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American Philosophical Quarterly: Vol. 46, No. 1, January 2009.

Stuff, KRISTIE MILLER

Linguistically, we distinguish between thing terms and stuff terms, where, roughly, "thing" is a count noun, and "stuff" is a mass noun. Syntactically, "thing" functions as a singular referring term, that is, a term that refers to a single "entity" and hence takes "a" and "every" and is subject to pluralization, while "stuff" functions as a plural referring term, that is, it refers to a plurality of "entities" and hence takes "some" and is not subject to pluralization. There exists a thing and some stuff.

Contextual Adaptation, JAMES ROSS

The question is about contextual adaptation of meaning, a matter of philosophy of language, occasioned here by a disagreement among philosophers of religion about whether words, like "knows," "wills," "loves," "commands," "does," used for common attributes of humans and the divine, and even "exists" as applied to both, mean the same or acquire divergences of meaning from the discourse contexts. I call the first group "reformers" and the other "analogists." Analogists think the reformers are anthropomorphic, contributing to popular naive imaginings about God as "a person like us," while the reformers think the analogists are grafting Hellenic ideas onto biblical faith. That is not a new dispute, of course. But there is a separable linguistic facet of it, examined here, that has wider applications to philosophy in general.

Some New Monadic Value Predicates, NICOLAS ESPINOZA

Some things have positive value and some things have negative value. The things with positive value are good and the things with negative value are bad. There are also things in-between that are neither good nor bad, which are neutral. All in all, then, there are three monadic value predicates: "good," "bad," and "neutral."

Love, Identification, and the Emotions, BENNETT W. HELM

Recently there has been a resurgence of philosophical interest in love, resulting in a wide variety of accounts. Central to most accounts of love is the notion of caring about your beloved for his sake. Yet such a notion needs to be carefully articulated in the context of providing an account of love, for it is clear that the kind of caring involved in love must be carefully distinguished from impersonal modes of concern for particular others for their sakes, such as moral concern or concern grounded in compassion. That is, we might say, the kind of caring that is central to love must be somehow distinctly intimate. The trouble is to cash out these firm intuitions in a satisfactory way.

Multiple Universes and Observation Selection Effects, DARREN BRADLEY

The fine-tuning argument can be used to support the Many Universe hypothesis; however, the Inverse Gambler's Fallacy objection seeks to undercut the support for the Many Universe hypothesis. The objection is that although the evidence that there is life somewhere confirms Many Universes, the specific evidence that there is life in this universe does not. I will argue that the Inverse Gambler's Fallacy is not committed by the fine-tuning argument. The key issue is the procedure by which the universe with life is selected for observation. Once we take account of the procedure, we find that the support for the Many Universe hypothesis remains.

Recent Social-Scientific Work on Interdependent, Independent, and Bicultural Selves: The Moral Implications, KRISTJAN KRISTJANSSON

Throughout the history of moral philosophy, most of its best-known practitioners have occupied positions antithetical to moral relativism. With a number of significant exceptions and caveats, which need not be rehearsed here, one could go as far as saying that the history of moral philosophy is the history of an ongoing battle against such relativism in its various forms and guises, ranging from the man-is-the-measure-of-all-things doctrine of the Sophists, to early twentieth-century anthropologically inspired cultural relativism, late twentieth-century power-focused poststructuralist discourse, and the ever-present moral subjectivism of first-year undergraduate students. Nor is there an end in sight; this battle seems to be a never-to- be-completed Sisyphean task.
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Title Annotation:PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS
Publication:The Review of Metaphysics
Geographic Code:1USA
Date:Jun 1, 2009
Words:643
Previous Article:American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Vol. 82, No. 4, Fall 2008.
Next Article:American Philosophical Quarterly: Vol. 46, No. 2, April 2009.
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