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American Philosophical Quarterly: October 2009, Vol. 46, No. 4.

Desires and Reasons, ALAN GOLDMAN

The article explores whether desires generate practical reasons. It expands the argument advocated by Ruth Chang regarding the question of whether reasons are created by desires themselves and argues that it is not the desire's affective component that normally indicates the presence of reason. It presents contrasting examples demonstrating the relevant and irrelevant desires that do not appear to create reasons.

Resting Content: Sensible Satisficing? PATRICIA GREENSPAN

The article discusses the sense of satisficing and its rationality. It argues that it is in bird-in-hand cases where satisficing makes sense, and that coherent rationale is present in it without refuting theories of maximization. The defense of satisficing is indicated to turn on the subjective factors' limitation in making decisions that affect the value of options. Satisficing is noted as based on the concerns of moral psychology and that its notion originally surfaced in economics.

Desires, Reasons, and Rationality, JOSHUA GERT

The article discusses the theory of desires, reasons, and rationality. It argues a view concerning the very thing that practical reason constitutes and the components that determine the rational status of action. It presents a case study reflecting how the relevance of desires to subjective rational status forms the notion that desires provide reasons.

Reasons, Regresses, and Tragedy: The Epistemic Regress Problem and the Problem of the Criterion, ANDREW D. CLING

The article discusses the problem of epistemic regress and criterion. The author states the definition of epistemic regress problem, which is an ancient skeptical paradox of the chain, and how the epistemic regress and criterion problems relate to the special case of the paradox of reasons. The author concludes that the acceptance of beliefs assumes the idea that satisfactory reasons are impossible ideal.

Uniqueness Revisited, IGOR DOUVEN

The article discusses the unique rational response to evidence called "Uniqueness." The author presents two grounds challenging the thesis of Uniqueness and discusses the Bayesian confirmation theory. Arguments laid by several advocates of Uniqueness in relation to rationality are also analyzed.

"Ought," "Can," and Practical Reasons, CLAYTON LITTLE JOHN

The article discusses the principle which considers ought as a necessary consequence of can. It presents a scenario wherein such principle is necessitated to explain some linguistic behaviors and relates uncontroversial claims about reasons for action. The author argues that practical reasons need not be the potential action's reasons when establishing the basis of claims that are regarded as relatively controversial about reasons for action.

Ignorance and Force: Two Excusing Conditions for False Beliefs, RENE VAN WOUDENBERG

The article discusses the two excusing conditions for false beliefs, which are ignorance and force. The author explores the nature of ignorance and investigates the conditions that let an agent be excused of the bad action being performed. As for force, the author argues that it can constitute an excusing condition for an action that is regarded as bad.
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Article Details
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Publication:The Review of Metaphysics
Geographic Code:1USA
Date:Dec 1, 2009
Previous Article:Zuckert, Catherine H.: Plato's Philosophers: The Coherence of the Dialogues.
Next Article:European Journal of Philosophy: September 2009, Vol. 17, No. 3.

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