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Aceh, Melaka and the Hystoria dos cercos de Malaca of Jorge de Lemos.

Melaka's principal enemy for most of the 130 years that it was a Portuguese possession was the north Sumatran sultanate of Aceh. By 1585, the year in which Jorge de Lemos published his Hystoria dos cercos ... de Malaca, an account of the series of Acehnese sieges of Melaka that took place during the early 1570s, Aceh represented a formidable threat to the position of the Portuguese not only in Melaka but throughout Southeast Asia and beyond. (1) In 1511, when a small Portuguese force under Afonso de Albuquerque captured Melaka and drove out its Muslim ruler, Pedir and Pasai were still the most important of the group of north Sumatran port-states that, at the same time as they commanded the entrance to the Straits of Melaka and the maritime trade routes that ran through them, also provided an outlet for the valuable produce of the Sumatran hinterland, which included gold, forest products and, above all, pepper.

Already at this time, however, Aceh was beginning to gain ascendancy over its neighbours and, in particular, Pedir with which, according to Tome Pires, 'tem sempre guerra' and where Acehnese attacks caused 'dapno mujto em sua terra' Pires records that Pedir 'foy [...] so r da boca do canall' (that is the entry to the Straits), had been 'homrrado Riquo & de trato' and 'senhoreou Ja os Regnos sobreditos', including Aceh. It still contained 'mercadores de todas nacoees' and, although constantly at war, had not yet fallen away much from what it used to be and would, in Pires's view, 'tomar ao seu' as soon as the civil war in which it was then embroiled was over. (2) Nevertheless, Aceh's location at the northernmost tip of Sumatra gave it a decisive strategic advantage over Pedir and its other neighbours, since this not only enabled it to win control of the entry to the Straits, but also provided it with a direct line of maritime communication with the western half of the Indian Ocean. (3) By 1585 it had become the chief commercial rival of the Portuguese and their most implacable enemy in the region.

As early as 1521 the Portuguese, in an attempt to gain more direct access to the Sumatran pepper that was already an essential element in their interoceanic trade, and to achieve better control of navigation in the Straits than could be maintained by possession of Melaka alone, had established a fortress at Pasai, which, according to Pires, had many inhabitants, most of them Bengalis, large towns and much trade. (4) Having established themselves in Pasai, they attempted to gain a similar concession in Pedir. They believed that these strongholds, in addition to enabling them to police the trade routes leading through the Straits more effectively, would help them to give better protection to the city of Melaka itself, which was entirely dependent for its supplies from outside.

In the same year a Portuguese force under the Captain of Melaka, Jorge de Brito, launched an unsuccessful attack against Aceh in which Brito and sixty or more of his companions were killed. Castanheda's account of this expedition demonstrates that already at that date Aceh was an adversary to be reckoned with. He describes Aceh as a large city at the foot of a hill, which stood between the city and the river so that it acted as a barrier. The houses had earthen walls and were roofed with palm thatch and only the royal residence had any pretensions to comfort or luxury (policia). The city was well furnished with provisions and populated by Muslims (among whom there must already at this date have been a substantial number of Indians and Indonesians). The ruler, 'Ali Mughayat Syah, founder of the sultanate, 'tinha pouco estado & pouca renda. E com tudo grande guerreiro & capital immigo dos Portugueses, & trabalhava por lhe fazer quanto mal podia'. (5)

The Portuguese in Pasai soon found themelves in conflict with the ruler and the nobility, who saw their presence among them as a threat to the royal monopoly over trade and to their control over the production of the foodstuffs on which the economy of Pasai, as of all the north Sumatran states, so largely depended. In 1523 an Acehnese force of 40,000 men came to Pasai's assistance, besieged the fortress and, having captured many ships and six hundred guns, forced the Portuguese to abandon it. In 1529 the Acehnese finally conquered Pedir and deposed its sultan, thus completing their conquest of the northern coasts of Sumatra. In a letter written to D. Joao III in 1543, the Sultan of Pedir sought the help of the Portuguese to regain his throne, declaring that the Acehnese had always been enemies of the Portuguese, whereas he had been their faithful vassal and ally and had only been deposed because he had helped them to suppress the revolts of the people of Pasai at the time the Portuguese fortress was established there. (6)

The Sultan of Pedir's contention that the Acehnese had been enemies of the Portuguese from the outset was evidently no exaggeration: many sixteenth-century Portuguese commentators refer to their implacable hostility, fuelled in equal measure by religious enmity and commercial rivalry. According to Diogo do Couto, 'foi tao grande, e antigo sempre o odio que os Reys do Achem tiveram aos Portuguezes, e a nossa fortaleza de Malaca, que nao quietavam, nem davam volta na cama, que nao tratassem da sua destruicao'. (7) The Jesuit Padre Manuel Alvares, who was shipwrecked in the Sao Paulo near the equator off the west coast of Sumatra in 1561, described the Acehnese in a letter to his brethren in Coimbra as 'huma gente fogitiva e alevantada, de muytas nacoes, e ynimicissimos dos portugueses', (8) and one of the principal arguments of the Hystoria dos cercos is that the chief motive impelling the Acehnese to besiege Melaka was the 'excessivo desejo que nelle mora de lancar os Portugueses fora della, pera co mais facilidade senhorear o mar do Sul, & trazer os Reis delle a sua obediencia'. (9) In order to reduce the risk of Acehnese attacks, Portuguese ships bound for Melaka took to sailing directly southeast from the Nicobar Islands across the Andaman Sea and then midway between the east coast of Sumatra and the west coast of the Malay Peninsula, or to Pulau Pinang and along the Malay coast to the Arao Islands. (10) Nor was it only the Portuguese who had reason to try to avoid quarrelling with the Acehnese: according to another account of the wreck of the Sao Paulo, written by Henrique Dias and first published in 1565, their neighbours feared them 'like very devils'. (11)

By the end of the reign of Ala'ad-din Ri'ayat Syah al-Kahar (1539-71), Aceh had become the greatest pepper mart in the region, and by 1580 had extended its rule in Sumatra as far south as Padang and Indragiri, had conquered Perak and Johor on the Malay Peninsula, and had thus secured its position as the most powerful state in the Straits and as a vital link in the network of interoceanic trade between the spice islands of eastern Indonesia and the Mediterranean. This trade was almost entirely in the hands of Muslim merchants trading on behalf of Muslim rulers, from Ternate and Tidore and the other spice islands at one end to the Red Sea ports, by then under Ottoman rule, at the other, by way of the Maldive Islands and Gujarat. The principal goods traded were Sumatran pepper and Moluccan and Bandanese spices, but also included camphor and benzoin, musk, sandalwood and sappanwood, silk, gold, silver, precious stones, tortoiseshell, and other goods, many of them brought from mainland Southeast Asia, China and Japan. In 1567, Ala'ad-din al-Kahar entered into a formal alliance with the Ottoman Sultan Selim II, so that any attack that Aceh made with Turkish support against the Portuguese in Melaka ceased to be simply a defence of Acehnese commercial interests and acquired the character of a jihad. (12)

Lemos recounts that every year the sultan of Aceh would send to the Sublime Porte by way of the Red Sea

riquissimos presentes ao Turco, douro, pedraria, drogas, & outras especies aromaticas, pera o obrigar a lhe mandar artilharia de metal, como lhe tem mandado quartaos, basiliscos, leo es, salvages, esperas, fundidores, officiaes de gales, Patro es, comitres, & ingenheiros, pera fortificar & sitiar fortalezas.

He says that in 1567 Aceh had asked Selim II to send a fleet of galleys to his assistance and had paid twice the sum of money needed for this to sweeten the request. In the years between the last campaign of Suleyman the Magnificent in 1566 and the Battle of Lepanto in 1571, Turkish military and naval resources were fully engaged in the Mediterranean, the Balkans and the Middle East, and the fleet of fifteen galleys despatched in 1567 in response to the Acehnese request had to be diverted to Yemen to put down a local uprising, while the four hundred Turkish soldiers who took part in the Acehnese attack on Melaka in the following year were probably mercenaries. (13) Nevertheless, Lemos claims that, as a result of their alliance with the Turks, the Acehnese, who only a few years before had had little in the way of armed forces on land or sea, had now become 'tao bravoso, tao obstinado, e tao possante' that all the neighbouring rulers, in spite of the ill treatment they received at their hands, felt compelled to try to win their friendship and repudiate the friendship of the Portuguese, which they had once sought so willingly. (14)

The relative positions of Melaka and Aceh during the 1570s, when Melaka was being subjected to the sieges that form the subject of Lemos's book, is well summarized by the Jesuit Padre Alessandro Valignano in his report of 1579 on the missionary activities of the Society of Jesus in the Estado da India. In his view Melaka, although it was 'pequena y de poco precio por si mesma', was still

una de las mejores y mas importantes cosas que tiene en la Yndia S. A. porque como es llave de todas aquellas partes del Sul y escala de todas las mas ricas mercancias ques en la Yndia ay porque alli concurren las naves de la China y Jappon, de Maluco y Sion, de Banda, de Sunda, y de la Java, y de otras muchas yslas que estan en aquellas partes, y assi ay en ella grande concurso de mercadores y grande quantidad de pimienta, clavo, maca, nuez moscada, menxui, estan o, oro y de otras ricas mercancias.

Moreover, ever since St Francis Xavier had first set foot in Melaka in 1545, it had been the chief spearhead for the missionary work of the Portuguese Padroado Real in the Indonesian islands, mainland Southeast Asia and Japan. However, this glorious Christian endeavour was made more diBcult because Melaka was 'cercada de reyes moros capitales enemigos de los portugueses y especialmente uno que se llama Dachen entre ellos mas poderoso a quien quasi todos obedecen'. Valignano notes that the Acehnese built 'gruesas armadas de galeras que haze da grandissimo trabajo y opression a Malaca', and had besieged the city many times, so that, whereas 'en otro tiempo tan abundante y sana esta agora en mucha necessidad de mantenimientos y muy enferma'.

In the event, Aceh's domination of the Straits was to prove shortlived and, by the middle of the seventeenth century, largely as a result of the arrival of the Dutch in Southeast Asia, had virtually disappeared, but in 1579 it was approaching the zenith of its power and influence in the region, and Valignano believed that, unless the Portuguese speedily remedied this state of affairs by conquering Aceh, they would run the risk of losing Melaka altogether, whereas, if they did conquer it, the King of Portugal would then be able to make himself 'senor absoluto de todas aquellas partes'. (15)

In view of the perpetual threat that Aceh represented to the very survival of Portuguese Melaka, it is scarcely surprising that during the course of the sixteenth century there were many projects to overthrow it and humble what Lemos described as 'sua barbara altiveza & insolente orgulho'. (16) None of these projects materialized because there were so many other more urgent calls on Portugal's exiguous and overstretched resources of men and money. Among the earliest schemes was that devised in 1524 by the then captain of Melaka, Jorge de Albuquerque, after the Acehnese seizure of the Portuguese fortress in Pasai. Albuquerque planned to create an alliance with Aceh's numerous enemies, including the Sultan of Pasai, then in exile in Melaka, the Sultan of Pedir, also in exile in Perlis, and the Sultan of Aru (Deli). The one that came nearest to being carried out was that planned in 1576 by a later captain of Melaka, Matias de Albuquerque, who managed to assemble a substantial fleet for the purpose, but then had to allow it to be diverted at the last moment to Ceylon. (17)

A detailed description of another of these projects, which was almost contemporaneous with the work of Lemos, is to be found in the Roteiro das Cousas de Achem, compiled in 1584 by Dom Joao Ribeiro Gaio, who was Bishop of Melaka from 1578 to 1601. Gaio fervently believed that Portuguese power in Asia could be revived, first by extending the work of the missionaries under the Portuguese Padroado Real and strengthening the organization of the ecclesiastical heirarchy accordingly, so as to enable the missionaries to operate more effectively, and second by securing Portuguese domination of navigation and commerce in the Indian Ocean and beyond. He was convinced of the necessity of destroying Aceh in order to achieve these aims and thought that the civil disorder in Aceh that had followed the death of Sultan Ali Ri'ayat Syah in 1579 and the union of the crowns of Spain and Portugal in 1580, which would enable the two Iberian powers to make common cause in Asia, had created propitious circumstances for the adoption of such a policy. (18)

While the Portuguese were cherishing dreams of wresting control of the Straits of Melaka from Aceh and thereby regaining mastery of all the trade in the eastern half of the Indian Ocean, the Indonesian archipelago and the South China Sea, the Acehnese and their allies demonstrated that they were no less anxious to ensure that this did not happen by renewing their efforts to drive the Portuguese out of Melaka. The most important of their many attacks on the city before the publication of the Hystoria dos cercos had been in 1537, 1547, 1568, 1573, 1575 and 1582, and they were to make further attempts in 1616, 1629 and 1639. Lemos's work is concerned with the attacks made between 1570 and 1575.

There is little doubt that, in spite of its brevity and the relative baldness of most of its purely narrative passages, the Hystoria was intended to be more than a mere history of the sieges which gave the book its name. Its purpose was both to glorify the recent victories won by the Christian citizens of Melaka under the leadership of Tristao Vaz de Veiga against the attacks of the infidel Acehnese, and at the same time to argue the case for the Portuguese to go on the offensive against Aceh and the other Islamic powers in Southeast Asia. The book achieves the former of these objectives by the conventional means of showering praise on the principal participants in these stirring events. At the very beginning, in one of the sonnets by Diogo Bernardes that preface the book, Veiga is described as a 'capitao forte, & prudente' who, with a small number of 'ousados Lusitanos', vanquished 'barbaros sem conto'. 'Teus feitos nao direi que sam humanos', Bernardes declares, for 'que mais que humano he quem se aventura por seu Deos, por seu Rey, por sua gente'. The author himself is given an accolade in the same poem for having recorded the deeds accomplished by Veiga with 'sua forte espada', in an account that is 'tao douta historia (inda que breve) clara', as well as 'em prudencia, em estillo, alta, & rara, nao de ficcoes, mas de verdade ornada'. Not content with one prefatory sonnet, Bernardes composed another, in which he punningly says that the refined and learned style in which Lemos describes the feats of arms and excellent counsels of a great captain deserves 'louvores sem limite' from us who read (lemos) his work.

Other heroes are singled out for fulsome praise. One such was D. Joao Bandara, a native of Melaka and captain of the gentios (Hindus) in the city, who proved himself to be 'esforcado cavaleiro (de que tinha feito muitas demonstraco es nos cercos passados)', when in the siege of 1573 he went almost single-handed to fight a fire that the Acehnese had lit in Hilir, a native quarter situated outside the walls of the Portuguese fortress on the seashore to the south of the city.

Se Deos no mesmo instante que se o fogo ateou nao enviara hua grandissima trovoada de muita chuva que o apagou, & rigissimo vento que deu com algu s navios a costa, tem se por sem duvida ardera a povoacao toda, & acabara a gente abrasada & affogada. (19)

Two entire chapters are devoted to praising the deeds and 'muitos merecimentos' of individual fidalgos, casados and others, some of them civilians, who fought in successive naval engagements against Aceh or in the sieges themselves or who met the cost of supplying ships, arms or provisions for the soldiers from their own resources. (20)

Throughout the book Lemos takes the view, at least by implication, that, by so often successfully resisting the attacks on Melaka made by Aceh and its allies, among which the north Javanese Muslim state of Japara was prominent, the Portuguese were helping to defend the whole of Christendom from the onslaughts of the Infidel. In the true spirit of the great sixteenth-century Portuguese chroniclers, with whose works he was no doubt familiar, he reminds his readers that God was on the side of the Portuguese and that, had He not so often intervened miraculously to rescue Melaka, as in the burning of Hilir, the city, in spite of the extraordinary valour of its Christian citizens, would surely have fallen. Victory, Lemos declares, was 'mais [...] do prepotente Deos, que dos homes, que estribados em seu auxilio, & braco forte a alcancarao'. (21) He constantly harps, in the most florid and extravagant language, upon the theme of Divine intervention, emphasizing that

Posto que castigava Deos avia muitos annos este povo de Malaca, metendoo em grandes apertos, polla continuacao de peccados que cada dia comettia contra sua immensa bondade, principalmente (segundo se cria) pollo da insaciavel, & accesa cobica que nelle predominava, & da cega & desenfreada sensualidade, que em todos geeralmente abundava,

yet He never ceased to encourage them, sometimes by means of the most obvious miracles. He would make their enemies suddenly abandon all hope ('desesperar totalissimamente') of taking the city when it had already been devastated by the fighting and could have been entered without offering any resistance, or He would cause relief forces to arrive unexpectedly from India and drive the enemy away. (22) One of the many examples that Lemos cites is the naval engagement fought by Veiga against the Acehnese fleet in the Rio Fermoso, twelve leagues from Melaka, in which, in his opinion, it was plain for all to see that God was fighting for the Christians, 'quebrantando, opprimindo, & abatendo a feroz arrogancia, & rebolaria perversissima deste imigo' and defeating them so completely that they all fled. (23)

Just as Lemos is concerned to show that religious as much as economic motives inspired Portuguese resistance to the Acehnese, so also he stresses that it was hatred of Christianity as much as commercial rivalry that prompted the Acehnese attacks on Melaka. The first three chapters of the Hystoria are devoted to a description of the secret alliance formed in 1570 among the Muslim rulers of the Deccan 'contra o nome Christao, que o invictissimo Rey dom Manoel de gloriosa memoria tinha nesse mudo la mandado platar por seus valerosos capitaes & soldados', and relates how the Samorin of Calicut and 'o tyrano da Ilha de Samatra, chamado Ache' were then invited to join them in 'tao ardua & difficultosa empresa, como era arrancar & extirpar esse nome, que elles tanto abominavao'. This was to be achieved by all of them waging war simultaneously on 'as fortalezas finitimas, & chegadas a seus Reinos, que os Portugueses senhoreavao', that is to say Chaul, Goa, Bassein, Daman and Melaka. Melaka was assigned to Aceh.

Not surprisingly, Lemos goes on to ascribe the failure of this enterprise to Divine intervention as much as to the valour of the defenders, declaring that 'Deos tenha tomado muito a sua conta a coservacao dos povos Christaos, em especial os daquellas partes, segundo se pode julgar de successos milagrosos que lhes tem acontecido, assi no principio de sua fundacao, como depois de fundados'. On this occasion, the miracle was the unexpected arrival of relief forces from India to which reference has already been made. The Viceroy, D. Luis de Ataide, 'sem embargo de sua natural providencia, vigilante sagacidade, & animosa prudencia' that Lemos, with his usual hyperbole, attributes to him, had had no warning of the formation of the league, but by chance had sent a fleet of five well-armed galleons, a galley, and seven fustas, with a thousand soldiers, to the Sumatra Sea to cut off the ships coming from Mecca. There they encountered the Acehnese war fleet, which had already set sail for the Straits of Melaka, defeated them and so compelled them to abandon their plans to attack the city. (24)

The licence to publish the Hystoria granted by the Inquisition in Lisbon declares that these victories won by 'os Christaos Portugueses, dos infieis do Oriente' were 'tudo pera gloria do senhor, & dilatacao de seu nome'. In other words, the aim of the book was to demonstrate that the sieges were not merely a series of more or less inconclusive battles for the control of the trade routes in the Straits of Melaka, but episodes in the heroic worldwide struggle between Christians and Muslims which the Portuguese had undertaken from the very outset of their imperial enterprise as a sacred duty in the service of their God and their king, and that this was a just war in which ultimately the Portuguese owed their victories to the miraculous intervention of God on their side. (25)

The subject of the sieges of Melaka, in addition to providing Lemos with striking instances of the achievements of the Portuguese in defending the newly established Christian communities in Asia against the threat of Islam, also gave him an opportunity to join Gaio in publicizing the economic and strategic advantages of a decisive attack on Aceh. In a final propaganda outburst he treats his readers to a rousing call to arms, which surpasses even Gaio's Roteiro in the heroic vision of the future that it portrays. He states that Aceh, as a result of its domination of the trade with the Red Sea ports that the Turkish alliance had made possible and of the exploitation of its own natural resources, among which gold and pepper figure prominently, had become so rich that 'se pode bem paragonar com Inglaterra, de que as escripturas tanto falam'. (26) If, therefore, the King of Portugal were master of so profitable an island, he could add to his revenues the tributes and payments that were now paid to Aceh by its vassals and demand that they be paid in gold, silver, tin, lead, saltpetre, sulphur and pitch, for 'destas cousas, & de Rubis, & Diamantes, & especiaria, ha infinidade em seus Reynos'. In a bizarre passage, Lemos conjectures that in the capital of Aceh 'ha certeza de ser innumeravel o dinheyro amoedado, que os Reys passados enthesourarao', which he maintains must have been deposited there by Divine Providence with the express intention of enabling the King of Portugal to eradicate heresy, to restore hereditary rulers to their rightful patrimonies, to safeguard the peace in lands regained and recover lands that had been lost by other Christian kings and princes, to overcome the Turks and drive them out of the lands they had usurped and tyrannized, and to reconquer Jerusalem and Africa, 'pera o nome de Christo se manifestar pollo seu venturoso braco, & de seus magnanimos Capitaes, &fortissimos soldados'.

Although Lemos seems to have believed that, with the help of God and 'a invencivel estrella de sua Magestade', there would be enough treasure in Sumatra to achieve all these ambitious aims at any time, he ends the book on a slightly more realistic note by emphasizing that now was the moment to attack Aceh, while it was still embroiled in civil disorders following the death of Ali Ri'ahyat Syah in 1579, and that, if the Portuguese delayed, it might succeed in imposing a blockade on Melaka. (27) In the event, neither his proposals nor the rather more measured recommendations of Gaio in favour of an attack on Aceh were realized, and the auspicious moment soon passed. The Portuguese found their position in Melaka growing ever weaker, while Aceh regained internal order, initiative and strength with the accession of a ruthless new sultan, Ala'ad-din Ri'ayat Syah Sayyid al-Mukammil, in 1589. If the Acehnese had not been distracted by their almost continuous, and no doubt in Lemos's view miraculous, quarrels with Johor, which led to their making a temporary rapprochement with the Portuguese, Melaka might well have fallen to them at any time during the 1590s, so that the Dutch, when they arrived in Southeast Asian waters at the very end of the century, would have found the balance of power in the region already radically altered.

King's College London

(1) The full title of the book is Hystoria dos cercos que em tempo de Antonio Monis Barreto governador que foi dos estados da India, os Achens, & Iaos puserao a fortaleza de Malaca, sendo Tristao Vaz de Veiga capitao della (Lisbon: Casa de Manoel de Lyra, 1585; repr. Lisbon: Biblioteca Nacional, 1982). Little is known of the life of Jorge de Lemos except that he was secretary to several viceroys and at one time escrivao da Fazenda da India. Antonio Moniz Barreto was captain of Melaka from 1571 to 1573 and governor of India from 1573 to 1576, in succession to Dom Antonio de Noronha.

(2) The Suma Oriental of Tome Pires and the Book of Francisco Rodrigues, trans. and ed. by Armando Cortesao, 2 vols (London: Hakluyt Society, 1944), ii, 395.

(3) On Aceh's maritime trade in the sixteenth century and its relations with Portuguese Melaka, see M. A. P. Meilink- Roelofsz, Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630 (The Hague: Martinus NijhoC, 1962), pp. 142-46.

(4) Suma Oriental, II, 397.

(5) Fernao Lopes de Castanheda, Histo ria do Descobrimento e Conquista da India pelos Portugueses, ed. by Pedro de Azevedo and P. M. Laranjo Coelho, 4 vols (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade, 1924-1933), III (1929), Book 5, Chapters LXM-LXV, pp. 100-05.

(6) Sultan Mahamat of Pedir to D. Joao III, Melaka, 15 November 1543, in Artur Basilio de Sa, Documentacao para a historia das misso es do Padroado Portugues do Oriente: Insulindia, 6 vols (Lisbon: Agencia Geral do Ultramar, 1954-88), I (1954), 382-84 (p. 382).

(7) Diogo do Couto, Da Asia: Decadas 4-12, 15 vols (Lisbon: Regia Officina Typografica, 1778-88), Dec. 8, Chapter XXI.

(8) Padre Manuel Alvares to his brethren in Coimbra, Melaka, 5 January 1562, in Sa, II (1955), 381-429 (p. 394).

(9) Lemos, fol. 58r.

(10) See Georg Schurhammer, S. J., Francis Xavier: His Life, His Times, trans. by M. Joseph Costelloe, S. J., 4 vols (Rome: Jesuit Historical Institute, 1973-82), III (1980), 7, and the sources there cited.

(11) Further Selections from the Tragic History of the Sea 1559-1565, trans. and ed. by C. R. Boxer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press for the Hakluyt Society, 1968) p. 92.

(12) On Acehnese-Turkish relations see C. R. Boxer, 'A Note on Portuguese Reactions to the Revival of the Red Sea Spice Trade and the Rise of Atjeh, 1540-1600', Journal of Southeast Asian History, 10 (1969), 415-28 (pp. 420-21); C. R. Boxer, 'Portuguese and Spanish Projects for the Conquest of Southeast Asia, 1580-1600', Journal of Asian History, 3 (1969), 118-36 (pp. 119-20); Pierre-Yves Manguin, 'Of Fortresses and Galleys: The 1568 Acehnese Siege of Melaka, after a Contemporary Bird's-eye View', Modern Asian Studies, 22 (1988), 607-29 (pp. 621-22); Anthony Reid, 'Sixteenth century Turkish influence in Western Indonesia', Journal of Southeast Asian History, 10 (1969), 395-414 (pp. 400-10), Anthony Reid, 'Trade and the Problem of Royal Power in Aceh, c. 1550-1700', in Pre-colonial State Systems in Southeast Asia, ed. by Anthony Reid and Lance Castles (Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1975), pp. 45-55 (pp. 46-47); Sanjay Subrahmanyam, The Portuguese Empire in Asia 1500-1700: A Political and Economic History (London and New York: Longman, 1993), pp. 134-35.

(13) For further details of this episode see Salih Ozbaran, The Ottoman Response to European Expansion: Studies on Ottoman-Portuguese Relations in the Indian Ocean and Ottoman Administration in the Arab Lands during the Sixteenth Century (Istanbul: Isis, Analecta Isisiana XII, 1994), p. 65.

(14) Lemos, fols 58r-59v.

(15) 'Sumario da las cosas que pertenecen a la Provincia de la Yndia Oriental y al govierno della, compuesto por el Padre Alexandro Valignano visitador della, y dirigido a nuestro Padre General Everardo Mercuriano en el ano de 1579', in Antonio da Silva Rego, Documentacao para a historia das missoes do Padroado Portugues do Oriente: India, 12 vols (Lisbon: Agencia Geral do Ultramar, 1947-58), xii (1958), 470-638 (pp. 514-15).

(16) Lemos, fol. 5v.

(17) Matias de Albuquerque was captain of Ormuz from 1584 to 1587 and viceroy of India from 1591 to 1597.

(18) See Jorge M. dos Santos Alves and Pierre-Yves Manguin, O Roteiro das Cousas do Achem de D. Joao Ribeiro Gaio: Um olhar portugues sobre o Norte de Samatra em finais do seculo XVI (Lisbon: Comissao Nacional para as Comemoracoes dos Descobrimentos Portugueses, 1997).

(19) Lemos, fols 7v-8r.

(20) Lemos, Part I, Chapter XI, fols 16v-21r, and Part ii, Chapter XVI, fols 41r-45v.

(21) Lemos, fol. 20v.

(22) Lemos, fol. 9v.

(23) Lemos, fol. 15r.

(24) Lemos, fols 2r-4r.

(25) On the use of historically accurate descriptions of actual sieges as a topic for heroic narratives in the sixteenth century, see Michael Murrin, History and Warfare in Renaissance Epic (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 1994), pp. 79-102.

(26) Lemos, fols 61r-62r. 'Inglaterra' is perhaps a slip of the pen or a printer's error for 'Israel'.

(27) Lemos, fols 62r-64r.
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