's access to wider, nonresidential offices?
Flexner's scorn for correspondence study resonated in elite academic circles to the point that reaction to it "seemed to foreclose evermore any chance for its success at Columbia or Chicago," according to Thomas Gerrity (1976, 165). Indeed, Columbia closed its correspondence program in 1937 (Burrell 1954, 40-47).
Chicago's program struggled on, albeit under a permanent state of siege. Flexner's book was not the only challenge it faced during the 1930s. The University's new president, Robert Maynard Hutchins, developed a "New Plan" for undergraduate instruction that further marginalized correspondence courses. The Chicago College (the University's undergraduate college) discarded specific course requirements in favor of broad general education requirements and comprehensive examinations (Ashmore 1996). This curricular structure was at odds with the intricate scheme of quarter--hour, "major" and "minor" courses that President Harper had designed and upon which the Home--Study Program's (as it was by that time called) inventory of courses was based. Further, the New Plan's structure did not easily lend itself to the correspondence format.
Hervey Mallory tried to maintain Home--Study's relevance within, or alongside, the New Plan. This was important to the University, he said, because more than 20 percent of the 1,022 currently enrolled undergraduates had taken some courses by correspondence. Of that number, 171 had established their first contact with the University through HomeStudy (President's Papers, box 37, folder 6, Mallory to Woodard, May 18, 1931). He proposed conferences with deans in hopes of interesting them in adapting the New Plan to "Home--Study needs" (President's Papers, box 37, folder 6, Mallory to Filbey, January 18, 1932). When it became clear that integration was not working out, Mallory asked President Hutchins to at least make it clear to the University's General Administrative Board that the proposed new academic statutes regarding the New Plan be transmitted "in such a way as to preclude the impression that the recommendation implies dissatisfaction with home study as an effective educational agency" (President's Papers, box 37, folder 6, Mallory to Hutchins, December 19, 1932).
A 1934 Extension Division report indicated that while resident faculty and students were still making use of correspondence courses within the structure of the New Plan, the idea of "course credit" no longer had currency on campus. However, many people took the courses for the purpose of transferring them to degree programs at other universities. Home--Study, therefore, continued to use the term as a means of facilitating course transfer (President's Papers, box 37, folder 6, appended to letter from Huth to Hutchins, March 13, 1934). As of 1936, according to the Dean of University College (Extension and some other units), some Home--Study courses could "more specifically be said to be part of the New Plan" (President's Papers, box 37, folder 6, Huth to Filbey, March 12, 1936). Most of the courses so designated were parts of three--course sequences that could be considered a year's work under the New Plan.
Home--Study's travails in the 1930s did not end with Flexner's savaging and Hutchins's New Plan. The University underwent a full institutional review in the early 1930s. The volume containing the review of HomeStudy, The University of Chicago Survey, was published in 1933 (Reeves et al.). Its conclusions could be called odd. According to all objective measures, students who had taken one or more courses by correspondence equaled--or proved superior to--those who did not. Thus the quality of the instruction and the structure of the teaching format were not problems. However, the reviewers did identify a problem. Because HomeStudy produced no original research, it was therefore not central to the University's mission. According to The University of Chicago Survey's authors, "the University of Chicago can neither afford nor does it desire merely to duplicate the services provided adequately by other institutions for direct individual instruction through the correspondence method" (Reeves et al. 1933, 70). Unless Home--Study could reconfigure itself as an experimental unit, the University should consider closing it. Apparently, unlike other modes of instruction, such as lectures, correspondence study should not simply be seen as a means of transmitting knowledge. Instead, The whole program of correspondence work should be conceived as an educational experiment looking toward the improvement of old methods and the establishment of new techniques in this field. Unless this view is taken, the continuation of the Home--Study plan is unjustifiable. (Reeves et al. 1933, 71)
The University of Chicago Survey, like Flexner's attack and the New Plan, failed to bring about the immediate extinction of correspondence study at Chicago. However, taken cumulatively, this series of blows effectively marginalized it. Home--Study and the other remnants and descendents of University Extension were combined into a unit called "University College." Singly and collectively, they found their stature diminished as Chicago's reputation as a research--oriented university grew.
A SHIFT IN EMPHASIS AND DECLINE
In 1947, the University administration empowered Cyril A. Houle, who would become one of the premier scholars in the academic field of Adult Education (and who still stands as one of its best writers) to consolidate the extant units of University College and Extension into a "new" University College. This college came to include--among other units--Home--Study, Summer Session, and the Radio Office. Under Houle's leadership, HomeStudy shifted its emphasis even farther away from the University's resident instructional mission, to a more externally directed orientation toward adult education programs. This meant shifting away from producing university credit courses toward the development of noncredit courses aimed at either professional development or personal enrichment.
Houle initiated a review of all college--credit courses in Home--Study's inventory. The department then dropped about 300 of the extant 400 courses. It added its first noncredit sequence of courses in 1948. This was a series of courses based on the Great Books curriculum, which had been developed by Mortimer Adler and former president Robert Maynard Hutchins. Thereafter, all new courses were offered without university credit. These actions--while probably unavoidable--marked the beginning of the end of the University of Chicago's correspondence study program. With only a quarter of their former academic credit offerings, Home--Study could no longer effectively serve degree--seeking students (Stein 1987). The time and resources required to create and launch the first Great Books courses, and those that followed them, demonstrated Home--Study's new commitment to noncredit, adult education programs, rather than toward the University community. However laudable such offerings might have been, they had the overall effect of further separating correspondence study from the University's instructional mission.
On one level, Home--Study thrived, experiencing a steady growth in enrollments. Leonard Stein, the last Director of Home--Study, recalled that annual registrations doubled during his tenure, 1949--1962 (Stein 1987, 5). However, fees for noncredit programming--then as now--are marketbased, generally with tight margins. The tuition for academic credit programming, however, are arbitrary and artificial, and thus offer higher returns. This margin is critical for self--funded educational programs.
DRIFTING INTO OBLIVION
Throughout the late 1950s and into the 1960s, the Home--Study staff hung on by their fingernails. During the upheavals and restructuring of the 1940s, the University ceased allowing its resident students to take correspondence courses for academic credit. This created a curious situation whereby students at other colleges and universities could apply University of Chicago courses to their degree programs, while Chicago students could not. This anomaly further distanced Home--Study from the University's instructional mission (Stein 1987, 4--6; President's Papers, box 34, folder 8, Board of Trustees minutes, November 8, 1962).
Stein experimented with a number of initiatives, for example, trying to interest the University administration in using correspondence courses as a recruiting tool. In response to all such ideas, the administration warned of such perils as faculty resentment and a "watered--down curriculum" (President's Papers, box 34, folder 6, Harrison to Filbey, November 9, 1956). Stein proved unsuccessful in trying to obtain administration support for an application to the Carnegie Corporation for a program called "Freshman Year at Home," through which Chicago could use freshmanlevel courses to attract gifted high school students (President's Papers, box 34, folder 6, Gardner to Allard, July 28, 1960; Stein to Sulcer, August 11, 1960; Filbey to Ketchum, September 20, 1957).
Stein even tried to create an interest in putting together a Midwestern regional consortium to offer correspondence study through the Committee on Inter--Institutional Cooperation (CIC), an association of Chicago and the schools of the Big Ten Conference. As often happens in such groups, Stein received numerous expressions of interest, but no support (President's Papers, box 34, folder 6, Stein to Johnson, February 23, 1961; Johnson to Stein, February 23, 1961).
According to Stein, after World War II, Home--Study stayed afloat mainly because it had a contract with the Navy to produce educational materials for its in--service programs. When the Navy gave notice that it intended to terminate the arrangement, the University's interest in Home--Study's survival evaporated. "Important figures in the Central Administration who had supported Home--Study earlier, told me frankly they could no longer do so in the absence of this contract," Leonard Stein said (Stein 1987, 15). Correspondence instruction had never been popular among the faculty. Establishing Chicago as a premier research institution had dominated and diminished all other facets of its mission. For the greatest part of the faculty of the original University Proper, and their descendents, instruction came second, public service a poor third. Peripheral operations could be tolerated only if they did not embarrass the institution and if they made no demand on resources.
Nobel laureate George W. Beadle assumed the presidency of the University of Chicago in 1961. A renowned biochemist, he was one of fifteen researchers Time chose to represent its Man of the Year, "The American Scientist." As an educator, his interests naturally centered on research. Shortly after taking office, he floated the idea of terminating all of Chicago's continuing education programs--evening courses, radio programming, Home--Study, and everything else. However, at that time, work was nearing completion on a state--of--the--art continuing education center, funded by the Kellogg Foundation. Kellogg's Board of Directors did not find Beadle's suggestion amusing. He stepped back, the continuing education center was completed and opened, and University College's various departments were given a temporary reprieve (Stein 1987, 9).
In November, 1961, Beadle wrote a memorandum to the Council of the University Senate, proposing a review of adult education efforts, with an eye to strengthening them. At the same time, however, he questioned the importance of correspondence study. Leonard Stein responded--in a highly offended tone--with a defense of correspondence study's efficacy as a teaching medium. He told Beadle that he was weary of hearing the same tired view that correspondence study was somehow inadequate. He suggested a number of ways in which it might help the University meet its mission and goals (President's Papers, box 34, folder 6, Stein to Beadle, November 20, 1961). Within the President's Office, Stein's memo--which he mimeographed for distribution to the Council of the Senate--was received as "blended irritation and superiority ..." (President's Papers, box 34, folder 6, Harrison to Wilson, November 27, 1961).
Leonard Stein's intemperate memorandum was not a cause of HomeStudy's demise, but an indication that the process was well underway. The loss of the Navy contract had set the wheels in motion.
On August 1, 1962, President Beadle attended a scheduled meeting of the Board of Adult Education. His attendance was unusual; his decision to preside even more so. The agenda would consist of one item, he said, the future of Home--Study. He noted that Leonard Stein had announced that he would be taking a position at St. Louis University; this made an immediate decision on the future of Home--Study timely. He invited Stein and his staff to pass out a list of current Home--Study activities and problems. Stein explained that due to all of the recent talk about the possible abolition of his office, there was little to report on the "recent activities" side of his ledger (President's Papers, box 34, folder 8, Board of Adult Education minutes, August 1, 1962).
Stein listed several problems that had inhibited Home--Study's growth, an approach that Beadle brushed. At that point, Stein and his staff were excused. According to the minutes,
There was general agreement on the part of the Board members that the faculty appeared to have neither the time nor the interest to maintain the program. The Board's feeling was although the Home--Study Program itself was indeed a worthwhile enterprise, unless such venture was supported wholeheartedly, it should be discontinued. (President's Papers, box 34, folder 6, Board of Adult Education minutes, August 1, 1962)
The Board closed the meeting by voting to recommend to the Committee of the Council (of the University Senate) and the Board of Trustees that Home--Study be abolished and its assets disposed of. On the same day, Leonard Stein made public his letter of resignation (President's Papers, box 34, folder 8, Stein to Home--Study instructional staff, deans and department chairmen, and other administrative officers, August 1, 1962).
Representatives of the University of Wisconsin's Extension Division had been in communication with Stein before the decision to terminate HomeStudy was made final. Wisconsin's correspondence staff proposed several alternatives, including a partnership between the programs, or having Wisconsin assume administrative control, while still offering courses under Chicago's name. As a last resort, the Wisconsin program offered to buy out any of Chicago's courses that it could use in its program (President's Papers, box 34, folder 6, memorandum, October 19, 1962).
By the time the Wisconsin memorandum reached Chicago, President Beadle's decision was final. Chicago would terminate Home--Study. In a budget committee meeting on November 5, Beadle explained that any academic department that wished to offer some of its courses through correspondence study would be free to do so. However, "as a practical matter this will result in the discontinuance of all Home--Study programs at the University since the faculty do not regard correspondence work as an interesting part of education and have no real interest in such work" (President's Papers, box 34, folder 8, minutes, Committee on Budget, November 5, 1962).
After an inspection of Chicago's roughly remaining 100 courses, both credit and noncredit, the University of Wisconsin bought 55, for a total of $20,000. The Encyclopedia Britannica Schools bought three Spanish courses for an undisclosed sum. The Board of Trustees approved the sale of the courses, which formally ended the University of Chicago's correspondence program, which had been in continuous operation since 1892 (President's Papers, box 34, folder 8, docket of the president, committee on budget, May 6, 1963).
William Rainey Harper believed that correspondence study should be an integral part of the great university he founded. Universities should not only discover and generate new knowledge. They also should disseminate it, he believed. Thereby, they could advance one of the chief progressive causes of the day, the democratization of higher education. The inclusion of correspondence study in the University of Chicago's design gave this teaching format a credibility within the academy that it otherwise would never have had.
While Harper gave correspondence study a toehold, and a modicum of respect, he also left it vulnerable to elitism and academic snobbery. It was outside the "University Proper." Unlike any other instructional program at Chicago, it had to generate its own funds. Students were limited in the number of correspondence courses they could apply to a degree program. All of these limitations gave it a second--class status in the university community.
Under Hervey Mallory's leadership, Chicago remained a national leader in the field until the 1920s. Mallory became a prominent spokesman for correspondence study, co--authoring the first good book on the subject. He was also a leader in the establishment of national standards for the collegiate--level standards of practice.
The 1930s brought several events that effectively crippled the Chicago program. Critics dismissed correspondence courses, most notably those of the University, as worthless, or even deceptive. President Robert Maynard Hutchins's "New Plan" essentially took structured, discrete courses out of the undergraduate curriculum. A university review found that correspondence courses were educationally effective and they contributed to the persistency and success of many students. However, it also recommended that the program be closed.
The reverses of the 1930s effectively ended Chicago's days as a leader in collegiate correspondence study, and as an agency integral to its university's mission. By adopting an emphasis on noncredit adult education courses, Home--Study took itself ever further from the University's core mission. The University reduced it to a peripheral operation with no powerful champions. Home--Study was so far out on the fringe of the University by the early 1960s that, when President Beadle effected its termination, its closing was merciful and indeed barely noticed.
(1.) The terms correspondence study, home--study, and independent study have all been used at various times by various institutions. In this paper, the terms will be used synonymously.
(2.) The title "Correspondence Secretary" was unique to Chicago. Most of Mallory's counterparts had the title "Director".
Ashmore, H. S. 1996. Robert Maynard Hutchins: The higher learning in America. Society 33:69-75.
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Dunkel, H. B., and M. A. Fay. 1978. Harper's disappointment: University extension. Adult Education 29:3-16.
Edelson, P. J. 1990. Codification and exclusion: An analysis of the early years of the National University Extension Association (NUEA), 1915-1923. Continuing Higher Education Review 55:176--179.
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Flexner, A. 1910. Medical education in the United States and Canada: A report to the Carnegie Foundation for the advancement of teaching. New York: The Carnegie Corporation.
Flexner, A. 1930. Universities: American, English, German. London: Oxford University Press.
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Gould, J. E. 1961. The Chautauqua movement: An episode in the continuing American revolution. New York: State University of New York.
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Pittman, V. 1996. Harper's Headaches. In Distance education symposium 3: Policy and administration, ed. B. S. Duning and V Pittman, 19--31. University Park, PA: American Center for the Study of Distance Education.
Pittman, V. 2007. Inexpedient and Unwise: The first American external degree programs, 1876--1910. AEHJ 34:123-134.
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Reeves, F., C. O. Thompson, A. J. Klein, and J. D. Russell. 1933. University Extension Services. The University of Chicago Survey, vol. 8. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Stein, L. 1987. Oral History: Independent Study Division Papers. Special Collections Department, Pattee Library, The Pennsylvania State University.
Storr, R. J. 1966. Harper's university: A history of the University of Chicago. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
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Von Pittman University of Missouri
Von Pittman, Center for Distance and Independent Study, University of Missouri, 136 Clark Hall, Columbia, MO 65211, (T) 573-882-6431, (F) 573-884-9051, Email: email@example.com.
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|Title Annotation:||ARTICLE 12|
|Publication:||American Educational History Journal|
|Date:||Jan 1, 2008|
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