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4 Relative valuation.

In relative valuation, we value an asset based upon how similar assets are priced in the market. A prospective house buyer decides how much to pay for a house by looking at the prices paid for similar houses in the neighborhood. A baseball card collector makes a judgment on how much to pay for a Mickey Mantle rookie card by checking transactions prices on other Mickey Mantle rookie cards. In the same vein, a potential investor in a stock tries to estimate its value by looking at the market pricing of "similar" stocks.

Embedded in this description are the three essential steps in relative valuation. The fist step is fading comparable assets that are priced by the market, a task that is easier to accomplish with real assets like baseball cards and houses than it is with stocks. All too often, analysts use other companies in the same sector as comparable, comparing a software firm to other software firms or a utility to other utilities, but we will question whether this practice really yields similar companies later in this paper. The second step is scaling the market prices to a common variable to generate standardized prices that are comparable. While this may not be necessary when comparing identical assets (Mickey Mantle rookie cards), it is necessary when comparing assets that vary in size or units. Other things remaining equal, a smaller house or apartment should trade at a lower price than a larger residence. In the context of stocks, this equalization usually requires converting the market value of equity or the firm into multiples of earnings, book value or revenues. The third and last step in the process is adjusting for differences across assets when comparing their standardized values. Again, using the example of a house, a newer house with more updated amenities should be priced higher than a similar sized older house that needs renovation. With stocks, differences in pricing across stocks can be attributed to all of the fundamentals that we talked about in discounted cash flow valuation. Higher growth companies, for instance, should trade at higher multiples than lower growth companies in the same sector. Many analysts adjust for these differences qualitatively, making every relative valuation a story telling experience; analysts with better and more believable stories are given credit for better valuations.

4.1 Basis for Approach

There is a significant philosophical difference between discounted cash flow and relative valuation. In discounted cash flow valuation, we are attempting to estimate the intrinsic value of an asset based upon its capacity to generate cash flows in the future. In relative valuation, we are making a judgment on how much an asset is worth by looking at what the market is paying for similar assets. If the market is correct, on average, in the way it prices assets, discounted cash flow and relative valuations may converge. If, however, the market is systematically over pricing or under pricing a group of assets or an entire sector, discounted cash flow valuations can deviate from relative valuations.

Harking back to our earlier discussion of discounted cash flow valuation, we argued that discounted cash flow valuation was a search (albeit unfulfilled) for intrinsic value. In relative valuation, we have given up on estimating intrinsic value and essentially put our trust in markets getting it right, at least on average. It can be argued that most valuations are relative valuations. Damodaran (2002) notes that almost 90% of equity research valuations and 50% of acquisition valuations use some combination of multiples and comparable companies and are thus relative valuations.

4.2 Standardized Values and Multiples

When comparing identical assets, we can compare the prices of these assets. Thus, the price of a Tiffany lamp or a Mickey Mantle rookie card can be compared to the price at which an identical item was bought or sold in the market. However, comparing assets that are not exactly similar can be a challenge. After all, the price per share of a stock is a function both of the value of the equity in a company and the number of shares outstanding in the firm. Thus, a stock split that doubles the number of units will approximately halve the stock price. To compare the values of "similar" firms in the market, we need to standardize the values in some way by scaling them to a common variable. In general, values can be standardized relative to earnings to the book values or replacement values to the revenues or to measures that are specify to firms in a sector.

* One of the more intuitive ways to think of the value of any asset is as a multiple of the earnings that asset generates. When buying a stock, it is common to look at the price paid as a multiple of the earnings per share generated by the company. This price/earnings ratio can be estimated using current earnings per share, yielding a current PE, earnings over the last 4 quarters, resulting in a trailing PE, or an expected earnings per share in the next year, providing a forward PE. When buying a business, as opposed to just the equity in the business, it is common to examine the value of the firm as a multiple of the operating income or the earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA). While, as a buyer of the equity or the firm, a lower multiple is better than a higher one, these multiples will be affected by the growth potential and risk of the business being acquired.

* While financial markets provide one estimate of the value of a business, accountants often provide a very different estimate of value for the same business. As we noted earlier, investors often look at the relationship between the price they pay for a stock and the book value of equity (or net worth) as a measure of how over--or undervalued a stock is; the price/book value ratio that emerges can vary widely across industries, depending again upon the growth potential and the quality of the investments in each. When valuing businesses, we estimate this ratio using the value of the firm and the book value of all assets or capital (rather than just the equity). For those who believe that book value is not a good measure of the true value of the assets, an alternative is to use the replacement cost of the assets; the ratio of the value of the firm to replacement cost is called Tobin's Q.

* Both earnings and book value are accounting measures and are determined by accounting rules and principles. An alternative approach, which is far less affected by accounting choices, is to use the ratio of the value of a business to the revenues it generates. For equity investors, this ratio is the price/sales ratio (PS), where the market value of equity is divided by the revenues generated by the firm. For firm value, this ratio can be modified as the enterprise value/to sales ratio (VS), where the numerator becomes the market value of the operating assets of the firm. This ratio, again, varies widely across sectors, largely as a function of the profit margins in each. The advantage of using revenue multiples, however, is that it becomes far easier to compare firms in different markets, with different accounting systems at work, than it is to compare earnings or book value multiples.

* While earnings, book value and revenue multiples are multiples that can be computed for firms in any sector and across the entire market, there are some multiples that are specific to a sector. For instance, when internet firms first appeared on the market in the later 1990s, they had negative earnings and negligible revenues and book value. Analysts looking for a multiple to value these firms divided the market value of each of these firms by the number of hits generated by that firm's web site. Firms with lower market value per customer hit were viewed as under valued. More recently, cable companies have been judged by the market value per cable subscriber, regardless of the longevity and the profitably of having these subscribers. While there are conditions under which sector-specify multiples can be justified, they are dangerous for two reasons. First, since they cannot be computed for other sectors or for the entire market, sector-specify multiples can result in persistent over or under valuations of sectors relative to the rest of the market. Thus, investors who would never consider paying 80 times revenues for a firm might not have the same qualms about paying $2000 for every page hit (on the web site), largely because they have no sense of what high, low or average is on this measure. Second, it is far more difficult to relate sector-specify multiples to fundamentals, which is an essential ingredient to using multiples well. For instance, does a visitor to a company's web site translate into higher revenues and profits? The answer will not only vary from company to company, but will also be difficult to estimate looking forward.

There have been relatively few studies that document the usage statistics on these multiples and compare their relative efficacy. Damodaran (2002) notes that the usage of multiples varies widely across sectors, with Enterprise Value/EBITDA multiples dominating valuations of heavy infrastructure businesses (cable, telecomm) and price to book ratios common in financial service company valuations. Fernandez (2001) presents evidence on the relative popularity of different multiples at the research arm of one investment bank--Morgan Stanley Europe--and notes that PE ratios and EV/EBITDA multiples are the most frequently employed. Liu et al. (2002) compare how well different multiples do in pricing 19879 firm-year observations between 1982 and 1999 and suggest that multiples of forecasted earnings per share do best in explaining pricing differences, that multiples of sales and operating cash flows do worst and that multiples of book value and EBITDA fall in the middle. Lie and Lie (2002) examine 10 different multiples across 8621 companies between 1998 and 1999 and arrive at similar conclusions.

4.3 Determinants of Multiples

In the introduction to discounted cash flow valuation, we observed that the value of a firm is a function of three variables--it capacity to generate cash flows, the expected growth in these cash flows and the uncertainty associated with these cash flows. Every multiple, whether it is of earnings, revenues or book value, is a function of the same three variables--risk, growth, and cash flow generating potential. Intuitively, then, firms with higher growth rates, less risk and greater cash flow generating potential should trade at higher multiples than firms with lower growth, higher risk, and less cash flow potential.

The specify measures of growth, risk, and cash flow generating potential that are used will vary from multiple to multiple. To look under the hood, so to speak, of equity and firm value multiples, we can go back to fairly simple discounted cash flow models for equity and firm value and use them to derive the multiples. In the simplest discounted cash flow model for equity, which is a stable growth dividend discount model, the value of equity is:

Value of equity = [P.sub.0] = [DPS.sub.1]/[k.sub.e] - [g.sub.n].

where [DPS.sub.1] is the expected dividend in the next year, [k.sub.e] is the cost of equity, and [g.sub.n] is the expected stable growth rate. Dividing both sides by the earnings, we obtain the discounted cash flow equation specifying the PE ratio for a stable growth firm.

[P.sub.0]/[EPS.sub.0] = PE = Payout ratio x (1 + [g.sub.n])/[k.sub.e] - [g.sub.n].

The key determinants of the PE ratio are the expected growth rate in earnings per share, the cost of equity, and the payout ratio. Other things remaining equal, we would expect higher growth, lower risk, and higher payout ratio firms to trade at higher multiples of earnings than firms without these characteristics. In fact, this model can be expanded to allow for high growth in near years and stable growth beyond. (1) Researchers have long recognized that the PE for a stock is a function of both the level and the quality of its growth and its risk. Beaver and Morse (1978) related PE ratios to valuation fundamentals, as did earlier work by Edwards and Bell (1961). Peasnell (1982) made a more explicit attempt to connect market values to accounting numbers. Zarowin (1990) looked at the link between PE ratios and analyst forecasts of growth to conclude that PE ratios are indeed positively related to long term expected growth. Leibowitz and Kogelman (1990, 1991, 1992) expanded on the relationship between PE ratios and the excess returns earned on investments, which they titled franchise opportunities, in a series of articles on the topic, noting that for a stock to have a high PE ratio, it needs to generate high growth in conjunction with excess returns on its new investments. Fairfield (1994) provides a generalized version of their model, allowing for changing return on equity over time. While these papers focused primarily on growth and returns, Kane et al. (1996) examine the relationship between PE and risk for the aggregate market and conclude that PE ratios decrease as market volatility increases.

Dividing both sides of the stable growth dividend discount model by the book value of equity, we can estimate the price/book value ratio for a stable growth firm.

[P.sub.0]/[BV.sub.0] = PBV = ROE x Payout ratio x (1 + [g.sub.n])/[k.sub.e] - [g.sub.n],

where ROE is the return on equity and is the only variable in addition to the three that determine PE ratios (growth rate, cost of equity, and payout) that affects price to book equity. The strong connection between price to book and return on equity was noted by Wilcox (1984), with his argument that cheap stocks are those that trade at low price to book ratios while maintaining reasonable or even high returns on equity. (2) The papers we referenced in the earlier section on book-value based valuation approaches centered on the Ohlson model can be reframed as a discussion of the determinants of price to book ratios. Penman (1996) draws a distinction between PE ratios and PBV ratios when it comes to the link with return on equity, by noting that while PBV ratios increase with ROE, the relationship between PE ratios and ROE is weaker.

Finally, dividing both sides of the dividend discount model by revenues per share, the price/sales ratio for a stable growth firm can be estimated as a function of its profit margin, payout ratio, risk and expected growth.

[P.sub.0]/[Sales.sub.0] = PS = Profit margin x Payout ratio x (1 + [g.sub.n])/[k.sub.e] - [g.sub.n].

The net margin is the new variable that is added to the process. While all of these computations are based upon a stable growth dividend discount model, we will show that the conclusions hold even when we look at companies with high growth potential and with other equity valuation models. While less work has been done on revenue multiples than on book value or earnings multiples, Leibowitz (1997) extends his franchise value argument from PE ratios to revenue multiples and notes the importance of profit margins in explaining differences in their values.

We can do a similar analysis to derive the firm value multiples. The value of a firm in stable growth can be written as:

Value of firm = [V.sub.0] = [FCFF.sub.1]/[k.sub.e] - [g.sub.n].

Dividing both sides by the expected free cash flow to the firm yields the Value/FCFF multiple for a stable growth firm.

[V.sub.0]/[FCFF.sub.1] = 1/[k.sub.e] - [g.sub.n].

The multiple of FCFF that a firm commands will depend upon two variables--its cost of capital and its expected stable growth rate. Since the free cash flow the firm is the after-tax operating income netted against the net capital expenditures and working capital needs of the firm, the multiples of EBIT, after-tax EBIT and EBITDA can also be estimated similarly.

In short, multiples are determined by the same variables and assumptions that underlie discounted cash flow valuation. The difference is that while the assumptions are explicit in the latter, they are often implicit in the use of the former.

4.4 Comparable Firms

When multiples are used, they tend to be used in conjunction with comparable firms to determine the value of a firm or its equity. But what is a comparable firm? A comparable firm is one with cash flows, growth potential, and risk similar to the firm being valued. It would be ideal if we could value a firm by looking at how an exactly identical firm--in terms of risk, growth and cash flows--is priced. Nowhere in this definition is there a component that relates to the industry or sector to which a firm belongs. Thus, a telecommunications firm can be compared to a software firm, if the two are identical in terms of cash flows, growth and risk. In most analyses, however, analysts define comparable firms to be other firms in the firm's business or businesses. If there are enough firms in the industry to allow for it, this list is pruned further using other criteria; for instance, only firms of similar size may be considered. The implicit assumption being made here is that firms in the same sector have similar risk, growth, and cash flow profiles and therefore can be compared with much more legitimacy. This approach becomes more difficult to apply when there are relatively few firms in a sector. In most markets outside the United States, the number of publicly traded firms in a particular sector, especially if it is defined narrowly, is small. It is also difficult to define firms in the same sector as comparable firms if differences in risk, growth and cash flow profiles across firms within a sector are large. The tradeoff is therefore a simple one. Defining an industry more broadly increases the number of comparable firms, but it also results in a more diverse group of companies. Boatman and Baskin (1981) compare the precision of PE ratio estimates that emerge from using a random sample from within the same sector and a narrower set of firms from the same group with the most similar 10-year average growth rate in earnings and conclude that the latter yields better estimates.

There are alternatives to the conventional practice of defining comparable firms as other firms in the same industry. One is to look for firms that are similar in terms of valuation fundamentals. For instance, to estimate the value of a firm with a beta of 1.2, an expected growth rate in earnings per share of 20% and a return on equity of 40%, (3) we would End other firms across the entire market with similar characteristics. (4) Alford (1992) examines the practice of using industry categorizations for comparable firms and compares their effectiveness with using categorizations based upon fundamentals such as risk and growth. Based upon the prediction error from the use of each categorization, he concludes that industry based categorizations match or slightly outperform fundamental based categorization, which he views as evidence that much of the variation in multiples that can be explained by fundamentals can be also explained by industry. In contrast, Cheng and McNamara (2000), Bhojraj and Lee (2002) and Bhojraj et al. (2003) argue that picking comparables using a combination of industry categorization and fundamentals such as total assets yields more precise valuations than using just the industry classification.

4.5 Controlling for Differences Across Firms

No matter how carefully we construct our list of comparable firms, we will end up with firms that are different from the firm we are valuing. The differences may be small on some variables and large on others and we will have to control for these differences in a relative valuation. There are three ways of controlling for these differences.

4.5.1 Subjective adjustments

Relative valuation begins with two choices--the multiple used in the analysis and the group of firms that comprises the comparable firms. In many relative valuations, the multiple is calculated for each of the comparable firms and the average is computed. One issue that does come up with subjective adjustments to industry average multiples is how best to compute that average. Beatty et al. (1999) examine multiples of earnings, book value and total assets and conclude that the harmonic mean provides better estimates of value than the arithmetic mean. To evaluate an individual firm, the analyst then compares the multiple it trades at to the average computed; if it is significantly different, the analyst can make a subjective judgment about whether the firm's individual characteristics (growth, risk or cash flows) may explain the difference. If, in the judgment of the analyst, the difference on the multiple cannot be explained by the fundamentals, the firm will be viewed as over valued (if its multiple is higher than the average) or undervalued (if its multiple is lower than the average). The weakness in this approach is not that analysts are called upon to make subjective judgments, but that the judgments are often based upon little more than guesswork. All too often, these judgments confirm their biases about companies.

4.5.2 Modified multiples

In this approach, we modify the multiple to take into account the most important variable determining it--the companion variable. To provide an illustration, analysts who compare PE ratios across companies with very different growth rates often divide the PE ratio by the expected growth rate in EPS to determine a growth-adjusted PE ratio or the PEG ratio. This ratio is then compared across companies with different growth rates to find under--and overvalued companies. There are two implicit assumptions that we make when using these modified multiples. The fist is that these firms are comparable on all the other measures of value, other than the one being controlled for. In other words, when comparing PEG ratios across companies, we are assuming that they are all of equivalent risk. If some firms are riskier than others, you would expect them to trade at lower PEG ratios. The other assumption generally made is that the relationship between the multiples and fundamentals is linear. Again, using PEG ratios to illustrate the point, we are assuming that as growth doubles, the PE ratio will double; if this assumption does not hold up and PE ratios do not increase proportional to growth, companies with high growth rates will look cheap on a PEG ratio basis. Easton (2004) notes that one of the weaknesses of the PEG ratio approach is its emphasis on short term growth and provides a way of estimating the expected rate of return for a stock, using the PEG ratio, and concludes that PEG ratios are effective at ranking stocks.

4.5.3 Statistical techniques

Subjective adjustments and modified multiples are difficult to use when the relationship between multiples and the fundamental variables that determine them becomes complex. There are statistical techniques that offer promise, when this happens. In this section, we will consider the advantages of these approaches and potential concerns.

Sector Regressions. In a regression, we attempt to explain a dependent variable by using independent variables that we believe influence the dependent variable. This mirrors what we are attempting to do in relative valuation, where we try to explain differences across firms on a multiple (PE ratio, EV/EBITDA) using fundamental variables (such as risk, growth and cash flows). Regressions offer three advantages over the subjective approach:

(a) The output from the regression gives us a measure of how strong the relationship is between the multiple and the variable being used. Thus, if we are contending that higher growth companies have higher PE ratios, the regression should yield clues to both how growth and PE ratios are related (through the coefficient on growth as an independent variable) and how strong the relationship is (through the t statistics and R-squared).

(b) If the relationship between a multiple and the fundamental we are using to explain it is nonlinear, the regression can be modified to allow for the relationship.

(c) Unlike the modified multiple approach, where we were able to control for differences on only one variable, a regression can be extended to allow for more than one variable and even for cross effects across these variables.

In general, regressions seem particularly suited to our task in relative valuation, which is to make sense of voluminous and sometimes contradictory data. There are two key questions that we face when running sector regressions:

* The first relates to how we define the sector. If we define sectors too narrowly, we run the risk of having small sample sizes, which undercut the usefulness of the regression. Defining sectors broadly entails fewer risks. While there may be large differences across firms when we do this, we can control for those differences in the regression.

* The second involves the independent variables that we use in the regression. While the focus in statistics exercises is increasing the explanatory power of the regression (through the R-squared) and including any variables that accomplish this, the focus of regressions in relative valuations is narrower. Since our objective is not to explain away all differences in pricing across firms but only those differences that are explained by fundamentals, we should use only those variables that are related to those fundamentals. The last section where we analyzed multiples using DCF models should yield valuable clues. As an example, consider the PE ratio. Since it is determined by the payout ratio, expected growth and risk, we should include only those variables in the regression. We should not add other variables to this regression, even if doing so increases the explanatory power, if there is no fundamental reason why these variables should be related to PE ratios.

Market Regression. Searching for comparable firms within the sector in which a firm operates is fairly restrictive, especially when there are relatively few firms in the sector or when a firm operates in more than one sector. Since the definition of a comparable firm is not one that is in the same business but one that has the same growth, risk and cash flow characteristics as the firm being analyzed, we need not restrict our choice of comparable firms to those in the same industry. The regression introduced in the previous section controls for differences on those variables that we believe cause multiples to vary across firms. Based upon the variables that determine each multiple, we should be able to regress PE, PBV, and PS ratios against the variables that should affect them. As shown in the last section, the fundamentals that determine each multiple are summarized in Table 4.1.

It is, however, possible that the proxies that we use for risk (beta), growth (expected growth rate in earnings per share), and cash flow (payout) are imperfect and that the relationship is not linear. To deal with these limitations, we can add more variables to the regression e.g., the size of the firm may operate as a good proxy for risk or modify existing ones.

The fist advantage of this market-wide approach over the "subjective" comparison across firms in the same sector, described in the previous section, is that it does quantify, based upon actual market data, the degree to which higher growth or risk should affect the multiples. It is true that these estimates can contain errors, but those errors are a refection of the reality that many analysts choose not to face when they make subjective judgments. Second, by looking at all firms in the market, this approach allows us to make more meaningful comparisons of firms that operate in industries with relatively few firms. Third, it allows us to examine whether all firms in an industry are under--or overvalued, by estimating their values relative to other firms in the market.

In one of the earliest regressions of PE ratios against fundamentals across the market, Kisor and Whitbeck (1963) used data from the Bank of New York for 135 stocks to arrive at the following result:

P/E = 8.2 + 1.5 (Growth rate in earnings) + 6.7 (Payout ratio) - 0.2 (Standard deviation in EPS changes).

Cragg and Malkiel (1968) followed up by estimating the coefficients for a regression of the price-earnings ratio on the growth rate, the payout ratio and the beta for stocks for the time period from 1961 to 1965.
Year                     Equation                      [R.sup.2]

1961   P/E = 4.73 + 3.28g + 2.05 [pi] + 0.85 [beta]       0.70
1962   P/E = 11.06 + 1.75g + 0.78 [pi] + 1.61 [beta]      0.70
1963   P/E = 2.94 + 2.55g + 7.62 [pi] + 0.27 [beta]       0.75
1964   P/E = 6.71 + 2.05g + 5.23 [pi] + 0.89 [beta]       0.75
1965   P/E = 0.96 + 2.74g + 5.01 [pi] + 0.35 [beta]       0.85


where

P/E = Price/Earnings ratio at the start of the year,

g = Growth rate in earnings,

[pi] = Earnings payout ratio at the start of the year,

[beta] = Beta of the stock.

They concluded that while such models were useful in explaining PE ratios, they were of little use in predicting performance. In both of these studies, the three variables used--payout, risk and growth--represent the three variables that were identified as the determinants of PE ratios in an earlier section.

The regressions were updated in Damodaran (1996, 2002) using a much broader sample of stocks and for a much wider range of multiples. (5) The results for PE ratios from 1987 to 1991 are summarized below:
Year                    Equation                               [R.sup.
                                                                  2]

1987  PE = 7.1839 + 13.05 PAYOUT - 0.6259 [beta] + 6.5659 EGR   0.9287
1988  PE = 2.5848 + 29.91 PAYOUT - 4.5157 [beta] + 19.9143 EGR  0.9465
1989  PE = 4.6122 + 59.74 PAYOUT - 0.7546 [beta] + 9.0072 EGR   0.5613
1990  PE = 3.5955 + 10.88 PAYOUT - 0.2801 [beta] + 5.4573 EGR   0.3497
1991  PE = 2.7711 + 22.89 PAYOUT - 0.1326 [beta] + 13.8653 EGR  0.3217


Note the volatility in the R-squared over time and the changes in the coefficients on the independent variables. For instance, the R-squared in the regressions reported above declines from 93% in 1987 to 32% in 1991 and the coefficients change dramatically over time. Part of the reason for these shifts is that earnings are volatile and the price-earnings ratios reflect this volatility. The low R-squared for the 1991 regression can be ascribed to the recession's effects on earnings in that year. These regressions are clearly not stable, and the predicted values are likely to be noisy. In addition, the regressions for book value and revenue multiples consistently have higher explanatory power than the regressions for price earnings ratios.

Limitations of Statistical Techniques. Statistical techniques are not a panacea for research or for qualitative analysis. They are tools that every analyst should have access to, but they should remain tools. In particular, when applying regression techniques to multiples, we need to be aware of both the distributional properties of multiples that we talked about earlier in the paper and the relationship among and with the independent variables used in the regression.

* The distribution of multiple values across the population is not normal for a very simple reason; most multiples are restricted from taking on values below zero but can be very large positive values. (6) This can pose problems when using standard regression techniques, and these problems are accentuated with small samples, where the asymmetry in the distribution can be magnified by the existence of a few large outliers.

* In a multiple regression, the independent variables are themselves supposed to be independent of each other. Consider, however, the independent variables that we have used to explain valuation multiples--cash flow potential or payout ratio, expected growth and risk. Across a sector and over the market, it is quite clear that high growth companies will tend to be risky and have low payout. This correlation across independent variables creates "multicollinearity" which can undercut the explanatory power of the regression.

* The distributions for multiples change over time, making comparisons of PE ratios or EV/EBITDA multiples across time problematic. By the same token, a multiple regression where we explain differences in a multiple across companies at a point in time will itself lose predictive power as it ages. A regression of PE ratios against growth rates in early 2005 may therefore not be very useful in valuing stocks in early 2006.

* As a foal note of caution, the R-squared on relative valuation regressions will almost never be higher than 70% and it is common to see them drop to 30 or 35%. Rather than ask the question of how high an R-squared has to be to be meaningful, we would focus on the predictive power of the regression. When the R-squared decreases, the ranges on the forecasts from the regression will increase.

4.6 Reconciling Relative and Discounted Cash Flow Valuations

The two approaches to valuation--discounted cash flow valuation and relative valuation--will generally yield different estimates of value for the same firm at the same point in time. It is even possible for one approach to generate the result that the stock is undervalued while the other concludes that it is overvalued. Furthermore, even within relative valuation, we can arrive at different estimates of value depending upon which multiple we use and what firms we based the relative valuation on.

The differences in value between discounted cash flow valuation and relative valuation come from different views of market efficiency, or put more precisely, market inefficiency. In discounted cash flow valuation, we assume that markets make mistakes, that they correct these mistakes over time, and that these mistakes can often occur across entire sectors or even the entire market. In relative valuation, we assume that while markets make mistakes on individual stocks, they are correct on average. In other words, when we value a new software company relative to other small software companies, we are assuming that the market has priced these companies correctly, on average, even though it might have made mistakes in the pricing of each of them individually. Thus, a stock may be overvalued on a discounted cash flow basis but undervalued on a relative basis, if the firms used for comparison in the relative valuation are all overpriced by the market. The reverse would occur, if an entire sector or market were underpriced.

Kaplan and Ruback (1995) examine the transactions prices paid for 51 companies in leveraged buyout deals and conclude that discounted cash flow valuations yield values very similar to relative valuations, at least for the firms in their sample. They used the compressed APV approach, described in an earlier section, to estimate discounted cash flow values and multiples of EBIT and EBITDA to estimate relative values. Berkman et al. (2000) use the PE ratio and discounted cash flow valuation models to value 45 newly listed companies on the New Zealand Stock Exchange and conclude that both approaches explain about 70% of the price variation and have similar accuracy. In contrast to these findings, Kim and Ritter (1999) value a group of IPOs using PE and price to book ratios and conclude that multiples have only modest predictive ability. Lee et al. (1999) compare valuations obtained for the Dow 30 stocks using both multiples and a discounted cash flow model, based upon residual income, and conclude that prices are more likely to converge on the latter in the long term. While the evidence seems contradictory, it can be explained by the fact the studies that find relative valuation works well look at cross-sectional differences across stocks, whereas studies that look at pricing differences that correct over time conclude that intrinsic valuations are more useful.

(1) See Damodaran (2002), for expanded versions of the models are available in the chapter on PE ratios.

(2) See Wilcox (1984).

(3) The return on equity of 40% becomes a proxy for cash flow potential. With a 20% growth rate and a 40% return on equity, this firm will be able to return half of its earnings to its stockholders in the form of dividends or stock buybacks.

(4) Finding these firms manually may be tedious when your universe includes 10000 stocks. You could draw on statistical techniques such as cluster analysis to find similar firms.

(5) Damodaran (1996, 2002), provides regressions of both equity and firm value multiples. These regressions look at all stocks listed on the COMPUSTAT database and similar regressions are run using price to book, price to sales and enterprise value multiples. The updated versions of these regressions are online at http://www.damodaran.com. In the 1987-91 regressions, the growth rate over the previous 5 years was used as the expected growth rate and the betas were estimated from the CRSP tape.

(6) Damodaran (2006), examines the distributional characteristics of multiples in Chapter 7.

Aswath Damodaran

Stern School of Business, New York University, 44 W. 4th Street, 9th Floor, New York, NY 10012-1126, adamodar@stern.nyu.edu
Table 4.1 Fundamentals determining equity multiples.

Multiple                     Fundamental determinants

Price earnings ratio         Expected growth, Payout, Risk
Price to Book equity ratio   Expected growth, Payout, Risk, ROE
Price to Sales ratio         Expected growth, Payout, Risk, Net margin
EV to EBITDA                 Expected growth, Reinvestment rate, Risk,
                               ROC, Tax rate
EV to Capital ratio          Expected growth, Reinvestment rate, Risk,
                               ROC
EV to Sales                  Expected growth, Reinvestment rate, Risk,
                               Operating margin
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Title Annotation:Valuation Approaches and Metrics: A Survey of the Theory and Evidence
Author:Damodaran, Aswath
Publication:Foundations and Trends in Finance
Date:Mar 1, 2006
Words:6286
Previous Article:3 Liquidation and accounting valuation.
Next Article:5 Directions for future research.

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