A "Pretty Damn Able Commander" Lewis Hyde Brereton: Part II.
Air reinforcements also arrived. In October 1940, Maj. Gen. Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, Commander of the U.S. Army Air Corps, diverted to the Philippines forty-eight Republic P-35 pursuits originally consigned to Sweden. In March 1941, the Hawaiian Department sent eighteen Douglas B-18 Bob medium bombers to the Philippines, and a ship from the U.S. the following month brought thirty-one Curtiss P-40B Tomahawks, the latest U.S. pursuit aircraft. On May 6, the 3d, 17th, and 20th Pursuit Squadrons, 28th Bombardment Squadron (Medium), and 2d Observation Squadron were organized into the Philippine Department Air Force under Brig. Gen. Henry B. "Sue" Clagett. With the creation of USAFFE, the Philippine Department Air Force became the Air Force, U.S. Army Forces in the Far East. The War Department furnished additional P-4OBs and newer P-40E Warhawks in the fall of 1941 and planned for the 27th Bombardment Group (Light), equipped with Douglas A-24 Dauntless dive bombers, to reach the Philippines by the end of 1941. 
The most dramatic response to the threat in the Far East was the decision to deploy the U.S.'s premier offensive weapon, the four-engine Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress. The early Fortresses lacked the armament, armor, and high-altitude capability critical for survival in combat; but based upon misleading reports of success with the Royal Air Force, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson accepted that a small number of B-17s might deter further Japanese moves in the Southwest Pacific. The War Department determined to send USAFFE four heavy bombardment groups by April 1942, the earliest that most leaders believed the Japanese would attack.  Stimson approved this plan in August, and, in the words of historian Daniel F. Harrington, "the effort to establish four groups at full strength in the Philippines became the most important air force project in the months before Pearl Harbor." 
On September 5, nine B-17s from the Hawaiian Air Force, formed into the provisional 14th Bombardment Squadron under Maj. Emmett "Rosie" O'Donnell, Jr., took off from Hickam Field, Hawaii, for Clark Field, near Manila, by way of Midway Island, Wake Island, Port Moresby, and Darwin, arriving on the afternoon of September 12. An additional twenty-six B-17s of the 19th Bombardment Group under Lt. Col. Eugene Eubank had flown from New Mexico to Hawaii by October 22. Bad weather and persistent engine problems hampered Eubank's progress, but all of his aircraft had reached Clark by November 6 save one grounded at Darwin for an engine change.  As the big bombers flew west, the War Department issued MacArthur explicit instructions about their purpose. On October 14, Arnold emphasized that heavy bombers were offensive, not defensive weapons, and were to be used to control, not only the sea routes between Japan, Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies, but to reach the Japanese home islands, themselves.  And, most i mportant, Marshall emphasized to MacArthur on November 21 that the latest revisions to Rainbow 5 authorized him to conduct "air raids against Japanese forces and installations within tactical operating radius of available bases." 
With the buildup of aircraft in full swing by September, Arnold also moved to replace Clagett, a heavy-drinking old timer who suffered from high blood pressure, hardening arteries, and tertiary malaria. On September 30, Marshall asked MacArthur to select a new air commander from among Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, Maj. Gen. Jacob E. Fickel, and Brig. Gen. Walter H. Frank.  MacArthur remembered the tough, aggressive little commander of the 12th Aero Squadron from World War I: "Regard all three officers as highly qualified," he responded, "but would prefer Major General Lewis Brereton."  On October 3, Brig. Gen. Carl A. Spaatz, Chief of Staff of the Air Corps, called Brereton, then commander of Third Air Force in Florida, and told him that Arnold wanted to see him immediately. The summons surprised Brereton, whose command had just performed poorly during the U.S. Army maneuvers in Louisiana. He fully expected to be exiled to some Siberia, Brereton wrote later, not offered what had the potential to be the most critical operational command in the U.S. Army Air Forces. 
Lewis Brereton was an interesting choice. An experienced senior officer with the appropriate age, rank, and length of service--important considerations for promotion and assignment in the U.S. Army prior to World War II--Brereton was a 1911 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, early military aviator, and highly decorated combat veteran of World War I. He had risen to command quickly as one of William "Billy" Mitchell's boys, and following the war had aided Mitchell's effort to pry responsibility for coastal defense from the U.S. Navy. Despite his early association with Mitchell, however, most of Brereton's assignments had involved army cooperation and ground support and placed him outside the volatile controversies over an independent air force and strategic bombardment that had afflicted military aviation between the wars. Just prior to World War II, he had played a role in developing close air support doctrine. More recently, Third Air Force had operated two air maintenance commands during the Louisiana mane uvers, and Brereton was already planning maintenance and supply arrangements for the upcoming Carolina maneuvers. These activities gave him the kind of logistical experience needed in the Southwest Pacific where much of his work would be to establish bases and prepare support facilities. On the other hand, Brereton's lack of recent experience with heavy bombers and modern interceptors might have been considered negatives, and, in practice, would lead him rely on experienced subordinates like Gene Eubank and the energetic pursuit specialist, Col. Harold H. "Hal" George 
Brereton reported to Arnold and Spaatz at Army Air Forces Headquarters on October 5, and during the next few days, he met with Marshall and Brig. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow of the War Plans Division. Brereton quickly recognized serious problems. He warned Marshall and Arnold that the War Department was putting its most powerful offensive weapon in danger. In Brereton's words: "The lessons of the war in Europe were being completely ignored in placing a heavy bomber force in the Philippines without providing adequate protection."  The B-17s might be fortresses in the air; on the ground they were little more than lucrative targets. Basing them on vulnerable fields without a capable early warning system, efficient communications, facilities for dispersal, and adequate air and ground defenses was courting trouble. Marshall and Arnold recognized the War Department decision as a calculated risk, but it was a gamble they believed well worth taking. By April 1942, the air reinforcements would be in place along with the strong ground forces promised to MacArthur. In response to Brereton's concerns, however, Arnold agreed to send an air warning service battalion, an airfield engineer unit, and additional support units beyond the units already planned. 
Brereton, his chief of staff, Col. Francis M. Brady, deputy for operations, Maj. Charles Caldwell, and aides, Lt. Edgar W. Hampton and Capt. Norman J. Lewellyn, reached Manila on November 4, after a long, wearying flight across the Pacific. On November 5, he presented MacArthur with the latest amendments to Rainbow 5 and, in turn, learned that the training and mobilization schedule for USAFFE was based upon the conviction that nothing would take place before April 1, 1942. Brereton then inspected his new headquarters at Nielson Field, where he found a small, inexperienced staff operating on a relaxed, peacetime schedule.  Capt. Allison Ind found him personable but all business: "'I'm Brereton,' he said crisply but without drama as he came into my office and shoved out his hard, tough hand to me. He caught me for one real moment in the direct glance of his brown eyes, and I experienced for the first time the magnetism of his broad grin. 'I hear you've been doing some good work here. I hope that you'll fee l free to pitch right into it just as before and give it all you've got.'" 
Brereton descended like a tornado. "We found that few people work here," Captain Lewellyn wrote home, "and you can imagine how that affected Gen. B. and he is starting out to change it very abruptly and we are supposed to set the example and we are sure doing it. Everyone is betting even money that in 30 days we will slow down but unless the Gen[eral] has me fooled I don't think he will."  Brereton reorganized the staff, abolished peacetime procedures and schedules, ordered additional measures for air defense and force dispersal, and began the difficult process of effusing his units with a sense of urgency. He held conferences with the commanders and "every attempt was made to put operations on a 'war time basis.'"  Brereton increased work hours to the maximum and initiated a new training schedule on November 6, which required 40 percent of training to be night operations. He ordered each headquarters to establish a message center operating around the clock. Tactical units were to emphasize operation al readiness, aircraft were ordered dispersed, and aircrew were placed on call around the clock. FEAF stepped up maintenance, and aircraft were not allowed to be taken out of commission for routine checks or for twenty- and forty-hour inspections.  By November 15, all available pursuit aircraft were armed and on constant readiness. On the following day, Brereton activated Far East Air Force (FEAF) with three subordinate commands, Vth Bomber Command under Colonel Eubank, Vth Interceptor Command under General Clagett, and Far East Air Service Command under Col. Lawrence S. Churchill. Colonel George served initially as chief of logistics, but by December 8 was chief of staff for Vth Interceptor Command, although he continued to devote considerable time to FEAF's support problems.  "The General "cleaned house" pretty thoroughly after arriving" Lewellyn wrote, "and we are just beginning to see the light of day as far as our work is concerned." 
In one crucial operational area, Brereton was unable to gain a satisfactory decision. Marshall specifically authorized USAFFE to undertake aggressive aerial reconnaissance. The thirty PBY Catalina flying boats of the U.S. Navy's Patrol Wing Ten had conducted flights as far as Formosa, but their lack of speed made them vulnerable to Japanese fighters. At the beginning of December, Admiral Thomas C. Hart, commander of the Asiatic Fleet, proposed that Patrol Wing Ten cover the areas to the west of Luzon and that FEAF's B-17s fly reconnaissance to the north. MacArthur agreed. Brereton recommended high-altitude, photo-reconnaissance missions over Formosa. MacArthur refused, because War Department instructions cautioned him to avoid acts that might antagonize the Japanese. The bombers thus had to remain well outside the legal limits of Formosa. The 19th Bombardment Group began reconnaissance missions on November 29, normally with two aircraft each day. 
As Brereton asserted his leadership and changes in FEAF began to take hold, orders sent the air commander out of the Philippines for twelve precious days in mid-November. As commander of FEAF Brereton was responsible for all U.S. Army Air Forces activities in the Southwest Pacific, not just the immediate forces on Luzon. By late 1941, the War Department had begun exploring a less vulnerable air route to the Philippines south of the one via Midway and Guam. On October 3, a Presidential letter authorized the Secretary of State to open talks about bases with the British, Australians, New Zealanders, Dutch, and Free French. The State Department responded quickly, and the U.S. Army's Hawaiian Department despatched surveying parties to sites across the Pacific. On October 16, Secretary Stimson asked Secretary Cordell Hull to request permission from the Australian government for the use of airfields in Australia, New Britain, and New Guinea. When Arnold wrote MacArthur on October 14 spelling out the plan to reinfor ce the Philippines with bombers, he stressed the vulnerability of the existing ferry route and the need for the southern route. Consequently, by the time the War Department passed responsibility for developing the route west of the Solomon Islands and New Caledonia to USAFFE on October 27, MacArthur had already begun site surveys. By November, Australian authorities had granted permission for ferrying routes, training bases, and maintenance facilities in Australia. MacArthur directed Brereton to finalize agreements and obligate funds. 
On November 16, Brereton and a small party left for Darwin in a B-17 with Eubank at the controls. They toured Darwin, Townsville, and Brisbane in Australia, Port Moresby in Papua, and Rabaul on New Britain. The trip had its curious aspects. Everyone wore civilian clothes to preserve secrecy, but a group of civilians touring in a B-17 would more likely attract than repel attention. The B-17 was mandatory, however, because of its range and because the final test of a potential airfield was actually putting a bomber on it. At Rabaul, for example, the Fortress broke through the crusted surface of the field suggesting limitations of that site as a transit station. During a series of meetings in Melbourne with the Chief of the Australian Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Burnett, Brereton hammered out a program with three objectives. The first was for bases for the air ferry route across Australia, including facilities for the assembly of fighter aircraft at Townsville and Brisbane. The second was for addit ional airfields to accommodate three pursuit groups, three bomber-reconnaissance squadrons, and a heavy bomb group. The third objective was the construction of training centers for both bombers and pursuits. Subsequently, Australia became the main U.S. base in the Southwest Pacific, and Brereton's trip was an important contribution to its establishment. While this mission was important, however, it cost Brereton two of the five weeks between his arrival and the Japanese attack. And MacArthur subsequently ordered the airman to visit the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, Burma, and China. Brereton asked for a delay while he inspected his tactical units, which had continued training during his absence. MacArthur concurred, and Brereton scheduled his departure for the morning of December 8. 
When his B-17 returned to Clark Field on November 26, Brereton found the B-17s at Clark parked in neat, straight lines. The irate commander bluntly criticized the commanders at Clark for making it easy for a hostile air force to eliminate the entire heavy bombing strength of the Philippines in a single mission. He ordered them to disperse the force and never allow them to be lined up in the open again. Brereton's anger notwithstanding, there was little that Vth Bomber Command could do about dispersing bombers. Clark simply lacked that capacity. The Philippines, in fact, lacked the physical infrastructure to support the expanding air force or disperse it properly. Hal George had made a study of air requirements prior to Brereton's arrival and concluded that the projected force required fifty-six completely equipped air bases. At the time, FEAF had fewer than ten fields, most of which consisted of little more than bare ground. USAFFE had begun surveying additional sites, but little construction had been accomp lished.  As Lewellyn complained" "There has been no money spent by the army for the past four years and now we are expected to make up for all that in just a few months." 
Prior to Brereton's departure for Australia, MacArthur asked FEAF to prepare another plan delineating the "installation and operation of the Air Force as projected." Brereton left this assignment in the hands of his capable chief of staff, Colonel Brady, assisted by George and Capt. Harold Eads, FEAF's engineer.  On November 21, Brady submitted the plan to MacArthur's chief of staff, Brig. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland, "a first-class son of a bitch"  generally disliked as a brusque, hard-working, intelligent hatchet man who "built a wall around MacArthur by intimidating his staff and isolating him from outsiders."  FEAF's plan differed from previous ones by calling for the establishment of air bases for two heavy bombardment groups, a pursuit group, and a reconnaissance squadron on Mindanao, a major island south of Luzon well out of range of Japanese aircraft based on Formosa. Sutherland opposed moving the bombers to Mindanao, because USAFFE's defensive plans excluded that island. Brady was insisten t, however, and Sutherland reluctantly agreed to allow FEAF to prepare facilities at Del Monte and to base bombers there temporarily until new fields could be completed on Luzon, Cebu, and other islands north of Mindanao. 
Initially, Brereton appears to have considered sending all heavy bombers to Del Monte. Eubank, however, pointed out that the site could hold only six squadrons. With the 7th Bombardment Group expected from the United States--some of its aircraft would be attacked while approaching Hawaii on December 7--it made sense to base two squadrons of the 19th at Del Monte and send the 7th's four squadrons there as they arrived. Brereton deferred to Eubank's judgement. In later years, MacArthur's supporters, especially, Sutherland, claimed that Brereton disobeyed direct orders to send all B-17s to Del Monte. The written record fails to support Sutherland's assertions, however, and while it is possible that USAFFE gave verbal orders, the events that can be documented suggest that no such orders were issued. Further, the decision to split the bomber force with half at Clark protected by pursuit aircraft and half camouflaged and hidden at Del Monte was correct in retrospect. Clark could neither disperse four squadrons of b ombers adequately, nor scramble them quickly enough in an emergency. 
On November 28, USAFFE ordered the newly-arrived 5th Air Base Group to Del Monte to prepare the field, while FEAF alerted Vth Bomber Command for the move. It took the 5th Air Base Group almost a week to obtain boats, load equipment, make the 500-mile voyage to Mindanao, and convey everything inland. Shortages of construction equipment, supplies, and transportation added further delay. Despite these problems, the primitive field was ready by December 6, and "Rosie" O'Donnell led the 14th and 93rd Bombardment Squadrons south.  FEAF's insistence on preparing and stocking a field at Del Monte would prove providential in the coming weeks. "This was something that you had to give Brereton and his staff some credit for," pilot John Carpenter recalled. "They arranged to get some stuff laid in at Del Monte-additional gas and bombs.... He had some competent officers working for him; some good logistician types. 
Far East Air Force, on the eve of the Japanese attack, had more potential than strength. Air defense depended upon the five squadrons of the 24th Pursuit Group. The best prepared of these was the 20th Pursuit Squadron at Clark Field, fully equipped and experienced with P--40Bs. The 3rd Pursuit Squadron at Iba had swapped its obsolete P--35s for P--40Es in November, and had just installed and bore-sighted its guns. The 17th Pursuit Squadron at Nichols Field had barely begun practicing combat tactics in its new P--40Es. The 21st Pursuit Squadron, also at Nichols Field, received ten P--40Es on December 4, another ten on December 6, and expected the remainder on the 8th. None of its aircraft got into the air before they faced combat. And the 34th Pursuit Squadron still flew obsolescent P--35As with worn engines further aggravated by the dust at Del Carmen. On paper, Brereton had a reasonable force of at least 54 P--40Es, 18 P--40Es, and 18 P--35s, but in reality most of the force was unprepared on December 8. Also, the P--40 was the best American pursuit available, and the "B" model could be effective with the right tactics. The heavier P--40E however, climbed slowly and performed sluggishly at higher altitudes. At least one squadron, the 20th, had practiced intercepting bombers with some success; but gunnery and combat training were handicapped by a shortage of .50 caliber ammunition, while deficiencies in oxygen and oxygen equipment limited operational ceilings.  Finally, the pursuit pilots were tough, enthusiastic, and inexperienced, and they viewed their adversaries with a mixture of prejudice and contempt. This was a fatal error. While the Japanese flew superb aircraft, such as the Mitsubishi A6M2 Zero, their real advantage was in the quality of personnel. In the words of a recent history of the Japanese navy: "It was the skill of Japanese fighter pilots honed in air combat over China [from] 1937 to 1941...that gave Japanese air power its potency in the first six months of the Pacific War." 
The severe shortage of antiaircraft guns further compromised defense of FEAF bases. Many of those on hand were obsolete or worn out, ammunition was old and in short supply, and most fuses were set for low-altitude attacks. The only weapons available at Iba Field were World War I-vintage .30 caliber machine guns. The 200th Coast Artillery (AA)--a national guard unit from. New Mexico filled out with draftees--reached Luzon in September 1941 to defend Clark Field. Most of its three-inch and 37-mm guns were positioned north of the airfield. Better sites existed on private land to the south and east, but the army lacked the authority to place guns there. 
The 19th Bombardment Group provided the offensive punch for FEAF. The 28th, 30th, and Headquarters Squadrons had nineteen B--17s at Clark, sixteen ready for combat. The sixteen bombers of the 14th and 93d Bombardment Squadrons were at Del Monte. The B--17C and B--17D models were not the later model Fortresses already coming off the Boeing assembly lines and they lacked features that were necessities for survival in combat. A shortage of parts hampered maintenance and the complete absence of spare engines had already begun to restrict operations. The 19th was considered an elite outfit, and the veteran Vth Bombardment Command commander, a pioneer in the operational use of the B--17, was noted for his technical mastery. A superb navigator and excellent pilot and bombardier, Eugene Eubank had trained the 19th to high standards. In the coming weeks, the group would perform well under harrowing circumstances. Many of the 19th enlisted men who survived the Philippines and Java went on to become officers, and many o f its surviving officers became generals. 
Basing for the aircraft represented years of penury and neglect. Clark Field north of Manila, the only first-class field in the Philippines, was in the open and easy to locate. It had some revetments, but the limited protection for aircraft was one of Brereton's chief concerns. The principal fighter base, Nichols Field six miles south of Manila, had the only hard-surfaced runway in the islands, but, during the rainy season, the base reverted to swamp land. Nielson Field, southeast of Manila, was little used by combat aircraft. Iba, a pursuit field on the west coast, lacked facilities for extended operations. Del Carmen, fourteen miles south of Clark, had no running water or facilities, and six-inch dust prevented quick or mass takeoffs. Rosales, fifty miles north of Clark, was another dirt field without facilities. Del Monte on Mindanao had just opened and could take B--17s. Four primitive auxiliary strips--O'Donnell north of Clark, San Fernando southeast of Clark, Ternate near Cavite, and San Marcelino north west of Subic Bay--had no facilities at all. The other major air facility of note, the Philippine Air Depot in Manila, handled maintenance and supply, but was well known, easy to find, and highly inflammable. It also had limited capabilities, and Brereton at the end of November had recommended that engine overhaul be accomplished in the United States until personnel, tools, spares, and parts arrived. 
FEAF's communications and air warning systems were improving. The latter depended primarily upon native air watchers who reported to the headquarters at Nielson Field by civilian telephone or telegraph. Nielson relayed reports to a central plotting board at Clark Field by telephone, radio, or teletype. Radar had just been introduced. SCR-270 mobile radar and SCR-271 fixed location radar could detect aircraft at 150 miles under normal conditions, but had difficulty determining altitude and could only vector interceptors to about three miles from a target before they merged on the scope. One SCR-270 set had arrived on October 1. Set up at Iba, it was tied into the central plotting board by telephone and radio. Additional SCR-270 and SCR-271 sets had also arrived, but most were stored until sites could be prepared. The U.S. Marines operated an SCR-268 radar set at the Cavite Naval Yard, but it was not tied into the FEAF system. On December 8, the only fully operational set available to FEAF was the SCR-270 at Ib a. The radar system was short of experienced personnel and the lack of time to integrate it into the air defense system and exercise properly gave air commanders little familiarity with or confidence in its capabilities. Despite these deficiencies, however, the air warning system would prove effective on the morning of 8 December. 
Mention must also be made of the intelligence capability in the Philippines. The 16th Naval District's "Station Cast" was a major player in the U.S. Navy's radio intelligence crypto analytic effort against the Japanese. Located in an underground tunnel on Corregidor, Cast could read the Japanese Red code, had an analogue machine capable of deciphering the Purple code, and was directly involved in efforts to break the JN-25 fleet code. Based upon radio traffic analysis, Cast reported in October 1941 that the Japanese were on a wartime disposition, provided information on the concentration of shipping for the southern invasions, and paid special attention to Japanese air organization and operations. Admiral Hart was Cast's primary customer, but the Navy shared information with USAFFE through a cumbersome hand-transfer system. Station Cast was unable to provide warning of Japanese actions or intentions for December 8 in time to be of use, but since the Philippines had several hours advanced notice of the events at Pearl Harbor, this failure seems insignificant in retrospect. 
Brereton and his commanders were well aware of FEAF's abundant weaknesses. Much had been accomplished toward preparing a combat-ready air force in the five weeks since he had arrived, and given money, resources, and, above all, time, much more could be done. The money and resources were promised and reinforcements were on their way. Time, however, had run out.
Early on November 28, a message from General Marshall announced that negotiations appeared to have been terminated and hostile action could be expected at any moment. This message was meant to be a "war warning," but: "If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act."  This statement, Marshall warned, however, was not to be interpreted as restricting legitimate defensive measures, and he directed MacArthur to carry out the tasks assigned in the latest revisions to Rainbow 5 if war broke out. Later that day, Arnold cautioned MacArthur to guard against sabotage and subversive activities. In response to these warnings, Brereton called his commanders to Nielson Field and ordered FEAF on full war alert. He directed that all units, personnel, and aircraft be ready for immediate action, placed blackout conditions in effect, and cancelled leave to Manila for combat units, including the 19th Bombardment Group.  Captain Lewellyn wrote home that w ar with Japan was inevitable and "our air force, small as it is" is on 24-hour alert, with aircraft reconnoitering half way to Formosa and most of the bombers going to Mindanao, "to get them out of reach of Jap bombers, just in case."  Lewellyn had to call headquarters every thirty minutes while away with Brereton, and he was with Brereton "morning, noon and night."  On December 6, Brereton met with Eubank at Clark and reviewed the 19th Group's plans in case of war. If the enemy approached from the west, the two commanders expected a warning from Patrol Wing Ten; if from the north, their own B--17 reconnaissance flights should provide notification. The photographs of Formosa available were dated, but Takao Harbor presented, in Brereton's words, "the juiciest target to bomb immediately on the outbreak of war." 
On the evening of December 7, 1941, Brereton attended a dinner and party at the Manila Hotel thrown for him by the 27th Bombardment Group (Light), the dive bomber unit whose A--24s never reached the Philippines. The men had arrived on November 20, and had been kept busy doing infantry drill, filling sand bags, flying obsolete B--18s, and wondering when their airplanes would arrive. The gathering would later be recalled as a wild affair with "the best entertainment this side of 'Minsky's.'"  Brereton, however, was edgy, and few in attendance probably noticed him leaving for a few moments to consult with Sutherland and Rear Admiral William R. Purnell, Admiral Hart's chief of staff, who convinced him that war could come at any moment. Brereton ordered Brady to place all airfields on combat alert at daylight the next morning, which required all pilots to be briefed and the pursuit aircraft ready for immediate take off. 
Sometime around 0400, Brereton awoke to the news of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The call came from Sutherland, and Brereton told him "to tell General MacArthur that the 19th Bomb Group would be ready to bomb Formosa at daylight."  Brereton then ordered Brady to notify all air units about the attack and telephoned Eubank to prepare to launch an air strike at daybreak. Brereton began to specify the bomb load, but Eubank advised that it would be better to wait in case of a last-minute switch in targets. It would also be better for the aircraft to be unloaded in case of a sudden emergency. Eubank notified his units at Clark and sent a message to Del Monte, ordering O'Donnell to establish patrols and to alert the airfield guards and airplane crews. A second call from Brereton summoned Eubank to FEAF headquarters. Brereton's staff began preparing for an attack on Formosa. Planning data, although lean on detail, contained enough information to make the mission a practical thrust against FEAF's main tar gets, Takao Harbor and its naval airfield. While his staff prepared, Brereton reported to USAFFE headquarters where Sutherland told him that MacArthur was in conference. A War Department message received at 0530 had confirmed the attack on Pearl Harbor and directed MacArthur to implement the tasks specified in Rainbow 5--the second of which, it will be remembered, was to conduct air raids on Japanese forces and facilities within range of FEAF bases. Prevented by Sutherland from meeting with MacArthur, Brereton urged the chief of staff to approve launching the two squadrons at Clark against Formosa and moving those at Del Monte to Clark for a follow-on attack. Sutherland approved the preparations, but told the airman to wait until MacArthur authorized offensive action. Sutherland continued to refuse Brereton permission to speak directly with MacArthur, but in the face of Brereton's persistence finally went into MacArthur's office. He returned with the answer to wait; USAFFE was not to make an overt act. Breret on responded that to him, at least, Pearl Harbor appeared to be an overt act, but his argument fell on deaf ears. By 0715, Brereton had returned to his headquarters. Captain Ind, passed him in the hall walking "in a short, swift stride"  with a pale face and clenched jaw. The frustrated, impatient airman told Brady and Eubank to continue preparations for a reconnaissance of the airfields on Formosa, but to delay the attack. 
Meanwhile, unconfirmed reports of Japanese air activities had been flowing into FEAF headquarters. About 0800, Maj. David Gibbs, in charge of the B-17s at Clark in Eubank's absence, ordered them into the air based upon a radar report from the set at Iba Field of an approaching air raid. Of the nineteen bombers, one was hangared for repairs, two were being painted, a fourth was on a reconnaissance mission toward Formosa, and one took off late because of mechanical problems. Most of the bombers dispersed to search areas to the north and west of Luzon, while others remained around nearby Mount Arayat.  At 0850, Sutherland called Brereton and reaffirmed the earlier order: "Hold off bombing of Formosa for present." 
Over the next hour, confirmed reports of Japanese attacks on Baguio, Tuguegarao, and the airport at Davao reached FEAF headquarters.  Since these effectively disposed of the question of an overt action in the Philippines, Brereton called Sutherland at 1000 and resumed his plea for permission to attack Formosa. Sutherland told Brereton once again that all aircraft would be held in reserve and that USAFFE was standing on the defensive. Brereton responded that if Clark Field was destroyed FEAF would be unable to operate offensively, but Sutherland continued to disregard his arguments.  By then, the airman was beside himself. "General Brereton was sort of a tiger," Eubank remembered later. "He wanted to do something."  Shortly after this call, Brereton sent Eubank back to Clark. 
Finally, at 1014, MacArthur telephoned Brereton with permission to attack Formosa. Brereton responded that his plans at this late hour were to hold the bombers in readiness until he received reports from the reconnaissance mission then being prepared. He may not have told MacArthur, but he intended that Formosa would be attacked in late afternoon whether he received reconnaissance reports or not. At 1020 Brereton sent orders to Vth Bombardment Command: Two B-17 squadrons would attack the airdromes on Formosa at dusk; two squadrons of pursuit aircraft would cover the operation as far as possible; and the two squadrons of B-17s at Del Monte would deploy to the primitive landing strip at San Marcelino ready for a strike against Formosa early the next morning.  The B-17s were recalled, and they began landing about 1100. By 1130, three were being prepared for reconnaissance missions while the remainder were being refueled and loaded with bombs--which took about an hour-and-a-half--in preparation for an attack on Formosa "at the latest daylight hour today that visibility will permit." 
By this time, it was too late. Most of the pursuit units had scrambled earlier, returned to their bases, and refueled, except for the 17th Pursuit Squadron which recovered at Clark. At 1140, the Air Warning Center at Nielson relayed a report from the radar set at Iba to the Clark Field Communications Center of a group of planes over the China Sea west of Lingayen Gulf. Maj. Orrin Grover, commander of the 24th Pursuit Group, ordered the 3d Pursuit Squadron at Iba to scramble. Part remained over Iba; part covered Manila Bay. Five minutes later a second message reported a hostile flight over Lingayen Gulf about 100 miles north of Clark. Grover ordered the 21st at Nichols Field and 34th at Del Carmen to scramble and cover Clark. Subsequently, however, he diverted the 21st to Manila, while the 34th never received its order and remained on the ground. At 1155, Sutherland phoned Brereton at MacArthur's direction and asked for a report of air operations during the preceding two hours. The airman reported that the two Japanese forces appeared to consist of between 15 and 24 aircraft, but there had been no contact with American units, yet. The Communications Center at Clark continued to receive messages tracking the second Japanese force. At 1215, Major Grover ordered the 17th Pursuit Squadron into the air; however, he also sent this unit to Manila. At 1220, a message from Colonel George at the Air Warning Center ordered the 24th to intercept the Japanese force now approaching Clark. Grover hesitated; the only unit at hand, the 20th Pursuit Squadron, remained on the ground. And in the meantime, apparently none of the warnings from FEAF reached the 19th Bombardment Group. 
On Formosa, the Japanese force scheduled to attack Clark early that morning had been grounded by fog. Finally in the air by 0845, the force reached Clark at 1235 expecting to find the field empty. It was not. A combination of circumstances thus presented the Japanese with an opportunity that should not have existed, an opportunity that they had no right to expect, and an opportunity of which they took full advantage. In minutes they destroyed twelve of seventeen B-17s and twenty of the twenty-three P-40s at Clark. The remaining five Fortresses were severely damaged. The B-17 on the early reconnaissance mission and the one that had taken off late escaped damage. At the end of the day, only fifty-eight of FEAF's pursuit aircraft remained flyable. The airfields were heavily hit; the radar at Tha was among the facilities destroyed. Total Japanese losses were seven Zeros and one bomber.  With these successful strikes, the Japanese eliminated MacArthur's ability to defend the Philippines before a Japanese ship had reached the islands or a Japanese soldier had landed. Once the Japanese had established air superiority, the game was up for the United States Army Forces in the Far East.
An examination of the evidence now available suggests the following. Defensively, FEAF depended on an adequate warning system, immediate communications, and proper decision-making to scramble its pursuit aircraft and vector them to the target. The air warning system, especially the radar set at Iba, responded well on December 8; FEAF had ample warning of approaching Japanese air raids. Messages were relayed quickly and smoothly through Vth Interceptor Command to the 24th Pursuit Group. The communications net below that level performed less well. As noted, the order to launch the 34th Pursuit Squadron never reached Del Carmen, while the 24th Pursuit Group failed to pass warnings of the force approaching Clark to the 19th Bombardment Group, a critical breakdown. Less understandable were Major Grover's delays in scrambling units, especially the failure to launch the 20th Pursuit Squadron following the 1220 order from George, as well as the misdirecting of most of the pursuits to concentrate in the Manila Bay are a. It is highly unlikely that FEAF's prewar plans emphasized the defense of the Manila Bay area over its own flying fields, so one must conclude that in the confusion that morning, Grover failed to understood that his primary responsibility should have been to protect the airfields, especially Clark and its bombers. The inferior pursuits and inexperienced pilots probably would not have done well against the Japanese force had they been able to intercept, but hesitation and poor decisionmaking on the part of the 24th Pursuit Group commander prevented them from trying and, thus, ensured the destruction of the bomber force at Clark.
Offensively, it is clear that Brereton--despite later claims to the contrary by MacArthur, Sutherland, and their supporters--pressed vigorously for an air attack on Formosa at daybreak in accordance with the latest version of Rainbow 5, standard U.S. Army Air Forces doctrine, FEAF's prewar planning, and his own aggressive nature. The 19th Bombardment Group was prepared to attack, but USAFFE refused Brereton's request until mid-morning. The evidence fails to sustain Sutherland's assertion in 1945 that "Holding the bombers at Clark Field was entirely due to Brereton."  Second, a statement by MacArthur after the war and his subsequent memoirs clearly show that he reacted contrary to his orders from Marshall, recommendations from Arnold, and the provisions of Rainbow 5. According to MacArthur, reports seemed to indicate that the Japanese force had been hurt badly at Pearl Harbor, and the failure to attack the main facilities on Luzon early on December 8 reinforced that conclusion. Accordingly: "I therefore co ntemplated an air reconnaissance to the north, using bombers with fighter protection, to ascertain a true estimate of the situation and exploit any possible weaknesses that might develop on the enemy's front."  Since the limited range of the U.S. pursuits precluded escort for an offensive mission against Formosa, MacArthur obviously expected to save the bombers to counter a Japanese invasion force, rather than use them against the Japanese bases, a decision in line with prewar Army doctrine. Third, MacArthur always denied knowing of Brereton's proposal for a daylight attack on Formosa.  While, this assertion seems unlikely, it might just possibly be true. Richard Sutherland controlled access to MacArthur and it is conceivable that he did not bother the USAFFE commander with Brereton's entreaties.  In addition, this episode sheds further light on the later claim that USAFFE had ordered all of the heavy bombers to Del Monte prior to the attack. Sutherland failed to express surprise about 0400 when B rereton briefed him on the status of his force and informed him that FEAF was prepared to bomb Formosa at dawn, and MacArthur certainly knew that B-17s were at Clark when he authorized an attack at 1014 that morning. Subsequent claims of surprise at finding that heavy bombers were on Luzon thus remind one of Capt. Louis Renault's shock at discovering that gambling was taking place in the back of Rick's Cafe in Casablanca.
Above all, an historian of air power comes away from the events of December 8, 1941, with considerable frustration. MacArthur's ground force was unable to confront the enemy until Japanese troops landed in the Philippines and the Asiatic Fleet, outside its few submarines, was too weak to face the Japanese navy Only FEAF had the offensive capability to strike an immediate blow. MacArthur's failure--or Sutherland's refusal to allow MacArthur--at least to talk face-to-face with the commander of that force during that critical early morning remains inexplicable. 
That said, it should be noted that discussions would have made little real difference. No matter what took place in the Philippines in the days leading up to and through December 8, the real problem was the decision to place the B-17s in a vulnerable position without adequate bases, warning systems, and defenses. Once the U.S. pursuits lost control of the air, nothing could protect the bombers on the ground. The successful attack on Clark merely accelerated the inevitable. Many in MacArthur's headquarters clearly realized that fact, although it must be recognized that this view was convenient since it exculpated USAFFE decision-making. According to Paul P. Rogers, an enlisted clerk in MacArthur's office: "[Col.] Richard Marshall, a steady soul in times of adversity, remarked to Sutherland. 'Well, Dick, it doesn't make much difference. If we hadn't lost them on the ground at Clark today, we would have lost them later, in the air or on the ground, and it wouldn't have made any difference at all.'"  Lt. Col. Charles Willoughby, MacArthur's intelligence chief, later wrote: "The attempt has been made to equate the loss of seventeen bombers at Clark Field with the loss of the battleships at Pearl Harbor. But there is really no comparison; Brereton's pitiful number of planes was never enough to affect the issue in the Philippines, and they would have soon disappeared through attrition even with the most careful husbanding."  And Maj. Courtney Whitney concluded that "the air force at MacArthur's disposal was doomed as long as it was provided with no spare parts and confined to so few airfields."  Whitney reflected the FEAF perspective as expressed by the 93d Bombardment Squadron commander: "[Clark] was out there like a sore thumb in the middle of the damn plain, with no air warning and no air defense," Capt. Cecil Combs asserted bluntly. "Anything on the ground was a dead duck and you couldn't keep them in the air all the time." 
The commanders in Washington appear to have accepted that the prewar gamble had failed. While Arnold never came to terms with the destruction of the B-17s at Clark, he seems not to have blamed Brereton, whom he telephoned two days after the attack. According to the transcript, Arnold was obviously mystified and concerned, but supportive. Brereton's words show both confusion and shock--more than understandable given the events of the previous hours--mixed with a realistic understanding of FEAF's predicament. Impatient and ruthless, Hap Arnold refused to tolerate failure, as even close friends like Lt. Gen. Ira Eaker would discover. Had he attributed the debacle at Clark to the air commander, Brereton's combat career would have ended, as they did for many leaders who Arnold found wanting. Likewise, MacArthur appears not to have blamed his air commander, or at least not until the publication of The Brereton Diaries in 1946 intimated USAFFE's failure to act and called for instant, but, quite frankly, not well-ta ken rebuttal. 
Despite poor weather that interrupted operations, the Japanese air forces followed up their initial attacks systematically. On the night of December 8-9, they hit Nichols Field. On December 10, they concentrated on Nielson and Del Carmen Fields and the Naval facilities at Cavite. The initial Japanese landings on Luzon took place on December 10 at Vigan and Aparri. FEAF's desperate efforts were valiant but futile. When the pursuits went up, they met seemingly endless formations of Japanese fighters; the bombers seldom operated in more than threes and fours. On the ground the airplanes could be hidden but not protected. Maintenance and supply proved problematic, and attrition without replacement doomed the force quickly. By the end of December 11, FEAF withdrew the remaining B-17s to Mindanao. Reduced to twenty-two P-40s and eight P-35s, Vth Interceptor Command abandoned its defensive role and reserved its small force for reconnaissance missions and occasional bombing raids. This decision left Luzon defenseless and meant that the few attacks on the Japanese landings were almost completely ineffective.  "December 13 was the day the Japanese really began to hit us," Maj. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright, the veteran cavalryman commandin g the ground forces on northern Luzon, later wrote. "That was the day I realized, for all time, the futility of trying to fight a war without an Air Force." 
Effective control by FEAF headquarters was impossible and on December 23, Brereton requested permission to transfer his headquarters out of the Philippines. He followed this request on the next day with a memo asking for orders assigning him to Australia. Brereton, Sutherland, and MacArthur then met. The result was an order that directed Brereton to move south with his headquarters and quoted almost verbatim the mission Brereton had proposed in his memo earlier that day, which called for his primary effort to be support of the Philippines.  Captain Ind saw Brereton just before the latter left:
I felt that...he had possessed a clear vision of the horribly grim experience which faced us, and that he would allow nothing to interfere with his measures of preparation....He had instilled tireless energy into the sluggish forward motion of preparation....General Brereton gripped my hand tightly and, in short chopped sentences, expressed his appreciation of my attention to duty. 
By the end of December, the Japanese had driven the Asiatic Fleet to the Netherlands East Indies, crippled FEAF, isolated MacArthur's troops on Bataan and Corregidor, and landed in Borneo. Hopes for stopping this relentless tide now centered on a hastily-assembled force of American, British, Dutch, and Australians known as ABDACOM under British general Sir Archibald Wavell with U.S. Army Air Forces Lt. Gen. George Brett as his deputy. Brereton became deputy air commander under Air Marshal Sir Richard Peirse. 
ABDACOM was short-lived. The other allies could offer little in the way of modern aircraft, and Brereton's force comprised a few beat-up survivors from the Philippines and a trickle of new aircraft and units largely manned by inexperienced crews. Conflicting objectives hampered operations. The Dutch were concerned with the defense of Java itself and begrudged any diversions. British concerns about Singapore, Malaya, and Burma drew them to the west. Australians feared an attack on their homeland, thus concentrating their attention to the east. The Americans shared this concern, while Brereton remained deeply committed to succoring MacArthur's forces on Bataan.  While the conflicting objectives caused confusion and hampered operations, they had little impact on the final results of the campaign. ABDACOM simply lacked the forces to deal with the rampaging Japanese army and navy.
For Brereton, whose headquarters moved to Java on January 18, it was a miserable time. He could neither respond quickly to the rapidly changing situation nor adequately direct the operations of the small number of bombers at his disposal. His meager staff included ground officers filling in temporarily. He could do little to help MacArthur and saw no way to defend Java.  Horace M. Wade, who flew a Consolidated LB-30, an export version of the B-24 "Liberator," across North Africa to Bandung, Java, found nothing but confusion:
It appeared to me that the instructions that came down on what we were supposed to do didn't reflect the real true course of the military campaign that was going on out there....It didn't look to me that we were going to be effective. We didn't have support. We didn't have parts for the airplane. We were not doing good bombing. We didn't have good supervision. People were scared. That's the situation we were in. 
Eleven weary survivors from the 19th Bombardment Group made up the initial Java contingent. Reinforcements dribbled in. Six B-17s and four LB-30s of the 7th Bombardment Group arrived beginning about mid-January. By February 1, fifteen more B-17Es and four LB-30s had reached Java, many flying the long route from the west across Africa. Ultimately at least sixty-five B-17s, B-24s, and LB-30s reached Java counting those flown out of the Philippines. During its short existence, ABDACOM dispatched over sixty bombing missions, comprising more than 300 individual sorties, an average of about five aircraft per attack. Weather, distance, inexperience, and mechanical breakdown proved almost insurmountable barriers, and over 40 percent of the aircraft failed to reach their targets. Trained maintenance personnel, facilities, tools, and parts were in short supply. As in the Philippines, losses on the ground demonstrated ABDACOM's inability to defend its air bases. The bomber force lost six aircraft in combat, six in air accidents, and twenty-six on the ground. An inadequate air warning system and shortage of antiaircraft weapons and pursuit aircraft doomed defensive efforts. The shortage of ships meant that many of the new pursuits were assembled in Australia and flown to Java, and the combination of weather and inexperienced pilots contributed to a high attrition rate. 
Problems with supply were so critical that on January 26, Brereton sent a message to the War Department proposing that all of Australia be placed under ABDACOM, not just the northwest area. Brereton's efforts appear to have been directed at Maj. Gen. Julian F. Barnes, in command on the east coast of Australia, who, Brereton felt, was failing to furnish the logistical support required. Brereton's proposal met with some consternation in Washington, D.C., however. Though unity of air command in Australia was logical, Brereton's recommendations appeared to indicate a desire to shift the main U.S. effort away from defense of the Malay Barrier. Marshall emphasized that it was the War Department's goal to defeat of the enemy through a unified effort under General Wavell, and Brereton's responsibility was to carry out Wavell's orders. Marshall assured Brereton that he could make "direct and authoritative" calls on General Barnes for logistical support. At the same time, Marshall reminded Barnes that his mission was to support Brereton to the utmost. 
Personnel problems went deeper than shortages and inexperienced men. On January 25, Colonel Brady, now Chief of Operations, ABDA.COM, and Commander of U.S. Army Air Forces in Java, criticized the "lack of discipline and sense of responsibility on the part of Air Corps commissioned officers" who failed to care for their men, equipment, and ordnance. They were, Brady complained, helpless without a "full base installation with unlimited Air Corps supplies, machine shops, etc. to function."  Brett agreed and added that he and Brereton were concerned about "a general attitude of trying to find how not to do it, instead of doing it." 
February 8, 1942, may have been the lowest point of the war for Brereton. Reading the handwriting on the wall, he recommended that FEAF withdraw from Java, counsel criticized thoroughly as defeatist by both Wavell and Brett. This episode, differences with Air Marshal Peirse over operations, and the need to deal with the low morale and poor condition of his own air force, led Brereton to request his relief from ABDACOM. His request denied, he soldiered on for the two weeks or so that remained. On February 15, Singapore fell. The Japanese already held Borneo and the Celebes and had begun the invasion of Sumatra. Japanese forces occupied Bali on February 19, and on the same day bombed Darwin, heavily damaging its airfields and port facilities.  With Java isolated, ABDACOM was finished, and Wavell telegraphed the news to Prime Minister Winston Churchill on February 21:
I am afraid that the defence of ABDACOM area has broken down and that defence of Java cannot now last long.... It has always hinged on air battle and once [the] weaker air force is outmatched beyond certain proportion its elimination is rapid. I am afraid our air force owing to losses of last few days and failure of reinforcements has reached this stage. Anything put into Java now can do little to prolong the struggle. 
On February 22, Marshall ordered Brereton to send his airplanes out of Java and authorized him to go either to Australia or India. Wavell held his last conference on February 23 and afterward told Brereton in private that he hoped that Brereton would assume command of the U.S. air forces in India. Arnold preferred that Brereton remain in Australia with Brett to supervise the U.S. buildup. These last instructions apparently arrived too late, however. Brett and Brereton had concluded that the way to victory led through China, and, as airmen, they were tired of operating from places that could easily be outflanked. On February 24, Brereton departed for the China-Burma-India (CBI) theater. "I was glad to leave," he later wrote: "My desire for some time had been to give the [Japanese] territory and get back where we could reorganize the striking forces, and I didn't care whether it was India or Australia. Brett gave me my choice and I picked India, maybe because I was sick of islands, even one as big as Australia ." 
The final air evacuation of Java began on February 25, and on March 2 the last five B-17s and three LB-30s took off for Australia.  Rosie O'Donnell's diary for February 25 summarized everyone's attitude. "Hell of a feeling to pull out on the Dutch who to my mind [are] one grand people. But our position is untenable for heavy bombardment. Lost 14 planes on the ground in the last four days & its [sic] just a question of a few days until all will be lost."  Historians Wesley Craven and James Cate later summarized the effort in Java succinctly: "So ended, in still another terrifying demonstration of the cost to those who allow control of the air to pass to their enemies, the air phase of the Java campaign."  For Brereton, the evacuation of Java ended with a touch of humor. In Colombo, he and his party put up at the Galleface Hotel. The pilots had brought out nothing but the clothes on their backs, so Major Cecil F. Combs asked Brereton for money. Brereton divided $150 between the six or seven men. Co mbs returned to the air field where he found that the pilot of a newly arrived B-17 was carrying $250,000 entrusted to him in the United States. Combs signed for the money, then: "I took the $250,000 and went down and knocked on Louie's door. He was shaven and having a drink. I said, 'You stingy old son of a bitch. Here is $250,000.' I threw it down on the floor in front of him. I got the biggest kick out of it. I knew that he would forgive my language when I said $250,000.' 
From Ceylon, the party flew to New Delhi, where a reinvigorated Brereton plunged into action again. He first accompanied Wavell on a two-day tour of the theater to view the rapidly deteriorating situation. On March 5, he assumed command of Tenth Air Force with a combat force that comprised eight heavy bombers and their crews. From March 8-13, the bombers served as transports, hauling 474 troops and 29 tons of supplies into Burma and evacuating civilians. Additional forces began to assemble. Three ships reached Karachi on March 13 with the ground echelon of two squadrons from the 7th Bombardment Group, the 51st Air Base Group, personnel from the 51st Pursuit Group, and ten P-40s.  "Such were the meager beginnings of an organization," wrote Craven and Cate, "forced to operate at the end of a longer supply line than that of any other existing American air force, over distances within its theater that exceeded considerably those embraced by the bounds of the United States, and in an area possessed of few of the industrial facilities upon which air power is directly dependent."  Tenth Air Force was Brereton's "third extraordinarily difficult assignment" of the war. From the beginning, he lacked aircraft, personnel, facilities, and resources and he had to improvise a force in the face of the Japanese avalanche engulfing Burma. He did not even command the most combat-capable air unit in the theater, Claire Lee Chennault's American Volunteer Group, the "Flying Tigers." 
Brereton had a clear picture of what he wanted to accomplish. "Tenth Air Force," he told his new boss, Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, "would not be committed piecemeal nor employed until its operational training was completed. I had had enough of fighting in dribbles. I insisted on building a striking force with a punch to it."  Stilwell appeared to concur with Brereton, and his orders to his air commander were clear: get results, ensure American command, use his own judgment, and let him know if he needed help. Both men agreed that Burma was the first priority for the U.S. forces in the theater.  Despite this favorable first meeting, however, Brereton's actions over the next few months soon brought him into conflict with the two great American warlords of the China-Burma-India theater: Stilwell, who was building a Chinese-American ground force to fight in Burma, and Chennault, who had the ear of Chiang Kai-shek and was building an air force to fight in China.
Brereton established his temporary headquarters in a string of offices in the RAF headquarters at New Delhi near the Viceroy's palace. To get space for himself and his men, Brereton was forced to ask the Viceroy of India, Lord Linlithgow, to requisition rooms from British residents, to the great resentment of the dispossessed colonials. He lived in a comfortable, high-ceilinged, two-room suite in the Imperial Hotel. For a combat force, Brereton projected the need for one group of B--17 heavy bombers, one group of twin-engine North American B--25 "Mitchell" medium bombers, and the 51st Pursuit Group equipped with the latest model P--40F. He also wanted Tenth to absorb a detachment of thirty B--24s commanded by Harry Halverson on its way to China to bomb Japan, as well as the Flying Tigers, which would be reorganized as the 23d Fighter Group. These plans were the future, however, and Brereton would see few of these forces arrive. The War Department envisioned limited air forces in India, while other theaters, far more critical than the CBI, were demanding aircraft as they came off the assembly lines. Even the majority of those sent to India failed to arrive for a variety of reasons. When Brereton flew the entire bomber force of Tenth Air Force to Egypt in June, he took with him a force not appreciably larger than the six bombers he brought from Java in March. 
On March 6, Brereton reported to Arnold that it was essential for him to have the latest information in U.S. war plans for the China-Burma-India Theater. In the meantime, he had been consulting with Wavell and his staff. General Wavell promised full support for any size air force that the Americans commit in India, and agreed with the concept of operations that called for action to the northeast through China to Japan under General Stilwell. The proposed operations required an immense American line of communications, and Brereton had already directed establishment of an operational training area in the Karachi area and had diverted a convoy carrying P--40s and other equipment to that port. The British, however, opposed extensive American infrastructure around Karachi, because they had their own plans for the area. As an alternative, Brereton would shift the main effort for Tenth Air Force to Bangalore where the rainy season would pose less of a problem and sufficient room was available for airfields. Brereto n regarded the question of a ferry route across India to China as critical, and assigned Colonel Brady to the task because, according to Brereton, he was "lacking in tact and is much better situated in the solution of difficult problems such as this, than for contacts requiring diplomacy and smooth working."  Airfield, technical services, and maintenance problems were overwhelming He asked that Brig. Gen. Elmer E. Adler from the Middle East be sent to help. Finally, Brereton reported that he had developed good relations with Stilwell, who commanded a huge area with responsibilities spread in many directions. Communications between Burma and India were primitive, however, and they were frequently out of touch. Brereton had every confidence that he could support his boss, but, prophetically, he anticipated that sooner or later he would have to make a major decision that would conflict with Stilwell's intentions. 
Brereton followed his March 6 letter with a more personal "Dear Hap" missive, which reported that Karachi's air and port facilities were adequate. To his request for Adler, he added several other key personnel including future generals Nathan Twining and Earle Partridge. He also wanted the authority to award medals to his men and asked that FEAF to be cited in War Department orders for its valiant but doomed fight. In more personal matters, Brereton asked for a generous amount of expense money so he could impress the British and maintain a steady supply of American cigarettes for his men. He also asked that Arnold support the Distinguished Service Medal that Brett had recommended for him. Arnold helped Brereton to the full extent of his power. He asked the War Plans Division to send complete instructions to Brereton and to transfer Adler to India. He strongly recommended that Brereton be designated as Stilwell's deputy, enabling him to address his problems in India from a position of greater authority. Arnol d also placed $10 million at Brereton's disposal, and reported that he was pushing for a citation for FEAF and the Distinguished Service Medal for Brereton. Other matters were out of his hands, however. Twining and Partridge were needed elsewhere, and only the theater commander could award medals, so that authority was reserved for Stilwell. Likewise, Stilwell had the power to appoint Brereton as his deputy and Arnold was urging that action, unsuccessfully as it turned out. 
Brigadier General Adler and two assistants reached India on April 26 where they activated an Air Service Command on May 1. The convoy diverted by Brereton reached Karachi two weeks later with supplies and personnel, and many of the latter went to the Air Service Command enabling it to begin operations. Newly-promoted Brigadier General Brady took charge of establishing a reception, classification, and training center that became one of the major Army Air Forces centers in the Far East, and Brig. Gen. Raymond Wheeler arrived to organize port facilities and establish a theater supply system. The ground elements that arrived from Australia provided personnel for the training center and Brereton held the P--40s that reached India at that location for additional preparation and training. Brereton's new chief of staff, Brig. Gen. Earl L. Naiden, drafted plans for two transport commands: Trans-India connected Karachi with Dinjan in Assam, while Assam-Burma-China operated between Dinjan and Loiwing in China by way of Myitkyina in Burma. Brereton wanted the ferry route assigned to Tenth Air Force, but Marshall responded in early April that it would be administered centrally by what would become Air Transport Command. Col. William D. Old took temporary command of the Assam-Burma-China route. His first job was to ensure the delivery of 30,000 gallons of gasoline and 500 gallons of lubricants to China for the use of Jimmy Doolittle's raiders, already at sea on the carrier Hornet. 
But progress was slow, and not the least of the challenges Brereton faced were the British cobnial leaders, military and civilian, who seemed to have difficulty accepting that there was a war on and that the Japanese were at the gate. Lewellyn wrote on March 20 that Brereton was getting fed up with the British "and I am looking for an explosion as far as he is concerned any day now. I don't see how he has managed to control himself as well as he has." And, again, he opined that, "The worst thing about winning this war, when and if we do, is that we will keep the British from getting the hell whipped out of them at the same time." 
Tenth Air Force flew its first two combat missions on the night of April 2. The one against Rangoon aborted when one of two B-17s crashed on takeoff killing the entire crew, including Norman Lewellyn. The other turned back for mechanical problems. Brereton personally led the second mission, two B-17s and one LB-30, against the Andaman Islands. The target was somewhat questionable. Before takeoff, Brereton briefed the crews that the Japanese fleet might be at Port Blair, or it might be their own fleet for all the British knew. Combs responded that he had never seen the Andaman Islands, so they should go anyway. Brereton flew as Combs's copilot. The little force found Japanese ships at Port Blair and claimed hits from 3,500 feet on a cruiser and transport. Two bombers were damaged, but all returned to base safely.  Clare Boothe Luce described a belligerent Brereton "wearing a broad and beatific grin" as he emerged from his bomber. "Boys," she quoted him as saying, "bombing Japs makes me feel damned fine."  As the highest ranking Army Air Forces officer to fly a combat mission to that date, Brereton received the Distinguished Flying Cross, while the other members of the crew were generously decorated. Brereton actively sought the decoration. "About the only fun a professional soldier looks forward to outside of killing people, is to pin a ribbon on his belly," he wrote his friend Maj. Gen. George Stratemeyer in his most bellicose style. "Besides it adds prestige in allied circles, were [sic] we are outranked at every corner." 
The Andaman Islands raid surprised Stilwell, who expected missions flown by Tenth Air Force to be devoted to supporting him in Burma and that all decisions be made through him as theater commander. Brereton, in turn, was disturbed that Stilwell expected the heavy bombers only to support operations in Burma. In his view, he had a responsibility to support the British when necessary or opportunity arose. Port Blair, he reported to Arnold in justification, was a supply base for the Japanese army in Burma and as well as naval forces in the Bay of Bengal. The RAF lacked the range to reach the target, conditions for a night operation were ideal, and enemy opposition was ineffective. The raid had not only done material damage, he told Arnold, but its effect on British and American morale more than justified the effort. Marshall commended Brereton for his aggressive blow, but cautioned him that he must operate within Stillwell's orders. Subsequently, on April 15 Marshall advised Stillwell that Tenth Air Force would cooperate with the British in the Bay of Bengal. This decision violated the principle of unity of command, however. Finally, on May 24 Marshall declared that Tenth was completely under Stilwell's command as the senior U.S. officer in the theater. In the meantime, however, the controversy placed Brereton in a delicate situation with relation to Stilwell, who already distrusted him.  One of Brereton's strengths was that he worked extremely well with the British. He especially liked Wavell, whom he considered to be "the finest general I have ever met."  The austere, acerbic Stilwell, on the other hand, despised all but a handful of "Limeys" and distrusted Americans who were popular with them. Brereton had adopted British uniforms after losing his own in the Philippines, and his staff wore them for comfort in the steamy conditions of India. This affectation probably bothered Stilwell, who criticized Brereton for carrying a riding crop, a symbol of personal authority in India, and having an "oriental rug " on the floor of his airplane.  All in all, "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell viewed Brereton as a little too "British" and much too "Raj." "My impression," he wrote Marshall, "is that Tenth Air Force dug in at New Delhi and acquired an orientation nearer to British problems rather than towards the China theater."  For this he blamed the Tenth's commander. Had Brereton stayed in the CBI, it is doubtful that he could have remained on good terms with his boss.
Brereton also ran into trouble with Chennault, who demanded every airplane, drop of gasoline, and piece of equipment in the theater for his own use. Anyone who denied resources to this dedicated, single-minded air warrior was a black-hearted, back-stabbing traitor, and Brereton's decision to retain pilots and aircraft in India for training instead of immediately sending them to China fit that criteria. There was justice in both positions. Chennault was nose-to-nose with the enemy, fighting superior forces with whatever resources were available, and he needed men, planes, supplies and equipment immediately. Additionally, Chiang Kai-shek was suspicious about the planned induction of the AVG into Tenth Air Force, fearing that the British might convince Brereton to use the new 23d Pursuit Group in India and leave China without air support. On the other hand, Brereton's refusal to trickle inexperienced and poorly-trained men and small numbers of planes into combat where they would be chewed up in detail was based upon extensive, recent experience. And as Burma collapsed, Brereton recognized that the fall of India would end any hope of fighting in China. Thus, the defense of India had to be his first priority, another view that placed him in conflict with the commander of the Flying Tigers and his sponsor.  As in the case of the situation with Stilwell, had Brereton remained in command of Tenth Air Force, he probably would have run into serious trouble with Chennault and the Generalissimo, and through them, with President Franklin D. Roosevelt himself.
By mid-June, when the monsoon season set in, Brereton had made considerable progress. Though he still lacked a strategic plan from Washington, he had determined that his first priority was to gain control of the air in Burma. In furtherance of this goal, Brereton planned to base most of his short-range fighter units in China. Medium bomber units would base in southern China and eastern India where they would be effective against Japanese air bases in northern Burma. The heavies he planned to operate from India. Tenth Air Force had grown to about 600 officers and 5,000 men, and it had begun to shift its combat weight eastward, although Brereton warned Arnold that until he could prepare more bases Tenth Air Force would continue to operate at extreme range, reducing the intensity of its attacks. For the time being, the 11th Bombardment Group (Medium) and four squadrons of fighters, three from the AVG and one from the 51st Fighter Group, were based at Kunming. The 7th Bombardment Group's two squadrons were at Al lahbad in India. The 22d Bombardment Squadron (Medium) had reached Andal where it was expected to begin operations after the monsoons. And the advanced echelons of the remaining squadrons of 51st Fighter Group were at Dinjan waiting for their aircraft. Additionally, the transport aircraft and pilots of the Assam-Burma-China Ferry Command had already delivered over 2,000 tons of supplies to Burma and China, pointing the way to what would become the heroic airlift from India to China, the fabled "Hump." Brereton's major immediate problem, he wrote Arnold, was a shortage of engines, which as of June 24 had grounded all of his B-17s and was threatening to do the same to the transport aircraft. Brereton wanted engines shipped to him by air instead of by sea, and for the Middle East Theater to quit stealing them as they passed through on their way to India. 
On June 20, Wavell received a message from Gen. Sir Claude Auchinleck in Cairo, notifying him that German general Erwin Rommel had defeated the British Eighth Army, which was in full retreat to Egypt. On June 23, Marshall ordered Brereton to the Middle East with every available heavy bomber. On June 26, Brereton left India, followed by the men and planes of the 9th Bombardment Squadron--one LB-30, four B--24s, and four B--17s--all that could be prepared thanks to the engine shortage.  Once more Lewis Brereton was pitchforked into a desperate situation with a potential for disaster. His response was grim, but upbeat: "[It] sounds like another tough job," he wrote Arnold. "However, that's what we're out here for.  As he departed India, Stilwell provided a reasonably objective evaluation, rating him "excellent" with a "thorough and practical" knowledge of his profession. He acknowledged differences with Brereton, but stated that they had been resolved, and he placed Brereton in the middle third of the air generals that he knew, although under supervision he rated him in the upper third. In summary, Stilwell called Brereton "an aggressive fighter and therefore of great value."  Despite his favorable comments, however, it is clear that Stilwell believed that the British had coopted Brereton, and he did not want him to return to the CBI should his assignment to the Middle East prove temporary Stilwell argued for, and eventually got, a more compliant Clayton Bissell as commander for Tenth Air Force despite Arnold's objections and Marshal's concerns." 
The war finally turned around for Brereton in the summer of 1942, as indeed it did for the Allied cause. Two dates stood out for him personally. On July 4, 1942, he was at British headquarters when Auchinleck ordered the Eighth Army to counterattack Rommel at El Alamein. "This day will long be remembered by me," Brereton wrote. "It was the first time in the war that the question of moving forward not backward, has been raised."  And on July 18, Brereton sent a letter to General Arnold vastly different from his previous communications. "I'll bet he'll be glad to get this one," he commented, "because it's the first time I haven't asked him for a damn thing." 
Subsequently, Brereton organized and led the Ninth Air Force, which was closely associated with British Eighth Army's victories over the Germans and Italians beginning with El Alamein. In August 1943, Operation Tidalwave, took place under Brereton's command. Plans for the low-level bombing raid on the Ploesti oil refineries in Rumania originated in the Air Staff, but Brereton determined that the attack would originate from Libyan rather than Syrian bases, trained the bomber force, and ably defended the controversial low-level concept.  From the Mediterranean Theater, Brereton went to England. Promoted to lieutenant general he commanded the Ninth Air Force when it provided tactical support for Operation Overlord, the D-Day landings, and Operation Cobra, which opened the door to France for the Allied armies. At its peak strength, Ninth Air Force was the largest tactical air force in history, comprising 4,000 aircraft and almost 180,000 personnel.  Subsequently, he took command of the 1st Allied Airbor ne Army. Under Brereton it conducted Operation MarketGarden, the airborne assault in Holland in September 1944, and Operation Varsity in support of Field Marshall Sir Bernard Montgomery's massive crossing of the Rhine River in the spring of 1945.  After Market-Garden, 1st Allied Airborne Army went into eclipse. There was little purpose in holding well-trained airborne divisions and experienced air transport groups in reserve when they were desperately needed in France. Brereton thus finished the war outside the limelight.  Following World War II, he served in several positions, most notably as the senior U.S. Air Force representative on the military liaison committee of the Atomic Energy Commission, during which he and General Stilwell participated in Operation Crossroads, the atomic bomb tests at Bikini Island in 1946. Brereton retired on September 1, 1948, and he and his third wife later settled in Florida.  He died unexpectedly on July 19, 1967, following surgery. 
The evidence examined for this article suggests that Lewis Brereton was a capable commander and effective leader, but not a great general. He was a solid product of the U.S. military system prior to World War II, and as such was neither a star performer nor mediocre failure. He fits into that large middle ground of competent but unspectacular American officers who brought victory in World War II. Brereton had important strengths. In both world wars, he proved himself a brave, aggressive, and candid officer. Gen. Carl Spaatz justly described him as "personally fearless, forthright and given to firm and direct expression of his opinions regardless of the consequences to himself."  His effort to get the 12th Aero Squadron into action has been detailed, as has been his willingness to fly hazardous missions. The DSC he won as a Corps Observation Wing commander 1918, was well-earned, and the Andaman Islands raid in 1942 showed he had not lost this pugnacity. He coupled aggressiveness with considerable leaders hip ability, especially at squadron and group level where the force of his personality could have immediate impact. His ability to impress his personality on larger commands was evident in FEAF's increased pace of preparation during the few short weeks prior to the Japanese attack. Brereton's superiors recognized these attributes, and throughout his officer evaluations is the refrain: "Best suited to operations in the field with troops."
Brereton was an intelligent airman who knew his business, and a competent planner and administrator. Gen. George Kenney opined, on the other hand, that Brereton lacked the attention to detail necessary in a great commander.  This conclusion seems illustrated in the Philippines where he left much of the details to subordinates Brady, George, and Eubank. Mitigating factors, however, must be considered. For one, this was standard U.S. Army practice under which a commander set larger goals and left implementation to subordinates. For another, Brereton had limited experience with pursuit aircraft and heavy bombers and naturally tended to defer to his specialists. Further, George and Eubank, had been in the Philippines longer and had greater familiarity with local conditions. Finally, his absence from the Philippines for two of the five weeks prior to the Japanese attack must be remembered Despite these points, however, Brereton's surprise at the parking arrangements for the B-17s at Clark on his return from Australia and the breakdown of command and control under the 24th Pursuit Group on December 8 suggest a need for greater attention to operations one and two levels of command below Headquarters FEAF. This, perhaps, was his failing.
Brereton was neither an innovator nor original thinker like Kenney and younger men such as Curtis LeMay, and Elwood "Pete" Quesada, who had yet to make their mark in 1942. The plans made and actions taken by FEAF reveal a logical, but conventional approach to the extraordinary problems faced in the Far East. Brereton also lacked the breadth of view that would distinguish such senior air commanders as Hap Arnold, Carl Spaatz, and Frank Andrews. His proposal that all U.S. air forces in Australia be placed under his command in February 1942, recommendation later in the month that FEAF abandon Java, and attempt to obtain autonomy for Tenth Air Force in India suggest a commander concerned more with his own immediate problems than the larger picture of conflict expected of a theater commander.
On a personal level, Brereton was loyal to but did not curry favor from his superiors, while his well-documented tendency to blunt speech probably cost him support from peers. There is little evidence that Brereton was a headquarters operator or "water-cooler general." Throughout his service against the Japanese, he was a whirlwind of action and intensity. Some contemporaries later claimed that he treated his work too casually, and this view has been echoed by a few writers who have cited Brereton's alleged indolence as the cause for failures under his command. The historical record, through June 1942, fails to support such a view. On the other hand, it is clear that the general appreciated his comforts, liked women, and loved a good party. He drank. "Am on the wagon," Lewellyn wrote his wife in November 1941. "Finally decided I couldn't keep up with Louie."  But the old officer corps was often a hard-drinking crew, and evidence has yet to emerge that alcohol affected his performance during the war. Pea cetime was another matter. During the 1920s, Brereton appears to have suffered from the ennui that afflicts many successful veterans of combat, combined in his case with serious problems in his marriage. These interrupted his career in 1927, as described in Part I, and probably damaged his reputation permanently. Everyone knew everyone in the Old Army and long memories were common. A reputation once gained was usually impossible to shed.
In the long run, however, it was Brereton's military ability that mattered, and in that regard, Cecil Combs--who flew Wavell out of Java, flew the Andaman Islands raid, served on the Ninth Air Force staff in North Africa, and ultimately retired as a major general--provided perhaps the best epitaph. Many years later, Combs described the feisty little airman as "a cocky, aggressive, intelligent, experienced, pretty damn able commander." 
Roger G. Miller is a historian with the Air Force History Support Office at Bolling AFB, Washington, D.C. He is currently writing a history of air logistics from the Mexican border to the Persian Gulf. His articles have appeared in Air Power History, The Indiana Magazine of History, Military Affairs, Prologue, and The Air Force Journal of Logistics. Dr. Miller's books, To Save a City. The Berlin Air lift, 1949-1949, was recently published by Texas A&M Press.
(1.) Maurice Matloff and Edwin M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-42, United States Army in World War II (Washington, D.C., Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953), pp. 43-48, 67-69; Louis Morton, The War in the Pacific: Fall of the Philippines, United States Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1953), pp. 15-19, 31-32; Walter D. Edmonds, "What Happened at Clark Field," The Atlantic Monthly (Sep. 18, 1951), p. 20; Michael Schaller, Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 74.
(2.) Msg, Marshall to MacArthur, Sep. 9, 1941, File: "USAFFE: General MacArthur's Personal File, Jul 26-Sep 12, 1941," Box 1, RG 2, MacArthur Memorial Archives.
(3.) HQ USAFFE G.O. No. 4, Aug. 4, 1941, HQ USAFFE G.O. No. 5, Aug. 1941, ibid.; Note card on A-24s, Box 45, Hap Arnold-The Murray Green Papers, Air Force Academy Library (AFAL); "Army Air Action in the Philippines & Netherlands East Indies," U.S. Air Force Historical Study No. 111, (Historical Division, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, Mar. 1945), pp. 23-24, Air Force Historical Research Agency (AFHRA); William H. Bartsch, Doomed at the Start: American Pursuit Pilots in the Philippines, 1941-1942 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1992), p. 4; Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. I, Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942, New Imprint (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), pp. 176-78.
(4.) H. H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), pp. 208-209, 261-63; Larry I. Bland, ed. "We Cannot Delay:" July 1, 1939-December 6, 1941, Vol. II, The Papers of George Catlett Marshall, 2 Vols. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 676-78; Daniel F. Harrington, "A Careless Hope: American Air Power and Japan, 1941," Pacific Historical Review (May 1979), pp. 220, 222-24, 226; Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, p. 177; Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, pp. 65-67, 69-70; Douglas Gillison, Royal Australian Air Force, 1939-1942, Vol. I, Series 2 (Air), Australia in the War of 1939-1945 (Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1962), pp. 152-55; Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, edited by Robert Considine (New York: Bantom Books, 1986), p. 13.
(5.) Harrington, "A Careless Hope," p. 224.
(6.) Intvw, Gen. Emmett "Rosie" O'Donnell, Jr., March 27, 1970, pp. 21-22, Box 73, Hap Arnold-The Murray Green Papers, AFAL; "Army Air Action in the Philippines & Netherlands East Indies," pp. 14-20, 28-29; Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, pp. 177-79, 181; John H. Mitchell, On Wings We Conquer: The 19th and 7th Bomb Groups of the United States Air Force in the Southwest Pacific in the First Year of World War Two (Springfield, Mo.: G.E.M. Publishers, 1990), p. 21.
(7.) Ltr, Arnold to MacArthur, Oct. 14, 1941, "MacArthur Personal File, 7 Oct-7 Nov 41," Box 1, RG 1, MacArthur Memorial Archives.
(8.) Quoted in Robert F. Futrell, "Air Hostilities in the Philippines, 8 December 1941," Air University Review (Jan.-Feb. 1965), p. 34.
(9.) Radiogram, Marshall to Cmd. Gen., P.I., Sep. 30, 1941, Box 2, RG 2, MacArthur Memorial. Archives; Intvw, Green with Gen. William Kepner, Jan. 5, 1970, p. 58, Folder 6, Box 68; Notecard, "B/Gen Clagett Gets in Trouble Re Flights from West Coast," Box 11; Notecard, "Gen. Clagett Reduced Again?--March 1941," Box 11, Hap Arnold-The Murray Green Papers, AFAL; "Army Air Action in the Philippines & Netherlands East Indies," pp. 32-33; William H. Bartsch, "Was MacArthur Ill-Served by His Air Force Commanders in the Philippines?" Air Power History (Summer, 1997), pp. 47-49. DeWitt S. Copp, A Few Great Captains: The Men and Events that Shaped the Development of U.S. Air Power (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1980,) pp. 235, 285-86, 346-47, 358-61.
(10.) Radiogram, MacArthur to Chief of Staff, Oct. 2, 1941, Box 2, RG 2, MacArthur Memorial Archives.
(11.) Lewis H. Brereton, The Brereton Diaries: The War in the Air in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941-8 May 1945 (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1946), p. 3.
(12.) Roger G. Miller, "A 'Pretty Damn Able Commander' Lewis Hyde Brereton: Part I," Air Power History (Winter, 2000), pp. 4-27; Brereton, The Brereton Diaries, pp. 3-5, 18; Richard G. Stone, "Climbing the Brass Pyramid: How American World War II Generals Got Their Stars" (Paper Presented at the Ohio Valley Historical Conference, Cookeville, Tenn., Oct. 22, 1999), pp. 2-3.
(13.) Oral History, "Lewis H. Brereton," Nov. 30, 1956, Rollins College Library, Winter Park, Fla.
(14.) Brereton, The Brereton Diaries, pp. 3, 5-11; Memo, Lt. Col. Claude Duncan, Sec., Air Staff, to Gen. Marshall, Oct 22, 1941, Box 88, Papers of Henry H. Arnold, Library of Congress (LC); Bartsch, "Was MacArthur Ill-Served by His Air Force Commanders in the Philippines?," p. 49.
(15.) Ltr, Capt. Norman J. Lewellyn to wife and family, Oct. 18, 1941; Ltr, Lewellyn to wife, Oct. 26, 1941; Ltr, Lewellyn to wife, Oct. 29, 1941; Ltr, Lewellyn to wife, Nov. 6, 1941; Ltr, Lewellyn to parents, Nov. 11, 1941 (Courtesy Robert Llewellyn, Pebble Beach, California.); Brereton, The Brereton Diaries, pp. 11, 15, 17; "Memorandum Reference Activities in Philippine Islands," Dec. 18, 1941, Box 20, Papers of Henry H. Arnold, LC; Brereton, The Brereton Diaries, pp. 19-20. Mr. Llewellyn later changed the spelling of his last name from that used by his father.
(16.) Ind, Bataan, p. 65.
(17.) Ltr, Lewellyn to his wife, Nov. 6, 1941, (Courtesy Robert Llewellyn, Pebble Beach, California.).
(18.) "Memorandum Reference Activities in Philippine Islands," Dec. 18, 1941, Box 20, Papers of Henry H. Arnold, LC.
(19.) Brereton, The Brereton Diaries, pp. 19-20; Bartsch, Doomed at the Start, p. 27.
(20.) Ind, Bataan, pp. 65-68; Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, pp. 185-86; Walter D. Edmonds, They Fought With What They Had: The Story of the Army Air Forces in the Philippines, 1941-1942, reprint (Washington, D.C.: Center for Air Force History, 1992), pp. 37-38.
(21.) Ltr, Lewellyn to parents, Nov. 11, 1941, (Courtesy Robert Llewellyn, Pebble Beach, California).
(22.) "Memorandum Reference Activities in Philippine Islands," Dec. 18, 1941, Box 20, Papers of Henry H. Arnold, LC; "Army Air Action in the Philippines & Netherlands East Indies," pp. 42-43; Brereton, The Brereton Diaries, pp. 34-35; Edmonds, They Fought With What They Had, p. 60; Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, p. 1991.
(23.) Ltr, Adj. Gen. to Cmdr., USAFFE, subj: Additional Ferry Routes--Hawaii to Philippines, Oct. 27, 1941; Ltr, Adj. Gen. to Cmdr., USAFFE, Nov. 3, 1941, File: USAFFE Personal Fields of General MacArthur, 7 Oct-7 Nov 1941), Box 1, RG 2, MacArthur Memorial Archives; Note Cards on Brereton Mission to Australia, Box 45, Hap Arnold-The Murray Green Papers, AFAL. "Development of the South Pacific Air Route," Army Air Forces Historical Study No. 45 (AAF Historical Office, 1946), pp. 24-39; Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, pp. 179-8, 183-84.
(24.) Brereton, The Brereton Diaries, pp. 28-29, 31; Ind, Bataan, pp. 70-76; Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, pp. 185-86; Eric M. Bergerud, Fire in the Sky: The Air War in the South Pacific (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 2000), p. 54. The Brereton trip has been dramatized in a novel. Sky Phillips, Secret Mission to Melbourne, November 1941 (Manhattan, Kans.: Sunflower University Press, 1992).
(25.) Ind, Bataan, pp. 50-56, 76-77; Memo, "Study of Air Force for United States Army Forces in the Far East," Sep. 11, 1941, File: "MacArthur Personal File, July 26, 1941-September 12, 1941, Box 1, RG 2, MacArthur Memorial Archives.
(26.) Ltr, Lewellyn to parents, Nov. 11, 1941, (Courtesy Robert Llewellyn, Pebble Beach, California).
(27.) Msg., MacArthur to Marshall, Nov. 18, 1941; Mem, Col. Francis M. Brady, to Cmd. Gen., USAFFE, subj: Proposed Installations and Facilities for Far East Air Force, Nov. 21, 1941, File: "USAFFE: Personal Files of Gen. MacArthur, Nov. 8-24, 1941," Box 2, RG 2, MacArthur Memorial Archives; Futrell, "Air Hostilities in the Philippines," pp. 34-35.
(28.) This is Sutherland's description of himself: See Rogers, The Good Years, p. 40.
(29.) Stephen R. Taeffe, MacArthur's Jungle War: The 1944 New Guinea Campaign (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), pp. 35-36.
(30.) Ltr, Col. Francis M. Brady, Chief of Staff, FEAF, to Cmd. Gen., USAFFE, Subj: Proposed Installations and Facilities for Far East Air Force, Nov. 21, 1941; Ltr, MacArthur to Marshall, Nov. 29, 1941, File: "USAFFE: Personal Files of Gen. MacArthur, Nov. 8-24, 1941," Box 1, RG 2, MacArthur Memorial Archives; Brereton, The Brereton Diaries, pp. 32-33; Futrell, "Air Hostilities in the Philippines," p. 35; Bartsch, "Was MacArthur Ill-Served by His Air Force Commanders in the Philippines?," p. 50.
(31.) Intvw, Eugene Eubank, May 8, 1970, Part II, p. 23, Box 64, Hap Arnold-The Murray Green Papers, AFAL; Ltr, MacArthur to Marshall, Nov. 29, 1941, File: "USAFFE: Personal Files of Gen. MacArthur, Nov. 8-24, 1941," USAFFE Special Order No. 83, Nov. 29, 1941, all in Box 1, RG 2, MacArthur Memorial Archives; Intvw, D. Clayton James with Gen George C. Kenney, July 16, 1971, pp. 19-21, MacArthur Memorial Archives; Futrell, "Air Hostilities in the Philippines," pp. 36-37; Bartsch, "Was MacArthur Ill-Served by His Air Force Commanders in the Philippines?," pp. 50-53.
(32.) Memo, Brady to Commanding Officers, Vth Interceptor Command, Vth Bomber Command, Vth Service Command, and the 2nd Observation Squadron, subj: Readiness Status of Far East Air Force, Nov. 28, 1941; USAFFE Special Order No. 82, Nov. 28, 1941, USAFFE Special Order No. 83, Nov. 29, 1941, all in File: "USAFFE: Personal Files of Gen. MacArthur, Nov. 8-24, 1941," Box 1, RG 2, MacArthur Memorial Archives; Memo, Maj. Gen. Emmet O'Donnell to Chief, Army Air Forces Historical Office, Feb. 13, 1946, AFHRA; Msg, Churchill to Cmd Off., Del Monte, GE6 V OW7 NR 7(D) 40 P, Dec. 5, 1941, 0555, Box 12, Folder 5, Emmett O'Donnell, Jr., Papers, AFAL; Edmonds, They Fought With What They Had, pp. 52-55; "Army Air Action in the Philippines & Netherlands East Indies," p. 47; Bartsch, "Was MacArthur Ill-Served by His Air Force Commanders in the Philippines?," pp. 50-51. The report of the 5th Air Base Commander may be found at: Rpt, Lt. Col. Ray T. Elsmore to. Gen. H. H. George, subj: Air Base Status, Feb. 2, 1942, Appendix 6 to "Army Air Action in the Philippines & Netherlands East Indies," pp. 264-68.
(33.) Intvw, Lt. Gen. John W, Carpenter, III, Jan 12, 1979, p. 67, K239.0512-1110. AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
(34.) Edmonds, They Fought With What They Had, pp. 70-71; Bartsch, Doomed at the Start, pp. 41-52; Ltr, Parker Gies to George Kirksey, Dec. 4, 1945, Box 3, File 15, George Kirksey Collection, (Special Collections and Archives, University of Houston Libraries).
(35.) David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941 (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1997), p. 342; John Prados, Combined Fleet Decoded: The Secret History of American Intelligence and the Japanese Navy in World War II (New York: Random House, 1995), pp. 202-205.
(36.) Richard B. Meixsel, "Clark Field & the U.S. Army Air Corps in the Philippines, 1919-1942" (unpublished manuscript.), pp. 65-66; "Army Air Action in the Philippines & Netherlands East Indies," pp. 43-44; Edmonds, They Fought With What They Had, p. 13, 70-71; Bartsch, Doomed at the Start, p. 47; Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, p. 187; Morton, Fall of the Philippines, pp. 44-45; John F. Kreis, Air Base Air Defense, 1914-1973 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1988), p. 31.
(37.) Brereton, The Brereton Dairies, p. 22; Edmonds, They Fought With What They Had, pp. 5,41,43-45,68.
(38.) Ltr summary, Dec 1, 1941, Subject Index, Decimal File, 1940-1945, Box 56, Papers of Henry H. Arnold, LC; Walter D. Edmonds, They Fought With What They Had, pp. 26-27, 38, 68-70; Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, p. 187; "Army Air Action in the Philippines & Netherlands East Indies," pp. 46-47.
(39.) Brereton, The Brereton Diaries, pp. 23-24; Charles H. Bogart, "Radar in the Philippines, 1941-1942" The Journal of America's Military Past (Fall, 1999), pp. 27-35; Kreis, Air Base Air Defense, pp. 24-31; Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, pp. 186-87. See also, "Working for the Air Forces" in Dulany Terrett, The Signal Corps: The Emergency (To December 1941), United States Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1956), pp. 251-74.
(40.) "Reminiscences of Lieutenant Colonel Howard W Brown," Aug. 4, 1945, Signal Security Agency, SRH-045, pp. 12-16, in RG 457, National Archives (NA); Prados, Combined Fleet Decoded, pp. 209-15.
(41.) Msg No. 624, Marshall to Cmd. Gen., USAFFE, Nov. 27, 1941, quoted in Edmonds, They Fought With What They Had, pp. 56-57.
(42.) Edmonds, They Fought With What They Had, pp. 57-58; Brereton, The Brereton Diaries, pp. 33-34; Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, p. 190 Barsch, "Was MacArthur Ill-Served by His Air Force Commanders in the Philippines?," p. 53. The message from Arnold to MacArthur is quoted in Brereton, The Brereton Diaries, p. 34.
(43.) Ltr, Lewellyn to wife, Nov. 27, 1941(Courtesy Robert Llewellyn, Pebble Beach, California).
(44.) Ibid. According to pilot Frank Kurtz, Brereton was constantly visiting Clark Field. William L. White, Queens Die Proudly (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1943), p. 13.
(45.) Brereton, The Brereton Diaries, p. 37.
(46.) Morton, Fall of the Philippines, p. 72.
(47.) "Army Air Action in the Philippines & Netherlands East Indies," pp. 50, 52; Brereton, The Brereton Diaries, pp. 37-88; Edmonds, They Fought With What They Had, p. 72; D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, Volume II, 1941-1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1975), pp. 6-7. Morton, Fall of the Philippines, pp. 72-73.
(48.) Lt, Col. Charles H. Caldwell, FEAF operations officer, quoted in Futrell, "Air Hostilities in the Philippines," p. 38.
(49.) Ind, Bataan, p. 92.
(50.) HQ FEAF, "Summary of Activities," Brereton Papers, Eisenhower Library; Msg, Eubank to Cmd Off, Del Monte, GE6 V 0W7 1(FW) 21, Dec. 8, 1941, 0555, Box 12, Folder Pers, Emmett O'Donnell, Jr., Papers, AFAL; Ind, Bataan, pp. 92-93; Brereton, The Brereton Diaries, pp. 38-39; Morton, Fall of the Philippines, p. 67; Edmonds, They Fought With What They Had, pp. 79-80; Barsch, "Was MacArthur Ill-Served by His Air Force Commanders in the Philippines?," pp. 53-54, 59. Among those who witnessed the Brereton-Sutherland exchange was Col. William B. Morse, one of MacArthur's staff officers. See John Toland, But Not in Shame (New York: Random House, 1961), p. 41.
(51.) Intvw, Lt. Gen. John W, Carpenter, III, Jan 12, 1979, pp. 61-62, K239.0512-1110. AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala; Brereton, The Brereton Diaries, pp. 39-40; Edmonds, They Fought With What They Had, p. 44; Mitchell, On Wings We Conquer, p. 33. The 17th and 20th Pursuit Groups took off about 0800 to intercept this reported force, but failed to locate anything hostile. Bartsch, Doomed at the Start, pp. 62-63.
(52.) "Brief Summary of Action in the Office of Chief of Staff, USAFFE, 8:58 AM to 5:40 PM, Dec. 8, 1941," Folder 5 "A Brief Summary of Action," Box 2, RG 2, MacArthur Memorial Archives. This is probably the same call that FEAF recorded as received at 0900 in which Sutherland told Brereton that FEAF's aircraft were not authorized to carry bombs. HQ FEAF, "Summary of Activities," Brereton Papers, Eisenhower Library. USAFFE
(53.) "Brief Summary of Action in the Office of Chief of Staff, USAFFE, 8:58 AM to 5:40 PM, December 8, 1941," Folder 5 "A Brief Summary of Action," Box 2, RG 2, MacArthur Memorial Archives.
(54.) HQ FEAF, "Summary of Activities," Brereton Papers, Eisenhower Library; Intvw, Eugene Eubank, May 8, 1970, Part II, pp. 20-22, Box 64, Hap Arnold-The Murray Green Papers, AFAL.
(55.) Intvw, Eugene Eubank, May 8, 1970, Part II, p. 22, Box 64, Hap Arnold-The Murray Green Papers, AFAL.
(56.) HQ FEAF, "Summary of Activities," Brereton Papers, Eisenhower Library; Brereton, The Brereton Diaries, p. 40.
(57.) HQ FEAF, "Summary of Activities," Brereton Papers, Eisenhower Library; Futrell, "Air Hostilities in the Philippines," p. 39.
(58.) Brereton, The Brereton Diaries, p. 41; Mitchell, On Wings We Conquer, p. 33. The quotation is from FEAF Field Order No. 1 issued at 1120 as quoted in Morton, Fall of the Philippines, p. 82.
(59.) "Brief Summary of Action in the Office of Chief of Staff, USAFFE, 8:58 AM to 5:40 PM, Dec. 8, 1941," Folder 5 "A Brief Summary of Action," Box 2, RG 2, MacArthur Memorial Archives; HQ FEAF, "Summary of Activities," Brereton Papers, Eisenhower Library; Edmonds, They Fought With What They Had, pp. 79-98; Bartsch, Doomed at the Start, pp. 62-85; Koichi Shimada, "The Opening Air Offensive Against the Philippines," in David C. Evans, ed. and trans., The Japanese Navy in World War II: In the Words of Former Japanese Naval Officers, 2nd. Edition (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1986), pp. 86, 91.
(60.) Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, pp. 210-13; Mitchell, On Wings We Conquer, p. 34; Prados, Combined Fleet Decoded, p. 208; Shimada, "The Opening Air Offensive Against the Philippines," pp. 79, 86, 90-92, 94.
(61.) Quoted in Futrell, "Air Hostilities in the Philippines," p. 40.
(62.) Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 117. See also his statement quoted in D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, II, pp. 10-11.
(63.) Intvw, James with Kenney, Jul. 16, 1971, p. 22, MacArthur Memorial Archives; "M'Arthur Denies Brereton Report," New York Times, Sep. 28, 1946, p. 6.
(64.) Futrell, Air Hostilities in the Philippines," p. 40; James, The years of MacArthur, II, pp. 13-14, 200-201.
(65.) Diary: General Douglas MacArthur [21 Jul. 1941-23 Feb. 1942], p. 28, Box 3, RG 2, MacArthur Memorial Archives; Bartsch, "Was MacArthur Ill-Served by His Air Force Commanders in the Philippines?," p. 53.
(66.) The Good Years, pp. 98-99.
(67.) Willoughby, MacArthur, p. 26.
(68.) Maj. Gen. Courtney Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous With History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 12.
(69.) Intvw, Maj. Gen. Cecil F. Combs, Jun. 29, 1982, p. 62, K239.0512-1344. AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
(70.) Transcript, Telephone Conversation Between General Arnold and General Brereton, Dec 8, 1941, Box 210, Papers of Henry H. Arnold, LC; "M'Arthur Denies Brereton Report," New York Times, Sep. 28, 1946, p. 6; Brereton, The Brereton Diaries, p. 11; James, The Years of MacArthur, II, p. 12; Bartsch, "Was MacArthur Ill-served by His Air Commanders in the Philippines?," pp. 58-60.
(71.) Shimada, "The Opening Air Offensive Against the Philippines," pp. 94-99; Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, pp. 215-19; Prados, Combined Fleet Decoded, p. 208.
(72.) Wainwright, General Wainwright's Story, p. 25.
(73.) "Brief Summary of Action in the Office of Chief of Staff, USAFFE," Dec. 23 and Dec. 24, 1941, Folder 5 "A Brief Summary of Action," Box 2; Memo, Brereton to MacArthur, "Plan of Employment, FEAF," Dec. 24, 1941, Box 4, Memo, Sutherland to Brereton, Box 4, RG 2, MacArthur Memorial Archives; James, The Years of MacArthur, II, pp. 16-18 Bartsch, "Was MacArthur Ill-Served by His Air Force Commanders in the Philippines?," p. 57; Brereton, The Brereton Dairies, pp. 62-63.
(74.) Ind, Bataan, p. 166.
(75.) Brereton, The Brereton Diaries, pp. 76-77; Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, pp. 366-71; Maj. Gen. S. Woodbury Kirby, The War Against Japan Vol. I, The Loss of Singapore (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1957), pp. 293-94; Alfred Chandler, ed., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, 5 Vols. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), I, pp. 49-52.
(76.) Brereton, The Brereton Diaries, pp. 75, 79, 79; Gillison, Royal Australian Air Force, pp. 319-20; Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, pp. 371-74; "Army Air Action in the Philippines & Netherlands East Indies," pp. 102-103.
(77.) Ltr, Col. Francis M. Brady to Brig. Gen. Carl A. Spaatz, Chief of Air Staff, Jan. 25, 1942, File Diary [Personal], Jan 17-Feb 8, 1942, Box 8, The Papers of Carl A. Spaatz, LC; Brereton, The Brereton Diaries, p. 80; Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, pp. 377-78.
(78.) Intvw, Gen. Horace M. Wade, pp. 76-77, 85, K239.0512-1105. AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
(79.) Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, pp. 380-87, 400-401; Mitchell, On Wings We Conquer, pp. 73-74, 80-81, 88, 174-75.
(80.) The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, I, pp. 76-77, 80-81; Connell, Wavell: Supreme Commander, pp. 124-26.
(81.) Ltr, Col. Francis M. Brady to Brig. Gen. Carl A. Spaatz, Chief of Air Staff, January 25, 1942, File Diary [Personal], Jan 17-Feb 8, 1942, Box 8, The Papers of Carl A. Spaatz, LC.
(83.) Brereton, The Brereton Diaries, p. 88; Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, p. 388.
(84.) Connell, Wavell: Supreme Commander, p. 194.
(85.) Brereton, The Brereton Diaries, p. 99.
(86.) Note Card on Colonel Eubank, Box 44; Note Card on Evacuation of Java, Box 45, Hap Arnold-The Murray Green Papers, AFAL; Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, pp. 398-400.
(87.) Diary, Feb. 25, 1942, Folder 1, Box 44, Emmett O'Donnell, Jr., Papers, AFAL.
(88.) Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, p. 400.
(89.) Intvw, Maj. Gen. Cecil F. Combs, Jun. 29, 1982, p. 119, K239.0512-1344. AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala. Brereton tells a somewhat different story. See Brereton, The Brereton Diaries, p. 105.
(90.) Ltr, Lewellyn to wife, Mar. 5, 1941, (Courtesy William Bartsch); Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, pp. 484, 493-95.
(91.) Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, p. 484.
(92.) Ibid., pp. 484-85.
(93.) Brereton, Brereton Diaries, p. 106.
(94.) Ibid., p. 108.
(95.) Clare Boothe Luce, "Brereton," Life Magazine (June 1, 1942), p. 72; John R. Morris, "To Tokyo, Dammit!", Collier's (June 6, 1942), p. 31; Brereton, Brereton Diaries, p. 109; The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, I, p. 221; Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, pp. 493-95.
(96.) Ltr, Brereton to Arnold, Mar. 6, 1942, Box 199, Papers of Henry H. Arnold, LC.
(98.) Ibid.; Memo, Arnold to War Plans Division, Mar. 24, 1942, Ltr, Arnold to Brereton, April 28, 1942, Both in Box 199, Papers of Henry H. Arnold, LC.
(99.) "Index Cards, 04-04-42, Decimal File, 1940-1945, Box 39, The Papers of Henry H. Arnold; Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, pp. 495-97. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. VII, Services Around the World, New Imprint (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), pp. 117-19.
(100.) Ltr, Lewellyn to wife, Mar. 20, 1941, (Courtesy Robert Llewellyn, Pebble Beach, California).
(101.) Intvw, Maj. Gen. Cecil F. Combs, Jun. 29, 1982, p. 109, K239.0512-1344. AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala.; Brereton, The Brereton Diaries, pp. 116-18; Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, pp. 500-501.
(102.) Luce, "Brereton," p. 66
(103.) Award of Distinguished Flying Cross, and Ltr, Brereton to Stratemeyer, Aug. 1, 1942, 201 File.
(104.) "Summary of Brereton's Letter to Arnold, dated April 17, 1942," Box 199; Index Cards, Decimal File, 1940-1945, 05-03-42, Box 39, The Papers of Henry H. Arnold. Papers of Henry H. Arnold, LC; Herbert Weaver and Marvin Rapp, "The Tenth Air Force, 1942." (Army Air Forces Historical Study No. 12. Historical Division, Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, Aug. 1944), pp. 26-30.) Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, pp. 502-503; Msg, Stilwell to Brereton, n.d., Riley Sunderland and Charles F. Romanus, eds., Stilwell's Personal File: China-Burma-India, 1942-1944, 5 vols. (Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1976), I, p. 228.
(105.) Alan Moorehead, The March to Tunis: The North African War, 1940-1943 (New York: Harper & Row, 1943), p. 265.
(106.) Barbara W. Tuchman, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-1945 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1970), p. 257.
(107.) Msg, Stilwell to Marshall, Jul, 14, 1942, Sunderland and Romanus, eds., Stilwell's Personal File, I, p. 254.
(108.) "Summary of Brereton's Letter to Arnold, dated April 17, 1942," Box 199, Papers of Henry H. Arnold, LC.; Weaver and Rapp. "The Tenth Air Force, 1942." pp. 30-32.; Claire Lee Chennault, Way of a Fighter: The Memoirs of Claire Lee Chennault, Ed by Robert Hotz (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1949), pp. 164, 168, 184
(109.) Ltr, Brereton to Arnold, Jun. 24, 1941, Decimal File, SAS 320.2 India-Middle East, Folder 1, Box 91, Papers of Henry H. Arnold, LC; Brereton, The Brereton Dairies, p. 125; Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, p. 512. "Fighter" replaced "pursuit" as a designation in May 1942.
(110.) Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, I, pp. 512-13.
(111.) Postscript, Jun. 25, 1941, to Ltr, Brereton to Arnold, Jun. 24, 1941, Decimal File, SAS 320.2 India-Middle East, Folder 1, Box 91, Papers of Henry H. Arnold, LC.
(112.) Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, subj: Efficiency Report, Major Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, Jun. 27, 1942, 201 File.
(113.) Msg No. 921, Marshall to Stilwell, Jun 29, 942; Draft msg, Stilwell to Marshall, Jun, 30, 1942; Msg No. 976, Marshall to Stilwell, Jul 8, 1942; Msg, Stilwell to Marshall, Jul 14, 1942; Msg, Marshall to Stilwell, Jul 19, 1942; Draft msg, Stilwell to Arnold, Jul 20, 1942; Msg, Marshall to Stilwell, Aug 5, 1942; Sunderland and Romanus, eds., Stilwell's Personal File, I pp. 249-50, 253-54, 256-57, 261.
(114.) Brereton, The Brereton Dairies, p. 138.
(115.) Ibid., pp. 141-42.
(116.) Telephone intvw, Miller with Gen. Jacob Smart, USAF, Ret., Aug. 26, 1999; Intvw, Gen. Leon Johnson, June 14, 1971, p. 8, Box 68, Hap Arnold-The Murray Green Papers, AFAL; Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. II, Europe: Torch to Pointblank, August 1942 to Dec. 1943, New Imprint (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1983), pp. 477-83.
(117.) Philip S. Meilinger, Hoyt S. Vandenberg: The Life of a General, New Imprint (Washington, D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 2000), p. 50. For the selection of Brereton as commander of Ninth Air Force in England, see Msg, 140, Marshall to Eisenhower, Jul. 18, 1943, Files: Cable Off. (GCM/DDE Mar 28-Aug 1, 1943) (1), Box 132, Pre-Presidential Records, Eisenhower Library.
(118.) Meilinger, Vandenberg, pp. 41-42, 44-45, 49, 60; Davis, Spaatz, p. 316-19, 354-55, 465-66; Solly Zuckerman, From Apes to Warlords (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), p. 348.
(119.) Meilinger, Vandenberg, p. 221; Intvw, Gen. Samuel E. Anderson, Jul. 1, 1976, K239.0512-905, pp. 274-75, AFHBA; The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower, IV, pp. 2466-69; Gen. of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, subj: Special Rating of General Officers, Jul. 12, 1945, 201 File.
(120.) Telephone intvw, Miller with Gen. DeVol Brett, USAF, Ret., Aug. 30, 1999; "Lt. Gen. Brereton to Wed London Woman Thursday," The Sunday Star [Washington, D.C.], Jan. 20, 1946; [Photograph], The Sunday Star [Washington, D.C.], Jan. 25, 1946 (Brereton File, U.S. Naval Academy Library, Annapolis, Maryland); Obituary, New York Times, 21 Jul. 1967; Intvw, Miller with Mrs. Lewis H. Brereton, Winter Park, Florida, Sep. 26, 1999.
(121.) Obituary, New York Times, 21 Jul. 1967.
(122.) Officer efficiency report, Jul. 1 to Dec. 31, 1945, 201 File.
(123.) Intvw, James with Kenney, Jul. 16, 1971, p. 19, MacArthur Memorial Archives.
(124.) Postcard, Lewellyn to wife, Nov. 19, 1941. (Courtesy Robert Llewellyn, Pebble Beach, California.).
(125.) Intvw, Maj. Gen. Cecil F. Combs, Jun. 29, 1982, p. 59, K239.0512-1344. AFHRA, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
|Printer friendly Cite/link Email Feedback|
|Author:||Miller, Roger G.|
|Publication:||Air Power History|
|Date:||Mar 22, 2001|
|Previous Article:||Origins and Development, 1964-1972.|
|Next Article:||GENESIS OF THE AEROSPACE CONCEPT.|