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American Philosophical Quarterly: April 2012, Vol. 49, No. 2.

Reflection, Disagreement, and Context, EDWARD S. HINCHMAN

How far, if for any length at all, do our intrapersonal and our interpersonal epistemic obligations run in parallel? How are we epistemically obligated to weigh diverging opinions--a change of mind--that we expect we will have in the future? Do those obligations resemble whatever obligations we may have to be responsive to the opinions of peers who disagree with us? This essay recommends that we treat these questions as addressing the stability of doxastic commitment in the two dimensions. If we think of belief as paradigmatically the product of doxastic deliberation, as some philosophers now do, then we can view forming a belief as bringing doxastic deliberation to a proper conclusion, thereby generating a properly stable commitment. And we can make our questions more specific: Does a doxastic stance that fails to do justice to expected future opinion manifest a properly stable orientation as it moves forward into that future? Does a doxastic stance that fails to do justice to interpersonal disagreement manifest a properly stable orientation as it moves outward into the social give-and-take of reasons? How far, if at all, do these species of doxastic stability run in parallel?

Rational Epistemic Akrasia, ALLEN COATES

Epistemic akrasia arises when one holds a belief even though one judges it to be irrational or unjustified. There is some debate about whether epistemic akrasia is possible, but this article will assume for the sake of argument that it is, in order to consider whether it can be rational. More precisely, the article will consider whether cases can arise in which both the belief one judges to be irrational and one's judgment of it are epistemically rational.

Perceived Colors and Perceived Locations: A Problem for Color Subjectivism, PETER W. ROSS

Color subjectivism claims that colors attributed to external physical objects in virtue of visual experience--or perceived colors--are not instantiated by those objects. Instead, perceived colors are wholly explained in terms of visual experience itself. (Subjectivism is often called eliminativism or irrealism.) Subjectivism is a theory of the nature of color and is, strictly speaking, independent of a theory of color perception. But a theory of the nature of color sets constraints on a theory of color perception. For example, subjectivism sets the extremely strong constraint that color perception does not involve a causal relation between perceivers and colors instantiated by physical objects external to the mind. The question that this essay addresses is whether there is a plausible theory of color perception that meets the subjectivist constraint. If not, and assuming that any theory of the nature of color is simply untenable if it cannot be combined with a plausible theory of color perception, subjectivism is untenable.

How to Manipulate an Incompatibilistically Free Agent, ROGER CLARKE

A prominent criticism of compatibilist theories of moral responsibility is that they do not deal adequately with cases of manipulation, and particularly with induced desires. So, for example, accounts that give the conditions for responsibility in terms of the reasons-responsiveness of the mechanism governing one's decisions, as Fischer and Ravizza do, seem to leave the door open to cases such as that dealt with in this article.

Reasoning, Normativity, and Experimental Philosophy, SUSANA NUCCETELLI and GARY SEAY

The development of modern science, on one widely held view, has come largely through naturalizing domains of inquiry that were historically parts of philosophy. Theories based on speculation about matters empirical were replaced with law-based, predictive explanatory theories that invoked empirical data as supporting evidence. Although philosophers have, by and large, applauded such developments, there is no consensus about whether inquiry into normative domains can be naturalized. Since the early twentieth century, attempts at naturalizing ethics have been at the center of heated debates, and later attempts at naturalizing epistemology triggered similarly contentious disputes. But there have so far been no substantial reactions to attempts at naturalizing inquiry into another plainly normative domain, that of reasoning. The article offers a partial remedy to this state of affairs by challenging a naturalistically minded argument offered by Stephen Stich and his collaborators against the Goodman account of the justification of rules of inference. This argument invokes a number of results from psychology as evidence of a relativism problem facing the Goodman account, and more generally, analytic epistemology as a whole.

T-Gunk and Exact Occupation, DANIEL GIBERMAN

Evidentiary Fallacies and Empirical Data, MICHAEL BYRON
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Publication:The Review of Metaphysics
Article Type:Report
Geographic Code:1USA
Date:Jun 1, 2012
Previous Article:American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Spring 2012, Vol. 86, No. 1.
Next Article:Australasian Journal of Philosophy: June 2012, Vol. 90, No. 2.

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