Yet The Taliban Mindset Will Survive.

While the Taliban may no longer be a factor in Afghan politics, what is virtually certain is that the mindset will survive. There is a strong appeal in the Taliban call for the establishment of a pure Islamic emirate in the country, which has not been dimmed by the US attacks. To some extent, the expected capture or killing of Mullah Omar and Osama Bin Ladin will have a negative impact on the way ordinary Afghans will judge the Taliban. But it is equally possible that they would be regarded as "martyrs" who are to be emulated and avenged.

There will be two aspects to the survival of Taliban - internal and external, with the latter aspect being more potent. In the first case, many of those Pashtuns who have switched allegiances, or simply deserted Taliban formations and gone back to their villages, will remain prepared to return to any movement that intends to repeat the Taliban's policies - should such a movement appear to be on the winning side at some point in the future.

Indeed, members of the movement have openly admitted in interview to Western reporters in Afghanistan that they have laid down their arms simply in order to fight another day. Traditionally, the Afghans have preferred to fight with the winning side and pledge their loyalties accordingly. It has not been uncommon to see frequent defections from Taliban lines to NA troop concentrations, and the defectors are soon treated as part of the NA. Depending on how the political situation evolves in Germany, and how the ground war proceeds, there is likely to be a series of defections and re-defections in the weeks and months to come.

Moreover, despite the NA victory on the ground, assisted by US, British and other special forces, there is a limit to how much area the forces of the American-led coalition can monitor on a day-to-day basis. The Taliban now are in control of less than 20% of territory in Afghanistan, compared to more than 90% before the US bombings began. But retain the capability to continue a military conflict of the hit-and-run kind for some time. There is no shortage of small arms, explosives and volunteers to continue an asymmetric war. They can make governance from Kabul difficult for any government of which they are not a part. That in turn will make peace the major casualty.

Much depends on the extent of American and allied military presence in Afghanistan. This is the key to minimising the Taliban's room for manoeuvre in future, and to ensuring that the radical mindset of its followers does not continue to infect Afghan society. But even if there is a US military presence in Afghan for years to come, this does not mean that the mindset can be crushed. The experience of Arab states with Islamic movements is an example. For instance, the best efforts of the intelligence agencies and security forces in Egypt and Jordan have not been enough to stamp out the Islamist movements in these countries.

Most observers agree, however, that only by concentrating on the external aspects can the Taliban mindset be eliminated from the region. This is where the Taliban's links to Pakistan are crucial. The Taliban emerged mainly from among the Pashtun community - comprising both refugees from the previous Afghan wars and local Pashtuns - who were educated in the estimated 40,000-50,000 madrassas of Pakistan.

As the Taliban collapse began by the second week of November 2001, many of these Taliban followers escaped across the border to Pakistan. The Pakistani military establishment, which had nurtured and supported the Taliban, also played a key role - despite joining with the US-led coalition - in helping the Taliban in the initial phases of Operation Enduring Freedom. Western media reports pointed out that arms were being supplied under cover of darkness, and under the guise of humanitarian aid. When the Taliban began to flee after the collapse of Mazar-e-Sharif and Kabul, the Pakistan government allowed several groups of select Taliban figures to enter the country. More recently, as the siege of Kunduz was underway, there were reports in 'The New York Times' and 'USA Today' among others that Pakistani Air Force had airlifted several planeloads of Taliban figures as well serving and ex-Pakistan Army officers out of that city.

Thus, the observers say, Pakistan is indicating that it still has use for the Taliban after Operation Enduring Freedom comes to an end. In that case, the anti-Taliban goals of the war against terrorism will only be partly achieved. According to the observers, the Taliban mindset cannot be eradicated unless the source of the Taliban ideology - a mixture of Deobandi and Wahhabi Islam - is targeted. The source lies in the madrassas of Pakistan, where most of the Taliban - including the vast majority of its leaders - were educated. The ideals espoused by the Taliban continue to be taught in these madrassas despite promises by the Pakistani establishment that the curriculum would be revised.

The observers point out that Islamabad may help the returning Taliban in order to offset the negative implications of Pakistan's betrayal of Mullah Omar and Osama Bin Ladin. They would also hope to use such gestures to calm the Pashtuns in its border areas. (Pakistan has a larger Pashtun population than Afghanistan, and the possibility of a revival of the Pashtunistan issue is always a nightmare scenario in the minds of Pakistani strategists. Some reports referring to such an entity in the Western media have caused alarm among the leadership in Islamabad).