A NEW WORLD ORDER: FIFA FISCAL SCANDAL OPENS THE DOOR FOR THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TO PROSECUTE CRIMES COMMITTED ACROSS THE GLOBE THROUGH THE USE OF EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.
The Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) is one of the most well-known and well-funded organizations in the world. (1) Recently, the United States uncovered a massive money laundering scandal inside FIFA after an extensive investigation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) of high-ranking FIFA officials. (2) The United States employed extraterritorial jurisdiction over the accused executives because the FIFA executives were not physically present in the United States of America when they committed the crimes they are charged with. (3) After the rumors of bribery and officials selling their votes during the bidding process, behind closed doors, for the rights to host the 2018 and 2022 World Cups, indictments returned in May of 2015 that rocked the footballing world. (4) As a result of the indictments served by the United States Department of Justice (DOJ), extensive investigations have been conducted into many high-ranking FIFA executives, such as former FIFA president Sepp Blatter, Jack Warner, and many other FIFA executives since the first round of arrests of officials in Zurich, Switzerland. (5) All of the arrested FIFA executives were seized in Switzerland, which lead to the United States DOJ petitioning Switzerland, under extraterritorial jurisdiction, to extradite the officials to the United States for prosecution of the crimes regarding their roles. (6)
The United States had extraterritorial jurisdiction because the operation of both FIFA and the banking institutions inside the physical borders of the United States allowed the United States DOJ to exert extraterritorial jurisdiction over the indicted officials. (7) This Note will explore the present state of the United States extradition relationship with Switzerland, and why Switzerland's Federal Office of Justice (FOJ) should have unanimously granted all of the United States extradition requests in regard to the FIFA officials seized in the May 27, 2015 arrests. (8) Part II will discuss the history of extradition between of United States and Switzerland, the development of extraterritorial extradition in the United States, and the structure and development of FIFA. (9) Part III will recount the events of the FIFA raids conducted in Zurich, Switzerland and the extradition requests made by the United States for multiple FIFA officials based on the theory of extraterritorial jurisdiction. (10) Part IV will analyze the extradition requests made by the United States, and whether Switzerland should have granted them, as well as future steps that may be taken to ensure uniform extradition decisions. (11) Lastly, Part V will conclude the Note by highlighting the appropriate action Switzerland's FOJ should have taken based on precedent and the strength of extraterritorial jurisdiction. (12)
A. Extradition in the United States
Before the creation of extradition treaties, fugitives could seek asylum in other countries to avoid facing criminal prosecution. (13) In 1794, the United States of America entered into the Treaty of Amity, Commerce & Navigation between His Britannic Majesty and the United States (Jay Treaty) with the United Kingdom to ensure that individuals who fled to the United States from the United Kingdom, or vice versa, would face prosecution for his or her crimes. (14) Extradition agreements require the United States and the partner government to send promptly the requested individual back to the nation making the request to face the criminal charges, if the charged act is also a crime in the nation the individual is currently hiding in to avoid prosecution. (15) Any extradition agreement entered into force by the United States government becomes binding and mandatory on all courts of the United States. (16) Due to the growth of international crime and international travel, the United States continues to create extradition treaties and is currently a member of over one hundred extradition treaties with various nations around the world. (17)
B. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Individuals committing large-scale monetary crimes in that involve American businesses, transactions using the dollar, and organizations with a presence in the United States or its territories may be investigated and prosecuted by the courts of the United States. (18) Extraterritorial jurisdiction allows the United States DOJ to pursue fugitives that perpetrate crimes against the United States from physical locations outside of the United States' traditional jurisdiction, established by its international borders. (19) Due to rapidly evolving business practices, created by technological advances in the banking world, the United States DOJ began using extraterritorial jurisdiction to combat criminal actors. (20) The United States DOJ, through extraterritorial jurisdiction, may prosecute foreign individuals that electronically attack or use American businesses even when the illegal act is committed in a foreign country. (21) Today, the United States DOJ employs extraterritorial jurisdiction not only to pursue violent criminal actors, but individuals guilty of financial crimes as well. (22)
C. Priority Extradition
If multiple countries petition to extradite an individual from another nation, the requested nation must first decide if each extradition petition is valid, and if so, which country shall have the right to prosecute the sought individual first. (23) The United Nations has established guidelines to aid a requested nation in the decision making process. (24) Some factors the United Nations believes should determine which petitioner is awarded priority extradition are: the dates the requests are received; the ability of each petitioner to prosecute all of the alleged crimes; the location of the witnesses; availability of evidence; the individuals nationality; and the ability to conduct a speedy trial. (25) Through its recommendations for efficient extradition between countries, the United Nations makes it clear that the petitioner with the best ability to conduct an encompassing, efficient, effective and just trial should be awarded priority jurisdiction, as long as that petitioner followed proper procedure. (26) The criteria, however, set forth by the United Nations is not an absolute test of which petitioner checks off the most boxes, but a guide to help requested nations make decisions. (27) The ultimate decision to award priority falls to the requested nation based on their best judgment of the facts and a review of the interests of each petitioner. (28)
D. United States Requesting Extradition From Switzerland
Switzerland and the United States agreed to the Switzerland International Extradition Treaty with the United States, an extradition treaty in 1990 that was ratified and went into force in 1997. (29) The Swiss FOJ have denied extradition requests from the United States if they have been able to on multiple occasions, if the extradition treaty between the United States and Switzerland did not clearly require the grant of the extradition request. (30) Most of the difficulties between the United States and Switzerland in extradition matters revolve around tax evasion due to a lack of dual criminality. (31) Government officials in the United States believe that the treaty entitles the United States to the extradition of accomplices that aid in the crime, as well as the chief criminal actor committing the crime. (32) The Swiss FOJ has not always agreed with this position. (33)
1. Structure and Role of FIFA
FIFA is the head governing body of world football activities, and it has a specific organizational structure to facilitate its many duties to its member Associations. (34) Along with its responsibilities to govern the game of football, FIFA uses its influence as the global face of the sport to promote social equality, education, youth groups, and more through its Football for Hope initiative. (35) FIFA is made up of five Football Confederations, which in turn are made up of numerous Football Associations arranged by geographical location. (36)
2. Evolution of the FIFA World Cup
In 1904, FIFA was founded to bring the Football Associations of Europe together to promote the global game of football. (37) FIFA expanded rapidly and held its first international football tournament, the World Cup, in 1930. (38) Many companies and nations bid for the rights to be associated with FIFA and its tournaments as either host countries or advertisers for an event. (39) The enormous quantities of money advertisers and television companies are willing to pay for these rights presents FIFA with much of the funds it requires to run the tournament every four years, as well as the cash reserves of FIFA. (40) FIFA officials are in charge of voting and assigning these rights within FIFA's ethical standards. (41) Today the FIFA World Cup is the largest tournament in the world, and it generates billions of dollars of revenue for FIFA as well as its corporate sponsors and advertisers. (42)
3. Warning Signs of Corruption Spreading Through FIFA a. International Sports and Leisure
Prior to International Sport and Leisure's (ISL) bankruptcy in 2001, the company enjoyed a lucrative marketing and media relationship with FIFA where ISL negotiated broadcasting contracts for the World Cup on FIFA's behalf. (43) ISL paid over sixty six million pounds to sports executives to obtain the rights to various television and marketing deals. (44) One of the officials that received bribes from ISL was Nicolas Leoz, who was a member of FIFA's executive committee. (45) Two other South American FIFA officials, Joao Havelange and Ricardo Teixiera of Brazil, also resigned from their positions in FIFA after it became public that ISL bribed both Havelange and Teixiera (46) Amid allegations of bribery and corruption, FIFA paid in excess of GBP 1.6 million to ISL's creditors (47)
b. Possible Bribery in the World Cup Bidding Process
A little more than a decade later, controversy surrounded the awarding of the 2010 FIFA World Cup to South Africa in light of a USD 10 million payment to FIFA by the South African Football Association. (48) South Africa claims their refusal to accept a USD10 million payment due to their football federation was a humanitarian gesture to aid the African diaspora, but the money was placed in a fund at the control of former FIFA Vice President Jack Warner to disperse as he saw fit. (49) Due to the controversy surrounding South Africa's 2010 World Cup bid, Russia and Qatar's bids to host the 2018 and 2022 World Cups respectively, investigations were opened to determine whether any bidding violations occurred during the voting process. (50) The ensuing investigations into World Cup bidding practices revealed that a multitude of officials at FIFA, including the FIFA Executive Committee and FIFA President Sepp Blatter, might have accepted bribes to award a country the right to host the World Cup. (51)
A. Zurich Raid Executed at FIFA Conference
The FBI through a three-year investigation discovered evidence of widespread fiscal crimes committed by multiple executive members of FIFA's governing body, and the United States DOJ believes it has connected the arrested officials to accepted bribes in excess of USD150 million. (52) After reviewing subpoenas with evidence of the charged crimes, the Swiss FOJ agreed to seize the indicted FIFA officials. (53) On May 27, 2015, plain clothes officers conducted a raid of the Baur au Luc Hotel to arrest multiple high-ranking FIFA executives after an extensive FBI probe into the awarding of the 2018 and 2022 World Cup tournaments to Russia and Qatar respectively. (54) Many of the individuals seized in the May raid did not commit their crimes within the traditional jurisdiction of the United States, but rather filtered the money through banks in the United States. (55) Over the six months following the May arrests, the world watched as FIFA's deceptive and unethical fiscal practices came to light as the list of charged FIFA officials continuously grew as the United States DOJ revealed the results of the United States probe into FIFA. (56)
B. Extradition Cases
Many of the officials seized in the Zurich raid immediately began legal battles in front of the Swiss FOJ to avoid extradition to the United States. (57) The issue in these extradition requests was not whether there was dual criminality, but rather if the United States' use of extraterritorial jurisdiction obligated the Swiss FOJ to grant the extradition requests. (58) The United States DOJ claimed that because FIFA exists and does business within the United States, as well as the use of American banking institutions to commit the crimes, that it granted the United States jurisdiction over the executives. (59) The Swiss FOJ granted six of the seven extradition requests the United States submitted for the officials seized in the Zurich raids. (60)
The only FIFA executive seized on May 27, 2015 to escape extradition to the United States was Figueredo. (61) After the United States revealed the fruits of their extensive investigation into illegal practices within FIFA, Uruguay launched their own investigation into Figueredo's business dealings and submitted an extradition request of its own to the Swiss FOJ. (62) Both Uruguay and Nicaragua subsequently filed extradition requests for Figueredo and Rocha respectively, with the Swiss FOJ to obtain priority extradition to prosecute their respective citizen for the alleged crimes. (63) The Swiss FOJ originally honored the United States extradition request as it came as the result of an in depth investigation and was filed first, but while the United States request was pending the Swiss FOJ decided to grant priority extradition to Uruguay in Figueredo's case. (64) When Rocha's home country of Nicaragua filed an extradition request with the Swiss FOJ to prosecute Rocha in Nicaragua, the Swiss FOJ granted the United States priority over Nicaragua and extradited Rocha to the United States on May 18, 2016. (65)
A. Switzerland Carrying out Seizures and Serving Indictments on United States' Behalf
The United States correctly applied extraterritorial jurisdiction after investigating the corruption within FIFA's governing body. (66) FIFA operates within the United States and it uses the dollar in many of its transactions, which by United States law, grants the United States the right to investigate the organization and prosecute crimes under the theory of extraterritorial jurisdiction. (67) The United States and Switzerland have held differing views on this issue over the years, as exhibited by the Swiss FOJ's refusal to extradite Swiss bankers to the United States upon request for tax evasion. (68) Switzerland recognized the validity of the United States extraterritorial jurisdiction claim, and served the indictments on the accused officials on behalf of the United States. (69) Many individuals view the United States use of extraterritorial jurisdiction to prosecute fiscal crimes committed in other countries to be an aggressive overstep by the United States, and this has caused difficulties for the United States in its attempt to obtain extradition requests in this area. (70) The Swiss FOJ, in their granting of United States extradition requests for the executives, and upon appeal, correctly recognized the validity of the United States extradition requests under extraterritorial jurisdiction. (71)
B. Switzerland's Granting of Priority Extradition to the United States
The Swiss FOJ should not have granted Uruguay or Nicaragua priority extradition in the respective cases of Figueredo and Rocha because the United States was best placed to conduct the prosecution of both individuals. (72) Originally, in both the case of Figueredo and Rocha, the Swiss FOJ granted the United States priority extradition ahead of the subsequent extradition requests made by their respective home nations of Uruguay and Nicaragua. (73) The United States spent three years investigating FIFA and its officials for suspected acts of corruption before serving indictments on the arrested executives and requesting their extradition to the United States to face trial. (74) In the aftermath of the arrest of Figueredo, Uruguay reopened a long-closed investigation into Figueredo for similar fiscal crimes, and submitted their extradition request while Figueredo was appealing the Swiss FOJ's decision to extradite him to the United States. (75) Nicaragua, like Uruguay, submitted an extradition request to prosecute Rocha in Nicaragua for his crimes, both claims were rightly granted by the Swiss FOJ as many of the charged crimes were conducted in those countries. (76) Figueredo and Rocha agreed to extradition to their home countries in an attempt to avoid extradition to the United States, but the Swiss FOJ correctly granted the United States priority extradition that would allow the United States DOJ to block the extradition of the disgraced FIFA officials to their home countries. (77)
The United States had built substantial cases against each individual involved in the FIFA corruption probes, and was most prepared to effectively prosecute Figueredo and Rocha for their many crimes, and therefore was the correct jurisdiction to conduct the trials for all of the indicted FIFA officials. (78) Uruguay conducted their own bribery investigation into Figueredo, and decided to prosecute him, but the United States was the proper place to host the trial. (79) The United States had conducted a three year investigation into FIFA, the witnesses and evidence were present in the United States, and the United States had already begun prosecuting Figueredo's counterparts making them more prepared than Uruguay to proceed with a strong and efficient prosecution of Figueredo. (80) Uruguay hastily pulled together a case against Figueredo after less extensive investigations than the United States, and submitted their extradition request well after the United States had leveled its charges against the official. (81) Nicaragua similarly sought the right to prosecute Rocha, but the United States was the correct nation to extradite Rocha to because most of the evidence and witnesses in the case were already present in the United States. (82)
C. Switzerland's Incorrect Decision To Adjust Priority
The Swiss FOJ originally granted the United States priority extradition over Figueredo before reversing and granting Uruguay priority, but the United States should retain priority extradition over Uruguay in Figueredo's case. (83) Just as with Rocha's case, the best evidence against Figueredo was present in the United States, where the United States DOJ spent three years building its case against the officials arrested in Zurich. (84)
Uruguay was not in a better position to prosecute Figueredo than Nicaragua was prepared to prosecute Rocha because neither country had conducted as extensive investigations into their citizen's crimes as the United States, but Switzerland granted priority extradition to Uruguay and not Nicaragua. (85) In Rocha's case, the Swiss FOJ argued that the United States was much more prepared to prosecute Rocha than Nicaragua, and the Swiss FOJ should have continued to apply that reasoning in deciding Figueredo's extradition as well. (86) The country could possibly prosecute Figueredo for additional crimes, but the fact that the United States had built a strong case and procured the necessary evidence and witnesses to prosecute Figueredo should have stopped the Swiss FOJ from denying the United States priority extradition over Figueredo. (87)
The United States DOJ was clearly the best-placed justice department to prosecute the corrupt FIFA officials for the charges of bribery, money laundering, and fraud that Figueredo and Rocha faced because the United States had secured the strongest evidence proving the guilt of the arrested officials. (88) In conjunction with the United States' superior ability to prosecute the ex-officials, the fact that extradition to the United States had already been granted in both cases, the Swiss FOJ needed to stand firm in their prior decision to allow the United States to block the extradition requests of Uruguay and Nicaragua. (89) If the Swiss FOJ felt that the United States had compiled all of the necessary resources to prosecute Rocha, then the Swiss FOJ should have made a similar finding in Figueredo's case as the evidence and witnesses in both cases were the result of the same three-year probe by the FBI into FIFA's activity. (90)
FIFA's inability to ensure their executives carried out their responsibilities in an ethical manner resulted in the FBI uncovering extensive corruption throughout the organization. (91) The United States further expanded its international authority through the use of extraterritorial jurisdiction to indict and prosecute several FIFA executives arrested on their behalf by the Swiss FOJ on May (27), (2015), in Zurich Switzerland. (92) After the officials were seized, the Swiss FOJ granted the United States priority extradition for each of the seven indicted officials. (93) However, both Uruguay and Nicaragua submitted extradition requests for Figueredo and Rocha respectively, and the Swiss FOJ incorrectly awarded Uruguay priority extradition over the United States in Figueredo's case. (94) The Swiss FOJ's reversal of extradition priority, even though the United States was more prepared to prosecute Figueredo, creates an ambiguity that may allow the Swiss FOJ to avoid extraditing criminals to the United States. (95)
(1.) See Simone Rice, What Is FIFA, How Much Is It Worth--and Who Votes For the President?, Independent (May 28, 2015), http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/ football/news-and-comment/what-is-fifa-how-much-is-it-worth-and-who-votes-for the-president-10281482.html [hereinafter What Is FIFA] (demonstrating FIFA's value, inner workings, and responsibilities to world football). FIFA runs international football and governs the activities of all footballing bodies. Id. FIFA uses its power and influence as a global organization to not only host tournaments, but also suspend and discipline individuals, teams, and individual nations if the offender fails to follow the rules of the game. Id.
(2.) See Who Are the Indicted FIFA Officials?, BBC News (Jan. 6, 2016), http:// www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-32897171 [hereinafter Indicted FIFA Officials] (outlining all officials indicted by United States government in probe of FIFA money laundering scandal). The United States conducted a massive probe into FIFA's dealings. Id. FIFA officials accepted illegal payments in exchange for awarding advertising rights during matches hosted by Association members as well as World Cup matches. Id. See also FIFA Corruption Inquiries: Officials Arrested in Zurich, BBC News (May 27, 2015), http:// www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32895048 [hereinafter FIFA Corruption Inquiries] (explaining possible consequences of arrests on FIFA's governing body moving forward). In the initial raids conducted in Zurich, the Swiss authorities arrested seven members of FIFA's governing body. Id. The arrested officials were: FIFA vice president and the chief officer of the Confederation of North, Central America and Caribbean Association Football (CONCACAF) Jeffrey Webb of the Cayman Islands; newly appointed member of FIFA's executive committee and the chief of national football in Costa Rica Eduardo Li of Costa Rica; president of the South American Football Confederation (CONMEBOL) Eugenio Figueredo (Figueredo) of Uruguay; president of the Venezuelan Football Federation Rafael Esquivel of Venezuela; member of the FIFA Development Committee Julio Rocha (Rocha) of Nicaragua; and aid to the president of CONCACAF and former general secretary of the Cayman Islands Football Association Costas Takkas of the United Kingdom. Id. See also FIFA Corruption Crisis: Key Questions Answered, BBC News (Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/ world-europe-32897066 [hereinafter FIFA Corruption Crisis] (investigating FIFA leads to multiple indictments for numerous international crimes officials committed). FIFA officials were indicted for money laundering, racketeering, wire fraud, and other crimes committed for personal economic advancement in abuse of their positions. Id. Widespread misappropriation of resources and abuses of power for person gain by these officials allegedly took place over decades without any oversight or review of any kind to assure that the dealings of FIFA executives were carried out in an appropriate and legal manner. Id. See generally FIFA, FIFA Code of Ethics, http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/administration/50/02/82/codeofethics_v211015_e_neutral.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2017) [hereinafter FIFA Ethics] (providing ethical standards expected of FIFA members acting on behalf of FIFA). FIFA operates around the world to grow football around the world and to bring people of all different social and cultural backgrounds together through football. Id. FIFA aims to encourage humanitarian values and charity work to improve the status of all members of the global community. Id. FIFA officials are expected to embody the mission of FIFA through their actions in their personal lives, but the indicted officials instead abused their positions by accepting bribes. Id.
(3.) See William Magnunson, The Domestic Politics of International Extradition, 52 Va. J. Int'l. L., 839, 843 (2012) (describing growing networks of international crimes across globe). Extradition treaties are necessary in today's world to ensure criminal operations cannot develop safe havens from prosecution for their crimes. Id. The improvement of extradition treaties between countries and creation of new alliances between governing bodies will develop a more predictable extradition procedure. Id. See also Extradition, Legal Info. Inst., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/extradition (last visited Jan. 10, 2017) (explaining definition of extradition). Extradition is defined as:
Extradition is the removal of a person from a requested state to a requesting state for criminal prosecution or punishment ... Extradition procedures are normally determined by reciprocal agreements between countries or by multilateral agreements between a group of countries. The European Union, for example, shares a system of extradition laws. In most jurisdictions, extradition will be granted only if the alleged crime is also against the law in the requested country.
Id. Even with these agreements, many nations have exceptions for crimes that they will not grant an extradition request for, even if they have an active extradition agreement with the requesting sovereign entity. Id. Many nations employ an exemption for political crimes. Id. Political crimes are crimes that are thoroughly of a political nature, including offenses like defamation or voter fraud will not be grounds to grant an extradition request. Id. Multiple nations also use a "double-jeopardy exception," where the country will not agree to extradition if the accused already faced a trial for the offense in question. Id. See also Jon Sopel, FIFA Scandal: Is the Long Arm of US Law Now Overreaching?, BBC News (June 4, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/worldus-canada-33011847 (debating United States use of extraterritorial jurisdiction in FIFA corruption cases). Most of FIFA's executive officials do not regularly do business in the United States, but rather at FIFA's headquarters in Zurich, Switzerland or various other nations around the world. Id. The United States used the fact that the FIFA executives used banking institutions based within the United States, along with the fact that FIFA has a branch of its organization based in within the United States of America's borders as grounds to employ extraterritorial jurisdiction over the arrested executives. Id.
(4.) See Indicted FIFA Officials, supra note 2 (ensuing investigation into FIFA conducted by United States after bribery claims in World Cup bidding process). Sepp Blatter, the then president of FIFA, and other FIFA officials were accused of accepting bribes when they voted to give the 2018 World Cup to Russia, and the 2022 World Cup to Qatar. Id. The United States and Australia both believed that their bids should have been selected, but were not. Id. Qatar's choice for the World Cup lead to outrage over the human rights violations in the country, as well as the substantial problems with extreme heat during the summer months in Qatar when the World Cup takes place. Id. Michel Platini and Sepp Blatter were both found to have accepted illicit payments for their services as ranking FIFA officials. Id.
(5.) See Indicted FIFA Officials, supra note 2 (detailing three-year investigation into numerous FIFA officials conducted by FBI). Officials from multiple FIFA Associations were found by the United States DOJ to have accepted bribes. Id. The arrests made in Zurich in May of 2015 on the behalf of the United States DOJ were only the first of dozens of indictments and arrests to be made in the ever-widening FIFA corruption scandal probe. Id. The depths of the corruption and abuse of power in FIFA became evident as more and more charges were revealed by the United States DOJ against members of FIFA's governing body and member confederations. Id. See also Evan Perez & Shimon Prokupecz, United States Charges 16 FIFA Officials in Widening Probe, CNN (Dec. 3, 2015), http://edition.cnn.com/ 2015/12/03/sport/ fifa-corruption-charges-justice-department/ (describing growing depth of corruption by FIFA officials for personal gain). After the questionable World Cup bidding process, authorities began investigating whether FIFA presidents and vice-presidents were abusing their positions in FIFA's governing body for personal gain. Id. The Swiss FOJ also suspected FIFA officials acted inappropriately when accepting World Cup bids. Id. See also Kevin Baxter, FIFA Chief Sepp Blatter Under Criminal Investigation in Switzerland, L.A. Times (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/sports/ sportsnow/la-sp-sn-sepp-blatter-criminal-charges-20150925-story.html (providing details of criminal probe into Blatter's conduct as FIFA president). Sepp Blatter has been the de facto face, voice, and leader of FIFA since he was first elected president in 1998. Id. Most of the crimes discovered by the FBI have taken place during Sepp Blatter's regime. Id. Sepp Blatter has been suspected of fixing FIFA elections for many years, but they had no hard proof until a recent investigation conducted by the Swiss FOJ after the United States DOJ indictments were filed:
[A] contract Blatter signed in 2005 that assigned World Cup television rights to the control of a indicted former FIFA official, Jack Warner. That contract ... awarded Warner's Caribbean Football Union the rights to both the 2010 and 2014 World Cups for $600,000. Warner then licensed those rights and sold them for $20 million. In 2011, when Warner left FIFA after being implicated in a bribery scheme, he claimed FIFA gave him undervalued World Cup rights in exchange for helping Blatter win reelection as the organization's president.
Id. In addition to selling World Cup rights below market value in exchange for securing votes to remain in office, it is also believed that Sepp Blatter made a "disloyal payment" to Michel Platini in excess of USD2 million. Id. Michel Platini, was the then president of the Union of European Football Associations, and considered one of the front-runners to challenge Sepp Blatter in the next FIFA presidential election. Id. "Under Swiss law, a payment is disloyal if it is against the best interest of the employer." Id. Platini claimed the money had been earned, but no record shows exactly what duties were carried out by Michel Platini to deserve a two million dollar payment. Id. See also Rupert Neate, FIFA Officials Pocketed $150m from 'World Cup Of Fraud'--US Prosecutors, The Guardian (May 27, 2015), https://www. theguardian.com/football/2015/may/27/fifa-officials-world-cup-fraud-us-prosecutors (detailing United States DOJ criminal charges against indicted officials). Jack Warner left FIFA in 2011 in the wake of bribery charges leveled against him in regards to fixing the FIFA presidential election. Id. Even though he no longer holds an official position inside of FIFA, the United States DOJ found plenty of evidence to include him among the individuals indicted for using their positions within FIFA to generate more than USD 150 million for themselves through fraud, bribery, and money laundering schemes. Id. United States Attorney General Loretta Lynch described the actions of Warner and the other indicted FIFA executives as criminals who took advantage of their positions of power in FIFA to increase their own personal worth at the expense of others for over two decades. Id.
(6.) See Rebecca Ruiz, Jailed South American Official In FIFA Case Agrees To Extradition, N.Y. Times (Dec. 9, 2015) http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/09/sports/soccer/ jailed-south-american-official-in-fifa-case-agrees-to-extradition.html?_r=0 (extending United States jurisdiction with extraterritorial justification). The United States DOJ employed extraterritorial jurisdiction over the FIFA executives by claiming their crimes went through American institutions, thus giving the United States jurisdiction to prosecute the individuals for their crimes. Id. See also Perez, supra note 5 (filtering money through American institutions). Much of the bribe money filtered through banks in the United States, and forces the Swiss FOJ to review extradition requests made by the United States DOJ in relation to the arrested officials. Id. If a valid extradition request is submitted within the permitted timeframe between the United States and Switzerland, the country receiving the request must review and rule on the request because of the bilateral agreement between the two countries in regards to extradition of suspected criminal offenders. Id. See also Peter D. Camesasca et al.. Extradition And Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties: Cartel Enforcement's Global Reach, 75 Antitrust L.J. 353 (2008) [hereinafter Global Reach] (using extraterritorial jurisdiction to achieve authority over individuals). Extraterritorial jurisdiction is a product of international cooperation, and a necessary tool to combat global crime. Id. Extraterritorial jurisdiction is "the operation of laws upon persons existing beyond the limits of the enacting state or nation but who are still amenable to its laws, jurisdiction exercised by a nation in other countries by treaty ... in foreign lands." Id.
(7.) See Phillip Bump, How the United States Can Arrest FIFA Officials in Switzerland, Explained, Wash. Post (May 27, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ the- fix/wp/2015/05/27/how-the-us-can-arrest-fifa-officials-in-switzerland-explained/ (showing United States prosecution as valid use of extraterritorial jurisdiction). By exploiting the use of American banks by the arrested officials, the United States has a valid avenue to pursue a priority claim to have the officials transported to the United States to face prosecution in the American justice system. Id. Even though the crimes were planned and executed on foreign soil across the globe involving individuals from multiple regions of the world, the use of banking institutions primarily based in the United States grants extraterritorial jurisdiction for the United States DOJ to move forward with prosecutions against the individuals. Id. Without the cooperation of the Swiss FOJ, the United States would have had to try to extradite the officials from their respective home countries to proceed with formal hearings. Id. See generally Rebecca Ruiz, FIFA Official Agrees to Extradition, Just not to U.S., N.Y. Times, (Aug. 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/15/sports/soccer/fifa-official-agreesto-extradition-just-not-to- us.html?_r=0 [hereinafter FIFA Official Agrees to Extradition] (preferring to try official in home country). Rocha served as the Nicaraguan Football Federation's president before the raid in Zurich exposed his criminal exploits. Id. Nicaragua decided to prosecute Rocha for his crimes and protested the United States extradition request of its citizen. Id. Nicaragua filed a subsequent extradition request for Rocha with Switzerland after the United States began extradition proceedings against the arrested officials. Id.
(8.) See John G. Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 Geo. L.J. 1441 (1988) (granting extradition follows precedent set in prior rulings). The multitude of settled United States extradition request cases sets a precedent for the Swiss FOJ to grant priority extradition to the United States in regards to the indicted FIFA officials. Id.
(9.) See infra Part II (describing history of extradition and extraterritorial jurisdiction).
(10.) See infra Part III (detailing arrested FIFA officials arrest and extradition cases).
(11.) See infra Part IV (analyzing United States extradition requests submitted to Swiss FOJ).
(12.) See infra Part V (reviewing Swiss FOJ decisions on extradition requests).
(13.) See Nick Cumming-Bruce & Michael Cieply, Swiss Reject United States Request to Extradite Polanski, N.Y. Times, July 12, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes .com/ 2010/07/13/movies/l3polanski.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2017) (seeking asylum in foreign countries provides relief for criminals). Roman Polanski is wanted in the United States for child molestation, but the United States had an extradition request for Polanski denied by the Swiss FOJ. Id. Polanski had been involved in a long legal battle in the United States, but the Swiss FOJ denied the United States extradition request because the Swiss FOJ believed that Polanski was not being treated fairly by the United States justice system. Id. Even though Polanski plead guilty to his crime, and dual criminality was met, Switzerland was able to refuse to extradite Polanski to the United States on political grounds. Id. See also Claire Suddath, A Brief History Of Extraditions, Time, Sept. 30, 2009, http://content.time.com/ time/world/article/ 0,8599,1926810,00.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2017) (providing brief overview of extradition and its affects). France refuses to agree to extradition requests for French citizens. Id. Allowing individuals like Polanski, of French descent, to seek asylum in their home nation to avoid facing prosecution for crimes committed in other countries. Id. The United States and Russia have never entered into a formal bilateral extradition agreement with one another. Id. Due to the violent political atmosphere during the Cold War in Russia, many individuals sought asylum in the United States to avoid persecution by the Russian government. Id.
(14.) See Treaty of Amity, Commerce & Navigation between His Britannic Majesty and the United States of America, art. XXVII, Gr. Brit-U.S., Nov. 19,1794, available at http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/documents/1786-1800/the-jay-treaty-1794.php (last visited Jan. 10, 2017) (promising bilateral extradition with Great Britain). The Jay Treaty was established between the United States to create a friendly relationship between the United States and Great Britain in the aftermath of the American Civil War. Id. The main goal of the treaty was to promote and protect commerce between the two sovereign nations, but the Jay Treaty also created an extradition agreement between the United States and Great Britain in article twenty-seven of the treaty. Id. The United States and the United Kingdom mutually agreed that there was a need to return suspected and convicted criminals to the nation in which the crime was committed if the crime was illegal in both countries, thus making dual criminality becomes a staple of American extradition practices. Id. See generally Williamson, supra note 3 (describing practical difficulties of international extradition). Extradition requests are never guaranteed, as factors other than dual criminality come into play in a country making extradition decisions. Id.
(15.) See Suddath, supra note 13 (extraditing defendants based on dual criminality). Without the element of dual criminality, a partner country will not extradite an individual sought by the requesting party, nor will any country be obliged to do so if there is no existing agreement between the two nations. Id.
(16.) See Chelsea S. Novelli, Comment, Treaty Law--The Broad Interpretation of "Lapse Of Time" Provides Protections Beyond the Bounds of LJ.S.-Mex. Treaty, 39 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 239, 241 (2016) (recognizing need to follow extradition agreements). Any treaty entered into by the United States government with another sovereign entity rules supreme and must be adhered to. Id. Some United States jurisdictions go as far as to hold the language and power of a treaty is as powerful as the language of the United States Constitution. Id.
(17.) See Sabbath, supra note 13 (examining delicate nature of extradition treaties). With the growth of international crime, it is important to avoid abusing the power of extradition. Id. Many countries, including the United States, make a concerted effort to not openly aid in the persecution of political opponents, and will reject extradition requests made by a country to retrieve a powerful political figure without substantial evidence of a criminal offense. Id. See generally 18 U.S.C. [section] 3181 (listing all United States extradition agreements). The United States has extradition agreements in place with countries such as Argentina, Columbia, Germany, the Congo, Switzerland, and others where dual criminality applies, extradition will be granted in most instances. Id. Countries that the United States does not have an active extradition agreement in place include countries such as Russia, Iran, and China. Id. See David Millward, Norway Refuses to Grant Edward Snowden Guarantee Against Extradition, Telegraph, Nov. 26, 2016, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/11/26/ norway-refuses-grant-edward-snowden-guaranteeagainst-extradition/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2017) (revealing Norway will not protect Snowden from extradition like Russia). The United States has been seeking to extradite Edward Snowden back to the United States ever since he leaked sensitive government information to the public. Id. Snowden has been living in Russia, where the United States does not have an active extradition agreement in place, and therefore the United States do not have the power to extradite Snowden from Russia. Id. The United States does have an active extradition treaty with Norway, and the Norwegian courts will not promise Snowden extradition protection if he steps into their jurisdiction. Id. The lack of a United States-Russia extradition agreement allows Russia to ignore any pleas from the United States government to return Snowden, even if there is dual criminality, but Norway would be under pressure to comply with an extradition request from the United States due to their existing extradition treaty as long as the Norwegian courts held that the Espionage Act under which the United States plans to charge Snowden, has a comparable law in Norway. Id. The Norwegian courts, nor any other nation entered into an extradition treaty with the United States needs to make a ruling on whether extradition would be granted until the case takes place in court, allowing countries leeway to avoid possibly violating the extradition treaty. Id.
(18.) See Michel Rose, France: The US must be challenged over its judicial "extortion" of corporate Europe, Business Insider, Oct. 11, 2016, http://www.businessinsider.com/ france-slams-us-over-judicial-extortion-of-corporate-europe-2016-10 (last visited Jan. 10, 2017) [hereinafter The United States Must Be Challenged] (indicating United States growing use of extraterritorial jurisdiction dangers Europe). Many countries see the United States use of extraterritorial jurisdiction to pursue fiscal crimes by businesses in Europe as quick cash grab, and not a real attempt at ferreting out international crime that is aimed to harm the United States. Id. France finds the use of extraterritorial jurisdiction by the United States to pursue bank crimes in other countries to be a serious and unreasonable abuse of power. Id. Evidence suggests that the United States is punishing foreign businesses more severely than American businesses for similar crimes, as seen in the recent settlement agreement between the United States DOJ and BNP Paribas, the largest bank in France. Id. But see Global Standards, infra note 20 (providing different ways United States DOJ employs extraterritorial jurisdiction). Much of the criminal behavior investigated by the United States in the FIFA case took place outside of the United States, but because FIFA operates within the territory United States and uses some banking practices in the United States, the United States DOJ was able to provide a connection to FIFA to validate the claim of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Id.
(19.) See 18 U.S.C. [section] 3042 (2016) (constituting parameters of extraterritorial jurisdiction in United States); see also Suddath, supra note 13 (pursuing criminals seeking asylum in other countries). See also Global Reach, supra note 6 (defining extraterritorial jurisdiction). Extraterritorial jurisdiction allows the United States DOJ to claim jurisdiction on individuals whom perpetrate crimes outside of the United States if part of the crime was within the purview of United States jurisdiction, such as a corporation incorporated inside of the United States. Id.
(20.) See Isabella de la Guardia & William Roppolo, Adapting to Global Standards of Compliance, Bloomberg (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.bna.com/adapting-globalstandards-n73014449336/ [hereinafter Global Standards] (explaining developments in United States policies to combat crimes committed outside of United States). The United States expanded its laws against money laundering through the Patriot Act. Id. The Patriot Act grants jurisdiction to the United States for money laundering crimes committed by foreign offenders if part of a transaction occurred in the United States, which includes filtering money through banks established in the United States and organizations with bank accounts in banks based in the United States. Id.
(21.) See Russian Hacker Sought By US Arrested In Czech Republic, Fox News (Oct. 19, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/10/19/russian-hacker-sought-byus-arrested-in-czech-republic.html (pursuing international criminals committing crimes against United States). Cyber terrorism opens the door for individuals to commit crimes against the United States without stepping foot on American soil. Id. LinkedIn, an American business, fell prey to a Russian hacker circumventing its security and releasing private information. Id. Extraterritorial jurisdiction allows the United States to pursue a criminal trial against the hacker in United States courts because his crime was committed against a corporate entity based in the United States. Id.
(22.) See Kim Hjelmgaard, United States Asks Swiss to Extradite FIFA Officials in Bribery Probe, USA Today (July 2, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ 2015/07/02/fifa-switzerland-extradition-us/29605777/ (seeking extradition of officials in bribery scandal involving U.S. institutions). As a result of the FBI investigation into FIFA and its dealing, the United States found evidence that the arrested officials were utilizing banks based in the United States to commit their crimes. Id. Loretta Lynch, the United States Attorney General said the FBI found that the multitude of criminal offenses committed by the officials took place over an extended period of time by individuals abusing their positions in FIFA to illegally obtain millions of dollars by accepting countless bribes over the course of their careers. Id. On top of bribery, the United States found evidence that FIFA officials committed "wire fraud, racketeering and money laundering" as well as bribery. Id. The personal proceeds the indicted officials earned illegally via the above-mentioned acts passed through American banks in violation of United States law. Id. See also Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Levin and McCain to DOJ: Extradite Swiss Bankers, Wash. Post (Mar. 19, 2014), https:// www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/03/19/levin-and-mccain-to-doj-extra dite-swiss-bankers/ (evading taxes owed to United States government). Large-scale tax evasion costs the United States millions in revenue and is a federal crime, but up to this point perpetrators of the crime can safely hide in Switzerland without fear of extradition to the United States, even though the United States continues to apply pressure on the Swiss FOJ to change their stance on the issue. Id.
(23.) See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Informal Expert Working Group on Effective Extradition Casework Practice, U.N. Doc., at 20-21 (2004) (establishing methods of deciding between competing extradition requests). Multiple nations may attempt to obtain extradition for an individual if the individual has committed a crime against that nation, and it is up to the requested nation to grant priority to one of petitioners if extradition is to be granted. Id. See also Int'l. Law Commc'n, Rep. of the Working Group on the Obligation to Extradite or Prosecute (Aut Dedere Aut Judicare), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.829, at 4 (2013) (outlining process to examine extradition requests). The United Nations believes that its reports give the proper process for reviewing extradition requests and establishing priority. Id.
(24.) See Int'l. Law Commc'n, supra note 23, at 10 (examining United Nations report on extradition requests). The United Nations has researched common extradition practices conducted around the globe, and synthesized general themes and criteria it believes are important to be considered and weighed when a decision regarding extradition is made. Id.
(25.) See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, supra note 23, at 21 (analyzing details of competing extradition requests United Nations focuses on). The United Nations gives an extensive list of what it believes to be important when a requested nation reviews competing extradition requests. Id. While the United Nations gives some criteria that seem to be like a check list of which nation is more prepared to carry out the most complete prosecution, the United Nations gives some open-ended factors that allow the requested nation to have more control over the award of priority. Id.
(26.) See id. at 21 (addressing United Nations focus on following extradition regulations). Even if a nation has the strongest evidence and best case against a defendant, the United Nations makes it clear that it believes any and all petitioners should follow any and all procedures agreed to in extradition treaties between nations. Id.
(27.) See id. at 20 (recognizing nations may choose to adopt these factors or not). The United Nations recommends that nations use the criteria set forth in their report to determine extradition priority, but nations do not need to. Id. Nations may choose or reject certain factors the United Nations deems important, and therefore retain their autonomy. Id.
(28.) See id. at 21 (indicating petitioners may not know how priority is calculated). Requested nations do not face any repercussions from the United Nations for their extradition decisions. Id. Extradition is decided in accordance with various extradition treaties made between nations. Id. As long as a requested nation does not violate their treaty, they may decide what weight to give competing extradition requests independently on a case-by-case basis. Id.
(29.) See Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Swiss Confederation, U.S.-Switz., Nov. 14,1990, 32 U.S.T. 221 (outlining terms of extradition between United States and Switzerland). The United States and Switzerland executed the extradition treaty on November 14, 1990, but the treaty did not go into force until September 10, 1997. Id. The treaty requires the United States and Switzerland to review and grant valid extradition requests made by one of the two nations to the other if the criminal offense is a crime in both countries. Id. See also Douglas-Gabriel, supra note 22 (showing difficulties of United States-Switzerland extradition in fiscal crimes). One of the major issues with extradition relations between the United States and Switzerland since the extradition treaty went into force arises in crimes of tax evasion. Id. In these matters, dual criminality is lacking as tax evasion is not a felony in Switzerland, and therefore the Swiss FOJ is not required to grant extradition requests made by the United States in tax evasion prosecution cases. Id.
(30.) See Cumming-Bruce, supra note 13 (rejecting to extradite Polanski). The Swiss FOJ refused to return Polanski to the United States to face trial for his crimes. Id. See also Joanna Berendt, Roman Polanski: Extradition Request Rejected by Poland's Supreme Court, N.Y. Times (Dec. 6, 2016), available at https://www.nytimes .com/2016/12/06/worId/europe/ roman-polanski-extradition-poland.html?r=0 (displaying Poland's similar refusal to extradite Polanski to United States). Poland also rejected the United States DOJ request to extradite Roman Polanski for his crimes because they did not believe that he would receive a fair trial in the United States, not because the charge was not illegal in Poland. Id. Nations look at all aspects of an extradition request, and may refuse to grant an extradition request even if the request is sound on legal grounds. Id. A Polish prosecutor disagreed with the ruling due to its valid legal grounds, and believed the refusal was a substantial breach of Poland's extradition treaty with the United States. Id. See also Magnuson, supra note 3, at 844 (underlining problems countries face when requesting extradition). Countries deny extradition for reasons other than a lack of dual criminality. Id. Sometimes a valid request may be denied due to political pressure in the country deciding whether to extradite an individual or not. Id. Many nations conduct a cost benefit analysis in difficult extradition cases. Id. at 848. If the political backlash for granting an extradition request is seen as more detrimental than being seen to fail to meeUhe requirements of the treaty, then a country may choose to deny extradition. Id. This mentality sometimes leads to countries refusing to grant an extradition request that under a strict interpretation of the rules likely would have been granted if they feel the requesting nation will accept the result. Id.
(31.) See David Voreacos, Patricia Hurtado & Giles Broom, Swiss Bankers Said Ready to Plead Guilty in U.S. Tax Case, Bloomberg (Feb. 2, 2016), http://www .bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-02/julius-baer-bankers-said-ready-to-plead guilty-in-tax -case (fighting tax evasion without dual criminality). Tax evasion is a cloud over United States-Switzerland relations. Id. Swiss bankers cannot be extradited to the United States in tax evasion cases because it is not illegal in Switzerland, so Switzerland is not bound by the extradition agreement to comply with any request in the matter. Id. See also Alexander Zodikoff, Comment, Constitutional Law - The Required Records Exception Includes Regulatory Foreign Banking Records but Reflects the Fifth Amendment's Purpose, 39 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 257, 261 (2016) (examining United States regulations regarding offshore bank accounts). In 1970 the Currency and Foreign Transactions Act was passed to regulate legally offshore bank accounts that were legally used and maintained by the account holder. Id. The Act established record-keeping techniques and created inspection protocols in relation to possible instances of tax evasion and other fiscal crimes. Id. The United States enforces strict regulations within its borders of how foreign bank accounts may be used to avoid tax evasion and money laundering. Id.
(32.) See Douglas-Gabriel, supra note 22 (exhibiting United States belief in their right to request extradition of Swiss bankers). Senator McCain knew that the United States extradition requests may be denied, but he wanted to make a statement with the extradition requests that the United States took tax evasion seriously, and would pursue these criminal offenders to the full extent allowed by law to make the offenders face prosecution for their crimes. Id.
(33.) See Douglas-Gabriel, supra note 22 (demonstrating Swiss FOJ disagreement with United States extradition stance). The Swiss FOJ regularly denies extradition requests by the United States for Swiss bankers helping Americans avoid paying taxes. Id. Even though the crime committed is a crime in the United States, and the Swiss bankers sought are accomplices to the crimes, the Swiss FOJ stands behind dual criminality to deny the requests of the United States FOJ, while Senator McCain and other members of the United States government believe these refusals only perpetuate the crime of tax evasion in the United States. Id.
(34.) See FIFA's Structure, Fifa, http://www.fifa.com/governance/how-fifa-works/ index.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2017) (detailing organizational structure of FIFA). The highest-ranking member of FIFA is the president of FIFA. Id. Every four years representatives of the 211 member associations. Id. The president is the leading member of the FIFA Congress, which acts as the main governing body of FIFA. Id. The FIFA Congress votes and rules on various issues regarding the game of football, such as alterations to the rules or how to expand the global appeal of the sport. Id. The third tier of FIFA executives are the various committees devoted to specific focus areas in the sport of football such as the Development Committee, Medical Committee, Finance Committee, Referees Committee and more. Id. These committees handle most issues concerning their respective specialty, unless the FIFA Congress takes action on an issue. Id.
(35.) See FIFA Statutes, Fifa at ([paragraph] 5, http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/ generic/02/78/29/07/fifastatutsweben_neutral.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2017) (characterizing laws and regulations all members of FIFA must follow). One of FIFA's most important missions is to "promote friendly relations a) between and among member associations, confederations, clubs, officials and players; and b) in society for humanitarian objectives." Id. FIFA governs the rules of the actual game of football, but more importantly, promotes the importance of cooperation and unity in the global football community. Id. FIFA prides itself on its dedication to fighting social injustice and promoting social equality, and expects these values expressed in the opening paragraphs of the FIFA Statutes to be upheld by any and all individuals that represent FIFA at any level, as evidenced by the clear-cut language in the statute. Id. See also Football for Hope, Fifa, http://www.fifa.com/sustainability/football-forhope.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2017) (setting forth goals and community projects Football for Hope runs). Football for Hope is FIFA's way of giving back to the community. Id. FIFA uses this organization, as well as many other partner social organizations to promote a culture of social change, and provide medical aid and education to disparaged parts of the world. Id.
(36.) See id. (outlining FIFA association structure). FIFA defines an Association as governed by its Statutes as a Football Association recognized by, FIFA that has been granted membership into FIFA by the governing councils of the organization. See also History of FIFA--Foundation, Fifa, http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/who-weare/history/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2017) (providing background of FIFA's founding). FIFA started out as a group of eight members: France. Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland before it expanded to other nations outside of Europe. Id. See also FIFA, FIFA Associations, http://www.fifa.com/associations/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2017) (listing all member Associations and Confederations within FIFA). From those eight member nations, FIFA has grown to contain five Football Confederations: CONCACAF, CONMEBOL, UEFA, the Asian Football Confederation, the Confederation of African Football, and the Oceana Football Federation. Id. These five Confederations vary in size, but are all responsible for ensuring their member associations follow the rules of FIFA and, in return, the member Associations receive financing from FIFA. Id.
(37.) See History Of FIFA--More Associations to Follow, Fifa, http://www.fifa .com/ about-fifa/who-we-are/history/more-associations-follow.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2017) (detailing development of FIFA throughout World War I). World War 1 consuming Europe stalled the growth of FIFA. Id. After overcoming the difficulties caused by the war, and the loss of its founding president, FIFA expanded into South America to increase the reach of the organization and its humanitarian mission to promote fairness and equality within sport and society. Id.
(38.) See History Of FIFA--The First World Cup, Fifa, http://www.fifa.com/ about-fifa/who-we-are/history/first-fifa-world-cup.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2017). The first World Cup took place in 1930, in Montevideo. Id. See also Rory Smith, World Cup Could Expand After FIFA Vote in January, N.Y. Times (Oct. 13, 2016), at Bll, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/14/sports/soccer/fifa-world-cup-expansion.html (continuing growth and expansion of FIFA into new countries). FIFA continues its history of promoting inclusion by expanding the World Cup to include new Football Associations that have never been allowed a chance to participate in a World Cup. Id. The expansion promotes unity in the sport, which is one of FIFA's founding goals. Id. See Rory O'Callaghan, FIFA President Gianni Infantino Favors Further World Cup Expansion, Sky Sports (Nov. 23, 2016), http://www.skysports .com/football/news/12040/10669088/fifa-president-gianni-infantino-favours-further world-cup-expansion (affirming FIFA's continued growth and plans to expand World Cup finals). The FIFA World Cup finals currently showcases thirty-two teams from different member Associations. Id. Gianni Infantino ran for president promising to expand the current World Cup format from thirty-two teams to forty teams, and less than one year into his presidency is already looking to increase that number so that forty-eight teams will feature at the World Cup finals. Id. See also What Is FIFA, supra note 1 (listing numerous international tournaments and responsibilities of FIFA). Since the introduction of the World Cup, FIFA has expanded its purview to organize additional international tournaments such as the FIFA Club World Cup, FIFA Women's World Cup and running the Olympic Soccer Tournament as well. Id.
(39.) See Chris Smith, The Biggest Sponsors of Brazil's 2014 World Cup Spend Big To Engage With Fans, Forbes (June 12, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2014/ 06/12/the-biggest-sponsors-of-brazils-2014-world-cup/#5b939d7615e5 (highlighting increase in company payments to FIFA for World Cup advertising rights). Sponsors seeking to associate their products with the 2014 World Cup in Brazil were required to pay anywhere between Fifteen Million and Twenty-Five Million Dollars to FIFA for advertisement rights. Id. FIFA generated almost one-third of their entire yearly revenue through the sale of World Cup advertisement slots in 2013, the year preceding the World Cup. Id. See also Virginia Harrison, How FIFA Makes Its Billions, Cnn Money (May 27, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/05/27/news/fifacorruption-profit/ (breaking down different revenue streams utilized by FIFA to generate billions of dollars). FIFA constantly produces large amounts of revenue, but the income received in sponsorship, media rights, and ticket sales substantially increase during a World Cup finals cycle. Id. But see Baxter, supra note 5 (concluding Warner received undervalued World rights to sell for personal gain). With advertiser willing to pay such exorbitant prices for the rights to advertise and broadcast the World Cup, Sepp Blatter sold Jack Warner the Caribbean Football Union rights to the 2010 and 2014 World Cups for approximately six hundred thousand dollars. Id. Warner then proceeded to turn around and sell the rights for twenty million dollars to advertisers and media companies for a significant profit. Id. See also Rupert Neate & Owen Gibson, Jack Warner: Former FIFA Kingpin Spends Night in Jail After Corruption Arrest (May 28, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/football/2015/may/28/former-fifakingpin-jack-warner-spends-night-in- jail-after-corruption-arrest (confirming United States found multiple instances of illegal personal enrichment among Warner and other FIFA officials). Jack Warner and other FIFA officials constantly used their positions in FIFA to enrich themselves by selling World Cup rights, or taking bribes to vote for a certain country to host the World Cup rather than confirming to the ethical standards expected of FIFA officials. Id.
(40.) See Harrison, supra note 39 and accompanying text (examining fees paid by advertisers for World Cup rights). FIFA makes significantly larger sums of money from advertising and television contracts in a World Cup Year. Id.
(41.) See FIFA Statutes, supra note 35, [paragraph] 2 (reviewing FIFA's attempt to stamp out illicit practices). One of FIFA's objectives is to create an atmosphere of ethical behavior in the sport of football and the global community as a whole, and to use its position as an authority figure to cull the use of performance enhancing drugs, the fixing of matches, and any form of cheating that may impair the integrity of the game from all athletic competitions participated in by any of its member associations. Id. FIFA makes it clear that the organization is committed to removing all forms of scandal, controversy, and dishonesty from the sport, and that all members of FIFA are expected to act on FIFA's behalf within the mission statement of the organization. Id. Specifically, all member associations and FIFA officials are to remain objectively neutral in and avoid conflicts of interest to assure corruption does not infiltrate the global football community. Id. [paragraph] 14.
(42.) See Mike Ozanian, World Cup Brazil Wilt Generate $4 Billion For FIFA, 66% More Than 2010 Tournament, Forbes (June 5, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/ sites/mikeozanian/2014/06/05/the-billion-dollar-business-of-the-world-cup/#46d730a76 652 (evaluating record revenues FIFA earned hosting 2014 World Cup in Brazil). Most of the profit FIFA receives for the World Cup comes from the broadcast rights sold to a multitude of advertisers across the globe. Id. Companies across the globe continue to pay exorbitant prices for the right to host and broadcast World Cup matches in an attempt to reach the massive viewership the FIFA World Cup garners every four years. Id.
(43.) See David Bond, FIFA's Report into ISL Scandal Is Just Window Dressing, BBC News (Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/sport/football/22355455 [hereinafter FIFA's Report Into ISL] (exploring past instances of corrupt practices in FIFA). When ISL went bankrupt they defaulted on sums owed to creditors totaling in the millions of pounds. Id. In the course of investigating ISL's crash, authorities found evidence of FIFA officials receiving illicit payments in exchange for broadcasting rights. Id. Joao Havelange, a former FIFA president, and Ricardo Teixeira, a past chief of the Brazilian football Association, resigned from their positions in FIFA after authorities found that the two men directly received bribes in exchange for television broadcasting rights, but neither individual faced criminal charges for their alleged offenses because the charged crimes were not considered criminal offenses in Switzerland at the time. Id.
(44.) See David Bond, The 66m [pounds sterling] 'Bribe' Shadow Hanging Over FIFA, Telegraph (Mar. 13, 2008), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/columnists/davidbond/ 2294323/ The-66m-bribe-shadow-hanging-over-Fifa.html (showing ISL owed GBP153 million to its creditors when company filed bankruptcy). ISL partnered with the International Olympic Committee similarly to FIFA before the company went bankrupt. Id. The International Olympic Committee ended their relationship with ISL in 1995 when questions about ISL's business dealings began to surface, but FIFA continued to maintain its relationship with ISL. Id.
(45.) See id. (revealing FIFA's involvement in questionable marketing transactions). Nicolas Leoz was a Paraguayan member of FIFA's executive committee who had received a total of eighty-five thousand pounds in bribes from ISL. Id. See also FIFA's Report Into ISL, supra note 43 (highlighting resignation of multiple FIFA officials after ISL scandal). Leoz remained a high-ranking member of FIFA until 2013, when he resigned from his position as the President of CONMEBOL as the depth of the ISL scandal was revealed. Id. Two other South American FIFA officials, Joao Havelange and Ricardo Teixiera of Brazil, also resigned from their positions in FIFA after it became public that ISL had made similar bribery payments to the two officials. Id.
(46.) See FIFA's Report Into ISL, supra note 43 (indicating FIFA officials resigned to avoid further disciplinary action). Neither Havelange nor Teixiera were charged for their crimes because bribery was not illegal in Switzerland when the crimes were committed. Id.
(47.) See id. (suggesting FIFA knew its executives received multiple bribes from ISL in exchange for lucrative contracts). FIFA did not reveal why the payments were made, but they were likely made to protect their embattled officials from persecution by creditors owed money from ISL in connection to FIFA. Id.
(48.) See Andrew Harding, Did South Africa Pay a World Cup Bribe?, BBC News (June 3, 2015), available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32985032 (evaluating likelihood South Africa and FIFA acted in bad faith during World Cup bidding). South Africa refutes the idea they bought the 2010 World Cup illegally by giving FIFA ten million dollars, but rather returned the payment to FIFA so that it may benefit others. Id.
(49.) See id. (suggesting South Africa's refusal of funds was bribery). The South African Football Association was adamant that they did nothing illegal, but correspondences with members of FIFA indicates otherwise. Id.
(50.) See Karl Vick, Qatar Bribery Allegations Loom Over The 2022 World Cup, Time (June 5, 2014), http://time.com/2822288/qatar-world-cup-bribery/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2017) (investigating allegations of Qatarian officials bribing FIFA executives for votes). Multiple sources with intimate knowledge of the allegations against Qatar confirmed that there were in fact large bribes paid to officials to buy their votes for the 2022 World Cup. Id. See also James Masters & Don Riddell, Third FIFA "Whistle-Blower" Says 'Bribes Offered For World Cup Votes', Cnn (Dec. 5, 2014), http:// edition.cnn.com/2014/12/05/sport/les-murray-fifa-qatar/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2017) (revealing additional sources with detailed information regarding unethical World Cup bidding practices). FIFA executives during the 2018 and 2022 World Cup bidding did not only accept bribes from respective member Associations, but they solicited the bribes themselves. Id.
A former member of FIFA's ethics committee, Les Murray, says a member of the world governing body's executive committee asked a member of the Australian bid team for the 2022 World Cup for a kickback in exchange for a vote. "I know of one particular instance where one of the Australia bid team was asked for cash money by one of the executive committee members," Murray told CNN.
Id. Australia did not pay the bribe, and it may have played a role in the Australian Football Association failing in their bid to host the 2022 World Cup. Id.
(51.) See FIFA Corruption Inquiries, supra note 2 (showing extent of criminal activity through multiple levels of FIFA's hierarchy). Multiple members of FIFA's high-ranking councils had abused their positions within FIFA for personal gain over a number of years. Id.
(52.) See id. (setting forth evidence gathered in thorough probe into FIFA dealings). The effects of the scandal were felt at the very top of the FIFA food chain. Id. Sepp Blatter served multiple terms as president of FIFA, but amidst the accusations of widespread, systematic corruption coursing through the sport's governing body, Sepp Blatter enacted plans to resign as the President of FIFA. Id. See also Corinne Gretler, Hugo Miller & Vernon Silver, FIFA Busts at Bauru au Lac: Inside the FiveStar Takedown, Bloomberg (May 27, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-27/fifa-busts-at-baur-au-lac- inside-soccer-s-five-star-takedown (last visited Jan. 10, 2017) [hereinafter FIFA Takedown] (describing events of initial raids on FIFA officials for deep rooted corruption). The arrests carried out by the Swiss authorities in Zurich was a result of an extensive investigation conducted by the FBI into one of the largest corruption scandals to take place in the world of sports, and one in which the worst offenders held the most senior executive positions in FIFA. Id. The FBI conducted extensive investigations into the unethical practices conducted by the highest members of FIFA and discovered that many of FIFA's highest executives and officers had been illegally using their positions for personal gain for decades. Id. See also FIFA Crisis: US Charges 16 More Officials After Earlier Zurich Arrests, BBC News (Dec. 4, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/sport/football/34991874 (last visited Jan. 10, 2017) (tracing additional United States DOJ indictments and arrests made against FIFA officials). The FBI investigation into FIFA for corruption went much deeper and was much more widespread than the indictment and arrest of seven high-ranking FIFA executives on May 27, 2015. Id. The new round of indictments served by the United States DOJ included twenty-seven new FIFA officials being charged with similar crimes of bribery, money laundering and racketeering. Id. Further releases by the United States DOJ concerning the investigation shows that the corrupt FIFA officials had received illegal payments for rights to FIFA tournaments for a decade into the future. Id. See also FIFA Corruption Crisis, supra note 2 (reviewing FIFA officials incriminated by FBI corruption investigation into FIFA). By the end of May 2015, a total of fourteen FIFA executives and officials had been arrested for offenses that displayed a deep and systematic corruption scheme inside of FIFA following a massive investigation into the organization the United States DOJ and the FBI. Id. By the end of December 2016, the count of indicted officials had risen to twenty-four FIFA executives and five broadcasting and marketing officials. Id.
(53.) See FIFA Corruption Crisis, supra note 2 (accusing FIFA officials of using positions for personal gain). Not only did FIFA officials accept illicit payments in the bidding process for the 2018 and 2022 World Cup, but former FIFA president Sepp Blatter made an undisclosed another high-ranking FIFA official Michel Platini in excess of $2 million for an undisclosed advisory role Michel Platini served in for Sepp Blatter. Id. The payment has been denounced by FIFA's ethics committee as the corruption the FBI investigation uncovered directly contradicts the ethical code and rules FIFA expects all of its members to follow. Id. As a result of the FBI investigation, Swiss officials have opened their own criminal investigatory proceedings against ex-president of FIFA Sepp Blatter for widespread corruption inside of FIFA. Id. See also FIFA Ethics, supra note 2 (conforming to ethical practices mandatory and expected of all FIFA officials); see also FIFA Statutes, supra note 35 (requiring FIFA members to act with integrity and denounce corruption).
(54.) See Rebecca Ruiz, Matt Apuzzo & Sam Borden, FIFA Corruption: Top Officials Arrested in Pre-Dawn Raid At Zurich Hotel, N.Y. Times (Dec. 3, 2015), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/03/sports/fifa-scandal-arrests-in-switzerland.html [hereinafter Pre-Dawn Raid] (detailing events of Swiss FOJ serving indictments on FIFA officials). The Swiss FOJ arrested seven of FIFA's most influential and long serving members on multiple accounts of racketeering, money fraud, bribery, fraud and other crimes committed while representing FIFA. Id. The officials abused their positions of power in FIFA to garner personal wealth by accepting illegal payments in exchange for voting certain ways on issues or awarding competition rights to certain entities. Id. The United States DOJ planned the raid in conjunction with the Swiss FOJ to coincide with a FIFA conference to be held at its headquarters in Zurich when all of the officials targeted by the indictments would be in a single centralized location. Id. The FBI at the raids claimed the indictments were the result of the FBI investigation into FIFA where they found a pattern of abuse where FIFA officials fixed World Cup bidding procedures in exchange for substantial bribes. Id. See also FIFA scandal: South Africa Denies $10m World Cup Bribe, BBC News (June 3, 2015), available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32994208 (examining bribery allegations against South Africa and FIFA officials in 2010). South Africa was awarded the 2010 World Cup over Morocco for supposedly submitting a higher bid to FIFA to host the tournament, as the nation submitting the largest bid for the right to host the tournament should be awarded the tournament. Id. However, allegations have surfaced that South Africa bribed FIFA with a ten million dollar payment to award South Africa the tournament over rivals Morocco. Id. South Africa did not cut a check or make any undocumented cash payment to FIFA officials, but instead returned a note for ten million dollars due to the South African Football Association to FIFA stating it was a donation to help African diaspora, but the money was deposited into an account in Jack Warner's name to be distributed at his discretion. Id.
(55.) See Pre-Dawn Raid, supra note 54 (discussing United States right to prosecute arrested officials). FBI investigators found evidence of wire fraud in FIFA offices based in Miami, without which the United States would likely not be able to claim extraterritorial jurisdiction over the FIFA officials for this crime as wiretapping requires the wire to be sent from the jurisdiction that the crime is being charged in, and most of the wires were not sent from the United States, in the investigation of the Miami office, evidence was found of "Traffic Sports USA Inc.," a Florida corporation being involved in the wire fraud scheme. Id.-, see Bump, supra note 7 (using Miami FIFA Confederation office to gain jurisdiction over wire fraud charges).
(56.) See ESPNFC Staff, FIFA Timeline: Blatter And Platini Banned, More Officials Arrested (Dec. 21, 2015), available at http://www.espnfc.us/blog/fifa/243/post/ 2630853/fifa-timeline-blatter-and-platini-banned-more-arrested (outlining timeline from first arrests in May to final indictments in December). Dozens more FIFA officials were handed indictments for taking part in widespread corruption that seemed to encompass the entire governing body of FIFA dating back decades. Id.
(57.) See Associated Press & PA Sports, United States Requests Extradition Of Seven FIFA Officials After Zurich Arrests, ESPN Fc (July 2, 2015), available at http:// www.espnfc.us/fifa-world-cup/story/2510649/us-requests-extradition-of-seven-fifa-officials (requesting extradition of officials arrested in Zurich). The United States immediately requested the extradition of the seven FIFA officials targeted in the raid executed by Swiss authorities on the United States behalf to ensure the applications were submitted before the deadline required in an extradition request. Id. The seven arrested FIFA officials held had fourteen days to decide whether or not to fight extradition to the United States. Id.
(58.) See FIFA Official Agrees to Extradition, supra note 7 (succeeding in avoiding extradition to United States). Rocha agreed to be extradited to his home of Nicaragua to avoid extradition to the United States for his crimes. Id. Rocha preferred to face prosecution for his crimes in his home country of Nicaragua rather than in the United States. Id. But see Associated Press, Swiss Extradite Last Of FIFA Suspects Julio Rocha to United States in Bribery Case, Espn Fc (May 18, 2016), available at http://www.espnfc.us/blog/fifa/243/post/2875512/swiss-extradite-last-of-fifa-suspectsjulio-rocha-to-us-in-bribery-case [hereinafter Julio Rocha to United States] (denying Nicaragua priority in request to extradite Rocha). The Swiss FOJ denied Rocha's request to be extradited to his own country rather than the United States, and to grant the United States priority extradition for the former FIFA official. Id. Rocha was the last of the original indicted officials to learn if the United States' extradition request in his case would be granted, and it ultimately was. Id.
(59.) See Global Standards, supra note 20 (expanding United States' jurisdiction over criminal offenders acting outside United States). The accused executives' use of the dollar and FIFA's presence in the United States creates a string linking the crimes to the United States. Id. By employing expansive and over inclusive extraterritorial jurisdiction laws in the United Slates, especially in crimes involving money laundering, the United States DOJ gives itself a platform from which to prosecute crimes happening outside of the country. Id.
(60.) See FIFA Scandal: Former Vice-President Extradited To Uruguay, BBC News (Dec. 24, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-35176527 (granting Uruguay's extradition request instead of United States'). Figueredo was the only FIFA official seized at the Zurich raids in May to escape extradition to the United States in the massive FIFA corruption cases that continue to unfold. Id. The Swiss FOJ stated that Uruguay would be just as able to follow through with a prosecution of Figueredo as the United States, and that Uruguay had opened investigations into Figueredo's dealings while associated with FIFA before the United States sent the Swiss FOJ their indictments regarding their investigation into FIFA. Id. But see FIFA Official Agrees Extradition, supra note 7 (denying Rocha's home nation priority extradition). While the Swiss FOJ granted Uruguay's extradition request for its citizen to prosecute him for crimes committed against his country, the Swiss FOJ denied Nicaragua the same opportunity in Rocha's case in favor of a prosecution headed by the United States DOJ. Id.
(61.) See Swiss Approve Extradition Of Ex-FIFA Official Rocha To United States, Reuters (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-soccer-fifa-extradition-idUSKCN0S91HU20151015 (providing overview of United States' extradition requests for original seven indicted officials).
Of the seven arrested in Zurich, only former FIFA Vice President Jeffrey Webb agreed in July to be extradited to New York, where he has pleaded not guilty. The other six remain in Switzerland, though the FOJ has also approved U.S. extradition requests for Uruguay's Eugenio Figueredo, Venezuelan Rafael Esquivel, Eduardo Li of Costa Rica and Costas Takkas, a British citizen.
Id. The Swiss FOJ granted the United States priority extradition in all cases except for Figueredo, who was allowed to return to Uruguay to face prosecution at home. Id.
(62.) See John Miller, Ex-FIFA Official Figueredo Accepts Extradition to Uruguay --Swiss, Reuters (Nov. 11, 2015), http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-soccer-fifafigueredo-idUKKCN0T01L620151111 (announcing Figueredo's preference to face extradition to Uruguay over United States). Uruguay did not submit their extradition request to the Swiss FOJ until October 13, 2015. Id. Uruguay's extradition request was not filed until five months after Figueredo was arrested, and a month after the United States extradition request had been granted. Id. Figueredo had appealed the decision to extradite him to the United States, and his appeal was still pending when he agreed to be extradited to Uruguay, but the Swiss FOJ at this time still held that the United States held the priority extradition claim. Id.
(63.) See id. (describing reasoning for extradition decisions). Figueredo was allowed to be prosecuted in his home country of Uruguay, even though most of the evidence complied against him was in the United States, but Rocha was extradited to the United States over his home of Nicaragua because most of the evidence against him was in the United States. Id.
(64.) See Miller, supra note 62 (detailing prior Swiss FOJ stance on Figueredo extradition). When Uruguay first submitted their extradition request to the Swiss FOJ in Figueredo's case, they claimed that the United States had the right to challenge any Uruguayan extradition claim. Id. See also Melana Castaldi, Switzerland OKs Extradition of Soccer's Figueredo to Uruguay, Reuters (Dec. 18, 2015), http://www.reuters .com/article/us-soccer-fifa-conmebol-idUSKBNOUl 1HL20151218 (revealing Switzerland's changing stance regarding Figueredo's extradition destination). By December 2015, the Swiss FOJ decided that Uruguay's extradition request would be given priority over the United States earlier filed claimed. Id. Figueredo was the only FIFA executive seized in the Zurich raids on May 27, 2015, to avoid extradition to the United States. Id. See also Mica Rosenberg, U.S. Prosecutors Trumped by Uruguay in FIFA Corruption Case, Reuters (Dec. 30, 2015) http://uk.reuters.com/article/uksoccer-fifa-uruguay- idUKKBN0UDlTN20151230 (describing Uruguay's ability to obtain priority). The Swiss FOJ decided to allow Uruguay to prosecute Figueredo instead of the United States as he faced bribery accusations in Uruguay as well. Id.
(65.) See Julio Rocha to United States, supra note 58 (providing overview of Rocha's extradition to United States). Rocha lost his extradition battle. Id. Rocha took his case to its final appeal, but the Swiss FOJ would not be moved, and decided to uphold the United States request to try Rocha for racketeering crimes in American courts. Id. See also Jeff Zalesin, Swiss Pick US Over Nicaragua For Latest FIFA Extradition, Law 360 (Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/714626/swisspick-us-over-nicaragua-for-latest- fifa-extradition (explaining United States ability to prosecute Rocha rather than Nicaragua). The Swiss FOJ recognized that the United States was better equipped to prosecute Rocha than Nicaragua because the United States had conducted large-scale criminal investigations and proceedings against other individuals for similar crimes. Id. Even though Rocha was arrested on May 27, 2015, Nicaragua failed to open an investigation into Rocha until June 10, 2015. Id. See also John Miller, Swiss Approve Extradition of Ex-FIFA Official Rocha To United States, Reuters (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-soccer-fifa-extradition-idUSKCN0S91HU20151015 (describing why Swiss FOJ saw United States as appropriate extradition destination for Rocha). The Swiss FOJ believed that the United States had an overarching case against many individuals that were tied together, and that Nicaragua only had charges against one individual and Nicaragua's case would not allow a full viewing of the evidence against Rocha. Id.
(66.) See Global Standards, supra note 20 (applying extraterritorial jurisdiction against foreign individuals acting through United States). The United States may apply extraterritorial jurisdiction against the accused FIFA officials because FIFA does business in the territory of the United States. Id. See also Indicted FIFA Officials, supra note 2 (revealing extent of FBI investigation into FIFA fiscal crimes). The FBI conducted an extensive probe into FIFA for three years to uncover massive crimes of corruption conducted by various FIFA executives that formed the basis of the FIFA indictments. Id.
(67.) See Global Standards, supra note 20 (describing various avenues U.S. DOJ may use by law to gain extraterritorial jurisdiction). Through the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), the United States may prosecute anyone in the United States, or any entity that does business in the United States, for making illegal payments to foreign officials. Id.
(68.) See Douglas-Gabriel, supra note 22 (detailing Swiss reluctance to grant United States extradition requests in purely fiscal matters). The Swiss FOJ regularly denies United States extradition requests for individuals that have committed monetary crimes against the United States if that crime is not a crime in Switzerland, regardless of the law in the United States. Id.
(69.) See FIFA Corruption Inquiries, supra note 2 (observing Swiss authorities' agreement to arrest FIFA executives on behalf of United States). The Swiss FOJ raided the May 2015, FIFA conference because the United States submitted the indictments against numerous FIFA executives present at the conference. Id. The Swiss authorities recognized the United States authority to prosecute the individuals by carrying out the requested seizures based on the evidence gathered by the United States DOJ to prosecute the executives. Id. See also Bump, supra note 7 (explaining United States application of extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign FIFA executives). The use of American institutions by the criminal actors, the United States has the ability to prosecute the officials in the United States. Id. The Swiss FOJ grants the United States extradition request for all seven officials arrested in the Zurich raid because it recognized the validity of the United States use of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Id.
(70.) See The United States Must Be Challenged, supra note 18 (contesting United States use of extraterritorial jurisdiction to regulate European commerce). France does not agree that the United States should be able to prosecute foreign institutions. Id. The use of extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign banks is seen as a gross abuse of power by the United States and the behavior should not be tolerated by the rest of the world. Id.
(71.) See Julio Rocha to United States, supra note 58 (summarizing results of United States' extradition requests of seven officials seized in Zurich FIFA raid). Even Figueredo's extradition to the United States was approved, but the Swiss FOJ decided to award Uruguay extradition priority over the United States. Id. The Swiss FOJ granted all of the United States extradition requests for the individuals because they believed the reasoning of the United States DOJ to be a correct use of extraterritorial jurisdiction. Id.
(72.) See Julio Rocha to United States, supra note 58 (demonstrating United States' superior ability to prosecute Figueredo and Rocha). The Swiss FOJ recognized the United States DOJ as the most qualified body to conduct the trial of Rocha. Id. Both cases involved the same evidence and charges, but the Swiss FOJ wrongly chose to deny the United States priority extradition in Figueredo's case as they did in Rocha's. Id.
(73.) See Zalesin, supra note 65 (noting Swiss FOJ decision to extradite Rocha to United States). See also Castaldi, supra note 64 (outlining United States' ability to block extradition to Uruguay as United States has priority claim). Even though Figueredo agreed to extradition to Uruguay and the Swiss FOJ granted it, that does not supersede the United States' claim as they at this time still have the priority extradition claim. Id.
(74.) See Indicted FIFA Officials, supra note 2 (examining extent of United States' investigation into FIFA).
(75.) See Miller, supra note 62 (reviewing process of Uruguay's case against Figueredo). Uruguay did not submit an extradition request for months after the arrest, and were presenting the facts of their own bribery case against Figueredo to justify their extradition request over the one made by the United States. Id. These steps were taken to try and beat the United States priority claim already approved by the Swiss FOJ. Id.
(76.) See Miller, supra note 62 (showing Swiss FOJ approval of Uruguay's extradition request). See also Zalesin, supra note 65 (revealing Swiss FOJ decision to grant Nicaragua's extradition request for Rocha behind United States).
(77.) See Miller, supra note 62 (revealing Figueredo's choice of extradition destination). Figueredo sought extradition to his home of Uruguay to avoid prosecution in the United States, but the Swiss FOJ originally maintained that any extradition to Uruguay would have to be approved by the United States as they had priority. Id. See also Julio Rocha to United States, supra note 58 (showing Rocha's reluctance to face corruption charges in United States). Rocha wanted to avoid facing extradition to the United States where many of the arrested FIFA officials had already been extradited to face the many charges levied against the officials. Id.
(78.) See FIFA Corruption Crisis, supra note 2 (outlining corrupt practices unearthed by FBI in extended investigation into FIFA). The United States dedicated substantial resources to the investigation of FIFA, and built cases to prosecute each individual seized in Zurich on May 27, 2015. Id. The United States DOJ uncovered massive sums of money FIFA executives had received in return for compromising the values of FIFA, and were prepared to extradite each official to the United States for trial. Id.
(79.) See Rosenberg, supra note 64 (explaining charges brought by both United States and Uruguay against ex-FIFA official). The United States had a case against Figueredo where he was charged with taking illegal payments worth millions of dollars during his FIFA career, and part of an extensive, wide-ranging corruption case against FIFA executives. Id. However, in Uruguay he is charged with fraud, but would likely only face a few years in prison in Uruguay instead of decades as he would if found guilty in the United States of his crimes. Id.
(80.) See id., supra note 64 (analyzing decision to extradite all other officials to United States). The evidence readily available in Uruguay was not of the same caliber of what was already present in the United States. Id. In thirteen other cases involving disgraced FIFA officials, Switzerland extradited the defendant to the United States, but now in the case of Figueredo decided that the United States was not best placed to conduct the prosecution. Id.
(81.) See id., supra note 64 (revealing late decision by Uruguay to charge Figueredo). The United States arrested Figueredo in March, after an exhausting investigation into FIFA executives who illegally received more than 200 million dollars, and had already had their extradition request granted by the Swiss FOJ. Id. Uruguay charged Figueredo on December 24, 2015, months after the United States revealed the evidence they had against Figueredo and the other executives. Id.
(82.) See Zalesin, supra note 65 (explaining Swiss FOJ decision to deny Nicaragua priority extradition in Rocha case). The Swiss FOJ decided the United States had the best case against Rocha, and that all of the evidence against him had been gathered in the United States, so the United States DOJ should be the ones to prosecute Rocha. Id.
(83.) See Miller, supra note 62 (depicting Swiss FOJ original granting of priority extradition for Figueredo). Originally, even after granting Uruguay's request to extradite Figueredo to Uruguay, they maintained the stance that the United States would have the power to block the extradition because they had priority. Id. See also Rosenberg, supra note 64 (revealing Swiss FOJ deciding to give Uruguay priority over United States). The Swiss FOJ decided after reviewing Figueredo's case and both extradition requests, to give Uruguay the right to extradite Figueredo over the United States, even though the United States had a stronger case. Id. Figueredo's age and declining health helped to sway the Swiss FOJ in their decision-making process. Id. The fact that Figueredo is over the age of eighty, and has some medical problems should not have a bearing on the decision to grant Uruguay priority extradition for Figueredo. Id. The United States had built a stronger case with a much more comprehensive investigation into Figueredo's dealing. Id.
(84.) See Zalesin, supra note 65 (providing Switzerland's motives to deny Nicaragua priority extradition in Rocha's case).
(85.) See Rosenberg, supra note 64 (outlining differences between United States and Uruguayan charges against Figueredo). Uruguay had a corruption and bribery case against Figueredo for receiving bribes of hundreds of thousands of dollars, which is not an unsubstantial sum of money, but the United States had a multi-million-dollar case against multiple officials who abused their positions in FIFA for person gain. Id. See also Neate, supra note 5 (detailing extent of criminal activity unearthed by United States DOJ).
(86.) See Zalesin, supra note 65 (showing practical reasoning for Swiss FOJ to uphold United States priority extradition request). The United States procured more than enough evidence against Rocha during its investigation and prosecution of other FIFA officials to prosecute Rocha. Id.
(87.) See Rosenberg, supra note 64 (revealing possible effects Figueredo decision could have on extradition of Rocha). The Swiss FOJ granting Uruguay priority to prosecute Figueredo opens the door for other FIFA executives to fight to be extradited to their home countries rather than the United States. Id. See also Zalesin, supra note 65 (revealing strength of charges levied by United States DOJ). The Swiss FOJ believe that the United States have all of the necessary tools to prosecute these FIFA officials. Id. If that is the case, all of the officials, Figueredo included, should have been extradited to the United States to face trial for the crimes they committed when they held executive positions inside of FIFA. Id.
(88.) See Indicted FIFA Officials, supra note 2 (evidencing United States DOJ readiness to prosecute indicted officials). The United States DOJ conducted its probe into FIFA, something no other nation did. Id. The United States alone discovered proof of the corruption of FIFA's executives, and the United States was the only nation prepared to fully prosecute the officials for their crimes because of their investigation onto FIFA. Id. See also FIFA Corruption Inquiries, supra note 2 (outlining extent to which United States investigation into FIFA affected FIFA).
(89.) See Rosenberg, supra note 64 (showing inconsistency in decisions made by Swiss FOJ). The Swiss FOJ first granted the United States priority extradition for all seven charged FIFA executives, but later decided to award Uruguay priority extradition over Figueredo. Id. Nicaragua submitted their own extradition request for Rocha under similar circumstances, but the Swiss decided to allow the United States to prosecute Rocha instead. Id. The inconsistent decisions made by the Swiss FOJ will allow individuals in the future to argue that the United States should not be granted priority jurisdiction in their case if the accused individuals' home nation also submits an extradition request. Id.
(90.) See FIFA Crisis: US Charges 16 More Officials After Earlier Zurich Arrests, supra note 52 (affirming United States right to prosecute FIFA officials by allowing more indictments). The Swiss FOJ has executed additional indictments on FIFA executives on the United States behalf, clearly identifying that the United States is correctly exercising its judiciary power to prosecute members of FIFA that commit their crimes without actually stepping foot in the United States. Id. If Switzerland believes that these arrests are valid, then the Swiss FOJ should not grant another nation priority extradition over the United States, if the United States has built a strong case against the criminal defendant. Id. See also Rosenberg, supra note 64 (leaving open possibility Switzerland will restrict United States extraterritorial jurisdiction). If other nations follow Switzerland's decision to grant Uruguay priority extradition over the United States, then Switzerland may use this as an attempt to curtail the United States attempts to prosecute foreign individuals. Id. Future defendants may employ the same method of reasoning from the Figueredo case to avoid facing extradition to the United States. Id. See also Zalesin, supra note 65 (demonstrating extent of United States' evidence against Rocha in FIFA corruption case).
(91.) See FIFA Statutes, supra note 35 (outlining regulatory standards FIFA executives must operate within). Individuals operating on FIFA's behalf must act in accordance with the standards set forth in FIFA's authorized statutes. Id. See also FIFA Corruption Inquiries, supra note 2 (examining corruption charges levelled against FIFA after FBI investigation). The FBI uncovered acts of corruption committed by FIFA executives abusing their positions that had gone unpunished by FIFA. Id.
(92.) See FIFA Takedown, supra note 52 (reviewing raids conducted by Swiss FOJ at FIFA conferences). The Swiss FOJ carried out the arrests of the seven FIFA executives at the request of the United States DOJ after the United States revealed the fruits of their investigation into FIFA. Id.
(93.) See Miller, supra note 62 (noting Swiss FOJ decision to allow United States to block Uruguayan extradition). Even though the Swiss FOJ granted Uruguay's request to extradite Figueredo from Switzerland, the Swiss FOJ held that the United States still held priority extradition and could overrule any extradition of Figueredo to Uruguay. Id. See also Julio Rocha to United States, supra note 58 (granting United States DOJ extradition request over Rocha's appeal). The United States successfully obtained approval from Switzerland to extradite Rocha to the United States. Id.
(94.) See FIFA Scandal: Former Vice-President Extradited To Uruguay, supra note 60 (observing Figueredo avoided extradition to United States in favor of Uruguayan extradition). While Figueredo was fighting extradition to the United States, his native country of Uruguay submitted its own extradition request to the Swiss FOJ, and Figueredo subsequently was extradited to Uruguay by the Swiss FOJ. Id. See also Zalesin, supra note 65 (analyzing decision to deny Nicaragua priority extradition in favor of United States). Nicaragua like Uruguay attempted to extradite its own citizen from Switzerland, but unlike Figueredo's case, Rocha was extradited to the United States in the aftermath of his arrest in Switzerland. Id.
(95.) See Rosenberg, supra note 64 (foreseeing possible repercussions of Swiss FOJ extraditing Figucredo to Uruguay over United States). By granting Uruguay priority extradition over the United States, it creates similar routes for other criminals charged by the United States DOJ to avoid extradition to the United States. Id. A criminal defendant may have a desire to face prosecution for a crime in their home country over the United States in hopes of receiving an easier trial. Id.
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|Publication:||Suffolk Transnational Law Review|
|Date:||Jan 1, 2018|
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