All right, retired judges, write!
Some obvious activities come to mind: Traveling with your spouse is a good idea. Get on the golf course on weekdays. Become really acquainted with your grandchildren. Pick up some how-to books, buy state-of-the-art electric power tools and become a real "Mr. Fix It." With your own hands, take up the home improvement projects you always wanted to have done, but were in no mood to pay $90.00 an hour for a carpenter to complete.
But all this is for openers.
As judges, you have been using your brains during your entire professional careers, as well as in your lives as lawyers before putting on the robe. But the brain is a muscle, and one thing is beyond cavil: You cannot allow that muscle to get flabby, and there is the tendency in retired people to do just that. To be sure, you can join a prestigious law firm as counsel or participate in mediation and arbitration if that is your inclination. These are fine choices all, but I encourage you to take a path slightly less traveled.
Technically, I have been "retired" since 1987, but as a senior judge I have opted to work part-time, filling up the void by doing the thing that I always wanted to do during my eight years as an active Pennsylvania state trial judge and nineteen years as an active United States Circuit Judge--I have found the time to write. (1)
And this is the recommendation that I make for every retired judge--trial or appellate, state or federal: Make yourselves heard on scholarly issues. (2) One of the most serious deficiencies in legal literature today is the paucity of books and articles written by judges. It is melancholy that academia has preempted a field once invigorated by the perspective of judges and practitioners. There is a reason for this sea change: the sheer increase of the caseload of the state and federal judiciary.
Look for a moment at the paper storm that has descended on the West Publishing Company. In the thirty-five years between 1929 and 1964, West published approximately 28,000 opinions every year. Yet by 1981, the volume had almost doubled to 54,104. By 1991, the number of published opinions peaked at 65,333. (3) Drawing on my own experience, when I began as a member of the Third Circuit in 1968 each judge was responsible for deciding on the merits ninety appeals a year. But now, each active judge in the Third Circuit decides 400 cases every 365 days.
The more opinions that have to be written by state and federal judges, the less time judges have to write books and articles on the law. In my mind, "After the Bench" is the time for retired judges to finally do some serious writing on the law. A vast landscape of topics stretches out before you, and these are topics that should command your attention. You have seen firsthand the warts and blemishes upon the law and its practice; now is the time to raise a mirror to the public to present what you have witnessed and think should be changed. With that said, I would argue that no problem is more pressing than the high cost of delivering legal services today. In plain speak, it simply costs too much to bring a lawsuit and, as a result, many valid claims aren't being adjudicated. My goal in this article is to spur discussion amongst my fellow "retired" judges on this issue. I defend the thesis that the primary cause for the explosion of fees and costs has been the states' wholesale adoption of the federal pleading rules, especially those dealing with unlimited discovery.
THE DISASTER OF FEDERAL NOTICE PLEADING RULES
First, let's talk about the mess in the federal district courts. We can begin with the astronomical cost of trying a case there. Let's take a case that involves $75,000.00. I select this figure because it's the minimum amount required for diversity jurisdiction. (4) Assume the following: The facts are disputed, the case must go to trial, no statutory fees are available, and the subject matter is not conducive to a contingent fee arrangement. What would it cost to obtain a competent federal court practitioner to represent you? I'm suggesting that it's going to cost you at least $75,000.00 to prosecute a claim for $75,000.00, or a like amount to defend it. (5) The main culprit is the pleading regime established by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Our current system of notice-pleadings-cum-expensive-discovery requires lawyers to jump through so many hoops that it's not economically feasible for firms to work on anything but the most lucrative cases. As I will explain, I find special fault with the I've-got-a-secret-and-I-won't-tell-you-what-I-want-or-have- until-I'm-forced-to-do-it-philosophy that lies at the heart of the federal rules.
But first, how did we ever end up in such a tangle?
The early roots of our current predicament lie in England. After the Norman Conquest of 1066, strict pleading rules developed in the English common law system. Formalism reigned. The plaintiff's complaint and the defendant's response had to be exact. The pleader, moreover, had to shoehorn the facts of his case into one of the limited forms of action, such as trespass, covenant, and assumpsit. (6) If a claimant was unable to meet these rigid requirements, the judge dismissed the suit at the pleading stage without the benefit of a trial on the merits. Under such a system, justice was ill-served; judges frequently tossed out worthy claims because of minor missteps in the pleadings.
Despite serious flaws, common law pleading endured for centuries. Not until the late nineteenth century did state governments in the United States move to adopt more flexible rules. New York acted first, enacting a code-based system to govern procedure in its state courts. Dubbed the Field Code, New York's system eliminated much of the unneeded formalism of common law pleading. Under the new doctrine, the emphasis shifted to making a detailed statement of facts that, if true, merited legal relief. Code pleading muted many of the controversies associated with the common law but it also spawned new problems. Most notably, lawyers complained that it was often difficult to research all of the facts needed to write a complaint before the statute of limitations expired.
In 1906, Roscoe Pound became the main proponent of further reform; he pushed for procedural changes that would increase flexibility and reject the more confining common law and Field-like procedures that attempted to deliver substantive law in a predictable manner.(7) Pound's ideas found favor with Yale Law School Dean Charles E. Clark, who was in 1935 appointed Reporter of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee and tasked with drafting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (8) He sold the committee on the philosophy he preached in his 1928 treatise, (9) sounding the theme that procedural technicality should not stand in the way of reaching the merits or applying substantive law. The committee's work revolutionized procedure; pleading under the Federal Rules only requires that a party make "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." (10) Few, if any facts, are required to file a lawsuit, and according to Professor Clark:
[T]he more general pleadings are amply sufficient. Let me say that if any of you feel you need more information to develop your own case, if you need more information from your opponent, we have provided for that, and I think have provided for that much more directly and simply than ever you will obtain by attempting to force the correction of the pleadings. That is in the section on Deposition and Discovery. I think that is the device you should use to secure that information. (11)
The idea sitting at the core of the Federal Rules is that a plaintiff with a reasonable but incomplete claim can file a complaint and then flesh out the details of the case by compelling the defendant to turn over evidence during the discovery and deposition phase. Notwithstanding the drafters' good intentions to simplify procedural rules--remember the mantra of Rule 1: "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action"--it hasn't worked out that way. Instead we have discovery rules anchored on a glorious Catch-22: You may discover only that which is relevant, but you can't tell what is relevant until you complete discovery.
It simply is not "inexpensive" when the lawyer is required to expend more time in discovering what the case is all about than in preparing for the actual trial itself. Indeed, Judge Bridlegoose would have chuckled at the work of the modern-day federal court practitioner. Only after
having well and exactly seen, surveyed, overlooked, reviewed, recognized, read and read over again, turned and tossed about, seriously perused and examined the preparatories, productions, evidences, proofs, allegations, depositions, cross speeches, contradictions.., and other such like confects and spiceries, both at the one and the other side, (12)
do today's federal litigators finally get to know what exactly is the claim and defense.
I do not believe that the original drafters ever anticipated that their efforts to simplify and streamline would backfire so tragically. Their intentions were noble. The revolutionary concept they dreamed up sounded good on the drawing board-to knock out all the complications and limitations of common law pleading and Field Code fact pleadings. But the language they chose purposely avoided the "facts" and "cause of action," requirements of the codes. (13) This concept was faulty from the get-go.
From the very beginning, the most populous states in the country, whose courts handle America's most important litigation, had the prescience to anticipate the difficulties and said no thank you to the invitation to jettison fact pleadings. When you consider the illustrious pedigree of those who sired the federal rules, it is significant that the subsequent adoption of their brainchild by the states has varied inversely with the state's population. Nixing the idea are California, New York, Texas, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Florida, and New Jersey. (14)
That was foresight on the part of those states. Let's try some hindsight.
The most damning evidence of the failure of the rules to live up to their promise to deliver a "just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action" (15) is that it has taken over two hundred bound volumes of reported district court opinions to tell us what these rules mean. (16) And this does not include (1) unreported district court opinions, (2) reported and unreported opinions of the Courts of Appeals, and (3) opinions of the Supreme Court.
I think that it is a mess, and this is precisely why we need the expertise of retired state judges to suggest how to clean it up.
In short, if ever a wheel needs re-inventing, it is the concept of notice pleading. There can be little debate that the cost of the delivery of legal services has become obscene and that, examining the anatomy of the system, it can be traced to the excessive costs of discovery and the new cottage industry of excessive depositions. Unfortunately for any judge who decides to take up this cause, state courts have largely gotten out of the business of generating procedural reforms. For years states had been the laboratory of new ideas in procedure, but regrettably, most of them they have fallen in lock-step with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Until state courts announce a renewed intention to innovate, I hope all retired judges will take some time to think about how our legal system could benefit from lessons learned abroad.
LET'S LOOK AT OTHER COUNTRIES
For some time I have looked upon the German system of pleading as an efficient way to let it all hang out and end some of these abuses. (17) The German complaint names the parties, the plaintiff's demands, the redress sought--either actual (equity) or substituted (money damages) and a distinct statement and object of the claim (fact pleading). In Germany, information that we learn in the United States through expensive discovery is contained in the complaint: names and addresses of witnesses, and references to documents or physical copies thereof. (18)
I find myself looking with admiration upon another role model as well. And here I go back to England, the motherland of the American legal tradition, where the new Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (CPR) for England and Wales became effective April 28, 1999. This wholesale revision of the civil procedure system in England came about when the Lord Chancellor appointed Master of the Rolls, Lord Woolf, to review the existing rules. Re-inventing the wheel, Woolf and his team of judges reduced paper work to twenty-first century standards by designing a whole new system. (19) The new rules are designed
a) to improve access to justice and reduce the cost of litigation;
b) to reduce the complexity of the rules and modernise terminology; [and]
c) to remove unnecessary distinctions of practice and procedure. (20)
Lord Woolf jettisoned existing pleading practice and substituted in its stead a set of forms to be used by the litigants. Even the name of party who makes a claim has been changed. The term "plaintiff" is relegated to the Old Curiosity Shop. The new term is "claimant." Lord Woolf identified a range of defects in the civil justice system, concluding that the system was
a) too expensive, in that the costs often exceed the value of the claim.
b) too slow in bringing cases to a conclusion;
c) too unequal, in that there was a lack of equality between the powerful wealthy litigant and the under-resourced litigant;
d) too uncertain, causing difficulty in estimating cost and direction; [and]
e) too fragmented in the way the system was organised. (21)
Under the new rules, the claimant and defendant fill in the blanks of prepared forms, known as "statements of case." The Claimant must clearly set out the facts alleged and the grounds on which the remedy is sought. The original statement of case is entitled "Claim Form," and when completed, the first page of the general "N1Claim Form (CPR Part 7)(4.99)" sets forth the name of the claimant and defendants, brief details of the claim, the value of the case, and the defendant's address. (22) In addition, the reverse of the form prompts the claimant to set forth the facts in detail by including a section titled "Particulars of Claim," and indicating that these particulars must be attached to the claim form or follow within fourteen days after it is served. The claimant or claimant's solicitor must sign the Claim Form and its "Statement of Truth," indicating the claimant's or solicitor's--as the case may be--belief that "that the facts stated in these particulars of claim are true."
In their "statements of case" the parties may name witnesses, refer to any point of law, and attach or serve copies of documents necessary to the claim or defense. (23) The new code also directs claimants to include copies of any contracts relied upon along with the particulars of claim. (24) Getting further into the nuts and bolts of the system, the Practice Directions also set forth "MATTERS WHICH MUST BE INCLUDED IN THE PARTICULARS OF CLAIM IN CERTAIN TYPES OF CLAIM," (25) and specifically identify what information must be included with filing claims for personal injury, fatal accidents, recovery of land, hire purchase, and defamation. (26) It is the philosophy of CPR that real issues between the parties should be identified at an early stage, and with greater precision.
Obviously recognizing the past financial abuses and delays in discovery, CPR also provides that
[g]reater control will be exercised over discovery, which will be considerably limited in many cases. The fresh approach to this part of the litigation process has probably contributed to it being given the new name of "disclosure." (27)
Freewheeling deposition-taking, the major cause for increased litigation costs in American courts, is no longer available in England and Wales. You must get a court order for cause shown to obtain a deposition, and when permitted, it must be conducted under strict supervision. Rule 34.8 CPR provides that a party may apply to the court for a person to be examined before the hearing. (28) The person is described as a "deponent" and evidence is referred to as a "deposition." The deposition must be taken before (a) a judge, (b) an examiner of the court, or (c) such other person as the court appoints. Moreover, if the party intends to introduce the deposition in evidence at the hearing, he or she must serve the notice twenty-one days before the day fixed by the hearing. (29) These are all salutary developments, and I can't resist pointing out that what our moribund federal rules really need is a good dose of CPR.
In apologizing for dwelling on the revolutionary new rules of England and Wales, I must emphasize that my purpose was two-fold: (1) to provide an example of a topic on which other retired judges might express their views in writing "After the Bench," and (2) to show how judges in England and Wales have already met the overarching problem facing courts in this country. In Lord Woolf's words, trying civil cases is "too expensive, in that the costs often exceed the value of the claim." (30) Because our active judges are totally overburdened with day-by-day caseloads, the leadership in writing serious articles on court matters must come from retired judges.
My invitation to retired judges--especially state judges--to examine your trial procedures is only one topic that would open an important dialogue. For example, I have not mentioned needed reforms in appellate practice. In particular, consider how we should process that type of appeal described by Cardozo in 1921 when he was Chief Judge of the State of New York, presiding on its Court of Appeals:
Of the cases that come before the court in which I sit, a majority, I think, could not, with semblance of reason, be decided in any way but one. The law and its application alike are plain. Such cases, are predestined, so to speak, to affirmance without opinion. (31)
These are but suggestions. All of you retired judges--state or federal, trial or appellate--can remember rules, customs, or practices that caused you to grind your teeth and mutter during your tenure on the bench. Act on this feeling. Choose your pet peeve and write about it. Begin your article or book with, "Our way of doing things is not right. If I had my druthers, this is what I would do."
(1.) I started my judicial career as an Allegheny County (Pittsburgh) Common Pleas Court judge in 1961. In 1968 I was appointed a United States Circuit Judge. Since "retiring" I have written a number of law review articles and the following books: Ruggero J. Aldisert, Opinion Writing (West Publg. Co. 1990); Ruggero J. Aldisert, The Judicial Process: Readings, Materials And Cases (West Publg. Co. 1996); Ruggero J. Aldisert, Logic For Lawyers: A Guide To Clear Legal Thinking (3d ed., Natl. Inst. for Trial Ad. 1997); Ruggero J. Aldisert, Winning On Appeal: Better Briefs and Oral Argument (2d ed. Natl. Inst. for Trial Ad. 2003); Ruggero J. Aldisert, Road To The Robes: A Federal Judge Recollects Young Years & Early Times (Authorhouse 2005).
(2.) The Federal Judiciary has a category of judges that should be a model for State systems--the Office of Senior Judge. Upon obtaining the age of 65, with fifteen years of service, or upon reaching the age of 70 with ten years of service, a judge of the Third Article (United States District judges and United States Circuit judges) may take senior status. This is technically retirement but with a fundamental difference from the State systems. A senior judge has the option of working full-time, part-time or not at all--while receiving the same salary as an active judge. To be sure, if a judge is going to pack it all in and still retain Senior Judge status, he is under the same restraints as an active judge. He cannot participate in commercial work or practice law.
(3.) Letter from Kate MacEachern, Manager, West Group, to Ruggero J. Aldisert 1 (Nov. 15, 2002) (on file with author).
(4.) See 28 U.S.C. [section] 1332(a) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.") (2005) (available at http://www.uscode.house.gov).
(5.) But there is also an assumption within the assumption--this example assumes that you can get a competent firm to represent you at this cut rate. The ABA-type law firms where my law clerks end up (those firms that meet the high starting salaries) would not touch a trial-bound federal court case for less than a $100,000.00 fee.
(6.) At common law, pleading was technical and was designed to resolve a single issue. The parties pleaded back and forth until one side either demurred, resulting in a legal issue, or traversed, resulting in a factual issue. Joseph H. Koffler & Alison Reppy, Common Law Pleadings 13 (West Publg. Co. 1969):
The functions of pleading at Common Law are six in number and may be listed as follows:
(I) The first or Primary Function of Pleading is to reduce the controversy between the Parties to a single, clear cut, well-defined Issue of Fact or Law;
(II) To reduce Questions of Fact to clear-cut Issues by eliminating immaterial and incidental matter, thus narrowing the case to one or more specific prepositions on which the controversy turns, thus operating as an aid to the Court in admitting or rejecting offers of evidence;
(III) To notify the Parties and the Court of the respective Claims, Defenses, and Counter-Demands of the adversaries;
(IV) To serve as an index to the respective Counsel as to the Points to be Proved at the Trial and as a Guide to the Court in Apportioning the Burden of Proof and Rebuttal as between the plaintiff and the defendant;
(V) To serve as a Formal Basis for the Judgment:
(VI) To preserve a Record of the Controversy Litigated and to create a foundation for the Plea of Res Judicata, thus preventing a relitigation of the same controversy between the same Parties at a later date.
(7.) Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 909, 944 (1987).
(8.) Id. at 961-962.
(9.) Charles E. Clark, Handbook of the Law of Code Pleading (West Publg. Co. 1928).
(10.) Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
(11.) See Stephen N. Subrin, Martha L. Minow, Mark S. Brodin, & Thomas O. Main, Civil Procedure: Doctrine, Practice, and Context 254 (2d ed. Aspen L. & Bus. 2004) (emphasis added) (quoting Charles E. Clark, Comments in Proceedings of the Institute at Washington, D.C., on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (ABA Oct. 6, 1938)).
(12.) Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial Decisions, 14 Cornell L.Q. 274, 277-278 (1929) (quoting 2 F. Rabelais, Gargantua and Pantagruel 39-40 (Everyman's Ed. 1929)).
(13.) Subrin, supra n. 7, at 976.
(14.) Thomas O. Main, Procedural Uniformity and the Exaggerated Role of Rules: A Survey of Intra-State Uniformity in Three States that Have Not Adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 46 Viii. L. Rev. 311, 322-23 (2001) (discussing differences among states); John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 Wash. L. Rev. 1367, 1378, 1429, tbl. II (1986) (indicating that these states did not follow federal pattern).
California: "A statement of the facts constituting the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language." Cal. Civ. Proc. Code [section] 425.10(a) (West 2001).
New York: "Statements in a pleading shall be sufficiently particular to give the court and parties notice of the transactions, occurrences, or series of transactions or occurrences, intended to be proved and the material elements of each cause of action or defense." N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. [section] 3013 (McKinney 2001).
Texas: "a short statement of the cause of action sufficient to give fair notice of the claim involved." Tex. R. Civ. P. [section] 47(a) (Vernon 2001). Oakley & Coon explained "Rule 47(a)'s requirement of stating a 'cause of action' undercuts its liberal language about 'fair notice' with an apparent requirement of pleading facts beyond those required for mere notice of claim." Oakley & Coon, supra this note, at 1418 n. 339. Case law in Texas supports their characterization of this state as one that requires fact pleading:
In determining whether a cause of action was pied, plaintiffs pleadings must be adequate for the court to be able, from an examination of the plaintiff's pleadings alone, to ascertain with reasonable certainty and without resorting to information aliunde the elements of plaintiff's cause of action and the relief sought with sufficient information upon which to base a judgment.
Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679, 683 (Tex. 1979) (citations omitted).
Pennsylvania: "The material facts on which a cause of action or defense is based shall be stated in a concise and summary form." Pa. R. Civ. P. [section] 1019(a) (West 2001).
Illinois: "All pleadings shall contain a plain and concise statement of the pleader's cause of action, counterclaim, defense, or reply." 735 Ill. Comp. Star. Ann. 5/2-603(a) (West 2001).
Florida: "a short and plain statement of the ultimate facts showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(b)(2) (West 2001).
New Jersey: "a pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall contain a statement of the facts on which the claim is based, showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." N.J. Ct. R. 4:5-2 (West 2000).
(15.) Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 (available at http://uscode.house.gov).
(16.) These cases are collected in the West Group publication known as Federal Rules Decisions, and as we go to press, the latest volume is 237 F.R.D. (2006).
(17.) See Ruggero J. Aldisert, Rambling Through Continental Legal Systems, 43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 935, 954-55 (1982).
(18.) Arthur Taylor Von Mehren & James Russell Gordley, An Introduction to the Comparative Study of the Civil Law System 164 (2d ed. Little, Brown & Co. 1977).
(19.) Links to the various sections of Lord Woolf's report are available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/civil/fmal/contents.htm (accessed March 21, 2007; copy on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
(20.) Blackstone's Guide to the Civil Procedure Rules 1 (Charles Plant ed., 1999) [hereinafter "Guide"].
(21.) Id. at 3-4.
(22.) Id at 927-28. For an example of this form, see the appendix to this essay.
(23.) Id. at 420 (reproducing Part 10.3 of Practice Direction 16--Statements of Case):
A claimant may:
(1) refer in his particulars of claim to any point of law on which his claim is based,
(2) give in his particulars of claim the name of any witness whom he proposes to call, and
(3) attach to or serve with the particulars of claim a copy of any document which he considers is necessary to his claim (including any expert's report to be filed in accordance with Part 35).
See also id. at 421 (reproducing Part 16.3 of Practice Direction 16--Statements of Case):
A party may:
(1) refer in his statement of case to any point of law on which his claim or defence, as the case may be, is based,
(2) give in his statement of case the name of any witness he proposes to call, and
(3) attach to or serve with this statement of case a copy of any document which he considers is necessary to his claim or defence, as the case may be (including any expert's report to be filed in accordance with Part 35).
You will notice that these citations are to the Practice Directions that accompany the CPR; nearly every rule is accompanied by a Practice Direction containing this sort of useful advice.
(24.) Id. at 419 (reproducing Part 9.3 of Practice Direction 16--Statements of Case): Where a claim is based upon a written agreement:
(l) a copy of the contract or documents constituting the agreement should be attached to or served with the particulars of claim and the original(s) should be available at the hearing, and
(2) any general conditions of sale incorporated in the contract should also be attached (but where the contract is or the documents constituting the agreement are bulky this practice direction is complied with by attaching or serving only relevant parts of the contract or documents).
(25.) Id. at 417.
(26.) See e.g. id. (reproducing Parts 4 and 5 of Practice Direction 16--Statements of Case):
Personal injury claims
4.1 The particulars of claim must contain:
(1) the claimant's date of birth, and
(2) brief details of the claimant's personal injuries.
4.2 The claimant must attach to his particulars of claim a schedule of details of any past and future expenses and losses which he claims.
4.3 Where the claimant is relying on the evidence of a medical practitioner the claimant must attach to or serve with his particulars of claim a report from a medical practitioner about the personal injuries which he alleges in his claim.
4.4 In a provisional damages claim the claimant must state in his particulars of claim;
(1) that he is seeking an award of provisional damages [under certain statutes],
(2) that there is a chance that at some future time the claimant will develop some serious disease or suffer some serious deterioration in his physical or mental condition, and
(3) specify the disease or type of deterioration in respect of which an application may be made at a future date.
Fatal accident claims
5.1 In a fatal accident claim the claimant must state in his particulars of claim:
(1) that it is brought under the Fatal Accidents Act 1976,
(2) the dependents on whose behalf the claim is made,
(3) the date of birth of each dependent, and
(4) details of the nature of the dependency claim.
5.2 A fatal accident claim may include a claim for damages for bereavement.
5.3 In a fatal accident claim the claimant may also bring a claim under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of 1934 on behalf of the estate of the deceased).
You get the idea. The provisions addressing recovery of land, hire purchase, and defamation are similar. See id. at 417-19 (reproducing Parts 6, 7, and 8 of Practice Direction 16--Statements of Case).
(27.) Id. at 5.
(28.) Id. at 556-58 (reproducing CPR Part 34--Depositions and Court Attendance by Witnesses).
(29.) For an example of the form ordering the examination of a deponent, see the appendix to this essay.
(30.) Guide, supra n. 17, at 3.
(31.) Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 164 (Yale Univ. Press 1921).
Ruggero J. Aldisert, Senior United States Circuit Judge, Chief Judge Emeritus, United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
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|Author:||Aldisert, Ruggero J.|
|Publication:||Journal of Appellate Practice and Process|
|Date:||Sep 22, 2006|
|Too soon to celebrate.|
|Judge, lawyer reverse course.|
|Honoring your honor; Special Worcester session.|
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