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A security regime among democracies: cooperation among Iroquois nations.

For over three centuries, five and later six Native American nations cooperated in an international organization known as the Iroquois League. Prior to the formation of the League, violent conflict was both common and costly among the original five nations. But from about 1450 to 1777, the Iroquois League, located in what is now upstate New York, functioned to reduce conflict among its members, eliminating war among them. Even upon its dissolution during the U.S. colonial War of Independence (due to a disagreement over whom to ally with), Iroquois League members agreed to dismantle their regime nonviolently. This history raises several questions: why did Iroquois nations stop fighting each other; did the fact that the members of the Iroquois League were democracies have anything to do with the end of war among them; and what are the lessons of the League for international relations scholars?

Scholars of international relations and security know little about the Iroquois League. The original five nations, whose members spoke distinct but closely related languages, were the Cayuga, Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, and Seneca. In 1600, they comprised a total population of perhaps a hundred thousand.(1) The Tuscarora nation joined the Iroquois League in about 1720. Throughout, I will refer to these peoples as they are refered to by the Europeans and North Americans in translation. The word "Iroquois" is not indigenous: many Iroquois people called themselves the People of the Long House, or Houdenosaunee (Ho-De'-No-Sau-Nee) in the Seneca language. The League of the Iroquois was also called the Five Nations or the Six Nations depending on the period in question. Moreover, it was also called the Confederacy of the Five (or Six) Nations. Because there were several confederacies (for example, the Illinois and Delaware confederacies) of Native American peoples during and after the exploration and conquest of North America by Europeans and the United States, I will usually refer to the Iroquois nations organization as the Iroquois League.

The popular myths are on the one hand that the Iroquois nations were at least fierce warriors and possibly an imperialist alliance and on the other hand that they were an almost saintly group of peaceful nations. The evidence and history are much more complicated than either myth and shows that this international system bears looking at for several reasons.

First, I argue that the Iroquois nations stopped fighting each other and kept the peace among themselves through the operation of a well-functioning security regime. There are few examples of functioning security regimes in Robert Jervis's sense of principles, rules, and norms that permit nations to be more restrained in their behavior in the belief that others will reciprocate.(2) Adding the Iroquois League to our analysis expands the universe of cases of security regimes. Jervis's own account of security regimes uses the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe as the best example of such a system, but the concert is a weak regime compared with the Iroquois League: the Iroquois League existed much longer than the concert, was more institutionalized, and functioned in a quite different--arguably more stressful--security environment. As a security regime, the Iroquois League functioned well to decrease conflict among its members. It was also later partially successful in enabling the Iroquois nations to adapt to the exogenous shocks posed by the Europeans' arrival--massive epidemic depopulation, disruption of the local economy, and the wars between the Europeans--because it formed the basis for diplomacy and collective security.

Second, the Iroquois League exemplifies Immanuel Kant's idea of a system for perpetual peace. The fact that the Iroquois League was composed of democracies is not coincidental to its success as a security regime: members were inclined, because they were democracies, to use negotiation and consultation to resolve disputes. While much recent international relations scholarship has examined the "zone of peace" among democracies, few studies have paid attention to Kant's idea of a league of peace, of which the Iroquois League is an excellent example. When "To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch" was published in 1795,(3) many considered it a utopian document; this is true even to this day. Ironically, several thousand miles from autocratic Prussia, such a system had already arisen, endured for over three hundred years, and fallen before Kant's essay was published.

Third, examining non-European international relations may begin to correct any biases that may result from the condition that most theories of international relations are primarily based on a reading of European history.(4) Realist claims to cross-cultural and timeless validity (e.g., Hans Morgenthau's first principle of political realism that "politics, like society is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature .... and [that nature] has not changed" in thousands of years) are at best premature.(5) Realist claims to cross-cultural validity have, for the most part, been untested because few have looked at the international relations of non-European systems. This form of Eurocentrism is problematic if the generalizations drawn from European history, and the history of European contact with other systems, do not apply to other cultures and geographic settings. If international relations theory were based on a reading of Iroquois history rather than primarily Western European history, would Kantian or Grotian perspectives of international relations have become dominant instead of the Hobbesian "war of all against all" paradigm? While the history of the Iroquois League can only begin to open the door to analysis of international relations in other cultures, this small extension of the historical and cultural domain of international relations scholarship shows that international systems based on different premises (belief systems) do not necessarily conform to realist predictions about state behavior.

The next sections describe the formation and functioning of the League of the Iroquois as a security regime and examine the pattern of Iroquois warfare before and after the initiation of the Iroquois League. The League of the Iroquois is then compared with the Concert of Europe and is shown to be a much more robust security regime: the key difference between the Iroquois League and the Concert of Europe may be the different levels of institutionalization achieved in both regimes. Finally, I discuss Kant's system for perpetual peace.

The Iroquois League as a security regime

The League of the Iroquois worked to maintain the peace among its member nations for over three centuries, even in the face of difficult outside pressures and despite the fact that individual League members occasionally disagreed with each other and set policies that were at times directly opposed to each other. League resilience lies in stark contrast to relations among other Native American nations, including the Iroquois' adversaries, who, under the pressures of European contact, sometimes turned upon each other or even disintegrated internally. How did the members of the Iroquois League keep the peace? Further, the Iroquois frequently fought Native and European nations during the period considered here (circa 1450-1777). Was the Iroquois League really an alliance for war-making and, thus, less important as a security regime?

Security regime theory

Regimes, according to Stephen Krasner, are "rules, norms and decision-making procedures" that are thought to mitigate the effects of international anarchy--the lack of an overarching sovereign to keep peace and enforce international agreements.(6) Regimes are institutions that facilitate communication, negotiation, and coordination among participants and thus function to reduce information and transaction costs. Security regimes should reduce conflict between sovereign states by decreasing the uncertainty and distrust characteristic of the "security dilemma," wherein what one state does to enhance its security may be seen as a threat to another state.

Security regime theory should address several questions. First, why and how do states form security regimes? Realist theories suggest that hegemons (dominant states) impose regimes or that regimes will only form if the interests of all the actors converge. Liberal idealists suggest that regimes form when actors renounce short-term self-interest and seek to promote their long-term interest in peace and security. Jervis argues that security regimes form when states believe that war is costly and that expansion is not the route to security. Janice Stein agrees: security regimes are likely to form when "leaders ... see war as unattractive, with damaging and undesirable consequences. They are likely to do so in the aftermath of protracted, or costly, or indecisive war which failed to achieve its minimum objectives even as it disrupted the economic and social fabric of domestic society."(7)

But, as Joseph Nye argues, "if cooperation can be explained on the basis of short-run self-interests, such as avoiding the disproportionate costs of ... war, then regimes become a redundant explanation." Limited "cooperation can be based on risk aversion without requiring agreement on the long-term course of history."(8) Are states with common historical or cultural elements more likely to form security regimes, or will states with quite different cultures, economies, histories, and goals form security regimes with the same frequency?

Second, exactly how do security regimes work? Do security regimes change the conditions among states (the structure of international politics), the perception of interests of state actors, or conceptions of "identity" within and among regime members? Third, what conditions foster the maintenance of security regimes? Is institutionalization a virtue or a hindrance? Does the inertia of habit and sunk cost better explain the duration of security regimes?(9) Are narrow security regimes more successful than broad security regimes? Does the character of the regime's member states (i.e., their regime type) influence the likelihood of success of security regimes? Are regimes that are composed entirely of democracies more successful? Finally, what causes security regimes to break down? Possible causes of security regime breakdown are the diverging interests of actors, the declining strength of a hegemon, the failure of regime maintenance mechanisms, exogenous shocks, or declining "war-weariness." We might also ask (although there is not room here to consider this question) if, even after a security regime breaks down, there are residual effects among former regime members: perhaps the history of a once-successful security regime casts an optimistic or pessimistic shadow onto the future.

Sources and methods

At this point, important questions or objections may already have sprung to mind concerning the relevance, comparability, and quality of evidence for such a study as this. First, how can the international relations of Iroquois nations be compared with those of European states? Are not the political units so dissimilar as to make reasonable comparisons impossible? Second, there must be enormous problems of sources and evidence. How were these difficulties resolved?

The first issue can be rephrased as: "Native American nations are not the same as, or even analagous to, modern (post-1648) European states. Since we are not talking about states as they are commonly understood in international politics, the units are not comparable and the effort is irrelevant to international relations theory." In an important sense, this question goes to the crux of the article and there are two layers of response. In another way, the question shows the Eurocentrism of international relations scholarship and a fixation on ideas of nations, states, inter-national relations, sovereignty, and tribes that are fixed on some European-derived ideal type.

Are the units comparable? Yes, if one makes a distinction between the forms of "states" and the functions of "government." The forms of Native American and European states certainly were different from each other, but their governments performed similar functions-functions that normally are associated with states: there were within Iroquois nations decision-making structures and ways to provide collective goods; there were elected and appointed representatives as well as hereditary leadership. Further similarities exist in the area of international relations: the nations of North America used diplomatic envoys, recognized the "sovereignty" of other nations, and negotiated binding treaties. Finally, Iroquois governments had a monopoly on the use of force, although the egalitarian structure of the state meant that force could only be deployed after consensus was reached by all adult members of the nation. The Iroquois League nations of, for example, 1500 were different from European nations in that they were in general smaller, less urban, less industrialized, and more democratic than European states of the same period. But, just as the ideal of the "state" does not quite correspond to the Iroquois nations, it also does not correspond to all European-type states. In fact, there is wide variation among the states that comprised the European international system (for example in terms of provision of collective goods, the criteria for political leadership, and the degree of democracy), both in comparison with one another and over time.(10) So, although the units of analysis are not identical, if one understands states as institutional arrangements--performing certain "governing" functions--that vary along several dimensions and change over time, then one can compare the international relations of Native North America with international relations in Europe.

More fundamentally, are different cultures/civilizations comparable? In one important sense, the answer is no, and we need to stop talking about different societies as if social science described one world. Multiple "worlds" existed in sixteenth-, seventeenth-, and eighteenth-century North America, and their inhabitants had radically different views of the rights of citizens, the origin of species, and the afterlife. Thus, any comparisons between European and Native American states should be viewed with caution bordering on suspicion. On the other hand, the very differences highlighted by comparison may allow for a critical reappraisal of the modern European state and war systems. An examination of the Iroquois and of the similarities and differences between the two societies may tell us something new about international relations among European-type states. But even if the Iroquois did not tell us, by contrast, much about modern international relations, the Iroquois League is by itself worth knowing about.

The second major problem concerns sources. How do we or can we know anything about the League of the Troquois? Many problems of evidence exist: first, because they were primarily an oral society during the period discussed here (i.e., they did use "wampum" beads as a form of writing) the Iroquois nations themselves left few written records. Wampum, and the songs made up to memorialize an event, were the official records of agreements between Iroquois League nations.(11)

But on another level, this is not to privilege written text. Written texts are handy because they are semipermanent. But written "primary" texts are no more omniscient than oral histories; in fact, they may be less so. Written texts usually are inscribed by individual authors who rarely give us a sense of how widely shared their interpretations are. Even if widely shared, the written history is necessarily incomplete and reflective of a particular set of concerns and biases. In contrast, given the process of preserving and transmitting oral history, we know that more than one author was involved in shaping the account, for the generation of oral history is a public event, subject to public scrutiny and correction. This is not to say that oral history is never incomplete or biased by a particular worldview. In democracies such as the Iroquois, however, we can be assured that the history is probably "true"--that is, not widely divergent from the reality perceived and constructed by most of its members.

Second, a good deal of evidence was lost over the years. Much of the history died with the death of elders--the keepers of the oral tradition--in the depopulation caused by massive epidemic disease. Disruption and death due to epidemic diseases were enormous in all of Native America. Although figures vary, according to some estimates, in 1492 there were about a hundred million people in North and South America; by 1600, perhaps ten million Native Americans survived.(12) The Iroquois were seriously affected by these epidemics, but the original population and the rates of infection and mortality for the five nations are unknown.(13) An epidemic in the 1630s reduced their population, according to Francis Jennings, by "a half or more."(14) The social dislocation, including the loss of oral history, due to epidemics certainly was enormous. Wampum and other ethnographic evidence also disappeared over the centuries. Perhaps the greatest recent loss of data occurred in Albany, New York, on 29 March 191 1, when fire damaged the capitol and the New York State Library that held much ethnographic material on the Iroquois: over two-thirds of the collection was lost.(15)

Third, much of what is known about the Iroquois--early translations of Iroquois speech, analysis of Iroquois metaphor, and descriptions of the international behavior of the Iroquois Nations--depends on the work of European observers unfamiliar with the Iroquois. These early observers were biased by their roles as missionaries, diplomats, and traders. Some, like Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson, were impressed by the democratic practices of the League of the Iroquois; others, for instance George Washington, wanted the Iroquois "destroyed."(16)

It was not my task, nor should it have been, to write a bibliographic essay about Iroquois studies. My effort was to try to figure out what happened: Why did the Iroquois nations stop fighting one another? Why did they fight Europeans and other Native nations? How important to understanding the end of war among Iroquois League members is it that these members were participatory democracies? Nevertheless, the answers to these questions are deeply influenced by the biases of the many missionaries, colonizers, anthropologists, and historians who have studied the Iroquis League. How have I approached the problem of interpreting diverse and often contradictory sources?

First, I read a lot--though certainly not all--of the material written by early observers of the Iroquois; I also read accounts by modern historians and anthropologists. I tried to learn about the biases these authors took to their work and how early accounts shaped later interpretations. Second, I attempted to sift through the contradictory accounts of Iroquois nation practices and Iroquois League conduct by comparing them directly. I remained sceptical of all controversial evidence until it was corroborated by second and, if possible, third sources that relied on different evidentiary bases. In instances where important disagreements remain, such as the date of the founding of the Iroquois League, I have indicated the controversy and provided the main alternative views and the supporting evidence. Third, whenever possible I have used the language of participants as recorded by contemporary observers, even though those observers probably have not translated Iroquois statements with complete accuracy, in an effort to get closer to the times in question and to add at least a representation of the voice of participants in League diplomacy.

Finally, I have tried to be open to the evidence. This meant acknowledging startling (apparent) contradictions: members of the Iroquois League and the League itself were genuinely democratic; individual members of the five nations were sometimes torturers and cannibals (they took war captives and sometimes ate those captives). These people were both peaceful and violent, egalitarian and characterized by firm sex roles, oriented to the dream world and simultaneously acutely aware of and pragmatic in their dealings with the British, Dutch, French, and other Native nations. The members of the Five Nations were as complex in their motives and behavior as any other society. To the extent that we can know anything about them, I have attempted to preserve that complexity.

Origin of the Iroquois League

The Cayuga, Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, and Seneca nations formed between 1000 and 1400 A.D. from what anthropologists have called the "Owasco" peoples.(17) It is difficult to determine exactly when the League of these five Iroquois nations was founded, and this determination is related to the purpose of the confederation: although some scholars believe that the Iroquois League could only have been formed after Europeans appeared, most suggest it was formed sometime in the fifteenth century--well before the arrival of Europeans. The traditional account of the Iroquois League's formation by Native peoples traces it back to a period of intense warfare among the original five nations. Deganawidah proposed the idea of a league to stop the intertribal warfare. Hiawatha, Deganawidah's spokesperson, negotiated its formation over several years.(18)

Some scholars have suggested other reasons for the formation of the Iroquois League. Peter Farb argues: "An impetus for Iroquois confederation more likely than any vision of a prophetic Dekanwidah may be traced to the first probings by French ships into the Gulf of St. Lawrence, early in the sixteenth century."(19) Dorothy Jones suggests that the League had two purposes: it was an "attempt to suppress ingroup hostility and turn it outward."(20)

Most accounts place the founding between 1000 and 1450 A.D., and the weight of the evidence seems to argue for the later date. Arthur Parker and Francis Jennings suggest that the League was formed in 1390.(21) Anthony Wallace suggests that it was founded around 1450 "in a successful endeavor to revive an even more ancient but less formally constructed ethnic confederacy."(22) Some Iroquois accounts place the founding of the League as one or two generations before the Iroquois first came into contact with Europeans: the French explorer Jacques Cartier first encountered Mohawk along the Saint Lawrence River in 1534-35.(23) William Fenton states: "It is certain, however, that the League was founded before European settlement, probably about A.D. 1500 give or take twenty five years, although arguments for earlier and later dates abound."(24) This would be consistent with archaeological evidence that dates the founding of the League to "sometime in the late fifteenth century."(25) Other Iroquois traditions recall that the final negotiations for the League occurred during a time of solar eclipse, which would put the founding around 1451.(26)

In sum, it seems likely that the League of the Iroquois was formed well before the five original nations came into contact with European explorers and settlers. The negotiations for the formation of the Iroquois League probably were concluded around 1450, about eighty-five years before the Mohawks, in the League members' first direct contact with Europeans, met Cartier on the Saint Lawrence. The Seneca nation was the last of the original five nations to decide to join. It appears that other Native nations were asked to join the League upon its formation, notably the Cherokee, Delaware, and Erie, but they declined.(27)

The Great Law

The institution of the Iroquois League was codified in the Great Law of Peace (or the Great Binding Law). This "constitution" of the League, although certainly modified over the centuries, is a comprehensive document that includes the policies, procedures, philosophy, and mechanisms of amendment for the League. The Great Law comes to modern scholars of the Iroquois through generations of Native oral historians. In the words of Fenton, "seen as an historical discourse, it is comprised of three main parts: (1) the myth of Deganawidah ... ; (2) the legend of the conversion of local chiefs to the cause of peace; (3) the principles of the League--its internal structure and rituals."(28) The narrative also provides a guide to its members on how to commit the Great Law to memory and recall it accurately: "Should two sons of opposite sides of the council fire agree in a desire to hear the reciting of the laws of the Great Peace and so refresh their memories in the way ordained by the founder of the Confederacy," one sachem (spokesperson) would be appointed to publicly recite the laws.(29)

In terms of assessing the League of the Iroquois as a security regime, several provisions of the Great Law are of interest: the overall purpose and philosophical orientation of the League; the articulation of the relationships among member nations; the processes for decision making; and the relationship of the Iroquois League to other Native nations--particularly in terms of war.

Purposes. The main purposes of the Iroquois League were to achieve general peace and to keep unity and order among the five nations, which frequently had fought one another before the Iroquois League's formation. The image is one of nations sitting together under a tree of peace: "I Dekanwidah, and the Union Lords now uproot the tallest pine tree and into the cavity thereby made we cast all weapons of war.... We bury them from sight and we plant again the tree. Thus shall the Great Peace be established and hostilities shall no longer be known between the Five Nations but peace to the United People." Every five years the people were to assemble and ask each other if they were still of the same mind, that is if they were still united in the League: "If any of the Five Nations shall not pledge continuance and steadfastness to the pledge of unity then the Great Binding Law shall dissolve."(30)

The original members of the Iroquois League were concerned not only with peace among the five nations but also with threats from other Native nations. Thus, the Iroquois League could also facilitate collective security: "We bind ourselves together by taking hold of each other's hands so firmly and forming a circle so strong that if a tree should fall upon it, it could not shake or break it, so that our people and our grandchildren shall remain in a circle in security, peace, and happiness."(31) They also put a metaphorical eagle on top of the tree to look for threats to the peace from outside the League.(32)

Relations between Iroquois League members and other Native nations. The Iroquois League was not conceived as a union that would eliminate all differences among the original five nations, and the Great Law clearly states that the five nations were to remain autonomous. Moreover, the rights of each nation, that is, their cultural as well as political autonomy, were not to be changed by their membership in the League: "The rites and the festivals of each nation shall remain undisturbed and shall continue as before because they were given by the people of old times as useful and necessary .... "(33) Early eighteenth-century observer Cadwallader Colden noted that "each of these Nations is an absolute Republick by itself, and every Castle in each Nation makes an independent Republick, and is governed in all publick Alfairs by its own Sachems or old Men."(34) Fenton argues that "each community had its local ways which it zealously maintained and defended" and notes that "this diversity ... continues to this day."(35) Historians agree that "each of these Five Nations retained full sovereignty over its own affairs."(36) Importantly, each member of the Iroquois League was free to make war or peace separately.(37)

In terms of relationships between League and non-league nations, the Great Law provides that all were welcome under the Tree of Peace if they were willing to abide by the laws of the League.(38) A proposition to establish the "Great Peace" between the Iroquois League and another nation would be made in councils between Iroquois and the other nation. But the language does not make clear the circumstances necessary for an invitation to join the Iroquois League and, in fact, seems rather bellicose. According to the Great Law, the other nation should be persuaded by reason to join the League and if the other nation does not immediately agree to join, the request should be made several times. "If refusal steadfastly follows, the War Chief shall let the bunch of white lake shells drop from his outstretched hand to the ground and shall bound quickly forward and club the offending chief to death. War shall thereby be declared.... War must continue until the contest is won by the Five Nations."(39) When the Iroquois League "has for its object the establishment of the Great Peace among the people of an outside nation and that nation refuses to accept the Great Peace, then by such refusal they bring a declaration of war upon themselves from the Five Nations. Then shall the Five Nations seek to establish the Great Peace by conquest of the rebellious nation."(40) Once the war was over, the other nation was to be disarmed and was further instructed to observe all the laws of the Great Peace "for all time to come."(41)

The messianic quality of the Great Law's proposal to extend the peace is not clearly supported or refuted by Iroquois League history. Was an invitation to join the Iroquois League alliances with other Native nations or to join the Covenant Chain alliance system made only if the outside nation had attacked an Iroquois nation, or was an invitation made to neighboring nations as part of a policy of expansion? According to the law of the five nations, whether a nation joined the League of its own free will or as the result of conquest, it could continue its own system of internal government, and it was to be disarmed. The law also said these new nations "must cease all warfare against other nations."(42) In addition, newly admitted nations were not to have a right to participate equally in Iroquois League councils. In addition, individuals were free to join and leave the individual nations of the League. The Great Law also provides for expelling those nations that did not follow the law of the five nations.

Decision making within the Iroquois League. Both the individual member nations of the Iroquois League and the League itself operated as democracies. The League of the Iroquois included a body, the Great Council, for decision making among member nations. Each of the original five nations sent a number of sachems to the Great Council, for a total of fifty sachems. The sachems were to be above gossip and partisanship in order to keep the best interests of the nations in mind: "All their actions shall be marked by calm deliberation."(43) Sachems who did not perform well or in the best interest of the people were to be admonished three times, after which they could be removed and replaced.(44) Colden confirmed that these practices were still in place in the early eighteenth century: the sachems were "generally poorer than the common People" because they gave their wealth away and "every unworthy Action is unavoidably attended with the Forfeiture of their Commission; for their Authority is only the Esteem of the People, and ceases the Moment that Esteem is lost."(45)

Fenton argues that the sachems "enjoyed great prestige but little power." Fenton clarified this by saying, "I use |power' here in the sense of prestige translated into action. In Iroquois polity no one ordered any one else around. Issues were argued to consensus, and if agreement was not reached, the matter was dropped. Even when the chiefs had attained |one mind,' an appeal was made to the people, hoping they would agree."(46) There also seems to have been a clear separation of military and political authority: Iroquois League sachems were not allowed to take part in warfare as leaders--there were separate military chiefs. In practice, the Iroquois nations conducted war and peace negotiations, as well as made alliances, both as the collective League and as individual nations.

The Iroquois League's Great Council met annually in the autumn (or at other times when necessary) at Onondaga, where they discussed alliance formation and peacemaking and decided on major wars. Although the nations formally were equal and autonomous, the Great Law outlined different roles for each in decision making within the Great Council. The Onondaga were designated the keepers of the "fire" (meeting place) and the wampum bead records of the League. The Mohawk and the Seneca nations were known as the older brothers, and the Cayuga and Oneida were younger brothers. Decisions were reached by a series of caucuses: each "brotherhood" talked separately about an issue and came to consensus before consulting the other side: "First the question shall be passed to the Mohawk and Seneca Lords, then it shall be discussed and passed by the Oneida and Cayuga Lords. Their decisions shall then be referred to the Onondaga Lords, (Fire Keepers) for final judgment."(47) Elisabeth Tooker reports that if the Onondaga received the opinions of the other four nations and disagreed, "they referred it back for further discussion; but in so doing, they had to show that the opinion of the other tribes was in conflict with established custom or with public policy."(48) The decisions of the Great Council, even in times of great threat, were then to be confirmed by going back to the people of each nation.(49) A nineteenth-century observer, Asher Wright, noted:

If any individual desired to bring any proposition before the general council,

he must first gain the consent of his family, then his clan, next of the

four related clans in his end of the council house, then of his nation, and

thus in due course ... the business would be brought up before the representatives

of the confederacy. In the reverse order, the measures of the general

council were sent down to the people for their approval. It was a standing

rule that all action should be unanimous. Hence, the discussions were

continued until all opposition was reasoned down, or the proposed measure

was abandoned.(50)

Openness in discussing every matter, including war, may have been a problem at times in terms of gaining the element of surprise against the Iroquois League's adversaries. During a seventeenth-century war with the French, a British envoy advised the Iroquois to "take one or two of your wisest Sachems, and one or two chief Captains of each Nation, to be a Council to manage all the affairs of the War. They to give Orders to the rest of the Officers what they are to do, that your designs may be kept Private, for after it comes among so many People, it is Blazed abroad and your designs are often frustrated."(51)

So, in practice the Iroquois League's members made decisions in the Great Council by consensus. The Great Council also functioned as an information and communication center as well as a decision-making body. In local matters of revenge warfare against non-league tribes, the Great Council would sometimes remain silent and nations were allowed to make separate alliances with other nations. Other nations, not formally Iroquois League members, were consulted in accordance with their relationship to or status within the League and made their views known through the sachems of their League sponsor.(52) Formal allies were talked with as equals and hopefully were persuaded by Iroquois League oratory. When allies were not persuaded, the Iroquois League apparently assented to their right to hold a different position.

When the Tuscarora nation joined the Iroquois League, it was admitted as a junior member, without a formal seat at the fire of the Great Council: Tuscarora chiefs were not made sachems and the total number of sachems remained at fifty. The Tuscarora were treated as de facto equals by the other five nations and were able to make their views known through their sponsors, the Oneida.(53) On the other hand, apparently the Tuscarora did not always follow Great Council decisions.(54)

Patterns of war, alliance, and peace and the Iroquois League's demise

To determine the role that the Iroquois League played in international security, several questions need to be answered. First, what was the pattern of conflict among the five nations both before and after the League's formation? If war was endemic before the formation of the Iroquois League, a successful security regime should have reduced or eliminated war and violent conflict between its members. Second, did the formation of the League change the pattern of conflict between the Iroquois League member nations and other Native American nations, for instance the Algonquins or Hurons? The League of the Iroquois could function to reduce the uncertainty of relations among member nations, allowing them to pursue war against other nations: confident that their "backs" were secure, the individual members of the League (or coalitions of members) might go to war against others. Alternatively, if the ideology of peaceful relations embodied in the Great Law was imbibed by Iroquois League members, then outwardly directed conflict for offensive purposes ought to have decreased while the number of peaceful agreements between the five/six Iroquois nations and other nations might increase. And, if the pattern of conflict and treaty making between the League members and other Native nations did change, what accounts for the shift? Third, after the powerful exogenous shocks of contact with the Europeans, how did the patterns of violent conflict, war, and cooperation change? Was the Iroquois League a war-making alliance? If not originally conceived as a war-making alliance, did the League allow its members to wage war against other nations because near neighbors were not hostile?

War before and after formation of the Iroquois League

The myth of Deganawidah and the founding of the Iroquois League holds that war among the five nations was widespread before the formation of the League, and archaeological evidence supports that history.(55) The dominant form of precolonial warfare among those nations that would later form the Iroquois League is called "blood feud" or "mourning war."(56) War as a result of boundary disputes appears to have been uncommon, although there is good evidence that the Iroquois and other groups did have clear notions of territory and sovereignty.(57) Rather, war more commonly began as feuds. Escalation was likely according to Wallace: "Over a period of time . . . a sequence of mutually vengeful killings could occur, involving an increasing number of members of the two groups, until finally there were so many unsettled scores left on both sides that a state of chronic |war' could be said to exist, justifying an endless exchange of forays."(58)

Iroquois families were obliged by tradition and religious belief to seek revenge and often a replacement for the death of a family member by either killing or capturing and adopting one of the enemy. This is one reason why warriors were praised for their ability to take captives. Iroquois League nations were not the only Native American nations to make use of this practice: capture could lead to terrible physical abuse, especially for male prisoners, who were forced to run through two rows of male members of the capturing village, each of whom inflicted blows on prisoners (running the gauntlet). Sometimes one or more of their fingers were cut off to mark prisoners as adoptees and to limit, at least for a time, their ability to use weapons against their captors. Some captives were killed and parts of their bodies eaten if they did not meet with the satisfaction of their captors. Those who were chosen for adoption were apparently then treated with kindness and placed with their new families.(59) Daniel Richter notes:

The connection between war and mourning rested on beliefs about the

spiritual power that animated all things. . . . Because the individual's death

diminished the collective power of a lineage, clan, and village, Iroquois

families conducted "Requickening" ceremonies in which the deceased's

name, and with it the social role and duties it represented, was transferred

to a successor. Such rites filled vacant positions in lineages and villages both

literally and symbolically: they assured survivors that the social function and

spiritual potency embodied in the departed's name had not disappeared

and that the community would endure. In Requickenings, people of high

status were usually replaced from within . . . but at some point lower in the

social scale an external source of surrogates inevitably became necessary.

Here warfare made its contribution, for those adopted to "help strengthen

the familye in lew of their deceased Freind" were often captives taken in

battle.(60)

In a condition of constant feuding, and if escalation was not uncommon, there was a strong incentive for an end to the killing. In proposing the formation of Iroquois League itself, its rituals for "condolence" accompanying meetings of members nations, and treaty making between the Iroquois League and other nations, Deganawidah and his spokesperson Hiawatha provided an alternative to this form of war and a way to soothe those who were grieving. Thus, at least among the five nations of the Iroquois League, it was no longer necessary to take captives to replace the dead because the condolence ritual partly fulfilled that mourning function. At the same time, the Iroquois League itself strengthened the bonds between nations and reassured members of the peaceful intentions of other nations within the League.

The continued existence of the Iroquois League suggests that war among the five and later six nations significantly declined or was entirely eliminated. There is no mention by historians of war among its members after Iroquois League formation, although there was some fighting (characterized by George Snyderman as "a quarrel") among the Mohawks, Onondagas, and Senecas over captives taken in a war against the Hurons in the 1650s.(61) Also, to be clear, the increasingly fluid residence patterns in the villages of Native American nations meant that some members of Iroquois League nations resided in the villages of other nations and vice versa. So, for example, it is entirely possible that Seneca peoples who made their residence with the Illinois would join the Illinois in wars against one of the five/six nations.(62) In addition, during the wars on the frontier between the British and French, Iroquois League members sometimes took different sides. But there was no war among the member nations of the League between its formation and its dissolution over three hundred years later. According to Jennings, "a number of generations--no one knows certainly how many--went by before the Five Nations solved most of the problems of keeping their League united. By the time of English conquest of New Netherland in 1664, the Five Nations had ceased to fight against each other, and they acted as a unit for defense though internal strains continued throughout the League's existence."(63) Thus, the Iroquois League functioned well as a security regime.

But if organized war among members of the Iroquois League halted, what was the pattern of warfare between member and nonmember nations? The next section surveys the complex history of Iroquois war from about 1535 to 1777 and demonstrates that while the Iroquois League nations were not fighting each other, they were often at war with Native and European neighbors. This pattern of Iroquois war, however, cannot be understood outside the context of economic and political relations among Native and European nations in North America.

Character of wars and treaties after contact with Europeans

The pattern and scale of Iroquois war appear to have changed dramatically soon after the first Europeans began to settle in the Northeast and trade with the Iroquois and other nations. There is little doubt that prior to contact with Europeans, the Iroquois nations fought with their neighbors: evidence includes the fact that the institution of war chiefs was intact and is further corroborated by the physical layout of Iroquois settlements. The larger settlements consisted of thirty to 150 longhouses surrounded by wooden fortifications that Europeans would later describe as "castles" or palisades. The Iroquois also had a fierce reputation. But, whereas native war before contact with Europeans primarily consisted of blood feuds and territorial skirmishes, several new motives and pressures for war were introduced with the European presence.

First, with the Europeans came the epidemic diseases that led to a dramatic decline in Native American populations; the Iroquois increasingly resorted to war to boost their population by adopting war captives. Richter writes that "the thousands of deaths from disease led women to demand continual mourning-wars and inspired young men to seize even more captives to requicken the dead."(64) For example, he notes that some of the Iroquois went to war against Native nations in the Carolinas after a small pox epidemic in 1679 and that observers in the mid-1600s believed that as many as two-thirds of the people in some Iroquois villages were adoptees.(65)

Second, the fur trade changed the international relations of Native nations in important ways: those nations with access to the fur trade also had access to European weapons and often allied with a European power. Added firepower also altered the balance of power among Native nations. Third, European settlers increasingly encroached on Iroquois land. So, with European settlement of the Northeast, the Iroquois began to fight for other reasons: for access to trade goods, to retain their influence in the region among other Native groups and between themselves and the Europeans, and to protect their land from encroachment by the settlers and traders. Often the several reasons for war (desire for captives, access to the fur trade, and control of territory) were intertwined.

From the 1600s to the late 1700s, Iroquois League members frequently were at war with the other Native nations and with the British, French, and later the young United States. Relations with the Dutch, who occuppied New Netherland from 1614 to the mid-1700s, were much less antagonistic and almost entirely focused on trade.(66) The wars and treaties involving Iroquois League nations during these years number in the dozens, and no single source provides a comprehensive summary of both treaties and wars. Apart from Iroquois League treaties, the five and six Iroquois nations also made separate treaties with other Native American nations and the Europeans. While it is impossible to discuss all the wars, treaties, and alliances of these centuries here, Tables 1 and 2 list the main wars and treaties of select periods.

[TABULAR DATA 1 OMITTED]

The "Beaver Wars"

The fur trade began almost as soon as the Europeans began their exploration of the Northeast. Dutch, English, and French colonials were involved in the trade, which entailed Native Americans bringing beaver pelts and other furs to European traders in exchange for European goods, including weapons. To the south and east, trade with the Dutch appears to have been mutually profitable and relations with the Dutch were relatively peaceful. But to the north, members of the Iroquois League appear to have been locked out of the fur trade with the French at first because the Algonquin, Huron, and Montagnais, who had made the initial contact with the Europeans, were attempting to secure a monopoly.(67) Later, in the late sixteenth century, the Iroquois went to war to plunder and to break the exclusive control over trade held by other Native nations.

Meanwhile the Algonquin, Huron, and Montagnais nations formed various alliances among themselves and later with the French to protect their trade monopoly. In some instances, New France directly joined in the conflict among Native nations over access to trade: in 1609 Champlain and his Native allies defeated a Mohawk party of over three hundred warriors; in the following year, they killed nearly a hundred Mohawk warriors.(68) Jennings argues that "the long antagonism between the French and the Five Nations was created by the French, not by the Iroquois, as a deliberate implementation of divide and conquer strategy. Every effort by the Iroquois at reconciliation was rebuffed or evaded until finally they exploded."(69) The entire French population of New France in 1650 was about two thousand people dispersed in scattered settlements.(70) With so few French in the New World, the French policies of alliance with Native nations, and also the practice of miscegination and adoption of native peoples, makes strategic sense.

The fur trade also caused increased tension among nations of the Iroquois League. For example, Bruce Trigger argues that after 1650 the Mohawk became more "arrogant in their dealings with the other tribes of the confederacy, who needed their permission to pass through the Mohawk River valley to trade with the Dutch."(71) There were also divisions among the five nations over access to trade with the English through Mohawk territory and conflicts between the Mohawk and the Onondaga and between the Seneca and the Onondaga over relationships with the French in 1656.(72) Tooker notes that the existance of the Iroquois League "did not mean that each tribe ceased to pursue its own national interests as some have supposed." Rather, "each tribe continued to seek a policy that would give it advantage in the fur trade . . . establishing new or renewing old trade relationships if that course of action seemed profitable and, as the Great Peace established by the League extended only to its members, going to war if success there promised some advantage."(73)

But, whatever the tensions among Iroquois League members over the fur trade, the Iroquois certainly faced a more direct threat from the French than from one another. In 1642, the Iroquois approached the French at Three Rivers to establish trade and peace. They were rejected in their three attempts.(74) In 1664, Louis XIV sent an order to French troops to "totally exterminate" the Iroquois.(75) The French extermination program became unnecessary when four of the five Iroquois nations submitted to a treaty with the French in December 1665. The Mohawk, who did not sign immediately, made an agreement with the French in May 1665; despite the agreement, the French commander found an excuse to burn Mohawk villages and farms in October.(76) J.D. Hurley argues that "the peace . . . secured by the treaties of 1665-1667 . . . was never really more than a truce of convenience. Underlying this |peace', the basic cause of Franco-Iroquois warfare remained: competition for exclusive control of the Great Lakes fur trade."(77)

The Iroquois nations were a buffer between the British and the French. New York's first secretary of Indian affairs, Robert Livingston, wrote in May 1701: "Of the Five [Iroquois] Nations, I need not enumerate the advantages arising from their firmness to this government [of New York], they having fought our battles for us and been a constant barrier of defence between Virginia and Maryland and the French, and by their constant vigilence have prevented the French from making any descent that way."(78) In 1754, British commissioners for trade clearly noted that

The preserving and securing the friendship of these Indians is in the present

situation of affairs an object of the greatest importance. It is from the

steady adherence of these Indians to the British Interests that not only New

York but all the other Northern Colonys have hitherto been secured from

the fatal effects of the encroachments of a foreign power, and without their

friendship and assistance all efforts to check and disappoint the present

view of this power may prove ineffectual.(79)

Diplomacy, alliance, and collective security

While individual member nations of the Iroquois League conducted separate diplomacy with the colonizers, the League itself became the basis for Iroquois diplomacy with both Native and European Nations in the seventeenth century. Mathew Dennis argues that the Iroquois sought to bring the European nations into a peaceful relationship based on the notion of kinship.(80) But, whatever the Iroquois League's grand design, the conduct of diplomacy was complex and expansive in geographic character. The popular notion that the Iroquois managed a vast empire may be due in part to the fact that Iroquois League sachems sometimes spoke for other native nations in negotiations with Europeans, as for instance when they spoke up for the Tuscarora in 1713.(81) The Iroquois also involved Europeans in their diplomacy: at least twice in the 1600s the Iroquois League asked the Dutch to mediate for them with the French.(82) In addition the Iroquois League managed a complex system of alliances, the Covenant Chain, beginning in 1677 when two treaties were negotiated at Albany between the Iroquois League, the state of Delaware, and the colonies of Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia. Jennings credits the Covenant Chain with maintaining the peace:

The Chain is the reason there was peace between colonies and tribes in the

"middle colonial" region during the long period from 1677-1755. The

Chain organized trade between Indians and colonials over a vast region. . . .

It recruited warriors in joint struggles of Indians and English colonials to

conquer New France. It organized systematic retreats of Indians from defeats

in New England and southern colonies into sanctuaries in New York,

Pennsylvania, and Iroquoia. Chain negotiations covered the peaceful retreat

of Indians from eastern Pennsylvania to the Ohio region beyond the

Appalachians. And Chain arrangements opened the west to English settlement.

The Chain's arrangements, rather than incessant ferocious war, explain

how the Iroquois achieved leadership and occasionally the power of

command over other tribes.(83)

Iroquois alliances also existed between the Iroquois nations and many other Native nations. These variously were agreements between equals, as in the Delaware-Iroquois alliance, and those where Native nations, for example the Susquehannock, were under the "protection" of the Iroquois.(84) In some cases, especially later in the eighteenth century, it appears that the Iroquois exaggerated their ability to speak for other Native nations bound to the Covenant Chain, perhaps to increase their leverage in negotiations with the British.(85) Several nations that fled the advancing European colonists were treated as "brothers," "cousins," or "nephews" by the Iroquois League. Europeans called these nations "tributaries" of the League, although Jennings argues that the relationship of these other Native nations to the Iroquois was more reciprocal: "No general rule can be applied, but duality or reciprocity was the principle operating throughout Iroquois political structures; what Europeans called tributaries were known by the Iroquois as bretheren, cousins, or nephews--statuses that involved Iroquois responsibilities as well as privileges."(86)

The Iroquois League also began increasingly to function for collective security. For example, even while they made agreements with the colonists, the Iroquois debated among themselves and with other Native American groups about whether to throw the English out of the Northeast by force. In 1726, the Iroquois, disturbed by the increasing loss through sale or seizure of their territory, proposed that all Indian nations fight both the British and the French to prevent them from taking all the Native American lands.(87) Later, in 1761 and again in 1763, the Seneca tried to organize a war against the Europeans: Pontiac's Conspiracy.(88) In neither period were the Iroquois able to convince all the nations invited to join with them. On the first occasion in 1726, they were unsuccessful in getting their neighbors to mount any action against the colonists. On the second occasion, the allied Native nations attacked the English in Detroit, Fort Pitt, Niagra, and elsewhere, but despite short-term gains, they were ultimately unsuccessful.

Dissolution during the War of Independence

He has excited domestic insurrections among us, and has endeavoured to bring

on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known

rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions.

--Declaration of Independence, 1776

The British and the colonists each worked hard to keep the Iroquois on their side during the colonial rebellion that became the War of Independence. In 1775, the Continental Congress sent a delegation to the Iroquois in Albany to ask for their neutrality in the coming war against the British while, on the other side, the British argued that the colonists were essentially naughty children. The Iroquois agreed to be neutral on the condition that their hunters be allowed free passage during the war and that actions be limited to the coast. There was some involvement of small groups of Iroquois warriors on both sides, but for the most part the Iroquois kept a low profile. In late 1775, a Mohawk person was killed by a Continental soldier, and the next year other Mohawk warriors joined the British against the rebels. In the next two years the neutrality policy gradually disintegrated as both sides exhorted the Iroquois to take up arms for their respective causes.(89)

In 1777, the six Iroquois nations disagreed about their role in the War of Independence. The Oneida and Tuscarora decided to support the Continental rebels while the rest of the Iroquois League (the Cayuga, Mohawk, Onondaga, and Seneca) supported the British in large numbers on the condition that Iroquois land claims be adjudicated.(90) The disagreement resulted in the League "putting out the fire" in Onondaga and dividing the wampum records of their agreements between the two sides. Iroquois nation met Iroquois nation in battle for the first time in more than three hundred years at Oriskany, New York, on 8 August 1777.(91)

The Iroquois nations that fought for the British did well, and in some battles the Iroquois fielded more troops and suffered more casualties than the British. At the battle in Oriskany, ninety-one Iroquois and thirty-three British died on the British side; at Wyoming Valley on 3 July 1778, the Iroquois fielded five hundred combatants and the British, four hundred; at Cherry Valley on 11 November 1778, the Iroquois provided five hundred warriors and the British sent two hundred.(92)

General Washington, clearly distressed by their role, urged that the Iroquois be "destroyed," and part of the Continental army attempted to do just that.(93) As Wright notes, "In 1779, General John Sullivan cut down orchards and crops, burning 500 [Iroquois] houses and nearly a million bushels of corn. Colonel Daniel Brodhead, in an infamous attack that became known as the |squaw campaign,' dodged Indian armies but slaughtered women and children."(94) Despite the Continental army's efforts, in 1781 the governor of New York had to admit to the Congress that the Iroquois deprived them of "a great portion of our most valuable and well inhabited territory."(95)

At the conclusion of the war, the Continental army claimed that it also defeated the Native nations that had backed the British, and no provisions for the Iroquois were made in the 1783 Treaty of Paris. The young U.S. colonies crowded the individual Iroquois nations in a westward expansion, acquiring Iroquois land by various means including treaties, purchase, swindle, and force.(96) The Iroquois gradually were confined to reservations in New York, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin and in Canada. The Iroquois League was renewed in the late eighteenth century at both Six Nations Reserve in Canada and on the Buffalo Creek Reservation in upstate New York and continues to operate in both Canada and in United States.(97)

In sum, what should be clear from this short history of Iroquois war after the arrival of European traders is that the severity and probably the frequency of war and diplomacy changed dramatically because of the desire to replace individuals lost to epidemics and the new mix of motives introduced by the European-Native American fur trade. Despite opportunities for the League of the Iroquois to fall apart as a security regime, it remained intact. Individual members of the Iroquois League were threatened by the increased strength of their neighbors and those nations' direct alliance with the French, who also worked to dissolve the League. The Iroquois responded to those pressures with both insistent diplomatic efforts and by taking up arms against the French and their Native trading partners. The Iroquois League's relationships with the Dutch and later the British were less overtly conflictual and even advantageous to the British. Despite the differences between Iroquois League member nations over relations with the Europeans and the often conflictual relationships with them, the League did not dissolve during the pre-revolutionary period.

George Snyderman argues that the original and most important function of the League of the Iroquois (as a security regime among five powerful neighbors) gradually evolved into a war-making alliance: "The League was established to arbitrate quarrels among its members.... It was therefore established to promote peace. However, it freed its members from fear and danger of a rear attack and allowed them to devote their individual attention to a single enemy.... The League itself organized for peace became an instrument of war."(98) This interpretation, though plausible, does not quite fit the evidence, and it also confuses the League itself with its individual members. The Iroquois League did offer its members a sense of security about their relations with each other and, hence, did foster peace--its explicit and intended function. It was the individual members, in nearly all cases, that went to war, not the entire Iroquois League membership or large coalitions of League members. The evidence of a continuing debate among Troquois League members about whom to support in the conflicts between the British and the French and later between the British and the American revolutionaries, as well as the practice of individual nations fighting wars of defense and offense apart from the Iroquois League, indicates that the League was not a war-making instrument. Perhaps if the Iroquois had been a war-making alliance, successful European colonization would have been delayed. It was only with Pontiac's Rebellion in the 1760s that the Iroquois tried to rid North America of, from their perspective, the lying, cheating, land-grabbing Europeans. Instead, the Iroquois League biased the foreign policy of its five member nations toward diplomacy and peace negotiations with the Europeans, despite the Iroquois' numeric advantage during much of this period. Thus, they hoped to secure Iroquois lands and the benefits of trade, "for Trade & Peace we take to be one thing."(99) Meanwhile the Americans and the French openly spoke of destroying the Iroquois League and made attempts to do so.

Comparing the Concert of Europe and the League of the Iroquois

Comparing the Concert of Europe and the League of the Iroquois illustrates several interesting similarities and differences between the two systems that are relevant for theories of security regimes and collective security. The Concert of Europe was established after the defeat of Napoleon by Austria, Britain, France, Prussia, and Russia to prevent the outbreak of another pan-European war.(100) There is much debate over what to call post-1815 European international relations, how long the "order" lasted, how the system functioned, and why it was different from previous international orders. Jervis describes the concert as a security regime. Gordon Craig and Alexander George describe the system as a balance of power the aim of which was to resist attempts at universal domination and to maintain an equilibrium of force among the major powers.(101) The historian Paul Schroeder recently has bucked the consenus among historians and argued that the "essential power relations were hegemonic, not balanced, and a hegemonic distribution of power, along with other factors, made the system work."(102)

The concert grew out of five treaties negotiated during 1814 and 1815 (the Treaty of Chaumont, the two Treaties of Paris, the Holy Alliance, and the Quadruple Alliance) that both defined the postwar settlement with France and set the terms for future relations among the great powers. While there were important disagreements among the great powers, they did agree that their primary objectives were keeping a balance of power in Europe and preventing nationalist constitutionalist revolutions from spreading. The principle mechanisms for preserving the peace were territorial redistribution (including creating a buffer state, the Netherlands, around France) and periodic meetings among members to monitor threats to the peace and if necessary engage in collective action. The March 1814 Treaty of Chaumont converted the coalition into the Quadruple Alliance whose collective security mission it was to prevent France from resuming war.(103) The four powers renewed the Quadruple Alliance in November 1815, and the treaty provided for meetings among the states "for the purpose of consulting upon their common interests, and for the examination of the measures which ... should be considered most salutory for the repose and prosperity of the Nations and for the maintenance of the peace of Europe."(104)

And there was some degree of "repose" among the concert members from 1815 to 1914. Concert members held dozens of meetings (twenty-seven important conferences between 1815 and 1914) to manage affairs among states.(105) However, concert members also fought each other: in 1854, Britain allied with others against Russia in the Crimean War; in 1870, the Franco-Prussian War ensued. Additionally, concert members were fighting wars of territorial acquisition abroad in the New World and were intervening in revolutions in Europe.

Similarities and differences

There are important similarities between the Concert of Europe and the Iroquois League. First, both systems were formed among states that shared much in terms of culture. Second, both the concert and the iroquois League were formed after a period of costly conflict and war. Third, after the formation of the regimes, the operations of both the Concert of Europe and the League of the Iroquois were characterized by greater diplomatic openness and consultation among members.(106) Such openness facilitates one of the main purposes of a security regime, ensuring that the actions a state takes for defensive purposes does not appear offensive to its neighbors. Fourth, both systems preserved the autonomy of nations in their foreign affairs: members continued to make separate wars and alliances apart from the other members of the regime. In the Concert of Europe, for example, from 1820 to 1823 France intervened in Spain on behalf of the government to halt a civil war, and from 1821 to 1829 Britain, France, and Russia intervened on the side of Greek revolutionaries who were attempting to overthrow Turkish domination. Such flexibility allows regime members to continue to pursue their self-interest. The potential problem with such an arrangement is that states may make alliances or treaties that encourage powers outside the regime to believe that they may commit aggression elsewhere. Finally, in both the Iroquois League and the Concert of Europe there was apparently some functional "spillover." The mechanisms of consultation and cooperation that characterized the two systems carried over to other areas besides mutual security; both the concert and the Iroquois League became the basis of collective security and alliance systems.(107)

However, there were also striking differences between the Concert of Europe and the League of the Iroquois in terms of the characteristics and the dynamics of both security regime formation and operation. First, unlike the Iroquois League, the Concert of Europe formed out of an existing alliance, the Fourth Coalition (Austria, Britain, Prussia, and Russia), that had been brought together to defeat Napoleon: before the establishment of the concert there were already a high degree of existing cooperation and mechanisms for coordination among concert members. By contrast, the League of the Iroquois was negotiated among parties that were in active conflict with each other and apparently did not form out of an alliance system.

Second, the Concert of Europe and the Iroquois League were established on quite different normative footing and with somewhat different intentions. Norms and intentions are an issue if the beliefs of actors, especially the dominant normative climate, influence the success of security regimes.(108) Norms and intentions may influence the success of a security regime in two ways. First, it may be easier for states with a shared normative framework, regardless of the substance of the norms, to cooperate over the long term. Second, the substance of the beliefs, if they are oriented toward peaceful rather than violent means of dispute resolution, will determine the success of the regime.

The Concert of Europe, while clearly valuing peace, did not develop a statement of the goals and ideology of a system of peace that was as extensive as the Iroquois League's. Jervis argues that the concert was characterized by norms different from pre-1815 European international norms: "The change in values and beliefs about how politics can and should be conducted was very great." Specifically, the "conception of self-interest expanded, and statesmen came to believe that menacing states could best be contained by keeping close ties to them. A necessary though probably not sufficient cause for the transformation of world politics then was a transformation in thinking about world politics.... Ideas had real autonomy; they were not the direct and predictable consequences of changed material conditions."(109)

But, the "transformation" certainly was short lived, if indeed there was a transformation. While this was a period, like many others, when ideas changed international behavior, there was little or no transformation of world politics. Rather, global international politics continued much the same as before: the European powers that comprised the concert were preoccuppied with expanding their influence in Africa, Asia, and the New World by military means. The most significant European international normative transformation of the era may have been the abolition of the international slave trade, which had been on the agenda at Vienna in 1815, that occurred in the early nineteenth century.

The Treaty of Holy Alliance, signed by Austria, Prussia, and Russia in September 1815 was oriented toward a general peace along the lines of a Christian European community, that is, a community based on the "precepts of Justice, Christian Charity, and Peace."(110) But Britain and France did not sign the treaty: Castlereagh called it "sublime mysticism and nonsense" and Talleyrand called it a "ludicrous contract."(111)

The Concert of Europe, unlike the Holy Alliance, was initiated as much to prevent revolutions inside European states--and to prevent civil wars or unrest in non-concert nations from escalating into potential threats to concert members--as it was to prevent or limit conflict between member states; domestic concerns dominated concert congresses.(112) The motives of most concert members, while differing somewhat from each other and changing over time, converged around the idea of squashing potential revolutions and preventing

unrest in Europe in order to preserve the status quo. Charles Kupchan and Clifford Kupchan argue that "as it operated during the nineteenth century, the Concert acted as a great power club, effectively ignoring, and at times violating, the concerns of Europe's smaller powers."(113) According to Craig and George, Metternich and Alexander "tried to turn the Quadruple Alliance into an agency that would automatically intervene in the affairs of any country in which there was a revolution or an agitation against the status quo and suppress by force the revolutionary or democratic movements."114 Britain's Castlereagh disagreed with this mission, arguing that "nothing could be more immoral or more prejudicial to the character of governments generally than the idea that their force was collectively to be prostituted to the support of established power without any consideration of the extent to which it was abused."(115) It appears that ameliorating the potential security dilemma among concert states was a tertiary concern for Austria and Prussia, members who cared more about squashing revolution.

Third, the operations of the League of the Iroquois were more precisely institutionalized than were those of the Concert of Europe, providing a basis for evaluating divergent claims about the virtues of institutionalization. Institutionalization occurs when parties to a regime establish, formally or informally, the procedures for interaction and regime maintenance, including procedures for information exchange, dispute resolution, modification, and renewal of the regime.(116) Jervis argues that there was "a limited degree of institutionalization" in the concert so that "coordination was facilitated and expectations were fairly quickly and effectively shared."(117) He writes that in the concert, "higher levels of communication and more frequent meetings among national leaders increased transparency, lowered the level of debilitating suspicions that plague many attempts at cooperation, and made it less likely that any statesman could think that he could successfully cheat on understandings with others."(118) In addition, Jervis suggests that "statesmen had grounds for believing that others shared these preferences, thus facilitating long-run reciprocity."(119) Too little institutionalization may be a long-term problem: "by controlling the risk of war and yet not becoming institutionalized and developing supernational loyalties the Concert may have contained the seeds of its own destruction" precisely because the "structure appeared stable enough to permit states to impose a greater strain on it."(120)

Kupchan and Kupchan, suggest the opposite: "because of its informality, the Concert was able to preserve the peace in Europe for almost four decades."(121) Stein argues that informality allows security regimes to grab a toehold in a contentious climate: "It is precisely the informality of most security regimes, ... their capacity to build on tacit consensus, to exploit common aversions which are mutually shared, which gives them special potential in an environment that is coldly inhospitable to more formal arrangements.(122)

The comparison between the two regimes suggests that higher levels of institutionalization, namely frequent substantive meetings and regularized mechanisms for dispute resolution, facilitate the functioning of security regimes. While there were meetings every few years between concert diplomats on an almost ad hoc basis, the Iroquois League structure provided for annual meetings (more frequently as needed) whether or not there was nascent or ongoing conflict to resolve. Further, the agreement among Iroquois League members that the League would come up for renewal every five years meant that, in the democratic systems of the member nations, renewed commitment probably required discussion and argument for and against the League, thereby strengthening the institution.

Fourth, the Iroquois League worked considerably longer to keep the peace among its members than did the Concert of Europe and appears to have been more resilient. Schroeder argues that the rulers of nineteenth-century Europe "feared war" because war often led to domestic unrest and revolution. His explanation of the breakdown of the system in 1914 was the declining power of the hegemons (Britain and Russia) as much as the growth of German power.(123) Jervis suggests that the demise of the concert in the 1820s is partially explained by the condition that "memories of the ravages of the Napoleonic Wars faded, and with them the main incentives to avoid confrontations."(124)

But, if declining war weariness is to play an important role in an account of the end of the concert, and if war weariness is a strong foundation of security regimes, then one would expect that the Iroquois regime would have fallen apart much sooner than it did--perhaps in 1460, 1480, or 1492. Instead, generations after the Iroquois regime formed, it was still functioning. Indeed, the Iroquois regime was quite resilient, surviving the shocks of the arrival of Europeans whose very presence brought death in the form of epidemic disease, the economic disruption of the fur trade, and the introduction of firearms. Moreover, the French actively worked to divide the Iroquois League.(125) The resilience of the Iroquois League to external shocks is perhaps its most striking feature.

If we take the war-weariness hypothesis into account, there are two alternative explanations for the long duration of the Iroquois security regime in comparison to the European concert: (1) Iroquois war was much more devastating than the Napoleonic wars and/or it took the Iroquois much longer to recover; (2) the effects of war and rate of recovery were roughly comparable, but the people in the five Iroquois nations had a better memory than their European counterparts (an unlikely scenario). Other plausible hypotheses are: (3) the greater institutionalization of the Iroquois arrangement allowed it to develop the norm of reciprocity and to deal with the shifts in balance of power that could have derailed it; (4) the peace-oriented belief system and ideology of the Iroquois League made it more resilient, while the concert system was embedded in a "war-oriented" belief system; (5) the difference in the composition of the two systems (five democracies in the League of the Iroquois compared with a mixture of democracies and nondemocracies in the Concert of Europe) made a difference in the ability of members to cooperate; and (6) the fact that Iroquois League nations faced several common enemies in the form of Europeans and their Native allies encouraged alliance maintence. The Iroquois League's longevity may, in fact, be due to multiple causes.

Finally, all of the Iroquois League members were functioning democracies while members of the Concert of Europe consisted of nascent democracies and nondemocracies.(126) That all of the Iroquois regime's members were democracies may mean that states with similar domestic structures find it easier to cooperate over the long term. Alternatively, there may be something peculiar about democracies that makes them more peaceful toward each other.

Lessons for security regime theory

What do these comparisons between the Iroquois League and the Concert of Europe suggest about the theoretical questions raised at the beginning of this article? First, why and how do security regimes form? Realists and idealists both are correct: security regimes form when the interests of actors converge around the idea of the necessity for peace; they also form when participants become convinced, as were Tsar Nicholas and Dekanawidah, of the long-term virtues of cooperation. Both the Concert of Europe and the Iroquois League were formed among geographically close and culturally similar states who had had a long history of costly wars among themselves. In neither case did hegemons impose the security regime on its members. Also, regimes that overtly constrain the domestic and foreign policy autonomy of states appear to be unlikely to form: neither the European Concert nor the Iroquois League put constraints on alliance partners or domestic social and political practices of member states.(127)

Second, how do security regimes work to decrease the intensity of the security dilemma and to promote conflict resolution and peace among members? Security regimes function to increase mutual security in three ways. First, security regimes change the environmental conditions under which states act, reducing the uncertainty characteristic of anarchy. Uncertainty is decreased in the short term by increasing the quality of communication flows between parties and by making the behavior of regime members more predictable. Second, over the long term, if the security regime is successful at decreasing conflict, the regime may allow greater economic and cultural transactions among members: there is greater integration and positive dependence between members. Third, changed environmental conditions--which make possible increased trust--and changes in the level of integration may lead to changing conceptions of identity. Where before the formation of the regime, states saw each other as antagonists and actual or potential enemies, after a long period of more positive interaction, members may see that they share more than an interest in avoiding unwanted war. Participants may begin to see the other parties to the regime as more like them, forming a larger identity community. Institutionalization is crucial to this process because it facilitates the functioning of security regimes (providing information, contact, reassurance, and problem solving in order to ameliorate the security dilemma) and helps to increase cohesion among regime members.

Third, what conditions foster the maintenance of security regimes? As noted earlier, that the Iroquois League lasted much longer than the Concert of Europe can be explained by several factors. Both norms (namely, the peace-oriented belief system of the Iroquois League) and the fact that the League was composed of democracies may well be significant. Institutional factors are also important: the Iroquois League appears to have been better institutionalized than the Concert of Europe. The General Council of the League met at least annually; if the League lasted from 1450 to 1777, and members adhered to the practice of raising the question of renewal every five years, then Iroquois League members reaffirmed their regime over sixty times. Again, contrary to some suggestions, greater institutionalization (e.g., regular meetings, agreed-upon decision-making procedures, and a periodic discussion about whether to renew the regime) appears to help maintain security regimes. As one Oneida spokesperson explained to a European: "You may say that Love & Affection may be strong in Absence as when present but we say not.... Nothing more revives and enlivens affection than frequent Conferences."(128)

Ad hoc procedures and irregular meetings decrease the predictability and communication functions of the regime and result in only marginally decreased uncertainty. If the members of security regimes, over the long run, develop a common identity, they will also be more likely to face common threats together (moving toward collective security) than to dissolve and join competing alliances. But other hypotheses may emerge when we examine the differences between security regimes of long versus short duration and the reasons why security regimes break down.

So, finally, why do security regimes break down? The hypothesis that declining war weariness explains the dissolution of security regimes appears to be off the mark when one compares the duration of the Iroquois and European systems. Yet I do not want to completely discount the war-weariness hypothesis. If war weariness is not an individual generational effect but a function of collective societal memory, then memories of the devastation and gains of war can be maintained in societies if the culture (specifically the norms and systems of education and communication) foster maintainance of those memories. Thus, Europeans may have "forgotten" (despite their colonial wars and other conflicts) the ravages of war more quickly in a society that stressed the glories of war. Iroquois nations may have kept the memories of war's devastation alive effectively through their oral history and because of their frequent wars with others; inhibitions fostered by such popular memories among the Iroquois may also have played a larger role because of Iroquois democratic practices.

If we think of the Concert of Europe as a limited security regime and the Iroquois League as a strong security regime, then limited security regimes--those that are not clearly institutionalized and have not functioned to enlarge the identity community of its members--may fall apart, as did the Concert of Europe, when members' interests and capabilities shift. Strong security regimes may fail when powerful challengers and exogenous shocks change the beliefs and/or alliegiences of members.

The Iroquois League and Kant's |perpetual peace'

Much recent scholarship has shown that democracies tend not to fight each other, at least since 1815; yet democracies go to war with the same overall frequency as nondemocracies.(129) The Iroquois League anticipates Kant's thesis that republican states should not fight each other, resembling in practice Kant's theory of a league of peace. The Iroquois stressed the importance of trade and diplomacy among one another and with other nations while preserving the independence of member nations' internal and external affairs. There were no standing armies or individuals whose sole role was to serve as warriors. Most important, the nations that belonged to the Iroquois League were democratic--certainly more democratic than European nations between 1450 and 1777. Scholars of the peace among democracies have defined democracy to include free elections with opposition parties, widespread voting, a legislative institution at least on par with the executive, civilian control of the military, and minimal civil and economic rights.(130)

To summarize the form Iroquois democracy took, universal voting rights (regardless of gender or property status), a separation of civil and military authority, and broad civil and economic rights were all in effect. The five nations (and other Iroquois nations) were matrilineal, and this matrilineal extended family system was the basis of Iroquois political order. Women and men appear to have had nearly equal political power, although their roles differed. The men were charged with diplomacy, hunting, and leading warfare. Women were heads of household and the keepers/owners of the land; elder women were charged with nominating political leaders.(131) (It was also not unusual for women to take part in warfare, although it appears that all military chiefs were male.(132)) Sachems could be removed by popular disaproval in a process involving three warnings. But again, sachems were not the only decision makers because in villages (as among the nations) Iroquois decision making was consensual. The political organization of each nation consisted of roughly five clusters: fireside (immediate nuclear family), household, village, tribe/clan (with more than one clan residing in each village), and nation. It is important to stress that this organization was not hierarchical. Rather, one may think of a series of circles with the number of persons involved in decision making increasing as a proposal moved from fireside to nation. Thus, using the cross-cultural criteria for democracy of "degree of political participation," the Iroquois were certainly democratic.(133)

But more than the form of participatory democracy in individual nations, the nations extended an ideology of democracy to the League itself. The ideology of the Iroquois League was based on three parts: rightiousness, health, and power. As Deganawidah explained when he argued for the Iroquois League's formation: "Rightiousness means justice practiced between men and between nations; it means also a desire to see justice prevail. Health means soundness of mind and body; it also means peace, for that is what comes when minds are sane and bodies are cared for. Power means authority, the authority of law and custom, backed by such force as is necessary to make justice prevail; it also means religion, for justice enforced is the well of the Holder of the Heavens and has his sanction."(134)

Kant made his arguments about peace among democracies at three levels. First, he argued that democracies are more peaceful because of their institutional configuration: "if ... the consent of the citizenry is required in order to determine whether or not there will be war, it is only natural that they consider all its calamaties before committing themselves to so risky a game."(135) This burden of consent is precisely why appeals to nationalism and the threat of being overrun are required to overcome the inertia of democratic polities when it comes to making war. On the flip side, nondemocracies are more prone to go to war because war does not so directly affect the interests of the political leadership in autocracies. Similarly, David Lake argues that autocracies face fewer constraints in the form of citizen monitoring, voice (political participation, including protest), and exit (emigration or secession).(136) At Kant's second level of argument, he suggested that perpetual peace could be guaranteed by removing structural causes of war. Kant's recognition of the security dilemma is evident in his critique of large standing armies that "constantly threaten other nations with war by giving the appearance that they are prepared for it, which goads nations into competing with one another ... and the practice knows no bounds."(137) Thus, Kant proposed the elimination of large standing armies to reduce the security dilemma. Third, Kant proposed a "league of peace," which would be distinguished from a "treaty of peace" because "the latter seeks merely to stop one war while the former seeks to end all wars forever."(138) Because the "state of peace is not a natural state," an institutional mechanism would help guarantee the peace among democracies.(139) Kant explicitly gives the league a crucial role: "without a contract among nations peace can neither be inaugurated nor guaranteed."(140) When Kant writes of a guarantee, he is suggesting that the logic of anarchy, which creates the need for civil society, also creates the need for a league of peace.

The composition and functioning of the league proposed by Kant deserves some focused attention; it is here that we find Kant's argument that democracies should not fight each other. First, the league should consist of democratic states. Second, the league was not to be a single world government, which Kant thought impractical because it was "too large to govern" effectively.(141) Thus, the league was to be a "federation" to prevent war, not a nation: the league "does not seek any power of the sort possessed by nations, but only the maintenance and security of each nation's own freedom, as well as that of the other nations...."(142) Third, the league was necessary "not ... in order to meddle in one another's internal dissensions, but in order to afford protection against external aggression." And fourth, the league was to be based on a contract or constitution that "can be renounced at any time and therefore must be renewed from time to time."(143) Finally, the league of peace functions by extending the rule of law from individual states to a community of states: "nations, by accomodating themselves to the constraints of common law, establish a nation of peoples ... that (continually growing) will finally include all the people of the earth."(144) Thus, the league extends law governing civil society, the original social contract, to a "contract among nations" and so extends the role that norms play among states, although desire for commerce plays its part in the promotion of peace.(145)

Despite the important role of the league in Kant's thought, most modern students of the "zone of peace" among democracies correctly have noted that peace prevails among modern democracies in the absence of a league. Using Kantian logic, even without a league democratic states (i.e., states sharing the practices and belief in the rule of law) should share norms of dispute resolution and develop a "norm of mediation" among themselves.(146) Thus, an international community of law spreads informally and a formal security regime would be redundant.

So, what does a league--a formal security regime--add if all members of an international society are democracies? Quite simply, we know that democracies have not renounced the right to self-defense: democracies will act militarily against other states if the democracy's leaders believe the nation's survival or interests are threatened. If two democracies feel threatened, security dilemma dynamics may come into play as each state reacts to the other's efforts to increase security. In other words, as long as individual states exist, the possibility for security dilemma spirals exist. A formal or informal security regime can function in the ways described earlier to decrease the potential for security dilemma spirals. A security regime also paves the way for construction of a larger identity community.

Conclusions: lessons of the Iroquois League

What lessons, insights, and questions does the League of the Iroquois nations suggest for scholars of international security regimes and the relationship between democratic nations and war? Obviously, there are too few cases here to claim firm conclusions, but three tentative conclusions are in order. First, security regimes can work well over long periods of time to decrease the security dilemma and promote peace. Security regimes also work best if they are more institutionalized, whether formally or informally. Second, security regimes can evolve, as did the Iroquois League, into other institutions. The Iroquois League was first a security regime and then functioned for collective security, eventually becoming a democratic "pluralistic security community" where legally and functionally independent nations developed a "sense of community"--the sense that common problems can and should be resolved by peaceful change, that is, the rule of negotiation and law.(147)

Third, the composition of regime members is probably quite important. Security regimes composed of democratic states probably are more stable--because they consist of members who value the rule of law and the process of arbitration--than security regimes composed of a nondemocracies (or a mixture of democracies and nondemocracies), where the arbitrary quality of might-makes-right and hegemonic interests determine the quality of the regime. Scholars of Kant's "To Perpetual Peace" have tended to overlook the important notion of a league to promote peace. Such leagues functioning as security regimes among states (especially among democracies) promote the process of institutionalization and the development of a larger identity community that makes dimunition of the security dilemma and peaceful resolution of conflict more likely. (Table 3 summarizes some of these conclusions.)

The Iroquois League experience suggests that peace among nations may best be secured over the long term if both democracy and the institution of a league/security regime are present. The five and later six Iroquois nations could have turned on each other in the face of the European presence. There are many instances of entire Native American nations or their members joining with European nations or with the colonials against other Native nations. The difference between these instances and the peace among the Cayuga, Mohawk, Onandaga, Oneida, Seneca, and Tuscarora nations, even upon the dissolution of the Iroquois League, may simply be the institution of the League, which functioned as a successful security regime and provided the normative framework for peace.

Finally, studies of the international relations of precolonial and colonial North America and studies of other regions, although they are quite difficult to undertake, are important because they allow scholars to broaden the empirical base of international relations scholarship. The Iroquois League was a remarkable international achievement in cooperation among nations that, in comparison with the Concert of Europe, highlights the importance of norms and institutionalization. This study of the Iroquois League lends support to the institutionalist/idealist school; other studies of non-European international relations may support realist propositions. But the point is clear: international relations scholarship has been overwhelmingly shaped by its focus on European history, and that history has possibly been particularly violent and bereft of successful international institutions. Perhaps the realist school would not be dominant today if scholars had studied the international relations of other regions with as much diligence as we have studied European international relations.

I am grateful to Elizabeth Cohen, Barbara Cruikshank, Stanley Hoffmann, Robert Keohane, Sue Peterson, Laura Reed, and Bruce Russett for giving the article particularly close critical readings. Sarah Deutsch, James Der Derian, Cynthia Enjoe, Steven Flank, David Guston, Peter Haas, Jack Levy, Barry O'Neill, M.J. Peterson, and Jackie Urla also made useful suggestions. Steve Miller and Harvard's Center for Science and International Affairs provided some institutional support for the research. Anonymous reviewers and John Odell of International Organization were critics of the best sort. Finally, I am grateful to the descendents of the Six Nations, many of whom live in New York, Ontario, and Quebec. (1.) This rough population estimate is based on figures in Bruce G. Trigger, Natives and Newcomers: Canada's Heroic Age Reconsidered (Kingston, Ontario: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985), pp. 231-41. On the problem of estimating Native American populations, see William M. Denevan, ed., The Native Population in the Americas in 1492, 2d ed. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1992). (2.) Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 173-94. On other security regimes, see Janice Gross Stein, "Detection and Defection: Security "Regimes' and the Management of International Conflict," International Journal 40 (Autumn 1985), pp. 599-27; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes," International Organization 41 (Summer 1987), pp. 371-402; and Roger K. Smith, "Institutionalization as a Measure of Regime Stability: Insights for International Regime Analysis from the Study of Domestic Politics," Millennium 18 (Summer 1989), pp. 227-44. (3.) Immanuel Kant, "To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch," in Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Morals, trans. Ted Humphrey (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983), pp. 107-43. (4.) For recent exceptions to this condition, see Marc Howard Ross, The Culture of Conflict: Interpretations and Interests in Comparative Perspective (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1993); Carol R. Ember, Melvin Ember, and Bruce Russett, "Peace Between Participatory Polities: A Cross-Cultural Test of the |Democracies Rarely Fight Each Other' Hypothesis," World Politics 44 (July 1992), pp. 573-99; and Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Ptinciples for a Post-cold War World (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993). (5.) Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th ed., ed. Kenneth Thompson (New York: Knopf, 1985), p. 4. (6.) Stephen Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," in Krasner, International Regimes, p. 2. (7.) Stein, "Detection and Defection," p. 615. (8.) Nye, "Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes," pp. 375 and 377. (9.) Stein, "Detection and Defection," p. 610. (10.) Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, The State, Conceptual Chaos, and the Future of International Relations Theory (Boulder, Colo.: Lynn Rienner, 1989). (11.) See Michael K. Foster, "Another Look at the Functions of Wampum in Iroquois-White Councils," in Francis Jennings, William N. Fenton, and Mary A. Druke, eds., The History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy: An Interdisciplinary Guide to the Treaties of the Six Nations and The League (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1985), pp. 99-114; and Elisabeth Tooker, "The League of the Iroquois: Its History, Politics, and Ritual," in Bruce G. Trigger, ed., Northeast, vol of Handbook of North American Indians (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1978), pp. 41841 and p. 424 in particular. (12.) See Ronald Wright, Stolen Continents: The "New World" Through Indian Eyes (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1992), pp. 4 and 14; and Francis Jennings, The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975), pp. 22 and 30. (13.) See Daniel K. Richter, The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), p. 17; and Matthew Dennis, Cultivating a Landscape of Peace: Iroquois-European Encounters in Seventeenth-Centur (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 137. (14.) See Francis Jennings, Theambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Confederation of Indian Tribes with English Colonies from its Beginnings to the Lancaster Treaty of 1744 (New York: Norton, 1984), p. 89; and Richter, The Ordeal of the Longhouse, p. 59. (15.) William N. Fenton, ed., Parker on the Iroquois (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1968), p. 43. (16.) Bruce Johansen, Forgotten Founders: Benjamin Franklin, The Iroquois, and the Rationale for the American Revolution (Ipswich: Gambit, 1982). Washington is quoted in Wright, Stolen Continents, p. 139. (17.) Dennis, Cultivating a Landscape of Peace, pp. 43-75. (18.) Arthur C. Parker, The Constitution of the Five Nations or the Iroquois Book of the Great Law (1916; reprint, in Fenton, Parker on the Iroquois, pp. 61-109). See also Fenton, Parker on the Iroquois, pp. 44-46. (19.) Peter Farb, Man's Rise to Civilization: The Cultural Ascent of the Indians of North America (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1978), p. 90. (20.) Dorothy V. Jones, License for Empire: Colonialism by Treaty in Early America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 23, (21.) See Parker, The Constitution of the Five Nations or the Iroquois Book ofthe Great Law, p. 71; and Francis Jennings, The Founders of America: How Indians Discovered the Land, Pioneered in It, and Created Great Classical Civilizations; How They were Plunged into a Dark Age by Invasion and Conquest; and How They are Reviving (New York: W.W. Norton, 1993), p. 77. (22.) Anthony F.C. Wallace, The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), pp. 41-42, (23.) Tooker, "The League of the Iroquois," pp. 420-21. (24.) See p. 16 of William N. Fenton, "Structure, Continuity, and Change in the Process of Iroquois Treaty Making," in Jennings, Fenton, and Druke, The History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy, pp. 3-36. (25.) Richter, The Ordeal of the Longhouse, p. 31. (26.) Tooker, "The League of the Iroquois," p. 420. (27.) Parker, The Constitution of the Five Nations, pp. 79-80 and 96. (28.) Fenton, "Structure, Continuity, and Change in the Process of Iroquois Treaty Making," p. 15. (29.) Of the several translations of the Great Law made in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, I use a translation by Arthur C. Parker, The Constitution of the Five Nations, which is reprinted in Fenton, Parker on the Iroquois, pp. 30-60, and which appears to be the most widely used version. This quotation is from p. 48. (30.) Ibid., p. 49. (31.) A. Wallace, The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca, p. 41. (32.) Parker, The Constitution of the Five Nations, p. 30. (33.) Parker, The Constitution of the Five Nations, p. 56. (34.) Cadwallader Colden, The History of the Five Indian Nations of Canada Which are Dependent on the Province of New York, and are a Barrier Between the English and the French in that Part of th World, 2 vols. (1747; reprint, New York: A.S. Barnes and Company, 1904), p. xvi. This work was again reprinted, incorporating both volumes into one (see footnote 51). The quotations herein are taken from this edition, unless otherwise indicated. (35.) Fenton, "Structure, Continuity, and Change in the Process of Iroquois Treaty Making," p. 9. (36.) See p. 37 of Francis Jennings, "Iroquois Alliances in American History," in Jennings, Fenton, and Druke, The History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy, pp. 37-65. (37.) Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, p. 106. (38.) Parker, The Constitution of the Five Nations, p. 30. (39.) Ibid., p. 54. (40.) Ibid., p. 52. (41.) Ibid., p. 53. (42.) Ibid. (43.) The Iroquois quotation is from Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991),p. 41. (44.) Parker, The Constitution of the Five Nations, p.p. 34-40. (45.) Colden, The History of the Five Indian Nations, p. xvii. (46.) Fenton, "Structure, Continuity, and Change in the Process of Iroquois Treaty Making," pp. 12 and 33. (47.) Parker, The Constitution of the Five Nations, p. 32. (48.) Tooker, "The League of the Iroquois," p. 429. Paul Wallace reports yet another order but also emphasizes the consensus orientation of the caucusing procedure; see Paul A.W. Wallace, The White Roots of Peace (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1946), pp. 33 and 37. Also see Denn is, Cultivating a Landscape of Peace, p. 95. (49.) Parker, The Constitution of the Five Nations, p. 55. (50.) Wright is quoted in Fenton, "Structure, Continuity, and Change in the Process of Iroquois Treaty Making," pp. 12-13. (51.) The envoy is quoted in Cadwallader Colden, The History of the Five Indian Nations Depending on the Province of New York in America (1747; reprint, 2 vols. in 1, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Universit Press), pp. 66-67. (This edition is hereafter cited as The History of the Five Indian Nations [Cornell]). (52.) P. Wallace, The White Roots of Peace, p. 42. (53.) See p. 519 of David Landy, "Tuscarora Among the Iroquois," in Trigger, Northeast, pp. 518-24; Lewis H. Morgan, League of the Ho-De'-No-Sau-Nee or Iroquois, vols. 1 and 2 (New York: Burt Franklin, 1901), pp. 93-94; Fenton, "Structure, Continuity, and Change in the Process of Iroquois Treaty Making," p. 9; and Wallace, The White Roots of Peace, p. 42. (54.) See pp. 158-59 of Douglas W. Boyce, "|As the Wind Scatters the Smoke': The Tuscaroras in the Eighteenth Century," in Daniel K. Richter and James H. Merrell, eds., Beyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and Their Neighbors in Indian North America, 1600-1800 (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1987), pp. 151-63. (55.) Dennis, Cultivating a Landscape of Peace, pp. 50 and 54. (56.) George S. Snyderman, Behind the Tree of Peace: A Sociological Analysis of Iroquois Warfare (1948; reprint, New York: AMS Press, 1978) p. 7. See also A. Wallace, The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca, pp. 44-48. (57.) See Tooker, "The League of the Iroquois"; and Richter, The Ordeal of the Longhouse, pp. 32-38. (58.) A. Wallace, The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca, p. 44. (59.) For a vivid discription of the fate of captives, see White, The Middle Ground, pp. 3-6. (60.) Richter, The Ordeal of the Longhouse, pp. 32-33. (61.) See Snyderman, Behind the Tree of Peace, p. 14; and Richter, The Ordeal of the Longhouse, p. 65. (62.) On residence patterns, see White, The Middle Ground. (63.) Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, p. 8. (64.) Richter, The Ordeal of the Longhouse, p. 60. Also see Wright, Stolen Continents, pp. 123-24; and Colden, The History of the Five Indian Nations (Cornell), p. 8. (65.) Richter, The Ordeal of the Longhouse, pp. 65-66 and 145. (66.) Dennis, Cultivating a Landscape of Peace, pp. 119-79. (67.) Trigger, "Early Iroquoian Contacts with Europeans," p. 346. (68.) See ibid., p. 349; and J.D. Hurley, Children or Brethren: Aboriginal Rights in Colonial Iroquo (Saskatoon, Canada: University of Saskatchewan, 1985), p. 112. (69.) Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, p. 87. (70.) Ibid., p. 85. (71.) Trigger, "Early Troquoian Contacts with Europeans," p. 350. (72.) See ibid., p. 355; and Snyderman, Behind the Tree of Peace, pp. 25-26. (73.) Tooker, "The League of the Iroquois," p. 430. (74.) See P. Wallace, The White Roots of Peace, pp. 89-90; and Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, pp. 48-50. (75). Louis XIV's instructions to the French commander are quoted in Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, p. 131. Also see Dennis, Cultivating a Landscape of Peace, pp. 215 and 217. (76.) Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, pp. 131-32. (77.) Hurley, Children or Brethren, p. 161. (78.) Livingston is quoted in Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, p. xvi. (79.) The British are quoted in Jones, License for Empire, p. 29. (80.) Dennis, Cultivating a Landscape of Peace. (81.) Boyce, "|As the Wind Scatters the Smoke,'" p. 155. (82.) Dennis, Cultivating a Landscape of Peace, pp. 170 and 247. (83.) Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, pp. xvii-xviii. (84.) Jennings, "Iroquois Alliances in American History," p. 41. (85.) See Jones, License for Empire, p. 34; Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, p. 8; and Mary A. Druke, "Linking Arms: The Structure of Iroquois Intertribal Diplomacy," in Richter and Merrell, Beyond the Covenant Chain, pp. 29-39, and p. 32 in particular. (86.) Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, p. 8; italics original. (87.) Jennings, "Iroquois Alliances in American History," pp. 42-43. (88.) A. Wallace, The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca, pp. 114-15. (89.) For more on this period, see Marjory Barnam Hinman, Onaquaga: Hub of the Border Wars of the American Revolution and New York State (Windsor, N.Y.: Valley Offset, 1975). (90.) See Tooker, "The League of the Iroquois," pp. 434-35; and A. Wallace, The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca, pp. 149-83. (91.) Jennings, The Founders of America, p. 301. (92.) Micheal Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualties and Other Figures, 1618-1991 (Jeferson, N.C.: McFarland and Co., 1992), pp. 199-200. (93.) Washington is quoted in Wright, Stolen Continents, p. 139. (94.) Wright, Stolen Continents, p. 139. (95.) Ibid. (96.) A. Wallace, The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca, pp. 141-48. (97.) Elisabeth Tooker, "Iroquois Since 1820," in Handbook of North American Indians, vol. 15, pp. 449-65. (98.) Snyderman, Behind the Tree of Peace, p. 78. See also Morgan, League of the Ho-De'-No-Sau-Nee or Iroquois, p. 8. (99.) Iroquois spokesperson in 1735, quoted in Fenton, "Structure, Continuity, and Change in the Process of Iroquois Treaty Making, " p. 13. (100.) Turkey was admitted into Concert of Europe in 1856, but British participation diminished in the 1820s. See Kalevi J. Hoisti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). (101. See Jervis, "Security Regimes"; and pp. 28-48 of Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). (102.) Paul Schroeder, "Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?" American Historical Review 97 (June 1992), pp. 683-706, and p. 684 in particular. (103.) Evan Luard, War in International Society: A Study in International Society (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1987), p. 300. (104.) The treaty is quoted in Alan Sked, "Introduction," in Alan Sked, ed., Europe's Balance of Power 1815-1848 (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), p, 5. (105.) Luard, War in International Society, p. 301. (106.) Jervis, "Security Regimes," p. 364. (107.) Ibid. (108.) On beliefs, see ibid., pp. 176-77 and 191. Haggard and Simmons are more precise about the role beliefs in their discussion of so-called cognitive theories of regimes; see Stephan Haggard and Beth Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," International Organization 41 (Summer 1987), pp. 491-517; see in particular pp. 509-13. (109.) Robert Jervis, "A Political Science Perspective on the Balance of Power and the Concert," American Historical Review 97 (June 1992), pp. 716-24; see in particular p. 723. (110.) The treaty is quoted in Rene Albrecht-Carrie, The Concert of Europe: 1815-1914 (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 33. (111.) Castlereagh and Talleyrand are quoted in Holsti, Peace and War, p. 122. (112.) See Jervis, "Security Regimes," p. 181; and Luard, War in International Society, p. 300. (113.) See p. 144 of Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," International Security (Summer 1991), pp. 114-61. (114.) Craig and George, Force and Statecraft, p. 31. (115.) Castlereagh is quoted in Craig and George, Force and Statecraft, p. 32. (116.) See Smith, "Institutionalization as a Measure of Regime Stability." (117.) Jervis, "Security Regimes," p. 183. (118.) Jervis, "A Political Science Perspective on the Balance of Power and the Concert," p. 721. (119.) Ibid. (120.) Jervis, "Security Regimes," p. 184. (121.) Kupchan and Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," p. 123, italics original. This contradicts their suggestion that the "absence of a binding commitment to collective action may weaken deterrence" (p. 143). (122.) Stein, "Detection and Defection," p. 624. (123.) Schroeder, "Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?" pp. 700 and 706. (124.) Jervis, "Security Regimes," p. 184. (125.) Dennis, Cultivating a Landscape of Peace, p. 229. (126.) Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace. (127.) Two limited security regimes between Egypt and Israel (1956-67 and 1975-78) also fit this description according to Stein; see her "Detection and Defection." (128.) The spokesperson is quoted in Fenton, "Structure, Continuity, and Change in the Process of Iroquois Treaty Making," p. 22. (129.) See Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace; Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review 80 (December 1986), pp. 1151-69; and Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali, "Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816-1976," Journal of Conflict Resolution (March 1989), pp. 3-35. (130.) This list closely follows the criteria summarized by Nils Petter Gleditsch, "Democracy and Peace," Journal of Peace Research (November 1992), pp. 369-376, and p. 370 in particular. Also see Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, pp. 14-16. (131.) Fenton, "Structure, Continuity, and Change in the Process of Iroquois Treaty Making," p. 12. (132.) Snyderman, Behind the Tree of Peace, p. 19. (133.) See Ember, Ember, and Russett, "Peace Between Participatory Polities," p. 579; and Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, p. 100. (134.) Quoted in P. Wallace, The White Roots of Peace, pp. 13-14. (135.) Immanuel Kant, "To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch," p. 113. (136). David A. Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," American Political Science Review 86 (March 1992), pp. 24-37; see in particular p. 26. (137.) Kant, "To Perpetual Peace," p. 108. (138.) Ibid., p. 117, italics original. (139.) Ibid., p. 111. (140.) Ibid., pp. 116-17 and 120-25. (141.) Immanuel Kant, "The Metaphysics of Morals," trans. John Ladd, in John Ladd, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1965), p. 124. (142.) Kant, "To Perpetual Peace," p. 117. (143.) Kant, "The Metaphysics of Morals," p. 116. (144.) Kant, "To Perpetual Peace," p. 11 7. (145.) Kant, "The Metaphysics of Morals," pp. 116-17 and 125. (146.) William J. Dixon, "Democracy and the Management of International Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution (March 1993), pp. 42-68. See also Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, pp. 118-119. (147.) On security communities, see Karl Deutsch, Sidney Burrel, Robert A. Kann, Maurice Lee, Jr., Martin Lichterman, Raymond Lindgren, Francis Loewenheim, and Richard W. Van Wagenen, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957).
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Author:Crawford, Neta C.
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Date:Jun 22, 1994
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