Printer Friendly

Afghanistan theater consolidation and shipping point selection in support of operation enduring freedom.

Introduction

This research effort analyzes the locations under consideration for Theater Consolidation and Shipping Point (TCSP) emplacement in the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) area of operation. The goal of this effort is to enhance senior leaders' understanding prior to selection of the final locations. This effort compared locations and provided recommendations for TCSP emplacement; however, the results are not prescriptive. The final decision will be made by senior military and civilian leaders. This research was conducted in parallel to a combined effort between the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and United States Central Command.

Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan represents a specific situation which requires massive amounts of logistics support from DLA and USTRANSCOM. Unfortunately, Afghanistan is a land-locked country. Cargo transported via sealift must unload at a sea port of debarkation (SPOD) in another country and be further transported via rail, truck, or airlift into Afghanistan (see Figure 1). Additionally, the land-based transportation network (rail and roads) is not well developed into and within Afghanistan. This makes logistics efforts for OEF significantly more difficult than for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in which USTRANSCOM can utilize SPODs in Iraq or Kuwait followed by minimal land-based transportation over a relatively well developed system of roads and railways.

As a result of the difficulties involved in transporting items into Afghanistan, DLA is currently undertaking a mission to establish TCSPs within Afghanistan in order to provide "joint, centralized capability for controlling troop-support commodities such as clothing and individual equipment, packaged petroleum products, construction material, and repair parts in country." (2)

A TCSP is a facility which has both warehousing and sorting capability to increase the amount of throughput when compared to a pure warehouse. A TCSP serves as the primary conduit for sustainment items (primarily Class II: General Supplies, Class III: Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants (POL), Class IV: Construction and Barrier Materials, and Class IX: Repair Parts) entering the theater. (3) TCSPs provide material distribution services including the "consolidation/segregation [of] shipments from multiple sources" followed by preparation for "onward movement directly to the warfighter." (4)

Personnel at TCSPs perform receiving, packing, and shipping functions for cargo items. In the receiving or inbound phase, personnel at TCSPs verify received items, complete receiving documentation, provide internal truck routing, unpack containers, break down pallets, and segregate freight. (5) During the packing or crossdocking phase, containers are packed, pallets are loaded, and crates are filled with cargo items requiring either surface or air transportation. (6) If necessary, TCSPs have fabrication capability to build pallets and crates. (7) In the shipping or outbound phase, personnel at TCSPs apply radio-frequency identification (RFID) tags, prepare transportation documentation, including hazardous material (HAZMAT) certification (if required), consolidate the shipping route plan, and coordinate outbound transportation. (8) An example of an existing TCSP is the Defense Distribution Center Kuwait, Southwest Asia located at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait.

[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]

Methodology and Data

Parametric analysis is defined as the "description and examination of relationships between different parameters" or factors with the goal of making an informed decision. (9) Although not its only use, parametric analysis can be utilized to select a preferred option or course of action from the available set of alternatives. The parametric analysis utilized in this research effort directly compares the potential locations using various measures of merit and then provides an aggregate ranking. Some potential parameters for consideration when comparing potential TCSP locations are the ease with which surface based cargo reaches the TCSP (including transportation conditions, routing security, border crossings, and distance traveled), and political considerations. Additional factors such as cost of building a facility, proximity to customers, security existing or available at a location, preexisting facilities, parking maximum-on-the-ground (MOG), and working MOG were initially considered for inclusion in the parametric analysis. Parking MOG refers to the total number of planes which can be parked at a location; working MOG refers to the total number of or rate at which parked aircraft can be loaded or unloaded. Unfortunately, classification concerns limit the allowable degree of discussion of these factors; as a result, they were not included in the research.

The potential sites considered for this research effort include locations in the northern and eastern regions of Afghanistan. In the northern region, the potential site of Mazar-e-Sharif is located approximately 35 miles south of the Uzbekistan border. In the eastern region, Bagram and Kandahar are potential sites near the Afghanistan border with Pakistan. These sites are visible on Figure 2.

According to Ryan, Afghanistan is "extremely mountainous in the north and east and mostly desert in the south and west. Most significant to logisticians, Afghanistan lacks any significant transportation network." (11) Currently, two methods exist for transporting nonlethal and unclassified cargo items via surface routes into Afghanistan. The first involves sealift to Karachi (Pakistan) followed by transportation using convoys on unimproved roads via the Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAKGLOC). Using this method, there are two border crossing points into Afghanistan: Chaman, Pakistan and Torkham, Afghanistan. These two border crossing points have final destinations at Kandahar, Afghanistan and Bagram, Afghanistan, respectively. These routes are indicated in Figure 3.

[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]

The second method is the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) which crosses into Afghanistan along its northern border. The NDN is a "multi-route logistical network that transports nonmilitary supplies using commercial providers and existing infrastructure." (13) The NDN is currently broken into three sections: NDN North, NDN South, which both cross into Afghanistan at Termez, Uzbekistan and NDN Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan (KKT) which crosses into Afghanistan through Tajikistan at Sher Khan Bandar. (14) The final destination in Afghanistan for these routes is Mazar-e-Sharif.

The NDN North route is shown in Figure 4. Cargo ships cross the Atlantic Ocean, continue through the North Sea to the Baltic Sea, and arrive at the Latvian port of Riga. From Riga, cargo is loaded onto rail cars and transported using existing Soviet-era rail lines to traverse Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and finally entering Afghanistan at Termez, Uzbekistan. (15)

The NDN South route, shown in Figure 5, transits the Caucasus thereby completely bypassing Russia. For this route, cargo ships navigate the Mediterranean Sea, and traverse the Aegean Sea into the Black Sea to the port of Poti, Georgia. Cargo items then cross Georgia and Azerbaijan before arriving in Baku, Azerbaijan at which they are loaded onto ferries for their journey across the Caspian Sea. The cargo items arrive in the port of Aktau, Kazakhstan and cross Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to Termez before entering Afghanistan. (17)

[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]

The KKT route of the NDN is shown in Figure 6. This route requires cargo ships to follow an identical route from their sea ports of embarkation (SPOE) to the port of Riga, Latvia as the NDN North route. The KKT route also requires traversal of Russia via the Soviet-era rail system; however, after crossing Kazakhstan, this route bypasses Uzbekistan, instead traversing Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The KKT route arrives in Afghanistan at Sher Khan Bandar. (19)

[FIGURE 4 OMITTED]

As previously discussed, the NDN routes traverse numerous countries using rail lines. The rail lines are inherently more secure than the truck routes used through Pakistan; there is less chance of insurgent or terrorist attacks on these rail lines. Furthermore, theft of items on a moving is train not highly probable. Additionally, the NDN has developed "more efficient and less corrupt border regimens" which enable easier transportation of goods between countries. (21) With the expansion of the Trans-Asian Railway Network to include these railways, their security increases due to fewer required stops. (22) Unfortunately, two of the NDN routes pass into Afghanistan through the border crossing at Termez, Uzbekistan. This border crossing is therefore a chokepoint for the NDN, which is a security concern.

[FIGURE 5 OMITTED]

The Pakistani government requires that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) cargo items transported from the port of Karachi to Afghanistan utilize Pakistani trucks and drivers. This requirement provides less security for the routes through Pakistan, and as a result, these routes are subject to "armed attacks, unexpected delays, and pilferage...." ( 23) The moderate and high threat areas along the two routes are displayed in Figure 7. Note that the route to Bagram, through the Torkham border crossing, is both longer (in mileage) and has larger threat areas than the route to Kandahar, through the Chaman border crossing. Although "Pakistani security forces provide guards for the [cargo] trucks and tankers in the northwest" region of Pakistan, they do not usually provide these forces in the southern and central portions of Pakistan; attacks in these regions are relatively rare. (24)

[FIGURE 6 OMITTED]

Thus, the NDN routes appear to be more secure than the two routes through Pakistan. Of the two routes through Pakistan, the route to the Chaman border crossing experiences less threat activity than that of the route to Torkham.

Recent worldwide events have drastically impacted the price of a barrel of oil; as a result, the price of fuel has been likewise influenced. Thus, another important factor for discussion in the parametric analysis includes the cost of transporting items into Afghanistan. For sealift, USTRANSCOM contracts container ships at specified rates; these rates are constant for the length of the contract. At the time of this research effort, the cost to transport a cargo container longer than 40 feet from a port of embarkation in the United States to Pakistan was $1,355; a container less than 40 feet in length costs $1,016. (26) Using the same carrier and port of embarkation in the United States, the cost of transporting a cargo container longer than 40 feet to the Eastern Mediterranean region (such as Riga, Latvia) was $1,765; a cargo container less than 40 feet in length costs $1,324. (27) Thus, the cost of transporting items via sealift to Pakistan is less than the cost to transporting the same items to the Eastern Mediterranean region.

Unfortunately, the actual costs of rail and truck transportation are not available in open sources; furthermore, these transportation costs fluctuate in conjunction with fuel costs. Due to the fluctuations in fuel costs, a constant estimate of the transportation costs cannot be calculated.

A somewhat less meaningful (but nonetheless significant) method for comparison is total travel distance. Assuming that fuel costs are relatively consistent for a given day, the total distance traveled from source to destination can be a valid surrogate for transportation costs. The following distances are approximate estimates for comparison purposes; they are not precise values used for actual transportation efforts.

[FIGURE 7 OMITTED]

The NDN routes utilize railways in their transportation, while the routes through Pakistan are traversed using cargo trucks. The total distance to Mazar-e-Sharif for the NDN North route is approximately 4,250 miles; the NDN South route is approximately 1,600 miles; the NDN KKT route is approximately 4,600 miles. Note that the distance for the NDN South route does not include the travel distance by ferry from Baku, Azerbaijan to Aktau, Kazakhstan. The total distance from the Karachi, Pakistan to Kandahar is approximately 590 miles. The total distance from the Karachi, Pakistan to Bagram, Afghanistan is approximately 1,015 miles.

Four border crossing points into Afghanistan are utilized by USTRANSCOM for surface transportation of cargo items. In the eastern region of Afghanistan, two border crossings exist. The border crossing at Torkham has a final destination in Kandahar, while the crossing at Chaman has a final destination of Bagram. The border crossings at Termez, Uzbekistan and Sher Khan Bandar, Tajikistan are in the northern region of Afghanistan; they service the three NDN routes with a final destination in Mazar-e-Sharif.

[FIGURE 8 OMITTED]

The Torkham border crossing facility is situated at the actual border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This implies that "there is [customs] clearance of pedestrians, trucks, and cargo all in a small and confined space." (28) Furthermore, personally owned vehicles are "not generally allowed to cross the [border control point], so all passengers are obliged to alight and walk across." (29) Additionally, at the Torkham border crossing, "there is rudimentary channeling of pedestrians, separating inbound and outbound [traffic], but it is not rigorously policed nor robustly demarcated." (30) These difficulties are shown in Figure 8.

The border crossing at Chaman is a "narrow, pothole-riddled dirt track that is controlled by a 33-year-old suspected drug lord and by the whims of the Pakistani military." (32) Additionally, at this border crossing, "traffic switches from the left side of the road in Pakistan to the fight in Afghanistan, supply trucks must pass along with a flood of pedestrians, donkey carts, drug shipments and materials to make roadside bombs." (33)

The remaining two border crossing points service the NDN routes. The border crossing at Termez has both road and railway links with Afghanistan. The railway at Termez crosses into Afghanistan and continues to Mazar-e-Sharif. The use of railway lines at a border crossing point separates cargo items from pedestrians and civilian vehicles, thereby allowing for a relatively simpler customs process. Currently, there is no railway between the border crossing at Sher Khan Bandar and Mazar-e-Sharif. Cargo arriving by railway must be offloaded to trucks before passing through the border crossing point.

Since the NDN routes pass through several countries, the political situation along these routes varies. Currently, the United States is on favorable terms with the countries involved in these routes. Additionally, the NDN supports economic growth for these countries. Because multiple routes exist for the NDN, when political tensions arise between the United States and certain countries in the region, the entire network will not necessarily be disabled. If necessary, different NDN routes can be used to bypass Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Russia, Tajikistan, or Uzbekistan. The only country which is utilized by all three NDN routes is Kazakhstan. Thus, if the United States can continue positive relations with Kazakhstan and not simultaneously achieve negative relations with the other countries, at least one of the NDN routes should be available.

The political situation in Pakistan is extremely unstable. On multiple occasions, the Pakistani government has closed the border crossings into Afghanistan. In 2008, the government of Pakistan closed a border crossing for several days in response to an American aircraft attack which "bombed a Pakistani paramilitary post in Mohmand." (34) During this attack, eleven Pakistanis were killed. (35)

On 30 September 2010, the government of Pakistan closed the Torkham border crossing into Afghanistan, thereby stopping the flow of cargo items and fuel into Afghanistan. (36) This closure was in response to NATO helicopters crossing into "Pakistan's Kurram tribal region along the Afghan border" and subsequently firing "on paramilitary troops at the Mandata Kandaho border patrol post." (37) This exchange demonstrates the "rift between the two governments prompted by Pakistan's unwillingness to move against insurgent strongholds in North Waziristan. [United States] commanders in Afghanistan have adopted a more aggressive stance about attacking across the border when it has clear evidence that insurgents are moving back and forth ..." (38) As a result of the closing of the Torkham border crossing, on 1 October 2010, insurgents in southern Pakistan "set ablaze more than two dozen tankers carrying fuel for [NATO] troops in Afghanistan" that were rerouted to the Chaman border crossing. (39) As NATO troops pursue insurgents in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, the possibility of heightened tensions between the United States and Pakistan increases.

In summary, although the NDN routes traverse numerous countries, the political relationships between the United States and these countries is relatively stable. Additionally, multiple routes exist along the NDN, thereby allowing for the bypass of certain countries, if necessary. The political situation between the United States and Pakistan is tenuous and strained, resulting in numerous border crossing closures by the Pakistani government.

Analysis

The facts discussed in the previous section can be combined to produce a recommendation to decisionmakers regarding the proper locations for TCSP construction. Since the parametric analysis is conducted relative to each location, the potential locations can be ranked in a hierarchical order of preference. Thus, if more than one TCSP can be built, this order of preference recommends which locations should be utilized.

Parametric Analysis Results

A comparison table is utilized to aggregate the parametric analysis factors. In this type of table, each potential site is ranked in relation to the other sites for each factor. For this method of analysis, the preferred alternative receives a higher value (or score); since there are three sites, the top choice receives a score value of 3, the second choice is assigned a score value of 2, and the least preferred option is designated a score value of 1. The results of this parametric analysis are shown in the Table 1. The table demonstrates that the preferred choice to locate a TCSP is Mazar-e-Sharif. If an additional site can be built or is desired, it should be built at Kandahar. If a third site is desired, it should be built at Bagram.

Score Values

The five factors listed in Table 1 provide a basis for comparing the potential TCSP sites. The weight value for each factor provides a method by which decisionmakers can indicate relative importance of the factors; higher weight values indicate factors with a higher level of importance. The score of each factor for a potential TCSP site is multiplied by the weight value; this value is the weighted score value. The weighted scores for a potential TCSP site are then summed to produce the total weighted score for the site. The potential TCSP site with the highest total weighted score is the preferred option. Unfortunately, decisionmaker preferences for factors were not available for this analysis. Thus, each factor has a weight of 1; the values do not change from the score for each factor to the weighted score. If the preferences become available at a later time, they could be incorporated into this analysis.

Score Value Explanation

The score values listed in Table 1 arise from the descriptions and analysis described in the previous section; however, it is necessary to properly justify each value contained in the table.

All three routes require transportation from the United States to a SPOD using sealift. After arriving at a SPOD, the NDN presents three options for reaching Mazar-e-Sharif using relatively well developed railway lines. With respect to transportation quality, the railways are vastly superior to the unimproved roads through Pakistan which must be used to reach Kandahar or Bagram from the SPOD of Karachi. As a result, Mazar-e-Sharif receives a score of 3 for this factor, and both Kandahar and Bagram receive a 1 since the overland transportation conditions are basically equivalent.

The three routes between the SPODs and the border crossings for the NDN routes servicing Mazar-e-Sharif are relatively secure; there is less concern for terrorist or criminal activity along these routes. The two routes through Pakistan experience both terrorist and criminal activities in several threat areas. The route to Kandahar which utilizes the Chaman border crossing has fewer and less dense threat areas than the route to Bagram through the Tork_ham border crossing. Therefore, for this factor, Mazar-e-Sharif is designated a score of 3, Kandahar receives a score of 2, and Bagram is assigned a score of 1.

The distance traveled for the three NDN routes to Mazar-e-Sharif are approximately 4,250; 1,600; and 4,600 miles for the NDN North, NDN South, and KKT routes, respectively. The distance from Karachi, Pakistan to Kandahar is approximately 590 miles, while the distance from Karachi, Pakistan to Bagram is approximately 1,015 miles. Thus, for this factor, Kandahar receives a score of 3, Bagram is assigned a score of 2, and Mazar-e-Sharif is designated a score of 1.

The cost of sealift transportation for a cargo container from the United States to Karachi, Pakistan is cheaper than the cost of transporting the same container from the United States to the Eastern Mediterranean region. Thus, the routes which utilize Karachi, Pakistan have cheaper sealift costs. The NDN routes utilize two different border crossing points to reach their final destination at Mazar-e-Sharif. Since the border crossing point at Termez, Uzbekistan includes a railway line which eases the customs process, Mazar-e-Sharif receives a score of 3 for this factor. The two border crossing points from Pakistan are very similar; neither is clearly superior to the other. As a result, Kandahar and Bagram are assigned scores of 1 for this factor.

With respect to political constraints, the score is based upon the relationship status between the United States government and the government of the country or countries which the routes traverse to reach their respective potential TCSP location. Although cordial with many of the countries in the region, the United States is not closely allied with any of them.

As a result, no potential TCSP site is awarded a score of 3. The relationships between the United States and the countries along the NDN routes are relatively stable. Furthermore, except for Kazakhstan, alternate routes exist that can bypass a country in the NDN routes if their relationship with the United States worsens. This results in Mazar-e-Sharif receiving a score of 2. As was mentioned earlier, the relationship between the United States and Pakistan is strained; therefore both Kandahar and Bagram receive scores of 1.

Sensitivity Analysis

Sensitivity analysis can be performed to determine which changes in the values for the weight can impact the preferred TCSP location. In this type of sensitivity analysis, the values of the scores do not change; however, the weighted scores change when a weight value changes. For this scenario, if the weight of the travel cost and distance factor is at least 3 times the weights of the other factors, the preferred location changes from Mazar-e-Sharif to Kandahar. This is verified in Table 2. Changing any other combination of weights will still result in a preferred location at Mazar-e-Sharif.

Analysis Summary

Thus, for the TCSP selection in Afghanistan the parametric analysis indicates that the preferred option for TCSP location is Mazar-e-Sharif. Because of classification issues, specific geographic coordinates for the site are not specified. Furthermore, if an additional TCSP is desired or warranted, the parametric analysis shows that a location near Kandahar is best suited. The least preferred option is at Bagram. The sensitivity analysis shows that if the travel distance is given a weight that is at least triple the weights of the other factors, the desired location changes from Mazar-e-Sharif to Kandahar; however, Mazar-e-Sharif is still preferred over Bagram in this situation.

Conclusions

According to the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), the availability of "spare parts and other critical items provided through the Depart of Defense's (DOD) supply chains affects the readiness and capabilities of [United States'] military forces." (40) Operation Enduring Freedom presents difficult challenges for the logistical support of forces from the United States and other NATO countries involved in the efforts. Typically, the majority of logistics items are transported via surface methods using sealift, railway networks, and trucks. Airlift is most effectively utilized for relatively smaller items with short delivery times, high valued goods, and classified items. Fortunately, the airlift network into Afghanistan is well designed and well utilized. Unfortunately, since Afghanistan is a landlocked country, cargo items requiring sealift must be unloaded at a sea port of debarkation in another country and transported via railways or trucks into Afghanistan. Furthermore, neither the railway network nor the systems of roads into and within Afghanistan are extensive or well maintained. Thus, cargo items that arrive in Afghanistan and are not immediately sent to their final destination require storage.

As a result of the difficulties transporting items into Afghanistan, this research was conducted to determine the best location for TCSPs within Afghanistan. This research was conducted in parallel to a combined effort between the United States Transportation Command, Defense Logistics Agency, and United States Central Command. The results contained in this research effort were intended to augment and, if necessary, validate the conclusions reached in the parallel effort.

This research determined that for the TCSP location in Afghanistan, the preferred option is near Mazar-e-Sharif. If an additional TCSP is desired or warranted, the research shows that a location near Kandahar is best suited. The least preferred option is at Bagram

Article Acronyms

DLA--Defense Logistics Agency

DOD--Department of Defense

GAO--Government Accounting Office

HAZMAT--Hazardous Material

KKT--Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan

MILP--Mixed Integer-Linear Program

MOG--Maximum-on-the-Ground

NATO--North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDN--Northern Distribution Network

OEF--Operation ENDURING FREEDOM

OIF--Operation IRAQI FREEDOM

PAKGLOC--Pakistani Ground Lines of Communication

POL--Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants

RFID--Radio-Frequency Identification

SPOD--Sea Port of Debarkation

SPOE--Sea Port of Embarkation

TCSP--Theater Consolidation and Shipping Point

USTRANSCOM--United States Transportation Command

Notes

(1.) WorldAtlas, "Afghanistan Regional Map," [Online] Available: http:/ /www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/asia/afghreg.htm, accessed 29 September 2010.

(2.) Heather Athey, "Leadership in Action," [Online] Available: http:// www.dla.mil/Loglines/Pages/LoglinesND2011Story07.aspx, accessed 14 December 2011.

(3.) Defense Distribution Center Kuwait, Southwest Asia, General Order Number 7-09, 2, [Online] Available: www.dla.mil/dlaps/mf/ddks.pdf.

(4.) Thomas A. Reichert, "Material Management," Slide 16, Army Logistics University, 20 June 2010, [Online], Available: http:// chadalong.com/Joint%20Logistics/DAY%209 -2%20Material%20Management%2024%20Jun%202010.ppt, accessed 14 December 2011.

(5.) Reichert, " Slide 17.

(6.) Ibid.

(7.) Ibid.

(8.) Ibid.

(9.) Business Dictionary Website. "Parametric Analysis." [Online] Available: http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/parametricanalysis.html, accessed 30 September 2010.

(10.) WorldAtlas, "Afghanistan CIA Map," [Online] Available: http:// www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/asia/ ciamaps/af.htm, accessed 22 March 2010.

(11.) Colonel Kurt J. Ryan, Exploring Alternatives for Strategic Access to Afghanistan, Strategy Research Project, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 2009.

(12.) Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Pakistan, [Online] Available: https://www.cia.gov/library/, accessed 17 November 2010.

(13.) Andrew C. Kuchins, Thomas M. Sanderson, and David A. Gordon, The Northern Distribution Network and the Modern Silk Road: Planning for Afghanistan's Future, [Online] Available: http://csis.org/ files/publication/091217_Kuchins_NorthernDistNet_Web.pdf, accessed 29 September 2010.

(14.) Business Dictionary Website. "Parametric Analysis."

(15.) Ibid.

(16.) WorldAtlas, "Middle East Map," [Online] Available: http:// www.worldatlas.com/webimage/countrys/me.htm, accessed 31 March 2010.

(17.) Kuchins, et al., 9-10.

(18.) WorldAtlas Website, "Middle East Map."

(19.) Kuchins, et al., 10.

(20.) WorldAtlas Website, "Middle East Map."

(21.) Kuchins, et al., v.

(22.) Marwaan Macan-Markar, "All Aboard the Trans-Asian Railway." Asian Times, 23 June 2009.

(23.) Kuchins, et al., v.

(24.) Aaron Favila, "Dozen of NATO Oil Tankers Attacked in Pakistan," Washington Post, 1 October 2010.

(25.) Association for Global Logistics and Transportation (NGTA), "Northern Distribution Network Panel," Briefing, [Online] Available: http://www.ndtahq.com/documents/ NDTAFinalCENTCOMNDNBrief15Sep2010.pdf, accessed 22 March 2011, Slide 3.

(26.) Author's interview with Lieutenant Colonel Shane Knighton, 5 April 2011.

(27.) Ibid.

(28.) United Nations Development Program (UNDP), "Midterm Evaluation of the European Community Support to Border Management in Afghanistan, Briefing, [Online] Available: erc.undp.org/ evaluationadmin/downloaddocument.html?docid=2732, accessed 30 March 2011.

(29.) Ibid.

(30.) Ibid.

(31.) Digital Globe Satellite Imagery, "Torkham Border Crossing, Pakistan," [Online] Available: http://www.flickr.com/ photos/digitalglobeimagery/5062128599/, accessed 30 March 2011.

(32.) Spin Boldak, "Border Crossing at Chaman may affect US buildup: McChrystal," The Frontier Post, 20 January, 2010.

(33.) Ibid.

(34.) Jane Perlez and Helene Cooper, "Signaling Tensions, Pakistan Shuts NATO Route," New York Times, 30 September 2010.

(35.) Ibid.

(36.) David S. Cloud, Alex Rodriguez, and Laura King, "Pakistan Closes Border Crossing, says NATO Copters Killed 3 of its Soldiers," Los Angeles Times, 30 September 2010.

(37.) Ibid.

(38.) Ibid.

(39.) Favila.

(40.) United States Government Accountability Office, DOD's High Risk Areas: Efforts to Improve Supply Chain Can Be Enhanced by Linkage to Outcomes, Progress in Transforming Business Operations, and Reexamination of Logistics Governance and Strategy, transcribed testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, US Senate, GAO-07-1064T, 10 July 2007.

Major August G. Roesener, USAF, PhD is currently an Operations Research Analyst for the United States Northern Command at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. At the time of the writing of this paper, he was a student at the Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

Colonel Kyle Gresham, USAF, PhD is currently the Commander of the European Office of Aerospace Research and Development (EOARD), a detachment of the Air Force Research Laboratory, London, United Kingdom. At the time of the writing of this paper, he was the Director for Research and Publications at the Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

James T. Moore, PhD passed away on 15 November 2011. At the time of the writing of this paper, he was Department Head, Department of Operational Sciences, Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.

Major August G. Roesener, USAF, PhD is currently an Operations Research Analyst for the United States Northern Command at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. At the time of the writing of this paper, he was a student at the Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

Colonel Kyle Gresham, USAF, PhD is currently the Commander of the European Office of Aerospace Research and Development (EOARD), a detachment of the Air Force Research Laboratory, London, United Kingdom. At the time of the writing of this paper, he was the Director for Research and Publications at the Air Command and Staff College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

James T. Moore, PhD passed away on 15 November 2011. At the time of the writing of this paper, he was Department Head, Department of Operational Sciences, Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.
Table 1. Weighted Score Table

 Location

 Factors Mazar-e-Sharif Kandahar

 Weight Score Weighted Score Weighted
 Score Score
 Transportation 1 3 3 1 1
 Conditions
 Route Security 1 3 3 2 2
 Travel Cost and
 Distance 1 1 1 3 3
Border Crossing Points 1 3 3 1 1
Political Constraints 1 2 2 1 1
Total Weighted Score: 12 9

 Location

 Factors Bagram

 Score Weighted
 Score
 Transportation 1 1
 Conditions
 Route Security 1 1
 Travel Cost and
 Distance 2 2
Border Crossing Points 1 1
Political Constraints 1 1
Total Weighted Score: 6

Table 2. Adjusted Weighted Score Table

 Location

 Factors Mazar-e-Sharif Kandahar

 Weight Score Weighted Score Weighted
 Total Total

 Transportation
 Conditions 1 3 3 1 1

 Route Security 1 3 3 2 2

 Travel Cost and 3 1 3 3 9
 Distance

 Border Crossing
 Points 1 3 3 1 1

Political Constraints 1 2 2 1 1

 Total Weighted
 Score: 14 15

 Location

 Factors Bagram

 Score Weighted
 Total

 Transportation
 Conditions 1 1

 Route Security 1 1

 Travel Cost and 2 6
 Distance

 Border Crossing
 Points 1 1

Political Constraints 1 1

 Total Weighted
 Score: 10
COPYRIGHT 2011 U.S. Air Force, Logistics Management Agency
No portion of this article can be reproduced without the express written permission from the copyright holder.
Copyright 2011 Gale, Cengage Learning. All rights reserved.

Article Details
Printer friendly Cite/link Email Feedback
Title Annotation:Candid Voices
Author:Roesener, August G.; Gresham, Kyle; Moore, James T.
Publication:Air Force Journal of Logistics
Geographic Code:9PAKI
Date:Sep 22, 2011
Words:5134
Previous Article:Difficulties in obtaining MICAP Support to Bagram Air Field. (INSIDE LOGISTICS: EXPLORING THE HEART OF LOGISTICS.
Topics:

Terms of use | Copyright © 2017 Farlex, Inc. | Feedback | For webmasters