After Auschwitz: reflections on the identity politics of myth, memory and messianism.
The political and social upheavals of the last decade of the 20th century in Europe mark on the one hand the end of the East-West and Cold-War conflict as a last burden of World War II. At the same time they raise some serious and poignant questions regarding the past. It is becoming increasingly clear, that these questions will not be solved by mere social-economic answers, even if they were in the long run to offer positive prospects for the future. The political climate in many Western democracies struggling to meet the demands of a united Europe shows a growing concern with the diversities of opinion in terms of economic, social, and religiously orientated political solutions needed to mould post-war Europe into a place where people can feel at ease and at home in a truly open society.
The search for an ethos of a united and democratic Europe is closely linked with the loss of tradition, and thus of the historical-cultural consciousness in the secularisation process. Various societies have experienced this in different ways in the course of the 18th and 19th centuries, culminating in the atrocities of two World Wars fought in almost every country on the continent and, under the cloak of war, resulting in the virtual destruction ofEuropean Jewry.
After the failure of the emancipation of the Jews, and despite the partial integration of Wissenschaft des Judentums as an academic discipline in the 19th century, it becomes, after the Shoah of the 20th century, and particularly in the light of the presently alarming manifestations of a growing antisemitism in many parts of Europe, more than a mere scholarly mandate to search for a new orientation in Western Humanities and Social Studies.
The question of the Jewish origin and its contribution to Western civilization and thought is part and parcel of 19th century historiography. It was then, in the wake of a historicism that tried to free religious canonical texts within the western Christian tradition of their dogmatic content and discover their historical roots, that a fundamental shift took place in modern Jewish consciousness as they struggled for emancipation and integration into Western societies. This shift affects the attitude towards the past, and is evident in terms of a strong desire to respond to the historical, political, social and cultural challenges posed by modernity.
This essay tries to trace the roots of modern antisemitism through the power of political myths inherent in the dialectics of history, memory and messianism in Western tradition, as a response to the intellectual crisis of our time.
History, Memory and Morality in Holocaust Narrative
At the beginning of the 21st century, as we look back on the end of the Jewish world in Europe, especially in what was the Jewish space called Ashkenaz--united by the common use of the German language in all its cultural ramifications--we find we are no longer using the same discourse as before: the reflection on antisemitism after Auschwitz enlarges the horizon of our consciousness in a new way that enables us to confront the Holocaust from a human, that is a moral point of view, crossing the boundaries between aesthetics and ethics. (1)
Although one would not deny the extraordinary character of the Holocaust as an historical event, there exists a considerable debate concerning the uses and misuses of memory regarding its moral implications, its "moral space of figurative discourse" (2) with its more radical one: silence.
The problem is however not only inherent in the context of Holocaust writing, but even more so in reading Holocaust narrative. Thus, when dealing with the relationship between "how narratives are told (their aesthetics) and how they mean (their 'hermeneutics')", Daniel Schwartz notes, "I see telling as a crucial act, all the more crucial because of the trauma of the originating cause. Because we can never trust memory fully, in narrative effects (how a teller presents himself or herself) sometimes precede cause (the explanation for why a narrator is the person he or she is). (3)
The very act of telling the story thus creates a discontinuity with the historical past: the narrator chooses to place him or herself in the situation of those who did not live to tell their story to us, the survivors burdened with the task of creating continuity in time. (4)
The question posed by Myth, Memory and Messianism in the context of antisemitism after Auschwitz is therefore: what are the political, ethical and, as we shall see, messianic implications of breaking the silence of Auschwitz, of speaking, not only the unspeakable, but the language of those whose voices were not heard then and cannot be recaptured to-day. "The disaster always takes place after having taken place" (Maurice Blanchot).
Thus the remarkable fact of the Holocaust representation confronts us in the first place with our own lives, with the way we look, directly and indirectly, through the very blurred vision of our consciousness, trying at all costs to recapture something of the recognition of origin, to try and fill the gap caused by a general feeling of "world-loss", to avoid falling in the abyss of meaninglessness.
"Perhaps we should say that Holocaust narratives have become a genre with its own archetypes and its own cultural continuity." (5) It means starting at the very beginning: questioning language and narrative, questioning the way one writes and interprets history.
Here we can encounter the convergence oi political myth and the dialectics of history, memory and messianism in recognizing the Nazi perversion of values in the name of a 'higher order' which demanded a human 'sacrifice' on the part of the German nation, moving towards its intended destiny as ultimate redemption, its Heilsgeschichte, an issue we will deal with in depths later on in this essay.
It means a breaking not only with the historical conventions of western tradition, but also seeking to bridge the gap between ethics and aesthetics, touching upon the question of concern versus indifference, when dealing with detachment and objectivity as a scholarly virtue. This search for truth, as the solid ground for knowledge became fractured, revealed the deep fissures caused by the very fact that Auschwitz really happened. Dealing with this historical fact, thus poses a moral burden which is normally hidden from the eye, when dealing with historical experience from an ethical point of view: ". . . on the brink of morality without institutions."
Emmanuel Levinas names this the Conditio Judaica--the Jewish Destiny:
"When temples are standing, the flags flying atop the palaces, and the magistrates donning their sashes, the tempests raging in individuals' heads do not pose the threat of shipwrecks. They are perhaps but the waves stirred by the winds of the world around well-anchored souls within their harbors. The true inner life is not a pious or revolutionary thought that comes to us in a stable world, but the obligation to lodge the whole of humankind in the shelter--exposed to all the winds--of conscience . . . But the fact that settled, established humanity can at any moment be exposed to the dangerous situation of its morality residing entirely in its "heart of hearts" its dignity completely at the mercy of a subjective voice, no longer reflected or confirmed by any objective order - that is the risk upon which the honor of humankind depends. But it may be this risk that is signified by the very fact that the Jewish condition is constituted within humanity. Judaism is humanity on the brink of morality without institutions." (6)
The dignity of humanity is, as Levinas points out, not lodged in stable institutions, but "at the mercy of a subjective voice no longer reflected or confirmed by any objective order", because "Judaism is humanity on the brink of morality without institutions". He reflects then on the price the Jewish people have paid for this "exposure" and concludes:
"But that condition, in which human morality returns after so many centuries as to its womb, attests, with a very old testament, its origin on the hither side of civilizations. Civilizations made possible, called for, brought about, hailed and blessed by that morality--which can, however, in its part, only know and justify itself in the fragility of the conscience. . ." (7)
Conscience is, in fact, fragile, because knowledge breaks down in the face of each individual and becomes relevant where the "personal" meets the "general", the "religious" meets the "profane". Our debate on "Antisemitism after Auschwitz" therefore cannot avoid the question of the nexus between power and memory. (8) Dealing with the Jewish Question after Auschwitz is thus not only a political issue, a form of restitution or reparation, but rather about the intellectual survival of society as a whole, and particularly about the necessary consideration of the renewed role of the humanities in countries experiencing antisemitism as the late consequences of a rupture of civilization, especially in those countries where Jews are no longer a present force to help carry the burden of values. It means addressing the question of the relevance of traditional texts--be they religious or secular--which, to paraphrase William James, (9) reveals the impact of the varieties of historical experiences and their transformations, offering an opportunity to study and research the tradition-founding elements in the various traditions that have shaped European identities, and their cultural connection with Judaism. This would be a common task for all, to make a new beginning out of destruction, to confront the historic hour and therefore history. It would allow us to delve into the Archives of Memory and Morality rather than History to extract the deep layers of amnesia and strategies of denial inherent in human nature, to free the spirit from the burdens of forgetting, as an act of resistance to any form of totalitarianism, because "The struggle against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting" (10)
It means a coming to terms, not merely with the historical fact of the annihilation of European Jewry, the conscious killing of six million innocent men, women and children under the cloak of war, but also with the way we look at life and history, how wejudge our actions and those of others, and how we practice political activism and social critique. In short, it poses the question of the politics of history and memory, and urges us to reflect on the means and ways to move towards, what I would call, A Political Hermeneutics of Culture.
The Third Reich and the Jews
When considering the problem of antisemitism in myth, memory, and messianism after Auschwitz, the question of European Jewry after the Enlightenment thus becomes important: Jews were murdered in the 'Third Reich', not because they were criminals or deviants--not even solely for their riches in Germany and other parts of Europe--but for the simple reason that they were Jews: Europe had to be made "Judenrein" for the establishment of the Third Reich--Das Heilige Roemische Reich Deutscher Nation - on the threshold of the Third Millennium.
Beyond the question of good and evil, the politics of myth, memory, and messianism do not find their answer in reflecting on the premises of legal and philosophical concepts or pseudo-conventions such as 'etiquette' and 'political correctness,' nor in an attempt to hide behind learned discussions concerning the correct facts and figures, nor in the use of language borrowed from the lexicon of religious canon, such as 'martyrdom', 'victim' or 'suffering'. (It is for this reason that I find the word Holocaust Greek: burnt-offering--so problematic since Jews were not given a choice in Auschwitz to die for Kiddush Haschem, the Sanctification of God's name: they were murdered in the name of duty for 'Fuehrer und Vaterland'.)
But representation entails a serious reflection on accepting the onus to rethink, not only the Shoah, (11) but the very project of the Humanities as a discipline, in the light of history, language and the self (12), directed towards finding a cultural paradigm which breaks down our preconceived notions of reason, of reality, and of normality, and critiques our normative values and standards. "The universe of dying that was Auschwitz yearns for a language purified of the taint of normality" (13) writes Lawrence Langer. But the question arises: was it a "universe of dying" and can this universe "yearn for a language purified of the taint of normality"? Can a universe yearn at all, when those who were murdered cannot speak, but still move our lips? Our mourning and yearning for them is much stronger than any act of memory that can possibly heal the universe by way of language. "Manchmal freilich stirbt der Himmel unseren Scherben voraus" (Paul Celan). (14) --Looking up to Heaven thus makes no sense and is to no avail when we are left to gather the pieces which have rained down on us from the broken sky: the flight into an outdated metaphysics--or theology--is no longer possible.
Documents show, that the murder of the Jews was a political program ofNazi ideology, and cannot be surmised under the rubric of anti- Marxism or anti-Semitism. In the words of Martin Bormann at the end of 1944:
"National Socialist doctrine is totally anti-Jewish, which means antiCommunist and anti-Christian: everything is linked to National Socialism and everything concurs towards the fight against Judaism." (15)
Although one might argue about the historical, political, and sociological reasons for the extermination of the Jews of Europe, the fact remains that one single group was singled out--the Jews--who would not have a place in the redemptive notion of "the world to come": the "New Order" of Europe. (16)
The emancipation of the Jews had to a certain degree guaranteed their equal status before law, but not their acceptance as members of European society, sharing a common ethos of justice, framed by the universal values of equality and human rights. The social and cultural implications of this tension became most poignantly evident for Jews in Germany against the Jewish demand for a home was soon transformed into the ecstatic illusion ofbeing athome." (17)
This hope was cruelly shattered as the "symbiosis" between Jews and Germans failed the test of social reality: "Society", as Hannah Arendt observed correctly, "confronted with political, economic and legal equality for the Jews, made it quite clear that none of its classes were prepared to grant them social equality, and that only exceptions from the Jewish people would be received." (18)
When considering the destruction of European Jewry, we are indeed probing the limit, not only of representation while witnessing the inversion of human values, but also touching upon the identity politics inherent in Nazi ideology.
An illustration of this can be found in Heinrich Himmler's famous 1943 Posen speech to upper-level SS-officers, revealing the importance and function of the annihilation of the Jews in shaping the German psyche. After announcing to his comrades that he is going to speak of "a really grave matter", Himmler continues: "Among ourselves, this once, it shall be uttered quite frankly; but in public we will never speak of it." He reminds them of the beginnings, when almost ten years before, on June 30, 1944, they carried out their duties as ordered "to stand against the wall comrades who had transgressed, and shoot them, also we have never talked about this and never will. It was the tact, which I am glad to say is a matter of course to us that made us never discuss it among ourselves, never talk about it. Each of us shuddered, and yet each one knew that he would do it again if it were ordered and if it were necessary." And then Himmler comes to the main point: "I am referring to the evacuation of the Jews, the annihilation of the Jewish people. This is one of those things that are easily said. . . Most of you know what it means to see a hundred corpses lie side by side, or five hundred or a thousand. To have stuck this out, and--accepting cases of human weakness--to have kept our integrity, that is what has made us hard. In our history, this is an unwritten, never-to-be-written page of glory. . . All in all, we may say that we have accomplished the most difficult task out of love for our people. And we have not sustained any damage to our inner self, our soul and our character." (19)
We see here, that Himmler was well aware of the moral burden of the atrocious acts of his officers, but in evoking their memory of the events, he justifies those as a just punishment against those "who had transgressed". And yet it had to remain secret, not only because later generations would not understand, but because indeed then "each of us shuddered" and even now "he would do it again if it were ordered and if it were necessary". (20) It meant a following of orders in the name of necessity, i.e. higher "Order of Things", which "we" didn't discuss even "among ourselves": "In our history, this is an unwritten, never-to-be written page of glory"--a sublime act without memory, never to be written, never to be remembered, but to be repeated again, if necessary. The act of remembering would present a moral burden as an obstacle to what was "the most difficult task out of love for our people": (21) the ultimate sacrifice of memory in the name of love. . ."
The last sentence of our quote is perhaps the most telling and chilling of all: the extermination of the Jews, the singling out of each and every member of this specific group to be wiped from the face of the earth, this task was accomplished without any moral damage "to our inner self, our soul and our character" but "out of love for our people".
Himmler understood perfectly well that "this glorious page in the history of the German nation" needed to remain secret. The concern he expressed was not whether future generations might bring a moral consciousness to bear on their collective memory of events; rather, he was alluding to the significance of Nazi ideology as a "New Heaven and a New Earth" albeit not in the sense of a "New Testament", but through the power of political myth, as an act of "self-sacrifice". As executioners of the Jews, they sacrificed themselves in a redemptive act on the "altar of history": they offered themselves up as a burnt-offering of memory itself: the Jews must die so that we can live. This freedom from "damage", to their inner selves, their souls and their character was "proof'--as paradoxical as it may sound - of the "moral character of their acts", for the Reich to be saved from oblivion by the chosen few until the end of days, as a messianic paradigm.
In his well-known critique of German ideology, The Jargon of Authenticity, Theodor W. Adorno exposes the Nazi corruption of the notion of authenticity and its devastating effects:
"The armored man was so conscious of his unprotected places that he preferred to grasp at the most violent arrangement of arguments, rather than call subjectivity by its name. He plays tactically with the subjective aspect of authenticity: for him authenticity is no longer a logical element mediated by subjectivity but is something in the subject, in Dasein itself, something objectively discoverable. The observing subject prescribes whatever is authentic to the subject as observed: it prescribes the attitude towards death. This displacement robs the subject of its moment of freedom and spontaneity: it completely freezes, like the Heideggerian states of mind, into something like an attribute of the substance 'existence'. . . the category of authenticity, which was at first introduced for a descriptive purpose, and which flowed from the relative innocent question about what is authentic in something, now turns into a mythically imposed fate. . . Jews are punished for being this destiny, both ontologically and naturalistically at the same time." (22)
The jargon of authenticity functions as an ideology of language, rendering it an aura of Dignity and Death. "There was a time when the subject thought itself a small divinity, as well as a law- giving authority, sovereign in the consciousness of its own freedom." (23) This freedom is now sacrificed on the altar of Being, as a kind of messianism of Dasein as the core of Heidegger's New Metaphysics.
"Sacrifice means farewell from the existent on the way to the preservation of the favor of Being. Nevertheless, sacrifice can be prepared in the working and effecting (Leisten) within the existent, yet such action can never fulfill the sacrifice. The fulfillment of sacrifice stems from the urgency out of which the action of every historical man rises--by means of which he preserves the achieved Dasein for the preservation of the dignity of being." (24)
Here, historical man is instrumentalized for the purpose of an eternal and true goal. "Sacrifice is at home in the essence of the event. In the form of the event being claims man for the truth of Being." There is no room for human judgement or calculation of any kind since it "disfigures the nature of sacrifice". All considerations and desires for a higher or lower purpose had to be suspended for the sake of the "clarity of the courage for sacrifice, which is marked by an awe which really fears; and which has taken upon itself to live in the neighborhood of that which is indestructible." (25)
The displacement of reality between perpetrator and victim now becomes apparent: the Jew became a substitute for the moral consciousness of the German soul, and the act of killing the Jew a substitute for messianic self- sacrifice, with its devastating consequences not only for the fate of European Jewry but for post-holocaust Germany and other parts of Europe, as witnessed by increasing antisemitism with its specific characteristics in East and West." (26)
Modern Messianism in German Romanticism
The annihilation of European Jewry was thus an act of vindication that would once and for all inscribe the German nation in history. It is from here also, that the struggle against communism becomes evident, as one ideology confronts another, and it can be called the irony or rather the List der Geschichte (as variant of "List der Vernunft") that pitched the West against Communism for 40 years after the war. One sees this, especially in retrospect, knowing that Hitler was not much better than Stalin, because both were dictators and tyrants, with perhaps one difference: Stalin persecuted those who were his political opponents, Hitler those who were his moral and thus religious, that is, messianic opponents.
Thus, when considering the dialectics of history and memory in the context of the politics of power in myth, memory and messianism, the issue of responsibility and leadership gains an immense importance. It poses the question of moral responsibility, in particular that of the individual and its impact on the course of history. Is the excuse of hiding behind 'rules and regulations' an avoidance of responsibility, or does it carry, at its very core the surrendering of individuality altogether? The question must thus be formulated as follows: To what degree is the human act--in any given circumstance - an expression of individuality and responsibility, and above all, in which way does it impact human freedom to choose, and exercise the one quality that is given to humans as a birthright: to express through action the difference between right and wrong, on history'?
Now, it should be borne in mind that the notion of responsibility was for a long time left out of the discourse of western tradition. Before the Enlightenment, the outcome and impact of human action was discussed in Christian-theological terms, informed by the notion, that our actions (Werke) were redeemed in the light of the death of the Messiah Jesus Christ, a belief that carried western society from Augustine's Civitas Dei to Luther's "Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms" (Zwei-Reiche-Lehre) with the possibility of redeeming all acts of Man in the coming Kingdom of God. (27)
The Enlightenment tried to reinstate the individual--cogito ergo sum (Descartes): by way of reason one was to know right from wrong. The backlash came from Romanticism, meant to regain a sense of origin, lost through historicism, with its heritage in the humanities of intrinsic ambivalence in regard to the relevance of traditional texts. (28)
When considering this development in regard to the question of moral responsibility and leadership, we see, that, in contrast to the Enlightenment and Historicism, it was in Romanticism that the question of leadership became important: the leader was declared to be the incarnation of the spirit of the nation, that is, the "Kingdom of Man", as the incarnation of the "Kingdom of God\ Hence the romantic attraction on the part of the Nazis and their misuse of Nietzsche for political purpose; the "Death of God" paved the way for the "Life of Man". Therefore, Jews--not only the Jew, but Jesus of Nazareth, Messiah of the Christians--had to die, "so that we may live": The notion of leadership thus became extremely important, because the leader incorporated the Law and the Nation, and his orders had to be followed unconditionally.
Seventy years later, as the Drang for normalcy and integration in postwar Europe has blotted out personal reflection and civil responsibility, complacency has replaced critical consciousness, resulting in a flight towards deliberate ignorance: the admission of possible collective guilt is sublimated by a desire for vindication. A reflection on antisemitism after Auschwitz in the context of identity politics of myth, memory, and messianism thus touches upon the very foundations of human existence and may open new perspectives for the future. As one of the foremost Holocaust scholars puts it:
"We have much to learn yet about the Holocaust in this, as well as in other inquiry. But as we all know, the question is no less important than the answer. We are asking about the human response to tragedy, about the feeling of community between groups and individuals, about the community of interests between people who care for and respect each other and each other's legitimately different traditions. The Holocaust is a touchstone of such inquiry." (29)
(1.) See Robert Eaglestone, "From the Bars of Quotation Marks: Emmanuel Levinas's (Non)-Representation of the Holocaust," in The Holocaust and the Text: Speaking the Unspeakable, ed. Andrew Leak and George Paizis (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 97109.
(2.) Berel Lang, Act and Idea in the Nazi Genocide (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 160-161.
(3.) Daniel R. Schwartz, Imagining the Holocaust (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 35.
(4.) Compare the biblical injunction to remember the Exodus from Egypt It is because of what God did to me when I went free from Egypt. "And you shall tell your son on that day, saying" (Ex. 13:8).
(5.) Daniel R. Schwartz, Imagining, p. 35.
(6.) Emmanuel Levinas, Proper Names, transi by Michael B. Smith, London 1996, p. 122.
(7.) Ibid., p. 123.
(8.) Jan-Wemer Mueller, ed., Memory and Power in Post-War Europe. Studies in the Presence of the Past (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
(9.) William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience. A Study in Human Nature (London: Longman, 1902).
(10.) Milan Kundera, The Book of Laughter and Forgetting (NewYork: Knopf, 1980).
(11.) Yehuda Bauer, Rethinking the Holocaust (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).
(12.) Eveline Goodman-Thau, Aufstand der Was ser. Judische Hermeneutik zwischen Tradition und Moderne (Berlin: Philo Verlagsges, 2002), 9-10 and 15-31.
(13.) Lawrence Langer, Admitting the Holocaust: Collected Essays (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 93.
(14.) "Surely, Heaven sometimes dies ahead of our shards
(15.) In: Adolf Hitler, Libres propos sur la guerre et la paix, vol. 2, (Paris: Flammarion, 1954); quoted from Saul Friedlaender, Some Aspects of Historical Significance of the Holocaust. Jerusalem: Institute of Contemporary Jewry, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1977), 8.
(16.) It is in this context interesting to note, that even Claus von Stauffenberg and several of his co-conspirators of the failed attempt to kill Hitler at his headquarters in EastPrussia on July 20, 1944 did not die in the name of democracy. In a document declaring their shared ideals and principles they asserted ". . . that they believed in the 'future of the Germans' a people, it claimed, that represented a 'fusion of Hellenic and Christian origins in its German being'. . . the Germans, the document read, had a calling 'to lead the community of the Western peoples to a more beautiful life'. This projected 'New Order' would involve all Germans, it continued, and would guarantee 'rights and justice'. At the same time, it announced that the conspirators 'despise the lie of equality, however, and bow before the ranks assigned by nature'. It ended, 'We commit to join an inseparable community that through its attitude and actions serves the New Order and forms the fighters for the future leaders Fuhrer - which they will need'." Quoted from: Robert. E. Norton, Secret Germany: Stefan George and his Circle (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 745-746.
(17.) Gershom Scholem, "Jews and Germans," in On Jews and Judaism in Crisis, ed. Werner J. Dannhauer (New York: Schocken Books, 1976), 80.
(18.) Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, 1958), 56.
(19.) Lucy Dawidowicz, ed., A Holocaust Reader (West Orange, NJ: Berman House, 1976), 132-133.
(20.) Italics are mine.
(21.) Italics are mine; Cf. also among others the treatment of this document by Dominick LaCapra, Representing the Holocaust: History, Theory and Trauma (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), 105-110, as well as History and Memory after Auschwitz (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 25-35 and Saul Friedlander, Memory, History, and the Extermination of the Jews of Europe (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993).
(22.) "Judgement," Adorno illustrates, "is passed according to the logic of that joke about the coachman who is asked to explain why he beats his horse unmercifully, and who answers that after all the animal has taken on itself to become a horse, and therefore he has to run." Theodor W. Adorno, The Jargon of Authenticity (London: Routledge, 1973), 126127 (italics are mine).
(23.) Ibid., 160.
(24.) Ibid., 161 (italics aremine).
(25.) Ibid., 162.
(26.) Jeffrey Heri, "The Emergence and Legacies of Divided Memory: Germany and the Holocaust after 1945," in Mueller, Memory and Power.
(27.) One of the fallacies of Christian faith is to my mind, that one is made guilty for an act one has not committed in the beginning in the form of original sin, and one is forgiven for any real action throughout one's life, by the sacrificial death of Christ, which means not only a victory of life over death, but at the same time a vindication of any acts committed. . .
(28.) Juergen Habermas, "Die verkleidete Tora. Rede zum 80. Geburtstag von Gerschom Scholem," in Politik, Kunst undReligion (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1978), 133.
(29.) Yehuda Bauer, The Holocaust in Historical Perspective (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1978), 92.
Eveline Goodman-Thau, Founding director of the Herman Cohen Academy for European Studies and Austria's first woman rabbi.
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|Title Annotation:||Auschwitz, Germany|
|Publication:||Journal for the Study of Antisemitism|
|Date:||Dec 1, 2015|
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