"Different points of view?": The Daily Telegraph affair as a transnational media event.
This view of the state of Anglo-German relations was common at the time and has dominated the historiography of the period. The Daily Telegraph Affair of 1908 is typical, for historians have mainly examined the episode from the perspective of its effect on either England or Germany in their respective national contexts. In the English case, for example, T.G. Otte has compellingly argued that the Daily Telegraph Affair had a major effect on the decisionmaking establishment in London; its increasingly pessimistic stance toward Germany increased as a function of the interview's apparent confirmation of the German peril. (2) For the history of the Kaiserreich, on the other hand, the traditional interpretation has viewed the Daily Telegraph Affair as important primarily at the domestic level for what it tells us about the particular nature of the German political system--even if no historian has as yet directly connected the dots between a backward monarchical government and Germany's oft-discussed "special path" (Sonderweg) to modernity. (3) Particularly with regard to the heated historiographical discussion surrounding the Kaiser's so-called "personal rule," (4) the general scholarly consensus sees the Daily Telegraph Affair as mostly confirming William II's position and power in relation to his "responsible" ministers. They were either powerless to impose constitutional limits on the monarchy, (5) self-emasculated by their "notorious submissiveness," (6) or deliberately instigated the crisis to rein in and humiliate the Kaiser, subsequently regaining control of Germany's foreign policy. (7)
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Peter Winzen's in-depth treatment of the Daily Telegraph crisis, which is the most recent scholarly work to examine the episode in detail, points exactly to these two questions as the central themes highlighted by the dramatic events of 1908. He stresses the "stunning" foreign ramifications of the Kaiser's interview for inciting a fear in London that Germany would deflect the domestic storm "with an unprovoked military strike against England and France." (8) But Winzen pays even greater attention to the domestic cover-up engineered by Chancellor Bernhard von Bulow (1849-1929) and his advisors, who did everything they could to hide their own accountability and irresponsible actions prior to publication. Winzen meticulously argues not only that Bulow knew the entirety of the interview in advance and determinedly whitewashed the record of his foreknowledge, but also that he must have recognized better than anybody the manuscript for the "political dynamite" that it was. He also emphasizes many of the essential components of the old Sonderweg interpretation of the Kaiserreich, which focused on the manipulative strategies of the entrenched governing elite that thwarted democratization. Indeed, he argues that "the incompetence, inefficiency and disoriented nature" of the constitutionally responsible figures of William II's government is "perfectly clear." (9)
There is undoubtedly a kernel of truth that many European newspapers did indeed interpret the interview in light of national interest. English, French, and even Russian newspapers received the Kaiser's revelations as a further indication of the untrustworthiness of German diplomats. Nonetheless, a closer examination of the role of the newspaper press in the Daily Telegraph Affair does not support some elements of the arguments laid out in the scholarship to this point. Otte--as is perhaps the natural inclination for a diplomatic historian--has argued that the impact of the British press on the crisis was negligible, since newspapers viewed the revelations with "amused contempt." (10) Yet many in the British decision-making elite were closely connected to journalists and editors of influential papers and surely monitored their opinions closely as they were developing and weighing policy. (11) And, as will be shown below, the views expressed in the British press ran very much parallel to those expressed privately on Downing Street.
Similarly, those recent accounts focused on Germany largely ignore the role played by newspapers in stoking and fueling the crisis--strange considering the Daily Telegraph crisis originated in a media event--preferring to see public opinion as manipulated and orchestrated by responsible statesmen rather than influencing and limiting their choices. (12) Nevertheless, current research on the media portrayal of scandals and Anglo-German relations before 1914 has tended to question this view of media-state relations in this period. These works have made it increasingly apparent that the quarter century before the First World War witnessed a major media revolution that directly challenged the established social and political order and proved ever more difficult to manage from above. The relatively recent historiographical emphasis on the development of democratic culture in the Kaiserreich, (13) as well as the path-breaking work of David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley in the 1980s challenging the Sonderweg school, inform the broader trends behind this shift. (14) It affected William IPs reign and role in German political life, as Martin Kohlrausch has argued, because the press placed limitations on the Kaiser's ability to enact his "personal rule." (15) The Wilhelmine press acted as a democratizing force, causing William II to consider the public reaction to his advisors' policies, his leadership style and his personality faults, all of which ballooned in importance as a result of growing public interest and debate. Perhaps just as important were the transnational dimensions of this media revolution. As Dominik Geppert and Frank Bosch have emphasized, this transformation at its heart was about European journalists and newspapers behaving as independent, transnational actors who influenced diplomacy and subsequently limited the policies open to responsible decision-makers. (16) This article will build on recent historiography of this sort by examining the Daily Telegraph Affair as a transnational media event.
From this perspective, the transnational dimensions of the Daily Telegraph Affair are very clear. In the scandal, German journalists participated in a debate and discourse about the Kaiser's transgressions that crossed traditional national boundaries. That debate was directly informed by the transnational and highly discursive nature of the major news-gathering networks at the turn of the century. Many European newspapers at the time lacked the financial resources to maintain an extensive foreign-news service; there was simply too much global news for even papers with the most extensive foreign-correspondent corps to be able to keep up with events. With a few exceptions, the vast majority of German newspapers--like their European counterparts-had to rely upon foreign news-gathering agencies for international news. By the end of the nineteenth century, these agencies developed news-sharing agreements that assigned responsibility for obtaining and sharing reports: The Associated Press controlled news emanating from the United States; Reuter's Agency covered Great Britain, Canada, and the Empire; Agence Havas monopolized news from France, southern Europe, and Latin America; and Wolff's Telegraph Bureau was responsible for sharing reports from central and eastern Europe. (17) Each of these agencies habitually translated reports and excerpts from newspapers in the regions they controlled, which they then shared abroad.
As a result, much of the news originating in a foreign country came from a non-German source and discussions of, and discourse with, international "opinion" in German papers became daily fare before 1914. The obvious potential that international reports could influence German public opinion through these networks was definitively unmasked during the First Moroccan Crisis. Bulow desperately wanted to influence foreign and domestic newspapers--as he asserted at one point in 1905, to nationalize the news--but he found that it was increasingly beyond his control to do so. (18) Because most German dailies in this period represented very specific points of view politically, they were already highly predisposed to discuss and respond to other domestic political opinions.
The prewar transnational information networks likewise filled a demand for reports and editorials from papers abroad, since articles emanating from foreign periodicals became newsworthy as well. Newspapers that were perceived to have intimate connections to the official establishment in any country--or "semiofficial" organs, to use the parlance of the time--were perhaps the most closely followed. In Germany, these included the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, the Kolnische Zeitung, and the Frankfurter Zeitung. Yet progressive and Marxist papers were also prone to strike a cosmopolitan view, following likeminded opinion in other countries. And newspapers inclined to sensationalism were major attention-grabbers as well. This phenomenon is difficult to capture without an exhaustive analysis. But a simple keyword search for major German newspaper titles in digital newspaper databases such as Gale's Times Digital Archive helps to flush out the pervasiveness of the transnational news-gathering networks. Indeed, the transnational news-sharing described here appears to have reached a peak of intensity between the 1890s and the 1920s. (19)
The upshot was that European newspapers almost seemed to develop a will of their own. Ultimately it was the journalists who came to have influence over the statesmen, as Wolfgang Mommsen has argued--but with the important qualifier that the work of foreign reporters and correspondents was just as significant as that of nationalist editors and commentators back home. (20) This phenomenon meant that the discourse on Daily Telegraph Affair, like most newsworthy items in the pre-war period, took on a decidedly transnational dimension. As will be shown below, a deliberate effort by the German Foreign Office to cultivate positive opinion abroad instigated the crisis. Very quickly, however, the situation spun out of control precisely because of the transnational discourse engendered by the interview. Newspapers throughout Europe closely followed each others' reports and editorials, often going so far as to translate, republish, and respond to articles from foreign papers. In Germany, these discussions of William ITs revelations were particularly influential in the way the crisis played out. They helped radicalize the debate over the emperor's "personal rule"; German papers noted how the episode and the heated transnational discussions it instigated had actually engendered greater suspicion of German policy abroad. At the end of this process, the dramatic public outcry over the interview curtailed the Kaiser's influence, and the power of his responsible advisors and the Reichstag generally increased as a result.
The years immediately before the publication of the Daily Telegraph interview witnessed a diplomatic revolution of major proportions. Following the First Moroccan Crisis in 1905, which had solidified the entente cor diale between France and England, Germany increasingly was confronted with a hostile enemy bloc. Encirclement threatened by the agreement concluded between England and Russia in August 1907. By dividing up Iran into a southern zone controlled by Britain and a northern zone between the Caucasus and Afghanistan controlled by Russia, with a neutral zone between and another further east in Tibet, it had eliminated all the outstanding sources of friction between the two countries. (21) The significance of the agreement was immediately obvious. It indicated that the Anglo-French entente cordiale had developed into a Power bloc pitting Germany against its two neighbors on the Continent and its biggest competitor outside of Europe. Yet Bulow and his advisors in the German foreign office refrained from an immediate diplomatic response, preferring to initiate a publicity campaign aimed at improving relations with Britain. Ultimately this media campaign culminated in the appearance of the Daily Telegraph interview.
Already in April 1907, Bulow had emphasized that the forthcoming Anglo-Russian agreement would not harm Germany's position vis-a-vis England and France. It dealt, he told the Reichstag, solely with colonial issues and did not impinge on German economic interests. (22) Nevertheless, the far-right press in Germany received the news as the most recent in a long line of German diplomatic defeats. (23) In England, too, there was skepticism about Billow's claims. Throughout 1907 and into 1908 conservative organs dredged up charges of German duplicity during the Boer War. The Times catalogued every German diplomatic misstep since the conflict. (24) The National Review also published similar allegations, asserting that William II had tried to engineer a coalition of Germany, France, and Russia to hasten Britain's defeat in the Boer War. (25) The culmination of this campaign came in July 1908 with the appearance of an article authored by a French diplomatic insider and editor, Andre Mevil (1870-c. 1950), a confidant of the architect of the entente cordiale, foreign minister Theophile Delcasse (1852-1923). Mevil asserted that Bulow had proposed the aborted interventionist scheme, while simultaneously claiming that Delcasse had blocked his plans. (26) All this negative publicity created a broader narrative emphasizing Germany's diplomatic isolation since 1904. The German foreign office closely monitored the situation so as to better correct these impressions. (27)
In order to cultivate English sympathy, the German foreign office orchestrated a press campaign beginning in 1907. As the first step, Bulow worked the Berlin correspondents representing London dailies sympathetic to the Liberal Party. One such interview granted to the representative of the Liberal Westminster Gazette, J.L. Bashford, portrayed the chancellor's optimistic view of Anglo-German relations. (28) William II likewise allowed an article written by Bashford to appear in early 1908 as a response to the criticisms of The Times and the National Review. Avowing his English sympathies during the South African war, William II offered proof of his friendship. "An offer was made to Germany simultaneously from two powerful sides to take advantage of the situation and to interfere in British policy, and I refused point-blank," he told Bashford. (29) There can be no doubt that Bulow approved of the article. The chief of his press bureau, Otto Hammann (1852-1928), worked to get the word out about the Kaiser's interview in Germany by arranging the publication of a summary and extracts from the article. (30) Furthermore, the Kaiser visited England late in 1907 to cultivate a good press for German policy, occasioning intense discussion of the state of Anglo-German relations in both countries. There was even a kind of dry run for the Daily Telegraph interview which appeared in the Manchester Daily Dispatch in December. (31) Emanating from an unnamed diplomatic insider, the Kaiser affirmed his desire for amicable relations in it, while supposedly making other, more eyebrow-raising statements. Not only had William II advocated German naval power and the need for colonies abroad to service German economic interests, but he had also discussed conquests at the expense of the Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, and Russia. The German Embassy in London quickly disavowed the report, although apparently it had initially given the green light to publish it. (32)
Going beyond even these measures, the German foreign office made two similar attempts to influence British public opinion in the summer of 1908. The first of these came in yet another interview Bulow conducted with Sidney Whitman, a sympathetic journalist representing the Conservative London Standard (33) As a direct response to a recent article entitled "The German Peril" appearing in the Quarterly Review, Bulow made the case that Germany was peacefully disposed toward England. (34) After having claimed to read the article with a fine-tooth comb--supposedly making 125 marginal comments in blue pencil--he pointed out that Germany was the only great power that had not waged a war in the previous four decades. He denied that Germany's naval build-up had been aimed at England and disputed that the outbreak of Anglophobia during the Boer War had been extraordinarily powerful. He even seemed to dangle the hope of a settlement with regard to the naval question in the near future. (35)
The second intervention came directly as an article ghostwritten by the German foreign office and intended as a direct response to Mevil's animadversions in the National Review. The state secretary of the Reich Foreign Office, Wilhelm von Schoen (1851-1933), ordered--with the full knowledge of Bulow--a semi-official response published in the Deutsche Revue. (36) Noting the Germanophobe inclinations of the National Review and quoting Mevil at length, this semiofficial rejoinder utilized many of the same talking points that would be employed again in the Daily Telegraph a few months later: that the Russians had instigated the demarche against England, but the Germans had never taken the idea seriously; that the Kaiser's attitude was friendly during the conflict, as could be seen from the supportive letters he sent to his grandmother, Queen Victoria; that any hope of intervention in the Boer War fell apart after France and Russia refused to guarantee the territorial status quo in Europe. (37) There is hardly any doubt that the chancellor and his advisors in the foreign office approved of these measures, for Billow repeatedly made attempts to measure and influence British public opinion at this time, even with traditionally hostile British papers like The Times. (38) Altogether, these maneuvers represented a purposeful campaign to cultivate a better image of German foreign policy in England that foreshadowed many of the Kaiser's later revelations.
It was as a direct contribution to this publicity campaign that William II and Chancellor Bulow allowed the Daily Telegraph interview to be prepared and--with official revisions and prior to approval--published in England. The source of the article was Colonel Edward Stuart-Wortley (1857-1934), a self-professed admirer of the Kaiser. (39) The British officer had kept a record of the Anglophile sentiments the emperor expressed during an unofficial three-week vacation at Stuart-Wortley's estate in late 1907 and then again later when the two were reunited at the annual German army maneuvers at Saarbrucken between 7 and 10 September 1908. (40) After the latter visit, Stuart-Wortley drew up a manuscript and suggested William II should consider publishing it. In all this, his self-professed objective was to place "your Majesty's good feelings and intentions ... strongly and prominently before the British public." (41) The Daily Telegraph was highly suited to that purpose, Stuart-Wortley argued, for it had never struck a regrettable tone about the Kaiser in the past. According to the official German foreign-office report, William II found the draft to be "well written and a true rendering of his words." (42) But before giving his assent, he instructed Bulow to read the draft personally, make any necessary corrections, and assess the feasibility of publication. Probably at least perusing the draft himself, Bulow forwarded it to the foreign office, where the draft was to be thoroughly scrutinized as the Kaiser had desired and a new typescript draft typed with any advisable revisions. (43) After completing the vetting process, the foreign office made no major objections to publication, although some minor changes to the language of the article did result. (44) Bulow forwarded these recommendations on to the diplomat representing the foreign office in the Kaiser's circle, (45) who duly presented them to William II on (15) October. (46) Stuart-Wortley was then empowered to publish the article after making the necessary revisions. (47) The result, as the proprietor of the Daily Telegraph remarked, was "a very valuable page in the history of our time" that would improve the Kaiser's public image in Britain and contribute to a "more natural and friendly" relationship with Germany. (48)
When the article finally appeared in the morning edition of the Daily Telegraph on 28 October 1908--as "a communication" from an unnamed "unimpeachable authority"--it was full of allusions to the Kaiser's friendly feelings. "I have said time after time that I am a friend of England," William II remarked, "and your Press---or at least a considerable section of it--bids the people of England refuse my proffered hand and insinuates that the other holds a dagger." (49) He maintained further that these feelings were contrary to the opinions of his own people:
My task is not the easiest. The prevailing sentiment among large sections of the middle and lower classes of my own people is not friendly to England. I am, therefore, so to speak, in a minority in my own land, but it is a minority of the best elements, just as it is in England with respect to Germany. (50)
The second half of the interview turned to the question of Germany's attitude during the Boer War, when the Kaiser had supposedly maintained a friendly stance toward England that contrasted with the views of a majority of his countrymen. William II fully admitted the hostility
of German press and "private opinion," but he also pointed out the strenuous efforts made by "official Germany" to remain friendly to Britain. (51) He also noted the hostile stance adopted by England's current friends, Russia and France:
[W]hen the struggle was at its height, the German Government was invited by the Governments of France and Russia to join with them in calling upon England to put an end to the war. The moment had come they said, not only to save the Boer Republics, but also to humiliate England to the dust.... I said that so far from Germany joining in any concerted European action to put pressure upon England and bring about her downfall, Germany would always keep aloof from politics that could bring her into complications with a Sea Power like England. (52)
The Kaiser had gone even a step farther. During the "Black Week" of December 1899, when the Boers' initial stunning victories had created a deep sense of pessimism in Britain, William II had written his grandmother Queen Victoria with the plan for a military campaign. It was "a matter of curious coincidence," he elaborated, "that the plan which I formulated ran very much along the same lines as that which was actually adopted by Lord Roberts and carried by him into successful operation." (53) The Kaiser concluded the interview by asserting the peaceful intentions even of Germany's naval construction, which was not aimed at England, but was instead intended solely for the protection of Germany's imperial possessions and commerce in Asia. (54)
The ensuing discussion of the Daily Telegraph article is fascinating for what it demonstrates about the transnational dimensions of newspaper debates before 1914. The Daily Telegraph interview was "international," because it was a piece of news about relations between states. The individual interpretations in the various different countries of this media event were "national," because papers mostly viewed the scandal from the perspective of national interest. Nevertheless, the discussions throughout the European press were "transnational" in that newspaper discourse about the interview actually interacted across national boundaries. Newspapers from different states republished reports from abroad and responded directly to each other's editorials and articles in fashioning their interpretations. This process created a situation where the ability of statesmen to manage the public debate was significantly restricted. And because grand questions of international politics were at the heart of the interview, there was widespread pan-European interest in the story. The ensuing debate accelerated more and more rapidly as a result. Particularly in Germany, these discussions radicalized the heated discussions about the constitutionality of the Kaiser's actions, even beyond other comparable domestic scandals--such as the Moltke-Harden-Eulenburg scandals, or the Zabern Affair--that had ginned up less intense interest abroad, and thereby less heated transnational debates. (55)
Thus, the publication of the interview caused an immediate shockwave throughout the European press. In Germany, independent translations of the interview began to appear in the afternoon and the evening editions the same day that the original article appeared in the Daily Telegraph. (56) The interview was republished in full or partial reports and summarized throughout the rest of the German press in late October and early November. (57) Likewise, verbatim or summary reports immediately appeared throughout the English and the French press. (58) Many of these initial reports expressed skepticism about the authenticity of the interview. In Germany, many dailies--especially the more conservative ones--expressed their doubt or declared the interview an "invention." (59) Papers outside of Germany also preferred to avoid discussing the interview until there was an official confirmation of its authenticity. (60) Even The Times felt compelled to admit that some of the details could not be construed as absolutely true, despite that the general substance of the interview was probably correct. (61)
Nevertheless, the article set off an alarm bell in Berlin. Heinrich Mantler, the Berlin chief of Wolff's Telegraph Bureau and an intimate associate of the foreign office's press bureau, directly requested instructions about whether to republish the interview. (62) The immediate reply was a simple no. (63) In response to the problem of how to deal with the revelation, the government decided upon a delicate course. It would allow the report to appear through Wolff's Telegraph Bureau. (64) But in order that the release should not be misinterpreted as an admission of Berlin's prior approval, a semi-official statement would also appear in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung asserting that the Daily Telegraph alone was responsible for the article. Bulow did not finally give his approval for releasing the article through Wolff's until the afternoon, even though it was too late to send the semi-official hint to the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung that same evening. (65) The semi-official statement that finally appeared the following day confirmed the content of the interview, without going very far beyond a lengthy summary. (66)
Initially, the Foreign Office was able to secure the support of semi-official organs and other sympathetic papers. Representing this apologetic stance, the Kolnische Zeitung acknowledged that it was inevitable that the Kaiser's remarks "would stir up much dust," but it also saw little ground for the storm to grow too great, since the disclosures were old news that had already appeared in the Deutsche Revue. (67) Indeed, this semi-official organ even hoped that the interview might actually fulfill its goal of improving Anglo-German relations. (68) Theodor Schiemann (1847-1921), writing his weekly column in the Kreuzzeitung, likewise defended William II's actions by noting that the secrets unmasked were hardly new, simultaneously regretting that many papers had gone overboard in their initial criticisms. (69) Other semi-official papers reserved judgment, or refused to believe that William could actually go so far as to draw up the campaign plan. (70) A handful of liberal papers followed this lead, either arguing that the Kaiser's battle plan could be chalked up to his interest in military affairs, (71) or declaring his policy identical with that of the German people. (72) Because many of these papers had established a long-standing relationship with the government to gain access to what Kurt Riezler later labeled "inside dope" for toeing the official line, such a stance was not surprising. (73)
Nevertheless, the appearance of the article through the Wolff's release and its quasi-confirmation caused a second shockwave to ripple through the European press. One of the most explosive topics was the revelation that the Kaiser had drawn up military plans to aid the British. Conservative papers in England could hardly contain their delight at this little morsel. The Pall Mall Gazette airily confessed it "would rather like to know what they think... in Berlin of that piece of information." (74) The Daily Express described the news as "a truly amazing piece of information," which could only fail in its "avowed object" of improving Anglo-German relations. (75) For its part, the Daily Mail called the revelation "a paradox most amazing" and doubted that the Boers would be pleased to find the author of the Kruger telegram "among their enemies." (76) Even the radical Daily News was inclined to view this revelation unfavorably, particularly as it called to mind William II's congratulatory message to Kruger, "the root and origin of evil." (77) French and Russian commentators seized on these points as well. One insider interviewed in Paris mocked William IPs self-grandeur: He was obviously "laboring under a misconception, very remarkable in the case of so thorough a soldier." (78) Others similarly pointed irreverently to the absence of any reference to the Kruger telegram. (79) Echoing the sentiment that the interview had failed miserably, the Petit Republique asserted that, viewed together, the Kruger telegram and William IPs generous strategizing underscored the fickle nature of his friendship. (80) Russian newspapers, on the other hand, interpreted the article as "an attempt made deliberately to sow discord between England and Russia," even though St. Petersburg had never encouraged President Kruger. (81) Here, too, emphasis was laid upon the deviousness of the Kaiser's motives. (82)
The German press picked up these arguments, sometimes even going into great detail to elaborate them. (83) The Social-Democratic Vorwarts expatiated at length on "the atrocious incompetence" that guided the Reich's "zigzag" foreign policy, pointing directly to the disconnect between the Kruger telegram and Germany's official Britain-friendly stance during the South-African conflict. (84) The primary organ of the National Liberals asserted that a report of the Evening Standard about the Kaiser's war plan demanded an answer to the serious question of whether the German General Staff had actually crafted the document in its "hours of idleness." (85) The nationalist Tdgliche Rundschau regretted that even the "semiofficial" Westminster Gazette found this aspect of the story to be "a considerable faux pas" occasioning "an embarrassing state of affairs" in England and Germany. (86)
The storm abroad helped stir up emotion in Germany. Across the political spectrum opinion was offended. Many papers felt William II lacked an understanding of his own people, but Pan-German and nationalist dailies--organs linked in directly to the transnational information networks--were especially incensed. The views of the Rheinisch-Westfalische Zeitung were typical:
The soul of the German nation will be deeply wounded by the knowledge that its Kaiser worked up a war plan with which to annihilate the valiant Boers, a people of a kindred race.... Was the emperor also a party to the plan by which 30,000 Boer farms were destroyed and plundered and the women and children placed in deadly concentration camps? (87)
Calling German official policy "book-keeping by double entry," the Tagliche Rundschau likewise questioned the government's stance during the war:
Could a German at the time of the Boer War have believed it possible that, while money was being collected throughout the country for the Boers and while the Boer generals were being greeted with a storm of enthusiasm, his emperor ... was elaborating a plan of campaign for the destruction of these selfsame Boers? (88)
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Picking up the cutting views expressed abroad, the famous liberal humor magazine Simplicissimus published a cartoon that summed up the mockery William II had made of himself. It imagined Queen Victoria's ghost apologetically explaining to an apparition of "Ohm Kruger" that she had used William
II's plan all along. "Then we know why you botched it so badly," Kruger's wraith bitterly retorted. (89)
As if to rub salt in the Kaiser's wounds, the British secretary of state for war, Viscount Haldane (1856-1928), faced an interpellation from the Irish parliamentarian William Redmond (1861-1917) in the House of Commons as to the existence of William II's plans in the war office's archives. In the exchange that ensued, Haldane replied that he knew of none--and that it would be a waste of energy to look for them. Redmond ended the exchange by suggesting sardonically, "it would be easier, and, indeed, more regular, to offer the Kaiser a seat in the Cabinet." (90) Here again, the European press took delight in publicizing Redmond's joke at William IPs expense. (91) Back in Germany, reactions to the interpellation ranged from a mixture of extreme embarrassment to concern that Haldane's response had not ruled out the possibility that the plans might really exist. (92)
The other extremely controversial statement was the Kaiser's assertion that he, as a friend of England, was in the minority in his own country. Like the revelation surrounding William IPs putative planning on his grandmother's behalf, this point engendered a heated discussion in the European press, particularly in Britain. There, the national press--especially Conservative and Unionist organs--found this stunning admission a compelling justification for the tough stance adopted in Britain toward Germany since the Boer War. The opinion The Times expressed was typical: That the German middle classes were "bitterly hostile" was "precisely one of the considerations on which we have constantly insisted when discussing the relations of this country with Germany." (93) In other papers, the revelation was "a grave confession" of an "unfortunate animosity," which "compelled this country to take certain precautions" (94); it meant that "the actions of the German Government have not squared with the friendly words of the German Emperor" (95); it was, in short, "the whole difficulty at a glance," giving credence to the prevailing pessimistic view of German intentions. (96)
In Germany, the opinions of these papers were quoted, reported, and discussed at length, even in papers with close ties to the press section of the foreign office. (97) Some newspapers regretted William ITs comments about the Anglophobia of his own people because it seemed to tarnish Germany's image abroad. As could be expected, the Social-Democratic party organ Vorwarts was among their number. It editorialized that the emperor was "misinformed once again," because German workers held a "lively proletarian solidarity" with their compatriots in England. (98) Dr. Theodor Barth (1849-1909), a progressive leader in Germany who had close ties to British radicals and was a known "friend of England," represented this fear about how the interview might further mar Anglo-German relations. (99) Working with the British radical editor C.P. Scott (1846-1932), he wrote and published an op-ed piece for the Manchester Guardian to refute the Kaiser's claims about his subjects' supposed Anglophobia. If it were possible to hold a public-opinion poll about what state Germans liked the best, Barth emphasized, "I have not the slightest doubt that an enormous majority of our people would vote for England." (100) Perhaps less likely were the comments of the Kreuzzeitung, the paper of the Prussian Junker; it, too, remarked that William II was "not correctly informed about the actual views of the German people with regard to England." (101) F.E. O'Neill, The Times' acting Berlin correspondent, reported almost gleefully that the nationalist and Pan-German press were "gnashing their teeth over what they consider a betrayal of their most cherished aspirations," for the English would never reciprocate William II's show of friendliness. (102)
The attention of foreign papers also fixated on the Kaiser's other revelations. One major topic of discussion was whether the German government had chosen the specific moment of the Bosnian Crisis, which had only recently broken on the European scene, for this publicity stunt. It seemed yet another thinly veiled attempt to break up the Triple Entente. The Kaiser's revelations about Franco-Russian attempts to intervene during the Boer War appeared aimed at that goal, as foreign correspondents and diplomats immediately surmised. (103) The socialist Petite Republique, for example, completely denied French machinations during the Boer War and instead asserted Germany had instigated the whole matter to deflect attention from more pressing international events. (104) This line of thinking was of particular interest in much of rest of the French press as well. After first reminding the world of the Kruger Telegram, the Figaro asserted, "France never contemplated such a project, and never did take the initiative against England in favor of the Boers [even if s]uch suggestions were made to us, and today it is plainly evident that we did well not to follow them." (105) Andre Mevil, writing in the conservative Echo de Paris, repeated all the talking points he had used in his article in the National Review the previous summer. (106) In England, many of the more conservative papers placed credence in these French reports. George Saunders, the Paris correspondent for The Times, reported an interview with an unnamed French statesman who asserted it had been a German demarche all along. (107) Likewise, the Pall Mall Gazette picked up the French view and ran with it. (108) Similar reports attempting to exculpate Russia were also reported in the European press. (109)
The discussions only hardened many English and French observers in their resolve to strengthen the Triple Entente. The Times warned that England would forgive friends for their earlier actions because hostile attitudes had been replaced by "mutual sentiments of friendship." (110) The Russian conservative paper, Novoe Vremia, echoed this view. Reminding Britain of Russia's unfriendly actions during the Boer War, it exaggerated, was about the equivalent of trying to alienate the Anglo-French friendship by bringing up Joan of Arc. (111) The Echo de Paris reported further that the interview might very well prelude serious complications in the Near East. (112) The Journal des Debats also warned of what it called the "Bismarckian" tendencies of German statecraft in the following days. (113) Finally, the Figaro believed the interview demonstrated one of the "most disquieting" elements of German diplomacy: The Kaiser bragged about disclosing secret negotiations with one power to another power, which made working with German statesmen very difficult, for "the preliminary condition of being able to live on good terms with them is to avoid all intimacy." (114) The ultimate lesson in the English navalist lobby was vigilance and further naval construction. Even W.T. Stead (1849-1912), who was normally sympathetic to Germany, wrote a long letter to the editor of the Daily Mail. The "alarming admission" that large sections of lower- and middle-class Germans were hostile to England drove Stead logically to a feeling that the British navy had to remain strong. "We shall," he concluded, "lay down six Dreadnoughts at once--not as a menace ... but merely as ... insurance against dangers to which your Majesty has been so good as to call to our attention." (115)
All told, these discussions tended to increase suspicion of German intentions in other countries, generating a negative impression of the effects of the interview on Germany's international image. Although recent historiography has neglected to address the impact of newspaper opinion on the denouement of the crisis, foreign diplomatic circles closely followed the heated press discussions of the Daily Telegraph interview and developed policy accordingly. (116) Their analysis of the situation mostly confirmed the impression expressed publicly by journalists and political commentators. In a summary of the immediate reaction to the Kaiser's revelations in the London press, for instance, the French charge d'affaires pointed directly to the hypothesis that the interview had been calculated to stir up dissension in the Triple Entente. Fortunately, he argued, "the result has been exactly the opposite of what was intended." (117) More important, the British Foreign Office closely scrutinized the public debate regarding William ITs efforts to block the formation of a continental coalition. In an extended assessment of the back and forth that had appeared in the National Review, the Deutsche Revue, and more recently in The Times, it was determined that, contrary to the Kaiser's asseverations, the proposed intervention had been entirely a "German initiative." (118) The official reaction in England, France and Russia thus mirrored the public reaction. As the permament undersecretary at the Foreign Office Charles Hardinge (1858-1944) remarked, both he and Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey (1862-1933) believed the Kaiser's revelations were aimed primarily at injecting an "element of disorder" among the Entente powers. (119)
It was perhaps even more important that Bulow and his subordinates in the Reich Chancellery and Foreign Office closely monitored the discussions in the European press. The ambassador to Britain, Count Paul von Metternich (1853-1934), was particularly active. The interview, he told Bulow, had given rise to a plethora of leading articles in the London press. "The detailed reports emanating from Berlin, Paris, and St. Petersburg after appearance of the interview," Metternich noted, "have given much substance for discussion [in British newspapers]." (120) As a result, the tone of the British press was growing increasingly sharper and the revelation about the Anglophobia of the German middle classes had renewed the fear of William II's battleship building. The interview also created "an embarrassing impression" and "downright spiteful" responses in the Russian press, where the most objectionable passage was the revelation about the proposed three-Power intervention during the Boer War. (121) Bulow even felt compelled to give Tokyo explanations about the Kaiser's apparent fear in regard to the supposed "yellow danger." (122) Altogether, the reaction in the foreign and domestic press was, as Bulow well knew, about as abysmal as could be imagined.
On 30 October Bulow wrote as much to the Kaiser. Enclosing representative articles from the Standard, the Daily Mail, La Libre Parole, and several far-right German newspapers, Bulow sketched out the foreign and domestic reaction:
The British press discusses the interview in a mostly skeptical, critical and disapproving way.... French and Russian papers use the occasion for vehement attacks against Your Majesty and German policy. Above all, the view of the German press--with very few exceptions--is that our foreign policy and our country have been severely damaged. (123)
As a result of these "unfair" attacks, Bulow offered to resign. (124) When the Kaiser declined, the chancellor and his chief press officer published an official explanation in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung. (125) Acknowledging the firestorm in the European press, Bulow explained that William II had not acted on his own initiative, but rather had forwarded the article to him for approval. (126) He had then sent the draft to the Foreign Office, which gave the go-ahead for publication. Although the chancellor asserted no foreknowledge, he nevertheless accepted responsibility on behalf of the government. Similar pronouncements were made for the benefit of the foreign press. In the statement made to the Berlin Reuters correspondent, Hammann specifically lamented how the British and French press had made "untrue" accusations against the Kaiser, arguing that, "The suggestion of the British Press that the Emperor undertook this political move on his own responsibility against foreign Powers is both unfair and ungentlemanly." (127)
But the situation deteriorated rapidly, fed by the acknowledgement that the Kaiser had gotten advance permission to publish the article. The initial indignation, which had mostly focused on the irresponsibility of the Kaiser, now shifted in part to Bulow and his advisors. The Pan-German Rheinisch-Westflaische Zeitung recalled Bulow's promise--made in a famous Reichstag speech of 12 December 1900, where he had dismissed the Pan-Germans as "beer-bench" politicians--to resign if the Kaiser ever acted against the national interest. (128) The liberal Viennese Neue Freie Presse found it hard to believe that Bulow had indeed not read the article. (129) The progressive Welt am Montag called Bulow "the main culprit." (130) The Catholic Center party's official paper, Germania, was especially harsh: "We need a Chancellor who is responsible not with words, but rather for the political process--not simply a whipping boy who has to atone for the sins of the generals' adjutants and other irresponsible people, even when they were called 'diplomats.'" (131) Some progressive papers picked up this line as well. (132) The humorous weekly Kladderadatsch published a cartoon comparing the leadership of 1870 and 1908: One picture depicted the elder Moltke (1800-91) ready with a war plan upon hearing of the French declaration of war; another showed a group of portly porters in 1908 at the foreign office looking with bewilderment at six declarations of war for which they had neglected to take down return addresses. (133) The nationalist Tagliche Rundschau complained sarcastically that, to the foreign office, a "careful examination" meant checking facts without worrying about their potential political effects. (134)
All told, the transnational nature of the discussion continued to promote an escalation of the domestic crisis back in Germany, as the official explanations failed to neutralize the effect of foreign reports on the views of the German press. Many Berlin dailies continued to note the obvious negative effects of the interview abroad; there was a general consensus that the episode was extremely detrimental to the national interest. (135) One especially illustrative example could be seen in the remarks of the vociferous nationalist editor of the Tagliche Rundschau, Heinrich Rippler (1866-1934). He complained bitterly of the effects of the interview in foreign countries, taking up many of the talking points of English, French, and Russian papers:
The fact remains that the Kaiser courted England unsuccessfully in conversation with foreigners, and, by doing so, discussed secrets of international politics that would have been better left unmentioned; it also remains that he thereby revealed his plan of campaign against the Boers, the knowledge of which can only create enemies for him and us.... (136)
[FIGURE 3 OMITTED]
Other papers followed a similar line of thinking. Now Germany would no longer be able to play the role of "honest broker" in the Bosnian Crisis, the agrarian Deutsche Tageszeitung complained. (137) "Our diplomats will have to work for a long time," the Berliner Neueste Nacbrichten noted, "before they will have overcome the last traces of this blow that has been struck against their work." (138) Paul Michaelis, writing in the liberal Berliner Tageblatt, aptly summed up the sorry results of the interview: "All of a sudden, we have to deal with the rest of the world being against us." (139) Altogether, the universal dissatisfaction with the Kaiser's work increased in the following days, as similar reports from foreign papers continued to trickle back to the German press.
Following the initial reaction to the interview, the outcry against the government and the Kaiser settled on three lines of criticism. The first critique castigated the Kaiser's personal rule; a fundamental constitutional reform was necessary, it was felt, to inaugurate parliamentary control of government and foreign policy. In Germany, the organs of the Center party, the progressives, and the Social Democrats took the lead on this issue. The Kolnische Volkszeitung, for instance, declared that the chancellor's policy of "cowering and concealment" had to end; only then could William II understand how the German nation felt. (140) The Berliner Tageblatt was especially vociferous: its editor, Theodor Wolff (1868-1943), contended that the Reichstag had to make a "unanimous demonstration" against the Kaiser's anachronistic personal regime. (141) Many papers of the left stressed similar concerns in the first few weeks of November. (142) Even the nationalist editor Rippler--an odd bedfellow for the German left--grumbled in the nationalist Tagliche Rundschau about the Kaiser's apparent lack of concern for the constitution. What "weighs down all German patriots," he asserted, was that the emperor "appears to rule the field of our foreign policy alone, and that constitutionally responsible persons are degraded to the chorus." (143)
The second stance was that adopted in conservative and nationalist circles, where criticism of the Kaiser's actions was stated directly or implied, but without attacking the monarchy as an institution or a form of government. In this vein, the Conservative party issued a statement in its official news organ, the Conservative Corresponded. Party leaders called upon William II to act with greater reserve, but also deplored the widespread public discussion of the matter for highlighting German disunity abroad. (144) This view reflected the importance of the transnational press discussion of the interview, which had brought this question to the fore and caused even regularly sympathetic organs to strike a more critical stance than usual. The Conservative Kreuzzeitung, for instance, adopted a newly independent line:
We cannot allow the matter to become a question of power between parliament and crown. It is not the parliamentarians who give expression to the wishes of the people, but the leaders of a monarchically sympathetic people's party. (145)
What the situation called for, in other words, was a conservative leadership that could assert itself in the name of the monarchy, as had been the case in Bismarckian times. Many of the organs of the nationalist right echoed this call, (146) while finding fault with the Kaiser's war planning. (147)
Altogether, the intense discussion of the interview in the European press tended to escalate popular feeling at home because it had aired Germany's dirty laundry in such an embarrassing and public way. Indeed, German readers had been almost hit over the head by the painful foreign reaction. A report from the British consulate in Dresden remarked on the popular excitement aroused by the acknowledgement that the Kaiser had submitted the interview to the foreign office for approval:
The news was posted up in the streets in Dresden on Saturday October 31st, and spread like wild-fire in spite of the fact that on the following (Sunday) morning hardly any papers appear. I cannot exaggerate the rage and shame caused by Prince Bulow's announcement.... I am convinced that a deep and lasting indignation has taken hold on the people, which is combined with a burning desire to vindicate the national honour both at home and abroad.... I was so strongly impressed by the intensity of this feeling that I ventured to telegraph to you that I feared any provocation from abroad would be welcomed. (148)
Because the German government's public-relations policy had failed to stem criticism in the European press--indeed, actually exacerbated it--Bulow and his advisors continued to monitor reports about the state of public opinion closely, especially in Britain. In London, Ambassador Metternich approached Grey about the interview on 7 November. While attempting to play down the more disturbing revelation about the Anglophobia of the German middle classes, Metternich argued that, in all things, British newspapers exhibited "such an anti-German tone that whoever formed their opinion from the press must reckon on England's resolute hostility toward us." (149) Grey as much as admitted that the interview had caused anxiety in Parliament and the public, particularly as it had reawakened alarmist fears about the growth of the German navy. Still, both sides agreed that the situation called for a period of official reserve and mutual cooperation. Then, as Grey asserted, public opinion would naturally grow friendlier as diplomatic "relations between the two countries became more favourable." (150) A 6 November editorial of the Westminster Gazette--clipped in London and sent by diplomatic courier back to Berlin--seemed to confirm the wisdom of this strategy. While expressing thanks for "the disclaimers in the German press" about the hostility of the German nation, it regretted that "a perverse spirit" seemed to compel the German people to "cause alarm in this country just at the very moment when we had supposed we were on the eve of better things." (151) The paper maintained this line in the coming days, a fact noticed in the German foreign office, as it continued to monitor the British press closely in mid- to late November. (152)
As a result of these fears about the internal and external reactions to an extended discussion of the matter, the imperial government began to take action to preempt further criticism. Maximilian Harden (1861-1927)--editor of the Zukunft and the originator of many of the attacks on William IPs court--had already delivered a lecture to a packed crowd criticizing the Kaiser's "personal rule" on 6 November. (153) It was hardly surprising when he published an article reviewing events in detail, in which he noted that a "storm broke out, at home and abroad," characterized by "wide-ranging fury and scorn, and howling and laughter in foreign quarters." (154) Bulow and his subordinates reacted swiftly. They immediately banned the sale of the November edition of the Zukunft at all the newsstands operating in stations controlled by the Prussian state railroad.
The public eagerly awaited interpellations about the interview in the Reichstag. The domestic and the foreign press attempted to anticipate how the chancellor would respond to his critics, and whether the outcry would be so great as to force fundamental constitutional reform. After the initial three days of newspaper discussion, the debate to the left of the Conservatives became centered on how much Bulow--or someone else in his position--could be held to account for the Kaiser's actions. Bulow was careful to make all the necessary preparations in advance. He had submitted his resignation and William II turned it down even though the chancellor had seemingly not bothered to read the article as instructed. (155) On 3 November 1908, the chancellor asked his press chief, Otto Hammann, to draft a speech that was very crisp, powerful, and serious, without being too humble or betraying any guilt. (156) Bulow also had his subordinates get into touch with sympathetic Reichstag deputies to orchestrate as much as possible the questions he would have to answer. (157)
The chancellor's appearance was finally scheduled for 10 November, when he would answer questions put to him by the National Liberals, the progressives, the Conservatives, the Free Conservatives, and the Social Democrats. (158) The transnational press discussion of the interview had piqued public interest. Emphasizing the drama of the scene, The Times reported that people had begun lining up outside the Reichstag at 3:30 am to get a seat in the public gallery, despite a temperature of five degrees below zero. (159) A full slate of speeches by representatives of each party excepting the Center preceded Bulow's speech.
Ernst Bassermann (1854-1917), who delivered the official interpellation for the National Liberals, restated the salient complaints in the press and potential solutions to the crisis. He noted the widespread excitement engendered by the interview abroad, especially in the English press, which demanded proof by "deeds, and not words." (160) In Great Britain, the public had rejected the Kaiser's peaceful overture, taking the naval build-up to be justified; in France and Russia, there were complaints of the emperor's indiscretion in making confidential diplomatic negotiations public; the Boers and the Dutch had been angered by the Kaiser's actions; even the Japanese had been offended, as was obvious from the "complete uproar in the yellow press." (161) There had been, moreover, a unanimous protest in Germany against William II's repeated interventions in foreign policy, a field ideally marked by an "absence of noise." (162) All told, Bassermann sought from Bulow a "guarantee against further intrusions of the emperor's personal rule," an increase in parliamentary influence on foreign affairs, and an assurance that matters of state should be conducted by "responsible officials." (163) He desired, in short, that the Kaiser would act with the dutiful reserve of a constitutional monarch. The other parties voiced similar criticisms, although the Social Democrats and Liberal People's party gravitated left with demands for ministerial responsibility, while the Conservative party drifted farther right by avoiding direct calls for constitutional reform. (164)
Despite being greeted by cheers from the crowd outside, the chancellor arrived on the scene solemnly; "looking worn and ill," as one foreign observer put it, he "dropped all his habitual floridness of style and spoke quietly, directly, and to the point." (165) Bulow began by noting his inability to answer every issue put to him. "I must be careful about the effect of my words abroad," he explained, avoiding any revelations that might increase "the great damage" already done by the Kaiser's interview. (166) What followed was a vague defense of the emperor that attempted to answer or deflect the most salient criticisms of the transnational press debate on the crisis. Bulow addressed the most harmful passages of the Daily Telegraph article relating to the attitude adopted by the people and the Kaiser during the Boer War. With regard to the putative war plans, Bulow assured the assembled audience, the exchange was limited to "a few purely academic ideas," mere "aphorisms" that were "without practical significance for the course of operations or for the outcome of the war." (167) In answer to French and Russian commentators, he also denied that Germany had ever acted in a way that was duplicitous. The disclosures about a three-power intervention were hardly revelations; after all, the Deutsche Revue and the National Review had already conducted a back-and-forth "polemic" about them. To throw cold water on discussions of the German people's Anglophobia, Bulow endorsed Grey's formula of pursuing a mutual and friendly cooperation as a way to improve Anglo-German relations. The Kaiser's assertions were, he remarked, too strong: "the German people desires peaceful and friendly relations with England on the basis of mutual respect, [lively applause on all sides] and I find that the speakers of all the parties have expressed themselves in the same sense today. ['Very true!']." (168) Bulow even responded to the renewed British fears about German naval construction in the London press by rejecting outright that the naval build-up was rooted in any real or perceived "aggressive tendencies." (169) He finally accepted responsibility again, mentioning his attempt to resign, which he asserted was neither hard nor inevitable. What was ultimately the hardest decision in his political life, the chancellor asserted,
was the one to remain in office in accordance with the desire of the Kaiser; I only decided to do this because I considered it an obligation of my political responsibility to continue serving the country and His Majesty the Kaiser precisely during these difficult times. [Lively applause] (170)
Bulow guaranteed that William II would be more mindful in the future about what he said publicly and privately. "Were that not the case," the chancellor declaimed amidst cheering on the right, "then neither I nor one of my successors could assume responsibility." (171)
The debates for the day concluded with a speech by a Center party representative and highly critical invective delivered by an anti-Semitic delegate. (172) Resumed on the next day, representatives of all the parties aired their grievances again. (173) As with every other aspect of the Daily Telegraph Affair, the German parliamentary debates of 10 and 11 November received a wide, transnational coverage. The Reichstag proceedings were summarized or reprinted broadly throughout the European press. (174) In France and England, the analysis was for the first time in the crisis somewhat muted. The lack of any obviously provocative statements in Bulow's speech heartened many journalistic observers in France. Many there viewed the apparent disruption in the Kaiser's personal regime to be the first step in the direction of a parliamentary system, or at the very least a significant setback for the monarchy. (175) In a similar fashion, many Russian papers viewed events as significantly weakening William II's position vis-a-vis his chancellor and his "responsible government." (176)
The British national press also interpreted the debates optimistically. The Daily Telegraph, it is true, took issue with some of Bulow's facts, while some other organs like the Germanophobe Daily Mail appeared unwilling to give up playing the role of voice in the wilderness about Germany's naval program. (177) But other papers, almost seeming to realize the role they had played in intensifying the crisis, declined to comment on the Reichstag debate, calling it a domestic concern which they were loath to stir up. As The Times explained, "the discussion yesterday dealt so pre-eminently with matters of domestic concern that we prefer not to dwell upon it ... when the German mind may be naturally more ... sensitive to outside criticism." (178) Some Liberal papers saw the crisis as leading implacably to a modernization and constitutional reform, a view that was even accepted by some Conservative papers. At the very least, as the Westminster Gazette asserted, the affair had defined "the limits of the personal regime" in the realm of foreign policy. (179)
In Germany, on the other hand, the criticism of the Kaiser and his government did not let up, and a new (and third) line of attack opened up portraying William II as absent from Berlin, carelessly gallivanting about Europe and heedless of the criticism of his "personal rule." (180) During the debates, Bulow had balanced on a delicate tight-rope, using the angry parliamentary consensus against the Kaiser to shore up support for the "responsible" government. He won the unanimous support of the Prussian Ministry of State the day after his speech. (181) He reported as much to Hammann, asking that the press at home and abroad present the details to the public. "We can only pull through," he told his press chief, "if we move through the press cleverly and cautiously." (182) Bulow was also careful to shore up support in the Bundesrat Committee for Foreign Affairs against the Kaiser's personal rule. (183) Moreover, he began to intimate that William II would have to take the blame for his numerous indiscretions: Bulow listed seven altogether since 1890. (184) By the middle of November, it appeared he had a consensus behind him; subsequently he moved to rein in William II during a stormy personal interview on 17 November. The next day, an official report in the Reichsanzeiger confirmed that William II would bow to the pressure of the public, the press, the parliament, and his chancellor. (185)
There was a great deal of interest abroad about the meaning of the Kaiser's capitulation. French newspapers were fairly skeptical, as many doubted the aims and character of German foreign policy. The Temps expressed reserve, preferring to watch German actions closely in the future. (186) Gaston Calmette (1858-1914), writing in the Figaro, felt the cause of peace had been severely hindered, believing that Bulow was more bellicose than the Kaiser. (187) Taking a more moderate view, the Petit Parisien asserted that the cause of world peace would be greatly strengthened if the Kaiser really did abide by his guarantees. (188) All told, the general French consensus was that Germany's current crisis should not be judged by the standards of constitutional government, as they existed in France or England. (189)
English papers struck an optimistic, albeit cautious note: The Daily Telegraph episode seemed to indicate that the German public had been victorious in checking the excesses of the Kaiser's personal rule. The Westminster Gazette, the leading organ of the Liberal party in England, expressed a typical view: While a true system of parliamentary responsibility was still lacking, "our own experience has shown us that constitutional theory is liable to a gradual attrition in the world of fact, and the fact that the Emperor has yielded even on a side issue unquestionably weakens his power to resist on the main issue." (190) Likewise, the Manchester Guardian viewed the episode as a small step in the right direction, though the process of moving to a system of true ministerial responsibility was far from complete. (191) Even papers that were known for their skepticism of Germany exhibited guarded optimism. "The regime of personal intervention," the Daily Mail editorialized in this vein, "has received a blow from which it will never recover." (192) Bulow held, The Times reported, the strongest position of any chancellor since 1890, though it was undeniable that the Kaiser had not agreed to submit to any real "constitutional guarantees." (193)
In Germany, the interpretation of these dramatic events lacked uniformity and seemed to lose momentum as the foreign press viewed the matter as closed. Those papers representing the progressive left, the Social Democrats, and the Center party would have undoubtedly agreed with the judgment summed up by a headline in the Berliner Tageblatt: "Less than nothing," meaning Bulow's vague promise was essentially hollow without meaningful constitutional reform. (194) The Conservative party, on the other hand, issued a second manifesto protesting Prince Bulow's apparent failure to defend the Kaiser. (195) Yet the National-Zeitung, representing the view of the National Liberals and government-supporting deputies more generally, announced that the chancellor's Reichstag speech was a full and adequate reply. (196)
Altogether, then, it seemed that Bulow had weathered a major storm without getting too drenched and that Germany had made a significant step forward in its constitutional development. Yet from the resolution of the Daily Telegraph Affair until the conclusion of the Bosnian Crisis at the end of March 1909 (and probably in many ways after that) the chancellor's relations with William II remained severely strained. From November 1908 until his resignation the following year, Bulow depended on the support of the so-called Bulow Bloc he had forged in 1907 in the Reichstag to remain in office. What made this task especially difficult, however, was the precarious nature of that parliamentary coalition. When the Conservatives, who were already wary of Bulow's lackluster defense of the monarchy, moved into opposition over a proposed tax reform, the chancellor's position was threatened. In March 1909, the Conservatives announced that they no longer considered the Reich finance reform to be a question of Bloc politics. The Center party soon took the hint, and by the summer of 1909 a majority of votes was patched together against Bulow's will that pushed tax reform through the Reichstag without the Progressives, effectively shattering the Bloc. Bulow resigned on 14 July 1909 and Germany's short experiment with a system of quasi-parliamentary responsibility in the government ended. Nevertheless, because the prestige of the monarchy had been significantly challenged, the Daily Telegraph Affair laid a foundation for the development of a system of true parliamentary democracy after the Great War.
The extensive transnational debate over the Kaiser's indiscretions helped to encourage that denouement. It is true that the Kaiser's interview elicited many "national" responses in European newspapers, where the matter was largely interpreted from a domestic vantage point or from the view of national interest. In England, the prevailing view, especially in newspapers with close connections to the government, was that the interview merely confirmed both the international threat that Germany posed and the concomitant need to push forward with battleship construction to neutralize that threat. In France and Russia, the Kaiser's actions seemed to highlight Germany's untrustworthiness in diplomatic negotiations. In Germany, by contrast, the Kaiser's "personal rule" came under direct scrutiny from all sides of the political spectrum, as most newspapers viewed the Daily Telegraph Affair as an unfortunate example of the irresponsible behavior of the emperor, made all the worse because his actions had embarrassed the nation abroad and tarnished Germany's international image.
Yet the Daily Telegraph Affair simultaneously represented a transnational media event par excellence. It began as an official attempt, as a part of a concerted public-relations campaign, to improve Germany's image in England. Although the object of the interview backfired, it sparked a debate and a discussion that was largely transnational. In Germany, the main figures within the Reich government closely monitored the debate as it proceeded, not only in the domestic press, but also from reports that came in through embassies abroad. As they had managed the crisis, their actions were as much a response to what was said abroad as to what was said at home. Likewise, the public in Germany focused not just on the ranting of its own press, but also on how it was interpreted in newspapers across Europe, from England to France and Russia. German journalists responded directly to the main talking points expressed at a transnational level: They monitored, quoted, commented on, and directly responded to articles from papers in other countries, utilizing the global newsgathering networks and agreements in order to carry on the debate more fully. In some cases, these activities even reached a higher level of transnational intervention, as key domestic political leaders in Germany worked with the foreign press to explain the meaning of the crisis back at home. As a result, the crisis intensified and gained momentum, exactly because of the way the European press discussed it. Altogether, this meant that the debate over the Daily Telegraph interview was a "transnational" affair that significantly influenced how the domestic crisis in Germany played out.
Nathan N. Orgill is Associate Professor of History at Georgia Gwinnett College (GGC). The research for this article was supported in part by an internal research grant through the Seed Fund initiative at GGC. The author would like to thank the community at GGC for its generous support--particularly Ms. Holly Heitman of the library, Dr. Richard Rawls (for looking over the draft), and Dr. David Mason (for the encouragement "to just submit the article already"). He would also like to thank Dr. Alex Roland, Dr. Seymour Mauskopf, Dr. Dirk Bonker, Dr. Malachi Hacohen, and Dr. Martin Miller of Duke University for their advice and support in the earliest stages of this project; Dr. Wayne Bowen of Southeast Missouri State University, who read and commented on an early version of this article; as well as the editor, Dr. Kees Boterbloem, and the anonymous reviewers whose sage comments and suggestions greatly improved the final product. Lastly, he would like to thank his family for patiently watching him divert his energy and attention to German politics in 1908, as well as Mr. Donald Stillwell and Dr. John Bohnstedt of Fresno State for many interesting conversations about this topic and many others. This article is dedicated to Dr. Bohnstedt's memory for being a model mentor, colleague, and friend--and for originally sparking the author's interest in the Kaiserreich and many other topics in modern European history.
(1.) "Different Points of View," Westminster Gazette, 3 November 1908, 3.
(2.) Thomas G. Otte, "An Altogether Unfortunate Affair: Great Britain and the Daily Telegraph Affair," Diplomacy and Statecraft 2, 1994, 296-333.
(3.) For many years, the only major German study of the Daily Telegraph Affair--without using the word Sonderweg--took as its main premise that the historical roots of Nazism lie in the peculiarities of the Wilhelmine political system that were exhibited by the domestic crisis resulting from the Kaiser's interview (see, for example, Wilhelm Schussler, Die Daily Telegraph Affaire. Burst Bulow, Kaiser Wilhelm, und die Krise des zweiten Reiches 1908, Gottingen, Musterschmidt, 1952, 7). Hans-Ulrich Wehler, the dean of the Sonderweg school in Germany, nevertheless took almost exactly the opposite view: He argued that the m onarch was a "shadow Kaiser," a symbolic figure who masked the real power behind the throne represented by the bureaucracy and the possessing classes (Hans-Ulrich Wehler, The German Empire 1871-1918, trans. Kim Traynor, Providence, RI: Berg, 1985, 62-5).
(4.) Erich Eyck, Das personliche Regiment Wilhelms II. Politische Geschichte des deutschen Kaiserreiches von 1890 bis 1914, Zurich: Eugen Rentsch Verlag, 1948; John C. G. Rohl, Germany without Bismarck: The Crisis of Government in the Second Reich, 1890-1900, Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: U. of California P., 1967, 271-9; idem, "The 'Kingship Mechanism' in the Kaiserreich," in The Kaiser And His Court: Wilhelm II and the Government of Germany, trans. Terence F. Cole, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994, 107-30; Gregor Schollgen, "Wer machte im Kaiserreich Politik? Zwischen 'personlichen Regiment' und 'polykatischem Chaos,"' Neue politische Literatur 25, 1980, 79-97; and Geoff Eley, "The View from the Throne: The Personal Rule of Kaiser Wilhelm II," Historical Journal 28, 1985, 469-85.
(5.) Katherine Anne Lerman, The Chancellor as Courtier: Bernhard von Billow and the Governance of Germany 1900-1909, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990, 221-7, and 253-8; and Terence F. Cole, "The Daily Telegraph Affair and its Aftermath: The Kaiser, Bulow, and the Reichstag, 1908-1909," in John C. G. Rohl and Nicolaus Sombart, eds, Kaiser Wilhelm II: New Interpretations: The Corfu Papers, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1982, 249-66.
(6.) John C. G. Rohl, Wilhelm II: Into the Abyss of War and Exile 1900-1941, trans. Sheila de Bellaigue and Roy Bridge, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2014, 662-5.
(7.) Konrad Canis, Der Weg in den Abgrund. Deutsche Aufienpolitik 1902-1914, Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh, 2011, 277-81, and, especially, 674.
(8.) Peter Winzen, Der Kaiserreich im Abgrund. Die Daily-Telegraph-Affare und das Hale Interview von 1908. Darstellung und Dokumentation, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2002, 7. Henceforth, all German and French translations are my own unless otherwise noted.
(9.) Ibid., 9-10, and 90-1.
(10.) Otte, "Unfortunate Affair," 321n2.
(11.) Indeed, the infamous Germanophobe Eyre Crowe (1864-1925), who Otte rightly examines as a crucial figure behind the new pessimism toward Germany, was the brother-in-law of the leader-writer for the Morning Post, who later claimed to have influenced Crowe's infamous 1907 memorandum on France and Germany; these kinds of close relationships between journalists and political leaders abounded in Edwardian England (see Henry Spenser Wilkinson, Thirty-Five Years 1874-1909, London: Constable and Company, 1933, 220-1, and 31619).
(12.) Winzen almost seems to adopt the view he has ascribed to Bulow in an earlier work: For him, public opinion was "[t]he viewpoint that eighty or ninety intelligent and influential thinkers have formed--first, mostly in opposition to the views of the majority--which they then gradually spread and convert to a general sentiment [communis opinio]" (Peter Winzen, Billows Weltmachtkonzept. Untersuchungen zur Fruhphase seiner Aussenpolitik 1897-1901, Boppard am Rhein, Harald Boldt Verlag, 1977, 67; my translation).
(13.) See Stanley Suval, Electoral Politics in Wilhelmine Germany, Chapel Hill, NC: U. of North Carolina P., 1985; Larry E. Jones and James Retallack, eds, Elections, Mass Politics, and Social Change in Modern Germany: New Perspectives, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1992; Brett Fairbairn, Democracy in the Undemocratic State: The Reichstag Elections of 1898 and 1903, Toronto: U. of Toronto P., 1997; Jonathan Sperber, The Kaiser's Voters: Electors and Elections in Imperial Germany, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997; and Margaret Lavinia Anderson, Practicing Democracy: Elections and Political Culture in Imperial Germany, Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2000.
(14.) David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany, Oxford: Oxford UP, 1984.
(15.) Martin Kohlrausch, Der Monarch im Skandal. Die Logik der Massenmedien und die Transformation der wilhelminischen Monarchic, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2005, 450-6.
(16.) Frank Bosch and Dominik Geppert, eds, Journalists as Political Actors: Transfers and Inter actions between Germany since the late 19th Century, Augsburg: Winner Veriag, 2008, 1115; Frank Bosch, Offentliche Geheimnisse. Skandale, Politik, und Medien in Deutschland und Grossbritannien 1880-1914, Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2009, 35-41; and Dominik Geppert, Pressekriege. Offentlichkeit und Diplomatic in den deutsch-britischen Beziehungen (1896-1912), Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2007, 9-12.
(17.) Some German newspapers even developed agreements with individual foreign newspapers, the most important being the London Times; a vivid description of these news-sharing agreements is given in Valentine Williams, The World of Action: The Autobiography of Valentine Williams, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1938, 82-3.
(18.) Memorandum by Bulow, 15 November 1905, R1486, Deutschland 126a, seer., Bd. 1, Politisches Archiv des Auswartigen Amtes, Berlin [henceforth abbreviated as PA-AA]. Cf. memorandum by Stein, , N2106/62, Otto Hammann Papers, Bundesarchiv, Berlin-Lichterfelde [henceforth abbreviated as Nl.H., BarchL]; and Rudolf Rotheit, Die Friedensbedingungen der deutschen Presse. Los von Reuter und Havas!, Berlin: Puttkammer & Miihlbrecht, 1915.
(19.) Keyword searches for major German national newspapers conducted with Gale's Times Digital Archive (accessed between 1 February and 17 September 2011).
(20.) Wolfgang J. Mommsen, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in Wilhelmian Germany, 1897-1914," Central European History 9, 1991, 381-401.
(21.) Anglo-Russian Convention Relating to Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet, 31 August 1907, in Appendix 1, no. 268, British Documents on the Origins of the War, vol. 4, The Anglo Russian Rapprochement, 1903-1907, London, H.M.S.O., 1929, 290-1 [henceforth abbreviated as BD].
(22.) Speech by Bulow, 30 April 1907, 12th Leg. Per., Session 1, Stenographische Berichte uber die Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages, vol. 228, Won der 31. Sitzung ant 17. April 1907 bis zur 54. Sitzung am 14. Mai 1907, Berlin: Verlag der Norddeutschen Buchdruckerei, 1907, 1251-4 [henceforth abbreviated as SB Vi?]; and Otto Hammann, Um den Kaiser. Erinnerungen aus den Jahren 1906-1909, Berlin, Reimar Hobbing, 1919, 43.
(23.) E. Malcolm Carroll, Germany and the Great Powers, 1866-1914: A Study in Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, New York: Prentice-Hall, 1938; reprint, New York: Octagon Books, 1975, 563-4.
(24.) "The German Emperor's Visit," The Times, 10 October 1907, 7.
(25.) Ignotus, "Germany and England: Some Unpublished Pages of German Diplomacy," National Review 50, December 1907, 535-52.
(26.) Andre Mevil, "Delcasse and the Entente Cordiale," National Review 51, July 1908, 712-19: 714-15.
(27.) Metternich to Bulow, 6 July 1908, R5832, England 78, no. 2,secretiss., Bd. 1, PA-AA.
(28.) "Message from Prince Bulow to the British People," Westminster Gazette, 16 August 1907, 7.
(29.) J. L. Bashford, "Kaiser Wilhelm II," Strand Magazine 35, no. 205, January 1908, 19-26:22, R5831, England 78, no. 2, seer., Bd. 5, PA-AA.
(30.) Typescript draft for the Vossische Zeitung, 9 January 1908, Bl. 2-4, N2106/52, Nl.H, BArchL.
(31.) Daily Dispatch, 4 December 1907, quoted in "The German Emperor and German Policy," The Times, 4 December 1907, 11.
(32.) "Un dementi," Echo de Paris, 5 December 1907, 3; and "The German Emperor and German Policy" (Reuters report), The Times, 6 December 1907, 11.
(33.) Cf. Bernhard von Bulow, Denkwurdigkeiten, vol. 2, Von der Marokko-Krise bis zum Abschied, Berlin: Ullstein, 1930, 377; Sidney Whitman, German Memories, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1912, 214; and idem, Things 1 Remember: The Recollections of a Political Writer in the Capitals of Europe, New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1916, 211-12.
(34.) "The German Peril," Quarterly Review 209, July 1908, 264-98.
(35.) Sidney Whitman, "Interview with Prince Bulow," Standard, 14 September 1908, 7. The Quarterly Review fully dissected Bulow's response point by point, even citing some passages and phrases in German untranslated. "The German Peril: A Rejoinder to Prince Bulow," Quarterly Review 209, October 1908, 576-98.
(36.) Schon to Bulow, 18 July 1908, R5832, England 78, no. 2, secretiss., Bd. 1, PA-AA.
(37.) Ein Wissenden [Friedrich Heilbron], "Deutsche Intrigen gegen England wahrend des Burenkriegs," Deutsche Revue 33, no. 3, September 1908, 257-63, N2106/54, Nl.H, BArchL. For the ideas and notes behind the crafting of this article, see Bl. 26-28, and Bl. 2933, N2106/54, Nl.H, BArchL.
(38.) De Salis to Grey, 26 June 1908, no. 98, in BD, vol. 6, 154-6.
(39.) Stuart-Wortley served in the British army at the end of the nineteenth century; in 1901 he became military attache in Paris and personally helped to grease the wheels for the Triple Entente. On Stuart-Wortley, see A. J. A. Morris, "Wortley, Edward James Montagu Stuart," in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, vol. 60, Wolmark-Zuylestein, Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004, 363-4.
(40.) Stuart-Wortley to Violet Hunter, 1, 2 and 7 December 1907, nos. 1-3, in Winzen, Kaiserreich im Abgrund, 94-9. Some of the specific verbiage and phrases resulted from creative license, however: For instance, the Kaiser wrote very soon after the September maneuvers that Stuart-Wortley had regretted the fear of Germany in his own country, "My countrymen are as mad as marchhares," he told William II, "even in September" (William II's marginalia, Stumm to Bulow, 8 September 1908, R5827, England 78, no. 2, seer., Bd. 1, PA-AA).
(41.) Stuart-Wortley to William II, 23 September 1908, no. 5, in Winzen, Kaiserreich im Abgrund, 100-2.
(42.) Rucker-Jenisch to Bulow, 30 September 1908, R5832, England 78, no. 2, secretiss., Bd. 1, PA-AA.
(43.) Bulow to the Foreign Office, 2 October 1908, R5832, England 78, no. 2, secretiss., Bd. 1, PA-AA.
(44.) Typescript draft of the Daily Telegraph article with suggested revisions, enclosed in Stemrich to Bulow, 5 October 1908, R5832, England 78, no. 2, secretiss., Bd. 1, PA-AA. On those minor changes, see also Stemrich to Bulow, 7 October 1908, N1016/33, Bernhard von Bulow Papers, Bundesarchiv, Koblenz [henceforth, abbreviated as NI.Bu., BArchK].
(45.) Bulow to Jenisch, 11 October 1908, N1016/33, NI.Bu., BArchK. Incredibly, there is no copy of the revised typescript draft extant in Bulow's personal papers. The chancellor, as he later claimed, may have never even read the revised draft of the article, although there is also much to suggest he did and then lied about it later. Bulow's biographer, Katherine Lerman, inclines to the former view. But the other scholar who really knows Bulow well, Peter Winzen, suspects the opposite. The evidence Lerman relies on comes from a letter Friedrich von Holstein wrote to Bulow two days after the publication of the article, which can actually be interpreted in a way that supports Winzen: Holstein suggested that Bulow should tell the Kaiser he had avoided reading the article initially, asking the Foreign Office to fact-check it; that process had resulted in no major objections, so Bulow sent it back without examining it closely, a procedure that could be justified even in retrospect because the article did not contain any new public revelations. In some ways Lerman's interpretation does mesh well with Bulow's characteristic laziness. But my own view is that the chancellor probably did at least skim the article at some point before sending it back to William II, seeing nothing inherently objectionable in its contents. This interpretation certainly accords with Bulow's obsessive concern about his own image and "public opinion" more generally (see Holstein to Bulow, 30 October 1908, in Helmuth Rogge, ed., Holstein und Harden. Politisch-publizistisches Zusammenspiel zeier Au/lenseiter des Wilhelminiscben Reichs, Munich: C. H. Beck, 1959, 365; Norman Rich, Friedrich von Holstein: Politics and Diplomacy in the Era of Bismarck and Wilhelm II, vol. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1965, 819-22; Lerman, Chancellor, 221; and Winzen, Kaiserreich im Abgrund, 29-36, and 103-5).
(46.) Jenisch to William II, 15 October 1908, no. 11, in Winzen, Kaiserreich im Abgrund, 109-11. Cf. Lamar Cecil, Wilhelm II, vol. 2, Emperor and Exile, 1900-1941, Chapel Hill, NC: U. of North Carolina P., 1996, 134-5: Cecil argues specifically that the most objectionable passage was noticed by Bulow, who recommended its omission. The German in Jenisch's letter is however vague enough that it does not specifically ask for the complete deletion of the passage: "Das Anerkenntnis, dal? das Deutsche Volk in seiner Mehrheit gegen England nicht freundlich gesinnt ist," Jenisch wrote the Kaiser, "durfte fur eine englische Zeitung besser etwas eingeschrankt werden" (Jenisch to William II, 15 Octobe, 1908).
(47.) William II to Stuart-Wortley, 15 October 1908, no. 13, in Winzen, Kaiserreich im Abgrund, 113.
(48.) Lawson to Stuart-Wortley, 28 October 1908, quoted in the footnote to Stuart-Wortley to William II, 22 October 1908, no. 14, in ibid, 114n2.
(49.) "The German Emperor and England," Daily Telegraph, 28 October 1908; an abridged transcript is available at: http://germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfmidocument_ id=757, accessed 21 December 2015; and, in a slightly different abridgement, available at: http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/The_Daily_Telegraph_Affair, accessed 21 December 2015.
(50.) This was one of the three passages that the Foreign Office had revised. The original draft had said: "The prevailing sentiment amongst my own people is not friendly to England. I am in a minority in my own land" (Typescript draft of the Daily Telegraph article with suggested revisions, enclosed in Stemrich to Bulow, 5 October 1908, R5832, England 78, no. 2, secretiss., Bd. 1, PA-AA).
(51.) "German Emperor and England."
(52.) Here was another passage modified by the foreign office. The original had read "Germany would use her armed might to prevent such an action" (Jenisch to William II, 15 October 1908, no. 11, in Winzen, Kaiserreich im Abgrund, 109-11). In the recommendations sent back from Bulow, this statement had seemed to stray too far from the facts. It was especially problematic because the more measured account had just recently appeared semi-officially--with both the Kaiser's and chancellor's full knowledge and approval--in the Deutsche Revue. That version of events had admitted that Germany had heard the French and the Russians out about the possibility of intervening, even while eventually declining.
(53.) "German Emperor and England."
(54.) "The German Emperor and England," Daily Telegraph, 28 October 1908, 11.
(55.) By using keyword searches in the searchable digital databases for the Manchester Guardian and The Times, one can get a representative picture of the difference in interest. For the Harden-Moltke-Eulenburg scandals there were three leading editorials of approximately fifty lines (1/3 of a column) in the Manchester Guardian in 1907 and 1908, and no editorials in The Times in that same period. For the Zabern Affair, from 1 December 1913 to 31 January 1914, there was only one editorial longer than fifty lines in the Guardian and three in The Times. By contrast from 29 October to 18 November 1908, there were seven editorials of the same length or more on the Daily Telegraph Affair in The Times (most filling two columns) and five in the Guardian. Searches conducted in ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Guardian (1821-2003) and The Observer (1791-2003) (accessed 6 July 2013), and Gale's Times Digital Archive (accessed 21 July 2013). One can get a sense that these two stories were nonetheless very newsworthy. On the transnational dimensions of the Harden-Moltke-Eulenburg scandals, see Norman Dormeier, The Eulenburg Affair: A Cultural History of Politics in the German Empire, trans. Deborah Lucas Schneider, Rochester, NY: Camden House 2015, 1-6; for the Zabern Affair, see Martin Schramm, Das Deutschlandbild in der britischen Presse 1912-1919, Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2007, 117-23.
(56.) It had appeared, for example, in Ullstein's Berliner Zeitung am Mittag in the afternoon, and in Scherl's paper, Der Tag, in the evening (see "Kaiser Wilhelm uber seine Stellung zu England," Der Tag, 28 October 1908, no. 345a, 1-2, R5832, England 78, no. 2, secretiss., Bd. 1, PA-AA). A copy of this report is held in Billow's personal archive: Bl. 29-32, N1016/33, Nl.Bu, BArchK. See also "Kaiser Wilhelm und England," Berliner Tageblatt, 28 October 1908, no. 551, 4; "Letzte Nachrichten," Kolnische Volkszeitung, 28 October 1908, no. 928, 3; and "Eine Unterredung mit dem Deutschen Kaiser," T'agliche Rundschau, 28 October 1908, no. 508, 1. Wolff's Telegraph Bureau published an extended summary of the article with quoted extracts in the evening (see "London, 28. Oktober," Wolffs Telegraphisches Bureau, 28 October 1908, no. 4741, 1, enclosed in Klehmet to Bulow, 28 October 1908, N1016/33, Nl.Bu, BArchK).
(57.) "Kaiser Wilhelm und England" (Wolffs report), Hamburger Nachrichten, 28 October 1908, no. 762, Beilage, 1; "Die Veroffentlichung im Daily Telegraph," Hamburger Nachrichten, 29 October 1908, no. 763, 1; "Der Kaiser uber die deutsch-englischen Beziehungen," Hannoverscher Courier, 28 October 1908, no. 27717, 1; "Kaiser Wilhelm und England," Die Post, 28 October 1908, no. 508, 4; "Kaiser Wilhelm und England," Die Post, 22 October 1908, no. 509, 1; "Kaiser Wilhelm uber die deutsch-englischen Beziehungen," Frankfurter Zeitung, 29 October 1908, no. 301, 1; "Der Kaiser uber die Beziehungen zwischen Deutschland und England," Germania, 29 October 1908, no. 251, 1; "Der Kaiser und die deutschenglischen Beziehungen," Kolnische Zeitung, 29 October 1908, no. 1135, 2; "Letzte Nachrichten," Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 29 October 1908, no. 255, 7; "Kaiserliche Politik," Vorwarts, 29 October 1908, no. 254, 1; "Deutschland wahrend des Burenkrieges," Vossische Zeitung, 29 October 1908, no. 509, 1-2; and "Die Daily-Telegraph-Veroffentlichung und ihre Folgen," Kreuzzeitung, 2 November 1908, no. 516, 1.
(58.) "The Friendly Kaiser," Pall Mall Gazette, 28 October 1908, 7; "Kaiser and England," Westminster Gazette, 28 October 1908, 13; "The Kaiser's Statement," Daily Mail, 29 October 1908, 7-8; "Declarations de Guillaume II," Figaro, 29 October 1908, 2; "German Emperor and England," Manchester Guardian, 29 October 1908, 7; "Declarations de Guillaume II," Temps, 29 October 1908, 2; "The Article in the Daily Telegraph," The Times, 29 October 1908, 5; and "Kaiserliche Politik," Vorwarts, 29 October 1908, no. 254, 1.
(59.) Berliner Neueste Nachrichten, 28 October 1908, quoted and translated in "Sensation in Germany" (Reuters report), Manchester Guardian, 29 October 1908, 7; Berliner Neueste Nachrichten and Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger, 28 October 1908, quoted and translated in "The Kaiser and Britain," Daily Mail, 29 October 1908, 7; "Kaiser Wilhelm und England," Die Post, 28 October 1908, no. 508, 4; "Die Politik des Kaisers," Hamburger Nachrichten, 29 October 1908, no. 765, 1; and "Deutschland wahrend des Burenkrieges," Vossische Zeitung, 29 October 1908, no. 509, 1-2.
(60.) "Bulletin de l'etranger," Temps, 29 October 1908, 1.
(61.) "Statements in Berlin," The Times, 29 October 1908, 5.
(62.) "Heinrich Mantlers Erinnerungen an den 28. October 1908," no. 15, in Winzen, Kaiserreich im Abgrund, 115.
(63.) Memorandum by Schoen, [October 1909], R5831, England 78, no. 2, seer., Bd. 5, PA-AA.
(64.) Memorandum by Hammann, 28 October 1908, R5827, England 78, no. 2, seer., Bd. 1, PAAA; Hammann, Um den Kaiser, 66-72; and Otto Hammann, "Aufzeichnungen," Archiv fur Politik und Geschichte 4, 1925, 541-53: 545. The publication in this way still appeared as semiofficial. See Wilhelm von Schoen, Erlebtes. Beitrage zur politischen Geschichte der neuesten Zeit, Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1921, 96-7.
(65.) "Heinrich Mantlers Erinnerungen an den 28. October 1908," no. 15, in Winzen, Kaiserreich im Abgrund, 116-17.
(66.) "Letzte Nachrichten," Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 29 October 1908, no. 255, 7. The published version varies considerably in wording from the drafts originally drawn up by press chief Otto Hammann and corrected by Bulow. See typescript draft dictated by Bulow [29 October 1908], and typescript draft edited by Hammann [29 October 1908], R5832, England 78, no. 2, secretiss., Bd. 1, PA-AA. The government released a similarly worded announcement in the official Reichsanzeiger the same day. Cf. Reichsanzeiger, 31 October 1908, in footnote to no. 8257, in Johannes Lepsius, Albrecht Mendelssohn Bartholdy, and Friedrich Thimme, eds, Die grofie Politik der Europaischen Kabinette 1871-1914, vol. 24, Deutschland und die Westmachte 1907-1908, Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft fur Politik und Geschichte, 1925, 182 [henceforth abbreviated as GP], A full-length translation of the official German announcement also appeared in the Daily Telegraph in early November (see "The German Emperor and England," Daily Telegraph, 2 November 1908, 11).
(67.) "Die Aeusserungen des Kaisers," Kolnische Zeitung, 29 October 1908, no. 1137, 2.
(68.) "Die Worte des Kaisers," Kolnische Zeitung, 30 October 1908, no. 1139, 2; and "Eine grofe Irrung," Kolnische Zeitung, 1 November 1908, no. 1139, 1.
(69.) "Die aussere Politik der Woche," Kreuzzeitung, 4 November 1908, no. 519, 1. Schiemann's support was by this time quite generous, for he saw the government's attempts to manage a press policy that was always trying "to smooth over what was rough" as fundamentally harmful. Diary entry by Schiemann, 4 November 1908, no. 43, in Winzen, Kaiserreich im Abgrund, 168.
(70.) Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger, 28 October 1914, quoted and translated in "The Kaiser's Object," Daily Mail, 29 October 1908, 7-8; "Der Kaiser uber die deutsch-englischen Beziehungen," Hannoverscker Courier, 28 October 1908, no. 27717, 1; and "Kaiser Wilhelm und England," Die Post, 28 October 1908, no. 508, 4.
(71.) "Kaiser Wilhelm uber die deutsch-englischen Beziehungen," Frankfurter Zeitung, 29 October 1908, no. 301, 1.
(72.) "Kaiserliche Weltpolitik," National-Zeitung, 29 October 1908, no. 517, 1. See also Magdeburgische Zeitung, 29 October 1908, quoted in "Zeitungsschau," Tagliche Rundschau, 30 October 1908, no. 511, 5; and "Die Aeusserungen Kaiser Wilhelms," Vossische Zeitung, 30 October 1908, no. 512, 1.
(73.) Kurt Riezler, "Political Decisions in the Modern Mass Society of the Industrial Age," Ethics 2, January 1954, 1-55: 14.
(74.) "An Unbutterable Parsnip," Pall Mall Gazette, 29 October 1908, 1.
(75.) Daily Express, 29 October 1908, quoted in "The Kaiser and Great Britain," Standard, 30 October 1908, 11.
(76.) "The Kaiser's Revelations," Daily Mail, 29 October 1908, 6; and "The Emperor's Moods," Daily Mail, 30 October 1908, 4.
(77.) Daily News, 29 October 1908, summarized in "Sonstige Meldungen," Vossische Zeitung, 29 October 1908, no. 510, 1-2: originally in Latin as "fonsetorigo mali."
(78.) "Kaiser's War Plan for British Army" (Times report), Manchester Guardian, 30 October 1908, 14.
(79.) "Declarations de Guillaume II," Figaro, 29 October 1908, 2; Novoe Vremia, 29/16 October 1908, paraphrased in "Les declarations de Guillaume II," Matin, 30 October 1908, 3; "Denials in Paris," Pall Mall Gazette, 29 October 1908, 7; and "The Article in the Daily Telegraph," The Times, 29 October 1908, 5.
(80.) Petit Republique, 29 October 1908, quoted in "La presse de ce matin," Figaro, 30 October 1908, 2.
(81.) "Appreciations russes," Petit Parisien, 31 October 1908, 3.
(82.) Novoe Vremia, 3 November/21 October 1908, quoted and translated in "Russian Press Attack," The Times, 4 November 1908, 10.
(83.) "Die ablehnende Antwort der englischen Presse," Berliner Tageblatt, 29 October 1908, no. 553, 4.
(84.) "Dokumente der Unfahigkeit," Vorwarts, 3 November 1908, no. 258, 1-2.
(85.) "Kaiserliche Weltpolitik und kein Ende," National-Zeitung, 30 October 1908, no. 520, 1. The quoted portion appeared in English.
(86.) "Das Echo der Kaiserworte," Tagliche Rundschau, 29 October 1908, no. 510, 1; and "Auslandische Pressstimmen," Hamburger Nachrichten, 29 October 1908, no. 765, 1-2.
(87.) Rheinisch-Westfalische Zeitung, 29 October 1908, quoted in "Kaiser Wilhelm uber sein Verhaltnis zu England," Neue Freie Presse, 30 October 1908, no. 15874, 2.
(88.) "Die neueste Londoner Indiskretion," Tagliche Rundschau, 29 October 1908, no. 509, 1; the report also appeared in "The Kaiser's Revelations," Daily Mail, 30 October 1908, 5.
(89.) "Nach dem Kaiserinterview," Simplicissimus 13, no. 33, 16 November 1908, 1.
(90.) Interpellation by William Redmond, 2 November 1908, Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 4th ser., vol. 195, 1908, col. 762.
(91.) "The Kaiser's Blunder," Pall Mall Gazette, 30 October 1908, 7; "The Kaiser's War Plan," Daily Mail, 3 November 1908, 7; "Une question aux Communes," Figaro, 3 November 1908, 2; "La crise allemande," Matin, 3 November 1908, 3; and "Debat aux Communes," Petit Parisien, 3 November 1908, 3.
(92.) "Der 'Feldzugsplan des Kaisers' vor dem Unterhause," Berliner Tageblatt, 3 November 1908, no. 561, 2; "Der Feldzugsplan Kaiser Wilhelms," Frankfurter Zeitung, 3 November 1908, no. 306, 1; "Das politische Gewitter," Freiburger Zeitung, 3 November 1908, no. 302, 1; "Der Feldzugsplan fur den Burenkrieg," Flamburger Nachrichten, 3 November 1908, no. 776, 1; "England," Die Post, 3 November 1908, no. 517, 1st supplement, 1; "Der kaiserliche Feldzugsplan zum Burenkreig," Reichsbote, 4 November 1908, no. 260, 2; "Grossbritannien und Irland," Schwabischer Merkur, 3 November 1908, no. 513, 2; "Grossbritannien," T'agliche Rundschau, 3 November 1908, no. 517, 2; and "Zur Veroffentlichung des Daily Telegraph," Norddeutscke Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 November 1908, no. 260.1.
(93.) "The German Emperor and England," The Times, 29 October 1908, 9. Cf. "The German Emperor and the European Situation," The Times, 30 October 1908, 11.
(94.) "The Emperor's Moods," Daily Mail, 30 October 1914, 4; and Evening Standard and Daily Graphic, 29 October 1914, both quoted in "The Kaiser and Great Britain," Standard, 30 October 1908, 11.
(95.) "An Unbutterable Parsnip," Pall Mall Gazette, 29 October 1908, 1.
(96.) "The German Emperor and Great Britain," Westminster Gazette, 28 October 1908, 1.
(97.) "Die Beurteilung in England," Berliner Tageblatt, 29 October 1908, no. 552, 1-2; "Stimmung in England," Berliner Tageblatt, 29 October 1908, no. 553, 1-2; "Die Eindruck der Veroffentlichung des Daily Telegraph in London," Hamburger Nachrichten, 29 October 1908, no. 766, erste Beilage, 1; "Die deutsch-englischen Beziehungen," Die Post, 29 October 1908, no. 510, 1; "Urteile des Auslandes," Hamburger Nachrichten, 30 October 1908, no. 767, 1; "Das Kaiser-Interview liber die deutsch-englischen Beziehungen," Hannoverscher Courier, 29 October 1908, no. 27719, 1; "Aus England," Kreuzzeitung, 29 October 1908, no. 510, 2; "Das Echo der Kaiserworte," Tagliche Rundschau, 29 October 1908, no. 510, 1; "England und der Kaiser," Frankfurter Zeitung, 30 October 1908, no. 302, 1-2; "England und der deutsche Kaiser," Kolnische Volkszeitung, 30 October 1908, no. 932, 2.
(98.) "Kaiserliche Politik," Vorwarts, 29 October 1908, no. 254, 1.
(99.) "AFriend of England," Evening Post, 24 July 1909, 10.
(100.) "Germans and England," Manchester Guardian, 6 November 1908, 6; and Metternich to Bulow, 7November 1908, no. 1053, R5827, England 78, no. 2, seer., Bd. 1, PA-AA.
(101.) "Die Daily-Telegrapb-Veroffentlichung und ihre Folgen," Kreuzzeitung, 2 November 1908, no. 516, 1. This article was discussed in great detail by "William II and His Policy," The Times, 3 November 1908, 5.
(102.) "William II and His Policy," The Times, 31 October 1908, 7.
(103.) J. Cambon to Pichon, 29 October 1908, no. 512, and Daeschner to Pichon, 4 November 1908, no. 534, in Documents diplomatiques francais (1871-1914), ser. 2, vol. 11, 15 Mai 1907-8 Fevrier 1909, Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1950, 868-9, and 898 [henceforth abbreviated as DDF].
(104.) Petite Republique, 29 October 1908, quoted in "La presse de ce matin," Figaro, 29 October 1908, 4.
(105.) "Declarations de Guillaume II," Figaro, 29 October 1908, 2.
(106.) "Contre l'Angleterre," Echo de Paris, 29 October 1908, 1. This article was thoroughly discussed and quoted in a number of European newspapers. See "La presse de ce matin," Figaro, 29 October 1908, 4; "Die Eindruck in Frankreich," Berliner Tageblatt, 29 October 1908, no. 553, 1-2; "Die Enthullungen des Daily Telegraph," Germania, 30 October 1908, no. 252, 1; and "Die Intervention im Burenkriege," Frankfurter Zeitung, 31 October 1908, no. 303, 1-2.
(107.) "The Kaiser and the Triple Entente," The Times, 29 October 1908, 5, R5827, England 78, no. 2, seer., Bd. 1, PA-AA. This report was echoed in the editorial for the day, and then later quoted and discussed in detail by the English and foreign press. Reuters distributed a precis of the report. See "The Kaiser's Facts" (Reuters report), Daily Mail, 30 October 1908, 5. For foreign reactions, see "Die ablehnende Antwort der englischen Presse," Berliner Tageblatt, 29 October 1908, no. 553, 4; "The German Emperor and England," The Times, 29 October 1908, 9; and "Les declarations de l'Empereur d'Allemagne," Journal des Debats, 30 October 1908, 2.
(108.) "The Kaiser Interview," Pall Mall Gazette, 29 October 1908, 7.
(109.) "Das Echo in Russland," Berliner Tageblatt, 30 October 1908, no. 555, 1-2; "Russian Resentment," Daily Mail, 30 October 1908, 5; "Die russische Presse und die Kaiserworte," Kolnische Zeitung, 3 November 1908, no. 1154, 1; "Pressstimmen," Vorwarts, 3 November 1908, no. 258, 1; and "Russian Press Attack," The Times, 4 November 1908, 10.
(110.) "The German Emperor and England," The Times, 29 October 1908, 9. The Hamburger Nachrichten quoted and translated this report in "Das Echo," Hamburger Nachrichten, 30 October 1908, no 768, 1-2. By the next day The Times asserted England was ready to let bygones be bygones. See "The German Emperor and the European Situation," The Times, 30 October 1908, 11.
(111.) Novoe Vremia, 3 November/21 October 1908, quoted and translated in "Russian Press Attack," The Times, 4 November 1908, 10.
(112.) "Les paroles du Kaiser," Echo de Paris, 1 November 1908, 3.
(113.) "La demission du prince de Bulow Journal des Debats, 1 November 1908, 1.
(114.) "Diplomatic allemande," Journal des Debats, 31 October 1908, 1. George Saunders discussed and quoted this article in his daily report from Paris to The Times. See "The Impression in France," The Times, 31 October 1908, 7. This view followed the initial Belgian response to the interview. See Independance Beige, 28 October 1908, quoted in "French and Belgian Views," The Times, 29 October 1908, 5.
(115.) "An Open Letter to the Kaiser," Daily Mail, 30 October 1908, 5. Stead's letter ran through the Berlin press like an electric current that evening. See "Der Dank Englands," Tagliche Rundschau, 30 October 1908, no. 512, 1.
(116.) De Salis to Grey, 30 October 1908, no. 125, Nicolson to Grey, 31 October 1908, no. 126, and de Salis to Grey, 3 November 1908, no. 128, in BD, vol. 6, 201-4; and J. Cambon to Pichon, 31 October 1908, no. 517, in DDF, set. 2, vol. 11, 873-4.
(117.) Daeschnerto Pichon, 4 November 1908, no. 534, in DDF, ser. 2, vol. 11, 897-900.
(118.) Internal memorandum on the attitude of Germany about intervention during the Boer War, 6 November 1908, no. 129, in BD, vol. 6, 204-6.
(119.) Daeschner to Pichon, 4 November 1908, no. 535, in DDF, ser. 2, vol. 11, 900-1.
(120.) Metternich to Bulow, 30 October 1908, R5827, England 78, no. 2, seer., Bd. 1, PA-AA. See also, Metternich to Billow, 29 and 31 October and 2 November 1908, and "The Kaiser and the Triple Entente," The Times, 29 October 1908, 5, R5827, England 78, no. 2, seer., Bd. 1, PA-AA.
(121.) Pourtales to Bulow, 2 November 1908, R5827, England 78, no. 2, seer., Bd. 1, PA-AA.
(122.) Bulow's marginalia, Mumm to the Foreign Office, 30 October 1908, R5827, England 78, no. 2, seer., Bd. 1, PA-AA.
(123.) Bulow to William II, 30 October 1908, no. 8257, in GP, vol. 24, 179-81.
(125.) See article draft dictated by Bulow and corrected by Hammann, undated, Bl. 60-1, R5832, England 78, no. 2, secretiss., Bd. 1, PA-AA.
(126.) "Politischer Tagesbericht," Nordeutscbe Allgemeine Zeitung, 1 November 1908, no. 258, 1.
(127.) "Berlin Foreign Office Statement" (Reuters report), The Times, 2 November 1908, 7.
(128.) Rheinisch-Westfalische Zeitung, 30 October 1908, summarized in "Political Effects," Daily Mail, 31 October 1908, 5. Cf. Reichstag speech by Bulow, 12 December 1900, 10th Leg. Per., Session 2, SBVR, vol. 179, 473-6.
(129.) "Kaiser Wilhelm und Furst Bulow," Neue Freie Presse, 1 November 1908, no. 15876, 3. This article is discussed in "Austrian Criticism," The Times, 2 November 1908, 7.
(130.) Welt am Montag, 2 November 1908, quoted in "PreEtimmen," Vorwarts, 3 November 1908, no. 258, 1
(131.) "Die 'voile Verantwortung'," Germania, 3 November 1908, no. 255, 1.
(132.) "Politische Wochenschau," Berliner Tageblatt, 1 November 1908, no. 558, 1; and "Die Folgen des Zwischenfalls," Vossische Zeitung, 3 November 1908, no. 518, 1.
(133.) "1870 und--1908?" Kladderadatsch 61, no. 46, 15 November 1908, 807. See Figure 2.
(134.) "Die Katastrophe," Tagliche Rundschau, 2 November 1908, no. 515, 1.
(135.) "Das Echo," Germania, 31 October 1908, no. 253, 1-2.
(136.) "Die Katastrophe," Taglicbe Rundschau, 1 November 1908, no. 515, 1. This report was quoted and discussed at length in "Plain Speaking by the Press," The Times, 2 November 1908, 7, and in "German Press Views," Daily Telegraph, 2 November 1908, 11.
(137.) Deutsche Tageszeitung, 29 October 1908, quoted in "Kaiser Wilhelm uber sein Verhaltnis zu England," Neue Freie Presse, 30 October 1908, no. 15874, 2.
(138.) Berliner Neueste Nachrichten, 29 October 1908, quoted in "Kaiser Wilhelm uber sein Verhaltnis zu England," Neue Freie Presse, 30 October 1908, no. 15874, 2.
(139.) "Politische Wochenschau," Berliner Tageblatt, 1 November 1908, no. 558, 1.
(140.) "Wie steht'smit der Krisis?" Kolnische Volkszeitung, 5 November 1908, no. 951, 1.
(141.) "Die Kanzlerkrisis," Berliner Tageblatt, 2 November 1908, no. 559, 1.
(142.) Salis to Grey, 30 October and 3 November 1908, nos. 125 and 128, in BD, vol. 6, 201-2, and 203-4; Berliner Borsen Courier, 1 November 1908, quoted and translated in "Plain Speaking by the Press," The Times, 2 November 1908, 7; and "Am Pranger vor der Welt," Vorwarts, 3 November 1908, no. 258, 1.
(143.) "Die Katastrophe," Tagliche Rundschau, 2 November 1908, no. 515, 1. This article was quoted and discussed in "Plain Speaking by the Press," The Times, 2 November 1908, 7.
(144.) Conservative Corresponded, 6 November 1908, no. 180, quoted in "Zur Lage," Frankfurter Zeitung, 7 November 1908, no. 310, 1-2.
(145.) "Zur Lage," Kreuzzeitung, 7 November 1908, no. 256, 1. This statement was republished throughout England by Reuters. See "German Conservative Appeal" (Reuters report), Westminster Gazette, 7 November 1908, 9.
(146.) Geoff Eley, Reshaping the German Right: Radical Nationalism and Political Change after Bismarck, New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1980; reprint, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1991, 289.
(147.) Comments of this sort were to be found throughout the papers of the far right on 29 and 30 October. A synopsis of the views of the Rheinisch-Westfalische Zeitung, the agrarian Deutsche Tageszeitung, and the Hannoverscher Courier can be found in "Zeitungsschau," Tagliche Rundschau, 30 October 1908, no. 511, 5. Clippings of these articles were sent to the Kaiser by Bulow. See Bulow to William II, 30 October 1908, no. 8257, in GP, vol. 24, 179.
(148.) Findlay to Grey, 10 November 1908, no. 132, in BD, vol. 6, 209-11.
(149.) Metternich to Bulow, 7 November 1908, no. 8260, in GP, vol. 24, 186-7.
(150.) Grey to Goschen, 7 November 1908, no. 130, in BD, vol. 6, 206-8. See memorandum by Bulow, 9 November 1908, no. 8261, in GP, vol. 24, 187-8.
(151.) "The Franco-German Incident," Westminster Gazette, 6 November 1908, 1, enclosed in Metternich to Bulow, 6 November 1908, no. 1045, R5827, England 78, no. 2, seer., Bd. 1, PA-AA.
(152.) Metternich to Bulow, 10 November 1908, no. 1063, 11 November 1908, no. 1067, 11 November 1908, tel. no. 314, and 12 November 1908, no. 1074, R5828, England 78, no. 2, seer., Bd. 2, PA-AA.
(153.) "Prince Bulow Safe," Daily Mail, 7 November 1908, 5; "Die Kanzlerkrisis," Germania, 7 November 1908, no. 259, 2-3; "Herr Harden's View," The Times, 7 November 1908, 7; and "Herr Harden gegen den Kaiser," Vorw'arts, 7 November 1908, no. 262, 3.
(154.) Maximilian Harden, "Gegen den Kaiser," Die Zukunft 65, November 1908, 207-15: 209; and "The Authorities and the Zukunft," The Times, 9 November 1908, 7.
(155.) Bulow to William II, 30 October 1908, no. 8257, in GP, vol. 24, 181. Although Peter Winzen and Konrad Canis have implied and/or directly argued that Bulow allowed the Daily Telegraph interview to be published as a way of embarrassing and reining in the Kaiser, it is unlikely the chancellor read it closely enough for the publication of the interview to have been such elaborately laid trap. Bulow certainly knew of the broader brushstrokes of the article; if he actually did know the exact wording, he probably failed to anticipate how shocking the interview would be. Nevertheless, his marginal comments on the published version of the article he first saw indicate a level of ignorance about its contents that strikes one as improbable playacting if he had read the article carefully before publication. See Bulow's marginal comments on "Kaiser Wilhelm uber seine Stellung zu England," Der Tag, 28 October 1908, no. 345a, 1-2, R5832, England 78, no. 2, secretiss., Bd. 1, PA-AA.
(156.) Bulow to Hammann, 3 November 1908, N2106/14, Nl.H, BArchL. The draft of the speech was printed after the war in Theodor Eschenburg, Das Kaiserreich am Scheideweg: Bassermann, Bulow, und der Block: Nach unveroffentlichten Papieren aus dem Nachlass Ernst Bassermanns, Berlin: Verlag fur Kulturpolitik, 1929, 289-94. Bulow ultimately ended up dropping the outline about midway through his speech, especially those sections that defended William IPs actions.
(157.) E.g., Bassermann to his wife, 3 November 1908, no. 37, in Winzen, Kaiserreich im Abgrund, 159.
(158.) The speaker for the Center party did not deliver his speech until after Bulow had delivered his official explanations. See Speech by Hertling, 10 November 1908, 12th Leg. Per., Session 1, SB VR, vol. 233, 5397-5401.
(159.) "Prince Bulow and the Emperor," The Times, 11 November 1908, 9.
(160.) Speech by Bassermann, 10 November 1908, 12th Leg. Per., Session 1, SBVR, vol. 233, 5374-80.
(164.) Speeches by Wiemer, Singer, von Heydebrand, and Hatzfeldt, 10 November 1908, 12th Leg. Per., Session 1, SBVR, vol. 233, 5380-95.
(165.) Goschen to Grey, 12 November 1908, no. 134, in BD, vol. 6, 212.
(166.) Speech by Bulow, 10 November 1908, 12th Leg. Per., Session 1, SBVR, vol. 233, 5395-7. The Daily Telegraph was the one paper that really picked apart Bulow's speech as a way of vindicating itself and asserting the essential truth of its original report. See its untitled editorial, Daily Telegraph, 11 November 1908, 10-11.
(167.) Speech by Bulow, 10 November 1908.
(172.) Speeches by Herding and Liebermann von Sonnenberg, 10 November 1908, 1 Leg. Per., Session 1, SBVR, vol. 233, 5397-5401, and 5401-5405.
(173.) Debates for 11 November 1908, 12th Leg. Per., Session 1, SBVR, vol. 233, 5407-37.
(174.) For example, "Sitzungsbericht," Berliner Tageblatt, 10 November 1908, no. 575, 3-4; "Deutscher Reichstag," Berliner Tageblatt, 10 November 1908, no. 575a, 1-4; "Der Zweite Tag der Interpellationsdebatte," Berliner Tageblatt, 11 November 1908, no. 577, 3-1; "Deutscher Reichstag," Berliner Tageblatt, 11 November 1908, no. 577a, 1-3; "German Policy" and "Chancellor's Speech" (Reuters report), Daily Mail, 11 November 1908, 7; "Deutscher Reichstag," Frankfurter Zeitung, 11 November 1908, no. 314, 1-2, and no. 315, 1; "Reichstags-Verhandlungen," Germania, 11 November 1908, no. 262, 57; "Deutscher Reichstag," Kolnische Volkszeitung, 11 November 1908, no. 968, 1-3; "Die Interpellationen uber das Kaiser-Interview," Kolnische Zeitung, 11 November 1908, no. 1184, 1; "Deutscher Reichstag," Kreuzzeitung, 11 November 1908, no. 532, 2-3; "Reichstag and the Interview" (Reuters report), Manchester Guardian, 11 November 1908, 7; "European Outlook," Pall Mall Gazette, 11 November 1908, 7; "German Goodwill," Westminster Gazette, 11 November 1908, 9; "Deutscher Reichstag," Berliner Tageblatt, 12 November 1908, no. 578, 2nd Beiblatt; "The Attack on the Kaiser," Daily Mail, 12 November 1908, 5; "Reichstags-Verhandlungen," Germania, 12 November 1908, no. 263, 5-6; "Deutscher Reichstag," Kolnische Volkszeitung, 12 November 1908, no. 971, 1-3; "Die Interpellationen uber das Kaiser-Interview," Kolnische Zeitung, 12 November 1908, no. 1188, 1; "Die Interpellationen uber die Veroffentlichungen im Daily Telegraph," Kreuzzeitung, 12 November 1908, no. 533, 1-2; "Reichstags-Verhandlungen," Nordeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 November 1908, no. 267, Parlements-Beilage; "Reichstag and Kaiser" (Reuters report), Manchester Guardian, 12 November 1908, 7; "The Reichstag and the Emperor," The Times, 12 November 1908, 5; and "Deutscher Reichstag," Frankfurter Zeitung, 13 November 1908, no. 316, 1.
(175.) "M. de Bulow et le Reichstag," Action francaise, 11 November 1908, 2; "Le empereur et le Reichstag," Figaro, 11 November 1908, 1; "Une grande seance," Humanite, 11 November 1908, 1; "M. de Bulow sur la sellette," Matin, 11 November 1908, l;"Un grand debat au Reichstag," Petit Parisien, 11 November 1908, 1; and "Avant les interpellations," Temps, 11 November 1908, 2. Cf. "European Outlook" (Reuters report), Pall Mall Gazette, 11 November 1908, 7; "French Comment" (Reuters report), Westminster Gazette, 11 November 1908, 7; and "French Criticism," Standard, 12 November 1908, 7.
(176.) "Russian Views," The Times, 13 November 1908, 9; and "Die russische Presse uber die Reichstagsverhandlungen," Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 14 November 1908, no. 269, 1.
(177.) "Today's News," Daily Telegraph, 11 November 1908, 10-11; "Prince Buelow's Shattered Policy," Daily Mail, 11 November 1908, 6; "The Week," and "The Kaiser Crisis," Observer, 15 November 1908, 8-9.
(178.) "France, Germany, and Europe," The Times, 11 November 1908, 13. See also "In Clearer Air," Pall Mall Gazette, 11 November 1908, 1.
(179.) "Most Creditable," Westminster Gazette, 11 November 1908, 1.
(180.) "Der kaiserliche Superlativ," Berliner Tageblatt, 11 November 1908, no. 577, 1; "Der Kaiser beim Grafen Zeppelin," Hamburger Nachrichten, 11 November 1908, no. 797, 1; "Das Echo der gestrigen Kanzlerrede," Tagliche Rundschau, 11 November 1908, no. 532, 1-2; "Der Kaiser," Hamburger Nachrichten, 12 November 1908, no. 799, 1; and "Die Interpellationen uber die Kaisergespache," Germania, 12 November 1908, no. 263, 1. The official response is "Ruckblicke," Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 November 1908, no. 270, 1.
(181.) "Vertrauliche Besprechung des Koniglichen Staatsministeriums" (handwritten copy), 11 November 1908, Bl. 54-6, N1016/33, Nl.Bu., BArchK.
(182.) Bulow to Hammann, 11 November 1908, N2106/14, Nl.H, BArchL.
(183.) Protokoll der Sitzung des Bundesratsausschusses fur auswartige Angelegenheiten, 12 November 1908, no. 65, and memorandum by Bulow, 12 November 1908, N1016/33, Nl.Bu., BArchK.
(184.) Bulow to Jenisch, 12 November 1908, N1016/33, Nl.Bu., BArchK.
(185.) Reich sanzeiger, 17 November 1908, no. 75, in Winzen, Kaiserreich am Abgrund, 246-8.
(186.) "L'entrevue de Potsdam," Temps, 19 November 1908, 1.
(187.) "La capitulation," Figaro, 18 November 1908, 1.
(188.) "Denouement de la crise allemande," Petit Parisien, 18 November 1908, 1.
(189.) "The Constitutional Problem," The Times, 18 November 1908, 9; and Radolin to Bulow, 19 November 1908, nos. 526 and 527, R5829, England 78, no. 2, seer., Bd. 3, PA-AA.
(190.) "Constitutional Responsibilities," Westminster Gazette, 18 November 1908, 1.
(191.) "The Constitutional Question in Germany," Manchester Guardian, 17 November 1908, 6.
(192.) "The Submission of the Kaiser," Daily Mail, 18 November 1908, 6.
(193.) "Prince Bulow's Audience," The Times, 18 November 1908, 13; and Metternich to Bulow, 18 November 1908, no. 1103, and 19 November 1908, no. 1108, R5829, England 78, no. 2, seer., Bd. 3, PA-AA.
(194.) "Weniger als nichts!" Berliner Tageblatt, 11 November 1908, no. 576, 1-2.
(195.) "Ein letztes Wort in ernster Stunde," Kreuzzeitung, 13 November 1908, 1. This press release was summarized and discussed in "The Position of Prince Bulow," The Times, 14 November 1908, 9.
(196.) National-Zeitung, 16 November 1908, quoted and translated in "The Emperor William and Prince Bulow," The Times, 17 November 1908, 7.
Table I. Citation of Influential German Newspapers in The Times (1840s-1940s) Newspaper 1840s 1850s 1860s Berliner Lokal-Azeiger (1898) * -- -- -- Berliner Neueste Nachrichten (1881) -- -- -- Berliner Tageblatt (1872) -- -- -- Deutsche Tageszeitung (1894) -- -- -- Frankfurter Zeitung (1856) * -- 0 0 Hamburger Nachrichten (1792) 0 2 0 Hamburgischer Correspondent (1868) -- -- 0 Kolnische Volkszeitung (1848) 0 0 0 Kolnische Zeitung (1762) * 83 33 45 Kreuzzeitung (1848) * 0 46 61 National-Zeitung (1848) 7 19 22 Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (1862) * -- -- 40 Reichsanzeiger (1871) -- -- -- Reichsbote (1873) * -- -- -- Tagliche Rundschau (1880) -- -- -- Vorwarts (1891) -- -- -- Vossische Zeitung (1704) 0 2 2 Totals 90 102 170 Newspaper 1870s 1880s 1890s Berliner Lokal-Azeiger (1898) * -- -- 2 Berliner Neueste Nachrichten (1881) -- -- 4 Berliner Tageblatt (1872) 3 15 99 Deutsche Tageszeitung (1894) -- -- 3 Frankfurter Zeitung (1856) * 18 4 49 Hamburger Nachrichten (1792) 0 2 65 Hamburgischer Correspondent (1868) 0 0 16 Kolnische Volkszeitung (1848) 1 1 17 Kolnische Zeitung (1762) * 245 379 510 Kreuzzeitung (1848) * 17 58 124 National-Zeitung (1848) 28 102 184 Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (1862) * 42 339 241 Reichsanzeiger (1871) 8 18 43 Reichsbote (1873) * 0 10 3 Tagliche Rundschau (1880) -- 0 2 Vorwarts (1891) -- -- 35 Vossische Zeitung (1704) 3 25 137 Totals 365 953 1534 Newspaper 1900s 1910s 1920s Berliner Lokal-Azeiger (1898) * 5 3 18 Berliner Neueste Nachrichten (1881) 36 1 -- Berliner Tageblatt (1872) 114 260 80 Deutsche Tageszeitung (1894) 20 33 11 Frankfurter Zeitung (1856) * 147 583 78 Hamburger Nachrichten (1792) 7 27 1 Hamburgischer Correspondent (1868) 3 0 0 Kolnische Volkszeitung (1848) 47 57 4 Kolnische Zeitung (1762) * 1012 934 33 Kreuzzeitung (1848) * 136 123 49 National-Zeitung (1848) 174 17 4 Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (1862) * 356 215 1 Reichsanzeiger (1871) 6 3 -- Reichsbote (1873) * 10 1 1 Tagliche Rundschau (1880) 12 9 6 Vorwarts (1891) 28 116 34 Vossische Zeitung (1704) 193 153 65 Totals 2306 2535 387 Newspaper 1930s 1940s Berliner Lokal-Azeiger (1898) * 9 7 Berliner Neueste Nachrichten (1881) -- -- Berliner Tageblatt (1872) 123 1 Deutsche Tageszeitung (1894) 0 -- Frankfurter Zeitung (1856) * 79 34 Hamburger Nachrichten (1792) 0 -- Hamburgischer Correspondent (1868) 0 -- Kolnische Volkszeitung (1848) 10 0 Kolnische Zeitung (1762) * 1 0 Kreuzzeitung (1848) * 8 -- National-Zeitung (1848) 37 20 Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung (1862) * -- -- Reichsanzeiger (1871) -- -- Reichsbote (1873) * 2 -- Tagliche Rundschau (1880) 0 -- Vorwarts (1891) 9 1 Vossische Zeitung (1704) 16 -- Totals 296 64 Source: Keyword search for these titles in The Times' Digital Archive (accessed 1 Feb.-17 Sept. 2011). Papers considered "semiofficial" by observers abroad in the period of the Kaiserreich are indicated by an asterisk(*).
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|Author:||Orgill, Nathan N.|
|Date:||Jun 22, 2016|
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