An Excerpt from ADRP 3-05, Special Operations: Chapter 5, Intelligence.
Special operations missions are both intelligence driven and intelligence-dependent. Intelligence products developed for [Army special operations forces] ARSOF must be detailed, accurate, relevant, and timely. For example, infiltrating a building in a nonpermissive noncombatant evacuation operation requires exact information on its structure and precise locations of hostages or persons to be rescued. National- and theater-level intelligence products are often required at a lower echelon than is normally associated with support to conventional forces. They may also require near-real-time dissemination to the operator level.
Special operations requirements are heavily mission- and situation-dependent largely driven by diverse and unique operational environments. The problems ARSOF are tasked to address are often not regional but trans-regional or global. Because ARSOF missions may vary widely, the associated intelligence support may also vary. Therefore, intelligence support for [special operations forces] SOF requires a thorough understanding of special operations requirements at the tactical level and integration of intelligence products from across the operational environments and geographic combatant commands. This causes national and theater support to be much more detailed and precise to support special operations requirements.
The following variables can affect intelligence support:
* Combat (hostile) or cooperative noncombat (permissive) environments.
* Multinational, combined, joint, or unilateral operations.
* Force composition.
* Maritime or land-based operations.
* Mission duration.
* Availability of mission command system elements and intelligence support facilities.
* Adversary capabilities, objectives, and operational concepts.
* Connectivity to agencies outside the operational environment.
Intelligence Criteria for Surgical Strike Missions
This set of criteria supports [counterterrorism] CT, [counter-proliferation] CP, direct action, recovery operations, and [special reconnaissance] SR missions. Because SOF missions apply direct military force to concentrate on attacking or collecting information on critical targets, the information required is highly perishable, requires near-real-time reporting, and often requires special handling to protect sources. Intelligence products are built to erase uncertainty before, during, and after execution.
SOF engaged in these missions depend on detailed and current target materials for mission planning and execution. SOF require extensive information from national, theater of operations, and SOF-specific threat installation and target assessment databases, files, studies, and open-access Internet information. SOF require current intelligence updates on targets and target changes from assignment of the mission through planning, rehearsal, execution, and poststrike evaluation. These requirements drive valuable resources, to include what has become known as the 'unblinking eye', constant imagery feeds of targets, key locations, and key actors.
The basis for successful SOF mission planning is the target intelligence package normally developed by [theater special operations command] TSOC intelligence staff in coordination with the theater of operations [joint intelligence center] JIC or joint analysis center (United States European Command only). The information and intelligence necessary for the target intelligence package is gained by leveraging the intelligence enterprise. Target intelligence packages must contain timely, detailed, tailored, and all-source intelligence describing the--
* Target description.
* Climate, geography, or hydrography.
* Demographic, cultural, political, and social features of the [joint special operations area] JSOA.
* Threat, including the strategy and force disposition of the military, paramilitary, or other indigenous forces, as well as any forces that endanger U.S. elements.
* Infiltration and exfiltration routes.
* Key target components, including lines of communication.
* Threat command, control, and communications.
* Threat information systems.
* Evasion and recovery information.
Current geospatial intelligence (imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information) products of the target and [area of operations] AO are an important part of any target intelligence package. SOF elements in permission isolation use target intelligence packages as primary intelligence resources. The target intelligence packages help focus requests for information not covered or for data requiring further detail.
During all phases of these missions, SOF teams depend upon the timely reporting of detailed and highly perishable intelligence related to their operational situation. They also require rapid, real-time, or near-real-time receipt of threat warnings to enable them to react to changing situations and to ensure personnel protection. For example, in a recent operation, the executing direct action force did not have access to the real-time imagery being monitored by supporting ARSOF intelligence forces. The supporting force, despite being continental United States-based, was able to provide a warning of an incoming threat to the direct action force in near-real-time.
Teams conducting missions are primary providers of information that feeds the intelligence process for both SOF and conventional forces assigned to a theater of operations or joint operations area. Mission preparation requires that participants be aware of collection requirements and that procedures are established for reporting and dissemination.
Intelligence for Special Warfare
This set of criteria supports [unconventional warfare] UW, [foreign internal defense] FID, MISO, [Civil Affairs operations] CAO, and security assistance, as well as ARSOF involvement in humanitarian assistance and disaster-relief operations. Intelligence required to support indirect missions may be historical in nature and less perishable than that required for direct missions. The information may be unclassified, with much of it available in open-source formats. The emphasis is generally away from detailed, target-specific intelligence toward general military intelligence. Intelligence support focuses on leveraging the intelligence enterprise for social, economic, political, and psychological conditions within a targeted country or area to U.S. benefit. Developing and maintaining good rapport with [host nation] HN governments and indigenous population groups is essential to successful mission accomplishment. To establish rapport, ARSOF Soldiers require extensive knowledge of the local populace and its culture and language. Intelligence products are designed to allow the force to wade into uncertainty and prevail.
UW operations require extensive information on pre-existing, developing, and historical insurgent groups and their organization, location, and capabilities. UW also requires information on the presence and viability of subversive movements and military activity, as well as target-specific information. In addition, the information must describe the populace's likely response to government actions, thereby indicating the strength of potential local opposition to the foreign nation government.
ARSOF teams engaged in FID and foreign humanitarian assistance require detailed intelligence on the indigenous economic, military, social, and political structure and situation. Country or area studies are often invaluable sources of background information. Such studies encompass a wide range of topics covering all aspects of a country and its populace. However, they may be dated and require validation. Many country or area studies are unclassified and prepared using a variety of resources. They normally include text, imagery, and mapping data.
[Psychological Operations] PSYOP forces require access to open-access networks (such as public radio, television, newspapers, Internet) and the intelligence enterprise to assess the impact of all information activities. Requirements for MISO are often nontraditional (indigenous newspaper distribution figures, sentiments of local population to key communicators, and local media and advertising). The cultural intelligence section within PSYOP units provides ARSOF commanders useful military, sociological, psychological, and political information, as well as valuable demographic data. PSYOP forces rely heavily on operational variables (PMESII-PT) analyses to provide insight into the factors that drive population behavior.
Through area study, civil reconnaissance, and the execution of CAO, special operations [Civil Affairs] CA forces gather civil information on the PMESII-PT variables. Special operations CA elements conduct civil information management to develop, maintain, and fuse the civil common operational picture with the commander's common operational picture. Civil information management enables current operations tracking, future operations planning, and a holistic understanding of the operational environment.
Note: Open-source research pertains to electronic data that is publicly available without requiring an account, login, or other measures to access the information. Exploitation of Internet Web sites or social media that are not open-access should not be confused with open-source research. This type of exploitation will likely fall under other activities (intelligence or otherwise) and may include collection and acquisition of publically available information in cyberspace. These activities may include cyberspace operations, information operations, [military information support operations] MISO, special operations, information security, personnel security, disaster and humanitarian support operations, force protection, or criminal investigative authorities. Open-source intelligence is an intelligence discipline and may only be conducted by intelligence professionals because of the authorities and restrictions placed upon intelligence personnel in Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, DOD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components That Affect United States Persons, Army Directive 2016-37, U.S. Army Open-Source Intelligence Activities, and AR 381-10, U.S. Army Intelligence Activities. See ATP 2-22.9/MCRP 2-10A.3, Open-Source Intelligence (U), for details.
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|Publication:||Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin|
|Date:||Apr 1, 2019|
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