Printer Friendly

[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]: Pindar, Callicles and Plato's treatment of [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] in the Gorgias.

The edition of Pindar's poem has particularly concerned the critics. The editions of Puech (1923), Bowra (19471 (2)), Turyn (1952), and Snell (1955 (2)) are some of the more recent editions of the poem to 1961. (1) The poem spread to six-eight verses when, in 1961, Lobel published (2) a papyrus of the 1st or early 2nd century AD, by which over 24 verses were added to the fragment. Before Lobel's edition, all that was known about the text was a composition between the verses cited by Plato in his Gorgias and by the scholiast on Aelius Aristides' treatise To Plato: In defense of oratory. (3) The editio princeps of the fragment was followed by a number of restorations proposed by Page (1962:49-51). This paper will deal with those verses of Pindar's fragment utilised in the Platonic dialogue, as presented in Pindar's edition by Maehler (1975), (4) as well as the edition of the Platonic dialogue by Dodds (1959), and it will discuss the interpretative problems that arise, eventually offering a solution. These are the texts concerned:

[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]

(Pind. fr. 169a Maehler, 1-8);

[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]

(Pl. Gorg. 484b1-c3 Dodds) (5)

The meaning of [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]

Among older scholars, Boeckh (1821:642), Nestle (1942 (2):160), Laroche (1949: 174-175), and Dodds (1959:270) propose the interpretation 'law of Fate'; Gundert (1935:9-50), Untersteiner (1954:297 n. 30), Gigante (1956:75, 91), and Dodds (1959:270) identify [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] with Zeus' will; Nestle (1911:251, as well as 19422:164), Schroeder (1917:202), Ehrenberg (1921:120), (6) Heinimann (1945:6870), and Gigante (1956:75) accept its origination from Orphic or Pythagorean sources; Stier (1928:238), Untersteiner (1954:297 n. 30), Frankel (1962:545-546), Treu (1963:212) give to [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] the interpretation 'sacred and inviolable' 'order-system', while Croiset (19853:233), Puech (1923:218), Perotta (1935:109), Norwood (1945:58), Latte (1946:73) suggest the interpretation 'custom' or 'convention'. Among younger ones, Ostwald (1965:124-131) argues that, for Pindar, who is aware of the various semantic connotations of the term [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], the effective interpretation is the one based on which [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] means every conduct or perspective based on traditional, deeply rooted and established perceptions that initiate the application of certain practices. This interpretation of [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] is the link through which Pindar manages to connect Hercules' glorious actions with the violence of their performance. According to Pavese (1968:55), [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] does not just mean 'a custom', but the custom that becomes acceptable by the community and defines the individual conduct. Lloyd-Jones (1972:56) holds the view that, for Pindar, [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] is Zeus' will that constitutes the [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] of the universe. Pike (1984:20-22) contends that the poem refers to one [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], the king of all. Consequently, every act performed by a person is just to the extent that it is within the boundaries set by the [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] of the class to which he belongs. Thus, whatever Pindar thinks about some of Hercules' acts, he must accept them as just, because the almighty [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] renders them just. (7) Finally, Demos (1994:98) believes that Pindar resorts to the idea of [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] in order to justify the most violent act both in the human and in the godly sphere. Demos' proposal is the etymological connection of [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] with [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] ('distribute'). For Demos, [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] means the way in which things have been distributed or, more generally, the current state of things. Thus, [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] is the ultimate authority, which acts as a just king; despite the fact that Hercules' violent acts can be considered reprehensible, [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] has the power to negate the regular human ideas about just and unjust.

Is the verb [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] transitive or intransitive?

Ostwald (1965:117) believes that [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] is transitive and takes an object, [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], which is also the object of [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]. Pavese (1968:57) claims that one could argue, like Ostwald and Wilamowitz (1920:96), that [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] is transitive and takes the same object as [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]. However, when the godly factor intervenes, [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] is used intransitively, in order to state the godly leadership-guidance. Lloyd-Jones (1972:48) cites Schroeder (1917:196), Dodds (1959:270) and Ostwald (1965:117), who consider that [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] is the object of [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]. On the other hand, he cites Pavese (1968:57) disagreeing with his opinion that [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] in this poem is intransitive and that there is a godly factor guiding. Lloyd-Jones thinks that the object of [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] must derive from the expression [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]. In his opinion, the most appropriate interpretation is the following: 'the law guides all mortals and immortals according to its will'. Thus, [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] must be considered as the object of [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] and not of [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]. Grote (1994:23) thinks that [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] does not take an object, and he interprets the verse as follows: 'the law, which is the king of all, mortals and immortals, [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] (he leaves this untranslated), justifying violence ...'. Demos (1994:94) is in favour of the view that [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] is transitive. Disagreeing with Dodds and Ostwald (who say that its object is [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), she agrees with Lloyd-Jones that the object of [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] must derive from the expression [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII].

[TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]?

One must recall here that Aelius Aristides, in his discourse To Plato: In defense of oratory (52.14 Jebb; TLG online: Or. 45, vol. 2, p. 68 Dindorf), refers to the Platonic passage that preserves Pindar's poem exactly as it is printed in Dodds' edition: he cites the reading [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] and records the fragment up to [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]-; his scholiast, as we saw above, completes it. Ostwald (1965:32 n. 8) suggests that it is worth noting that the best manuscripts that preserve the Gorgias, Bodleianus (B), Venetus (T), and the two Vindobonenses (W and F), include the reading [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] in line 3. Only one note in the margin of Parisinus (V) includes the reading adopted by most editors of Pindar, namely [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]. The testimony of the manuscripts of the Platonic work creates the problem: what was Pindar's original text and which reading is adopted by Plato in his Gorgias? Most scholars agree that Pindar's reading was [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]. Did Plato maintain this reading or did he deliberately change it to [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]? Let us examine the discussion generated on this subject.

Wilamowitz (1920:95-105) believes that, in his Gorgias, Plato cites Pindar with the reading [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], correcting the wrong accentuation, from [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], which is the reading of the manuscripts, to [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]. Dodds (1959:272), Ostwald (1965:132 n. 8) and Pavese (1968:56-57) agree that the corruption ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) in the good manuscripts is no more than a spoonerism. According to this view, Dodds and Ostwald accept that Pindar wrote [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], exactly as Plato cited it in the Gorgias, a Platonic reading that changed to [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] due to a spoonerism of the copiers. Moreover, Pavese argues in order to promote the interpretation of [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] as 'bring before justice', 'punish'. He therefore interprets the fragment as follows: 'the law, the king of all, commands leading violence before justice ...'.

On the other hand, Lloyd-Jones (1972:48), trusting the reading of the manuscripts, mentions without any doubt that Plato writes [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]. However, in his opinion this cannot be credited to Pindar. On the contrary, [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] fits the context more: [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] means 'render just'; as a result, the expression [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] is interpreted as 'rendering the most violent act just'. Under the same reasoning, Pike (1984:19) notes the two possible interpretations of [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]. According to the first interpretation, [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] is interpreted as 'justify' or 'render just' (8) and he interprets the verse as follows: 'the law justifies the most violent act'. The second opinion interprets [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] as 'punish' or 'bring before justice' (9) and, thus, the verse is interpreted as follows: 'the law--through Hercules--brings the most violent acts of hateful characters, such as Geryon and Diomedes, to justice'. He eventually agrees for the first one, namely that of the justification of Hercules' violent conduct. Grote (1994:22, 30) and Demos (1994:88, 95-106) accept the same reading, namely [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], arguing that the change is deliberately made by Plato in order to check up on Callicles' ethical theory. Nevertheless, in order to draw safer conclusions, let us examine what precedes and follows Callicles' entry more thoroughly.

Main admissions before Callicles ' entry

From the discussion with Polus (464a ff) it was admitted that the true care ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) of the body is a single craft ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) that has two parts: (a) gymnastics ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), which guarantees physical health, and (b) medicine ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), which guarantees the restoration of physical health in case it is disturbed. Respectively, for the soul, which is superior to the body, there is one craft-care, namely politics ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), which has two parts: (a) legislation ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), which guarantees the soul's health, and (b) justice ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), which guarantees its restoration in case it is disturbed. Therefore, [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] as a whole is essentially equivalent to the well-known Socratic precept for the care ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) of the soul. Under normal circumstances, these four parts always provide care ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), in the one case for the body, in the other for the soul, aiming at the best ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]); and they pursue [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] because they are based on knowledge ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]). But what is the factor that establishes the smooth operation of the body and soul? This factor is the soul, which rules ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) and oversees the body. As a result, the soul bears the biggest responsibility for the smooth operation of the [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], which raises the important issue of its care ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]).

The problem in the smooth operation is created by flattery ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), which is not knowledge-craft ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) and, therefore, it is not care ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]). Divided into four parts, it goes into the body and soul and structures four kinds of unreal [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], which do not pursue the best ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), but what is most pleasant at the moment ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]). Thus, cosmetics ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) and cookery ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) replace gymnastics ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) and medicine ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), respectively, with regard to the body. Moreover, sophistry ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) and rhetoric ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) replace legislation ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) and justice ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), respectively, with regard to the soul, and they are sometimes so intertwined that they form an inseparable set. [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] subsumes knowledge about just ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) and unjust ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) things, pursuing the restoration of the soul's health (namely the work that normally belongs to [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) through the precept for the avoidance of punishment. However, the avoidance of just punishment constitutes an unjust deed. True happiness ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) involves the maintenance of the soul's health through the exercise of its virtue ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]). The soul's [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] is a consequence of the four cardinal virtues, namely justice ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), temperance ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), courage ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), wisdom ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), (10) that form a uniform set. As a result, [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], the work of which is to maintain the soul's health, is now equated with the exercise of the soul's [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]. The second [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] involves the restoration of the soul's health through [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] that benefits the soul.

Callicles' ideology

Callicles' entry (481b6 ff.) is marked by the declaration of his ideas that are radical for that time. According to these, doing injustice ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) is more shameful and worse by law ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), but better by nature ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]). On the other hand, suffering injustice ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) is better by law ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), but more shameful and worse by nature ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]). In this way, he separates [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] from [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]. Callicles talks about what is naturally just ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), the right of the most powerful, which is not related to human laws ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]); the people who institute the laws ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) are the weak ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) and the many ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]). The naturally [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] defines the absolute ruling ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), the desire to have more than other people ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), which is in contrast to what the many by law ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) consider as shameful ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) and unjust ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]). Therefore, the laws of the many ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) are laws contrary to nature ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]). For Callicles, the naturally [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] dictates [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] and, as a result, the absolute freedom of the exercise of power and the avoidance of submission.

Callicles' main accusation against Socrates is related to his choice to exercise the philosophical living beyond the appropriate age. He bases his argumentation on three thematic axes that describe three fundamental, in his opinion, concepts: (a) good repute ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), (b) manliness ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), (c) freedom ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]). Exercising the philosophical living beyond the appropriate age does not bring someone the experience needed in order to be a fine and good ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) and respected ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) man. On the contrary, it deprives someone, even the naturally very well favoured ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), of the knowledge they must have: (a) in order to adjust their behaviour towards laws ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) and, in short, the ways of human beings ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) altogether; (b) in order to be able to compose a speech that aims at a certain result; (c) in order to enjoy the pleasures and fulfil all their wishes to the greatest extent. Philosophy makes one unable to make a persuasive speech ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) in order to defend oneself and one's friends ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]). Furthermore, such a craft ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) cannot be a wise thing ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) as it does not lead to the guarantee of richness, supremacy and freedom.

Understanding of Pindar's poem by Callicles

By citing Pindar's poem, Callicles aims at supporting his views on naturally just ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), the right of the most powerful. In other words, Callicles is presented to understand Pindar's [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] as [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]: the law of nature defines the [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] of violent behaviour. Callicles is imbued with the Homeric idea of absolute ruling ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), the unhindered exercise of power with the aim of helping oneself, helping one's friends and harming one's enemies ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), the lawless enjoyment of pleasures and fulfilment of wishes, the concepts of freedom (deriving from it), good repute ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) and manliness ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]). Therefore, Callicles' understanding of Pindar's poem takes a specific ideological colour. Pindar's [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] is the behaviour and the perspective founded on traditionally rooted views. Callicles starts from these Homeric views. It should be reminded that Homeric ethics dictates the behaviour that 'justifies the most violent act' ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), because the [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] that it imposes accepts wrongdoing with the aim of defending what is at the heart of the value system of the Homeric heroes, namely honour ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]). Based on the Homeric ethics, it constitutes justice ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) of the Homeric good man ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) to perform unjust deeds with the aim of maintaining his [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] and avoiding being reproached by others. Callicles also starts from the same aristocratic view (Homeric and Pindaric) and develops it to the level of the absolute declaration of the person's independence from the restraints of [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII].

Plato's literary goal

What does Socrates reply to the declaration of Callicles' immoralistic theory? In fact, how does Plato use Pindar's poem? Socrates will teach that the real restraints are not set by the [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] that are established by the many ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII])--which may, as he states, hinder the ruling over others ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII])--but by the humans' relationship with themselves, by the essential [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] that must concern them, the [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] of their soul, the 'ruling oneself' ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]). Ruling over others ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) is secondary, because it refers to the body and the external goods ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), the pleasures of the body, the care for which must be secondary to the superior soul. Legislation ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), which he previously mentioned in his discussion with Polus, guarantees the maintenance of the soul's health. [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] first refers to the soul and then to the city. The good ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) legislator establishes [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] that plant [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] in the human's soul. In his Gorgias, Plato does not refer to any particular legislative system that the citizen must obey. The only [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] is the one that leads to the planting of [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] in the human's soul, in a way that the craftsman (craft analogy) arranges the product of his craft. Therefore, the good ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) politician is the good ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]: he must infuse [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] in order to arrange his citizens. If one establishes [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] in a city, he must have an absolutely specific goal: to instill justice ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) and temperance ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) in the citizens' souls, so that they can be taught them and pursue their exercise with the aim of maintaining their soul's health. [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] must also pursue this purpose, namely to restore the human's health through his integration in the just punishment of his unjust deed. The maintenance of the soul's health and, secondarily, its restoration, are the two stages of happiness ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), through which the injustice that causes the greatest evil ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) to the human's health can be avoided. The only way to achieve this is the exercise of philosophical living, the common search for knowledge in the most important ethical issues. Through this, one will always be able to avoid wrongdoing. Here, Socrates' (Plato's) secret belief that, as in the discussion in the Gorgias, in every other discussion too, the best reason ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) will be the one that dictates [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] as the model of good conduct, becomes evident. The common--via the philosophical way of life--exercise of virtue ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) makes those that exercise it better ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) with regard to thought and decision and, therefore, more capable of dealing with the affairs of the city ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]). The Homeric urge 'to be a speaker of words and doer of deeds' ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], Iliad 9.443) is redefined and adapted to the socio-political framework centred around just behaviour. The philosophical living is the only way of living through which one can achieve helping oneself ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) that Callicles proposed. And through justice, helping oneself ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) also becomes helping everybody ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]). Good engagement in politics means exercise of the philosophical living. The conclusion that is drawn is that the only good man in politics ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) is the philosopher (thus prefacing the Republic) and he is the one that constitutes Socrates' model. Philosophy ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) exclusively aims at the best ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) with consideration for what is pleasant ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), therefore [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII].

So which reading should we choose? [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]? I agree with the majority scholarly opinion that the text transmitted in the Gorgias' manuscripts is no more than a spoonerism. The reading chosen by Plato was [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], the same as that of Pindar's original. Based on the aforementioned reasoning, one must adopt Pavese's opinion, yet not without some important interventions. Political craft-care ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), namely [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], which is [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], judge the most unjust deed and punish it. Plato sophistically treats the semantical diversity of the term [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] and the ambiguity of [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] that is interpreted as 'justify' and 'bring to court, punish', with the aim of sending Callicles out of battle at a dialectic level. And he achieves this by defeating his opponent with his own (sophistic) 'weapons'. Therefore, the verbal ambiguity causes the following result: Callicles believes in nature's [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] that renders the most violent deed just ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), based on the [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] of the most powerful. However, the Platonic [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] punishes ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) the most violent deed, which is equivalent to the greatest evil ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) of the soul, injustice ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]). From this perspective, [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] does not refer to Diomedes' or Geryon's acts nor does it aim at justifying Hercules' acts; on the contrary, it defines Hercules' [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] per se. The prevalence of the Socratic [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] as the best reason ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) leads to the following conclusions: for Plato, [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] is the king of all, because [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] is equivalent to the soul's internal order, namely [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], which guarantees the internal harmony and the exercise of the soul's [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], which results in [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]. It should be reminded that [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]guarantees [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] with regard to others, [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] with regard to gods, and [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] with regard to the endurance while dealing with difficult situations (507a ff.). The [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] based on this [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] is the master of all, because he manages to construct a strict social framework, in which humans and gods hold their special role. Through this [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], which derives from the internal order of the soul, the appropriate behaviour towards fellow citizens and gods is guaranteed. The [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] is the most suitable person to deal with the affairs of the city, so that he can form a system of [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] through which he will instil [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] in the citizens' souls, recalling the relationship of a craftsman ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) with the product of his craft ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]), urging them to the soul's [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] through the just deed that exclusively benefits the soul and leads to [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII].

However, Plato does not stop here. He knows that the human belongs to the sphere of variability and this is why he highlights the importance of knowledge. For the human to manage to reach the level of [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII], he needs [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] about the important ethical issues. [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] covers the void in virtues, in this way forming the unbreakable unity of the virtues. But how can [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] be acquired? Here, Plato founds the justification of the philosophical living highlighting one more aspect of [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]: the one that overemphasises the necessity of the common ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]) search for the truth. The Socratic argumentation in the Gorgias declares the indissoluble connection of [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] with the unity of the soul's virtues. The [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII] exercise of the soul's virtue, which is guaranteed through the philosophical activity, judges and condemns every violent and unjust deed, leading to the final goal of human life, [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]. (11)

http://dx.doi.org/10.7445/60-1-953

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bergk, T 1866 (3). Poetae lyrici Graeci. Vol. 1. Lipsiae: In aedibus B G Teubneri.

Boeckh, A 1821. Pindari opera quae supersunt. Vol. 2. 2. Lipsiae: apud Ioann. August. Gottlob. Weigel.

Bowra, C M 1947 (2). Pindari carmina cum fragmentis. Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis. Oxonii: E Typographeo Clarendoniano.

Croiset, A 1985 (3). La poesie de Pindare et les lois du lyrisme grec. Paris: Librairie Hachette.

Demos, M 1994. Callicles' quotation of Pindar in the Gorgias. HSCP 96:85-107.

Dodds, E R 1959. Plato: Gorgias. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Ehrenberg, V 1921. Die Rechtsidee im fruhen Griechentum: Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der werdenden Polis. Leipzig: S Hirzel.

Frankel, H F 1962. Dichtung und Philosophie des fruhen Griechentums: Eine Geschichte der griechischen Epik, Lyrik und Prosa bis zur Mitte des funften Jahrhunderts. Munchen: C H Beck.

Galinsky, G K 1972. The Herakles theme: The adaptations of the hero in literature from Homer to the twentieth century. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Gigante, M 1956. Nomos Basileus. Ricerche filologiche v. 1. Napoli: Edizioni Glaux.

Grote, D 1994. Callicles' use of Pindar's [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]: Gorgias 484b. CJ 90:21-31.

Gundert, H 1935. Pindar und sein Dichterberuf Frankfurter Studien zur Religion und Kultur der Antike, Bd. 10. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.

Heinimann, F 1945. Nomos und Physis: Herkunft und Bedeutung einer Antithese im griechischen Denken des 5. Jahrhunderts. Schweizerische Beitrage zur Altertumswissenschaft, Heft. 1. Basel: F Reinhardt.

Lamb, W R M 1961. Plato. Vol. 5: Lysis, Symposium, Gorgias. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, Mass.: Heinemann Ltd.

Laroche, E 1949. Histoire de la racine [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]. Etudes et commentaries, vol. 6. Paris: Librairie C Klincksieck.

Latte, K 1946. Der Rechtsgedanke im archaischen Griechentum. A&A 2:63-76.

Lloyd-Jones, H 1972. Pindar Fr. 169. HSCP 76:45-56.

Lobel, E 1961. The Oxyrhynchus papyri. Vol. 26. London: Egypt Exploration Society.

Maehler, H 1975. Pindari carmina cum fragmentis. Pars 2. Fragmenta. Indices. Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana. Leipzig: Teubner.

Nestle, W 1911. Gab es eine jonische Sophistik? Philologus 70:242-266.

--1942 (2). Vom Mythos zum Logos: Die Selbstentfaltung des griechischen Denkens von Homer bis auf die Sophistik und Sokrates. Stuttgart: A Kroner.

Norwood, G 1945. Pindar. Sather Classical Lectures 19. Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Ostwald, M 1965. Pindar, Nomos, and Heracles. HSCP 69:109-138.

Page, D L 1962. Pindar: P. Oxy. 2450, fr. 1. PCPS N.S. 8:49-51.

Pavese, C 1968. The new Heracles poem of Pindar. HSCP 72:47-88.

Perotta, G 1935. Saffo e Pindaro: Due saggi critici. Bari: G Laterza & Figli.

Pike, D L 1984. Pindar's treatment of the Heracles myths. AClass 27:15-22.

Puech, A 1923. Pindare. Vol. 4. Collections des Universites de France. Paris: Les Belles Lettres.

Race, W H 1997. Pindar. Vol. 2: Nemean odes, Isthmian odes, fragments. Loeb Classical Library. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Schroeder, O 1917. [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]. Philologus 74:195-204.

Snell, B 19552. Pindari carmina cum fragmentis. Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana. Lipsiae: In aedibus B G Teubneri.

Stier, H E 1928. [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]. Philologus 83 :225-258.

Treu, M 1963. [TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]: Alte und neue Probleme. RhM 106:193-214.

Turyn, A 1952. Pindari carmina cum fragmentis. Oxonii: apud Basilium Blackwell.

Untersteiner, M 1954. The Sophists. English trans. K Freeman. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, U 1920. Platon. Vol. 2. Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung.

K C Stefou

(University of Ioannina, Greece)

(1) From the older ones, we can mention those of Boeckh 1821, Bergk 18663 4 and Schroeder 1900 (5).

(2) As 'P. Oxy. 2450, fr. 1'.

(3) Schol. ad Arist. Or. 2.226 (3.408 Dindorf). See Ostwald 1965:110.

(4) As fr. 169a.

(5) For English translations of the above texts, see e.g. Lamb 1961 and Race 1997.

(6) He accepts this view with some reservations.

(7) Pike 1984:22 n. 25 notes that a similar view is supported by Galinsky 1972:35, as well as Lloyd-Jones 1971:51.

(8) See Pike 1984:22 n. 20, where he cites Ostwald 1965:117 and Bowra 1964:75 as the supporters of this opinion.

(9) However, at 22 n. 21 he cites only Galinsky 1972:34 as the supporter of this opinion, forgetting Pavese, who essentially introduced it.

(10) A fifth one is often added to these, piety ([TEXT NOT REPRODUCIBLE IN ASCII]).

(11) I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
COPYRIGHT 2015 University of Stellenbosch, Department of Ancient Studies
No portion of this article can be reproduced without the express written permission from the copyright holder.
Copyright 2015 Gale, Cengage Learning. All rights reserved.

Article Details
Printer friendly Cite/link Email Feedback
Author:Stefou, K.C.
Publication:Akroterion
Article Type:Essay
Date:Jan 1, 2015
Words:5212
Previous Article:The soother of evil pains: Asclepius and Freud.
Next Article:Griekse drama in die moderne wereld.
Topics:

Terms of use | Privacy policy | Copyright © 2019 Farlex, Inc. | Feedback | For webmasters