A hybrid approach to negotiating today's operating environment.
The Army operations process provides a common framework to guide commanders in managing leader development and unit training, which begins with a sound analysis of the unit mission and the ability of the unit to accomplish that mission. Additional factors to be considered include the commander's guidance and the mission of the higher unit. All of these considerations assist the commander in selecting mission-essential tasks (METs), or tasks that the unit could perform based on its modified table of organization and equipment/table of distribution and allowances design. The compilation of these METs results in the METL; however, the METs--not the METL--drive the focus of training. To provide better focus, battalion and detachment commanders should minimize the number of METs and key collective tasks in the unit METL. At the company or battalion level, a MET could consist of a universal joint task, an Army tactical task from the Army universal task list, a combined arms training strategy task, a task from the brigade or higher-unit Department of the Army standardized METL, or a major collective task. Because training time and resources are limited, units cannot train all tasks to proficiency at one time; they must mitigate risk through the prioritization of leader and collective tasks most important to mission success.
A basic knowledge of the operations process involved in determining a unit METL allows for a better understanding of the application of the process and its variation between a combat support (CS) military police brigade and a CID military police group. The mission, design, equipment, and allowances of these units are distinctly different-- as evidenced by their assigned METs. Although both are charged with executing mission command, their tasks and dedicated training time are vastly disparate. When it comes to the development and execution of training plans, the biggest difference is that CID battalions/detachments have neither a modified table of organization and equipment position dedicated to training management nor the allocated time to train that equivalent CS military police units with a typical training cycle have. The continuous operational requirements of a CID detachment, coupled with the lack of sister unit support or assumption of responsibilities, do not enable a "green" training cycle.
CID commanders must prioritize trainingtasks and accept risk, just as their CS military police counterparts--but to a different degree and impact. CID and CS military police units are modified table of organization and equipment-deployable units; however, only CS military police units are authorized and equipped to self-sustain in a deployed environment and deploy collectively at the company level. Because CID units are not equipped to self-sustain, they do not transport and secure themselves in a deployed environment; rather, they rely on supported units to provide transportation and security for their investigative operations. This difference has an impact on CID commanders' prioritization of training tasks and acceptance of risk. Greater emphasis is placed on investigative tasks.
In a highly technical field such as investigations, a commander must rely on relevant and timely training resources. One difficulty that CID commanders face when training investigative tasks is that investigative training doctrine does not capture operational requirements. Because investigative requirements are constantly evolving, sustaining relevant doctrine is a challenge. Regulations, concepts of operations, and standard operating procedures become the default means of addressing gaps in training doctrine. Although this is a nondoctrinal approach to training and assessing readiness, it is a necessary tactic if CID battalions and detachments are to provide focused, relevant training that improves investigative skills, techniques, and supportive task performance.
In September 2013, 22d Military Police Battalion (CID) personnel set out to update our battalion and detachment METLs. Our goal was to provide a product that could be used across analogous CID organizations to facilitate resourcing, training, and unit readiness. We identified a number of critical tasks, including the following:
* Confirm that METs and key collective tasks nest with the 6th Military Police Group (CID) METL.
* Assess the applicability of current METs.
* Identify gaps between operations and training.
* Streamline redundant tasks while identifying key leader and high-payoff tasks.
The first step in updating the battalion and detachment METLs involved the reexamination of mission statements. We began with the CID mission outlined in Army Regulation (AR) 10-87, Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units, and quickly moved to that of the 6th Military Police Group to validate that the battalion and detachment missions were aligned and nested with higher headquarters. We repeated the process with METLs, concluding that the METs for the 22d Military Police Battalion were nearly identical to those of the 6th Military Police Group. While this was not surprising, we recognized the need to clarify roles and levels of responsibilities for battalions, detachments, and groups. This requirement was most evident with what was formerly battalion MET 4, "Provide Protective Services for Selected Individuals" (see Figure 1). Using CID Regulation 195-1, Criminal Investigation Operational Procedures, and battalion and detachment universal task lists to clarify roles and responsibilities for this particular MET, we realigned the battalion and detachment METLs to properly reflect the battalion and detachment missions. None of the battalion, detachment, or group mission statements mention the provision of protective services; rather, the focus is on the investigation of serious, sensitive, or special-interest matters. However, CID Regulation 195-1 governs the role of the 6th Military Police Group as a coordinator responsible for providing support personnel to the Protective Services Battalion. While the group's battalions and detachments were charged with ensuring that their personnel attend protective services training so that they would be prepared to augment the Protective Services Battalion when required, their missions, unit designs, and equipment did not support this directive as a primary MET--only as a supporting task.
Through the process of clarifying roles among battalions, detachments, and groups, gaps between training doctrine and operations were also identified. The most apparent gap was the absence of a management or supervisory task for an economic crime program at the battalion and detachment levels. Although training doctrine addresses individual tasks that support the economic crime program, it does not include leader tasks. Furthermore, the former battalion MET 6, "Conduct Logistics Security Operations," was actually a supporting individual and collective task for the economic crime program at the battalion and detachment levels. Consequently, MET 6 was eliminated and the task was more accurately placed within the economic crime arena. Another task that is not specifically identified within doctrine, but is alluded to in some specific training tasks, involves the coordination and conduct of a force protection/ antiterrorism program. Battalion and detachment level individual and collective tasks that incorporate personnel security vulnerability assessments; hostage negotiations; and newly positioned, protective-service activities are nested within this program.
The elimination of former battalion METs 4 and 6 and the repositioning of those tasks led to a major change in the creation of nonstandard METs at the battalion and detachment levels. Former battalion MET 3 and detachment MET 2, "Conduct Criminal Investigations," incorporated all investigative and supporting tasks. The size and breadth of the single MET and the expected proficiencies warranted further examination. Battalion level investigative and supporting tasks could be easily categorized into one of two areas. The first area, new MET 3, "Conduct Criminal Investigations," includes all collective tasks that support detachment execution of investigations; the second, new MET 4, "Conduct Criminal Investigative Support Operations," incorporates supporting tasks that do not involve the conduct of investigations. At the detachment level, the new battalion MET 3 was further divided into basic investigative tasks that apply to all investigations, detachment MET 2, "Conduct Criminal Investigation Operations," and specific investigative programs, detachment MET 3, "Conduct Investigative Program Operations." Within each detachment level MET, we identified high-payoff and key leader tasks to assist in the selection of training tasks with the most significant unit impact. The identification of new METs at the battalion and detachment levels helped with the organization of roles, responsibilities, and training. The separation of investigation and support responsibilities between levels enables better evaluation of training focus and proficiency.
CID battalion- and detachment-exclusive missions and authorizations influenced the adoption of standardized, nontraditional, hybrid CID battalion and detachment METLs using the Army training management system. By applying the operations process, the 22d Military Police Battalion identified shortfalls between training doctrine and the operational requirements outlined in regulations, concepts of operations, and standard operating procedures. Some of the individual and collective task performance measures contained in existing doctrine must be refined to better capture training objectives that reflect operations. The most significant METL changes are the classification and reorganization of METs and the individual and collective tasks within the METs to more accurately reflect the CID operational capability set forth by our mission and unit design. Updating CID unit METLs ultimately enables commanders and their units to prioritize tasks, maximize the use of finite time, and negate training risks to improve overall investigations and support to our communities and our Army at home or during deployment.
(1) ADRP 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders, 23 August 2012.
(2) METs are derived from a number of sources, most of which are specifically directed by the list of Army tactical tasks (ARTs) contained in Field Manual (FM) 7-15, The Army Universal Task List, 27 February 2009.
AR 10-87, Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and Direct Reporting Units, 4 September 2007.
CID Regulation 195-1, Criminal Investigation Operational Procedures, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, 1 January 2001.
Colonel Dolata is the commander of the 6th Military Police Group, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington. He holds a bachelor's degree in justice studies from Arizona State University and master's degrees in organizational management from the University of Phoenix; military operational art and science from the Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama; and strategic studies from the Army War College.
Lieutenant Colonel Russell-Tutty is the deputy commander of the 6th Military Police Group. He holds a bachelor's degree in police science from Eastern Kentucky University and a master's degree in human services from Murray State University, Murray, Kentucky.
Major Conkey is the executive officer of the 22d Military Police Battalion, Joint Base Lewis-McChord. She holds a bachelor's degree in Spanish from Furman University, Greenville, South Carolina, and master's degrees in business and organizational security management from Webster University and social organizational psychology from Teacher's College, Columbia University, New York City, New York.
Figure 1. Former and new METs and ARTs for the 6th Military Police Group, the 22d Military Police Battalion, and a military police detachment (2) 6th Gp METL Conduct Mission Conduct Provide Command (ART Criminal Protective 5.0) Investigations Services for (ART 126.96.36.199) Selected Individuals (ART 6.5.4) MP Bn (CID) Conduct Mission Perform Conduct METL (Former) Command (ART Deployment and Criminal 5.0) Redeployment Investigations Activities (ART (ART 188.8.131.52) 1.1) MP Bn (CID) Conduct Mission Perform Conduct Command (ART Deployment and Criminal 5.0) Redeployment Investigations Activities (ART (ART 184.108.40.206) 1.1) Detachment Conduct Mission Conduct Provide METL (Former) Command (ART Criminal Protective 5.0) Investigations Services for (ART 220.127.116.11) Selected Individuals (ART 6.5.4) Detachment New Conduct Mission Conduct Conduct METL Command (ART Criminal Investigative 5.0) Investigation Program Operations (ART Operations 18.104.22.168) 6th Gp METL Conduct Police Conduct Intelligence Logistics Operations (ART Security 2.2.5) Operations (ART 6.11.4) MP Bn (CID) Provide Conduct Police Conduct METL (Former) Protective Intelligence Logistics Services for Operations (ART Security Selected 2.2.5) Operations (ART Individuals 6.11.4) (ART 6.5.4) MP Bn (CID) Conduct Conduct Police Criminal Intelligence Investigative Operations (ART Support 2.2.5) Operations Detachment Conduct Police Conduct METL (Former) Intelligence Logistics Operations (ART Security 2.2.5) Operations (ART 6.11.4) Detachment New Conduct Conduct Police METL Investigative Intelligence Support Program Operations Operations Legend: bn--battalion gp--group MP--Military police
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|Author:||Dolata, Ignatius M., Jr.; Russell-Tutty, Thomas; Conkey, Kate|
|Date:||Sep 22, 2014|
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