Women and empowerment in the Arab world.

EMPOWERMENT, JUST LIKE THE TERM "liberation" is a complex and relative notion that implies a scale of power, and a linear progression from one end of that scale to another. One could debate whether the purpose of social welfare policies are to empower citizens, women among them, or whether they are intended to give the impression of empowerment, thereby legitimizing nation-states, international organizations or other actors. I cannot engage in that debate in this article, so let us begin with the premise that women's empowerment is indeed the goal of such policies.

The daunting task of describing and evaluating women's empowerment precedes and should accompany planning--daunting, although more data has been collected, and there is an increased awareness of gender as a category of power and status. That is because we increasingly see empowerment alongside, or in combination with other phenomena and the study of gender has in many ways, revolutionized the study of other power constellations in society. The task is also intimidating because most scholars agree that it is important to avoid the essentialization of women in ethnic, religious, or national categories. Yet, we here refer to an explicit category of "Arab women" in order to theorize, (1) and so that readers of this essay can appreciate any discernible trends, despite the diversity of Arab women

The premise of social welfare policies is that women (and men) lack power and basic rights as citizens when they have limited income or access to other important services. These policies may not and usually do not acknowledge discrimination of women on the basis of gender, race, ethnicity, or religion; for instance, social welfare policies in Israel refer to Arab women's disadvantages on the basis of their low income status, but never to the element of racism or discrimination which accord to them as Palestinians (or Bedouin) as a group, but factors that oppress as women in Muslim societies are of great interest.

Women are by no means globally empowered. It seems that everywhere, economic and political power appear to be equally necessary components of empowerment. Women's disproportionate lack of political power is accompanied by their status as the majority of the poor. Their lack of power is demonstrated in the fact that one third of the world's women will be subjected to violence. Two million girls under the age of 15 are forced into the sex trade each year, and about twice as many women as men are affected with H1V in Africa. We must begin with this mention of the global problems of women so that the problems of Arab women are not overemphasized, or misconstrued.

We are not fully agreed on the definition of empowerment or what it in turn, will produce--political or economic power? Positive self-image? More or less serious exploitation of others (other poorer, or non-Arab women, (2) or men)? It has been very difficult to coordinate efforts aimed at empowerment with the various competing ideas concerning the tactics to be employed. And finally, I think it is important to reflect on the explicit aspects of empowerment that may have a bearing on the subjects of other articles in this issue that variously deal with social policy and women.

With this in mind, I will comment on some key events in various Arab countries or within communities of Arab women that highlight the uncertain track record of women's "progress" toward empowerment. For the purposes of this task, let us define empowerment as a condition in which women hold or are in the process of obtaining educational, legal and political rights that are equivalent or nearly equal to those of male citizens. Further, women are able to work, and advance in any career they select; possess economic rights to own and dispose of property, and pay for goods at the same rate as others. And, women should obtain bodily rights--the rights to control their own health and fertility, and prosecute those who engage in domestic violence, rape, harassment, or other violations of women's bodies. Empowerment may also include legal rights that actually accord women certain advantages such as hiring or educational preferences in areas where women have historically lacked access or differential rights such as paid maternity leaves, or the state and criminal justice system's cooperation in enforcing laws that protect women. Empowerment extends beyond acts or attitudes of governments, for it should include women's increased knowledge of the history of women in their own country/region, and the social and psychological effects of patriarchy, and access to creativity.

Social welfare systems have however primarily focused on stop-gap systems for economic and health security. They have not, for the most part, caused, or intended social transformation. Yet, they implicitly include certain aspects of the above-defined goals of empowerment, at least, the ideas that an increase in the years of education, and increased ability to earn income will empower women in both public and private spheres.

The Arab states embody various patriarchal structures and Arab society clings to a patriarchal system in which women's position within and duties toward the family precede their rights as individuals. Many who argue for empowerment do so either with or without a full understanding of the conflicts between the historical and contemporary status of women and the goals of empowerment. Certainly we may track a great many changes that have occurred in the direction of empowerment, but women have yet to achieve or realize many of the ideal stages of empowerment. Hence it is certainly more rational to define empowerment as a process rather than an end-point.

The scholarly literature on women in the region (as many issues are shared with non-Arab states) has since the mid-1980s focused a great deal of attention on the "patriarchal bargain" (Kandiyotti, 1991) struck between elite (and in many cases, middle class women) women and the state. Within this arrangement, elite women acquired more power so long as they did not challenge the basic patriarchal structures of state and society. Cultural authenticity was important to relatively young modern states and often relied heavily on Muslim mores that discouraged any attacks on the patriarchal family structure. But it must be noted that other religious groups in the region, for example the Eastern churches observe many of the self-same patriarchal features. These elite (and middle class) women benefited from state actions which involved movement toward women's empowerment and which challenged patriarchal authority, but not as strongly as they might have--for example, the promotion of women in the professions, along with the idea that women would not sacrifice their families for their careers. Such women have played a leading role in state organizations and NGOs that claim the improvement of women's status as their primary goal. Whether because of these woman and their own participation in the patriarchal bargain, or Arab states' reluctance to introduce policies that would irritate their religious establishments, the patriarchal and paternal nature of political leadership, or a combination of all of these factors, very little has bean introduced that would severely challenge or question the prevailing conception of gender roles in the years since independence from colonial oversight, or mid-century. Rather, the patriarchal nature of the family has been taken as a given, and policies developed around it.

Over the last twenty years, scholars have also investigated the interaction of Islamic revival, or Islamism and ideas concerning gender. This area of inquiry as well as the more purely social science oriented examinations of economic change and women's status has not always featured the state as a key actor. There are clear differentiations between NGOs that are independent of the state and those deeply entwined with it. We may also differentiate between Islamist women who espouse many feminist ideals of empowerment although they may eschew others, and male Islamist or conservative Muslim authorities. Their views differ, but more importantly their degree of power differs. For example, A-Muhammad Sha'arawi or Yusuf Qaradawi are inherently more powerful and influential and known to more citizens than female counterparts. The point however is that very few Arab states have ignored the Islamist trends and the consequent entanglement of the goals of women's empowerment with fears of Western ideologies, or the perception that women's empowerment is a feminist (read, Western) target.

How should we measure the degree of empowerment women experienced after a very active century of social and political change? We are confronted with recent events that illustrate a very ambivalent success rate.

SUCCESSES

* The passage of the new law in Egypt in January 2001 that makes a no-grounds divorce easier for women by allowing a "khul" (surrender of the mahr and gifts) divorce.

* Statistics that show girls catching up to boys in elementary, secondary and tertiary educational institutions, and evidence that members of rural, neglected, or minority communities are slowly benefiting from access to higher education (for example, the numbers of Arab women college graduates in Israel, including Bedouin).

* Royal commitment to parliamentary seats reserved for women in Morocco who competed in the fall 2002 elections.

* An important shift in discourse--in literature and history, this has meant the incorporation of "women's voices," the politicization of the personal, and a revived interest in the lost or misplaced history of women and their forms of expression in the past up to the present.

* A marked decrease in the fertility in some urban areas of the Arab world, although other areas (the Gaza strip and Algeria) continue to evidence extremely high fertility rates. I am not trying to argue that population control is the prime feature of any decrease in poverty (distribution plays a role). Still with women's empowerment in mind, it is impossible to accept Islamist and Third Worldist ideas such as those of Adil Husayn that women should have even larger families than they do now (Karam, 202).

* Stories and studies of prominent women who have entered male dominated professions, run successful businesses, or are professional sportswomen (Sullivan, 1986, Al-Raida, XVI, 83-84, 1998-1999).

* Numerous (thousands) of NGOs focused on creating sustainable development end projects that bring income to women, literacy, girls education (Morocco), enhancing women's political power (Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon) and legal reforms (Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia, Egypt).

* More evidence that people oppose violence against women--including a) generally more negative attitudes toward wife-beating b) a state coordinated program to identify and punish men who harass women in the Emirates, c) a coordinated campaign to punish honor killings in Jordan d) NGOs dedicated to this issue in Lebanon and Egypt.

AMBIGUOUS FACTORS

* The legalization of 'urfi marriage in Egypt--perhaps success in that de facto unions are now legal, but could mean another increase in the fertility rate at a younger age.

* The increasing cost of marriage in urban areas around the region.

* The decreasing cost of marriage in a few areas--such as the Negev, where a concomitant rise in polygamy appears to have occurred (Al-Krenawi, 2000, 2001).

* Increasing numbers of women as heads-of-household in rural areas due to male migration, for example in Yemen and Morocco, or women who migrate for work themselves (Juntenen, 2001, Salih, 2001, Ennaji, 2001).

FAILURES

* The arrest of 47 women in a "driving demonstration" in Saudi Arabia in 1990 and subsoquent fatwa issued by bin Baz against women's driving

* Statistics showing that the practice of FGM (female genital mutilation) involves a huge number of women in Egypt alone, and the death of several young girls like 11 year old Mona Abdul Hafees due to complications following FGM conducted in public health facilities despite the 1996 ruling upholding the illegality of the procedure in such environs (Al-Krenawi & Lev-Wiesel, 1999).

* The continuity of "old" and rise of "new" versions of polygamy. It is argued that polygamous households represent only 2 to 11.5 % of the all in the region, but women and children of polygamous marriages suffer (Al-Krenawi, 2001). Moreover, in countries where polygamy has been targeted as a social ill, the practice continues--husbands however divorce their older wives and may be less likely to continue supporting them economically.

* Another fatwa approved by the same Saudi Committee (CRLO) that says women and their guardians should not be able to postpone marriages for the purpose of continuing education, since women only need a primary school education (Abou El Fadl, 2002, 224).

* The continuing valuation placed on virginity and male responsibility for female sexuality means that many women are still strongly encouraged to many instead of pursuing careers and advanced education. Others resort to hymen replacement or subterfuge to maintain their "honor." Marital kidnapping continues in rural places, as do crimes of honor in both rural and urban settings.

* The public beating and sentencing of women demonstrators in the Sudan for infractions of the dress code while acting in opposition to the state.

* Street shootings of women who would not wear the hijab in Algeria.

* The stymied campaign to legalize civil marriage in Lebanon.

* The laws in numerous Arab states which grant citizenship on the basis of the father's--not the mother's--nationality.

* Attacks by Islamists on prominent feminists, for example, Toujan al-Faisal of Jordan and Nawal al-Saadawi in Egypt.

* The defeat of proposed female suffrage in Kuwait.

* The terrible disadvantages of Palestinian girls in the Israeli educational system, due to lack of funding, the policies of separation, and discrimination which have a direct relationship to the very small number of "successes" in the list above.

It is not possible within the scope of this article to describe each of the oddly varied indicators of trends toward or away from empowerment enlisted above. We do need to understand that the complex task of changing women's status on economic, social, political and legal bases is just that--highly complicated. It is not without foes and not immune to the process of globalization, which at present appears to mean a more precarious economic situation in the region, and "culture wars" that invoke women and gender.

It is clear that efforts to improve income and living conditions (the basis of the early social welfare approach) are insufficient in empowering women unless considerations of the basic patriarchal features of society are brought into the equation and the responsibility of states to address its negative effects is addressed. Policy-makers must also take note of the backlash women have faced in their entry into public space, and coordinate vigorous efforts to continue legal reform, and enhance women's political participation.

Feminists--Arab and Western--understand that transformative change must occur in many areas of women's lives. Gains in one area may not be matched by incremental advances in other areas. Thus simply gaining access to educational rights does not necessarily lead to a stronger female presence in politics--perhaps wholesale changes of public perceptions of women, changes in constitutional rights, women's networking and special training for political leadership are required. Changing the laws that pertain to women's bodily integrity--as in the illegalization of FGM (female genital mutilation, or female circumcision) in public facilities cannot realize their intent if medical personnel are unconvinced of the merit of the law, and continue performing circumcisions in their private clinics.

I will now highlight aspects of certain trends mentioned above in order to explain their relevance to the processes of empowerment and the potential of social welfare policies for women.

ISSUES OF PUBLIC SPACE

In the Arab world, a large and highly differentiated region, women unaccompanied by men (sometimes even when they are accompanied!) experience harassment from men in public places as they do in other parts of the world. This harassment heightened when specific historical practices created to ensure the modesty and chastity of women resulting in the harem system passed into disuse. States promoted the employment of women in the public and private sectors and the gandering of public and private spaces changed. Laurence Michalak commented on the gendering of public space in Tunisia. On a recent visit, he reflected on the changes in the gendered space of Tunisian cities over the last two decades (Michalak, 2001). Couples walking hand in hand and young women walking unveiled may be seen in many cities of the region. Obviously, this is not the case in the Gulf States, or in the Sudan.

One of the latest fashions, which demonstrate women's ability to mirror men in public space, is the craze for smoking shisha (or water pipes) in Cairo and Beirut in outdoor (sometimes indoor) cafes, an environment and activity that have always been heavily male. But even in areas where "mingling" is now permitted, harassment of women who walk alone, with each other, or sometimes with family members occurs. One theory is that the changes in the gendering of public spaces, and the appearance of women in service occupations has "shocked" society and men, or often boys, act out their aggression and hostility toward women by annoying them in public--to demean them, and make them understand they are inferior to men.

Dress codes created to protect the modesty of women in public space were dropped in some areas, but continued to be imposed in other areas (the Gulf States) or self-imposed (by urban lower class, Islamist and other women). An Islamic revival that ensued in the 1970s brought about new debates over covering, modesty and modes of dress. The hijab was voluntarily adopted by millions of Muslim women in Egypt, Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, and other Arab nations, and we will never be able to ascertain precisely how many other women adopted it as a result of peer or family pressure. Disputes over this modern version of Islamic covering has ensued in Tunisia and elsewhere where and when it is associated with Islamism or opposition to the state and secularism. Although women who adopted the hijab sometimes asserted that it prevented them from harassment, this is not in point of fact, strictly true. Others argue that the increasing popularity of Islamic dress served to increase male teasing and taunting of unveiled women. Indeed street harassment appears to be endemic throughout the region (Rim Zabra, "The High Price of Walking," in Ilkkaracan, ed. 2000) and with the exception of the UAE where penalties have included posting of men's pictures in the press in addition to a fine, little has been done. Beyond the matter of covering, which has been so exoticized by the West, and which may involve religious or political ideas there are other measures of women's use of public space.

Research on the issues of public space, harassment, and dress has primarily focused on the veil because the wave of new veiling coincided with a growth in religiosity and Islamist movements and activism around the region. (Zuhur, 1992, MacCleod, 1991; El Guindi, 1999; Karam, 1999; Olson, 1984). This research has been useful in demonstrating that dress has powerful social, political, and religious meanings sometimes considered so crucial that the state will step in to discourage the new veiling as in Tunisia.

It is important to take note of the regional distinctions in this phenomenon since they are closely linked to other important social distinctions. So for example, in Egypt, the hijab is not worn by all women. Yet, in the Negev, nearly all younger Bedu women now wear the hijab, a dress unseen here some 30 years ago. In this situation, where the population is divided between Jews and non-Jews, the hijab becomes a particular marker of a religion that has come to mean an ethnicity and a sign of political, social, and economic status lower than the dress of any Jewish woman (whatever the actual economic status of its wearer). But for young Bedouin women, it can demonstrate their modesty while attending the mixed-sex university.

The hijab has played a role in women's access to public space. Many women now feel compelled to don the hijab as a means of demonstrating their modesty, or their religiosity in transit to work, school or volunteer activities. Some controversy and discussion has arisen, for example, when the hijab was declared an emblem of loyalty to the Intifada in Gaza, and despite the protests of by the Women's Committees on behalf of woman who were attacked or harassed, the discussion ceased to have any effect at the higher levels of leadership as Fatah could not then afford to antagonize Hamas. With the exception of one leaflet, and one "round" of the battle, women's concerns were subordinated to political considerations.

In Egypt, the rights of private "language" (French, English or German) schools to disallow the hijab recently stirred up controversy (Bahgat, 2001). Public or national schools have de facto lost their ability to dictate students' dress, although the government attempted to discourage the wearing of the niqab, after the recapture of the Imbaba neighborhood of Cairo from its Islamist masters.

Moving to a more extreme case, in the Sudan, where the local dress, the thob (a rather lovely voluminous and diaphanous garment worn sail-style to cover the head if desired) was the most commonly worn garment before the National Islamic Front came to power. Since there have been stem punishments of women who did not wear hijab, and a flogging ordered for a woman protester wearing trousers. Outrage about the imposition of the hijab could only expressed outside of the country and in the context of regional or international fear of Islamist measures imposed on women. But also, the Sudan's surprising transformation (once the site of the largest Communist Party in the Middle East) grants the hijab a broader symbolism.

In Saudi Arabia, female covering has been imposed strictly, but the form of outer veiling worn is not identified with a religions opposition movement as in some other cases. However, in March 2002 there was a horrifying report of a fire at a school and that rescue workers were hatred from entering since the girls were considered to be improperly dressed without their outer cover (BBC News, 15 March 2002). As women have gained increasing riots to education, and some have entered the world of business and work, the presence of women's bodies in public space remains problematic.

Let us also recall that on 6 November 1990, forty-seven Saudi women drove their own cars--an action that was merely forbidden by custom, but not illegal until their particular rebellion. These women were forced to sign a statement declaring that they would never drive again, false rumors were spread that they were not properly dressed (covered) in the demonstration, they were blacklisted and threatened, they lost their jobs and were not allowed to leave the country. A fatwa was issued declaring that women's driving was contrary to Islam. In a plea to non-Saudis, one woman described the events following their demonstration and observed:

   Sometimes I wish that I never went to school or learned
   anything so I would not see the unfairness and the wrongdoing
   and not be able to do anything about it, and most of all, so I
   would not know that I do not have rights (Letter printed in "In
   These Times," Austin Peace and Justice (16-22 January 1990
   and reprinted May 1991).

Another interesting point of the woman's letter is that she attributes state and society's absolute power to retaliate against the women demonstrators to a lack of "human rights" in Saudi Arabia--a condition pertaining to men as well as women, rather than simple discrimination against women. Since all is controlled by the royal family, there is little recourse for protesters, or rather; whatever movement toward liberalization of this restriction can take place only with the permission of the royal family. Liberal Saudi spokesmen explained that not all were opposed to women's driving, but that the incident came at an unpropitious moment.

Oddly, Sandi women are chauffeured by male, unrelated, usually foreign men. Since the fatwa rules against driving using the argument that women will run the risk of mixing with unrelated men if they are allowed to drive themselves, this is a little strange. These men, often Asian immigrants, have rights superior to women's with regard to freedom of movement in public space, although their social and economic status is far inferior to their mistresses in every other respect. This particular rule has not yet been ameliorated, despite many hints that it might occur.

POLITICAL RIGHTS

The area of political rights involves suffrage and women's rights to run for office, or hold appointed positions of power in government. Political empowerment for women is important to the subject of this journal issue because without politicians and officials who consider the effects of various policies, laws and measures on women's status--no cohesive headway toward social change or reform may be made. It has been assumed that more women with increased political power will work toward women's empowerment. Although some women politicians and decision-makers may be as ambivalent toward the empowerment of women as male counterparts, it is also clear that others (who may influence male counterparts) are responsive to certain basic conditions of their constituencies such as the greater number of women who are poor or illiterate, and the increasing number of woman-headed households in various districts.

Women in Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Jordan, Sudan, Yemen and Morocco may vote. Women in Kuwait may not. Female suffrage has been a contentions issue in Kuwait whore many hoped for, and anticipated the granting of this civil right, as well as the right to stand in parliamentary elections by 2003, once the Amir Sheikh Jahar al-Ahmad al-Sabah of Kuwait issued a degree to this effect in May 1999. Instead, in November of the same year, the all-male Kuwaiti Parliament officially rejected this decree to applause from men in the public gallery, and more applause when an Islamist yelled, "Kuwaiti people don't want women's rights. Why do you want to force it on them?" (Reeves, 1999). The vote was close and feminists and supporters of women's rights were deeply disappointed by the tribal representatives and Islamist antipathy to the decree. Historically this seemed to represent a misogynist response to actions by other state leaders (Ataturk, Reza Shah, Hahib Bourgulba, Anwar Sadat) of the region in attempts to empower women. Like Anwar Sadat's passage of "Jihan's laws" of 1979 which granted a number of important reforms to Egyptian women, the Amir's decree was first attacked on procedural grounds. Opponents claimed it was unconstitutional since it was issued when parliament was not in session. The first vote on the decree reflected objections on parliamentary principles (with 41 opposed and 21 in support) while a second vote on 30 November was much closer (32 opposed, 30 in favor and 2 abstaining) and one of those who abstained was an Islamist member of parliament Hasan 'Ali al-Qallaf (Al-Mughni & Tretault in Joseph, ed. 2000, 255). Analysis of this issue indicates that the Amir's position changed and that women are to some degree casualties of the divisions between Islamist and liberal factions in the government, or it was suggested that the liberal side might have lobbied hold-outs more effectively.

Arab women have turned their attention to the issue of women's political leadership, since suffrage alone is insufficient to add to the empowerment of women as a sector. Lebanese women have decried their own lack of participation in government and in the most recent elections, more women than ever before ran for seats in Parliament but only three won seats. Analysis of this problem has noted that women really were excluded from Lebanese politics for many years. The few exceptions, as in other parts of the world, were widows of candidates, and then daughters or wives associated with particular zu 'ama families. This pattern held for the United States earlier in the twentieth century as it did in South Asia (Jayawardena, 1986).

Lebanese observers and proponents of women's political leadership also inferred that women are socialized to regard women as being inferior to men and these attitudes which may be seen in voting patterns, must be overcome. These exist alongside a political environment in which egalitarianism is included by the Constitution but has been denied in the specific areas that have been refuted in the discussions over the UN's CEDAW (Mobassaleh, 2001).

In Egypt, the National Council for Women, an umbrella organization now headed by Farkhonda Hassan, has also turned its attention to this issue and cooperated with the Egyptian Center for Women's Rights which groomed and prepared women candidates in the most recent election (Garwood, 2000; Elbendery, October 2000, November 2000). One hundred and twenty women stood as candidates for Parliament and seven women were elected (considering Egypt's population this is not much better than Lebanon, although only five were elected in 1995). President Anwar Sadat had initiated a system of guaranteed seats for women, and since this quota system was dropped, it has proven fairly difficult, but not impossible for women candidates to achieve political success. Education, family support, social, and to some degree, economic status are initial factors. In Egypt as in Lebanon, it appears that candidates believe that women voters lack confidence in female politicians, and there are a host of other factors to be taken into consideration in addition to the sharp contrast in voting alliances in the two cases.

In Morocco, the USAID Democracy officer urged me to include the efforts made there to groom female candidates for the fall 2002 elections. A special program led by the Center for Women and Democracy at the University of Washington conducted several "campaign schools" over the year to impart specific skills (like public speaking) to candidates, pre-electoral and post-electoral planning, strategies and use of the media, and to boost their confidence. (3)

It is interesting to note that etatism may lead to more or less political rights and political participation for women. Fairly "liberal" Arab states, such as Lebanon may be compared to states with a mass party, like Syria or Iraq, where women participate through party politics, but not necessarily in positions of political leadership. However, state-backed feminism has been extremely important in the efforts made at legal reform on behalf of women, in these two cases and in other Arab countries.

LEGAL REFORMS

The area of legal reform is one in which significant steps have been taken toward the empowerment of women, or at least toward more equity. This area has been problematized by a long historical debate over secularism and the complicated derivation of civil laws from various codification systems. In some cases, there has been a failure to create civil laws, while in others the success of new modifications is not entirely complete.

Proposed Optional Civil Marriage in Lebanon

President Elias Hrawi first proposed to legalize civil marriage in Lebanon, on 22 November, 1996, Lebanon's Independence Day. To the present, couples must be married by religious officials or via a religious contract. Couples who do not wish to contract a religious marriage must travel out of the country, often to Cyprus or Greece to marry. This presents all sorts of difficulties for mixed-faith couples (as also occurs in Israel). Hrawi was quoted as saying that 80 percent of the Lebanese public supported the idea, and as controversy rose and his cabinet dragged their feet, he said he would call for a public referendum by February 1998.

Women's and progressive political parties which support non-sectarianism were in favor of the proposed civil marriage, but opposition arose first in the Sunni religious establishment, spread to other religious officials and then was mirrored in Prime Minister Hariri's decision to postpone this decision, and finally even the Syrian President's stance that the issue was divisive and should be avoided.

Lebanon granted women the right to vote in 1953 and the delicate balance of the various confessional groups in the country is balanced by the sloganeering of the Taif accords that ended the Civil War which also call for the reduction of sectarianism (ta'ifiyya). Sectarianism has a bearing on this issue which could pertain to inter-religious marriages--precisely what the Sunni religious leaders sought to rein in as well as retaining their own control over matters of personal status.

Just next door in neighboring Syria, civil marriages are firmly legal, whereas religious marriages are insufficient in the eyes of the state. However the state ceremony and contract is nearly identical to that used in a religious marriage. Nadia El-Cheikh analyzed the responses of the Sunni, Shi'i, and communities and the women's groups to the proposed law. She explains that Sunni opposition to the measure grew after the wording was revealed. When the cabinet voted--21 in favor, six against and one abstention to the measure-which was after all, just "optional" in March 1998, the debate began in full. The Sunni Grand Mufti of Lebanon, Shaykh Muhammad Rashid Qabbani, led a very strong attack on the proposed change, saying that it opposed the shari'a in that a Muslim woman was specifically forbidden from marrying a non-Muslim man. It outlawed polygamy, although the former point was highlighted rather than this particular change. Furthermore the new form of marriage would promote "secularism at the expense of the religious authorities and religious courts;" and "endanger the well-being of the family" (El Cheikh, 1999). Eventually other objections based on omissions of items that would pertain to Muslims under the law such as the length of the 'idda and so on were raised. Demonstrations, sit-ins and protests against the bill were convened in Tripoli, Sidon and elsewhere.

The Shi'i response was milder and more ambivalent to begin with, but the Sunni response began to include charges of apostasy for those who would submit to a civil procedure. Fadiallah and Shams al-Din came out against the measure, but Nabih Berri, Speaker of Parliament, voted for it. Indeed, the most progressive of the Shi'i clerics, Muhammad Hasan al-Amm, advisor to the Ja'afari court, held a forum with two Christian clerics in January 2000, upholding his previous overall approval of the position of civil marriage, and of the principle of secularization, although he acknowledged the doctrinal objections to intermarriage.

The Christian religious officials were at first hesitant, but later, some of the bishops published a document saying that the church denies the possibility of civil marriage, since marriage is a sacrament and those who married otherwise exist in a state of sin. The Maronite patriarch opposed the law from a religious standpoint but most of all because he was concerned by the Sunni opposition (Chahine, 1998). In the end, religious officials and their political patrons triumphed over the rather large numbers of the general public who continue to support the reform. Hardly anyone emphasized the matter of empowerment for women, who are in many ways restricted by religious marriages. Rather, opponents and proponents saw the proposed law as blow to sectarianism, ta'ifiyya (Zuhur, 2002).

In the end, sectarianism triumphed. The Prime Minister used the issue of "timing" just as the Saudi royal family or the Kuwaiti government decided that the time was not ripe for reforms that might benefit women.

Divorce Reform in Egypt

A new law affecting divorce was passed by the Egyptian Parliament after lively debates and charges of political steamrolling and President Hosni Mubarak signed the draft law on 29 January 2000. This new law seemed to bring women's empowerment to a new stage in which additional obstacles (the rights to freely obtain a passport and therefore travel) were identified, but not yet dealt with. Most importantly, the new law provides a way for women to divorce regardless of the legal grounds for their action so long as they forfeit monetary compensation of the second half of the mahr (dower) and the "girls" (jewelry given for the marriage). It includes the creation of a family court able to facilitate divorce cases and a family insurance plan. As this women's right to invoke "khul," a category of divorce, the law is referred to as the "khul" law. Women are thus able to ransom themselves from marriages, although the better educated and wealthier will obviously be better able to benefit from the new law.

Following a failed intervention by an arbiter for each side in accordance with a Quranic principle (Surah IV:35) the divorce may be granted in three months and is to be irrevocable. The new law prevents men from divorcing their wives without immediately informing them (talaq al-ghiyabi)--a very important reform.

Debates concerning the laws of personal status, which have been codified in some but not all Arab states, first emerged in the nineteenth century, when the customs of female seclusion and the lack of education for women were also questioned. The Ottoman Empire issued two imperial edicts allowing women to sue for divorce on limited grounds in 1915 and codified family law in the Ottoman Law of Family Rights two years later. Subsequent laws were passed in Egypt in 1920 and in 1929 and these broadened the grounds for divorce by incorporating principles acceptable in the more lenient Maliki madhhab into the Hanafi based law. Women could obtain a divorce under certain conditions: if they were deserted, mistreated, denied financial maintenance, or whose husbands were imprisoned or had a serious contagious disease (Esposito, 1982, 53-55). Other reforms were proposed but rejected by King Fuad and re-proposed during the 1940s. These would have allowed women to write clauses into their wedding contracts restricting their husband's right to take another wife.

Subsequent efforts ensued in 1971, due in part to efforts by the Minister of Social Affairs (c) A'isha Ratib. Special reforms affecting divorce, custody, retention of the family home were eventually decreed by President Anwar al-Sadat in 1979 during a parliamentary recess, and then later passed by the legislature--these were dubbed "Jihan's laws" for First Lady Jihan Sadat (Zuhur, 2001a). Because of their extra-parliamentary method of legal passage, the Higher Constitutional Court declared these reforms to be unconstitutional in 1985. Many of the reforms were lost, but the essential momentum and partnership between the state, the ruling party and women reformers remained. Thirty seats set aside for women in parliament under Law No. 30 (a quota system, modeled on the Sudan) wore also lost at this point.

The 1979 personal status reforms had incorporated new grounds for divorce by a woman if her husband took another wife without her consent. She was to be informed if her husband divorced her (this need not occur in various other countries, Kuwait for example) and allowed her to obtain a notarized certificate of divorce. The divorced wife could keep the custody of her children--until the ages of 10 for a boy and 12 for a girl--and was to be awarded the family apartment as a residence until she remarried. These reforms permitted female employment so long as it did not interfere with their "family duties" (this is similar to the Lebanese government's position) and ended the practice of bayt al-ta'a (home of obedience) wherein the husband could lock up a wife who had tried to leave the marriage (or to initiate a divorce) at home until he obtained her "obedience."

The 2000 reforms were very important indeed, and many regard Mona Zulficar as one of the architects of these laws, illustrating the ways in which women's education and empowerment can enhance further empowerment (Zulficar, n.d.).

One article was sacrificed, as if it were a bone thrown by the National Democratic Party to its opposition. This important article would have allowed women to obtain a passport without their husbands' permission. Another principle, not addressed at all, concerned the nationality of children which they receive through their father. This leaves many children without a nationality at all, or unable to attend schools for there are a large number of Egyptian children fathered and then abandoned by men from the Gulf (and they rationalize this with reference to a fatwa allowing for temporary marriage while abroad).

Finally, it must be observed that the reforms involving divorce and matters of personal status do not apply to Coptic women. Although the intent of such legal reforms has been to create a civil personal status code, the Church refused to recognize divorces that did not involve grounds of adultery and has denied couples who were divorced in "civil" proceedings the right to remarry (Zuhur, 2001a; Harem "The Pitfalls of Nationalist Discourses on Citizenship in Egypt," in Joseph, ed. (2000, 54-56; Zulficar n.d; Shukri, 1991). It is perhaps appropriate to observe that Egypt, with its larger Muslim population and leading political party was able to use both of these factors in implementing legal reforms, whereas the situation of the more numerous "minorities" in Lebanon mirrors the independence of the Copts--or their sense of being outside of the civil law.

(c) Urfi Marriage

The new reform to personal status law includes the recognition of (c) urfi marriages. "Urf is actually a category of law derived from customary practice and tribal law which has, in certain cases, been employed as a licit source of Shari'a. Marriages contracted in this way via simple oral agreement were practiced in Egypt in the 1930s, 40s and 50s, and since, but were never considered to be legitimate marriages implying transference of property, duties to financial support or inheritance. They became far more widespread in the last five to seven years and might involve simple written agreements or oral agreements recorded on audio cassette. They were not registered as are nikah (the "normal" category of the marriage contract) marriages, and were criticized and stigmatized because young people availed themselves of 'urfi in some cases without their families' knowledge, or permission 0VIutawwi, April, 2000). 'Urfi therefore could be categorized with other forms of marriage that are suspect to the Sunni madhahib like muta' marriage, known as sigheh in Iran (Haeri, 1989), with customs like kidnapping (Zuhur, 2000, 2001b) that often defied parental controls, and worst of all, close to the Western pattern of "living together" without benefit of marriage.

(c) Urfi marriages, however, proliferated, and it was said that half of Cairo University's students were "in" (c) urfi marriages. Many young Egyptians, reportedly often including university students, resort to (c) urfi marriages because "regular" marriage is beyond their financial means, costing more than six years' wages on average for young Egyptian men. The funds include payment of the dowry (mahr) gifts, formal engagement and wedding parties, purchase of an apartment and major appliances and furniture. Young people have to postpone marriage for many years and in the meantime are not, according to local custom and Islamic law, supposed to have sexual relations. As early as 1980, Andrea Rugh had cited comments in the press regarding the unmanageable costs of marriage (Rugh, 1984, 254-56). Diane Singerman estimated the cost of marriage at $10,490 in the mid 1980s (in Diane Singerman & Homa Hoofar, eds. 1996 p. 169), and with inflation it is much higher now (Singerman & Ibrahim, unpublished paper, 2000).

Although many have engaged in (c) urfi marriages, the courts had previously refused to consider the legal issues such couples might encounter when they sought to divorce, or had children. Mona Abaza pointed out that that jurists issued conflicting fatwas on (c) urfi some denying its legitimacy, just like mut'a or misyar (the form of marriage borrowed from Saudi Arabia which does not even have to involve cohabitation, and which is allowed if men do not reveal to women their intent to leave them at the end of their sojourn). The most interesting sociological aspect was the way in which the press created a discourse about the deviance of youth and women who engaged in this practice (Abaza, 2001). As women are empowered and many more are independent adults, society's morals are endangered as the entire fabric of viriginity, honor, and chastity is worn away from within. Coinciding with campaigns against modern Arabic literature accused of "pornography," Abaza discusses the press charges that many upper-class women engage in mizyar marriages or of women who apparently married four and six men respectively through 'urfi (Al-Ahram, 22 Mareh1999; Al-Akhbar, 28 September 1999, cited in Abaza, 2001).

BODILY RIGHTS AND SEXUALITY

The death of an eleven year old girl in Cairo in 1999 illustrates the complicity of the medical profession in the upholding of traditional beliefs about sexuality. In this exploration of empowerment, we would hope to see that women gain rights through the intervention of nation-states to be free of violence, and that social welfare policies take that sort of violence into consideration. This can mean beatings by family members, honor-killings, rape, or FGM, female genital mutilation which we euphemistically refer to as "female circumcision."

Female circumcision, just like the preservation of virginity until marriage, is believed to be a "good tradition," in that it controls both female sexuality and the designation of paternity. In fact, the practice has numerous negative effects on women's reproductive and psychological health. These effects notwithstanding the medical establishment in Egypt has never educated doctors about the negative effects of FGM (or female sexuality generally). Many promoted the idea of "medicalization" of FGM, meaning that the main problem was infection at the hands of non-professionals (barbers, midwives) and that if the practice were done in hospitals and clinics the infection could be controlled, and more severe forms of the surgery limited. A decree was issued to this effect following the International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo in 1994 at which FGM was addressed. A scandal ensued after CNN aired coverage of a young girl undergoing FGM in Egypt. The official story that the practice was dying out, and only involved those of rural backgrounds was challenged directly. Egypt's reputation was perceived to be under attack. As a result the succeeding minister of health imposed a ban on FGM in public places, and despite serious legal challenges which overturned the ban for a time, it was upheld. The ban should have prevented the death of the young girl mentioned in 1999. Instead, her mother took two girls to a clinic to be circumcised, and this child died, presumably from excessive anaesthesia (Digges, 1999). A Task Force on FGM has been in place in Cairo since 1994 engaging in a multi-pronged campaign against the practice (Ayda Seif al-Dawla, "The Story of the FGM Taskforce" in Ilkkaracan, ed. 2000) but its efforts are hampered by the nature of the issue which requires a full scale effort at public re-education and that would mean discussion of women's bodies and sexual issues in the media which is unlikely to be sanctioned.

Researchers often estimated that 50 to 60 percent of Egyptian women have been circumcised. The reason that the figures are quite high is related to the class divisions in Egyptian society. The far more numerous poorer classes, both Christians and Muslims, follow this Nile valley tradition, while the families of Turco-Circassian derivation, the main segment of the small historic elite, do not. Some prominent Islamists asserted that FGM is an Islamic practice, or recommended a milder form of FGM, which has not helped the campaigns against it. Al-Azhar, which has played a role in promoting family planning, for example, has produced conflicting statements on FGM, and has not strongly opposed the practice.

New data has suggested that the practice shows no signs of abating or is even more pervasive than earlier reported. A 1995 EDHS (Egypt Demographic Health Survey) showed that 97% of Egyptian women who have been married ("ever-married women" including divorcees and widows) are circumcised (El Zenaty et al., 1996; Guenena & Wassef, 1999). A separate clinic-based study confirmed these results. Although the study cannot tell us exactly how many young girls are being circumcised today, it does illustrate the magnitude of the issue.

In other Arab countries, where FGM is not so heavily practiced, the involvement of modern medicine in supporting traditional values of virginity and the code of honor are nevertheless apparent. Hymen replacement occurs in all the countries we have discussed as do honor killings--whereby older women as well as younger women may be killed by their families for breaking the social rules governing sexuality. Women's empowerment has most recently been involved in several campaigns on the issue of honor killings, a notable instance in Jordan. These can only address the aftermath of such incidents mandating more severe penalties for those who kill women for such "crimes."

Conversely it appears that rape which also involves the traditional concepts of honor and family ownership of women's bodies has been codified by the state as well, but not always to women's best advantage. Women's testimony is often not believed, and women are held accountable for their own victimization, even when there are witnesses, as in the 'Ataba bus case, where a girl was raped although she was "conservatively dressed" and her mother was with her at the bus station. As a result of their understanding of the law the police have often attempted to force the victim to marry the rapist (Sonbol, "Rape and Law in Ottoman and Modern Egypt," In Ilkkaracan, ed. 2000). It does seem that in this area, the steady pursuit of equity has not yet taken place, and the double standard guiding men's versus women's sexual behavior is still in place modified by new practices like (c) urfi described above.

LINKS BETWEEN LEGAL REFORM AND SOCIAL WELFARE

It is particularly necessary to understand and establish linkages between legal reform efforts and the policies of social welfare. Take for example the issue of violence against women that has been codified in law, or where customary practice has overridden law. Honor-killings are common throughout the region. State and legal intervention is at the core of reform of such issues, and social welfare policies should be involved, particularly when families with children are affected. More often than not, these are regarded as separate spheres of endeavor.

During the 1990s, efforts in Jordan were mounted to modify the laws addressing crimes of honor, specifically, honor killings of women by their male relatives. Efforts were also made by women's groups in the West Bank and by women's centers serving Arab women in Israel to draw attention to this longstanding problem. Such legislation has been proposed as a necessary step on the road to empowerment, although in countries where it has already taken place--Egypt, for example--it is clear that legislation alone cannot solve the problem. The police, the courts, and the judiciary must also regard the problem with an eye toward social transformation, or it will continue in modified form.

CONCLUSION

Empowerment by means of education, literacy or modest income-generating projects is clearly insufficient to ameliorate the prospects for a higher quality of life for women of the Arab world. The process of empowerment is taking place at so many levels that it is quite difficult to say whether there has been retrogression, or that women have advanced four steps forward, and two back, as seems likely at this time. Certainly the process is entangled in the struggles of civil society against the state, and under the weight of historical practice and ongoing debates over the appropriate role of Western and Islamic ideologies.

Empowerment along with feminist consciousness has been evidenced in women's life-stories, such as the memoirs written by Leila Ahmed (1999), Hanan Ashrawi (1995) and Fay (Afaf) Kanafani. (1999). But the distinct disjuncture between the painful process of empowerment and the day to day efforts to delineate the gains and debits of social welfare policy are, I think, somewhat telling. Clearly, the state's role in promoting, allowing, or forbidding social change is crucial. Without movement toward equivalent legal rights, access to public space, and political influence, women have little hope of further expansion of their rights, or of sex roles. Our assumptions about the transformative capacity of societies are in question as are those of intellectuals, planners, organizers, and officials. We have not yet figured out how to coordinate efforts between women, countries, scholars, end disciplines, nor have we carefully thought out the process toward or the broader implications and requirements of social transformation.

ENDNOTES

(1.) The category of "Arab women" is problematic because it implies women in all Arab states (which also include non-Arab women, for example, Kurdish or Berber women). For the purposes of this article, I also reflect on the experience of Palestinian women (Arab and Bedu) in Israel, a non-Arab state, but not on Arab women in Europe or the United States.

(2.) Here, I allude to the exploitation of female workers from Africa and Asia now serving the needs of households in Egypt, Lebanon and the Gulf states.

(3.) Although I found serious references to the project in Moroccan based publications, the U.S. reportage trivialized the issue and the women themselves with a humorous opener referring to candidates' questions regarding the sexual woes of overly-busy married women, and the closing sentences which provide the solution to "women's concerns," what else? "Victoria's Secret." See Susan Paynter, "Women's Concerns Cross Borders," Seattle Post-Intelligencer (12 December 2001).

REFERENCES

Abaza, M. (2001). (in press). Circuiting or transgression? Perceptions of (c) Urfi marriage and changing sexual norms in Egyptian press.

Abou El Fadl, K. (2002). Speaking in God's name: Islamic law, authority, and women. Oxford: Oneworld.

Afshar, H. (1998). Empowering women: Illustrations from the third world London: Al Saqi.

Afshar, H. (1993). Women in the Middle East: Perceptions, realities and struggles far liberation. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Ahmed, Leila. (1999). A border passage from Cairo to America--A woman's journey. New York: Farrar, Sirauss and Giroux.

Al-Ali, N. (2000). Secularism, gender, and the state in the Middle East. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Al-Krenawi, A. (2001). "Women from polygamous and monogamous marriages in an out-patient psychiatric clinic." Transcultural Psychiatry, 38(2).

Al-Krenawi, A. (2000). "The psychosocial impact of polygamous marriages on Bedouin women of the Negev." A paper presented to the Middle East Studies Association meetings, Orlando, 17 November 2000.

Al-Krenawi, A., & Lev-Weisel, R. 0999). "Attitudes toward and perceived psychosocial impact of female circumcision as practiced among the Bedouin-Arabs of the Negev." Family Process, 38(4), 431-443.

Altorki, S. (1986). Women in Saudi Arabia: Ideology and behavior among the elite. New York: Columbia University Press.

Arebi, S. (1994). Women and words in Saudi Arabia: The politics of literary discourse. New York: Columbia University Press.

Asfaruddin, A. (Ed.). (1999). Hermeneutics and honor: Negotiating female "public" space in Islamicate societies. Cambridge: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University.

Ashrawi, H. (1995). This side of peace: A personal account. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Bahgat, H. (January 2001). "The trouble with Azza: Does a French school have the right to prohibit the veil?" Cairo Times, 4(42), 4-11.

BBC News. (15 March 2002). Saudi Police 'Stopped' Fire Rescue. Retrieved on July 6, 2002, from http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/

Boddy, J. (1999). "Womb as oasis: The symbolic context of pharaonic circumcision in rural northern Sudan." In R.N. Lancaster and M. di Leonardo (Eds.), The gender sexuality reader: Culture, history, political economy (pp. 309-324). New York: Routledge.

Botman, S. (1999). Engendering citizenship in Egypt. New York: Columbia University Press.

Brand, L. (1998). Women, the state and political liberalization: Middle Eastern and North African experiences. New York: Columbia University Press.

Brink, J. & Mencher, J. (Eds.). (1997). Mixed blessings: Gender and religious fundamentalisms. New York: Routledge.

Butler, J. & Scott, J. (1992). Feminists theorize the political. New York: Routledge.

Chahine, J. (1998). "The Lebanese law on civil marriage: Balance of fear." Middle East Council of Churches New Report, 10(2-3).

Charrad, M. (1992). States and women's rights: The making of postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Dick, M. (6 February 1998). "Hrawi presents proposed civil marriage code: President says law would promote individual freedom." The Daily Star.

Diggas, D. (6-19 August1999). "Circumcisors circumvent the law." Cairo Times, 2(12).

Elbendary, A. (19-25 October 2000). "Ladies of the house." Al-Ahram Weekly Online, Issue 504.

Elbendary, A. (23-29 November 2000). "The meaning of success." Al-Ahram Weekly Online, Issue 509.

El Cheikh, N. (1998-1999). "The 1998 proposed civil marriage law in Lebanon: The reaction of the Muslim communities." In Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law, 5, 147-161.

Esposito, J. (1982). Women in Muslim family law. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

Fouad, A. (20 July 1999). "Kuwait MPs argue over women's rights, delay ruling," Kuwait: Reuters.

Fouad, A. (3 July 1999). "Likely Kuwait MPs vow to block women's vote. "Kuwait: Reuters.

Garwood, P. (30 June 2000). "Project aims to boost Egyptian women's voice." Middle East Times, 30.

Guenena, N. & Wassef, N. (1999). Unfulfilled promises: Women's rights in Egypt. New York: Population Council.

Haeri, S. (1989). Law of desire: Temporary marriage in Shi'a Islam. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

Hale, S. (1996). Gender politics in Sudan: Islamism, socialism and the state. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.

Hijab, N. (1988). Womanpower: The Arab debate on women at work. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hirst, D. (24 November1999). "Kuwait stalls on votes for women." The Guardian.

Ilkkaracan, P. (Ed.). (2000). Women and sexuality in Muslim societies. Istanbul: Kadinin Insan Haklari Projesi.

Jayawardena, K. (1986). Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World. London: Zed Books.

Juntunen, M. (2001). "Between Morocco and Spain: Men, masculinity and migrant traffic in the Gibraltar Strait" Paper delivered to the workshop, Anthropology in the Middle East: Gendered perspectives, 30 November-2 December 2001. Berlin: Center for Modern Oriental Studies.

Kanafan, F.A. (1998). Nadia, captive of hope: Memoir of an Arab woman Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe.

Khouri, G. (September 1998). "Caught in the middle: Women in Lebanon." Women's International Net, 13A.

Michalak, L. (2001). "Notes on Tunisia. Twenty years later." Tunisian Newsletter. Mobassaleh, Z. (21September 2000). Women consider themselves inferior to men. Daily Star, Retrieved from, http://www.dallystar.com.lb/features/21_09_00

al-Mughni, H. & Tretault, M.A. (2000). "Citizenship, gender and the politics of Quasi states." In S. Joseph (Ed.), Gender and citizenship in the Middle East. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

Mutawwi, (c) A. (20-26 April 2000). "Lend an ear." Al-Ahram Weekly.

Najjar, F. (1988). "Egypt's laws of personal status." Arab Studies Quarterly, 10(3).

"New civil marriage bill comes under fire in Lebanon." (20 March 1998). Beirut: AFP. Retrieved from, www.lubnan.com

Paynter, S. (12 December 2001). "Women's concerns cross borders." Seattle Post-Intelligencer.

Reeves, P. (24 November 1995). "Hardliners defeat votes for Kuwait's women." The Independent (from Jerusalem).

Rug, h, A. (1984). Family in Contemporary Egypt. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.

Saadawi, N. (1980). "Circumcision of girls." In Saadawi, The hidden face of Eve: Women in the Arab world (pp.33-43). London: Zed Books.

Salih, R. (in press). "Re-assessing transnational migration in the Mediterranean from a gendered perspective." Anthropological Journal of European Cultures.

Salih, R. (1999). Transnational lives: Plurinational subjects: Migration, identity and difference among Moroccan women in Italy. Ph.D. dissertation. University of Sussex.

Sami, M. (13August 999). "Saudi women find freedom on Web." Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: (AP) and Financial Times.

Second periodic reports of States parties due in 1988: Lebanon. 22/11/96. CCPR/C/42/Add.14. (State Party Report) Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant. Addendum. LEBANON 1/2, 6 June 1996.

Sevareid, S. (July 5, 1999). "Women's vote will change Kuwait." Kuwait: Associated Press.

Statement of the Higher Shar'i Muslim Council, In Rejection of the Optional Status Law (n.d.).

Shukri, G. (1991). Al-Aqbat fi watan mutaghayir. Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq.

Singerman, D & Hoofar, H. (Eds.). (1996). Development, change and gender in Cairo. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Saudi Embassy Press Release. (17 July 1998). Ifta ruling on civil marriage. Beirut: SPA.

Wassef, N. (Fall 1999). "Asserting masculinities: FGM in Egypt revisited." MEWS Review, 14(3), 1-3.

Wassef, N. (1998). Da Min Zaman (Past and present discourses on FGM in Egypt). Cairo: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

El-Zanaty, F.H., Hussein, E.M., Shawky, G.A., Way, A.K. & Kishor, S. (1996). Egypt demographic and health survey 1995. Calverton: National Population Council and Macro International Inc.

Zuhur, S. (2000). "Islamized or ambivalent?: Women and the Shi'i community in postwar Lebanon." Paper presented to the Middle East Studies Association, Orlando Florida, November 2000.

Zuhur, S. (March 2001). "The mixed impact of feminist struggles in Egypt during the 1990s." Middle East Review of International Affairs, 5(1), 78-89.

Zuhur, S. (2001b). "Reflections on Islamization on the margins: Women and the Shi'i community in postwar Lebanon." In S. Zuhur (Ed.), Women and gender in the Middle East: New research, new perspectives.

Zuhur, S. (2002). "Empowering women or dislodging sectarianism?: Civil marriage in Lebanon." Yale Journal of Law and Feminism, 14(1).

Zulficar, M. Al-Mar'ah al-Misriyya fi 'Alam Mutaghiir (n.d.) Cairo: Rasa'il al-Nid'a al-Jadid.

Sherifa Zuhur is a Visiting Associate Professor, Department of Religious Studies, Cleveland State University, Ohio.