You can't keep a good theory down; the just war, the Gulf War & beyond.

Two years ago, during the Gulf War of 1991, the just-war theory--for 1,500 years the mainstay of Catholic analysis for determining the morality of entering and conducting a war--was perhaps more widely discussed and debated than during any recent conflict, including hostilities in Bosnia, Somalia, and, last month, in Iraq itself. At the time, moralists, commentators, politicians, and even military leaders appealed to just-war principles as not only useful but even authoritative. Following the end of actual combat in the Gulf in late February 1991, however, the just-war theory itself came under attack from an unlikely source, the Rome-based Jesuit journal, La Civilta Cattolica. (Civilta's editorials are regularly reviewed by the Vatican Secretariat of State and they have been known to reflect Vatican approaches to various issues.) In a July 6, 1991, editorial, "Modern War and Christian Conscience" (reprinted, Origins, December 19, 1991), Civilta not only censured the war in the Persian Gulf but rendered an absolute condemnation of modern war in general. And going even further, it explicitly denounced the traditional just-war theory.

The editorial was warmly welcomed in many circles as an important contribution to the ongoing debate over the morality of war. Michael Kennedy, staff writer for the Boston Globe, wrote that it provided the "clinching argument" regarding the immorality of the Gulf War (March 17, 1992). Msgr. William H. Shannon, who provided the Origins translation of the Italian text, praised the editorial for breaking new ground in Catholic teaching on war and moving the church in "new directions of reflection and action" (America, February 15, 1992). He claimed that the editorial reflects a growing conviction in the church regarding the incompatibility of violence and Christian love.

Rather than "taking sides" in the ongoing moral debate about our involvement in the Gulf War, however, I would like to examine the quality of moral reasoning advanced by the Civilta editorial. The editorial's major argument is that the Gulf War, like all modern war, failed to meet the just-war criterion of "proportionality"; a subsidiary argument is that it also failed to meet the theory's criterion of "last resort." The heart of Civilta's argument is that the awesome destructive power of modern military technology always leads its users to wage an "unlimited" or "total" war and is therefore by its very nature "disproportionate."

The editorial argued that the UN coalition might have had "just cause" in initially responding to the occupation of Kuwait, but that the evils brought about in the actual waging of the war-- the editorial claims 30,000 civilians and perhaps 160,000 soldiers were killed--vastly outweighed the good that was being pursued. As J. Bryan Hehir (Commonweal, February 28, 1992), John Langan (Commonweal, June 1, 1991), and other scholars have observed, however, the postwar appraisal of proportionality depends on reliable empirical assessments of the long-term impact of the war on civilian life. Some experts believe that the number of civilian deaths from civil unrest, infrastructure devastation, and the economic embargo will far exceed the total number of deaths incurred during the active phase of the war. Greenpeace, for example, has estimated that over 240,000 Iraqi civilians (out of a total population of 18 million) died as a result of the war and its aftermath, not including those killed in recent air strikes. A November 1991 Middle East Watch report focused on the number of Iraqi civilians killed as a direct result of allied air bombardment or missile attacks, and last summer there was a resurgence of interest in long-term effects of the war, particularly with the emergence of medical problems among some American veterans of the campaign. In the September 24, 1992, New England Journal of Medicine, a Harvard study team maintained that approximately 46,900 children had died between January and August 1991 alone, a threefold increase in mortality among children under five years of age in Iraq. But from what I can tell, there have been no more comprehensive studies on the broader toll taken by allied attacks on the Iraqi infrastructure (deaths attributed to disease, malnutrition, and lack of medical care which resulted from disruption of Iraqi power and water purification systems). Judgments of proportionality, of course, consider not only damage to one's own soldiers but the harm inflicted on one's opponents, including civilian populations. Thus the absence of reasonably reliable estimates of war damage continues to cripple our ability to morally assess the proportionality of the prosecution of the war--a situation aggravated by the refusal of the United States government to affirm officially an estimate of casualities.

Civiltd's analysis of proportionality in the Gulf War can be outlined as follows: (1) the "nature" of technology leads modern war to be disproportionate (or "unlimited," or "total"); (2) the Gulf War was a case of modern war; therefore (3) the Gulf War was a disproportionate means to achieving the liberation of Kuwait. This conclusion may be correct but the argument is vulnerable to several criticisms. First, it ignores the obvious fact that these technologies are operated by human beings who have some degree of freedom and a range of choices regarding their use of such weapons. Military escalation may be an increased danger in modern war, but we are capable of more rational control than the editorial admits.

Second, Civilta ignores the fact that modern war has been limited in certain instances. Since 1918, with the possible exception of the Soviets in Afghanistan, none of the "Great Powers" has employed chemical or biological weapons. (Saddam Hussein's use of poison gas against the Kurds stands as the major example of the use of this weapon by a minor power.) Temptations to further escalation of biological and chemical, but also of thermonuclear, weapons have been resisted, with the notable exception of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. War has no doubt become increasingly "brutal" in this century, but it has not been consistently "unlimited" or "total."

The editorial omitted any reference to the increased accuracy of at least some of these weapons. Even though phrases such as "surgical strikes" and "pinpoint accuracy" are exaggerations, it is beyond doubt that laser-guided missiles and Tomahawk cruise missiles, for example, are much more accurate than the gravity bombs dropped from American B-29s and British Lancasters in World War II. Only 7 percent of the weapons employed in the Gulf War were in fact "smart bombs" (and of those about 40 percent missed their targets); nevertheless, a quantum leap in precision has increased the capacity of weapons to strike military targets and to minimize indirect damage to civilians. Technical capacity, however, must be complemented with a will to use these weapons in a just manner. Some people argue that since wars in this century have never been absolutely "clean," the conditions of the just-war tenets are now unattainable in principle. Failure to apply these tenets, however, might not be the result of their supposed obsolescence but a failure of human will, as when moral principles give way to military expediency, political advantage, or some claim of perceived national self-interest (or some other motive, such as revenge). From a just-war perspective, commitment to abide by these principles in those tragic instances when war is unavoidable is preferable to either absolute pacifism or "war-is-hell" realism.

The editorial, in keeping with public statements by Pope Pius XII and the documents of Vatican II, conceded that a war of strict self-defense is legitimate under certain conditions. Moral approbation of defensive war, however, seems to lead the editorial into a self-contradiction: either all modern wars truly are "absolutely immoral" and the exercise of self-defense is also immoral (and obviously, therefore, prohibited), or self-defense is legitimate and war is not absolutely, i.e., without exception, immoral. In either case, the argument of the editorial seems to collapse under the weight of this internal contradiction.

Once admitted, the fight to legitimate self-defense raises the question of defending the security of innocent third parties, an issue brought into heightened focus by events in Bosnia and Somalia. While a concern at the heart of the just-war tradition, it was an issue studiously avoided in the Civilta editorial. Interestingly, in his recent speech before the Vatican diplomatic corps (January 16, 1993), Pope John Paul II specifically endorsed the duty of capable third-party states to disarm an "unjust aggressor"--in this case, apparently, Serbian Bosnians--if all other means have proven ineffective. Presumably, this principle, which the pope described in terms of "humanitarian intervention," could be used with further specification in the case of the UN intervention in Somalia. It seems eminently reasonable that if one is justified in employing violence to defend the safety and welfare of one's own society, one is justified in defending the fight of other societies as well (assuming fulfillment of the other provisions, such as just authority, just cause, and right intention). However, the Civilta editorial argued that even though strict self-defense is a legitimate basis for entering into war, the "inexorable logic of war" leads to a "total" response. This implies that it would be better to submit to injustice rather than to prosecute even a defensive war in a disproportionate manner. But this itself is a traditional claim, one that recognizes self-defense as a fight whose exercise must be limited by proportionality and discrimination.

"Modern War and Christian Conscience" projected the in| evitability of "total war" onto every military engagement as a result of the "inexorable inner logic" of modern warfare. In my judgment, this imposition of an a priori moral evaluation amounts to a massive overgeneralization. The editorial moved from a historical tendency (escalation to "total" war) to a universal claim about the "nature" of modern war that claims a consistency that can only be properly attributed to a logical necessity (modern war is always "total"). The moralist John Ford, S.J., noted years ago that if all modern wars are necessarily "total"--i.e., always involve direct attack on noncombatants-- then modern war is by its very nature immoral; but that if, on the contrary, modern war is not always "total," one has a moral obligation to differentiate just from unjust military policies through the exercise of practical wisdom.

As a matter of fact, the most recent uses of U.S. military force have been quite "limited" and so provide empirical counterexamples to the editorial's claims. The 24,000 troops deployed in Somalia have protected relief workers and supplies and provided a degree of social order in a country destroyed by civil war among fourteen warring factions. Rather than employing large-scale military violence, the Marines have succeeded in bringing some measure of tranquility to Somalia simply through their armed presence, combined with a highly selective use of force, typically against snipers. The potentially limited nature of contemporary military interventions has also been displayed in last month's restricted, "tit-for-tat" targeting of Iraqi air defense control installations, mobile missile batteries, and hostile MIGs. Criticism did emerge from some coalition partners regarding the targeting of the industrial complex at Zaafaraniyah (the U.S. government claimed the complex played an important role in Saddam Hussein's enriched uranium program), but it seems to me that even this action must be considered a limited response to Iraqi provocation. Warnings were repeatedly issued in response to deliberate provocations and flagrant violations of the UN Security Council resolutions, only military targets were selected, and the degree of force employed was measured. None of this should be taken to diminish the tragedy of unintended civilian casualites in both Somalia and Iraq. In the case of potential military intervention in Bosnia, moreover, political and economic considerations alike support limited kinds of intervention (e.g., restricted to the use of air power), though ironically some strategists now maintain that peace in the region will only be attained through the deployment of significant numbers of ground troops. I say "ironically" because in this scenario, peace would be promoted through a more extensive rather than less extensive military intervention.

If the Civilta editorial's key assumption--that all wars today must of their very nature become "total"--is false--and it seems to be--then we are left not with an absolute prohibition of war but with thejust-war criteria narrowly interpreted: a strong presumption against war in general (a presumption by no means shared by all just-war theorists), an absolute prohibition of "total war," and an allowance of limited defensive war. This is in fact the position of Vatican II's Gaudium et spes.

The Civilta editorial was clear in detailing the evils of war: the fact that it is usually the poor and the innocent of both sides who suffer the most in war; that just-war tenets are often misused as a pretext for entering war for less than noble reasons, such as greed or political advantage; that the uses of force tend to beget a "spiral of violence"; that wars can be initiated with a just cause but waged in an immoral manner; etc. Yet all of these problems also characterized premodern war to some degree, and were recognized by moralists of the just-war tradition, for whom the burden of proof lay with those who would initiate war. Thomas Aquinas asked in the Summa theologiae not whether it is ever a sin for the Christian to fight in war but rather, "Is it always sinful to wage war?" His answer was "no," on the grounds that at times the needs of the common good can temporarily override the presumption against violence. Catholic theologians have repeatedly condemned "total war" on traditional grounds. In a famous article in 1944, John Ford, S.J., argued persuasively that the practice of regarding every citizen as a target--a presumption underlying Allied obliteration bombing-violated the principle of noncombatant immunity.

The tenets of the just-war theory have been considerably modified over the course of the last 1,500 years and there is no reason why the ongoing process of theological and moral development has to be arrested now. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas were not concerned with the principle of proportionality or with the distinction between offensive and defensive war; conversely, we no longer accept the view, held for centuries by the church, that "mocking the faith" justifies attacking "infidels." The tradition has gradually come to reject the fight to wage war to punish an offense (ad vindicandas offensiones) or to recover property (ad repetendas res) and now accepts only war to repel injury and aggression (ad repellendas injurias).

The Gulf War and more recent hostilities provide clear examples of why further reflection on just-war tenets is needed.

The application of proportionality to the conflict in the Gulf is a case in point. How can one compare and weigh the value of national sovereignty vis-a-vis the lives that might be lost defending it? What would have become of Kuwait had Operation Desert Shield not been succeeded by Desert Storm? When does a certain "price" paid in blood become too high for the value we are attempting to secure or promote? Should the elimination of Iraqi nuclear capacity be calculated into proportionality?

Because of its consequentialist character, proportionality can only be discussed in light of the relevant data. It may well be that, after all is said and done, the empirical evidence on long-term damage leads us to concur with the Civilta editorial--and apparently John Paul II himself--on the disproportionate character of the Gulf War. This judgment, however, can be .taken as an indication of the continued relevance--rather than the obsolescence--of the "just war" tradition.

The alternative to a careful, ongoing process of moral development of the just-war tradition, practically speaking, is absolute condemnation of all war. In such a case, all Catholics would be required to be conscientious objectors. The category of selective conscientious objector, now acknowledged by the church, would be rendered otiose. There would be no discrimination between particular motives for entering into war, and there would be no guidelines for distinguishing between the various means used in waging war. The church would "opt out" of the public policy debate regarding military intervention and cede any influence over conduct in war to other social influences--a very un-Catholic position, it seems to me, that would effectively serve rather than resist the idolatrous pretension to moral sovereignty that often characterizes the modern nation-state.

The following suggestions may seem obvious, but it is worthwhile to highlight them. Poorly reasoned moral arguments are counterproductive. Moralists and editorial writers need to support their claims with clearly defined principles and reasoning (including, of course, appeals to Scripture and tradition). Theologians who offer moral assertion in place of moral argument undermine their own credibility. In this instance, the anonymous authors of the Civilta editorial failed to establish the coherences among their moral claims: their acceptance of the fight to national self-defense does not square with their rejection of the just-war theory.

"Modern War and Christian Conscience" unequivocally stated that all "modern war" is immoral. From this a reader might infer that once a war has begun, the inexorable "inner logic of war" will inevitably lead to direct attacks on civilians, to abuse of prisoners of war, to arbitrary cruelty, and even to the use of "weapons of mass destruction." To reject the just-war theory as the Civilta editorial did might ironically contribute to the so-called "moral realism" that refuses to recognize the moral distinctions between atrocities, massacres, and combat between combatants.

Moral argumentation should avoid the use of gratuitous assumptions. The editorial claimed that modern war is always "total," involving the "whole world"; that war "always produces harm that far exceeds any advantages that may accrue in terms of justice and right"; and that there are always peaceful alternatives to war (and therefore war cannot meet the criterion of "last resort"). These claims are patently false, and they ignore the undeniable fact that not resisting evil with force can at times produce more harm than doing so--as we recall from the fatally mistaken appeasement of Hitler in the 1930s.

Editorial writers and moralists should eschew making misleading suggestions for the sake of rhetoric. The editorial's claim that the Gulf War "caused" the slaughtering of Kurds and Shi' ites and the environmental devastation of the Persian Gulf improperly imputed direct moral responsibility for these atrocious events to the coalition forces, when in fact they were perpetrated by the Iraqis. Of course we need to consider the effects of our actions in a broader way than a mechanical conformity to just-war tenets captures, but we must also develop appropriate distinctions regarding kinds and degrees of responsibility for these problems.

We need to resist the attempt to ground exceptionless moral principles on a few historical cases, and to use historical cases to "proof-text" moral conclusions arrived at on other grounds. To argue that there is an immutable "essence" of modern war that leads it to be universally disproportionate militates against discerning judgment and attentiveness to the actual historical events under consideration. This was exemplified in the editorial's refusal to recognize the clearly limited nature of the Gulf War, as was evidenced, for example in the cease-fire order of February 28, 1991 (however debatable that decision was from a strategic standpoint). Even if we grant that selected provisions of the just-war theory were violated in one specific war-- in this case the Gulf War--this does not, in and of itself, invalidate the relevance of these criteria for any and all future cases. Violations can point to either the moral guilt or ignorance of the agent, or the impracticability of the criteria as presently formulated, etc.

We also need to keep in mind the connection between moral norms and the deeper theological "background beliefs" within which they are framed, interpreted, and adjudicated. Catholic pacifists who endorse the editorial, primarily because of its unequivocal repudiation of the just-war theory, need to realize that this also calls into question both the "natural law" basis of that theory and the traditional Catholic affirmation of the harmony of revelation and reason that supports both "natural law" ethics and the just-war theory. Any account of the ethics of war and peace that intends to supplant the just-war approach must ultimately come to terms with the more profound theological interrelation of nature and grace, creation and redemption, and faith and reason that have characterized the Catholic tradition. The understanding of discipleship developed in Catholic circles will be decidedly different from that argued from sectarian or other perspectives.

Finally, we need to recognize that we think and believe within an ongoing religious tradition rather than in an ahistorical vacuum. Ethical norms are not set in stone; they are amenable to creative extension, refinement, or development when necessary. The Civilta Cattolica editorial offered a poignant example of why ongoing reflection on just-war theory is in order. Much more work needs to be done on notions such as proportionality, last resort, the distinction between direct and indirect killing, etc. Catholic moral theology must strive for realism, persuasiveness, and humanity--goals which can be attained only when the arguments used within the church reflect an openness to both the wisdom of the tradition and the truth discerned in concrete historical detail and in rational argument. In this way, theologians, journalists, and the magisterium alike can produce clear, honest, and constructive moral discourse.

STEPHEN J. POPE is an assistant professor of social ethics at Boston College.