Work on nuclear-test ban continues: views on security assurances heard.

A pledge not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) - "except in the case of an invasion or any other attack" on their territories--highlighted the conclusion of the first part of the 1995 Conference on Disarmament (31 January-6 April, Geneva).

In a joint statement on 6 April, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States called for the "unconditional and indefinite continuation" of the NPT.

During the debate, China, also a nuclear-weapon State, in urging a "smooth extension" of the NPT, said that its undertaking was it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances, nor would it use or threaten to use them against non-nuclear States or nuclear-weapon-free zones.

A number of delegations welcomed those statements as an important contribution to a successful conclusion of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference (17 April-12 May, New York).

The "Group of 21" non-aligned and neutral countries stressed the need for an "unconditional, multilaterally-negotiated and legally binding" convention on negative security assurances, which renounce the use of nuclear weapons, to be negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament.

In a joint statement, they also called for positive assurances--providing support to a victim of a nuclear-weapon attack--that "go beyond a mere reiteration of the principles of the UN Charter", and declared that Article 51 "should not be interpreted as legitimizing the use of nuclear weapons".

Although it was generally conceded that security assurances were an integral part of the non-proliferation regime and an essential element for NPT extension, the 38-member Conference--the world's sole multilateral disarmament body--was still unable to re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee on that item.

Divergencies of view also prevented the Conference from re-establishing Ad Hoc committees on transparency in armaments and on prevention of an arms race in outer space. It also was not able to address the issue of membership expansion.

A record number of non-member States-51--were invited to participate in the 1995 Conference.

During the session, the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear-Test Ban continued efforts to streamline provisions for a future treaty, finally adopting a revised rolling text.

However, some major problems remained unresolved, with nuclear-weapon States failing to agree on such basic questions as inclusion of definitions of a nuclear explosion and activities to be permitted under a treaty.

Entry into force, implementation, funding and amendment procedure were also problematic issues. Sweden and Brazil, for example, strongly supported the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the implementing organization, whereas the United States, India, China and some other countries preferred an independent body.

Verification was another contentious subject. China and the "Group of 21" opposed the use of national technical means for data collection, because they believed it would give an unfair advantage to the more technically advanced countries.

Most States agreed that the treaty should be of unlimited duration.

A new Ad Hoc Committee--on the Prohibition of the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear-Explosive Devices--was set up on 23 March.

There were varying interpretations of its negotiating mandate. Western and Eastern European groups, as well as India, wanted the ban confined to future production of fissile material, white the "Group of 21" believed that it should also encompass existing stocks.

It was generally felt that the Conference, when it resumed work at the end of May following the NPT Review Conference, might benefit from an improved political climate, which would enable it to solve some existing problems.

`Paramount importance'

"Our common efforts to stop the flow of arms and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction acquire even greater significance in the context of an increasing number of regional and subregional conflicts", Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali told the Conference at its opening meeting on 31 January, in a message delivered by his Personal Representative, Vladimir Petrovsky, the Conference Secretary-General and Director-General of the UN Geneva Office.

In calling for an early consensus on important, unresolved issues on a comprehensive nuclear test ban, the Secretary-General noted that the "negative impact of uncontrolled conventional arms transfers" on international security had to be vigorously addressed.

"We should bear in mind that ongoing conflicts are being fought with conventional weapons, exacting a heavy toll and causing untold human suffering", he stated. "Therefore, openness and transparency in military matters are essential to enhance confidence and trust among States, to help dissipate suspicions, and to contribute to global and regional stability."

Although the UN Register on Conventional Arms, established by the General Assembly in 1992, was an important element in that regard, Mr. Boutros-Ghali called for efforts to "develop universal and non-discriminatory practical means to increase openness and transparency", thus paving the way for a "more secure world with lesser reliance on weapons".

The contribution of the Conference to the "attainment of our common goals cannot be over-emphasized", since its agenda included "items of paramount importance for the furtherance of these objectives", he concluded.

RELATED ARTICLE: Preparations for NPT Review Conference concluded

A 21-item agenda was suggested for consideration by the Review and Extension Conference of States Parties to the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), to be held in New York from 17 April to 12 May.

The Preparatory Committee for the Conference, at its fourth and final session (23-27 January, New York), also recommenced that three subsidiary bodies be established to discuss the following: non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, disarmament and international peace and security, and the use of security assurances (Main Committee I); non-proliferation, safeguards and nuclear-weapon-free zones (Main Committee II); and the inalienable right of States parties to conduct research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes (Main Committee III).

The NPT--designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology and to further the goal of general and complete disarmament--is the most widely adhered to multilateral Treaty, after the UN Charter. It establishes a safeguards system under the responsibility of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and promotes cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

The Review Conference serves as both a quinquennial review of the Treaty's operation and a conference to determine whether the Treaty should be extended indefinitely or for a fixed period or periods.

The NPT was signed in July 1968 and entered into force in March 1970 with 97 signatures and 47 ratifications. Four review conferences have taken place since the Treaty entered into force; each has sought to assess implementation of the Treaty and recommend measures to strengthen it in a final document.

Agreement on a final document was reached during the 1975 and 1985 Conferences, but not at the sessions in 1980 and 1990. Differences centred on the question of whether or not the nuclear-weapon States had sufficiently complied with their obligations regarding such issues as continued nuclear testing, qualitative nuclear-weapon developments and security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.