World cup '98: playing a man up or a man down.

A tactical lesson for coaches

Watching the World Cup matches from France provided soccer coaches all over the world with a panorama of the ultimate in athletic estheticism and a wealth of intriguing and useful tactical information.

Whether it was via television or observation (this writer was fortunate to view the final week), coaches were treated to a number of lessons that could be applicable to their coaching this fall and beyond.

With the pre-tournament decision to reinforce (the law has always been there!) tackling from behind with a red card, many coaches planned for the worse - namely that they might be playing 10 vs. 11 or, in contrast, 11 vs. 10, due to overzealous officiating. And it happened!

It happened to England when Beckham was dismissed in the Argentina match. And then Holland went a man down vs. Argentina. But, unfortunately, the South Americans gave away their advantage when Ortega was later given his marching orders.

The World Champions, France, played down a man for the last 20 minutes of their semifinal win over Croatia, when Blanc was victimized by Bilic's theatrics, while Desailly's dismissal in the final also had them bailing water versus Brazil for a large part of the second half.

ENGLAND'S TACTICS IN A MAN-DOWN SITUATION

Let's examine the England-Argentina match for how the teams arranged themselves following Beckham's red card in the 47th minute.

The teams had staged perhaps the best soccer action seen in France '98 in the first half of the game. They left the field tied 22 after the first 45 minutes. After exchanging two penalty scores in the game's first 10 minutes,. Owen wove his way through the Argentine defense to score perhaps the tournament's best goal at 16 minutes.

Just before halftime, Argentina pulled off an exceptional restart outside the England box, with Zanetti slotting home the tying score.

England played a 3-5-2 [ILLUSTRATION FOR DIAGRAM 1 OMITTED] prior to Beckham's dismissal with Neville, Adams and Campbell in the back; Anderton and LeSaux playing wide in the midfield, with Scholes and Ince playing in support of Beckham in the midfield, and two strikers Scherer and Owen playing up top.

Meanwhile, Argentina challenged England by lining up in a 4-4-2 formation [ILLUSTRATION FOR DIAGRAM 3 OMITTED]. Roa was fronted by Vivas, Ayala, Almeyda, and Chamot. The midfield of Zanetti and Simeone, wide right and left, respectively, featured twin playmakers Veron and Ortega in the middle. Up top, the South Americans played to Batistuta and Lopez.

With Beckham's unfortunate dismissal, Coach Glenn Hoddle's basic adjustment was to drop either Scherer or Owen back into the role played by Beckham and play with a lone forward while maintaining the integrity of the remainder of the defense [ILLUSTRATION FOR DIAGRAM 2 OMITTED].

Initially, it was the more experienced Scherer who played up front with Owen dropping into the midfield. But as the game wore on, they exchanged roles, with Owen's tremendous speed perhaps offering more in terms of counter-attacking potential.

An examination of the second half of the match reveals that while Argentina outshot England, most of its shots were speculative in that they were taken outside the 18-yard line. Further, that the young team (which critics agreed never settled on which of its two midfielders, Ortega or Veron, was to "run the show") was a bit ambivalent in attack, resulting in numerous offside violations and./or regained possessions for England.

In addition, the South Americans appeared to be reluctant about using the width of the field. Most of the attack occurred within the 44-yard width of the penalty box and just outside of it. Rarely did they stretch England to the full width of the field, thus potentially opening the middle for penetration.

Finally, a tally of fouls by each team found that Argentina had a far greater number of fouls, providing England with both possession of the ball and time to catch their collective breath.

LATER ADJUSTMENTS

An examination of Argentina's play found that for much of the second half it was right-sided in nature, with Ortega-Batistuta-Lopez and Zanetti causing a great deal of problems for England.

When Argentina coach, Daniel Passarella, replaced both Batistuta and Lopez with Crespo and Gallardo in the 69th minute, Hoddle countered by subbing Southgate to play more left-sided defense for the attack-minded LeSaux.

In turn, the game would later find Ortega trying to generate a more left-sided attack, especially trying to connect with Crespo. It was the latter's off-form through the remainder of the game that had some questioning Coach Passarella's taking off of Batistuta.

Finally, in the later stages of the match, Passarella tried to initiate more width in attack [ILLUSTRATION FOR DIAGRAM 4 OMITTED] by playing three strikers (Crespo and Zanetti with Gallardo central), supported by two withdrawn players (generally Berti, who subbed for Simeone in overtime) and Ortega.

The old "W" of the "W-M" of yesteryear! Meanwhile, Veron played behind the five and tried to come from behind and hit long shots on goal. The defense of Argentina (and England for that matter} remained intact throughout the match.

England's substitution of Merson in the 79th minute for Scholes provided new energy in the England midfield; sometimes he was found behind Ince with Ince increasingly playing further upfield, where his seeming tireless work rate found him dispossessing an Argentine player on a double team or intercepting passes.

Finally, Batty's coming on for Anderton in the 98th minute provided a bit more defense on the right side as a tired Scherer moved out wide.

CONCLUSION

England's ability to withstand Argentina for 73 minutes while playing a man down might have been due as much to its discipline and work rate, but in reexamining the match via videotape I believe it also had much to do with Argentina's experience at the international level of play which sent the game into penalty shots.

Had the South Americans a bit more patience and played with more width (Zanetti might have been used more effectively, while Crespo's ineffectiveness hurt later on), they might have loosened up the central core of the English defense.

It didn't happen. Also, their three-man front late in the match needed a center forward type, not Gallardo, to knock home a goal - and there sat their leading scorer, Batistuta, on the bench!

If justice were done, it happened when the late sub Batty sent his kick right at Roa in the penalty shootout and thus ended one of France's most highly contested and tactically interesting matches.

Other tactical adjustments made by England included:

* Remaining compact centrally and forcing Argentina to play the ball wide if they were to try to penetrate;

* Maintaining goal-side positioning at all times when confronted with 1 vs. 1 situations, especially when combating the dangerous Ortega and Veron;

* Looking for double-teaming possibilities in the midfield to exploit their 5 v. 4 numerical advantage with Ince particularly helpful here;

* Using the offside trap to advantage when their opponent's attack was hesitant in its buildup;

* Trying for quick strikes when balls were won in midfield;

* Using the long throw-in of Neville down the touch-line to create other more dangerous throws into the Argentina box, with the potential then to create scoring opportunities via corner kicks;

* When pressured, playing to goalkeeper Seaman who served long balls over the Argentine midfield, trying to connect with either Scherer or Owen;

* Trying to maintain possession of the ball whenever possible, not giving the ball away easily and using the clock whenever possible.

Tim Schum coached soccer for 29 seasons at Binghamton [NY] and has served as editor o the National Soccer Coaches Association of America's magazine, Soccer Journal, since 1980. He is the editor of the book, Coaching Soccer, published in 1997.